1.REFERENCE MATERIAL OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM COL WALTER J BOYNE, USAF(RETD). OTHER BOOKS BY AUTHOR DAWN OVER KITTY HAWK CLASH OF TITANS BEYOND THE WILD BLUE SILVER WINGS THE IRAQ WAR WILLIAMSON MURRAY & MAJ GEN ROBERT HSCALES,Jr. OTHER BOOKS BY AUTHORS A WAR TO BE WON: FIGJTING THE SECOND WORLD WAR GULF WAR AIR POWER SURVEY. CERTAIN VICTORY YELLOW SMOKE : THE FUTURE OF LAND WARFARE FOR AMERICAS MILITARY. CSIS, WASHINGTON REPORT BY ANTHONY CORDESMAN ON THEARLEIGH A BURKE CHAIR FOR STRATEGY. WAR DESPATCHES MA J GEN ASHOK MEHTA (RETD). TIME MAGAZINE MAR - APR - MAY 04. BOOK REVIEW- MIL STRAT DIMENSIONS OF IRAQ WAR JASJITSINGH . PAPERS BY KAPIL KAK, BRIG GURMEET KANWAK,V PATNEY &BRIG GD BAKSHI, DA ( Turkey)

2. PARTS OF THE STUDY 3. OP IRAQI FREEDOM1. INTRODUCTION2. US OBJECTIVES AND REASONS FOR WAR.3. THE WAR OVERALL STRAT. CONCEPT. FORCE LEVELS OUTLINE PLAN AND FORCES4. CONDUCT OF OPS: OIF PHASE I : AIR CAMPAIGN. PHASE II: SHOCK & AWE CAMPAIGN PHASE III: ADV TO OUTER TIER PHASE IV : CAPTURE OF BAGHDAD AND IMP CITIES CAS ANALYSIS. WINNERS AND LOSERS NEW CONCEPTS 4. 5. LESSONS COMBINED ARMS AIR NAVY MISC6. EMERGING SIT7. CONCLUSION SIGN POSTS TO THE FUTURE 5. PART 1 : INTRODUCTION 6. STRAT IMPERATIVES 7. GEO STRATEGICIMPORTANCE 8. THE STRATEGIC HIGHWAY IRAQGATEWAY BETWEEN GULF, EASTERNMEDITERRANEAN AND THE CASPIAN SEA.JUNCTION OF ASIA, AFRICA AND EUROPE.STRAT LOC HEART OF WEST ASIA ANDHEAD OF PERSIAN GULF. 9. EUPHRATES TIGRISSHATT-AL-ARAB ONLYACCESS FOR IRAQ TO THE SHATTSEA. CONTROL OF THE RIVERSCONTESTED FROM ANCIENTAL ARABTIMES. 10. IRAQ - RESOURCES HAS 11% OF WORLDS OIL RESERVES. CHEAPEST OIL TO EXTRACT. IRAQS OIL IS MORE PROFITABLE THANGULF OF MEXICO/ NORTH SEA. 50% OF THE LAND - ARABLE. HEAVY FOREIGN INVESTMENT. HAS UN LTD SUP OF FRESH WATER FRMRIVERS 11. IRAQI OIL RESERVES 12. US STRAT 13. PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY (PNAC) GOES BACK TO 1992, DEF POLICY GUIDELINESPREPARED BY BUSH ,Sr, DICK CHENEY, PAULWOLFOWITZ, JEB BUSH AND DONALD RUMSFELD REAGANITE POLICY OF MUSCULAR MIL STRAT. STRAT CONSISTENT WITH US UNQUESTIONABLE STATUS,INTERVENE ANYWHERE IN WORLD. ENFORCEMENT OF US WILL AMONG NATIONS TO SHAPE THEWORLD IN AMERICAN IAMGE. THIS CALLED FOR INCR DEF SPENDING FOR GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES. FIGHT AND DECISIVELY WIN, MULTIPLE SIMULTANEOUS MAJTHEATRE OF WARS. CONT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMONS OF SPACE ANDCYBERSPACE. TAKE ON CONSTABULARY DUTIES AROUND THE WORLD THATWOULD DEMAND US RATHER THAN UN PRESENCE. EXPAND US BASES IN THE WORLD. 14. OVERALL US STRAT STRAT FOR WAR A PRODUCT OF TRANSFORMATIONALWARFARE, REFLECTED AS A NEW WAY OF WARCONSEQUENT TO THE RMA OF GULF WAR I. GOALS: QUADRENNIAL DEF REVIEW 02 DEF US HOMELAND AND OTHER BASES OF OPS ANDDEFEAT NBC WPNS AND THEIR MEANS OF DEL. DENY EN SANCTUARY DEPRIVE THEM ABILITY TO RUNAND HIDE. PROJ AND SUSTAIN FORCES IN DISTANT THEATRES INFACE OF ACCESS DENIAL THREATS. CONDUCT EFF OPS IN SPACE. CONDUCT EFF INFO OPS. LEVERAGE INFO TECH TO GIVE US FORCES A COMMONOP PICTURE. 15. PART 2 : US OBJECTIVES AND REASONS FORWAR 16. REASONS LEADINGTO GULF WAR II 17. THE Q FACTOR ? 18. WE DONT WANT THESMOKING GUNTO BECOME A MUSHROOMCLOUD 19. LIKELY US REASONS TO INVADE IRAQ ILLUSTRATE TO THE WORLD THAT IT WOULDNOT TOLERATE ANY THREATS TO USINTERESTS WORLDWIDE. DEMO THEIR SUPERIOR WAR WAGINGCAPABILITY. GIVE A MAJ FILLIP TO THE US ECO AND ARMSINDUSTRY, WHICH WOULD BE A NATURALCONSEQUENCE TO THE RECONSTRUCTION OFIRAQ AND CONT OF ITS OIL. STRENGTHEN THE WEAKENING $ AGAINSTTHE EURO. ACHIEVE A QUICK MIL VICTORY PRIOR TO THEPRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN 2004, GIVINGENOUGH TIME FOR THE POSITIVE IMPACT OFTHE WAR TO BE ABSORBED. 20. LIKELY US REASONS TOINVADE IRAQ NEED A FOOTHOLD IN THE ENERGY RICH WEST ASIANREGION & UNDERBELLY OF RUSSIA. ANTI US SENTIMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA WOULD COMPELPULL OUT. CONTAIN ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM BY DRIVINGWEDGE BETWEEN IRAN & SYRIA. DOMINO THEORY - A DEMOCRATIC, SECULAR IRAQWOULD EVENTUALLY ENCOURAGE OTHER ARABNATIONS TO FOLLOW SUIT. IMPOSE PERMT PEACE IN ISRAEL & ALSO ENSURE ITSSHARE OF MIDDLE EAST WATER. 21. PART IIITHE WAR OVERALL STRAT. CONCEPT. FORCE LEVELS. OUTLINE PLAN AND FORCES 22. OVERALL STRATEGY 23. SHOCK AND AWE STRAT CONCEPT POSTULATES EMP MASSIVE FIRE FROM AIR TO PSYCHE THE EN. EMP REDUCED- LIGHTLY EQUIPPED GRND TPS - PERMTING RAPID ADV. ATTAIN WAR OBJ W/O RESORTING TO ATTRN WARFARE. 24. SHOCK AND AWE STRAT BASICS OF CONCEPT. PARALLEL WAR. SIMULTANEOUS AIR STRIKESON NO OF TPS. OBJECT ALL ENCOMPASSINGDESTR OF TGTS IMPINGING ON THEIR LIVESWILL CAUSE SURRENDER. SPEED OF ESSENCE. EFFECT BASED OPS OPS AIMED TO REACH DESIRED OBJS W/O GOINGTHOUGH INTERMEDIATE STGS. GRND WAR WON BYDESTR OF COMD CONT SET UP RATHER THANGRADUAL WEAKENING EN. FORCE COLLAPSE BY TECH SUPERIORITY WITHLEAST COLLATERAL DAMAGE TO INFRASTRCTUREAND CIV POPULATION. CARRY OUT PSY OPS CONCURRENTLY. 25. END THE REGIME OF SADDAM HUSSEIN.US MIL OBJS IDEN, ISOLATE AND ELIMINATE WMDs. SEARCH, CAPTURE AND DRIVE OUT OP IRAQI FREEDOMTERRORISTS. COLLECTINT RELATEDTOINTERNATIONAL TERRORIST NETWKSAND OSTENSIBLE LINKS BETWEENSADDAM AND THE AL-QUAIDA. COLLECT INT RELATED TO GLOBALNETWK OF ILLICIT WMDs. END SANCTIONS AND IMDT DELHUMANITARIAN SP TO DISPLACED ANDNEEDY CITIZENS. SECURE OIL FIELDS AND RESOURCES . CREATECONDITIONSFOR ATRANSITION TO A REPRESENTATIVESELF GOVT. 26. