Guide Report Consti

18
Freedom of Expression Article III Constitution Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. Cases !rotected Speech New York Times v US Facts In "#$", during rising tensions over the undeclared %ietnam &ar, the New 'or( )imes attained top*secret articles based on the "#+ study, - istory of /.S. 0ecision 1a(ing !rocess on %iet Nam !olicy.2 )he New 'or( )imes analy3ed the articles for several months, and on une "5, "#$", it began publication. After the third set of articles w published, the 0epartment of ustice sought an in6unction to halt any further publication. )he next day, the /nited States obtained a restraining order prohibiting further publication until une "#. Shortly after, the 0istrict Court denied the government7s re8uest for a preliminary in6unction, but a Circuit Court 6udge prolonged the restraining order to give the Court of Appeals for the 0istric Columbia ade8uate time to consider the government7s case.

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Transcript of Guide Report Consti

Freedom of Expression
Article III Constitution
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of 
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
Cases
Facts
 In "#$", during rising tensions over the undeclared %ietnam &ar, the
New 'or( )imes attained top*secret articles based on the "#+ study,
 -istory of /.S. 0ecision 1a(ing !rocess on %iet Nam !olicy.2
)he New 'or( )imes analy3ed the articles for several months, and on
une "5, "#$", it began publication. After the third set of articles was
published, the 0epartment of ustice sought an in6unction to halt any
further publication.
)he next day, the /nited States obtained a restraining order
prohibiting further publication until une "#.
Shortly after, the 0istrict Court denied the government7s re8uest for a
preliminary in6unction, but a Circuit Court 6udge prolonged the
restraining order to give the Court of Appeals for the 0istrict of 
Columbia ade8uate time to consider the government7s case.
 
9n une ::, the Circuit Court remanded the case to the trial court for
determination of whether any of the future publications -posed such
grave and immediate danger to the security of the country as to
warrant prior restraint and a continued stay of publication.2 )he New
'or( )imes appealed the Circuit Court7s decision to the Supreme Court.
Issue Is the ;irst Amendment violated when the /nited States,
during wartime, prohibits a newspaper from publishing sensitive
articles which may cause security concerns for the /nited States<
Holding 'es. =+*5> 1a6ority . ?lac(, . 0ouglas, . ?rennan, .
Stewart, . &hite, . 1arshall. 1inority C.. ?urger, . arlan, .
?lac(man@
!er Curiam 0ecision )he decision of the Court stated that the
government -carries a heavy burden2 of providing 6ustification for
restraining the freedom of expression granted by the Constitution.
)he lower courts held that the government had not met that burden,
with which the Supreme Court agreed. )hus, the order of the Court of 
Appeals for the 0istrict of Columbia was affirmed and the stays
entered on une :, "#$", were vacated.
1a6ority 9pinions ustices ?lac( and 0ouglas wrote 6oint concurring
opinions in which they condemned the government7s actions, calling it
a -flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the ;irst
Amendment.2 ?lac( and 0ouglas stated that the language of the ;irst
Amendment is clear and supports the view that -the press must be left
free to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship,
in6unctions or prior restraints.2 )hey further concluded that to give the
!resident the power to withhold certain articles from the press would
 
