The classical view says that the manager organizes, coordinates, plans,and controls; the facts suggest otherwise.

H BR CLASsrc

The Manager's |obFolklore and Fact

by Henry Mintzberg

If you ask managers what they do, they willmost likely tell you that they plal, organize,

t coordinate, and control. Then watcb what

\ i -_) theydo.Don' tbesurpr isedi fyoucan' t re late-)e ) what you see to these words.

\ When a manager is told that a factory hasjust burned dor,rrn and then advises the callerto see whether temporary arrangements canbe made to supply customers through a for-eign subsidiary, is that manager plaruring, or-ganiztng, coordinating, or controlling? Howabout when he or she presents a gold watch toa retiring employee? Or attends a conferenceto meet people in the fiade and retums withan interesting new product idea for employeesto consider?

These four words, which have dominatedmanagement vocabulary since the French in-dustrialist Henri Fayol first introduced them inr9r5, tell us little about what managers actu-ally do. At best, they indicate some vague ob-jectives managers have when they work'

The field of management, so devoted toprogress and change, has for more than half a

HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW' MARCH_APRIL 199O

?century not seriously addressed fhe basic ques- \tion: What do managers do? Without a proper/answer, how can we teach management? Howcan we design planning or information sys-tems for managers? How can we improve thepractice of management at all?

our ignorance of the nature of managerialwork shows up in various ways in the modemorganization-in boasts by successful manag-ers who never spent a single day in a manage-ment training prograln; in the tumover of cor-porate planners who never quite understoodwhat it was the marager wanted; in the com-puter consoles gathering dust in the back roombecause the managers never used the fancy on-line MIS some analyst thought they needed.Perhaps most important, our ignorance showsup in the inability of our large public organiza-tions to come to grips with some of their mostserious policy problems.

Somehow, in the rush to automate produc-tion, to use management science in the func-tional areas of marketing and finance, and toapply the skills of the behavioral scientist to

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The Manager 's Job . H BR Cussrc

Henry Mintzberg is the BronfmanProfessor of Management at McGillUniversity. His latest bookis Mintzbergon Monagement: lnside Our StrangeWorld of Orgonizotions (Free Press,1989). This anicle appeared originally inHBR July-August 1975. l t won the McK-insey Award for excellence.

the problem of worker motivation, the man-ager-the person in charge of the organizationor one of its subunits-has been forgotten.

I intend to break the reader away fromFayol's words and introduce a more suppoft-able and useful description of managerialworl<. This description derives from my reviewand synthesis ofresearch on how various man-agers have spent their time.

In some studies, managers were observedintensively; in a number of others, they keptdetailed diaries; in a few studies, their recordswere analyzed. All kinds of managers werestudied-foremen, factory supervisors, staffmanagers, field sales managers, hospital ad-ministrators, presidents of companies and na-tions, and even street gang leaders. These"managers" worked in the United States, Can-ada, Sweden, and Great Britain.

A synthesis ofthese findings paints an inter-esting picture, one as different from Fayol'sclassical view as a cubist abstract is from a Re-naissance painting. In a sense, this pictue willbe obvious to anyone who has ever spent a dayin a manager's office, either in front of thedesl< or behind it. Yet, at the same time, thispicture throws into doubt much of the folklorethat we have accepted about the manager'swork.

Folklore and Facts AboutManagerialWorkThere are four myths about the manager's jobthat do not bear up under careful scrutiny ofthe facts.

Folklore: The manager is a reflective, system-atic planner. The evidence on this issue is over-whelming, but not a shred of it supports thisstatement.

Fact: Study after study has shown that man-agers work at an unrelenting pace, that their ac'tivities are characterized by brevity, variety, anddiscontinuity, and that they are strongly orientedto action and dislike reflective activities. Con-sider this evidence:

Half the activities engaged in by the fivechief executives of my study lasted less thannine minutes, and only to% exceeded onehour.1 A study of 56 U.S. foremen found thatthey averaged 583 activities per eight-hourshift, an average of r every 48 seconds.2 Thework pace for both chief executives and fore-men was uruelenting. The chief executivesmet a steady stream of callers and mail from

the moment they anived in the morning untilthey left in the evening. Coffee breaks andlunches were inevitably work related, andever-present subordinates seemed to usurp anyfiee moment.

A diary study of 16o British middle and topmanagers found that they worked without in-terruption for a half hour or more only aboutonce every two days,3

Of the verbal contacts the chief executivesin my study engaged in,93o/o were arranged onan ad hoc basis. Only r%o of the executives'time was spent in openended observationaltours. Only r out of 358 verbal contacts was un-related to a specific issue and could thereforebe called general planning. Another researcherfound that "in nof one single case did a man-ager report obtaining important extemal infor-mation from a general conversation or otherundirected personal communication."4

Is this the planner that the classical view de-scribes? Hardly. The manager is simply re-sponding to the pressures of the job. I foundthat my chief executives terminated many oftheir own activities, often leaving meetings be-fore the end, and interrupted their desk workto call in subordinates. One president not onlyplaced his desk so that he could look down along hallway but also left his door open whenhe was alone-an invitation for subordinatesto come in and interrupt him.

Clearly, these managers wanted to encour-age the flow of current information. But moresignificantly, they seemed to be conditioned bytheir own work loads. They appreciated theopportunity cost of their own time, and theywere continually aware of their ever-presentobligations-mail to be answered, ca)lersto at-/tend to, and so on. It seems that a manager isfalways pfagued by the possibilities of what /might be done and what must be done.

When managers must plan, they seem to doso implicitly in the context of daily actions, notin some abstract process resewed for twoweeks in the organization's mountain retreat.The plans of the chief executives I studiedseemed to exist only in their heads-as flexi-ble, but often specific, intentions, The tradi-tional literature notwithstanding, the job ofmanaging does not breed reflective planners;managers respond to stimuli, they are condi-tioned by their jobs to prefer live to delayed ac-tion.