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS SUBVERT SADDAMS REGIME. PRECISE ATTACKS ON COMMAND AND CONTROL CENTRES. SHAPE THE BATTLE FIELD. CAPTURE BAGHDAD. BYPASS OPPOSITION. INCITE LOCAL REBELLION. CAPTURE LOGISTICS BASES. HUMANITARIAN AID. RAPID DECISIVE OPS BASED ON:- FAST MOVING LT FORCES WHICH CAN BE MOV QUICKLY INTO BATTLE. QUICK DECISION MAKING, ALLOW FD FORCE CDRs TO REACT QUICKLY TO CHANGES INBATTLE. JT OPS INVOLVING ARMY, NAVY, AF AND MARINES. USE STRAT AIR POWER TO ATTACK HUNDREDS OF TGTS SIMULTANEOUSLY. USE HIGH TECH SMART BOMBS AND BATTLE FD INT GATHERING SYS. SPEED AND MVRE. FLEXIBILITY IN EXEC. HY USE OF SOGs, PRECISION BOMBING, INTEGRATION OF DIFFERENT SERVICES /BRANCHES UNPRECEDENTED JOINTNESS. TAKE ADVANTAGE OF NEWER TECHS PROVIDING REAL TIME PICTURE OF BATTLE FD. INCREASED CONNECTIVITY IN NETCENTRIC WARFARE. 27. IRAQI CONCEPT OF OPS IRAQI CORRECTLY ANTICIPATED MAINCOALITION THRUST FROM KUWAIT IN NWDIRECTION. HENCE DPLY WAS III CORPS WEST OF BAGHDAD. IV CORPS EAST OF BAGHDAD. I CORPS - NORTH OF BAGHDAD. II CORPS - SOUTH OF BAGHDAD. INITIAL PLAN DELAY , DISRUPT BY GUERILLA WARFARE. GIVE PITCHED BATTLE ONLY IN CITIES WHERE ALLIESARMR AND Ahs SUPERIORITY IS NULLIFIED GREATLY. SADDAMS DESIRE TO TURN BAGHDAD INTO AMESOPOTAMIAN STALINGRAD WAS WELL KNOWNAND THIS WAS ONE TRAP THE COALITION WAS READYFOR. 28. FORCE LEVELS 29. COALITION FORCES USA. UK. AUSTRALIA. POLAND 30. US COMD AND CONT, GULF NATIONAL COMD AUTH SECY OF DEF(DONALD RUMSFELD)C IN C CENTCOM( TOMMY R FRANKS /J ABIZIAD)CDR COMBINED FORCECDR COMBINED FORCE CDR COALITION FORCEMARITIME COMPONENTSPEC OPS COMPONENT LAND COMPONENTVICE ADM TJ KEATING BRIG GEN GL HARRELLLT GEN DD MCKIERNANCDR COMBINED FORCEAIR COMPONENTLT GEN TM MOSLEY 1 MARINEV CORPS EXPEDITIONARY FORCE LT GEN WS WALLACE LT GEN JT CONWAY 31. ORBAT COALITION FORCES 32. ORBAT AT COMMENCEMENT OF OPS US V CORPS 3 INF DIV. BDE EX 82 AB DIV. 101 AB DIV. 173 AIS ASLT BDE. 1 MEF UK 7 ARMD BDE. 3 CDO BDE. 16 AIR ASLT BDE. 102 LGS BDE. AUSTRALIAN 2000 TPS INCL 100 SAS. TOTAL 1.1 LAC SOLDIERS 33. FMNS INDUCTED LATER 4 INF DIV. 2 MEF. 1 CAV DIV GERMAN 1 INF DIV. US 2 CAV REGT. US 3 CAV REGT. 34. IRAQI FORCES 35. ORBAT- IRAQI ARMY 1 CORPS. 2, 8, 38 INFANTRY DIVISIONS & 5 MECHANISEDDIVISION. HEADQUARTERS AT KIRKUK. 2 CORPS. 15 AND 34 INFANTRY DIVISIONS AND 3ARMOURED DIVISION. HEADQUARTERS AT DEYALA. 3 CORPS. 11 INFANTRY DIVISION, 51 MECHANISEDDIVISION AND 6 ARMOURED DIVISION. HEADQUARTERSAT AL-NASIRIYAH. 4 CORPS. 14 AND 18 INFANTRY DIVISIONS AND 10ARMOURED DIVISION. HEADQUARTERS AT AL-AMARAH. 5 CORPS. 4, 7 AND 16 INFANTRY DIVISIONS AND 1MECHANISED DIVISION. HEADQUARTERS AT MOSUL. 36. STATE OF IRAQIFORCES ARMY STRENGTH APPROXIMATELYFOUR LACS. FIVE CORPS COMPRISING 17 DIVISIONS. REPUBLICAN GUARDS - SEVENDIVISIONS. OLD VINTAGE EQUIPMENT. HARD HIT BY ECONOMIC AND MILITARYSANCTIONS. MOTIVATION OF REGULAR ARMYSUSPECT. 37. IRAQI ARMY CONSIDERABLY DOWNSIZED POSTGULF WAR OF 1990-91 DEPLETION OF AFVS FROM 6000DURING DESERT FOX TO 2000 2500 ARMD DIV OF REPUBLICAN GUARDSREDUCED TO 120 T-72 TKS ALL DIVs OTHER THAN REPUBLICANGUARDS REPORTED TO BE AT 50%COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS AND 50% OFALL EQPT LACK SPARES 38. DEPLOYMENT : IRAQI ARMY xxx 5xxx1 xxx2Deyala xxx IRAQNC xxx SC xxx4xxx3 39. REPUBLICAN GUARDS NORTHERN CORPS ONE ARMOURED DIVISION. ONE MECHANISED DIVISION. TWO INFANTRY DIVISIONS. SOUTHERN CORPS ONE INFANTRY DIVISION. ONE MECHANISED DIVISION. ONE ARMOURED DIVISION. OTHER FORCES SPECIAL REPUBLICAN GUARDS. SADDAM FIDAYEEN. AL QUDS ARMY ( PALESTINIAN GUERILLAS). 40. OUTLINE PLAN& FORCES 41. GRND PLANOP PLAN 1003 VICTOR 42. COALITION GRND PLAN SOUTHERN THRUST: SECURING FAWPENINSULA AND ADV TOWARDS BASRA BY UK 7ARMD BDE AND 3 COMMANDO BDE. RUSH TO BAGHDAD BY- SW THRUST: US 3 INF DIV FROM KUWAIT TOWARDS ALNAJAF KARBALA GAP & ONTO BAGHDAD FROMWEST. CENTRAL THRUST: US 1 MEF ADV FORM KUWAIT TOAL NASARIYA- AL KUT 7 ONTO BAGHDAD FROM EAST. NORTHERN THRUST : AIRBORNE ASLT NEARMOSUL AND MOV SOUTHWARDS TO TIKRIT. 43. TURKEY COALITION GRND PLANIRAN173 AIR ASLT BDE (EX VCORPS/ITALY) EMP IN NORTHERNIRAQSECURE MOSUL / KIRKUK & TIKRIT SYRIA1 MARINE DIV/ 1 MEFADV TO CAPTUREIRAQBAGHDADUK -7 ARM D BDE16 AIR ASLT BDE3 CDO BDE USSECURING FAW HQ V CORPS PENINSULA AND ADVTOWARDS BASRA 3 INF DIV (MECH) ADV TO CAPTURE BAGHDADJORDAN 101 AND 82 AB DIVS EMP IN THE WAKE OF 3 INF DIV (MECH) D 2 MARINE DIV/ 1 MEF PA DIVERTED TO WESTERN H AXIS NCSAUDI ARABIAAU KUWAIT 44. PART 4 : CONDUCT OF OPS 45. OP IRAQI FREEDOM PHASE 1 : AIR WAR JUL 2002 MAR 2003. PHASE 2 : SHOCK AND AWE 20-21MAR 03. PHASE 3 : INITIAL GRND ADV: SECURING THEOUTER TIER . PHASE 4 : INVESTMENT AND CAPTURE OFBAGHDAD 31 MAR 14 APR 03 (ANDOTHER CITIES) CAS ANALYSIS NEW CONCEPTS 46. PHASE 1: AIR WAR OP SOUTHERN FOCUS. MAIN AIR CAMPAIGN. 47. PHASE 1 : AIR WAROP SOUTHERN FOCUS COMMENCED - JUL 2002. 9 MONTHS DURATION FOR UNDECLARED AIR WAR. TOTAL SORTIES 21,236 ( JUL 02 MAR 03). AIM TO DEGRADE IRAQI AD & DEFS. IRAQI AD & DEFS THICKENED SOUTH OF BAGHDAD LATE1990s. ON PRETEXT OFTHREAT TO NO FLY ZONES ,USATTACKED THESE DEFS REGULARLY. IRAQI OFC NETWORK FOR C2 BETWEEN BAGHDAD BASRA NASARIYA. SINCE ALL UG REPEATER STNSSEARCHED AND BOMBED. IMDT BEFORE G DAY, 606 PGMs ON 391 SELECT TGTS 48. PHASE 1 : MAIN AIR CAMPAIGN 1800 AC 20,000 SORTIES CAS 15,800 SEAD 1,400 POLITICAL / GOVT 1,800 SUSPECTED WMD LOC 800 TOTAL OF 29,000 BOMBS / CRUISE MSLS. 70 % OF ALL WPNS PGMs. CARGO DELIVERED BY AF 40,000 TONNES. 49. PHASE 2 : SHOCK AND AWE AIM WAS MORE PSY THAN PHY. PREPONED TO 19 MAR SINCE CIA HAD INPUT OFSADDAM & SONS AT DERA FARMS. TWO F 117s DROPPED FOUR 2000 LBS BUNKERBURSTING BOMBS. SIX WARSHIPS FIRED 36 TOMAHAWKS ATBAGHDAD ON LEADERSHIP. AF CDR LATER CONFIRMED NO BUNKEREXISTED. ATTACK CAUSED SPIN OFF AIDED BY MEDIA RUMORS SADDAM DEAD. 50. PHASE 2 : SHOCK AND AWE 20 MAR 03 700 TOMAHAWKs FIRED. 2000 PGMs FIRED. SALVO COVERED WIDE AREA OF BAGHDAD /BASRA. PENTAGON EXPECTED IRAQI ARMY TO FOLDUP. COUPS DID NOT HAPPEN. SHOCK AND AWE PASSED WITHOUT ANYVISIBLE DRAMATIC RESULTS ON THOSETARGETTED. 