Guerilla War History Lesson
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Transcript of Guerilla War History Lesson
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These slides have been edited for release only to those with AKO access.
PLEASE NOTE THE FOLLOWING:
--These edited AKO slides are a rough guide to class flow, and are not afull substitute for the classroom session.
--They have been redacted for copyright and file-size reasons. Thus they
lack most of the pictures and other graphics seen in the classroom slides.
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INFANTRY BOLC-B
GUERILLA WARFARE HISTORY,
AND BATTLE ANALYSIS
MCoE DIRECTORATE OF TRAININGDr. Douglas N. Campbell
Military History InstructorFt Benning, GA
Bldg 4, Rooms 3308
PHONE: 706-626-2402
E-MAIL: [email protected]
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected] -
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Enter Infantry School OES into AKO Search; pick the URL that
says the same; then select IBOLC folder; then the Historyfolder; & then the Delta Co 7-12 Battle Analysis Guide file (or D
Co 7-12 BA Source or Guerilla War History Lesson)
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GUERILLA WARFARE HISTORY
AND BATTLE ANALYSIS
TLO: Analyze selected guerilla war campaigns and battles.
TLO: Write a battle analysis that describes and analyzes a
selected battle.
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TRADOC Says
Topical History: Guerilla Warfare (Insurgency)
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GUERILLA WARFARE
TLO: Analyze selected guerilla war campaigns and battles.
ELO: Define guerilla warfare
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GUERILLA WARFARE
--Military or paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or
hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces
(often associated with insurgency)
--Irregular warfare favors the war of the flea: indirect and
asymmetric (e.g., unconventional) approaches, though it may
employ the full range of military & other capacities
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CONVENTIONAL vs.
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
--Conventional warfare implies direct military confrontation
between regular armed forces, in which the enemys armed force
or specific war-making power is targeted.
--Unconventional warfare includes subversion, raids, robberies,
ambushes, assassinations, sabotage, spying, and rescue
conducted most often by irregular forces or by specially trained
regulars.
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GUERILLA WARFARE
TLO: Analyze selected guerilla war campaigns and battles.
ELO: Define guerilla warfare
ELO: Identify the main currents of guerilla warfare history.
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GUERILLA WARFARE
TLO: Analyze selected guerilla war campaigns and battles.
ELO: Define guerilla warfareELO: Identify the main currents of guerilla warfare history.
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GUERILLA WARFARE IS NOT NEW
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GUERILLA WARFARE IS NOT NEW
Indeed, in analyzing guerilla success or failure, we see repeated
themes from early through modern times . . . .
Guerilla Success
--Will & Popular support
Algerian citizens support urban guerilla
war against French Army
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GUERILLA WARFARE IS NOT NEW
Indeed, in analyzing guerilla success or failure, we see repeated
themes from early through modern times . . . .
Guerilla Success
--Over-stressed &/or bad govt/army
Americans
tar and feather
British tax collector.
The French execute Spanish rioters
and help spark the guerilla war in Spain.
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GUERILLA WARFARE IS NOT NEW
Indeed, in analyzing guerilla success or failure, we see repeated
themes from early through modern times . . . .
Guerilla Success
--Charismatic, and/or opportunistic leaders
Yugoslavias
TitoIrelands
Collins
Carolinas
Marion
Cubas
Castro
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GUERILLA WARFARE IS NOT NEW
Indeed, in analyzing guerilla success or failure, we see repeated
themes from early through modern times . . . .
Guerilla Success
--Discipline / organization / prep
--Intimidation / terror / provocation
Suicide bombers Tamil leader
Velupillai Prabhakaran
Viet Cong cadre
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GUERILLA WARFARE IS NOT NEW
Indeed, in analyzing guerilla success or failure, we see repeated
themes from early through modern times . . . .
Guerilla Success
--Favorable environment
--Sanctuary
--OUTSIDE HELP
The Afghan countryside
Allied commando teams
help the French Resistance.
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GUERILLA WARFARE IS NOT NEW
Indeed, in analyzing guerilla success or failure, we see repeated
themes from early through modern times . . . .
Guerilla Success
--Surprise
w/light, mobile, flex forces
--Asymmetric ops; war of the flea
American Patriot ambush Afghan Mujahedeen ambush
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GUERILLA WARFARE IS NOT NEW
Indeed, in analyzing guerilla success or failure, we see repeated
themes from early through modern times . . . .
Guerilla Success
--Mixed forces
--Timing
Viet Cong guerillas NVA regulars
Germans in 1944 Paris face an
uprising and Allied armies.
Warsaw Jews must go it
alone in 1943, and get
crushed.
AND COUNTER INSURGENCY (COIN) /
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AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY (COIN) /
COUNTER-GUERILLA OPS ARENT NEW EITHER
RECURRING COIN / COUNTER GUERILLA
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COIN / C-G Success
--AIM / focus / will
--Leadership /
legitimacy
--Popular support
(And if youre using allies, this applies BOTH to you and to the ally.)