Folklore: The ffictive manager has no regu-

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HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW' MARCH_APRIL 199O

The Manager 's Job . H BR CLAssrc

How often can you workfor a half an hourwithout interruption?

Iar duties to perform. Managers are constantlybeing told to spend more time planning anddelegating and less time seeing customers andengaging in negotiations. These are not, afterall, the true tasks of the manager. To use thepopular analogy, the good manager, like thegood conductor, carefully orchestrates every-thing in advance, then sits back, respondingoccasionally to an unforeseeable exception.But here again the pleasant abstraction justdoes not seem to hold up.

Fact: Managerial work involves performing anumber of regular duties, including ritual andceremony, negotiations, and processing of sofr in-formation that links the organization with Its en-vironment. Consider some evidence from theresearch:

A study of the work of the presidents ofsmall companies found that they engaged inroutine activities because their companiescould not afford staff specialists and were sothin on operating personnel that a single atrsence often required the president to substi-tute.5

One study of field sales managers and an-other of chief executives suggest that it is anatural part of both jobs to see important cus-tomers, assuming the managers wish to keepthose customers.5

Someone, only half in jest, once describedthe malager as the person who sees visitors sothat other people can get their work done. Inmy study, I found that certain ceremonial du-ties-meeting visiting dignitaries, giving outgold watches, presiding at Christmas dinners-were al intrinsic part of the chief executive'sjob.

Studies of managers' information flow sug-gest that managers play a key role in securing"soft" extemal information (much of it avail-able only to them because of their status) andin passing it along to their subordinates,

Folklore: The senior manager needs aggre-gated information, which aformal managementinformation system best provides. Not too longago, the words fofal information system werceverywhere in the management literature. Inkeeping with the classical view of the manageras that individual perched on the apex of a reg-ulated, hierarchical system, the literature'smanager was to receive all important informa-tion from a giant, comprehensive MIS.

But lately, these giant MIS systems are notworking-managers are simply not using

them. The enthusiasm has waned. A look athow managers actually process informationmakes it clear why.

Fact: Managers strongly favor verbal media,telephone calls and meetings, over documents.Consider the following:

In two British studies, managers spent anaverage of 660/o and 8o% of their time in verbal(oral) communication.T In my study of fiveAmerican chief executives, the figure was 7870.

These five chief executives treated mail prGcessing as a burden to be dispensed with. Onecame in saturday moming to process 142pieces of mail in just over three hours, to "getrid of all the stuff." This same manager lookedat the first piece of "hard" mail he had re-ceived all week, a standard cost report, and putit aside with the comment, "I never look atthis."

These same five chiefexecutives respondedimmediately to z of the 40 routine reportsthey received dwing the five weeks of mystudy and to 4 items in the 1o4 periodicals.They skimmed most of these periodicals in sec-onds, almost ritualistically. In all, these chiefexecutives of good-sized organizations initi-ated on their own-that is, not in response tosomething else-a grand total of z5 pieces ofmail during the z5 days I observed them.

An analysis of the mail the executives re-ceived reveals an interesting picture--only1l7o was of specific and immediate use. So nowwe have another piece in the puzzle: not muchof the mail provides live, current informa-tion-the action of a competitor, the mood ofa government legislator, or the rating of lastnight's television show. Yet this is the informa-tion that drove the managers, intemrptingtheir meetings and rescheduling their work-days.

Consider another interesting finding. Man-agers seem to cherish "soft" information, espe-cially gossip, hearsay, and speculation. Why?The reason is its timeliness; today's gossip maybe tomorrow's fact. The manager who missesthe telephone call revealing that the com-pany's biggest customer was seen golfing witha main competitor may read about a dramaticdrop in sales in the next quarterly report. Butthen it's too late.

To assess the value of historical, aggregated,"hard" MIS information, consider two of themanager's prime uses for information-toidentify problems and opportunities8 and to

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HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW. MARCH-APRIL 199O

The Manager 's Job . H BR CLAssrc

Today's gossip may betomorrow's fact- that' swhy managers cherishhearsay.

build mental models (e.g., how the organiza-tion's budget system works, how customersbuy products, how changes in the economy af-fect the organization). The evidence suggeststhat the manager identifies decision situationsand builds models not with the aggregated ab-stractions an MIS provides but with specifictidbits ofdata.

Consider the words of Richard Neustadt,who studied the informationcollecting habitsof Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisen-hower: "It is not information of a general sortthat helps a President see personal stakes; notsummaries, not surveys, not the bland amal-gams. Rather...it is the odds and ends of fan6z-ble detail that pieced together in his mind illu-minate the underside of issues put before him.To help himself he must reach out as widely ashe can for every scrap offact, opinion, gossip,bearing on his interests and relationships asPresident. He must become his own director ofhis own central intelligence."e

The manager's emphasis on this verbalmedia raises two important points. First, ver-bal information is stored in the brains of people. Only when people write this informationdown can it be stored h the files of the organi-zation-whether in metal cabinets or on mag-netic tape-and managers apparently do notwrite down much of what they hear. Thus thestrategic data banl< of the organization is notin the memory of its computers but in theminds of its managers.

Second, managers' extensive use of verbalmedia helps to explain why they are reluctantto delegate tasks. It is not as ifthey can hand adossier over to subordinates; they must takethe time to "dump memory"-to tell subordi-nates all about the subject. But this could takeso long that managers may find it easier to dothe task themselves. Thus they are damned bytheir own information system to a "dilemmaof delegation"-to do too much or to delegateto subordinates with inadequate briefing.

Folklore: Management is, or at least is quicklybecoming, a science and a profession. By almostany definition of science and pro/essron, thisstatement is false. Brief observation of anymanager will quickly lay to rest the notion thatmanagers practice a science, A science involvesthe enaction of systematic, analytically deter-mined procedures or programs. If we do noteven know what procedures managers use,how can we prescribe them by scientific analy-

sis? And how can we call management a profession if we cannot specify what managers areto leam? For after all, a profession involves"lmowledge of some department of learning orscience" (Random House Dictionary).\o

Fact: The managers' programs-to scheduletime, process information, make declsions, andso on-remain locked deep inside their brains.Thus, to describe these programs, we rely onwords likejud6ment andintuition, seldom stopping to realize that they are merely labels forour ignorance.