51. SHOCK & AWE CAMPAIGN POSTULATES THAT IF MASSIVE FIREPOWER FROM AIR IS USED, THE WAR CANBE WON WITH CONSIDERABLY REDUCEDNO OF TPS. TPS COULD ALSO BE LTEQUIPPED PERMITTING RAPID ADV. 52. SHOCK AND AWE REASONS FOR ITS PARTIAL SUCCESS IRAQI MIND NOT CONDITIONED TODESIRED DEGREE. PSY OPS DID NOT YIELD DESIREDRESULT. IRAQIS UNCONVINCED ABOUTSTATED INTENTIONS OF USA. TURKEYS REFUSAL TO ALLOW USE OFITS TERRITORY 53. TURKEY COALITION PROG 19/20MAR IRANUS - 1 MEFUKSYRIA DECAPITATION STRIKES7 ARMD BDE16 AIR ASLT BDE3 CDO BDEIRAQ US HQ V CORPSJORDAN 3 INF DIV (MECH)D PA H 101 AND 82 ABU NCKUWAIT DIVS HELD IN RES LA SAUDI ARABIA 54. 19/20 MAR G-DAY 55. PHASE 3 : INITIAL GRND ADV:SECURING THE OUTER TIER US 3 INF DIV 200 MIAI ABRAMS,260 BRADLEYS,20,000 TPS. ADV ALONG SE AXIS KUWAIT NASARIYAH NAJAF KARBALA. 101 AB DIV IN FOLLOW ON SP ROLE. 56. TURKEY SW THRUST OP IRAQIMOSUL. .BASHUR FREEDOM . IRBILDEVP OF COALITION - 2,75,000OFFENSIVE KIRKUK IRAQ - 3,75,00007 APROIL FIELDKIRKUK .KARBALA WASSECURED 04APR . TIKRIT 21 MAR HADITHAH AN NAJAF WAS 3 DIV SECURES. AL QAIM . MONDHARIYA SECURED BY 101 THARTHAR . BRIDGES OVER AB DIV EUPHRATES . DEYALA IRAQI 51 MECH DIVSURRENDERS 29 APRH2 .UMM QASR ISOLATED 3 DIV ADV & CONTACTED NAJAF & KARBALAAR RAMADI. BAGHDAD3 CDO BDE AND 15 MEUSECURE UMM QASR FACING STIFF RESISTANCE & FIERCE HINDIYAH AL KUT FIGHTINGH3 .. . FORCES WERE 80 KM KARBALA . AL-HILLAH. 01 APR SHORT OF BAGDAD4 INF DIVWAS23 MARAN NAJAF . .AL FAJR .QAL AT SUKKARINDUCTED .AL AMARAHAN AD DIWANIYAH . .NASIRIYACONTACTED ARAR . ...AS SAMAWAHTALIL AIRFD SECURED25 MAR .AL NASIRIYAHFIGHTING STOPED 26 MARDISTANCE FROM BAGHDADBASRA .BASRA PAUSE SAND TAC - 467 KMAN STORM SEIZED ALL NASIRIYAH - 315 KM LEGENDUMM QASR .AN ACTIVITES 150 KM 28 NAJAF - TILL OIL FIELDS 3 INF DIV. AL FAW MARKARBALA- 90 KMOIL PIPELINE IRAQIS REINFORCEDMOSUL - 360 KM 7 CAV REGT20 MAR THEMSELVES KMKIRKUK - 240 MAIN ATTACKS BEGINSTIKRIT - 160 KM101 AB DIV KUWAIT 57. PHASE 3 : INITIAL GRND ADV:SECURING THE OUTER TIER US 1 MEF ADV ALONG CENTRAL APCH KUWAIT AL KUT BAGHDAD. 100 x F 18 & AV 8 b AC, 50 x AHs. 4 INF DIV LATER EMP IN FOLLOWON SP ROLE DURING ADV FROMBAGHDAD TO TIKRIT. 58. PHASE 3 : INITIAL GRND ADV: SECURING THE OUTER TIER UK 1 ARMD DIV ADV TO BASRA CAPTURE PORT CITY OF UMM QASR ONLY PORT CITY OF IRAQ CAPTUREVITAL FOR LGS SP. FAW PENINSULA INHERENT IN TASK. 59. TURKEY CENTRAL & SOUTHERNOP IRAQI THRUSTMOSUL. .BASHURFREEDOM . IRBIL 05 APRDEVP OF COALITION - 2,75,000OFFENSIVE 01 APR ISOLATED BAGDAD KIRKUK IRAQ 1 - 3,75,000 MEF ADV ONOIL FIELD CENTRAL AXIS BETWEEN TIGRIS & KIRKUK .EAST OF EUPHRATESEUPHRATES CONTACTED ALDIWANIYAH . TIKRIT HADITHAH02 APRIL. AL QAIM . MONDHARIYA FORCESTHARTHAR . WERE WESTSYRIA. DEYALAOF KARBALA08 APR H2O4 APR.BASRA FALLS. AN NAJAFAR RAMADIBAGHDAD SECURED FORCES REACHED . HINDIYAHSOUTH OF BAGDADH3 . . KARBALA . AL-HILLAH.SECURE BR INTACTAT AN NASIRYAAN NAJAF . AL FAJR . . QAL AT SUKKARIRAN AD DIWAN IYAH . AL . .AMARAH. . ..RUMAILIAH.AN NASIRIYAHOIL FIELD21 MAR UMM QASR WAS ISOLATED.BASRA UMM QASR SECURED (22APR) UMM QASR. UK 3 CDO BDE SECURED . AL FAWFAW PENINSULA STIFF RESISTANCE AT1 MEFBASRAKUWAIT UK 7 ARMD BDE 60. PHASE 3 : INITIAL GRND ADV: SECURING THE OUTER TIER 173 AB REGT / 82 AB DIV NORTHERNIRAQ AIDED BY SFs TASKED FOR CAPTURE OF KIRKUK. MOSUL. AID CAPTURE OF TIKRIT LATER. 61. TURKEY NORTHERN THRUST173 AIR ASSAULT BDE OP IRAQI & 50,000 KURDISHPESHMARGASMOSUL. . BASHUR FREEDOM11 APR . IRBIL 22 MARUS & KURDISHDEVP OF OFFENSIVE SECURITYTPS ENTEREDFORCESMOSULSECUREDKIRKUK.KURDISH 13 APR27 MAR ZONE SECURITY US FORCES 173 AB BDE ENTERED DROPPED AT TIKRITTIKRIT . BASHUR HADITHAH. AL QAIM . MONDHARIYA 31 MARTHARTHAR . 173 AB BDE . DEYALACOMPLETED H2DEPLOYEMENT..AR RAMADIBAGHDAD 10 APR.HINDIYAH AL KUT KURDISH H3. FIGHTERS .KARBALA. AL-HILLAH.SEIZED THEJORDAN NOTHERN CITY OF KIRKUKAN NAJAF . .AL FAJR . . QAL AT SUKKARIRAN AD DIWANIYAH. . AL AMARAH WITH FALL OFARAR . TIKRIT COALITION...AS SAMAWAH SAUDI ARABIAOPS EFFECTIVELY COMPLETE.AN NASIRIYAHDISTANCE FROM BAGHDAD . BASRABASRA- 467 KMAN NASIRIYAH - 315 KMLEGEND UMM QASR.AN NAJAF - 150 KMOIL FIELDS. AL FAWKARBALA- 90 KM OIL PIPELINEMOSUL - 360 KMKIRKUK - 240 KMTIKRIT - 160 KMKUWAIT 62. PHASE 3 : INITIAL GRND ADV:SECURING THE OUTER TIER SFs CAPTURE H1 & H2 AIRFDS INWESTERN IRAQ. SANITISE AREAS FROM WHERESCUDS COULD BE FIRED ON ISRAEL. SECURED OIL WELLS AND GEOPLATSTO PREVENT IRAQI TORCHING THEM. 63. TURKEYSF OPS OP IRAQI FREEDOM1.TOTAL STR 40002.OVERALL COMD SPECIAL OPS TASK FORCE20.MOSUL. . BASHUR . IRBILUS 5 th & 10 th SF GP. DEVP OF IRAQ NORTH OFFENSIVEUK SAS. US 10 th SF GP.AUSTRALIAN SAS.KIRKUK.SUCCEEDED IN MOB KURDS.ONE RANGER REGT(LESS BN). DESTR OF AL QAEDA NEST.BN EX 82 AB DIV. CAPTURE KIRKUK AND3.EQPT TIKRIT .MOSUL.FEW M1A1 ABRAM TKs. HADITHAH . AL QAIM HIMARS (TRUCK MTD MLRS).. MONDHARIYATHARTHAR . . DEYALACENTRAL IRAQ H2 SEIZED HADITHA DAM..HADITHA DAM RESERVOIR HAD.AR RAMADIBAGHDADCAPACITY TO FLOOD KARBALA GAPAND BEYOND..HINDIYAH AL KUTTHUS AIDED MOV OF V CORPS. H3. .KARBALA. AL-HILLAH.JORDANWESTERN IRAQCAPTURE H2 & H3 AIR FDS.AN NAJAF . .AL FAJR . . QAL AT SUKKAR IRANSANITISE AREAS FROM WHERE IRAQI AD DIWANIYAH . . AL AMARAHSCUDS FIRED AT ISRAEL.ARAR . ...AS SAMAWAH SAUDI SOUTH IRAQ ARABIA.AUSTRALIAN & UK SAS. AN NASIRIYAHONLY 09 OUT OF 1057 OILDISTANCE FROM BAGHDADWELLS TORCHED. THIS DUE TO . BASRABASRA- 467 KM ACTION OF SF TEAMS.TIMELYLEGENDAN NASIRIYAH - 315CAPTURE IRAQI AL ASAD AIR KM UMM QASR .AN NAJAF OIL FIELDS - 150 KM AND 50 UNDAMAGED MIG. AL FAWBASEKARBALA- 90 KM OIL PIPELINEFIGHTER AC.MOSUL - 360 KMKIRKUK - 240 KMTIKRIT - 160 KMKUWAIT 64. PHASE 4 : CAPTURE OF BAGHDAD LAYOUT OF DEFS OUTER RING - 3 & 4 CORPS . INNER ARC 48 KM LONG FROM YUSUFIYAH TO SEWARYAH BETWEEN EUPHRATES AND TIGRIS. OCCUPIED BY SPECIAL REPUBLICAN GUARD UNITS. OUTER ARC 160 KM LONG - FROM KARBALA TO KUT ; WESTERN FLK ON LAKE RAZZAH. MANNED BY MEDINA , NEBUCHADNEZZAR, BAGHDAD AND HAMMURABI DIVs. 65. INNERARC 66. BATTLE OF BAGHDAD SERIES OF SMALL BATTLES. MASSIVE DAMAGES BY AIR. COMMAND & CONTROL INFRASTRUCTURE DEGRADED. 