and security of the very people the government hopes to ma(e
secure.2 Bastly, ?lac( and 0ouglas discussed the issue of 
governmental secrecy, calling it anti*democratic, and noted that, -open
debate and discussion of public issues are vital to our nation7s health.2 
ustices Stewart and &hite 6oined in concurring opinions. )hey held
that an -alert, aware, and free2 press most critically serves the
purpose of the ;irst Amendment. ;urther, they reasoned that in the
absence of an informed and free press, there cannot be -enlightened2 
people. ;inally, Stewart and &hite argued that while a need for
secrecy exists in many national defense issues -the responsibility must
be where the power is.2 Since the xecutive is given a large, unshared
power in foreign affairs and national security, its duty must be to
 -determine and preserve the degree of internal security necessary to
exercise that power successfully.2 
)he ma6ority clearly frowned on the actions of the xecutive. )he six
concurring ustices in this case agreed that issuing an in6unction, a
prior restraint, would be a harsh violation of the ;irst Amendment
regardless of the -secret2 nature of the proposed publishings.
0issenting 9pinions Chief ustice ?urger wrote the first dissent,
stating, -the ;irst Amendment right itself is not an absolute.2 e
argued that the ;irst Amendment does not protect situations where
secret, stolen articles are published by a newspaper. e concluded
that since ;irst Amendment absolutism had never commanded a
ma6ority of the Supreme Court, it need not protect these types of 
cases involving stolen materials.
?urger continued his opinion scorning the New 'or( )imes for its lac(
of responsibility in dealing with the -illegally ac8uired2 materials.
?urger contended that it would have not been unreasonable or
 
anticipated the governmentDs reaction. ?urger found it -hardly
believable2 that a respected newspaper would fail to act upon one of 
the -basic and simple duties of every citi3en2 in regard to the discovery
of possession of stolen property.
New York Times v US
)he !entagon !apers, officially (nown as -istory of /.S. 0ecision*
1a(ing !rocess on %iet Nam !olicy,2 were illegally copied and then
lea(ed to the press. )he New 'or( )imes and the &ashington !ost had
obtained the documents. Acting at the EovernmentDs re8uest, the
/nited States district court in New 'or( issued a temporary in6unction
Fa court orderFthat directed the New 'or( )imesnot to publish the
documents. )he Eovernment claimed that the publication of the
papers would endanger the security of the /nited States. )he New
'or( )imes appealed the order to the /nited States Supreme Court,
arguing that prior restraintFpreventing publicationFviolated the "st
Amendment.
ISSUE
0id the Nixon administrationDs efforts to prevent the publication of 
what it termed Gclassified informationG violate the ;irst Amendment<
'S
RTI!
In its per curiam opinion the Court held that the government did not
 
in this case. ustices ?lac( and 0ouglas argued that the vague word
GsecurityG should not be used Gto abrogate the fundamental law
embodied in the ;irst Amendment.G ustice ?rennan reasoned that
since publication would not cause an inevitable, direct, and immediate
event imperiling the safety of American forces, prior restraint was
un6ustified.
Facts of t#e $ase
)he defendants were convicted on the basis of two leaflets they
printed and threw from windows of a building. 9ne leaflet signed
GrevolutionistsG denounced the sending of American troops to Hussia.
)he second leaflet, written in 'iddish, denounced the war and /S
efforts to impede the Hussian Hevolution. )he defendants were
charged and convicted for inciting resistance to the war effort and for
urging curtailment of production of essential war material. )hey were
sentenced to : years in prison.
ISSUE
0o the amendments to the spionage Act or the application of those
amendments in this case violate the free speech clause of the ;irst
Amendment<
No and no. )he actDs amendments are constitutional and the
defendantsD convictions are affirmed. In Clar(eDs ma6ority opinion, the
leaflets are an appeal to violent revolution, a call for a general stri(e,
and an attempt to curtail production of munitions. )he leaflets had a
tendency to encourage war resistance and to curtail war production.
olmes and ?randeis dissented on narrow ground the necessary
intent had not been shown. )hese views were to become a classic
libertarian pronouncement.
Facts
;ive plaintiffs were charged and convicted of conspiring to violate the
provisions of the spionage Act. )hey wrote, printed, and distributed
pamphlets in N', which critici3ed the /S &ar !rogram in Hussia. )hey
claim that it7s their intention to prevent in6ury to the Hussian cause>
their immediate reason was resentment caused by the /S gov7t
sending troops into Hussia as a strategic operation against the
Eermans on the eastern battlefront.
ISSUE
RU%IN&
)he SC held that there was a violation of the spionage Act. 1en must
be held to have intended, and to be accountable for, the effects which
their acts were li(ely to have produces. )he possible effect of their acts
was the defeat of the /S war program. ;urther, the plain purpose of 
their propaganda was to excite dissatisfaction, sedition, riots, and
 