RECURRING COIN / COUNTER-GUERILLA
THEMES IN HISTORY
Philippine Defense Minister
Ramon Magsaysay greets supporters
as Huk Rebellion subsides, 1953.
RECURRING COIN / COUNTER GUERILLA
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COIN / C-G Success
--Organization (of the whole effort) / discipline
Briggs, Thompson, and Templarget Britains Malayan COIN effort under control --
and then get the Malayan Insurgency under control.
RECURRING COIN / COUNTER-GUERILLA
THEMES IN HISTORY
RECURRING COIN / COUNTER GUERILLA
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COIN / C-G Success
--Deny aid
& sanctuary
-- isolate
Building the Morice Line
which cut guerilla traffic in
Algerian War
Successful coastal blockade,
Philippine War
Successful geographic, ethnic,
and strategic hamlet isolation,
Malayan Insurgency
RECURRING COIN / COUNTER-GUERILLA
THEMES IN HISTORY
RECURRING COIN / COUNTER GUERILLA
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COIN / C-G Success
--Divide & conquer; oil stain
Enlisting Filipino scouts
for the US Army,
Philippine Insurrection
British blockhouse,
Boer War
U.S. Army Apache scouts
RECURRING COIN / COUNTER-GUERILLA
THEMES IN HISTORY
RECURRING COIN / COUNTER GUERILLA
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COIN / C-G Success
--Intell, Surprise
--Light, mobile, flexible forces
Seminole guide
and Army scouts,
Second Seminole War
RECURRING COIN / COUNTER-GUERILLA
THEMES IN HISTORY
Britains Orde Wingate
and his Special Night Scouts help
suppress the 1930s Palestinian Uprising:
Ambush the ambushers and raid the
raiders.
RECURRING COIN / COUNTER GUERILLA
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COIN / C-G Success
--Violent force, but judiciously
--Conciliation
--Terms
Petraeus Kilcullen
Sons of Iraq with US and Iraqi soldiers
RECURRING COIN / COUNTER-GUERILLA
THEMES IN HISTORY
SOME GUERILLA WAR / INSURGENCY READINGS
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SOME GUERILLA WAR / INSURGENCY READINGS
--Asprey, Robert. War in the Shadows (encyclopedic history of g-war)--Beckett, Ian. The Roots of Counter-Insurgency--CSI Publications has several works that address insurgency/COIN:
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asp --Fall, Bernard. Street without J oy, andTheTwo Vietnams--Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice--Hammes,The Sling and the Stone--Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace (Algerian War)
--Joes, Anthony. Various works (mostly on COIN)--Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerilla--Laqueur, Walter. Guerilla Warfare (dated, but still a nice survey)--Marston and Malkasian. Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare--Moyar, Mark. A Question of Command
--Nagl, John. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife--ONeill, Bard. Insurgency and Terrorism--Poole, H. John. Various works (popular guides)
--Record, Beating Goliath--Taber, Robert. War of the Flea--Van Creveld,The Transformation of War
SOME AFGHANISTAN READINGS
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asphttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asp -
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SOME AFGHANISTAN READINGS
--Brooks. Eyewitness to War Volume III: US Army Advisors in Afghanistan(interviews)
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/EyewitnessToWar_Vol
umeIII_Brooks.pdf
--Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and BinLaden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001
--Courter, Jeff. Afghan Journal: A Soldiers Year in Afghanistan--Crile, George. Charlie Wilson's War--Feifer, Gregory. The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan--Grau, Lester. The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost;
andThe Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics inAfghanistan
--Grau, Lester, and Ali Ahmad Jalali. The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideenin the Soviet-Afghan War
--Jones, Seth. In the Graveyard of Empires: Americas War in Afghanistan
--Junger, Sebastian. War--Koontz, Christopher, ed. Enduring Voices: Oral Histories of the U.S. Army
Experience in Afghanistan, 2003-2005http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/enduring_voices/index.html
SOME AFGHANISTAN READINGS (cont )
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/EyewitnessToWar_Volhttp://www.history.army.mil/html/books/enduring_voices/index.htmlhttp://www.history.army.mil/html/books/enduring_voices/index.htmlhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/EyewitnessToWar_Vol -
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SOME AFGHANISTAN READINGS (cont.)
--Loyn, David. In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian, andAmerican Occupation
--MacPherson, Malcolm. Roberts Ridge
--Maley, William.The Afghanistan Wars--Matthews, Matt. An Ever Present Danger: A Concise History of British Military
Operations on the North-West Frontier, 1849-1947http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/csi.asp#global (scroll down to it)
--Matthews. We Have Not Learned How to Wage War There (Soviet experience)http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/MatthewsOP36.pdf
--Naylor, Sean. Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda--Potter. American Advisors: Security Force Assistance Model in the Long War
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/AmericanAdvisors.pdf
--Rasheed, Ahmad. (Two books)Taliban, and Descent into Chaos--Roe, Andrew. Waging War in Waziristan: The British Struggle in the Land of bin
Laden, 1849-1947--Rubin, Barnett.The Fragmentation of Afghanistan--Saikal, Amin. Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival--Tanner, Stephen. Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the
Fall of the Taliban
SOME AFGHANISTAN READINGS (cont )
http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/csi.asphttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/MatthewsOP36.pdfhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/AmericanAdvisors.pdfhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/AmericanAdvisors.pdfhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/MatthewsOP36.pdfhttp://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/csi.asp -
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SOME AFGHANISTAN READINGS (cont.)