5 CORPS PUSHED THROUGH THE KARBALA GAP. DEFENCES OF BAGHDAD LAY OPEN. REPUBLICAN GUARD SHATTERED. WEAKNESS OF IRAQI FORCES EXPOSED. DEEP ARMOURED PENETRATION. THUNDER RUNS BY ARMR INTO BAGHDAD 67. BATTLE OF BAGHDADSPEED OF 5 CORPS AND SPECIAL FORCESOPERATIONS PARALYSEDIRAQI RESISTANCE.SADDAM UNABLE TO CONDUCT URBAN WARFARE.COALITION CHOSE LINES OF ATTACK.SADDAM LOYALIST RESISTANCEDISPERSED AFTER INITIAL DEFEAT.FIGHTING BECAME A PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN.BAGHDAD AIRPORT CAPTURED. AIR STRIKES ON: MUTHENA MIL AIRPORT. INTELLIGENCE SERVICE HQ. TELECOM CENTRE. AL SALAM PALACE. PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARIAT 68. CAPTURE OF BAGHDAD SADDAMS REGIME CEASED TO FUNCTION 09 APR 03. OPERATIONS TO ELIMINATE RESISTANCE CONTINUED. BUILDING OCCUPIED BY SADDAMS HALF BROTHER TARGETEDBY JDAM. OUTER CORDON COMPLETED. STATUE OF SADDAM PULLED DOWN - 09 APR. ORGANISED RESISTANCE IN BAGHDAD DEFEATED. 11 APR - US FORCES COMMENCED DEPLOYMENT TOWARDSTIKRIT. 69. TURKEY OP IRAQICAPTURE OF MOSUL. .BASHURFREEDOM. IRBILBAGDADDEVP OF COALITION - 2,75,000OFFENSIVEKIRKUKIRAQ- 3,75,000 OIL FIELD 10/11 APR KIRKUK . COALITION FORCES04/06 APR BEGIN TO DEPLOY CAPTURE OF INTL FORCES TOWARDSAIRPORT TIKRIT . TIKRIT CORDON BY 3 INF DIVHADITHAH . AL QAIM .MONDHARIYA THARTHAR . SYRIA. DEYALA 09 APR STATUE OF SADDAMH2 . DEMOLISHEDB RIGADE EX 101 A IRB ORNE AR RAMADI .BAGHDAD DIVISION SECURED H2 & H3 AIRFIELDSHINDIYAH AL KUT .H3..KARBALA .AL-HILLAH.JORDAN AN NAJAF. AL FAJR .. QAL AT SUKKAR IRAN03 APRAD DIWAN IYAH . . . ALAMARAHINVESTED ARAR . .. . AS SAMAWAH SAUDI ARABIA RUMAILIAH .AN NASIRIYAHOIL FIELDDISTANCE FROM BAGHDAD. BASRABASRA- 467 KMAN NASIRIYAH - 315 KM LEGEND UMM QASR .AN NAJAF - 150 KM OIL FIELDS3 INF DIV . AL FAWKARBALA- 90 KMOIL PIPELINEMOSUL - 360 KM 7 CAV REGTKIRKUK - 240 KMTIKRIT - 160 KMKUWAIT 101 AB DIV 70. US CASUALTY UPDATE US DEATH TOLL APR 03 = 37 (FALL OF BAGHDAD) US DEATH TOLL APR 04 = 129 WINNING A WAR CAN BE DEADLIER THAN FIGHTING IT.CAS ANALYSIS BATTLE PERIOD CAS ANALYSIS WW I / WW II / VIETNAM-01 CAS / 15SOLDIERS GULF- 01 CAS / 480 SOLDIERS 19 MAR 20 APR ( OFFICIAL TRANSITION TO PEACEKEEPING ROLE)- 128 DEAD 19 MAR TO DATE - 501 DEAD ODS - AVERAGE 40 CAS / DAY OIF-AVERAGE 3 CAS / DAY TOTAL COALITION CAS UPTO 19 APR 04 494 + 5= 499 71. WINNERS TKS ICVs BRADLEY / WARRIOR CLASS. MED ARTY 155 mm. FD ARTY 105 mm. WIRE GUIDED ATGMs. RLs / RPGs. MULTI ROLE WELL TRAINED INF. HEPTRS FOR HB ROLE 72. LOSERS VULNERABILITY OF THE TAIL. LT ARMD VEH. IFF SYS. DIGITISATION. AHs. AIR MOB BY HEPTRS 73. NEW CONCEPTS DISTRIBUTED OPS. EBO FOCUSSED LGS. 3D LGS. VELOCITY MANAGEMENT. REVOLUTION IN DIPLOMATIC AFFAIRS AIDED BY RMA( PGM DIPLOMACY). NET CENTRIC. INTEGRATED SPACE BASED TECHNOLOGY. EFFECTS BASED OP V/S OVERWHELMING USE OFFORCE. KILL CHAIN. TIME CRITICAL TARGETTING. TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT. 74. DISTR OPS WHERE GRND FORCES ARE WILLING TO BETOTALLY DEPENDENT ON TAC AC FOR FIRESP AND CONSEQUENTLY MOV WITHOUT HYARTY. THIS ENABLES SWIFT MOV AS WELLAS GREATER AGILITY. FORCES DO NOT SWEEP THE EN TERRITORYTO HOLD IT; INSTEAD THE DISTR UNITSFORM LILY PADS THAT CONTROL CRITICALPOINTS AND KEY INTERSECTIONS. 75. EBO INCR RELIANCE ON PGMs. MOV TO AN ALL STEALTH AF. FIELDING NEW GENERATION OFISR NETCENTRIC. JT FIGHTING FORCE & ADAPTIVEPLG. ABILITY TO REACT IN NEAR REALTIME 76. RDA BY MILITARY COERCIONISURRENDER 77. PGM DIPLOMACY fly the bomb directly onto the tgt THE INCR NUMBER OF BOMBS COMPOUNDS THEDIFFICULTY OF AN EN CONFRONTING AMERICN POWER.IF SOME ROGUE NATION WERE TO CREATE A CRISISTHAT REQD MIL INTERVENTION, TEN B-2s COULD ARRUNANNOUNCED, CARRYING EIGHT SMALL DIAMETERBOMBS (SDBs) EACH, AND WITH EXCELLENT C4I2 SREFFECTIVELY SNUFF OUT THE MIL CAPABILITY OF THEEN WITH 800 LETHAL STRIKES IN A MATTER OF MINUTES. thus RMA has paved the way for RDA. 78. NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE 79. NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE IMPLIES HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION OF INFO FROM ALLSENSORS AND SOURCES AND MAKING IT AVAILABLEWHEREVER REQD. NETWK CONT COULD ALSO QUERRY A FD FMN FORMORE INFO AND VICE VERSA. THUS A REAL TIMEINTERACTIVE APCH WAS POSSIBLE. EG. F/A 18 C SUPER HORNET AC RECCE SYS ALLOWSAIR CREW TO CAPTURE , ASSESS , RECEIVE ANDDESPATCH INFO. A PICTURE COULD BE BEAMED TO AFAC FOR DETAILED MARKING AND BEAMED BACK TOTHE TGT FOR ENSURING CORRECTNESS OF THECOORDINATES, WHICH COULD THEN BE FED IN. NOT ONLY WAS INFO AVAILABLE , IT WAS ON CALLAND READY TO USE. 80. KILL CHAIN TGT CYCLE CONCEPT. FIND / FIX / TRACK / TGT / ENGAGE /ASSESS. GRND WORK FOR EXACT GRID REFOF TGTS WORKED OUT BY WPNSINSPECTORS FROM UNSCOM OVER10 YRS, UPDATED ON A WEEKLYBASIS. 81. TIME CRITICAL TARGETTING THE INTERVAL OF TIME IT TAKES TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO STRIKE A TGT THAT HAD BEEN FOUND FIXED AND TRACKED. 82. PART 5 : LESSONSLEARNT 83. LESSONS THE GOOD JOINT WARFIGHTING INTEGRATION OF CONVENTIONAL & SFs. COMMAND EFFECTIVENESS. FIRE SP. COMBINED ARMS TEAMS. INNOVATIVE TRG. 84. JOINT WARFIGHTINGFINDING : OIF WAS A COHERENT, JOINT FIGHT WITH OTHER SERVICE, SF AND COALITON.UNPRECEDENTED LEVEL OF JT INTEGRATION FROM THEATRE LEVEL TO TAC LEVEL.CONTEXT : TREMENDOUS JT EFFORT TO INTEGRATE AND SP EACH OTHER. HOWEVER,JT CAPABILITY IS MOVING FROM STRAT TO OP TO TAC LEVEL FASTER THAT OUR ORG,TRG AND EDN CAN ADAPT.WHY IT HAPPENED :TRUST AMONG JT TEAM MEMBERSJT DOCTRINE UNDERSTOOD BY SERVICESCENTCOM / CFLCC EXS BUILT THE TEAMAIR GRND INTEGRATION EFFORTS POST OEF PAID OFFCFLCC PREPARATION OF THEATRE INFRASTRUCTUREARMY PATRIOT PROTECTED ENTIRE THEATREV CORPS AND MEF OPERATED SIDE-BY-SIDEWHAT SHOULD BE DONE :EDN MORE, JT& EARLIER IN SERVICE SCHOOLSJT TRGARMY ORGS MORE MODULAR, MORE ADAPTIVE 85. SF AND CONVENTIONAL INTEGRATIONFINDING : MULTIPLE, EFFECTIVE SF/CONVENTIONAL FORCE COMBINATIONS INCR THERG OF COALITION CAPABILITIES, INCR