Group Conflicts in South Asia

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GROUP CONFLICTS IN SOUTH ASIA

Report on a Seminar Series Organised by CRISE, Michaelmas Term 2004.

Rajesh Venugopal

In Michaelmas Term 2004, CRISE organised a seminar series at Oxford to explore the issue of group

conflicts in the South Asian region. South Asia comprises seven countries: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India,

Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. It represents around one and a half billion people or one

quarter of the worlds population, almost half of whom live in extreme poverty and are classified as

falling below the World Banks $1 a day poverty line.

The issue of conflict in South Asia is widely associated with the India-Pakistan international dimension.

The two countries were at war in 1947, 1965 and 1971, and have a major unresolved territorial dispute

in Kashmir, which has been the site of a domestic militant insurgency inter-twined with an India-

Pakistan proxy war since 1989. In 1998, both countries tested nuclear devices, and subsequently tested

and developed missile systems capable of delivering nuclear type weapons into each others territory. In

December 2001, India and Pakistan appeared at the brink of nuclear war following an assault by

allegedly Pakistan-supported militants on the Indian parliament.

But beyond the issue of national identity and inter-state conflict, South Asias population is also divided

into numerous, cross-cutting and overlapping group identities based on language, religion, religious sub-

sect, region, ethnicity, caste, and class. Virtually all the countries of the region are subject to myriad

inter-group conflicts, the majority of which are peacefully negotiated. But on many occasions they have

also frequently spilled over into violent riots, insurgencies, and even civil war. Pakistan remains subject

to serious Sunni-Shia violence and from the violent repercussions of the instability in Afghanistan since

the late-1970s. Nepal has since 1996 been in the throes of a full-fledged civil war. Sri Lanka is in an

unstable peace after 20 years of civil war. India has, in addition to major internal insurgencies in

Kashmir, Punjab, and Assam during the 1980s, suffered serious incidences of caste-riots, and has

experienced major anti-Muslim violence since the late-1980s.

The CRISE seminar series has sought to explore the issue of group conflicts in South Asia by inviting a

series of academic experts to talk about their research on the subject. The growth of conflict studies in

the social sciences has led to a proliferation of different research questions and approaches over the

past decade, and we decided to use this occasion to find speakers that would maximise not just the

diversity of coverage by country and type of conflict, but also by disciplinary approach and researchmethod.

The topics covered included Hindu-Muslim riots in India (three speakers), caste divisions in Tamil Nadu,

the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, and the Sunni-Shia conflict in Pakistan. In

terms of disciplinary approach, it featured two economists, four political scientists, one historian, and

one cultural anthropologist, comprising diverse quantitative and qualitative research methods.


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Judith Heyers paper on Caste and Occupational Structure in a Fast-Growing Local Economy in South

India drew upon her research on dalit (formerly untouchable) castes in Coimbatore district of Tamil

Nadu (India) over the past twenty years. She found that caste remains a strong barrier to occupational

mobility, and that it is being reinforced in numerous ways under the pressure of a fast-globalising local

economy.

MansoobMursheds paper on Spatial-Horizontal Inequality and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal used

quantitative data on the geography of conflict-related deaths in Nepal, and transposed these against

indices of poverty, inequality and caste differences. He found that areas of the highest inequality and

poverty were closely correlated to the areas of the highest conflict related violence.

DibyeshAnands paper on Hindu Nationalism and Political Violence in India: Representing Muslim Men

examined how the representation of Muslims during the Gujarat riots of 2002 was instrumental in

dehumanising them and in rendering the victims as dangerous aggressors.

Jonathan Spencers paper on Sri Lanka Ethnic or Political Crisis drew upon his anthropological

fieldwork in the 1980s to explore how the discursive construction of the moral nation is transposed

against an immoral sphere of politics, and how this dialectic illustrates the nature of the conflict, and

the parallel emergence of the LTTE and JVP in the 1980s.

NandiniGooptus paper on Violence and Cultural Change examined the construction of a militant

Hindu identity in late-colonial North India. Drawing upon her historical research in eastern U.P. of the

1930s, she showed how economic conditions of poverty and vulnerability were transformed into

violence of a particular form through the intermediation of certain cultural and ideological factors that

came into being at the time.

AshutoshVarshneys paper on Hindu-Muslim Riots The State or Civil Society gave a summary of hisnow very well known book on the subject. By researching the history of riots in several Indian cities, he

found that civic ties and membership in non-sectarian organisation that bridge across ethnic or religious

divides help create conditions through which riot conditions and sparks are defused or negotiated.

Mariam AbouZahabs paper on Shia-Sunni Conflict in Pakistan discussed the socio-economic and

historical context in which extremist Sunni politics came into in Pakistan. In particular, she examined the

founding of the Sipah-e-Sahaba in the town ofJhang, a traditionally agricultural town undergoing rapid

commercialisation, where the traditional landed Shia elites were slowly being overshadowed by urban

Sunni merchants and partition-era migrants from India.

SubrataMitras paper on Governance and Conflict Management in India reported the findings of adecade long research he has conducted on the nature of governance institutions in India, in which he

has evaluated the extent of their role in managing group conflicts.

Intra-State Armed Conflicts in South Asia

Impact on Regional Security


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- SubaChandran

DEFINING ARMED CONFLICT

The paper is narrowly focused only on the armed intra state conflicts in South Asia.

While intra state conflicts is a vast subject including ethnic, environmental,

economic and social aspects, this paper take into account only those conflicts that

have witnessed armed struggle between two or more groups.

Second, the paper does not make any distinction on the basis of intensity of conflict.

An armed conflictis defined as a contested incompatibility which concerns

government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of

which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related

deaths.1 A major armed conflictis defined as a contested incompatibility that

concerns government and/or territory over which the use of armed force between the

military forces of two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, has

resulted in at least 1000 battle related deaths in any single year.2 An earlier definition

of a major armed conflictstated it as prolonged use of armed force between the

military forces of two or more governments, or one of one government and at least

one organized armed group, incurring the battle related deaths of at least 1000 people

during the entire conflict and in which the incompatibility concerns government

and/or territory.3 For the purpose of this paper, intra state armed conflict is defined as

an armed conflict between two groups, of which one is the state, in which violence

has been used by either or both parties resulting in human and material casualties.

1 Uppsala Universitys Conflict Database has been following this definition. See Peter Wallensteen and

Margareta Sollenberg, Armed Conflict 19892000,Journal of Peace Research, Vol.38, No.5, pp.

629644. Also see http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/

2 See Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg and Peter Wallensteen, Definitions, sources and methods


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of conflict data, Appendix 2 B in SIPRI Yearbook 2003 (Oxford University Press, 2003), p.122.

3 See Margareta Sollenberg, Peter Walensteen and Andres Jato, Major Armed Conflicts, SIPRI

Yearbook 1999 (Oxford University Press, 1999), p.15.

2

Third, the paper focuses primarily on ongoing armed intra state conflicts. In South

Asia, some of the armed conflicts have come to an end either, while some lie dormant

and others remain active. Analysis is limited to data on armed conflicts since 1991.

INTRA STATE ARMED CONFLICTS IN SOUTH ASIA: SALIENT FEATURES

An analysis of armed intra state conflicts in South Asia would reveal the following:

First, armed conflicts in South Asia have been primarily intra-state rather than inter

state since the 1950s. Since the late 1980s, South Asia has been witnessing a sudden

growth in the intra state conflicts. When compared to intra state conflicts, inter state

conflicts in South Asia in the last two decades were negligible or absent. The only

inter state armed conflict occurred between India and Pakistan during 1999. Besides

1999, there were two instances in which there were threats of an inter-state armed

conflict, but due to various reasons, there were no open hostilities. Even at the global

level, the armed conflicts were more at intra state levels rather than inter-state. For

example, according to a study, between 1990 and 2002 there were 58 major armed

conflicts in 46 different locations, in which all but three were internal.4 According to

another study, published latest, between 1989 and 2003, there were 116 armed

conflicts, in which 89 were intrastate, 20 internationalized intrastate and 7 interstate.5

Second, intrastate armed conflicts in South Asia are not monolithic in nature. They

differ in their nature, causes of birth, intensity etc. For example the intrastate armed

conflicts in Pakistan are related to terrorism, jihad and sectarianism; secessionism in

Sri Lanka; left wing, terrorism, communalism and secessionism in India; and left


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wing in Nepal. Even Bangladesh and Bhutan also have witnessed armed intra state

conflicts in the recent past. Maldives has been the only country in South Asia that has

remained free from any intrastate armed conflict.