--Tupper, Benjamin. Greetings From Afghanistan, Send More Ammo--US Army Combat Studies Institute. Wanat: Combat Action in Afghanistan, 2008
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asp (and then scroll down), or
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/Wanat.pdf--West, Bing. The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan--Woodward, Bob. Obamas Wars--Wright, Donald, et al. A Different Kind of War: The US Army in Operation
Enduring Freedom, October 2001-September 2005http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/docs/DifferentKindofWar.pdf
--Wright, Donald, ed. Vanguard of Valor: Small-Unit Actions in Afghanistanhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/VanguardOfValor.pd
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asphttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/Wanat.pdfhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/docs/DifferentKindofWar.pdfhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/VanguardOfValor.pdfhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/VanguardOfValor.pdfhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/docs/DifferentKindofWar.pdfhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/Wanat.pdfhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asp -
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OH BY THE WAY, OTHER SOURCES
--Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) website and its on-line library
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/archives.asp
--US Army Center for Military History (CMH) on-line publications
http://www.history.army.mil/bookshelves.html
--US Army Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Press on-line publications
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asp
--US Army History and Education Center (AHEC; formerly Military History
Institute) holdings
http://www.ahco.army.mil/site/index.jsp
GUERILLA WARFARE
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/archives.asphttp://www.history.army.mil/bookshelves.htmlhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asphttp://www.ahco.army.mil/site/index.jsphttp://www.ahco.army.mil/site/index.jsphttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asphttp://www.history.army.mil/bookshelves.htmlhttp://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/archives.asp -
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GUERILLA WARFARE
TLO: Analyze selected guerilla war campaigns and battles.
ELO: Define guerilla warfareELO: Identify the main currents of guerilla warfare history.
ELO: Recognize noteworthy guerilla warfare campaigns of the pre-
modern era
ELO: Recognize noteworthy guerilla warfare campaigns and
analyze selected guerilla warfare-related battles of themodern era, 1700s up to ~1900
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BLACK MINGO SWAMP
Swamp near Black River
14 September, 1780
Marions raid against isolated British
Loyalist (Tory) outpost
Patriot militia leaderFrancis Marion
v. Tory leader John Ball
~1,500 Patriot militia
v. ~800 Tory militia
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BLACK MINGO SWAMP
Preliminaries
--Aggravated locals support Marions rapid, mounted move
--Night, multi-axis attack
--Too much noise crossing a bridge
--Tories alerted; Marion presses the attack.
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BLACK MINGO SWAMP
Battle Summary
14 September 1780
--Dismounted frontal attack fails against intense Tory fire.
--Dismounted right-flank attack falters, then rallies.
--Left-flank mounted attack delivered with vigor.
--Tories panic and run.
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BLACK MINGO SWAMP
Analysis
Characteristics of the Offense
--Surprise
--Concentration
--Audacity
--Tempo
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THE PHILIPPINE WAR, 1899-1902
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FOR THE U.S., A CLASSIC COIN SUCCESS
--Political commitment in spite of controversies
--Naval blockade: isolate enemy & deny aid
--Outposts & small-unit interdiction
Environmental awareness
--Filipino constabulary: Isolate, Intell
--Aid, and conciliation politicsPolitical factors,
Legitimacy,
Awareness
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So with the Philippine War apparently
winding down,
A small-unit leader counter-insurgency
problem arises . . . .
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BALANGIGA MASSACRE
Isolated village on south coast of Samar Island
28 September 1901
--A local Filipino reaction to US Army companys bad policies as
Army tries to subdue rebellion on Samar Island
--CPT Thomas Connell
v. Valeriano Abador, village chief
--US Army, ~75 troops of C Company, 9th Infantry Regiment
v. ~500 townspeople and rebels
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BALANGIGA MASSACRE
Preliminaries
--Cultural unawareness
--Villagers and rebels plan well
--Clever placement of attackers fools lax Army security
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BALANGIGA MASSACRE
28 September 1901
Battle Summary / Result
--Pre-arranged signal strikes Army soldiers at breakfast
--Most guards eliminated by quick overwhelming attack.
--FOB overrun; Connell and half of company killed; the rest escape.
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BALANGIGA MASSACRE
28 September 1901Analysis
METT-TC
--Mission
--Enemy
--Terrain/Weather
--Troops/Support
--Time Awareness--Civil Considerations
GUERILLA WARFARE
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GUERILLA WARFARE
TLO: Analyze selected guerilla war campaigns and battles.