IRAQI PROBLEM AND ENABLED VICTORIES.CONTEXT : INTEGRATION TREND BEGUN IN THE BALKANS, ACCELERATED INAFGHANISTAN AND BORE FRUIT IN IRAQ. COALITION, JT, AND SERVICE CDRS, STAFFSAND OPERATORS DETERMINED TO MAXIMIZE SF AND CONVENTIONAL INTEGRATION.SUPERB INTEGRATION AT LOWEST LEVELS.WHY IT HAPPENED :THOROUGH PLG AND COORDSTRONG LIASION EFFORTSINNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO INTEGRATIONREDUCTION OF CULTURAL BARRIERSCAMPAIGN REQMTS FOR ECONOMY OF FORCE AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFAREWHAT SHOULD BE DONE :INCR INTEGRATED TRGINTEGRATE CONVENTIONAL / SF DOCTRINEIMPROVE ARMY LGS SP CAPABILITIES FOR SF GROUPSLIASION CAPABILITIES 86. BATTLE COMMANDFINDING : CDRS FROM CORPS THROUGH PL LEVELS MADE TIMELY AND EFFECTIVEDECISIONS, AND PROVIDED EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP IN COMPLEX AND AMBIGUOUS SIT.CONTEXT : CONTINUOUS, HIGH-TEMPO, RAPIDLY CHANGING, FULL-SPECTRUM OPSAGAINST ASYMMETRIC AND ADAPTABLE THREAT.WHY IT HAPPENED :LDR DEVELOPMENT, EDN AND TRGMOB, EFFECTIVE ASLT COMD POSTSNETWORKED BATTLE COMD SYSBLUE FORCE TRACKING IFF SYSWIDE-BAND SATL COMNSWHAT SHOULD BE DONE :MOVE TO SPACE AND / OR AIR-BASED VOICE/DATA COMNSCREATE A MOB BATTLE COMD SYS ( BETTER THAN AREN) CAPABLE OF BEING JOINEDIN BY MORE UNITS.INVEST IN IFF SYS TO REDUCE FRATRICIDE.PROPOND DOCTRINE OF SINGLE FORCE CDR WITH CONT OVER NAVAL / AIR OPSUSE IRAQI FREEDOM EXPERIENCES FOR OFFICER / NCO EDUCATION 87. FIRE SPFINDING : ARMY VASTLY IMPROVED ITS HIGHLY EFFECTIVE 24/7 CAPABILITYTO CONDUCT LONG-RANGE PRECISION STRIKE AND TIME SENSITIVE, HIGHVOLUME FIRES IN SP OF THE CLOSE FIGHT.CONTEXT : POST DESERT STORM BATTLE LAB AND FORCE XXI INITIATIVES INDEPTH AND SIMULTANEOUS ATTACK LED TO MATERIAL, ORG AND OPINVESTMENTS THAT PRODUCED AN ENHANCED CAPABILITY AT BOTH OP ANDTAC LEVELS.WHY IT HAPPENED :STREAMLINED, DIGITAL FIRE CONTROL PROCESS (PRECISION FIRES INMINUTES, NOT HOURS)ATACMS MLRS, ARTILLERY, AHsJOINT FIRES CASATACMS UNITARY ROUND ; SENSE AND DESTROY MUNITIONS VASTLYIMPROVED ACCURACY & LETHALITYROBUST INTERWAR EXPERIMENTATION; INVESTMENTWHAT SHOULD BE DONE :LAY DOWN JT FIRE DOCTRINE.INTER SERVICES JOINT EXPERIMENTATION ; DEVELOPMENT. 88. COMBINED ARMS TEAMFINDING : COMINED ARMS, HY/LT, SF, AND JT TEAMS WERE OVERWHELMINGLY LETHAL.RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF 173D AIRBORNE, 2nd CAV AND TEAM TANK DEMONSTRATEDSTRAT FLEXIBILITY. GREAT SUCCESS IN COMBINING CAPABILITIES OF COMB ARMS.CONTEXT : LEADER DEVP PROGRAMS AND DOCTRINE EMPHASIZE COMBINED ARMSSOLUTIONS TO THE WARFIGHT. COMB TRG CENTER EXPERIENCES ENABLED CDRS TORAPIDLY CHANGE TASK ORG AND MAXIMIZE THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF EVERY ELEMENTIN THE FORCE.WHY IT HAPPENED :EFFECTIVE, UP FRONT BATTLE COMMANDISR BY SCOUTS, SF AND HUMINTAGGRESSIVE MOUNTED / DISMOUNTED MVREACCURATE, RAPID FIRE BY ALL WEAPONSINDIRECT FIRES; ON TIME, ON TGT (MORTARS THRU MLRS)COORDINATED, TIMELY, EFFECTIVE CAS3-DIMENSIONAL; ARMED RECCE AND CLOSE ATTACKRESPONSIVE MOBILITY/COUNTER-MOBILITY UNDER FIREWHAT SHOULD BE DONE : DESIGN AND FD MODULAR CAPABILITIES-BASED COMBAT ORGSENHANCE COMBAT TRG CENTRESINCR TRG AMN, FLYING HOURS 89. INNOVATIVE TRG TRG FOR BROWNOUT. DESERT EQUIVALENT OFSIACHIN WHITEOUT WAS OVERCOME IN 3 DAYSBY A UK SOFTWARE FIRM WHICH MODIFIED THESIMULATOR PGMES FOR TRG IN SIMILAR OCEANICCONDITIONS. US ARMY DATABASE OF LAST 10 YRSWAS USED TO PRAC HEPTR PILOTS. OWN PILOTS CAN BE TRAINED WITH SIMULATORSAND EXACT TRN FEATURES PRIOR TO OPS. 90. IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGYFINDINGS HAD A MAJ IMPACT ON OUTCOME OF WAR AND DOCTRINE OFEBO.CONCEPT ALLOWED COALITION TO GET INSIDE IRAQI DECISION LOOP. ACTED AS THIRD EYE WHEN VISIBILITY WAS DOWN BY NI /SHAMALS. INTEGRATED BATTLE PICTURE. ALLOWEDCENTRALISATION OF CONT ANDDECENTRALISATION OF EXEC. ALLOWED TPS TO FLOW WHERE COMB SIT PERMITTED. COMMON OP PIC (COP) PREVENTED CENTRALISATION OF INFO,AIDED DECENTRALISATION OF EXECUTION. COP WAS A GIFTOF C4I2SR. INVESTMENT IN PGM R&D. US PGM CAPABILITY COMPOUNDSTHE DIFFICULTY OF ROGUE NATIONS ANY FUTURE IRAQTYPE OF CONFLICT COULD BE B-2ed , TOMAHAWKED INTOSUBMISSION AND TOEING US LINE. 91. IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGYWHY IT HAPPENED ENHANCED RGS.NO LOSS OF LETHALTYACCURACY DUE TO ENHANCED RGS. INERTIALNAVIG SYS (INS), GPS, TERCOM, SMART WPNS. FIREPOWER. EARLIER MEASURED IN TONNAGENOW EFFECT. PRECISION WPNS FOR SURGICALSTRIKES. ACCURACY. SMART, BRILLIANT, WPNS, LASERGUIDED WPNS. DAMAGE ASSESMENT. SATL IMAGERY, TI, STATEOF ART OPTICAL CAMERAS ENABLED ACCURATEDAMAGE ASSESMENT. INTEGRATION. SYSYEMS INTERGRATION, MODERNINTERGRATIVETECHHAS REVOLUTIONISEDWARFARE. 92. IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY FORCE MULTIPLIERS.MULTI ROLE COMB AC, AAH,CONVERTING CARGO PLANES INTO WARFIGHTING MACHINES,EW ACT AS FORCE MULTIPLIERS. EW.AWACS, JSTARS, SATLS, IT EQPT. EW PLAYED ASIGNIFICANT ROLE EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS HARDLY ANYPARITY IN CAPABILITIES OF ADVERSERIES. URBAN WARFARE. AIR POWER USED TO TARGET AND STRIKECITIES. UAVS FOR SVL AND TARGETTING NEW FUZES FORBUNKER BURSTING. ASYMMETRY IN POTENTIAL. USAGE UNILATERAL SAMEEQPT USED AGAINST AN OPPONENT OF COMPARABLEPOTENTIAL WOULD PERHAPS BRING OUT PITFALLS. JSTARS. INVESTMENT IN JSTARS, DECADES EARLIER PAID OFFWHEN DESPITE SHAMALS THE COALITION SYNERGISEDTHEIR PGM AND TI CAPABILITY BY JSTARS AND DIAL A WPNREADINESS TO DESTROY ALL WPN PLATFORMS WHILE IRAQISWERE TAKEN BY SUSPRISE. 93. IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGYAPPLICABILITY IN INDIAN CONTEXT NEED TO GO IN FOR MODERNISATION. ACQUIRE PGMS THOUGH AT A LTDSCALE. SPEND ON R&D TO DEVP NEW TECH. INFO WARFARE. 