I was struck during my study by the factthat the executives I was observing-all verycompetent-are fundamentally indistinguish-able from their counterparts of a hundredyears ago (or a thousand years ago). The infor-mation they need differs, but they seek it inthe same way-by word of mouth. Their deci-sions concem modem technology, but the pro-cedures they use to make those decisions arethe same as the procedures used by nineteenthcentury managers. Even the computer, so im-portant for the specialized work of the organi-zation, has apparently had no influence on thework procedures ofgeneral managers. In fact,the manager is in a kind of loop, with increas-ingly heavy work pressures but no aid forth-coming ftom management science.

Considering the facts about managerialwork, we can see that the manager's job isenormously complicated and difficult. Manag-ers are overburdened with obligations yet can-not easily delegate their tasks. As a result, theyare driven to overwork and forced to do manytasks superficially. Brevity, fragmentation, andverbal communication characterize theirwork. Yet these are the very characteristics ofmanagerial work that have impeded scientificattempts to improve it. As a result, manage-ment scientists have concentrated on the spe-cialized functions ofthe organization, where itis easier to analyze the procedures and quan-tifl/ the relevant information.rl

But the pressues of a manager's job are be-comingworse. Where before managers neededto respond only to owners and directors, nowthey find that subordinates with democraticnorms continually reduce their freedom toissue unexplained orders, and a growing num-ber of outside influences (consumer groups,government agencies, and so on) demand at-tention. Managers have had nowhere to turnfor help. The flrst step in providing such help is

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HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW. MARCH_APRIL 1990 PAGE 5

The Manager 's ,ob . H BR CLAssrc

to find out what the manager's job really is.

Back to a Basic Description ofManagerialWorkEarlier, I defined the manager as that personin charge of an organization or subunit. Be-sides CEOs, this definition would include vicepresidents, bishops, foremen, hockey coaches,and prime ministers. All these "managers" arevested with formal authority over an organi-zational unit. From formal authority comesstatus, which leads to various interpersonal re-lations, and from these comes access to infor-mation. Information, in turn, enables themanager to mal<e decisions and strategies forthe unit,

The manager's job can be described interms of various "roles," or organized sets ofbehaviors identified with a position. My de-scription, shown in "The Manager's Roles,"comprises ten roles. As we shall see, formal au-thority gives rise to the three interpersonal

Research on Managerial WorkIn seeking to descr ibe managerial work, Iconducted my own research and alsoscanned the l i terature to lntegrate the f ind-ings of studies from many diverse sourceswith my own. These studies focused on twodifferent aspects of managerial work. Somewere concerned with the characterist ics ofwork-how long managers work, where, atwhat pace, with what interruptions, withwhom they work, and through what mediathey communicate. Other studies were con-cerned with the content of work-what ac-t iv i t ies the managers actual ly carry out, andwhy. Thus, after a meeting, one researchermight note that the manager spent 45 man-utes wi th three governmentof f ic ia ls in theirWashington of f ice, whi le another mightrecord that the manager presented the com-pany's stand on some proposed legislat ionin order to change a regulat ion.

A few of the studies of managerial workare widely known, but most have remainedbur ied as s ingle journal ar t ic les or isolatedbooks. Among the more important ones Ici te are:. Sune Carlson developed the diary method

to study the work characterist ics of nineSwedish managing directors. Each kept a

HARVARD BUSTNESS REVIEW. MARCH_APRIL 1990

detai led log of h is act iv i t ies. Car lson's re-sults are reported in his book Executive Be-haviour. A number of Bri t ish researchers,notably Rosemary Stewart, have subse-quently used Carlson's method. ln Man-agers and Their )obs, she describes thestudy of 16o top and middle managers ofBr i t ish companies.Leonard Sayles's book Managerial Behav-ror is another important reference. Usinga method he refers to as "anthropologi-cal," Sayles studied the work content ofmiddle and lower level managers in alarge U.S. corporat lon. Sayles movedfreely in the company, col lect ing what-ever informat ion struck him as impor-ta nt.Perhaps the best-known source is Presr-dential Power, in which Richard Neustadtanalyzes the power and managerial be-havior of Presidents Roosevelt, Truman,and Eisenhower. Neustadt used second-ary sources-documents and i nterviewswith other part ies.Robert H. Guest, in Personnel, reports ona study of the foreman's working day.Fif ty-six U.S. foremen were observed andeach of their act iv i t ies recorded dur ing

roles, which in tum give rise to the three infor-mational roles; these two sets of roles enablethe manager to play the four decisional roles.

Interpersonal RolesThree of the manager's roles arise directlyfrom formal authority and involve basic inter-personal relationships. First is the fi gur e he adrole. As the head of an organizational unit,every manager must perform some ceremo-nial duties. The president greets the touringdignitaries. The foreman attends the weddingof a lathe operator. The sales manager takesan important customer to lunch.

The chief executives of my study spent 120loof their contact time on ceremonial duties; r7oof their incoming mail dealt with acknowledg-ments and requests related to their status. Forexample, a letter to a company president re-quested free merchandise for a crippledschoolchild; diplomas that needed to be signedwere put on the desk ofthe school superinten-

one eight-hour shi f t .. Richard C. Hodgson, Daniel J. Levinson,

and Abraham Zaleznik studied a team ofthree top executives of a U.5. hospital.From that study they wrote fhe ExecutiveRole Constellation. They addressed the wayin which work and socioemotional ro leswere div ided among the three managers.