Third, the intrastate armed conflicts in South Asia do not have the same intensity in

terms of armed violence since 1991. In most cases, the intensity waxed and waned

4 Mikale Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg and Peter Wallensteen, Patterns of major armed conflicts,

1990-2002, Appendix 2A in SIPRI Yearbook 2003 (Oxford University Press, 2003), p.109.

5 See Mikael Eriksson and Peter Walensteen, Armed Conflict, 1989-2003,Journal of Peace

Research, vol.41, no.5, September 2004, p.626. The study considers those intrastate conflicts with

foreign interventions as internationalized intrastate conflicts.

3

throughout the period. However in certain cases, armed hostility continued without

any major respite.

INTRA STATE ARMED CONFLICTS IN SOUTH ASIA: CRITICAL QUESTIONS

I. Why intrastate conflicts are more and protracted in South Asia than

interstate?

There have been more intrastate conflicts than interstate conflicts at the global level,

as has been seen earlier. The same trend was also reflected in South Asia. While there

are many reasons for this trend, the following are crucial.

Problems of Nation Building

First, invariably every state in South Asia is still in the process of nation building. The

process of nation building is complex and is burdened with the presence of numerous

actors with different demands and grievances real and imagined. The state

invariably in the whole of South Asia, unfortunately considered themselves as

successors of the British India, perceived these demands as threats to its legitimacy


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and instead of addressing them attempted state building rather than nation building.

Instead of co-opting the various groups into its fold in the nation building process, the

state alienated them through confrontation. As William Zartman has phrased it

eloquently that the internal conflicts emerges due to the inability or unwillingness of

the government to handle grievances to the satisfaction of the aggrieved; that is they

begin with the breakdown of normal politics.6

Multiple Actors with Diverse Objectives

Second, unlike in interstate conflicts, in most cases, there are more than two actors in

any intrastate conflict. An agreement between two state actors engaged in an interstate

conflict is likely to be resolved sooner, where the stakes are high. In an intrastate

conflict, besides the state, there are other actors which are both political and militant.

In the case of India, even the state is reflected in two entities the federating unit and

the federation. The case ofJammu and Kashmir is a classic example of this. The

6 William I Zartman, ed., Elusive Peace: Negotiating an end to Civil Wars (Washington DC: Brookings

Institution, 1995), p.5.

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state is represented by the Union government and the state ofJammu and Kashmir.

The governments in New Delhi and Srinagar at times had different objectives. The

difference between these two has been reflected in so many cases. For example, in

2000, the State legislative assembly passed a resolution in June 2000 demanding more

autonomy to the state.7 Though Atal Vajpayee, the then Prime Minister of India

commented that the resolution was within the framework of the Indian Constitution,8

it was rejected in the subsequent Cabinet meeting.9

Besides the differences between the state actors, non state actors are divided. In the

case ofJammu and Kashmir, besides the main stream political parties, there are other


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actors including the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) and the militant groups.

The Hurriyat is vertically divided into two factions after the split in 2003.10 The two

factions are now being led by Syed Ali Geelani and Moulvi Omar Farooq. The

militant groups are also equally divided and there are three main groups Lashkar-e-

Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad and the Hizbul Mujahideen.11

Problems of De-Weaponizing and De-Militarizing

Third, the problems of the state and society in de-weaponizing and de-militarizing

create an uncertainty factor about the post conflict situation and opportunities

amongst the non state actors. In an interstate armed conflict, the actors get back to

their pre-conflict situation without disbanding and disarming, with their personal and

economic security stable and safe. Unfortunately, in an intrastate conflict where there

7 For the major recommendations of the State Autonomy Committee Report and its explanations, see,

From the State Autonomy Committee Report, Frontline, 08-21 July, 2000.

8 Autonomy resolution within Constitution: PM, The Hindu, 01 July 2000.

9 For the text of Cabinet decision on J&K autonomy resolution see The Hindu, 05 July 2000.

10 See the following articles on why the Hurriyat split. AnirudhSuri, Recent Developments in the

Hurriyat I, Article no. 1134,

http://www.ipcs.org/Kashmir_articles2.jsp?action=showView &kValue=1143&issue=1012&status=arti

cle&mod=a, 13 September 2003; AnirudhSuri, Recent Developments in the Hurriyat II, Article

no. 1135,


cle&mod=a, 13 September 2003; AnirudhSuri, Recent Developments in the Hurriyat III, Article

no. 1136,


cle&mod=a, 13 September 2003; and Amin Masoodi, Is Hurriyat a Political Force, Article no. 1088,


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cle&mod=a; 11 August 2003.

11 For the differences amongst various militant groups fighting in Jammu and Kashmir see Suba

Chandran, Kashmir: Issues and Actors, in PR Chari and SubaChandran ed., Kashmir: The Road

Ahead(New Delhi: IPCS, 2001), p.9.

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arenon state actors involved, the problems of integrating them with the main stream

starts with an element of disarming and disbanding, leading to create a fear of

insecurity among them.

In South Asia, there are numerous cases in which an initial agreement with a non state

actor failed to materialize, due to this factor. One of the reasons for the government of

Pakistan failing to reach an agreement with the militants in South Waziristan has been

over disarming and disbanding. Even in Sri Lanka, disarming was one of the main

reasons for the LTTE resume fighting after the July 1987 agreement between India

and Pakistan.12

Besides, there are severe problems in dealing with the surrendered militants and this

issues is acute in Assam and Jammu and Kashmir. In Assam, a section of surrendered

cadres of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) are called Surrendered

ULFA (SULFA). There are nearly 7000 SULFA members in Assam, and the

government is yet to come out with a comprehensive package to deal with them.13

The SULFA control the coal and transport syndicates, have indulged in large-scale

extortion and intimidation, and usurped government tenders. Most of them have not

cared to refund their bank loans It is alleged that the SULFA cadres played an

important part in the former AsomGanaParishad (AGP) governments secret

killings policy to eliminate the relatives of the ULFA leadership; but they have


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proved to be a real menace now in the State.14 Even amongst the state security

forces, there are differences over whether the SULFA needs to be completely

disarmed and disbanded.15

In Jammu and Kashmir, the surrendered militants known as Ikhwans, are today seen

as a liability. According to a news report, local residents view them (the Ikhwans)

12 See SD Muni, Pangs of Proximity: India and Sri Lankas Ethnic Crisis, (New Delhi: Sage

Publications, 1993) p.132.

13 "Special package for SULFA men soon: Gogoi," The Assam Tribune, 7 June 2004.

14 Bibhu Prasad Routrau, Surrendered Militants in Indias Northeast: Outlived Utilities?,

http://www.ipcs.org/North_east_articles2.jsp?action=showView &kValue=273&status=article&mod=a;

For a critical analysis of the surrender policy in Assam and their success see AjaiSahni and Bibhu

Prasad Routray, SULFA: Terror by Another Name, Faultlines, Volume 9, pp.1-38.

15 NitinGogoi, Assam police divided over disarming SULFA, 8 January 2001,

http://in.rediff.com/news/2001/jan/08assam.htm

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with deep suspicion some even with contempt for switching sides. Mainstream

parties sneer at their recent attempts into electoral politics. Even the Army admits

their limited use.16 There were also reports accusing the Ikhwans aiding in finding

new infiltration routes even after being appointed as the Special Police Officers within

J&K police.17

There was no standard policy towards Ikhwans in Kashmir. There are around 3000

Ikhwans, being paid by the different security forces including the Army, BSF and

J&K Police. The Army used to pay a monthly salary of Rs 3000 along with Rs 5 lakh

insurance, while the J&K police used to pay Rs. 1500 per month.18 There was an

attempt in December 2003 to convert these Ikhwans into a full-fledged Territorial


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Army battalion.19 Most of the Ikhwans were incorporated into the J&Ks Special

Operations Group (SOG), which was disbanded after Mufti Sayeed became the Chief

Minsiter of the state. On the other hand Mufti has also been advocating for a

rehabilitation package for the surrendered militants, which would be entirely funded

by the Union government.20

II. Why intrastate conflicts waxes and wanes in certain regions and why they

remain constant in the other?