ELO: Define guerilla warfareELO: Identify the main currents of guerilla warfare history.
ELO: Recognize noteworthy guerilla warfare campaigns of the pre-
modern era
ELO: Recognize noteworthy guerilla warfare campaigns and analyze
selected guerilla warfare-related battles of the modern era, 1700s up to~1900
ELO: Recognize noteworthy guerilla warfare campaigns and
analyze more recent guerilla warfare-related battles.
GUERILLA WARFARE IN WW2
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GUERILLA WARFARE IN WW2
--Worked best mixed ops / outside help
--Timing was very important.
ROUGEMONT
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Small village east-northeast of Paris, rolling terrain
27 August 1944
ROUGEMONT
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Small village east-northeast of Paris, rolling terrain
27 August 1944
--Attempted French Forces Interior (FFI, Resistance) ambush ofretreating German units as Allies advance
--Attempted French Forces Interior (FFI, Resistance) ambush of
retreating German units as Allies advance
--Captains Godfrey Marchant and J. Chaigneau (Jedburgh
advisors), Major Dumont-Guillemet (FFI)
v. German commanders
--Jedburgh 3-man team & ~200-300 FFI
v. elements of PanzerLehrand 9th Panzer Divisions
ROUGEMONT
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Preliminaries
--FFI picks good ambush site
--FFI amateurs v. German professionals
--FFI poor armaments, & poor intell about targets
ROUGEMONT
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27 August 1944
Battle Summary / Result
--FFI is discovered and outgunned by German armor.
--Blocking force allows most FFI to escape, and then flees from
further German armored attacks.
--Ambush fails
ROUGEMONT
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Analysis (w/some Prelims & Summary)
Warfighting
Functions
--Mission Command
--Fires
--Intell
--Movement & Maneuver
--Protection
--Sustainment
--FFI picks good ambush site
--FFI amateurs
v. German professionals
--FFI poor armaments,
& poor intell about targets
--FFI discovered and outgunned
by German armor.
--Blocking force allows most FFI
to escape; then flees
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The American Experience in Vietnam (1961-1973)
We would not accept a communist Southeast Asia.
AMBUSH AT PHUOC AN
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Rice-paddy area near small village complex in Quang Ngai
Province, Evening, 18 June 1967
--Part of campaign to disrupt and interdict Viet Cong operationsagainst nearby Chu Lai air base
--SGT Lloyd Jones, squad leader)
v. Viet Cong (VC) patrol
--US Army, 2d Squad, 2d Platoon, C Co, 3d Bn, 21st infantry, U.S.
196th Light Infantry Bde (10-man squad)
v. VC patrol (~6+ troops)
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AMBUSH AT PHUOC AN
18 June 1967Preliminaries
--Intell on VC activity near villages
--Small teams with a mix of
weapons (including claymore
mines) and night-vision gear
--Positioned near trail junction &accounts for flanking threats
CLAYMORE
M16
M79
Viet Cong
AMBUSH AT PHUOC AN
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Battle Summary / Result
--About 6 VC approach; 4 enter the kill
zone and stop.
--Jones detonates claymore to
initiate ambush & prevent
premature detection
--VC pt-man mortally wounded
--General firing; VC scatter; firing VC
supporting fire suppressed
--Per ROE, no IDF support due to
nearby village
--2 confirmed VC KIA. Success?
CLAYMORE
M16
M79
Viet Cong
AMBUSH AT PHUOC AN
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18 June 1967
Analysis
Warfighting
Functions
--Command & Control
--Fires
--Intell
--Movement & Maneuver
--Protection
--Sustainment
--Small teams with a mix of weapons
(including claymore mines)
and night-vision gear
--Positioned near trail junction &
accounts for flanking threats
--Jones detonates claymore to initiate
ambush & preventpremature detection
--General firing; VC scatter; firing VC
supporting fire suppressed
--Per ROE, no IDF support due tonearby village
--2 confirmed VC KIA. Success?
BEFORE WE GET TO THE SOVIET AND US EXPERIENCE IN
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AFGHANISTAN, LETS LOOK AT ITS MODERN HISTORY
INSURGENCIES in AFGHANISTAN
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--Afghanistan
---It appeared as a political entity in the 1700s.
---It even briefly flourished as a small empire.
---But it struggled to remain whole.
WHY?
A TOUGH PLACE
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--We know the land is rugged.
--What justified an attempt to control the entire area?
--We have men and we have rocks in plenty,
but we have nothing else. -- Dost Muhammad
First Afghan War leader
A TOUGH PLACE
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--Breeds isolated, tough, and independent-minded people
--Pashtunwali (the Pashtuns ethical guide: hospitality,justice/vengeance; bravery; group loyalty; religion; personal
dignity; womans dignity)
--Intense group loyalty for all Afghans; & zan zar zamin: land,money, women: what any Afghan will allegedly fight for if
provoked re same
=A different concept of honor from what many in the West call
honor, but a strong sense of it nonetheless
--Religion: conservative, & revivals
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But for all of that, outsiders still like to meddle . . . .