. Wil l iam F. Whyte, from his study of astreet gang during the Depression, wroteStreet Corner Society. His findlngs aboutthe gang's workings and leadership,wh ich Ceorge C, Homans analyzed in TheHuman Croup, suggest interesting simi-lari t ies of job contents between streetgang leaders and corporate managers.My own study involved f lve American

CEOs of middle- to large-sized organiza-t ions-a consult ing f irm, a technology com-pany, a hospital, a consumer goods com-pany, and a school system. Using a methodcal led "structural observat ion," dur ing oneintensive week ofobservation for each exec-utive, I recorded various aspects ofeverypiece of mail and every verbal contact. Inal l , I analyzed 89o pieces of incoming andoutgoing mai l and 368 verbal contacts.

The Manager 's Job . H BR CLASsrc

dent.Duties that involve interpersonal roles may

sometimes be routine, involving little seriouscommunication and no important decisionmaking. Nevertheless, they are important tothe smooth functioning of an organization andcannot be ignored.

Managers are responsible for the work ofthe people of their unit. Their actions in thisregard constitute the leader rcle. Some ofthese actions involve leadership directly-forexample, in most organizations the managersare normally responsible for hiring and train-ing their own staff.

In addition, there is the indirect exercise ofthe leader role. For example, every managermust motivate and encourage employees,somehow reconciling their individual needswith the goals of the organization. In virtuallyevery contact with the marager, subordinatesseeking leadership clues ask: "Does she approve?" "How would she like the report totum out?" "Is she more interested in marketshare than high proflts?"

The influence of managers is most clearlyseen in the leader role. Formal authority veststhem with great potential power; leadershipdetermines in large part how much of it theywill realize.

The literature of management has alwaysrecognized the leader role, particularly thoseaspects of it related to motivation, In compari-son, until recently it has hardly mentioned the

liauon role, in which the manager makes con-tacts outside the verlical chain of command.This is remarkable in light of the finding of vir-tually every study of managerial work thatmanagers spend as much time with peers andother people outside their units as they dowith their own subordinates-and, surpris-ingly, very little time with their own superiors.

In Rosemary Stewart's diary study, the 160British middle and top managers spent 47%o oftheir time with peers, 4to/o of their time withpeople inside their unit, and only 12%0 of theirtime with their superiors. For Robert H.Guest's study of U.S. foremen, the figures were44o/o, 460/o, and to7o. The chief executives of mystudy averaged 44olo of their contact time withpeople outside their organizations, 4870 withsubordinates, andTo/o with directors and tmst-ees.

The contacts the flve CEOs made were withan incredibly wide range of people: subordi-nates; clients, business associates, and suppli- -"-{N,ers; and peers-managers of similar orgdniza-tions, government and trade organization \officials, fellow directors on outside boards,and independents with no relevant organiza-tional affiliations. The chief executives' timewith and mail from these groups is shown in"The Chief Executive's Contacts." Guest'sstudy of foremen shows, likewise, that theircontacts were numerous and wide-ranging, sel-dom involving fewer than z5 individuals, andoften more than 50.

Informational RolesBy virtue of interpersonal contacts, both withsubordinates and with a network ofcontacts,the manager emerges as the nerve center ofthe organizational unit. The manager may notknow everything but typically knows morethan subordinates do.

Studies have shown this relationship to holdfor all managers, ffom street gang leaders toU.S. presidents, In The Human Group, GeorgeC. Homans explains how, because they were atthe center of the information flow in their owngangs and were also in close touch with othergang leaders, street gang leaders were betterinformed than any of their followers.l2 As forpresidents, Richard Neustadt observes: "Theessence of {Franklin} Roosevelt's technique forinformation-gathering was competition.'Hewould call you in,' one of his aides once toldme, 'and he'd ask you to get the story on some

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InterpersonalRolesFigureheadLeaderLiason

lnformationalRolesMonitorDisseminatorSpokesperson

DecisionalRolesEntrepreneurDisturbanceHandlerResourceAllocatorNegotiator

HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW. MARCH_APRIL 1990 PAGE 7

The Manager 's Job . H BR CLAsstc

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complicated business, and you'd come backafter a couple of days of hard labor andpresent the juicy morsel you'd uncoveredunder a stone somewhere, and fhen you'd findout he knew all about it, along with somethingelse you didn't know. Where he got this infor-mation from he wouldn't mention, usually,but after he had done this to you once or twiceyou got damn careful about your informa-tion.'"13

We can see where Roosevelt "got this infor-mation" when we consider the relationship be-tween the interpersonal and informationalroles. As leader, the manager has formal andeasy access to every staff member. In addition,liaison contacts expose the manager to exter-nal information to which subordinates oftenlack access. Many of these contacts are withother managers of equal status, who are them-selves nerve centers in their own organization.In this way, the manager develops a powerfuldatabase of information.

Processing information is a key part of themanager's job. In my study, the CEOS spent4o%o of their contact time on activities devotedexclusively to the transmission of information;7oo/o of their incoming mail was purely infor-mational (as opposed to requests for action).Managers don't leave meetings or hang up thetelephone to get back to work. In large part,communication ls their work. Three roles de-scribe these informational aspects of manage-rial work.

Asmonitor,the manager is perpetually scan-ning the environment for information, interro-gating liaison contacts and subordinates, andreceiving unsolicited information, much of itas a result of the network of personal contacts.Remember that a good part of the informationthe manager collects in the monitor role ar-rives in verbal form, often as gossip, hearsay,and speculation.

In the drsseminafor role, the manager passessome privileged information directly to subor-dinates, who would otherwise have no accessto it. When subordinates lack easy contactwith one another, the manager may pass infor-mation from one to another.

In the spokesperson role, the manager sendssome information to people outside the unit-a president makes a speech to lobby for an or-ganization cause, or a foreman suggests aproduct modification to a supplier. In addition,as a spokesperson, every manager must informand satisfu the influential people who controlthe organizational unit. For the foreman, thismay simply involve keepingthe plant managerinformed about the flow of work through theshop.

The president of a large corporation, how-ever, may spend a great amount of time deal-ing with a host of influences. Directors andshareholders must be advised about finances;consumer groups must be assured that the or-ganization is tulfilling its social responsibilities;and government officials must be satisfied thatthe organization is abiding by the law.