Invariably in most protracted armed conflicts, the intensity has never remained

constant. Many factors contribute to the level of intensity and its sustenance. First is

the level of popular support for the armed conflict in the region.

Impact of Popular Support

The popular support to an armed conflict could be overt and/or covert and also

voluntary and/or forced. If the support to conflict is overt and voluntary, then the

situation reaches dangerous proportions. The initial phases of militancy in Punjab,

Jammu and Kashmir and Sri Lanka witnessed such overt and voluntary support; as a

16 KanwarSandhu, Former militants and their law of diminishing returns, The Indian Express, 9

December 1999.

17 6 SPOs held for searching new infiltration routes, Daily Excelsior, 01 January 2001.

18 KanwarSandhu, Former militants and their law of diminishing returns, The Indian Express, 9

December 1999.

19 The decision was pending in the Cabnet Committee and Security in December 2003 and there have

been no further reports on the outcome. See SaikatDatta, Army to explore new territory: Surrendered

militants, The Indian Express, 13 December 2003.

20 Many militants ready to discard gun: Mufti, Daily Excelsior, 11 February 2004.

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result the armed conflict was at its peak, with the state having fewer clues to bring the

situation back to normalcy. Invariably in all such cases in South Asia, this overt and

voluntary support for the initial phase of militancy declined to covert and forced

support for the armed movement.

Why does the initial overt and voluntary support decline into covert and involuntary?

Primary reasons are as follows: People and those who are leading the armed conflict,

after a period of time realize the futility of such action against the state which is well

armed and also better equipped economically and politically to deal with the

situation. Also the initial romance of fighting the state dissipates once it is realized

that the state is not weak enough to be demolished. The initial phases of militancy in

J&K and Sri Lanka witnessed this phenomenon. The JKLF led by Yasin Malik and

Javid Mir were the first one to realize the futility of an armed conflict with the Indian

state, hence came over ground and started fighting politically. In Sri Lanka, many of

the non-LTTE militant groups came over ground by the second half of the 1980s.

Second, the state response to the armed conflict in economic, political and military

terms also has an impact in reducing the overt and voluntary popular support to the

armed conflict in its initial phase. The state, besides responding militarily also

provides adequate economic and political space for the grievance to be met. The

intelligence and counter militancy efforts become more focused, making it difficult

for the armed groups to operate freely. Coupled with this modicum success on the

military front, the state provides adequate space to the political groups and even

militant groups to negotiate. The state, in certain cases also rejuvenates its machinery,

thus improving the standard of governance. When there is an improvement in the

delivery mechanisms of the state in terms of governance, many of the local grievance

are met; hence the local support for an armed conflict declines.


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Third, the intra conflict amongst the various armed group in an armed conflict

ultimately hits the local people. Both in J&K and Sri Lanka, the rivalries between the

various armed groups had its own collateral damage, making the people to realize that

the militant groups are an immediate threat to their peace and security.

8

Fourth, over a period of time, most of the armed groups degenerate into nothing more

than criminal groups with their own vested interests. The armed conflict is used to as

means to further their ends and for any popular cause. When the militant groups resort

to kidnapping and extortion from the local population, they get totally alienated from

the people for who they were allegedly fighting. In northeast there were numerous

cases of militant groups engaging in extortions.21

States Response

Besides popular support, the response of the state is crucial in determining the

longevity of an armed conflict and its intensity. In most cases, the beginning of an

armed conflict and the popular support towards it appears from nowhere. The state

after the initial shock wakes up to the reality and pursues a series of economic,

political and military measures. This economic, political and military response has a

crucial role to play in terms of sustenance of the armed conflict. If the state fails to use

these three components in the right combination, then its efforts only increase the gap

between it and the people, thereby increasing or sustaining the armed conflict. On the

other hand, if the state succeeds in providing adequate space to the people while

dealing successfully with the armed groups, the intensity of conflict automatically

would come down.

The State in many cases extended an invitation to negotiate with the armed groups

and to an extend has also succeeded in keeping them engages in select regions in


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South Asia. This has a direct impact in the intensity of the armed conflict, even if one

principle group is engaged in the dialogue. In the recent years the government of India

was willing to engage, so were the armed groups. In 2004, the Union government has

been engaged in a dialogue with the NSCN (IM)22; The All Tripura Tiger Force

(ATTF) in Tripura announced its willingness to negotiate with the government of

India in May 200423; Two factions of the National Liberation Front of Twipra (NLFT)

decided to engage in talks in April and one led by MantuKoloi and also lay down its

21 See "ULFA, NDFB extortion unabated in State," The Assam Tribune, 1 May 2004

22 See the following for the Union governments dialogue with the NSCN-IM: "NSCN (IM) leaders to

come India for talks," The North East Tribune, 12 February 2004; WasbirHussain, Naga Peace Talks:

Can Delhi Convert The Truce Into A Deal?, IPCS Issue Brief No. 25, August 2004; NSCN (IM)

leaders likely to visit India in Feb," The North East Tribune, 17 January 2004;

23 "Tripura militants to hold talks with New Delhi," Hindustan Times, 1 May 2004

9

arms in May 200424; and the NDFB recently in October 2004 has declared a ceasefire

announcing its willingness to initiate a dialogue.25 In Jammu and Kashmir, in the

recent years, in July 2000, the government of India initiated a negotiation with the

Hizbul Mujahideen.26 Even the security forces, as a part of building their public

relations with the society have initiated welfare programmes. For example, the Indian

Army carryout welfare measures in both J&K and the Northeast, which have a

positive impact.27 In J&K, the Indian Army has been carrying out a successful

programme called Operation Sadhbhavana.

In Nepal, the government engaged the Maoists in a dialogue on many occasions, but

failed to convert the ceasefire into a permanent peace. Since 2001, there were many

dialogues between the Maoists and the government. In July 2001, the Maoists


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declared ceasefire, followed by a three rounds of negotiations during August-

November.28 Next round of negotiations took place during February to August 2003,

after the government and Maoists declared a cease fire in January 2003.29 In South

Waziristan in Pakistan, the government initiated a series of negotiations with the tribal

militants in 2004.

The success and failure of these negotiations have a crucial impact on the armed

conflict. Whenever they have failed, as in the cases of Nepal, Sri Lanka, J&K, and

24 See "NLFT factions declare ceasefire for talks," The Assam Tribune, 17 April 2004; "NLFT faction

to lay down arms on May 6?," The North East Tribune, 5 May 2004; "Over 60 NLFT ultras to lay

down arms today," The Assam Tribune, 6 May 2004; "72 NLFT bids farewell to arms," The North East

Tribune, 7 May 2004.

25 See "NDFB declares unilateral ceasefire," The Assam Tribune, 9 October 2004; "NESO, AASU hail

NDFB truce offer; urge ULFA to follow suit," The Sentinel, 12 October 2004; "Centre asks NDFB to

make formal offer," The Assam Tribune, 14 October 2004; and "NDFB formally appeals for ceasefire,"

The Assam Tribune, 15 October 2004

26 See Centre invites J&K militants for talks, The Hindu, 29 July 2000; PM hails ceasefire offer,

The Hindu, 26 July 2000; Security forces told not to jeopardize ceasefire, The Hindu, 27 July 2000;

Positive development: Hizbul, The Hindu, 30 July 2000

27 See NishitDholabhai, "Army project heals old scars," The Telegraph, 7 June 2004;

28 See Government, rebels declare cease-fire, The Kathmandu Post, 24 July 2001; Priority to

Dialogue: Maoists respond to Deubas offer, halt offensive acts, The Rising Nepal, 24 July 2001;

"Maoists Call Off Violent Tactics: Hopes Rise For Resolving Problem," The Rising Nepal, 27 July

2001; Prem N. Kakkar, "Government-Maoists Talks: A Good Beginning," The Rising Nepal, 31

August 2001; "Maoists to present agenda in next round of talks," The Rising Nepal, 01 November

2001; "Govt-Maoist Talks Rekindle Peace Hope," The Rising Nepal, 01 November 2001; J Pande&


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Kamal Panthi, "Govt-Maoists talks get underway in Bardia," The Kathmandu Post, 14 September 2001;

29 See "Govt, Maoists announce cease-fire," The Kathmandu Post, 30 January 2003; "Pun holds

informal talks with Maoist team," The Kathmandu Post, 05 February 2003; Govt officially invites

Maoists for talks, The Kathmandu Post, 07 February 2003; YuvrajAcharya, Maoists commit to

nationalism and peace: Sign 22-point code of conduct for peace talks, The Kathmandu Post, 14 March

2003

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South Waziritan, the armed conflict have resumed with an added intensity. Where

there have been relative success, there is adequate pressure created by the civil

society, to maintain the cease fire to take it to the logical conclusion. Besides any

success in one set of negotiation influences the other armed groups in the region to

enter into negotiations. Recent successes in select armed conflicts Indias northeast in

terms of engaging the armed group into a negotiation to an extent is the outcome of

ongoing dialogue between the government and the NSCN-IM.