revolution in the /S, to defeat /S military plans in urope. Note the
olmes dissent, which discussed the theory that the constitution is a
mere experiment> we should not see( too much certainty from rules.
e further said that intent must be clearly shown, and used in a strict
and accurate sense, since it was not shown that petitioners did, in fact,
attac( the government.
"rams v US
'rief Fact Summar(.
during the Hussian Hevolution were upheld because their speech was
not protected by the /nited States Constitution JConstitutionK based
on the -clear and present danger2 test.
S(nopsis of Rule of %aw.
1en must be held to have intended and to be accountable for the
effects, which their acts are li(ely to produce.
;acts. )he 0efendants, Abrams and others J0efendantsK were Hussian
immigrants. )he 0efendant were self*proclaimed revolutionists and
anarchists who wrote and distributed thousands of circulars advocating
a general stri(e and appealing to wor(ers in ammunitions factories to
stop the production of weapons to be used against Hussian
revolutionaries. )hey were convicted under "#" amendments to the
spionage Act that prohibited the curtailment of production of 
materials necessary to the prosecution of war against Eermany with
intent to hinder its prosecution.
 
Issue. &hether the 0efendants7 speech was protected by the ;irst
Amendment of the Constitution<
Held. No. 1en must be held to have intended and to be accountable
for the effects which their acts are li(ely to produce. )he plain purpose
of 0efendants7 propaganda was to excite, at the supreme crisis of war,
disaffection, sedition, riots and as they hoped, revolution in this
country for the purpose of embarrassing and if possible defeating the
military plans of the Eovernment in urope. )herefore, their speech is
not protected by the ;irst Amendment of the Constitution.
Assembly and !etition
Facts !hilippine ?looming mployees 9rgani3ation J!?19K decided
to stage a mass demonstration in front of 1alacaLang to express their
grievances against the alleged abuses of the !asig !olice.
After learning about the planned mass demonstration, !hilippine
?looming 1ills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the
!?19. 0uring the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed
by the union. ?ut it was stressed out that the demonstration was not a
 
inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of 
speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.
)he company as(ed them to cancel the demonstration for it would
interrupt the normal course of their business, which may result in the
loss of revenue. )his was bac(ed up with the threat of the possibility
that the wor(ers would lose their 6obs if they pushed through with the
rally.
A second meeting too( place where the company reiterated their
appeal that while the wor(ers may be allowed to participate, those
from the "st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to
participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late
to cancel the plan, the rally too( place and the officers of the !?19
were eventually dismissed for a violation of the MNo Stri(e and No
Boc(out7 clause of their Collective ?argaining Agreement.
)he lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the
!?19 were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. )he Court of 
Industrial Helations for being filed two days late subse8uently denied
their motion for reconsideration.
Issue &hether or not the wor(ers who 6oined the stri(e violated the
C?A.
Held No. &hile the ?ill of Hights also protects property rights, the
primacy of human rights over property rights is recogni3ed. ?ecause
these freedoms are Gdelicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
 
exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions,G
they Gneed breathing space to survive,G permitting government
regulation only Gwith narrow specificity.G !roperty and property rights
can be lost thru prescription> but human rights are imprescriptible. In
the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of 
assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions> and such
priority Ggives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions.G
RTI!
)he freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when
directed against public officials or Gwhen exercised in relation to our
right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed.2 
;ree Speech and Suffrage
Facts !etitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the
mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and
time for political advertisements> two J:K individuals who are
candidates for office Jone for national and the other for provincial
officeK in the coming 1ay "##: elections> and taxpayers and voters
who claim that their right to be informed of election Issue and of 
 