--The Great Game with Russia drove British influence in
Afghanistan in the 1800s-early 1900s.
INSURGENCIES in AFGHANISTAN:
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INSURGENCIES in AFGHANISTAN:
First Anglo-Afghan War, 1839-42
--The underlying cause of the First Anglo-Afghan War was
Britain and Russias Great Game struggle for control/influence in
Central Asia. Britain incorrectly perceived that Afghan ruler Dost
Muhammad had allied himself with Russia; and thus in 1839 the
British Army entered Afghanistan via the Bolan Pass through
Kandahar, up through Ghazni (after an excellent reduction ofGhaznis fort), and then on to Kabul. Muhammad fled (later
surrendered) and the British emplaced an apparently more
favorable leader, Shah Shujah, on the throne. But there was no
local enthusiasm for Shujah, and the British Armys Sepoy troopswere uneasy about fighting outside of India proper.
INSURGENCIES in AFGHANISTAN:
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INSURGENCIES in AFGHANISTAN:
First Anglo-Afghan War, 1839-42 (cont.)
--The British hoped to secure peace through bribes and
manipulation of the disparate tribes, but their leaders made judgment
errors. They withdrew most of their best troops to India. The remaining
British general in Kabul, Wm. Elphinstone, was a weak leader and
deferred too much to the arrogant civil governor, Sir Wm. MacNaghten.
MacNaghten decided that, with Afghanistan apparently tranquil, the
British Kabul garrison could be moved from the imposing Bala Hissar
fortress to a low cantonment area a few miles away.
--Also, the British brought families, spurring culture clashes over
things like womens status. British troops fraternization with Kabuliwomen infuriated Kabuli men. A British attempt to build an Afghan Army
at the tribes expense engendered more ill will; and MacNaghtens
manipulative tactics failed to quell it.
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First Anglo-Afghan War, 1839-42 (cont.)
--Rebellions against the British started outside Kabul. A British
column returning to India had to fight its way through the KhyberPass in autumn 1840. Rebellion then erupted in Kabul in late
1841. The British response was weak and disorganized. The
supposedly reliable Shah Shujah increasingly favored the rebels.
--Rebellion escalated. By early 1842, Britains Kabuli force was in
dire straits and Elphinstone accepted a rebel offer of an amnesty
retreat east to Jalalabad. Undisciplined rebel groups attacked the
procession anyway; and except for Dr. Wm. Brydon, all British
were either killed or captured.
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First Anglo-Afghan War, 1839-42 (cont.)
--Britains response was brutal. In summer 1842, GENs Wm. Nott
and George Pollock advanced through the Bolan and KhyberPasses, and crushed all direct opposition. They also rescued the
remaining available captives.
--But the British did not stay because: (a) they did not want theextra commitment; and (b) they achieved an understanding with
the previous ruler, Dost Muhammad, that he would regain the
throne and ally with them and not the Russians.
Second Anglo-Afghan War 1879-80
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Second Anglo Afghan War, 1879 80
--The Second Anglo-Afghan War repeated the first one somewhat.
Upset over Afghan ruler Sher Ali Khans apparent
friendliness with the Russians, the British occupied much of the
country in 1879 and forced Alis successor, Muhammad Yaqub
Khan, to sign a treaty granting Britain various privileges. One of
these was an expanded British mission in Kabul, which was
massacred later that year in a Kabuli uprising after the BritishArmy returned to India.
--The returning British Armys punitive expeditions occasionally
struggled with Afghan forces (e.g., Maiwand), but they mostlydrubbed their opponents in conventional battles and regained
general control of key areas. Suspecting Yaqub of complicity in
the massacre of the mission, the British allowed Abdur Rahman to
take power.
Second Anglo-Afghan War, 1879-80
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--As with the first war, the British did not want to spend money and
resources occupying Afghanistan permanently. Indeed, a newly elected
British government under Wm. Gladstone wanted no overt imperialexpansion in that area. Instead they wanted and got a more compliant
Afghan leader who, in return for ample British subsidies, would maintain
some order and not let the Russians gain an advantage.
--Subsequent treaties set Afghan boundaries close to what exist today.The most notorious is the Durand Line, which mostly follows the
southern mountain range crest but also splits many Pashtun mountain
tribes between two national jurisdictions.
--Neither the Afghan leaders nor the British colonial authorities evercompletely controlled the people in the Durand Line area. The British
bought some order via bribes and the occasional punitive raid (e.g., see
Churchills The Story of the Malakand Field Force
http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/9404).
INSURGENCIES in/near AFGHANISTAN
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Post-Durand Agreement
--Afghan struggles for full independence & with modernity
Amanullah Khan,
1919-1929, secures
greater Afghansovereignty, but is
overthrown for
pushing reforms
which upset tribal and
religious order.