Support from Diaspora

The support from diaspora is another crucial element in sustaining the armed conflict

in a region. The diaspora support is crucial especially in terms of economic and

political sustenance of an armed conflict. The Sri Lankan diaspora in case of Tamil

Eelam movement and the present support to the LTTE and the Punjabi diaspora

duringKhalistan movement played a significant role in the armed conflict.

III. Is there a change in the nature of intra state conflicts in South Asia?

Intra state armed conflicts in general were primarily based on sub-nationalistic

identity. Outside the leading sub national armed conflicts, South Asia also witness

naxalite movements, whose intensity of the armed nature also waxed and waned over

a period of time. The armed conflicts to a large extent have remained secular.


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There seems to be a slow but steady change in terms certain conflicts becoming

sectarian and communal or sectarian and communal conflicts becoming the dominant

armed conflict in select regions. In Pakistan, the armed conflicts have assumed

sectarian nature, as could be seen from the last couple of years. In Kashmir, there is a

clear trend in which the struggle for an independent Kashmir is becoming a jihad and

the struggle for Islam. There have been numerous reports linking religion and

militancy in the recent years in Indias northeast.

Recent years witness many reports on the growth of Islamic militancy in Indias

northeast. The case of October 2 attack in Dimapur is worth mentioning in which not

only the state, but even non state actors have been claiming the link between religion

and militancy. Two bombs exploded simultaneously in Dimapur - in the railway

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station and a nearby market, killing more than 25 people.30 An army officer was

quoted telling that "We had positive information about a group of 20 fundamentalist

organisation-trained Bangladeshi jihadis sneaking into Nagaland through the

Karimganj border. They had an agenda of carrying out large scale violence in the

Northeast, but nobody probably realised that it would be such a devastating attack in

Dimapur."31 The Khaplang faction of the NSCN in Nagaland blamed the al Qaeda for

the bomb blasts in October 2004.32 Earlier an unknown outfit called "Al Jehad-e-

Islam" claimed the responsibility for this blast.33 Select groups in Indias northeast

also are believed to have increased their contacts with the religious militant groups.

For example, there are numerous reports linking the ULFA with fundamentalist

organizations.34

The change is clearly visible in Jammu and Kashmir, where the armed conflict is

slowly but steadily being over taken by the jihadi forces from militant groups. There


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were a series of attacks on minority community in the last few years. Most of these

attacks are not isolated, but well organized, with an objective to terrorize the minority

community.

Attack on Minority Community in J&K since 1998

District No of

Attacks

Persons killed in each

attack

Tota

l

Udhampur 5 9,4,5,7,8,3 36

Doda 17 26,15,20,29,13,4,5,6,5,5,

15

141

Rajori 10 11,9,3,12,10,5,4 54

Poonch 4 9,5,2,6 22

Anantnag 4 15,7,13,2 37

Pahalgam 3 23,5,8 36

Jammu 4 13,30,28,13 84

Pulawama 1 24 24

Anantnag 4 15,7,13,2 37

Source: Collected from various news paper sources

In Pakistan the armed conflict that one is witnessing now in South Waziristan, besides

the organized attacks in all parts of the country, have jihadi and sectarian undertones.

30 "Terror bursts, blood gushes," The Telegraph, 3 October 2004


18/51

31 "Army harps on jihadi hand," The Telegraph, 5 October 2004

32 "NSCN-K sees Al Qaeda footprints in Dimapur blasts," The Assam Tribune, 21 October 2004

33 "Muslim outfit behind Dimapur blasts," E-Pao.net, 16 October 2004.

34 "Police sees link between ULFA and Islamic fundamentalist groups," The North East Tribune, 20

September 2004.

12

Sectarian Killings in Pakistan

Month/Year Persons Killed

June 2003 13

July 2003 54

March 2004 47

May 2004 15 & 18

IV. Are the intra state armed conflicts becoming more violent?

The intra state armed conflicts have always been violent. However a crucial question

need to be asked is are the intrastate conflicts becoming more violent when compared

to the previous decade? An analysis of the armed conflicts in the recent years proves

to be the case, in select regions including Pakistan, J&K and Indias northeast.

While there were always casualties on a regular scale, there is a trend in recent years

in which there have been colossal attacks involving massive casualties. Also some of

these attacks are spectacular, though minor in terms of human casualties, but major in

terms of the target chosen.

Why are the intra state conflicts becoming more violent and spectacular? The

following could perhaps could be the reasons. One, the state has been successful in its

counter militancy operations; hence the armed groups find it difficult to conduct their

day to day operation. As a result, they plan meticulously to make their operations


19/51

successful, so as to make their presence felt. Two, due to continuous splits and also

due to mushrooming of new armed groups, there are many groups in the same region,

at times fighting for the same cause. In order to make them popular or seen the most

active group, they need to indulge in such spectacular activities. The fact that after

every major attack, a particular group owns the attack could be taken as a proof to

substantiate this thesis. Three, perhaps the violence threshold has increased among the

local population, thanks to the prolonged nature of an armed conflict in a region.

People become indifferent to killings and view them as a routine affair; hence one

needs spectacular attacks to draw the popular attention.

13

Some of the recent attacks would highlight the changing nature of armed conflict in

terms of increased intensity and the target chosen.

Major Attacks since 2001

April 2001 On 02 April, 300 Maoists attacked police post in Rukum

district killing 31 policemen and abducting more than

twenty.35

July 2001 On 07 July 2001, the Maoists killed 41 policemen in the

remote districts of Nuwakot, Lamjung and Gulmi36

November 2001 On 24 November 2001, 39 were killed including soldiers

and policemen.37

February 2002 On 17 February 2001, the Maoists killed 138, mostly

from the security forces.38

September 2002 On 8 September 2002, the Maoists killed 65, mostly

from the police forces.39

June 2003 On 8 June 2003, 13 shite police trainees were massacred


20/51

in Quetta.40

July 2003 On 4 July 2003, 44 shites were killed in a sectarian

attack in Quetta.41

December 2003 On 14 December 2003, a suicide attack was carried

against Gen Musharraf.42

July 2004 On 30 July 2004, a suicide attack was carried out against

Shuakat Aziz, who luckily survived. The attack killed

seven others in Fateh Jang.43

35 "Rebel hits kill 35 policemen, Two dozen more abducted," The Kathmandu Post, 3 April 2004.

36 "Maoists kill 41 policemen in Lamjung, Nuwakot and Gulmi: Rebels loose five in fierce gun battles,"

The Kathamndu Post, 7 July 2001

37 "A bloody end to the cease-fire: At least 39 killed in Maoists hit in Dang, Syangja," The Kathmandu

Post, 25 November 2001

38 "Govt forces suffer heavy losses in Achham: At least 138 dead, Mangalsen torched, Bank looted,"

The Kathmandu Post, 18 February 2002

39 Maoists kill 65 in Arghakhanchi: Toll could soar, as dozens reported missing, The Kathmandu

Post, 09 September 2002

40 11 police recruits gunned down in Quetta, Dawn, 9 June 2003.

41 "Attack on Quetta imambargah leaves 44 dead: Suicide bombing suspected; curfew clamped after

rioting," Dawn, 5 July 2003.