Section "" JbK amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles
out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only
publications of a particular content, namely, media*based election or
political propaganda during the election period of "##:. It is asserted
that the prohibition is in derogation of mediaDs role, function and duty
to provide ade8uate channels of public information and public opinion
relevant to election Issue. ;urther, petitioners contend that Section ""
JbK abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the
suppression of media*based campaign or political propaganda except
those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on
Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a
substantial reduction in the 8uantity or volume of information
concerning candidates and Issue in the election thereby curtailing and
limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.
Issue &hether or Not Section "" JbK of Hepublic Act No.
++4+constitutional.
Held 'es. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the ?ill
of Hights, which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression
and freedom of the press, has to be ta(en in con6unction with Article
I JCK J4K which may be seen to be a special provision applicable
during a specific limited period F i.e., Gduring the election period.G In
our own society, e8uality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public
 
have at oneDs disposal, is clearly an important value. 9ne of the basic
state policies givenconstitutional ran( by Article II, Section :+ of the
Constitution is the egalitarian demand that Gthe State shall guarantee
e8ual access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law.G )he essential 8uestion is whether
or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a
permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the
operations of communication and information enterprises during an
election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible
supervision or regulation of mediaoperations so as to constitute
unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the
press. )he Court considers that Section "" JbK has not gone outside
the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media
operations during election periods.
Section "" JbK is limited in the duration of its applicability and
enforceability. ?y virtue of the operation of Article I JCK J4K of the
Constitution, Section "" JbK is limited in its applicability in time to
election periods. Section "" JbK does not purport in any way to restrict
the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or
news*worthy events relating to candidates, their 8ualifications, political
parties and programs of government. 1oreover, Section "" JbK does
not reachcommentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by
reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in
respect of candidates, their 8ualifications, and programs and so forth,
so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact
advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum,
Section "" JbK is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary
 
forpolitical office. Section "" JbK as designed to cover only paid
political advertisements of particular candidates.
)he limiting impact of Section "" JbK upon the right to free speech of 
the candidates themselves is not unduly repressive or unreasonable.
National )ress $lu" v $omelec
1arch "##: . ;eliciano
F$TS
!etitioners are
". representatives of the mass media which are prevented from
selling or donating space and time for political advertisements>
:. two J:K individuals who are candidates for office in the coming
1ay "##: elections>
5. taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of 
election issues and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed.
!etitioners argue that Sec "" JbK of Hepublic Act No. ++4+ invades
and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of 
expression.
". amounts to censorship co3 it selects and singles out for
suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications
of a particular content, namely, media*based election or political
propaganda during the election period of "##:.
:. is a derogation of mediaDs role, function and duty to provide
ade8uate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to
election issues
 
5. abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the
suppression of media*based campaign or political propaganda except
those appearing in the C91BC space of the newspapers and on
C91BC time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a
substantial reduction in the 8uantity or volume of information
concerning candidates and issues in the election thereby curtailing and
limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.
Sec ""JbK HA ++4+ lectoral Heforms Baw of "#$
!rohibited ;orms of lection !ropagandabK for any newspapers, radio
broadcasting or television
station, other mass media, or any person ma(ing use of the mass
media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for
campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as
provided under Sections # and #: of ?atas !ambansa ?lg. ".
ta(en together with Sections # and #: of ?.!. ?lg. ", 9mnibus
lection Code of the !hilippines
Sec. #. C91BC space. F )he Commission shall procure space in at
least one newspaper of general circulation wherein candidates can
announce their candidacy. Such space shall be allocated, free of 
charge, e8ually and impartially by the Commission among all
candidates
Sec. #:. C91BC time. F )he Commission shall procure radio and
television time which shall be allocated e8ually and impartially among
the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television
stations.
 