Habibullah
Kalakani, 1929, the
ex-soldier and ex-bandit who briefly
ran Afghanistan
after Amanullahs
overthrow
Nadir Shah, 1929-
1933, the officer
who stabilized thecountry
somewhat by
nullifying most of
Amanullahs
reforms
Accelerating Modernization and Upheaval
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Zahir Shah
1933-1973
Daoud Khan
1973-1978
Nur M.Taraki
1978-1979
Hafi. Amin
1979-1979
B. Karmal
1979-1986
--Zahir Shah continued his father Nadirs moderate approach, but
Daoud Khan and especially the communist leaders who
succeeded him wanted to compel accelerated change. Afghanpolitics became unstable and bloody as communist factions vied
for control.
Zahir Shah and the new Great Game
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--Moderate reform
--US & USSRrentier state: superpower aid is a major sourceof Afghan GDP as Zahir plays the rivals. The Soviets give
more aid, and with it comes unfortunate influence within
Afghanistan
--Pakistan (arguments over the Durand Line border and the fate of
the Pashtun tribes split by same. Beset with border
problems with its larger neighbor and bitter rival India,
Pakistan rejects Afghan proposals to give Pahstun territory
to Afghanistan or to create a Pashtunistan)
--Cousin Daouds big ideas to accelerate Afghan modernization
sparks his overthrow of Zahir.
Daoud Khans
F t l W lt ith M d it 1973 1978
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Fatal Waltz with Modernity, 1973-1978
--Factional resistance, as usualsome of it in the university that
Daoud promotes as part of modernization. Also, someAfghans dont like his ruthless approach to reform
--Pakistan: occasional arguments over the border; and to make
things hot for the pesky Afghans, Pakistan supports therebel activities of one of the university radicals, Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar
--Misunderstandings with the Afghan communist allies who helped
him seize power. They dont like his distancing himself
from them and their even bigger plans for Afghanistan.
=They kill him in the overthrow
The Communist Regime to the mid 1980s
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Nur M.Taraki1978-1979
Hafi. Amin
1979-1979
B. Karmal
1979-1986
--Communism/modernity forced hard on Afghans
---Sweeping socio-political reforms
---Max coercion
--Communist factions
roughly match Afghan tribal divisions
--Top-level rift within a faction
= another bloody overthrow
--Enter the Soviets & their idea about leadership
SO WHY DID THE SOVIETS GO THERE
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in LATE 1979?
--To reinforce an unstable client & pre-empt any U.S. involvement
--Aging Soviet leaders goofed the assessment of the place
---Assumed more support: decades of Soviet aid
---Brought a military designed for conventional
European warfare, not a mountain insurgency.
Soviets, 1979-1985:
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--Afghan Army defections
--Hearts & minds? Nahhh, Drain the sea.
--Questionable will, focus;
---Low #s (
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Mujahideen, 1979-1985:
--Wouldnt give up
--Sanctuary & increasing aid
--Tactics good & bad (they use terrain and stealth well, but often attackSoviet mech infantry columns instead of more vulnerable targets)
--Cannot eject Soviets
--Divided force: There werefactions within the factions.
=Stalemate
VS. VS.
VS.
Soviets
MassoudHekmatyar
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DOBANDI AMBUSHMay 1987
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May 1987
Preliminaries
--Mujahideen check beforecommitting supplies
--Dispersed march formation
--Soviet ill-defined,
open-ended kill zone
From Lester Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali,
The Other Side of the Mountain:
Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
DOBANDI AMBUSHMay 1987
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May 1987
Battle Summary
--Soviet premature ambush
--Mujahideen good fire control
--Mujahideen fire support against
relief column
--Mujahideen escape from trap
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WARS PROGRESS
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1986-1989
--Gorbachev & a reassessment of the war
--Better outside aid, to include Stinger SAMs
--Over-stressed Soviet government
=Soviet withdrawal in 1988-89
Post-Soviet Occupation, Pre Taliban
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--Continued rebellion, but fractious rebels cannot unite against regime
--Soviet aid helps Najibullahs communist regime
--Najibullah coopts some opposition leaders and potential
troublemakers in the regime; he can still be ruthless as needed
--Outside players shift, as US and UK reduce rebel aid dramatically
--USSRs fall = Najibullahs fall in 1992
--Chaos as factions vie for power over the next four years.
PAKISTANS SITUATION
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--India is divided when it gains independence from Britain in 1947.
--Pakistans multiple wars with India over, among other things, Indias
possession of mostly Muslim Kashmir and its key terrain
--Pakistans ISI & radicals: Pakistani intelligence use Islamic radicals for
guerilla-war baiting of the Indians in Kashmir. This can be a two-edged
sword for the Pakistani government
--The Afghanistan Front & the Taliban. Pakistan wants Afghan leaders who are
sympathetic with Pakistans border concerns and who wont ally with
India against Pakistan. The newly formed Taliban fits that bill, and gets
critical Pakistani support in Afghanistans post-Soviet civil war.