42 Musharraf's convoy escapes bomb blast, Dawn, 15 December 2003.

43 Seven killed in suicide bomb attack: Shaukat survives assassination bid, The News, 31 July 2004

14

Suicide terrorism, though have been witnessed in Sri Lanka since the late 1980s,44 it

has attained alarming proportions over the last few years in other parts of South Asia,


21/51

especially in Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir. The fidayeen attacks in Jammu and

Kashmir, though cannot be strictly defined as suicide attacks, the fact is such attacks

have increased the intensity of the armed conflict, affecting the morale of the security

forces and creating a sense of helplessness in the society.45

44 For suicide attacks in Sri Lanka, see R Ramasubramanian and Beryl Anand, Suicide bombings in

Sri Lanka: A Chronology (1987-2003), IPOST, September 2004, Vol.1, No.2, pp.7-14, available at

http://www.ipcs.org/02-IPOST-Sep04.pdf; Also see R Ramasubramanian, Suicide Terrorism in Sri

Lanka, IPCS Research Paper 5 (New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, August 2004)

available at http://www.ipcs.org/IRP05.pdf

45 For suicide and suicidal attacks in Jammu and Kashmir see B Rajeshwari and R Radhakrishnan,

:Suicide and Suicidal Attacks in Jammu and Kashmir: A Chronology, IPOST, October 2004, Vol.1,

No.3, pp.4-9, available at http://www.ipcs.org/03-IPOST-Oct04.pdf

* PhD student at the Universty of New England, Australia.

** PhD student at the center for West Asian and African Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India.

Interstate Conflicts and Regionalism in South

Asia: Prospects and Challenges

ZahidShahab AHMED* - Stuti BHATNAGAR **

Abstract

Regional cooperation offers several benefits, for instance greater

economic integration, frequent and easier people-to-people contact,

sustainable peace and development at the regional level. Regional cooperation

in South Asia, initiated under the platform of the South Asian Association

for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985, has however been faced with


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numerous challenges. One of the greatest barriers for the SAARC has been

recurring inter-state conflicts between member states, which have posed

significant challenges, as the mandate of the SAARC excludes discussion on

bilateral issues. This paper is an attempt to bring to light the debilitating

effect of inter-state conflicts in South Asia on regional cooperation. Analyses

has focused primarily on the negative association of interstate conflict and

regionalism in South Asia, however this paper also discusses how other

regional cooperation mechanisms in Europe and South East Asia have coped

with such challenges to promote a vibrant regional identity. The paper also

offers some solutions in the form of recommendations, so to speedup the

process of regionalism in South Asia.

Key Words

Regional Cooperation, Interstate Conflict, South Asia.

Introduction

Today, peace means the ascent from simple coexistence to

cooperation and common creativity among countries and nations.

Mikhail Gorbachev

Richness in material and human resources has warranted a constant

interaction between countries in South Asia and the outside world. South

Asian states have also been aware of their geopolitical advantages and the

PERCEPTIONS Spring-Summer 2008

ZahidShahab Ahmed - StutiBhatnagar

1

need to integrate into a regional force. Efforts were made early1 to create

institutional mechanisms for regional integration to enable the fostering


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of a common regional identity and a cooperative growth strategy making

optimum use of inter-regional trade and social and political development. A

culmination of such an understanding was the creation of the South Asian

Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

Created in 1985, SAARC follows the principles of: focus on social and

economic matters; decisions by consensus; and non-discussion on contentious

bilateral issues. According to the SAARC Charter (1985) member states are

desirous of peace, stability, amity and progress in the region through strict

adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter and Non-Alignment,

particularly respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial

integrity, national independence, non-use of force and non-interference in

the internal affairs of other States and peaceful settlement of all disputes.

This charter was signed by heads of states of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India,

Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, in 1985 in Dhaka. Over the years,

SAARC has attempted to address several regional concerns, for instance

drug and human trafficking, economic cooperation among south Asian states

and the forging of a south Asian social identity and most recently efforts have

been made to tackle the menace of terrorism in the region.

Despite its stated intentions SAARC as a regional body has for years

grappled with inter-state, intra-state and regional conflicts. Since its existence

in 1985, SAARC has been criticized for its failure to forge an effective regional

identity. Inter-state conflicts and the bilateral interests of member states have

a decisive influence on the achievements of SAARC; the regional body has

also been influenced by external players and other regional organizations.

In an interdependent and swiftly globalizing world, it would be


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unrealistic to believe that SAARC can prosper in isolation. South Asian

integration efforts are often influenced either directly or indirectly by great

power politics and alliances in other regions. It has now become necessary

for SAARC to rise above bilateral conflicts and to foster closer relationships

with other regional and international organizations, in order to evolve into an

effective regional organization.


Interstate Conflicts and Regionalism in South Asia: Prospects and Challenges

2

1 The idea of regional cooperation in South Asia first emerged in November 1980. After severalconsultations, the Foreign

Secretaries of the seven countries met for the first time in Sri Lanka in April 1981.

SAARC: An Overview

Since its inception in 1985, SAARC has become a forum for

addressing a wide variety of issues pertinent to the region. Member states

meet at annual summits, while foreign ministers are supposed to meet at least

twice annually. The SAARC secretariat is located in Kathmandu, Nepal. In

the past 23 years there have been 15 annual summits and 31 sessions of the

Council of Ministers.2

Over the years, SAARCs agenda has expanded considerably,

exhibiting the intent and capability to work collectively on issues of agriculture

and rural development; health and population; women, youth and children;

environment and forestry; human resource development information and

communications technology; biotechnology and energy amongst others.

The SAARC forum has made significant attempts towards economic

cooperation and social cohesion. With the overall aim of economic integration,


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the SAARC Chambers of Commerce and Industry was set up in 1992 to

promote regional cooperation in the areas of trade and economic relations.

A breakthrough came with the SAARC Preferential Trade Arrangement

(SAPTA) Agreement which was signed in April 1993 and entered into force

in December 1995; opening the way for a certain expansion of intra-SAARC

trade. At the January 2004 summit meeting, the SAARC countries foreign

ministers signed the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) agreement.

Ratified and entered into force in January 2006, the objectives of

SAFTA include; elimination of all sorts of barriers in trade and facilitation

of free and fair movement of products; promoting fair competition and free

trade environment in respect of the existing economic conditions which will

ensure the maximum benefit and; and establish an institutional frame to

promote and expansion of regional cooperation.

One of the key highlights of SAFTA is the compensation for revenue

losses for smaller regional economies (Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and

Maldives) in the event of tariff reductions. By the end of first two years of

SAFTAs implementation, 2006-07, the developing countries in South Asia

that is, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, were demanded to bring their duties



3

2 The Council of Ministers is comprised of the Foreign Ministers of member states. The council isresponsible for formulating

policies, reviewing progress, deciding on new areas of cooperation, establishing additional mechanisms

as deemed important

and also in making decisions on other important matters of general interest for the SAARC. The council

meets twice a year and


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may also meet in an extraordinary session by agreement of member states.

down to 20 percent. In the final five year phase ending in 2012, the 20 percent

duty will be reduced to zero in a series of annual cuts. And on the other

hand, the least developing country group in South Asia consisting of Nepal,

Bhutan, Bangladesh and Maldives, get an additional three year to reach zero

duty, they have time till 2017.

Apart from its goal of economic integration, a significant focus of

the SAARC is social cohesion among member countries so as to promote

a vibrant South Asian identity. The SAARC social charter was signed in

Islamabad in 2004, in order to address such issues as population stabilization,

empowerment of women, youth mobilization, human resource development,

promotion of health and nutrition and the protection of children, all of which

are key issues for the welfare and well being of South Asian populations.3

Some other initiatives taken by the SAARC include:

1. SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism

(1987).

2. Association of SAARC Speakers and Parliamentarians (1992).

3. SAARCLAW: An association for persons from the legal

communities of the SAARC countries (1992).

4. SAARC Convention on Prevention and Combating Trafficking in

Women and Children for Prostitution (2002).

5. The Additional Protocol on Suppression of Terrorism (2004)

6. SAARC Scheme for Promotion of Organized Tourism: The scheme

was initiated with the over-all objective of people-to-people

contact in the region and more specifically as a step to facilitate


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development of intra-regional tourism.

7. SAARC Chairs, Fellowships and Scholarships Scheme: This

initiative intends to provide cross-fertilization of ideas through

greater interaction among students, scholars and academics.