Decisional RolesInformation is not, of course, an end in itself;it is the basic input to decision making. Onething is clear in the study of managerial work:the manager plays the major role in the unit'sdecision-making system. As its formal author-ity, only the manager can commit the unit toimportant new courses of action; and as itsnerve center, only the manager has full andcurrent information to make the set of deci-sions that determines the unit's strategy. Fourroles describe the manager as decision maker.

As entrepreneur, the manager seeks to im-prove the unit, to adapt it to changing condi-tions in the environment. In the monitor role,a president is constantly on the lookout fornew ideas. When a good one appears, he ini-tiates a development project that he may su-pervise himself or delegate to an employee

9

The Chief Executive's Contacts

Directors

7o/o 1o/o

Peers

160/o 25o/o

CIients, Suppli€rs,Associates

20o/o 13o/o

lndeoendents and Others

9o/o 2OVo

Chief Executive

Subordinates

48o/o 39o/.

Note: The first fisure indicates the DroDortion oftotal contact timespent with each group and the second hgure, the proportion of mailfrom each

HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW. MARCH_APRIL 1990 PAGE 8

The Manager 's Job . H BR Clnssrc

Over the years, one reaction has domi-nated the comments I have receivedfrom managers who read "The Man-ager 's Job: Folk lore and Fact" : "Youmake me feel so good. I thought al lthose other managers were planning,organizing, coordinating, and control-l ing, whi le I was busy belng inter-rupted, jumping from one issue to an-other, and try ing to keep the l id on thechaos." Yet everything in th is art ic le l

must have been patently obvious tothese people. Why such a reaction toreading what they already knew? Ki

Conversely, how to explain the very ' Idif ferent reacLion of l .wo media people Iwho cal led to I ine up interviews af ter Ian art ic le based on this one appearedin the New York Times. "Are we gladsomeone f inal ly let managers have i t , "both said in passing, a comment thatst i l l takes me aback. True, they hadread only the account in the l imes, butthat no more let managers have i t thandid th is art ic le. Why that react ion?

One explanat ion grows out of theway I now see this art icle-as propos-ing not so much another v iew of man-agement as another face of i t . I l ike tocal l i t the insightful face, in contrast tothe long dominant professional or ce-rebral face. One stresses com mltment,the other calculat ion; one sees theworld wi th integrated perspect ive, theother f igures i t as the components of aportfol io. The cerebral face operateswith the words and numbers of rat io-nal l ty; the insightful face is rooted inthe images and feel of a manager's in-teg r i ty.

Each of these faces implies a dif fer-ent k ind of "knowing," and that, I be-l ieve, explains many managers ' reac-t ion to th is art ic le. Rat ional ly, they"knew" what managers did-planned,organized, coordlnated, and con-trol led. But deep down that did not

Retrospective CommentaryHenry Mintzberg

feel qui te r ight . The descr ipt ion in th isart ic le may have come closer to whatthey real ly "knew." As for those mediapeople, they weren' t ra i l ing againstmanagement as such but against thecerebral form of management, so per-vasive, that they saw impersonalizingthe world around them.

In practice, management has to betwo-faced-there has to be a balancebetween the cerebral and the insight-fu l . So, for example, I real ized or ig i -nal ly that managerial communicat ionwas largely oral and that the advent ofthe computer had not changed any-thing fundamental in the execut ivesuite-a conclusion I continue to hold.(The greatest threat the personal com-puter poses is that managers wil l takei t ser iously and come to bel ieve thatthey can manage by remaining in theirof f ices and looking atdisplays of d ig i -tal characters.) But I also thought thatthe di lemma of delegat ing could bedealt with by periodic debrief ings-disseminat ing words. Now, however, Ibel ieve that managers need more waysto convey the images and impressionsthey carry inside of them. This ex-plains the renewed interest in strate-gic v is ion, in cul ture, and in the rolesof intui t ion and insight in manage-ment.

The ten roles I used to describe themanager's job also ref lect manage-ment's cerebral face, in that Lhey de-compose the job more than capturethe lntegration. lndeed, my effort toshow a sequence among these rolesnow seems more consistent with thetradit ional face of management workthan an insightful one. Might we notjust as wel l say that people throughoutthe organization take actlons that in-form managers who, by making senseofthose act ions, develop images andvis ions that inspire people to subse-

quent efforts?Perhaps my greatest d isappoint-

ment aboutthe research reported hereis that i t did not st imulate new efforts.In a world so concerned with manage-ment, much of the popular l i terature issuperf icial and the academic researchpedestr ian. Certa i n ly, many studieshave been carr ied out over the last 15years, but the vast majori ty sought torepl icate earl ier research. In part icu-lar , we remain grossly ignorant aboutthe fundamental content ofthe man-ager's job and have barely addressedthe major issues and di lemmas in i tspractr ce.

But superf icial i ty is not only a prob-lem ofthe l i terature. l t is a lso an occu-pat ional hazard of the manager 's job.Original ly, I bel ieved this problemcould be deal t wi th; now I see i t as in-herent in the job. This is because man-aging insightful ly depends on the di-rect experience and personalknowledge that come from int imatecontact . But in organizat ions grownlarger and more diversi f ied, that becomes dif f lcult to achieve. And somanagers turn increasingly to the ce-rebral face, and the del icate balancebetween the two faces is lost.

Certain ly, some organizat ions man-age to sustain their humanity despi tetheir large size-as Tom Peters andRobert Waterman show in their bookln Search of Excellence. But that book at-ta ined i ts outstanding success pre-clsely because i t is about the exceFt ions, aboutthe organizat ions so manyof us long to be a part of-not the or-ganizat ions in which we actual ly work.

Fif teen years ago, I stated that "Nojob is more vi ta l to our society thanthat of the manager. l t is the managerwho determines whether our social in-st i tut ions serve us well or whether theysquander our ta lents and resources."

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(perhaps with the stipulation that he must approve the final proposal).