--The Taliban takes most of Afghanistan (Ahmed Shah Massouds Northern
Alliance continues resistance)
--The Talibans brutal regime, friendship with bin Laden, and 9/11
OEF
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--October 2001, first US air raids against Taliban
--US air power and special forces work with Northern Alliance--November 01, Mazari-Sharif & Kabul fall to N. Alliance & US
--December 01, Kandahar & Tora Bora fall to N. Alliance & US
THE AFTERMATH IN AFGHANISTAN, 2002 ~2006
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--After Soviet occupation, destructive civil war, and Taliban repression,
Afghanistan needed assistance if it was to move forward with a stable,
non terrorist-influenced regime. So, what kind of assistance?
--American assumptions / aims: a big foreign presence will spark an
insurgency, and big nation-building projects usually fail anyway, so
keep the US presence (footprint) small and temporary
---Misimpressions of the Soviet experience. We assumed thatthe fierce Afghan resistance to the Soviets 1980s occupation was due
mainly to their large forces, but there were never more than 120,000
Soviet troops in country. Soviet brutality inspired Afghan anger.
---Aversion to nation building. The Vietnam War and stability
operations in places like Somalia led many Americans, including theBush administration, to prefer not to build nations in troubled places
that we dont understand or where we dont want to remain for long.
Indeed, President Bush and staff regarded most such deployments,
even the one to Bosnia, as wasteful diversions if not outright failures.
THE AFTERMATH IN AFGHANISTAN, 2002 ~2006
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--Stability and security issues: If we wanted a small foreign footprint,
then Afghan national peace at least required a rebuilt Afghan Army /
police force and stable central government. US leaders worked withnon-Taliban local leaders to promote an Afghan approach to these tasks;
but it meant working with the fractious warlords and factional leaders
who helped sustain the chaos that followed the Soviets 1989
withdrawal. Other problems with building effective national
government and security institutions included: illiteracy, corruption, low
army status among Afghans, poor soldier pay, factionalism, and related
disputes among Afghans over who served and how.
--But given a relative calm after the Taliban governments overthrow;encouraging signs like the 2004 Afghan national elections; and a big US
distraction in Iraq, the US commitment to Afghanistan remained small
and policy formation remained uncertain for several years.
THE AFTERMATH IN AFGHANISTAN, 2002 ~2006
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Small footprint & uncertain policy formation
--US force size remained at about, or below, 20,000 for years
--At first, commanders were told to avoid heavy commitments to
stability-force or COIN ops because we were not supposed to be
there long.
--At the time, US Army familiarity with COIN & local area needed work
--The situation improved some as commanders like LTGEN David Barnostrove to implement COIN pros and to coordinate efforts better;
but still the US commitment remained small.
--Obviously, there was also a big distraction with OIF.
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9
04
12
04
4
05
6
05
9
05
12
05
4
06
6
06
9
06
12
06
40
30
20
10
0
904
1204
405
605
905
1205
406
606
906
1206
U.S. Troops In-Country in Afghanistan, Thousands of Troops
04 2005 2006
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9
04
12
04
4
05
6
05
9
05
12
05
4
06
6
06
9
06
12
06
80
60
40
20
0
904
1204
405
605
905
1205
406
606
906
1206
Average Number of Daily Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan
Relatively low
04 2005 2006
Afghanistan Mid-2000s
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--Security & services breakdown as local Afghan forces struggle
--Local corruption: old warlords still run some places--Willpower issues: Ours declines as OIF continues. Allied forces
often operate under serious restrictions imposed by their
governments. Over time, the Taliban starts to resurge.
--The rebels outside help, and this involves Pakistan, with its
internal troubles.
Afghanistan, Mid 2000s
Control, and the lack thereof: as the
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9
04
12
04
4
05
6
05
9
05
12
05
4
06
6
06
9
06
12
06
4
07
6
07
9
07
12
07
4
08
6
08
9
08
80
60
40
20
0
904
1204
405
605
905
1205
406
606
906
1206
407
607
907
1207
408
608
908
Average Number of Daily Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan
Steady Increase
04 2005 2006 2007 2008
,
situation deteriorates, can we control the
countryside per classic COIN?
Control, and the lack thereof: as the
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9
04
12
04
4
05
6
05
9
05
12
05
4
06
6
06
9
06
12
06
4
07
6
07
9
07
12
07
4
08
6
08
9
08
40
30
20
10
0
904
1204
405
605
905
1205
406
606
906
1206
407
607
907
1207
408
608
908
U.S. Troops In-Country in Afghanistan, Thousands of Troops
04 2005 2006 2007 2008
,
situation deteriorates, can we control the
countryside per classic COIN?
Afghanistan, Mid-2000s
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--Security & services breakdown
--Local corruption
--Willpower issues
--The rebels outside help, and this involves Pakistan.