8. SAARC Youth Volunteers Program (SYVOP): The main objective

of the SYVOP is to harness the idealism of youth for regional

cooperation programs by enabling them to work in other countries

in the field of agriculture and forestry extension work.



4

3 A. Bailes, John Gooneratne, MavaraInayat, JamshedAyaz Khan and Swaran Singh (2007). Regionalism

and Security

building, Regionalism in South Asian Diplomacy, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 15, 2007 Stockholm International

Peace Research

Institute, Sweden.

Furthering SAARC objectives, in the 14th SAARC Summit held

in New Delhi in April 2007, member states agreed to launch the SAARC

Development Fund, establish the South Asian University, create a SAARC

Food Bank and set up the SAARC Arbitration Council. In a significant move,

Afghanistan was formally invited to take its place in the comity of SAARC

and the Peoples Republic of China, European Union, Republic of Korea

and the United States of America - nations crucial to regional cooperation -

were invited as observers to enrich the agenda of SAARC with their inputs

and experience. There are suggestions to include China and Iran as SAARC

member states, so to make it more effective. In March 2007, Iran had formally


28/51

requested for a grant for observer status in the SAARC.

Conflicts in South Asia Challenges to Regionalism

Regionalism has a different meaning and purpose for each nation

when they become a part of any regional organization. In most cases states

that join hands in any regional cooperation mechanism have certain basic

differences; for most regional cooperation is l imited only to economic

cooperation through free-trade agreements. Differences among memberstates

of the regional cooperation organizations are greater in the presence

of inter-state conflict(s) between the member states. Even if states seem to

agree on some issues at the platform of that particular regional cooperation

organization, their intentions behind the concept and purpose of regionalism

are fundamentally different. Inter-state conflicts have posed hurdles to

regionalism. This phenomenon is clearly visible in the functioning of the

SAARC.4

Established with a vision to forge a South Asian identity, SAARC

has been unable to fulfill this promise and has often been criticized for its

failures and shortcomings. Some constraining factors that can be identified

in the SAARC framework are: its inability to tackle inter-state conflicts that

has often made it hostage to bilateral conflicts and the nationalistic interests

of member states. Apart from this, an Indo-centric strategic perception exists

both among Indias neighbors as well as among the big players in global

diplomacy. Lack of trust among South Asian elites: SAARC was born with

disabilities and constraints, which were essentially self-imposed. It adopted a

functional approach of cooperation in non-controversial areas like social and

cultural fields, hoping that if successfully carried forward, opportunities for


29/51



5

4 ibid.

cooperation in more vital areas could open up. Moreover, SAARC follows

the principles that all decisions have to be made unanimously and that no

bilateral and contentious issue can be on the SAARC agenda. This clearly

exhibits a weaker inter-state relationship toward equitable participation in

policy making for South Asian people.5

The lack of trust among member states has often manifested itself

in the ineffective administration of several of the initiatives taken by the

SAARC. A prime example is that of the SAFTA. Though the seven signatory

nations of SAFTA implemented the first tariff reduction from July 1, 2006,

Pakistan and India have not yet allowed each other to be facilitated under

this agreement. In July 2006, India called for an urgent meeting of SAFTA

Ministerial Council (this council comprises of Commerce/trade ministers

of the SAARC countries and is responsible for the administration and

implementation of the SAFTA agreement). Under the SAFTA agreement, the

free trade area operates on the basis of the sensitive list. In this emergency

meeting, India accused Pakistan of backing away from its commitment under

the multilateral SAFTA agreement. However, this is not the only example

of the two countries adopting confrontational postures towards each other

at the SAARC platform. There have been several such occasions with both

countries debating contentious issues and delaying the actual implementation

of very important regional instruments for peace and economic integration.


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Apart from the continuing India-Pakistan conflict, a concern that has

often come up at SAARC forums is the dominant position of bigger states,

particularly India, in the regional set-up. The discrepancy of size and power

between India, a nation of over 1 billion people, and all its neighbors, leads

to natural concerns among the latter about Indias dominance in the region

and potential interference in their affairs. At different times this has been a

significant strand in the policy thinking of states such as Bangladesh, Nepal

and Sri Lanka; and has led them to seek security assistance first and foremost

from outside South Asia when they need it.6 Cooperative policies of SAARC

are influenced by the fear among some of the smaller states around India that

interdependence will lead to the erosion of their political autonomies and

therefore undermine their advantages for securing honorable settlement of

bilateral disputes with India.7



6

5 Atiur, Rahman, SAARC: Not Yet a Community, The Asia-Pacific: A Region in Transition, ed. Jim Rolfe.

Asia-Pacific Center

for Security Studies, Honolulu, 2004.

6 A. Bailes, Regionalism in South Asian Diplomacy

7 SmrutiPattanaik, S. Making sense of regional cooperation: SAARC at twenty, Strategic Analysis, Vol.

30, No. 1., 2006,

Institute for Defence Studies Analysis, New Delhi.

This can be witnessed by the motivations of several member states

in becoming a part of this regional body. Nepal joined SAARC hoping that

this platform will provide it with opportunities to voice its most important


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concerns, most of which are related to India. Also Nepal wanted multilateral

cooperation rather than a bilateral arrangement with India, especially in

water-related conflicts. At the time of conception of SAARC, Bangladesh

had serious concerns over the issue of sharing Ganges water with India,

therefore Bangladeshi leadership of that time hoped to seek solutions of

Ganges water and similar issues through the SAARC platform. Sri Lanka

was initially hesitant to join SAARC, considering its greater and favorable

economic ties with South East Asian nations. However, Sri Lankas internal

conflict compelled her to join SAARC with the hope of getting help from

SAARC towards alleviating its fears from India.

Pakistan joined SAARC to further strengthen its ties with other South

Asian states, which would, in the long run, help to counter Indias influence

in the region.

Types of conflict between the member states of SAARC

Territorial conflicts

SAARC members Conflict

India-Pakistan Deadlock on issues of Siachen

glacier, Kargil and Sir Creek.

Kashmir dispute which has resulted

in two major wars

Afghanistan-Pakistan Durand line issue

Cross-border terrorism


India-Pakistan On several occasions there have been

blames from both sides (India and


32/51

Pakistan) on each other for carrying

out terrorist activities or supporting

such acts in their country.



7

Conflict over natural resources


India-Pakistan Both countries are having dialogue

regarding the Baglihar dam being

built over River Chenab in ndianadministered

Kashmir.

India-Bangladesh Bangladesh wants a fair share of

Ganga river by opposing the

construction of Farrakha Barrage

in India

Conflict(s)-related to immigrants and refugees


India-Bangladesh Illegal immigration of Bengalis into

India.

Afghanistan-Pakistan Pakistan has decided to shut down

refugee camps under increasing

pressure to crack down on crossborder

militancy.

Nepal-Bhutan Over repatriation of Bhutanese


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refuges in Nepal.

Increasing military modernization in SAARC member states could

be seen as one of the indicators to assess the seriousness of commitments of

SAARC member states towards an efficient regional cooperation mechanism

in South Asia. Constant rise in military expenditures shows an unhealthy

environment for human development and also for the peaceful interstate

relationships; as even on the platform of SAARC the member states have

manifested lack of trust in countries with which they have a dispute or conflict.

Increasing defense spending will not only aggravate the countries internal

and external disputes, but also exacerbate human security in the region and

increase poverty.8 According to statistics from the International Institute of

Strategic Studies,9 the defense expenditure of five of the South Asian states

is as follows:



8

8 GobindThukral, Increased military spending keeps South Asia on the boil, Deccan Herald, Bangalore,

October 2007.

9 IISS, The Military Balance 2007, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 2007.

1. India - US$21.7 billion

2. Pakistan - US$ 4.14 billion

3. Bangladesh - US$840 million

4. Sri Lanka - US$686 million

5. Nepal - US$ 139 million

The continuing conflict between India and Pakistan has also led

to ever-increasing investments in arms and ammunitions to counter each


34/51

others military capability. Both states continue to invest huge amounts of

their financial resources in buying weapons from the USA, China, Russia,

Sweden and France.