94. MEDIAFINDINGS. COALITION AND IRAQIS MADE SKILFUL USE OF MEDIA.COALITION HAD ELABORATE SYS IN PLACE INCL EMBEDDEDJOUNALISTS, ACCOMPANYING FRONTLINE TPS. EXTENSIVE MEDIACAMPAIGN TO MOULD PERCEPTIONS OF THE EN, OWN PEOPLE ANDINTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.CONTEXT MORAL JUSTIFICATION FOR INVASION OF IRAQ LIBERATION FROM ADESPOTIC RULER, RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY. EXTENSIVE COVERAGE TO PULLING DOWN SADDAMS STATUE ANDRESCUE OF JESSICA LYNCH. DAILY MEDIA BRIEFING AT CENTCOM. EXTENSIVE USE OF MEDIA BY BOTH BUSH AND SADDAM. IRAQI MINISTER, AL SAHHAF DENIED ALL WESTERN CLAIMS. 95. MEDIAWHY IT HAPPENED MEDIA FORMS PART OF PSY OPS, IT IS A REALITY WHICH WECAN FIGHT OR EXPL. IN FUTURE CONFLICTS DEMAND FOR EMBEDDINGJOURNALISTS WITH COMB UNITS WILL BE PRONOUNCED. MEDIA BRIEFINGS PORTRAYED A VIEW PT WITH THE AIM OFSHAPING WORLD OPINION.OWN MEDIA MUST BE EXPL AND MADE USE OF IN ANY FUTURECONFLICT. WE HAVE A VERY MATURE AND RESPONSIBLE PRINT ANDELECTRONIC MEDIA WITH A LARGE NO OF INDEP TVCHANNELS WE MUST MAKE USE OF THEM. SHAPING OF PUBLIC OPINION MUST BE DONE THROUGHSKILFULL USE OF MEDIA. EMBEDDING OF JOURNALISES IN OPS IS RECOMMENDED THEYSHOULD INTERACT AND ATTEND TRG WITH DEF FORCES INPEACE. 96. MEDIA USED TO BOOST TP MORALE 97. LESSONS THE NOT SO BAD JT THEATRE & TAC MSL DEF. URBAN OPS. INFO WARFARE / INFO OPS. NON - CONTIGUOUS 360 DEGREE WARFIGHTING. 98. JT THEATER AND TAC MSL DEFFINDING : PATRIOT ACQUIRED AND DESTROYD ALL INCOMING IRAQI LONG-RG MSL.CHALLENGES REMAIN IN DEFEATING CRUISE MSL, SHORT-RG BALLISTIC MSL ANDAVOIDING FRATRICIDE.CONTEXT : POST DESERT STORM MISSILE DEFENCE INVESTMENTS PAID OFF INACCURACY, LETHALITY, AND INTEGRATION WITH JT / NATIONAL SENSORS ANDNETWORKS. MSL DEF GREW INTO OP PROTECTION MSN FOR ENTIRE THEATER,INCLUDING NBC DEF AND FORCE PROTECTION.WHY IT HAPPENED :FIRST EVER JT THEATER AIR / MSL DEFDEDICATED EFFORT BY MSL DEF COMMUNITYJOINT EFFORT (NAVY, AIR FORCE, NATIONAL SENSORS)RAPID, EARLY FIELDING OF LETHAL, ACCURATE SYSTEMSCOALITION EFFORT (KUWAIT KILLED 3 TBM)BALANCE STRAT AND TAC DEFPATRIOT MANEUVERED WITH GRND FORCESCOALITION OP PROTECTION CELLWHAT SHOULD BE DONE :INDEGENEOUS CRUISE MSL CAPABILITY AND SATL LAUNCHESCREATE NATIONAL DEF NETWORK WITH SP FROM CIVIL AGENCIES SATL / COMN 99. URBAN OPERATIONSFINDING : ARMY FORCES, SUPPORTED BY CAS AND SF, DOMINATED THE URBAN FIGHTAGAINST THIS EN; USED COMBINED ARMS FORCE MIX HY/LT OR LT/HY; SF, (NOFORTRESS BAGHDAD, BUT TOUGH PLATOON TO BRIGADE ENGAGEMENTS).CONTEXT : NEW URBAN OPS DOCTRINE, INNOVATIVE APPROACHES, AND THOROUGHPREP ENABLED ARMY FORCES TO WIN AGAINST THIS .EN WITHOUT THE EXPECTED HYCAS AND COLLATERAL DAMAGE. FULL-SPECTRUM ENVIRONMENT, WITH RAPIDTRANSITIONS FROM WARFIGHTING TO STABILITY OPS, OR BACKWHY IT HAPPENED :NEW SYS APPROACH TO PLGURBAN OPS SEMINARS FOR CORPS AND DIV PREPARED LEADERSTHOROUGH TRG AT BDE AND BELOWRAPID DISTR OF WPNS AND EQUPT FOR URBAN OPSHY/LT/SF INTEGRATED OPSISR CHALLENGES UNTIL CONTACT IN CITIESENEMY FAILURE TO CAPITALISE ON URBAN TRNWHAT SHOULD BE DONE :ENHANCE URBAN OPERATIONS TRAINING CAPABILITIESJOINT URBAN OPERATIONS ROADMAP FOR THREE SERVICES 100. INFO OPSFINDING : MIXED RESULTS; DECEPTION AND TAC PSY OPS EFFECTIVE. LITTLE ARMYOFFENSIVE EW; IRAQI COMD AND CONT AFFECTED, BUT NOT NEGATED. DESPITE INFOCAMPAIGN, SURRENDER OF IRAQI REGULAR ARMY UNITS FELL SHORT OFEXPECTATIONS.CONTEXT : DESPITE DECADE-LONG JT AND ARMY EFFORT, INFO OPS DOCTRINE, ORG,AND PRACTICE HAVE NOT REALISED POTENTIAL OF INFORMATION AGE.WHY IT HAPPENED :PLANNED AND RESOURCED DECEPTION AT MULTIPLE ECHELONS; SYNCHRONIZEDWITH MVRES / FIRE SPFEEDBACK SYS NOT EFFECTIVESYNCHRONISATION BETWEEN AND WITHIN JT AND ARMY ECHELONS POORNO DOCTRINE FOR EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS(EBO)FAILURE TO LINK INFO OPS PLAN WITH SCHEME OF MVRECENTRALISATON V/S ALL POLITICS ARE LOCALWHAT SHOULD BE DONE :STANDARDIZE INFO OPS COMD , STAFF AND SP RELATIONSHIPSALLOW PSY OPS CAPABILITIES AT DIVS AND BDESPROVIDE TAC RADIO AND TV CAPABILITIES AT OPERATIONAL LEVELS 101. NON-CONTIGUOUS 3600 WARFIGHTINGFINDING : COMB ELEMENTS WITHIN DIV WERE TRAINED FOR AND MASTERED NON-CONTIGUOUS COMB. COMB SUPAND COMB SERVICE SP FMNS REQUIRE TRG EMPHASISAND EQUPT FOR BOTH TAC AND SP WARFIGHTING TASKS.CONTEXT : ARMY ANTICIPATED IRAQI OPERATING ENVIRONMENT, WITH FULL-SPECTRUM OPS ACROSS THE BATTLESPACE (NO SANCTUARY); DIVS QUICKLY ADAPTEDTO ASYMMETRICAL ATTACKS.WHY IT HAPPENED :NON-CONTIGUOUS COMB TRG CENTER ROTATIONS; COUPLED WITH NEW DOCTRINE(FM 3-0)ARMY TRG AND MSN TEMPO FOCUSES LGS COMMUNITY ON SP AT EXPENSE OF TACSKILLSLGS OFFICER / NCO DEVELOPMENT DID NOT UNIFORMLY PREPARE LEADERS FOR 3600WARFIGHTINGWARFIGHTING TRG FOR LOGISTICIANS WEAK; NOT ENOUGH FOCUS, TIME RESOURCESWHAT SHOULD BE DONE :TRG AT YO LEVEL ONWARDSOIF EXPERIENCES SHOULD FORM PART OF BATTLE STUDIES FOR PROMOTION EXAMS 102. LESSONS THE UGLY MULTI NATIONAL FORCE INTEGRATION. TAC INT. LGS. 103. COALITION OPERATIONSFINDING : DESPITE EMERGING TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS, THE INTEGRATION OF AMERICAN-BRITISH-CANADIAN-AUSTRALIAN (ABCA) PARTNERS INTO PLG AND EXEC WAS HINDERED BY INFONAND APPLICATIONS LOCATED O US-ONLY SYSTEMS.CONTEXT : OIF PLG AND EXEC CONDUCTED PRIMARILY ON US-ONLY SIPRNET. PERSONNELINTENSIVE WORK-AROUNDS WERE IMPLEMENTED, BUT RESULTED IN LESS THAN REAL-TIMEACCESS TO ALL NECESSARY INFO, POTENTIALLY MARGINALIZING ALLIED COMD/STAFFPARTICIPATION.WHY IT HAPPENED :KEY PLG OCCURRED ON US-ONLY SYSTEMSSIPRNET IS US-ONLY; NOT DESIGNED FOR COALITION OPSCURRENT POLICIES PREVENT REQUIRED PORTING FROM US-ONLY TO COALITION SYSTEMSINFO RELEASE WAS BY EXCEPTIONCENTCOM/s MULTI-TIERED APPROACH: CENTRIX FOR ABCA PARTNERS MULTIPLE NETWORKS FOR OTHER COALITION PARTNERS RESTRICTED SIPRNET ACCESS US-MANNED SIPRNET WORKSTATIONSWHAT SHOULD BE DONE :APPLY TECHNOLOGY AND POLICY CHANGES FOR GREATER INDIA APIRATIONS IN 2050.DEVP AND WARGAME SOFTWARE CAPABLE OF HANDLING MULTI NATIONAL FORCE OPS.INVEST IN R & D 104. TACTICAL INTELLIGENCEFINDING : THE ABILITY TO