Afghanistan, Mid 2000s
--Control, the lack thereof, and the Battle of Wanat. US forceswere already having trouble maintaining full control of eastern
Afghanistans Waygal Valley, and had pulled one of their outposts
back down the valley to Wanat village. Just after the Wanat
outposts establishment, rebels attacked it with much firepowerbut its small garrison repelled the assault. Controversy arose over
preparation and whether the Wanat outpost was still too isolated.
Later the US would withdraw further down the valley.
OP KAHLER WANAT K P i 13 J l 2008
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OP KAHLER, WANAT, Kunar Province, 13 July 2008
Small village in mountain valley
WANAT, Kunar Province,
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13 July 2008, small village in mountain valley
--Mujahideen attempt to disrupt US outpost move
--CPT Matthew Myer v. Mawlawi Sadiq Manibullah
--ANA Platoon & 2nd PLTN, C Co, 2nd BN, 503rd IR (~73 troops)
v. Lashkar al Zil (~150-300 rebels)
WANAT,
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Preliminaries
--Move to this COP is quite recent; valley bottom
--Chilly locals, but US assumes delay before big attack
--COP abuts village; detached OP
--US does early AM stand-to anyway
WANAT, 13 July 2006
Battle Summary
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Battle Summary
--All-aspect rebel attack, maximum firepower
WANAT, 13 July 2006
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Battle Summary / Results
--All-aspect rebel attack, maximum firepower
--Key US weapons disabled; detached OP high losses
--US directs remaining fires well
--Commander calls in fire support & QRF; COP saved
WANAT, 13 July 2006
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, y
Analysis: METT-TC
--Mission --Enemy
--Terrain --Troops/Support
--Time --Civil Issues
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MARCH 2009,
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U.S. STRATEGY
FOR AFGHANISTAN
AND PAKISTAN
The goal is . . . to defeat, disrupt, and dismantle
Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
and to prevent their return to either country.
For Afghanistan, the strategy commits to
increasing U.S. troop levels
to fight extremists along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border,train Afghan security forces,
and provide civilian experts to help the Afghan government.
President Obama
CENTCOM commander
Petraeus
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--The goal and strategy reflect the presidents resolution of conflicting
opinions among his top deputies.
---Some leaders (both mil & civ) wanted a COIN full-court press
with ample troops and dedication to rebuilding Afghanistan.
---Others (both mil & civ) were concerned about American
domestic problems (economy, war weariness, etc.), the dauntingprospects for a timely resolution of Afghanistan and Pakistans many
internal problems; and so wanted a reduced commitment by relying
more upon high-tech weapons and small special forces.
Afghanistan, Mid-2000s
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--Security & services breakdown
--Local corruption
--Willpower issues (ours/the rebels/allies)
--The rebels outside help (Pakistan)
--The new surge
--Control, and the lack thereof
--
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9
04
12
04
4
05
6
05
9
05
12
05
4
06
6
06
9
06
12
06
4
07
6
07
9
07
12
07
4
08
6
08
9
08
12
08
1
09
4
09
6
09
12
09
1
10
80
60
40
20
0
906
1206
407
607
907
1207
408
608
908
1208
409
609
909
1209
410
610
910
1210
411
611
911
1211
412
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
U.S. Troops In-Country in Afghanistan, Thousands of Troops
2011
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9
04
12
04
4
05
6
05
9
05
12
05
4
06
6
06
9
06
12
06
4
07
6
07
9
07
12
07
4
08
6
08
9
08
12
08
1
09
4
09
6
09
12
09
1
10
80
60
40
20
0
904
1204
405
605
905
1205
406
606
906
1206
407
607
907
1207
408
608
908
1208
409
609
909
1209
410
Average Number of Daily Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan
04 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 10
THE DEFINITION OF WAR
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THE DEFINITION OF WAR
A conflict between organized groups with unknownresolve, each seeking to impose its will on the other
Afghanistan, Recently
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g , y
(President Obama Speech, 22 June 2011)
--Reduce forces used for surge---10,000 out by end of 2011
---33,000 total reduction
--Meeting our goals
---Al Qaeda is under more pressure than at any time since 9/11.
(Bin Laden death, 2 May 2011)
---We've inflicted serious losses on the Taliban and taken a
number of its strongholds
---Afghan Security Forces have grown . . . . [and] we have already
begun to transition . . . security to the Afghan people.
Afghanistan Recently
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Afghanistan, Recently
(President Obama Speech, 22 June 2011)
This is the beginning -- but not the end -- of our effort to wind down this
war . . . . But we must be as pragmatic as we are passionate; as strategic as we
are resolute.
At a time of rising debt and hard economic times . . . we must invest in
America's greatest resource -- our people.
Living within our means . . . . we must recapture the common purpose that we
shared at the beginning of this time of war.
We will not try to make Afghanistan a perfect place . . . . America, it is time tofocus on nation building here at home.
So please . . . preach for more study of books and
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history, a greater seriousness in military art. With 2,000
years of examples behind us we have no excuse . . . for
not fighting well.
T.E. Lawrence,alias, Lawrence of Arabia, 1933