SAARC and Conflict Resolution

While, there has not been a single direct attempt from SAARC to deal

with any of the above mentioned disputes, there have been bilateral dialogues

between the SAARC member states to soften their contentions. There is an

ongoing series of dialogues between India and Pakistan; and most recently,

Pakistan and Afghanistan organized Peace Jirgas to resolve their tensions

through this traditional conflict resolution mechanism. During Musharrafs

regime, Pakistan recommended the creation of a conflict resolution mechanism

in SAARC to deal with all intra-regional bilateral conflicts.

Globalization has also been influential in South Asia, especially

in terms of its impact on intra-regional politics and economics. On some

occasions there has been pressure on South Asian states to show seriousness

towards exploring possibilities for cooperation and the peaceful resolution

of conflicts. In this regard, there have been efforts from the USA to ease

tensions between India and Pakistan, and Norwegian mediation between

the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

(LTTE).

Dispute resolution has recently found a place in the SAARC framework.

At the 2005 SAARC summit in Dhaka, the member states agreed to establish

a SAARC Arbitration Council in Pakistan. The council is aimed at creating

favorable conditions for supporting greater investment by investors of one

member state in the territory of another member state. This initiative is geared


35/51



9

towards creating a South Asian forum for settlement of commercial disputes

by conciliation and arbitration. However, SAARC is yet to take serious steps

to fully tackle the issue of inter-state conflicts between its member states.

Prevalence of several inter-state conflicts in South Asia is not because

the stakeholders in conflicts are not highly motivated towards a productive

peace-building process; involving bilateral dialogues, third-party mediations,

back channels, track II diplomacy etc. The involvement of South Asian states

in peace-building initiatives is evident in its long-term participation in the

UN Peacekeeping Operations. At present, four of the worlds top four UN

peacekeepers are from South Asia; Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and India.10

It is ironical, therefore, that the same global peacekeepers continue to put

deadlocks in several conflict resolution processes within their own region.

According to some analysts, South Asian regional stability has been

troubled by the absence of an institutionalized security mechanism. Although

SAARC did not develop as a bilateral conflict resolution mechanism, it has

dealt with a few contentious issues such as terrorism and human trafficking.

The Declaration prepared as an outcome of the SAARC summit of 2004, held

in Islamabad, stated the commitment of member nations to the objectives

of and principles of SAARC and pledge to reinvigorate cooperation of all

peoples of South Asia. Member states added that, We envision South Asia

to be a peaceful and stable region where each nation is at peace with itself

and its neighbors through peaceful means and dialogue. In this declaration,


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the importance of peaceful resolution of conflicts was highlighted, but the

outcome has not been very positive in either forcing member states to engage

in any dialogue towards resolving their inter-state conflicts or SAARC

becoming a platform for these important issues

For a country or an organization to act as a facilitator in a regional

setting to resolving bilateral conflicts it has to be accepted as a neutral player.

In the case of South Asia, due to its socio-cultural linkages and political

history, it is difficult to consider any country as neutral.11 India, considering

its economic strength and geographical advantage, could play the role of

a facilitator in resolving intra-regional conflicts. But that is not possible

because India is a party to many inter-state South Asian conflicts. Second,

the option could be taking benefit from the SAARC observers (EU, USA,



10

10 Four South Asian countries are at the top of the list as of United Nations report of October 2007 onranking of military and police

contributions to UN Operations; Pakistan with 10603, Bangladesh with 9717, India with 9316 and Nepal

with 3674 members

(UN, 2007).

11 Pattanaik, Strategic Analysis, 2006

China, South Korea, Japan and Iran)12 towards resolving bilateral conflicts

in South Asia, but even among the observers there are ongoing tensions, for

instance the troubled relations between the USA, Iran and China. To rely on

the ineffective conflict resolution mechanism of the United Nations would

also be a frustrating exercise.


37/51

Apart from the conflicts between member states, there is also

disagreement among them on the need for a South Asian conflict resolution

mechanism to deal with bilateral disputes. India, Nepal and Sri Lanka are

not in favor of conflict resolution as a domain of the SAARC. However,

the SAARC has shown potential for emerging as a forum for dialogue,

negotiation, preventive diplomacy and confidence and peace building.

The South Asian community personality broadly depends on three

inter-linked economic and political factors: First, the character of economic

transactions such as formal and informal trade relationships and whether

there has been an honest attempt at reducing trade imbalances; second, how

leaders feel about the outstanding regional problems, especially bilateral

ones, such as the Indo-Pakistan conflict, India-Bangladesh border disputes,

and those leaders efforts to minimize these tensions; and third, the level of

consciousness among citizens of the region toward the status of human rights

in the region, and specifically, how they feel about states which at times,

instead of promoting freedoms, curb them.13

The failure of the region to run regular flights between the South

Asian capitals speaks volumes about the supremacy of mindless politics

over peoples concerns. Only recently, a decision has been made by the

concerned authorities in India and Pakistan to increase the number of flights

and routes between their countries. At the moment, only one airline from

each country operates between the Pakistani cities of Lahore and Karachi and

the Indian cities of Mumbai and New Delhi.14 For the last three years bus and

train services have reopened along some of the old railway lines and roads

between India and Pakistan. However, even in the presence of relatively high


38/51

inclination in friendly relationships between India and Pakistan, the later

refused to extend transit facility to India for trade with Afghanistan. A lot

of brainstorming has been done on peace pipelines between the concerned



11

12 Observer status allows these countries to participate in the meetings, shape its thinking through their

interactions, but not be part

of decision-making in SAARC.

13 Rahman, The Asia-Pacific: A Region in Transition, 2004

14 In February 2008, the aviation officials from India and Pakistan agreed to add Indias Chennai and the

Pakistani capital Islamabad

as future destinations between both countries.

states to deal with the expected energy crises in South Asia. There are two

proposals on peace pipelines: Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India

(TAPI) and Iran-Pakistan-India. Both these projects are yet to be finalized.

Societal desires for substantive cooperation in the fields of developing

natural resources, human resource and infrastructure remain inconsiderable.

Specific areas of cooperation in the field of natural gas, water resources, ports

and waterways, transportation, communications and hydropower remain

to be explored. Vast areas of the service sectors of human development

opportunities utilizing regional human and development infrastructures

have remained out of focus. The present low level of intra-regional trade

is a result of bad policy. Kashmir and other border conflicts have been used

as instruments for the deprivation of the people of India and Pakistan from

economic and social opportunities by some influential policy makers. The


39/51

leaders have not been trying earnestly to reduce intimidation and statesponsored

violence against people of the related regions. What South Asians

face today is a deep absence of pro-people governments and policies for

reducing poverty, ending violence, arresting environmental degradation and

improving human development status, balancing inter- and intra-regional

trade, and fostering peace and harmony.15

Unofficial SAARC A Way Out

Despite the criticism, the SAARC forum has enabled a constructive

space for dialogue btween member states. A significant success of SAARC

has been the relationship-building it has allowed at the sidelines of its formal

meetings.

Apart from the official institutions established under the ambit of

the SAARC, there also exists an unofficial channel of communication and

interaction among member states. I.K. Gujral in his inaugural address at

the conference on SAARC 2015 pointed out that the SAARC process has

generated a parallel process of unofficial SAARC. It is evident that in the past

two decades, there has been unprecedented rise in interaction and networking

among various institutions, agencies and civil society organizations in South

Asia. This unofficial cooperation exists on various issues, especially for the

promotion of human rights, conflict resolution, health, business, performing

arts etc. Concluding his address, Mr. Gujral said, I have the increasing



12

15 ibid.


40/51

feeling that unofficial SAARC is going to be the driving force behind the

official SAARC process. This is some sort of new regionalism that is fact

engulfing the entire South Asia region.16

According to this concept of new regionalism, civil society has a big

stake in promoting regional cooperation. An analysis of intangible outcomes

of the SAARC process is essential in an assessment of its efficiency in

promoting a regional identity. The most recent example of this is the pressure

by the civil society on their respective governments to evolve legal provisions

to curb the menace of trafficking of the girl child and women in South Asia.