There are two interesting features aboutthese development projects at the CEO level.First, these projects do not involve single deci-sions or even unified clusters of decisions.Rather, they emerge as a series of small deci.sions and actions sequenced over time. Appar-ently, chief executives prolong each projectboth to fit it into a busy, disjointed schedule,and so that they can comprehend complex is-sues gtadually.

Second, the chiefexecutives I studied super-vised as many as 5o of these projects at thesame time. Some projects entailed new prod-ucts or processes; others involved public rela-tions campaigns, improvement of the cash position, reorganization of a weak deparbnent,

resolution of a morale problem in a foreign di-vision, integration of computer operations,various acquisitions at different stages of de-velopment, and so on.

Chief executives appear to maintain a kindof inventory of the development projects invarious stages of development. Like jugglers,they keep a number of projects in the air; peri-odically, one comes down, is given a new burstofenergy, and sent back hto orbit. At variousintervals, they put new projects on-stream anddiscard old ones.

While the entrepreneur role describes themaryager as the voluntarilnitiator of change,t$ disturbance handler rglgdpicts the man-ag)ar-involunffiity-iilsponding to pressures.Here change is beyond the manager's control.The pressures of a situation are too severe to

Self-Study Questions for Managerst. Where do I get my information, and

how? Can I make greater use of my con-tacts? Can other people do some of my scan-ning? In what areas is my knowledge weak-est, and how can I get others to provide mewith the information I need? Do I have suff i-ciently powerful mental models of thosethings I must understand within the organi-zat ion and in i ts environment?

2. What informat ion do I d isseminate?How important is that information to mysubordinates? Do I keep too much informa-t ion to myself because disseminating i t ist ime consuming or inconvenient? How canI get more information to others so they canmake better decisions?

3. Do I tend to act before information isin? Or do I wait so long for al l the informa-t ion that opportunit ies pass me by?

4. What pace ofchange am I asking myorganizat ion to to lerate? ls th is change bal-anced so that our operations are neither ex-cessively stat ic nor overly disrupted? Havewe suff iciently analyzed the impact of thischange on the future of our organizat ion?

5. Am I suff iciently well- informed to passjudgment on subordinate 's proposals? Can Ileave f inal authorization for more of the pro-posals with subordinates? Do we have prob-lems of coordinat ion because subordinatesalready make too many decis ions indepen-dently?

HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW' MARCH-APRIL 199O

6. What is my vis ion for th is organiza-t ion? Are these plans primari ly in my ownmind in loose form? Should I make them ex-pl ici t to gu ide the decisions ofothers better?Or do I need f lexibi l i ty to change them atwi l l?

7. How do my subordinates react to mymanagerialsty le? Am I suf f ic ient ly sensi t iveto the powerful inf luence of my actions? DoI ful ly understand their reactions to my ac-t ions? Do | f ind an appropriate balance be-tween encouragemenl. and pressure? Do Ist i f l e their ini t iat ive?

B. What k ind of external re lat ionships do Imaintain, and how? Do I spend too much ofmy t ime maintaining them? Are there cer-tain people whom I should get to know bet-ter?

9. ls there any system to my t ime schedul-ing, or am I just reacting to the pressures ofthe moment? Do I f lnd the appropriate mixof act ivi t ies or concentrate on one part icu-lar funct ion or problem just because I f ind i tinteresting? Am I more eff icient with part ic-ular k inds of work, at special t imes of theday or week? Does my schedule ref lect this?Can someone else schedule my t ime (be-ci, . lo< mrr ccrrctrrr i \?

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10. Do I overwork? What effect does mywork load have on my eff iciency? Should Iforce myselfto take breaks or to reduce thepace of my activi ty?

11. Am I too superf ic ia l in what I do? Can Ireal ly shif t moods as quickly and frequentlyas my work requlres? Should I decrease theamount of fragmentation and interruptionin my work?

12. Do I spend too much t ime on current,tangible activi t ies? Am I a slave to the ac-t ion and excitement of my work, so that Iam no longer able to concentrate on issues?Do key problems receive the attention theydeserve? Should I spend more t ime readingand probing deeply into certain issues?Could I be more ref lect ive? Should I be?

13. Do I use the di f ferent media appropr i -ately? Do I know how to make the most ofwr i t ten communicat ion? Do I re ly exces-sively on face-toface comm u n lcation,thereby putt ing al l but a few of my subordi-nates at an informat ional d isadvantage? DoI schedule enough of my meetings on a reg-ular basis? Do I spend enough t ime observ-ing activi t ies f irsthand, or am I detachedfrom the heart of my organization's act ivi-t ies?

14. How do I b lend my personal r ightsand dut ies? Do my obl igat ions consume al lmy t ime? How can I free myself from obl iga-t ions to ensure that I am taking this organi-zation where I want i t to go? How can I turnmy obl igat ions to my advantage?

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because poor managers ignore situations until The final decisional role is that ef_negotigthey reach crisis proportions but also because , tor. ylAnugers spend considerable tim-in.ft-good managers cannot possibly anticipate al \Sfi-ationsltne

iresiOent of the football teamthe consequences of the actions theyrtake:r-:-\ works out a contract with the holdout super-

, Tne-nlirq decisional role is that(of resource ) tt*;the corporation president leads the com-( allocator.Tfe manager is responsible pany's contingent to negotiate a new strike is-\ng-rAAd'will get what. Perhaps the most im- sue; the foreman argues a grievance problem

portant resource the manager allocates is his to its conclusion with the shop steward.

be iglored-a strike looms, a major customer the various costs and benefits as well as thehas gone bankrupt, or a supplier reneges on a feasibility of the proposal. They also had tocontract-so the manager must act, consider questions of timing. All this was nec-

Leonard R. Sayles, who has carried out ap- essary for the simple approval of someonepropriate research on the manager's job, likens else's proposal. At the same time, however, thethe manager to a syrnphony orchestra conduc- delay could lose time, while quick approvaltor who must "maintain a melodious perfor- could be illconsidered and quick rejectionmance,"14 while handling musicians' prob- might discourage the subordinate who hadlems and other external disturbances. Indeed, spent months developing a pet project.every manager must spend a considerable One common solution to approvingamount of time responding to high-pressure projects is to pick the person instead of thedisturbances. No organization can be so well proposal. That is, the manager authorizesrun, so standardized, that it has considered those projects presented by people whoseevery contingency in the uncertain environ- judgment he or she trusts. But the managerment in advance. Disturbances afise not only cannot always use this simple dodge.

or her own time. Access to the manager consti- These negotiations are an integral part oftutes exposure to the unit's nerve center and the manager's job, for only he or she has thedecision maker. The manager is also charged authority to commit organizational resourceswith desigrring the unit's structure, that pat- in "real time" and the nerve<enter informa-tem of formal relationships that determines tion that important negotiations require.how work is to be divided and coordinated.