STRIKE, MVRE AND GENERATE EFFECTS GENERALLYEXCEEDED CAPABILITIES TO OBSERVE EN ACTIONS, DETERMINE INTENTIONS, SEE ENADAPTATIONS, SP TARGETING OR MEASURE EFFECTS. ALL SATLS , MANNED AC UAVs &UUVs WORKED IN CONCERT WITH REAL TIME INFO ON VIS FORMATS. TRANSITION OFTHIS INFO INTO INT GAVE INPUTS FOR A COMB CUTTING EDGE. THE COLATION THUSHAD AN UNFAIR ADVANTAGE OF INSIDE THE ENS DECISION LOOP THEREBY PRE-EMPTING EVERY IRAQI TAC.CONTEXT : OP CDRS AND STAFF BELIEVED INT WAS ADEQUATE FOR BATTLE COMMAND. TAC CDRS (CORPS AND BELOW) DESCRIBED EVERY BATTLE AS A MOV TO CONTACTDUE TO INSUFFICIENT, TIMELY INFO ON THE EN AND ON EFFECTS ACHIEVED IN SETTINGTHE CONDITIONS.WHY IT HAPPENED :BEST TAC INT WAS UAV, KIOWA AND LONGRANGE SURVEILLANCE (NETWORKED)SOME SUCCESSES IN HUMINT (SF, OGA)ISR PRIORITISED TO HIGHER HQLTD TAC SENSORS (FEW UAVs)POOR ASSESSMENT PROCESSES AND MEANSWHAT SHOULD BE DONE :PROCURE UAVs UPTO BDE LEVEL.PRIORITIZE TIME SENSITIVE TARGETING NEEDSDEVELOP SYSTEMS APPROACH TO ASSESSMENT 105. LOGISTICSFINDING : LGS DISTR AND MGMNT SYS, WEAKNED BY LATE DEPLOYMENT OF SP UNITS, FAILED TOADEQUATELY SP THE REQMTS OF OIF FORCES. V CORPS & 1 MEF OUTRAN SUP LINES.CONTEXT : DECADE-LONG EFFORT TO DIGITISE LGS, ADOPT BUSINESS PRACTICES AND PROMOTEEFFICIENCY OVER EFFECTIVENESS INSUFFICIENT FOR CONTEMPORARY OP ENVIRONMENT.WHY IT HAPPENED :THEATER SP VESSEL BIG SUCCESSLGS OVER THE SHORE WORKED WELLLGS UNITS AND ENABLERS DEPLOYED LATEPOOR IN TRANSIT VISIBILITY OF SUPINSUFFICIENT STOCKS IN THATER (FOOD)REPAIR PARTS CYCLE INEFFECTIVE FOR HIGH TEMPO, OFFENSIVE OPSLGS AUTOMATION TOO COMPLEXSUP AND SERVICE FUNCTIONS STOVEPIPEDEXTENDED LOCs (NEARLY 700-MILE SUPPORT OF MEF)WHAT SHOULD BE DONE :REVIEW LGS DOCTRINELGS AUTOMATIONINHERENT SURGE CAPACITY TO BE BUILT IN LGS SYS.DEPLOY LGS NODES AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. 106. SPECIAL FORCES 107. EMP OF SF CREATING DIVERSION TO MAIN ASLT. PRECISION TARGETTING. INT GATHERING. SCUD HUNTING. QUAIL HUNTING. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE. PSY OPS 108. LESSONS ON EMP OF SF EST COMD AND CONT STRUCTURE AT HIGHEST POL MIL LEVELS EVOLVE A JT DOCTRINE FOR SF OS.. GREATER JT TRG WITH THREE SERVICES. JT EQPT PROCUREMENT SHOULD BE PROMOTED FOR SF. QUALITY OVER QTY 109. LESSONS FOR THE AIRFORCE 110. LESSONS FOR THE AIRFORCE INTEROPERABILITY-NEED FOR INTEGRATED COMD STRUCTURE. COMD AND CONTROL NEEDS TO BE NET CENTRIC. EFFECT BASED BOMBING CMPT TGT MODELLING FOR WPN EFFECTASSESSMENT. MIN COLLATERAL DAMAGE USE PGMs, C4I2SR. USE OF J-STARS - SCALED DOWN VERSION FOR INDIA REQD. PGMs. INTERDICTION(AIR WAR) v/s CLOSE AIR SP(GRND WAR) . BOMBING DIAL A BOMB- SENSOR-SHOOTER TIME 4-7 MINS. HEPTRS- MVRE ARM- TAC OF HOVER & FIRE; LACK OF SPARES & VINTAGE UAVs LOOK OVER THE FENCE CAPABILITY. SPACE POWER GRND CDRS HAD PORTABLE DEVICES FOR DIRECT TGTIMAGE. STEALTH EXPENSIVE IN PRESENT STAGE FOR INDIA. AWACS BIG EYE LOOKS AT ALL. AE FUELLING ENHANCE RG (PARTICUALRLY OPS IN NORTH) AND NO OF SORTIES LACK OF COMPATABILITY NAVY PROBE AND DROGUE TYPE V/S USAF BOOM TYPE 111. LESSONS FOR THE AF INNOVATIVE TACS F 18 SUPER HORNET OR SUPER TANKER USEDIN DUAL ROLE STRIKE AC AND TANKER. USE FWD OP BASE BY HARRIER FORREFUELLING AND REARMING INSTEAD OFRETURNING TO AC CARRIER. FRATRICIDE PATRIOT MSL SYS ( THREE INSTANCS) 23 MAR RAF TORNADO SHOT NEAR KARBALA. 25 MAR LOCKED ONTO F 16;AC RESPONDED BYHARM RDR DESTR. 2 APR F 18 SHOT DOWN. 112. LESSONS FOR THE NAVY 113. LESSONS FOR NAVY SEA LIFT HY EQPT/ SUP & SUBSTITUTE FOR LAND BASES ( AVOIDTURKEY LIKE SIT). CARRIERS USED AS AIR BASES. JOINT FIRES ( OP MVRES FROM STRAT DISTANCES. SF (SEALS) PREVENTED DESTR OF GAS & OIL PLATFORM.. BLOCKING SLOCS IMPORTANT. FLEXIBILITY FOR MVRE AND APPLICATION OF COMB POWER. INNOVATIONS USE OF DOLPHINS AND UUVs(UNMANNEDUNDERWATER VEHS) FOR DEMINING OPS. SAVED TIME BYDISCRIMINATING BETWEEN MINES AND DEBRIS. 114. MISCELLANEOUS LESSONS(THE SEARCH FOR WMDs IN BACKGRND ) 115. MISCELLANEOUS LESSONS UNITY OF COMMAND. TECHNOLOGY. COMMUNICATIONS. PSY OPS INCL MEDIA MGMT. WAR INITIATION AND END STATE ASYMMETRY. SPACE WARFARE POLITICAL / DIPLOMATIC ROLE OF UN. 116. UNITY OF COMD SINGLE THEATRE CDR TOMMY FRANKS. LAND / AIR / NAVAL FORCE COMPONENT CDRS HANDLEDOIF UNDER TOMMY THUS MACRO LEVEL SYNERGY. PERMITTED GREATER JOINTNESS / INTERACTIVE OPS. INTER-SERVICE RIVALRY OF US ARMY v/s USAF v/s USNAVY v/s US MARINES WAS MITIGATED GREATLY DUE TOSINGLE THEATRE CDR - 117. MISCELLANEOUS LESSONS COMMUNICATIONS. .INTEGRATION OF INTER SERVICEC4I2 AT OP AND THEATRE LEVEL. .INDIGENOUS BACK UP. .ELECTRONIC WARFARE IN NONCOMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT. 118. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONSANALYSIS PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ANDPROPAGANDA MAJOR COMPONENTOFUS WAR FIGHTING CONCEPT. MAJOR FUNDS AND CONSIDERABLEINFRASTRUCTURE COMMITTED.US HAS A PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS COMMAND ANDPSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS UNITS ATCORPS LEVEL. 119. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONSAPPLICABLITYTARGET THE MINDS OF ENEMY GLORIFY STRENGTH OF OWNARMED FORCES.DEDICATED PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS CELL AT CORPSLEVEL. 120. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONSAPPLICABLITYPSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONSCONCEPTS AT NATIONAL LEVEL.PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONSTHEMES - PROJECT INDIAN STANCE.STRENGTHEN THE REACH ANDCREDIBILITY OF OWN PRINT ANDELECTRONIC MEDIA. 