It was this networking among civil society organizations and activists which

resulted in pressurizing the SAARC leaders to sign a Convention to fight this

critical problem in the eleventh SAARC summit held in Kathmandu in early

2002.17

Despite ups and downs in political relations of countries in the South

Asian region, civil society organizations have been continuously making

efforts to improve relations and create spaces for the governments to develop

agendas for the upcoming meetings. It was estimated that in 1998-99 alone

there were over 38 track-II channels working in South Asia,18 which is

indicative of the involvement of civil society actors. Thus, unofficial SAARC

is fast emerging in domestic and regional peace constituencies.19

The practice of unofficial SAARC has particularly impacted the

conflict between India and Pakistan. A landmark was the January 2004

Islamabad SAARC summit meeting where for the first time since the 1999

Lahore Declaration, the two countries leaders Indias PM AtalBihari

Vajpayee and Pakistans President Pervez Musharraf adopted a positive


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posture towards each other. They also issued a joint statement in which they

pledged to resume state-level talks on Kashmir.

There have also been social movements initiated by the civil society

to forge people-to-people connection forum in South Asia. This has also

enabled non-governmental voices to be heard at the regional level. One such

initiative is the South Asia Partnership International (SAP-I) with its member



13

16 I.K. Gujral, Inaugural address, SAARC 2015 expanding horizons and forging cooperation in a resurgent

Asia, Friedrich-Ebert-

Stiftung, New Delhi, 2007, pg. 19.

17 Mahendra, Lama, SAARC dynamics of emerging new regionalism, Conference on expansion of

SAARC: challenges and

opportunities, organized by Institute of Foreign Affairs and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Nepal, 2006.

18 NiazNaik, Confidence building in South Asia: problems and prospects Seminar paper presented in

the International Seminar

onSouth Asian Economic Cooperation: problems and prospects, organized by the Institute of Policy

Studies, Colombo, 2001.

19 Lama, Conference on expansion of SAARC: challenges and opportunities, 2006

organizations in Bangladesh, Canada, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

For more than 20 years they have been promoting regionalism through civil

society initiatives. This network is organizing the Peoples Summit since

2001, which is to promote the peoples agenda, since the formal structure of

SAARC is inadequate to enable an interaction with the civil society.

SAARC and other Regional Cooperation Mechanisms

In the light of state-centric interests hijacking the regional agenda,


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SAARCs relationship with external players is also crucial. For instance,

Indias growing clout in global politics is being perceived with suspicion

and concern by smaller states in SAARC and the recent strategic partnership

between India and the United States further exacerbates this suspicion. Thus,

while external players through their economic and political influence could

provide incentives and useful lessons for regional integration, they could also

act as an impediment in the budding South Asian integration process.

Other regions, including some dominated by lower-income developing

states, have drawn from building up mutual mechanisms that address their

security needs either directly or indirectly. Europe has explored this formula

and demonstrated its advantages most fully with the creation of the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), which

put an effective stop to war among the Western states after 1945 (and has

helped to contain their remaining internal disorders) and then spread the

benefits more widely with the enlargement decisions of the late 20th and early

21st century.

More recently, the ending of prolonged and bloody inter-state

conflict in South-East Asia has been both marked and consolidated by the

strengthening of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), its

enlargement to such countries as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam,

andits increasingly formalized cooperation and dialogue relationships with

Asias larger powers. China and Russias relationship, if still complex, has

been stabilized with the help of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

(SCO). The multilateral organizations of Latin America and the Caribbean

are generally seen as weaker, not least because of their multiplicity and


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many overlaps, but their explicit efforts for confidence building and conflict

prevention or resolution have certainly played a role in the gradual phasing

out of interstate conflicts in the region and the containment of such intra-state

ones as remain (e.g. in Colombia and Haiti).20



14

20 A. Bailes, Regionalism in South Asian Diplomacy

Regional cooperation mechanisms around the globe have been

influential in resolving or at least transforming inter-state conflicts, and

in this regard, the example of Association of South East Asian Nations

(ASEAN) is quite appropriate and relevant to SAARC. It is interesting to

note that despite the existence of fourteen inter-state conflicts (territorial

and maritime conflicts), the absence of war among the member countries is

no doubt a major achievement of ASEAN. Since the creation of ASEAN in

1967, not only ASEAN itself is free from war, but also none of the ASEAN

member states have fought an outright war with a non-ASEAN state. Unlike

SAARC, ASEAN has not hesitated to deal with issues of inter-state conflicts

and simultaneously it has extended its processes of conflict prevention to the

Asia Pacific region. In this regard, since 1994, there is the ASEAN Regional

Forum (ARF), which is also called ASEANs model of preventive diplomacy

and conflict resolution.21

Regional communities such as the European Union and ASEAN

have flourished due to a number of integrative factors. The concept of

Cooperative Security and Comprehensive Security were used in ASEAN


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for designing the basic objectives of this forum. These objectives were to

foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues

of common interests and concern; and make significant contribution to efforts

towards confidence building and preventive diplomacy in the region. It set up

a three-stage process consisting of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs),

Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution.22 India and Pakistan are also

members of ARF.

SAARC on the other hand, has not experienced these integrative

factors in any substantive way and will need to if the region is to develop

any sense of community. Strong regional cooperation will never be effective

unless both people and their leaders can comprehend the mutual benefits

of coming together. Unless the comparative advantages of intra-regional

trade are realized by trade and economic leaders, and until the cost of

non-cooperation is calculated by the elites of each member country, the

development of SAARC as a community will remain a far cry.

Member states of SAARC are engaged in multilateral cooperation

frameworks beyond the South Asian region, thus providing them an



15

21 L. Mangi, Regional Cooperation: Southeast Asian Experience, International Seminar on Regional

Cooperation in Asia and Option

for Pakistan, Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Pakistan, 2007.

22 NiazNiak, South Asian Economic Cooperation: problems and prospects, 2001

opportunity to learn and adopt some of these effective mechanisms. It is

often debated that the participation of SAARC members in other regional


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frameworks will dilute the interests of member states in SAARC, and

therefore will undermine the progress of this regional cooperation mechanism.

However, there are others who believe that the formal and informal interaction

with other regional frameworks will help SAARC in improving its progress

by learning from the experiences of others.23

Organization

ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences India

(ASEAN PMC)

Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), Pakistan (founding member),

created in 2002 India (founding member), Sri

Lanka (joined in 2003 and

Bangladesh (founding member)

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), India, Pakistan, Bangladesh

since 1994 and Sri Lanka

Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), Afghanistan and Pakistan

founded in 1985 (founding member)

East Asian Summit (EAS), since 2005 India

ASEM since 2006 India and Pakistan

Conclusion

The framework of SAARC provides its member states with a regional

space for policy making and implementation at the South Asian level.

Globalization has unleashed both opportunities and challenges. It has been

proceeding at such a pace that unless South Asian states act together there,

is every possibility that they will be left behind. As yet, South Asia has

been unable to act together, even in terms of articulating common ills like


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poverty, while dealing with global leaders setting the tunes of future trade,

environmental protection, and poverty reduction strategies throughout the

world.



16

23 Attanaik, Strategic Analysis, 2006

Yet, despite criticism, there have been some positive developments in

the South Asian region which have the potential to improve the efficacy of

the SAARC forum. Since 2003, India-Pakistan relations have shown at least

a temporary trend towards stabilization. Direct government to government

talks have addressed various types of confidence-building measures; a modest

step has been taken to open up communications and human contact across

the de facto boundary in Kashmir. The demands of humanitarian relief work

after the major earthquake of October 2005, which hit Kashmir particularly

hard, brought some further positive energy to the relationship after a cautious

start.24 Efforts have also been made in the field of terrorism. A Joint Antiterror

Mechanism between India and Pakistan is now operational, since its

first meeting, on 6 March 2007 in Islamabad. At the meeting, the Pakistani

side presented evidence of involvement of Indian intelligence agencies in

theBalochistan insurgency. However, officials from the Indian side denied

these allegations. On the other hand, the Indian officials failed to present

specific information on the Samjhauta Express25 blasts and just provided a

sketch of a Pakistani who allegedly disappeared in India after the blasts.

Information however was shared after the Mumbai Blasts ofJuly 2006. At


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the inter-governmental levels, the ongoing composite dialogue between India

and Pakistan provides not only optimism but opportunities to addressing

issues that characterize one of the most severe and conflictual inter-state

relationships in South Asia.26

Soon after its inception, the SAARC had taken into consideration the

most important issues of terrorism. And most recently, the Prime Minister

of India, Dr. Manmohan Singh has emphasized the need for a zero tolerance

towards terrorism. While there was significant debate within SAARC over

the formal definition

Group Conflicts in South Asia

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