Also, as resource allocator, the manager au-thorizes the important decisions of the unit be-fore they are implemented. By retaining thispower, the manager can ensure that decisionsare intenelated. To fragment this power en-courages discontinuous decision making and adisjointed sffategy.

There are a number of interesting featuresabout the manager's authorization of others'decisions. First, despite the widespread use ofcapital budgeting procedures-a means of au-thorizing various capital expenditures at onetime-executives in my study made a Sreatmany authorization decisions on an ad hoc ba-sis. Apparently, many projects cannot wait orsimply do not have the quanflfiable costs andbenefits that capital budgeting requires.

Second, I found that the chief executivesfaced incredibly complex choices. They had toconsider the impact of each decision on otherdecisions and on the organization's strategy.They had to ensure that the decision would beacceptable to those who influence the organi-zation. as well as ensure that resources wouldnot be overextended. Thev had to understand

The scarcest resourcemanagers have toallocate is their owntime.

The Integrated JobIt should be clear by now that these ten rolesare not easily separable. In the terminology ofthe psychologist, they form a gestalt, an inte-grated whole. No role can be pulled out of theframework and the job be left intact. For ex-ample, a manager without liaison contactslacks external information. As a result, thatmanager can neither disseminate the informa-tion that employees need nor make decisionsthat adequately reflect external conditions.(This is a problem for the new person in amanagerial position, since he or she has tobuild up a network of contacts before makingeffective decisions.)

Here lies a clue to the problems of teammanagement.l5 Two or three people camotshare a single managerial position unless theyca-n act as one entity. This means that theycannot divide up the ten roles unless they canvery carefully reintegrate them. The real diffi-culty lies with the informational roles. Unlessthere can be full sharing of managerial infor-mation-and, as I pointed out earlier, it is pri-marily verbal-team management breaks

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down. A single managerial job camot be arbi-trarily split, for example, into intemal and ex-ternal roles, for information from both sourcesmust be brought to bear on the same deci-sions.

To say that the ten roles form a gestalt isnot to say that all managers give equal atten-tion to each role. In fact, I found in my reviewof the various research studies that sales man-agers seem to spend relatively more of theirtime in the interpersonal roles, presumably areflection of the extrovert nature of the mar-keting activity. Production managers, on theother hand, give relatively more attention tothe decisional roles, presumably a reflection oftheir concern with efficient work flow. Andstaff managers spend the most time in the in-formational roles, since they are experts whomanage depaftments that advise other parts ofthe organization. Nevertheless, in all cases, theinterpersonal, informational, and decisionalroles remain inseparable.

Toward More EffectiveManagementThis description of managerial work shouldprove more important to managers than anyprescription they might derive from it. That isto say, the managers' effectiveness is signifr-cantly influenced by their insight into their ownwork. Performance depends on how well amanager understands and responds to thepressures and dilemmas of the job. Thus man-agers who can be introspective about theirwork are likely to be effective at their jobs.The questions in "Self-Study Questions forManagers" may sound rhetorical; none ismeant to be. Even though the questions can-not be answered simply, the manager shouldaddress them.

Let us take a look at three specific areas ofconcem. For the most paft, the manageriallogjams-the dilemma of delegation, the data-base cenffalized in one brain, the problems ofworking with the management scientist-re-volve around the verbal nature of the man-ager's information. There are great dangers incentralizing the organization's data bank inthe minds of its managers. VVhen they leave,they take their memory with them. And whensubordinates are out of convenient verbalreach of the manager, they are at an informa-tional disadvantage.

The manager is challenged to f.nd systematic

ways to share privileged information. A regulardebriefing session with key subordinates, aweekly memory dump on the dictating ma-chine, maintaining a diary for limited circula-tion, or other similar methods may ease thelogjam of work considerably. The time spentdisseminating this information will be morethan regained when decisions must be made.Of course, some will undoubtedly raise thequestion of confidentiality. But managerswould be well advised to weigh the risks of ex-posing privileged information against havingsubordinates who can make effective deci-sions.

If there is a single theme that runs throughthis article, it is that the pressures of the jobdrive the manager to take on too much work,encourage intemrption, respond quickly toevery stimulus, seek the tangible and avoid theabstract, make decisions in small increments,and do everything abruptly.

Here again, the manager is challenged to dealconsciously with the pressures of superficiality bygiving seious attent[on to the issues that requireit, by stepping back in order to see a broad pic'ture, and by making use of analyt[cal inputs. Al'though effective managers have to be adept atresponding quickly to numerous and varyingproblems, the danger in managerial work isthat they will respond to every issue equally(and that means abruptly) and that they willnever work the tangible bits and pieces of in-formation into a comprehensive picture oftheir world.

To create this comprehensive picture, man-agers can supplement their own models withthose of specialists. Economists describe thefunctioning of markets, operations researcherssimulate financial flow processes, and behav-ioral scientists explain the needs and goals ofpeople. The best of these models can besearched out and leamed.

In dealing with complex issues, the seniormanager has much to gain from a close rela-tionship with the organization's own manage-ment scientists. They have something impor-tant that the manager lacks-time to probecomplex issues. An effective working relation-ship hinges on the resolution of what a col-league and I have called "the planning di-lemma."16 Managers have the information andthe authority; analysts have the time and thetechnology. A successful working relationshipbetween the two will be effected when the

HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW' MARCH_APRIL 199O PAGE 12

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manager leams to share information and theanalyst learns to adapt to the manager's needs.For the analyst, adaptation means worqiingless about the elegance of the method andmore about its speed and flexibility.