&9N sec ""JbK of HA ++4+ is unconstitutional. &9N the provisions
constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or
regulation of the operations of communication and information
enterprises during an election period
HE%+ , RTI!-
". No. sec ""JbK is not unconstitutional. )here exists a reasonable
nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned ob6ective.
!urpose e8uali3ing the situations of rich and poor candidates by
preventing the rich from en6oying the undue advantage offered by
political advertisements
1eans prohibit the sale or donation of print space and air time Gfor
campaign or other political purposesG except to the C91BC
JC91BC time O spaceK
!urpose is not only a legitimate one but it also has a constitutional
basis of the "#$ Constitution
Art I C sec 4. )he Commission =on lections@ may, during the election
period, supervise or regulate the en6oyment or utili3ation of all
franchises or permits ... Such supervision or regulation shall aim to
ensure e8ual opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply,
including reasonable, e8ual rates therefor, for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the
ob6ective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.
AH) II, sec :+ the egalitarian demand that Gthe State shall guarantee
e8ual access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law.G
:. 'es. Sec ""JbK is still within the permissible bounds of supervision P
regulation of media operations during the election period.
 
the rights of free speech and free press are not unlimited rights for
they are not the only important and relevant values even in the most
democratic of polities, e8uality of opportunity to proffer oneself for
public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one
may have at oneDs disposal is also an important value
such restrictive impact upon freedom of speech O freedom of the press
is circumscribed by certain limitations
". limited in the duration of its applicability O enforceability P
limited only during the election period from an ":* une ", "##:K
:. limited in its scope of application P it only covers political ads of 
particular candidates O does not extend to reporting of news or
commentaries or other expressions of belief
5. limitation exempts from its prohibition the purchase by or
donation to the C91BC of print space or air time, which space and
time C91BC is then affirmatively re8uired to allocate on a fair and
e8ual basis, free of charge,
among the individual candidates for elective public offices in the
province or city served by the newspaper or radio or television station.
F candidates are still given e8ual media exposure in the C91BC
time O space that shall give e8ual opportunities to all the candidates
irregardless of their financial status
Q Sec ""b does not cut off the flow of media reporting, opinion or
commentary about candidates, their 8ualifications and platforms and
promises. Newspaper, radio broadcasting and television stations
remain 8uite free to carry out their regular and normal information and
communication operations.
Q Sec ""b does not authori3e any intervention and much less
control on the part of C91BC in respect of the content of the normal
 
advertisements which the individual candidates are 8uite free to
present within their respective allocated C91BC time and C91BC
space.
Q )here is here no censorship, whether disguised or otherwise.
&hat Section "" JbK, viewed in context, in fact does is to limit paid
partisan political advertisements to fora other than modern mass
media, and to GC91BC timeG and GC91BC spaceG in such mass
media.
Q )he freedom of speech O access to media, not being absolute, its
limitation bears a clear and reasonable connection with the
constitutional ob6ective in e8uali3ing situations of the candidates in
order to promote e8ual opportunity, and e8ual time and space, for
political candidates to inform all and sundry about themselves.
Q )he nature and characteristics of modern mass media, especially
electronic media, cannot be totally disregarded. Hepetitive political
commercials when fed into the electronic media themselves constitute
invasions of the privacy of the general electorate. )he right of the
general listening and viewing public to be free from such intrusions
and their subliminal effects is at least as important as the right of 
candidates to advertise themselves through modern electronic media
and the right of media enterprises to maximi3e their revenues from
the mar(eting of Gpac(agedG candidates.
National )ress $lu" v $omelec
Facts
!etitioners herein were representatives of mass media which were
prevented from selling and donating space or air time for political
advertisements under HA ++4+.
ISSUE &hether or not HA ++4+ constitutes a violation of the
constitutional right to freedom of expression.
 
RU%IN& N9. )he Comelec has been expressly authori3ed by the
Constitution to supervise or regulate the en6oyment or utili3ation of 
the franchises or permits for the operation f media of communication
and information. )he fundamental purposes of such power are to
ensure Ge8ual opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply,G as
well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such
media facilities, in connection with Gpublic information campaigns and
forums among candidates.G
  9f course, the law limits the right of free speech and of access
to mass media of the candidates themselves. )he limitation however,
bears a clear and reasonable connection with the ob6ective set out in
the Constitution. ;or it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print
space and radio and television time that the resources of the