121. SPACEWARFAREIMP OF SPACE BASEDSENSORS WAS AMPLYDEMO.DESPITEDOMINATION OF THISREALM BYTHECOALITION, IRAQCONTINUED TO HAVEACCESS TO SATL FOR TVTXN AND MADE GOODUSE OF ARAB FRIENDLYMEDIA TO PROPOGATEITS CASE. 122. STATUS OF THE UN RECONSTRUCTION POSTWAR : THE UN CAN DOTHINGS BETTER 123. POLITICAL / DIPLOMATIC ROLE OF UN INFLUENCE OF UN APPARENT AMERICAN USAGE OF UN WPNS INSPECTORS TO GAININT ALLOW UNMOGIP INTO FWD AREAS WITH CAREAND DUE THOUGHT AND INDO US JT EXS. EFFORTS APPARENT ? MAYBE THERE WAS POLITICALWILL TO CONDUCT OIF COME WHAT MAY. UN ROLE IMP FOR DPLY OF IMF / WB / MNCs FOR DEVPOF IRAQ TO PREVENT US / UK GOBBLING UP MAJ SHAREOF IRAQ PIE. NEED TO BUILD IN SAFEGUARDS INTO UN PROCEDURESTO OBVIATE RECURRENCE OF SUCH DOORMATTREATMENT OF UN BY AMERICA. 124. EMERGING SIT SOCIO POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS ROAD MAP. PLAYERS UN ASSISTANCE PROBLEMS SOLUTIONS / OPTIONS 125. SOCIO POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS RESURGENCE OF SHIAS IN IRAQ. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM. ARAB - KURD HOSTILITIES. IRAQI GOVERNING COUNCIL. AYATULLAH SISTANI GENIE 126. AYATULLAH SISTANI INSISTED ON A SPEEDED UP TIMETABLE FOR ELECTIONS. BRUSHED ASIDE BREMERS SCHEME OF SELECTION OF INTERIM RULERS IN DEC 03. OBJECTED ON TWO CLAUSES IN THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION LAST MINUTE KILL. SISTANIS SHOW OF POWER WITHOUT APPEARING PUBLICALLY. 127. ROAD MAP EVENTACHIEVED 19 MAR 03 G DAY.YES 09 APR 03 OIF COMPLETEYES( SADDAM CAPTURED) 12 MAR 04 RATIFICATION OF STYMIED BYINTERIM CONSTITUTION BY IRAQI AYATULLAHGOVERNING COUNCIL. 30 JUN 04 US TO HANDOVER????SOVREIGNETY 128. PLAYERS UPSTART MUQTADA AL SADR. MODERATE CLERIC AYATULLAHSISTANI WIELDING REAL POWER. US OIL INTERESTS. OTHER G 7 NATIONS INTEREST IN THEOIL PIE OF IRAQ. 129. UN ASSISTANCE / ROLE US NEED TO LEGITIMISE DEPLOYING IMF /WB FUNDS. DEVP PROJECTS FOR INFRATRUCTURE. RE-ENGAGE NEW IRAQ IN WORLDECONOMICS AT ZERO INTENSITYCONFLICT. 130. PROBLEMS CONTINUING LOW INTENSITY URBAN CONFLICT(LIUC) OP VIGILANT RESOLVE. 1 MEF OPS IN FALLUJAH SUNNI STRONGHOLD. HY CAS FALLUJAH SEIGE SEEMINGLY UNITED SUNNI TO SHIAAGAINST COMMON EN AMERICANS. MAHDI ARMY OPS. 04 APR 03 WITHIN HRS OF SADDAMS CAPTURE, SADRMILITIA SWARMED EASTERN BAGHDAD, TOOK OVER CONTOF MOSQUES, HOSPITALS, CIVIC OFFICES, REOPENEDSCHOOLS, ORG SECURITY, RAIDED WPNS FACTORIESFORMERLY UNDER BAATH CONT. MONEY NOW FLOWS IN FOR SADR FROM THE MOSQUES ITCONTROLS. BREMERS ORDER TO SIEZE AL HAWZA NEWSPAPER OFFICEAND ARREST YACOUBI (SADRS DY), PROVIDED MUQTADAAL SADR THE OPPORTUNITY TO LAUNCH MASS MAYHEM.WITH A 6-10,000 STRONG FORCE SADR CAN BE A MAJ THORNFOR THE US. 131. PROBLEMS (LIUC) IFF ( IRAN FOE OR FRIEND). TEHRAN GIVES SP TO THE SUPREME COUNCILOF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAQ, THE ANTISADDAM EXILE GP NURTURED FOR 20 YRS.THIS WILL GIVE ADDL FUNDS TO SADR . 132. PROBLEMS SELECTION OF IRAQI GOVERNING COUNCIL PATTERENED ON LOYA JIRGA. NON ACCEPTANCE OF CLAUSES IN INTERIMCONSTITUTION BY THE AYATULLAH. OVERALL RESENTMENT AGAINST USOCCUPATIONAL FORCES. FAST APCH SELF DECLARED DEADLINE OF30 JUN BY US ADM. BOOTS ON GRND TOO FEW. CASUALTY FIGS. 133. MOLDOVA 24 MACEDONIA 28KAZAKHSTAN 29 PROBLEMS: TOO FEW ESTONIA 55BOOTS ON GRND NEW 60 GEORGIA 70 TPS TO CIVILIANS RATIO ALBANIA 70 NORTHERN IRELAND 20 : 1000CZECH REP 80PHILIPPINES 96 IRAQ REQUIRES 50,000 TPS. SLOVAKIA 105 PROBLEM FOR US LITHUANIA105 PRESENTLY DPLY 120,000 ( 135,000 FOR LATVIA 121 ROTATION OF TPS)PORTUGAL 128 NO MORE TP CONTRIBUTING NATIONSNORWAY 150FORTHCOMINGAZERBAIJAN 151 MONGOLIA 180SINGAPORE 200 NICARAGUA 230DOMINICAN300 HUNGARY 300 EI SALVADOR360HONDURAS370THAILAND460 BULGARIA470TROOPSDENMARK 496JAPAN560LEAVINGROMANIA 700 IRAQSOUTH KOREA 700AUSTRALIA850NETHERLANDS1100CRACKS IN THE COALITION SPAIN 1300 UKRAINE1700 SPAINS DEFECTION FROM IRAQ, ALONG WITHPOLAND2400ESCALATING VIOLENCE, HAS LED OTHER ITALY 2700 ALLIES TO RETHINK THEIR COMMITMENT TOTHE COALITION.0 500 100015002000 25003000 134. SOLUTIONS / OPTIONS OPTION I INCR DPLY UK HAS DECIDED TO SEND IN 4000 ADDL TPS FOR FALLUJA. OPTION II DELAY SELF IMPOSED DEADLINE OF 30 JUN 04. SIKDAR BRAHIMI SAYS LET THE IRAQI BE DESPARATE FOR A SOLUTION; THEN THEY WILL WANT AND THEY WILL ENSURE IT. OPTION III - DECLARE MSN ACCOMPLISHED AND LEAVE VIETNAM FORMULATION. 135. Building democracy in a post war Iraq willrequire a dramatic change of attitude forall those concerned. If done right, theMiddle East will never be the same. Ifdone wrong, the world wont ever be thesame. -New York Times26 Feb 03 136. CONCLUSION 137. SIGNPOSTS TO THE FUTURE INTERDEPENDECE JT WARFIGHTING. CONVERGENCE USAF/NAVY NO GLOBAL CHALLENGE ; THEREFORE SP US ARMY IN FUTURE. ADHOCERY SETTING UP AD HOC FMNS - NEED BASED. SPECIAL OPS S-G-A SEQUENCE. SPEED DISLOC EN BY REACHING WELL BEFORE HE ANTICIPATES 350 MILES IN 3 WEEKS. KNOWLEDGE A NEED TO KNOW THE GROUND TRUTH. 138. SIGNPOSTS TO THE FUTURE PRECISION PGMs : GULF I 7 % ; GULF II 65 % SIMULTANIETY SIMULTANEOUSLY STRIKE FWD /DEPTH AREAS LAND / AIR / SEA PHY / PSY. DISPERSION WITH PGMs DEFENDER WILL DISPERSE ,SO WILL THE ATTACKER. VOIDS IN SPACE & TIME NEED TO BEFACTORED IN. ADAPTABILITY ABILITY TO MOV WITHIN ENSDECISION MAKING CYCLE DETERMINES VICTORIES. QUALITY IN MEN , MTRL AND DECISIONS. TRG, LEADERSHIP AND EDUCATION BOYNE SAYS THAT THE GREATEST STRENGH OF THE USFORCES WAS ITS EDUCATED NCO CADRE, CAPABLE OFINTELLIGENT DECISIONS. 139. PROBABLY CIA BRIBES DID WORK IN SUBVERTING MANY IRAQI CDRS /TPS IN SECOND TIER DEFS. SADDAMS UBIQUITOUS REPUBLICAN GDS SIMPLY NEVERFOUGHT THE MOTHER OF ALL BATTLES AS THEY SAW THEWRITING ON THE WALL AND A CHANCE TO MELT WITH THECIV. IRAQI AC WERE FLOWN OFF TO IRAN / SYRIA AND THE LEFTOVER WERE SIMPLY UNUSABLE PILOTS / US AIRSUPERIORITY. MEDINA DIV WAS IN PEACE TIME TASKED TO QUELL SHIAREVOLTS NEAR BAGHDAD SO WHERE DID IT HAVE THE TRGTO WARD OFF THE US MIGHT. UNIFORMED IRAQI SOLDIERS WAS A DECEPTION THEREWAS NO TRG TO MOST, EXCEPT PLEDGING ALLEGIANCE TOSADDAM WAS CONSIDERED ENOUGH. IRAQI 5 CORPS WAS WAITING TO SURRENDER EN MASSEITMADE SENSE TO LIVE ON AFTER THEY WERE DELIVEREDFROM THE DEVIL ( TO THE DEEP SEA OF UNCERTAINITY ASPOST OIF IRAQ GRAPPLES WITH LIC).