Analysts can help the top manager scheduletime, feed in analytical information, monitorprojects, develop models to aid in makingchoices, design contingency plans for distur-bances that can be anticipated, and conduct"quick and dirry" analyses for those that can-not. But there can be no cooperation ifthe an-alysts are out of the mainstream of the man-ager's information fl ow.

The manager is challenged to gain control ofhis or her own time by turning obligations intoadvantages and by turning those things he or shewishes to do into obligations. The chief execu-tives of my study initiated only 32o/o of theirown contacts (and another 5olo by mutualageement). And yet to a considerable extentthey seemed to control their time. There weretwo key factors that enabled them to do so.

First, managers have to spend so much timedischarging obligations that if they were toview them as just that, they would leave nomark on the organization. Unsuccessful man-agers blame failure on the obligations. Effec-tive managers tum obligations to advantages.A speech is a chance to lobby for a cause; ameeting is a chance to reorganize a weak de-partment; a visit to an important customer is achance to extract trade information.

Second, the manager frees some time to dothe things that he or she-perhaps no oneelse-thinks important by turmng them intoobligations. Free time is made, not found.Hoping to leave some time open for contem-plation or general planning is tantamount tohoping that the pressures of the iob will goaway. Managers who want to innovate initiateprojects and obligate others to report back tothem. Managers who need certain environ-mental information establish channels thatwill automatically keep them informed. Man-agers who have to tour facilities commit them-selves publicly.

The Educator's JobFinally, a word about the training of manag-ers. Our management schools have done anadmirable job of training the organization'sspecialists-management scientists, market-ing researchers, accountants, and organiza-

tional development specialists. But for themost part, they have not trained managers.lT

Management schools will begin the serioustraining of managers when skill training takesa serious place next to cognitive learning. Cog-nitive learning is detached and informational,Iike reading a book or listening to a lecture. Nodoubt much important cognitive materialmust be assimilated by the manager-tGbe. Butcognitive leaming no more makes a managerthan it does a swimmer. The latter will drownthe first time she jumps into the water if hercoach never takes her out of the lecture hall,gets her wet, and gives her feedback on herperformance.

In other words, we are taught a skillthrough practice plus feedback, whether in areal or a simulated situation. Our managementschools need to identify the skills managersuse, select students who show potential inthese skills, put the students into situationswhere these skills can be practiced and devel-oped, and then give them systematic feedbacl<on their performance.

My description of managerial work suggestsa number of important managerial skills-de-veloping peer relationships, carrying out negctiations, motivating subordinates, resolvingconflicts, establishing information networksand subsequently disseminating information,making decisions in conditions of extreme am-bigurty, and allocating resources. Above all,the manager needs to be inffospective in orderto continue to learn on the job.

No job is more vital to our society than thatof the manager. The manager determineswhether our social institutions will serve uswell or whether they will squander our talentsand resources. It is time to strip away the folk-lore about managerial work and study it realis-tically so that we can begin the difficult task ofmaking significant improvements in its perfor-mance,

References1. All the data from my study can be found in Henry Mintz-berg, The Nature of Managerial tVork (New York: Harper &Row,1973).

2. Robert H. Guest, "OfTime and the Foreman," Permnnel,May 1955, p. 478.

3. Rosemary Stewarl, Managers and Their /obs (London:Macmillan, r967); see also Sune carlson, Executive Behavior(Stockholm: Strombergs, 1951).

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The Manager 's Job . HBR Clesstc

4, Francis I, Aguilar, Scanning the Business Environment(New York MacmiUan,1967), P. 1o2.

s. Unpublished study by Irving Choran, reported in Mintz-berg,The Nature oJ Managerial Work,

6. Robert T. Davis, PerJormance and Development of FieldSales Managers (Boston: Division of Research, HarvardBusiness School,1957); George H. Copenm,The Role of theManaging Director (I-ondon: Business Publications, r963).

7. Stewart, Managers and Theft Jobsi Tom Bums, "The Directions of Activity and Communication in a DepartmentalExecutive Group," Human Relations 7, no. t (t954): 73.

8. H. Edward Wrapp, "Good Managers Don't Make PolicyDecisions," HBR September-October 1957, p. 91. Wrapp re-fers to this as spotting opportunities and relationships inthe stream ofoperating problems and decisions; in his arti-cle, Wrapp raises a number of excellent points related tothis analysis.

9. Richard E. Neustadt, Presidenfial Polver (New York: JohnWiley, 1960), pp. 1s3-rs4; italics added.

10. For a more thorough, though rather different, discus-sion ofthis issue, see Kenneth R. Andrews, "Toward Profes-sionalism in Business Management," HBR March-April1969,p.49.

11. C. ,ackson Grayson, Jr., in "Management Science andBusiness Practice," HBRtuly-August 1973, p. 4r, explains in

similarterms why, as chairman of the Price Commission' hedid not use those very techniques that he himselfpromotedin his earlier career as a management scientist.

12. George C. Homans, The Human Group (New York: Har-court, Brace & World, r95o), based on the study by WilliamF. Whyte entitled Street Corner Society, rev. ed. (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1955).

13. Neustadt, Prestdential Power, p, 757.

14. Leonard R. Sayles, Managerial Behavior (New York:Mccraw-Hill, 195 4, p. 162.

15. See Richard C. Hodgson, Daniel J. Levinson, and Abra-ham zaleznik, The Executive Role Constellation (Boston: Di-vision of Research, Harvard Business School, 1955), for adiscussion ofthe sharing of roles.

16. Iames S. Hekimian and Henry Mintzberg, "The PIan-ning Dilemma," The Management Review,May7968,p, 4.

17. See l. Sterling Livingston, "Myth of the Well-EducatedManager," HBR January-February 79V, p.79,

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