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Planning Theory

DOI: 10.1177/14730952080904312008; 7; 123Planning Theory

Steven Griggs and David Howarththe Stop Stansted Expansion campaign

Populism, Localism and Environmental Politics: the Logic and Rhetoric of

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P O P U L I S M , L O C A L I S M A N D

E N V I R O N M E N T A L P O L I T I C S : T H E

L O G I C A N D R H E T O R I C O F T H E S T O PS T A N S T E D E X P A N S I O N C A M P A I G N

Steven Griggs

University of Birmingham, UK

David Howarth

University of Essex, UK

Abstract Proposed plans to build or expand large infrastructure projects

such as airports, motorways or housing developments are often sites of

intense political contestation and conflict management. This article

explores the intersection between environmental planning processes and

political practices by analysing the Stop Stansted Expansion (SSE)

campaign to curtail the further development of Stansted Airport in the

south-east of England. Highlighting a paradox of political engagement,

the article builds upon recent poststructuralist theory to develop a novel

grammar of concepts and logics with which to explore the dynamics of

political campaigning. This grammar develops Ernesto Laclaus recent

approach to populism by elaborating a spectrum of political forms of

engagement, along which concrete manifestations can be located. We then

characterize the logic of the SSE campaign surrounding New Labours

consultation exercise for the 2003 Air Transport White Paper, before

problematizing strategies and tactics in the light of the available options.

We conclude by sketching out the possibility of a dialectical connection

between localism and populism, in which particular demands can be

inscribed into a more universal rhetoric and strategy for change.

Keywords airports, environmental planning, large infrastructure

projects, localism, political engagement, populism

123

Article

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The practices and processes surrounding the physical planning of large infra-

structure projects such as airports, motorways or housing developments are

often the sites of intense political contestation and political management. How

much of what is put where, to use Peter Halls pithy phrase (Hall, 1980: 2), can

prompt the voicing of particular, yet contradictory, demands by different

sections of communities. For example, demands may be advanced either to

defend local employment or the regional economy, or to protect sites of

environmental interest, thus minimizing the negative impacts of noise or

congestion on surrounding neighbourhoods. But equally, more universal

demands can also emerge that may challenge wider contradictions in society by

linking together particular demands into more general political projects for

environmental protection and challenges to growth. Indeed, as we have seen

with recent protests against airport expansion and road-building in the UK,

broad and novel coalitions can emerge through the planning process as localresidents ally with environmental interest groups and radical direct action

movements in potentially counter-hegemonic projects (Griggs and Howarth,

2002, 2004).

This article explores the different ways in which issues of physical planning

become sites of political struggle and negotiation. More precisely, it concerns

the relationship between what we shall call the paradox of political engage-

ment, which emanates in turn from a tension between particularity and uni-

versality in political campaigning, and the environmental and social problems

that arise from the provision of large-scale infrastructure projects. In so doing,we focus on the conflicts surrounding the plans to expand Stansted Airport in

the south-east of England, where we analyse the dynamics of the Stop Stansted

Expansion (SSE) campaign. The struggle emerged in 2002 in response to the

New Labour governments consultation exercise to determine the future of

aviation in the UK, and pits the current UK government, the British Airports

Authority (BAA), as well as the various economic interests that are promoting

airport expansion, against the local residents, elected politicians and environ-

mental campaigners who are opposing the proposed developments.

Our main aim is to characterize, explain and problematize the strategies andtactics pursued by the SSE in its endeavour to curtail the expansion of the

airport during and immediately after the consultation over the 2003 Future of

Aviation White Paper (DfT, 2003). We begin with a few remarks on the para-

doxes of political engagement in the field of environmental politics, where we

build upon the work of Ernesto Laclau (2005a, 2005b) on populism to develop

a grammar of concepts and logics with which to understand the dynamics of

political mobilization and their relationship to specific policy outcomes. We then

use these notions to explain and evaluate the logic of campaigning pursued by

SSE. Our analysis focuses on the publicly articulated discourse, especially therhetorical devices, employed by the SSE leadership in its campaign statements

and documents. The article concludes by problematizing the campaign of SSE

in the light of our discussion of populism, offering some reflections on its impli-

cations for the practice and critical evaluation of environmental politics in

general.

Planning Theory 7(2)124



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The paradoxes and logics of political engagement

Though expressed in different, often competing or even incommensurable,

idioms of analysis, a number of social and political theorists draw attention to

what we might term a paradox of political engagement. In broad terms, the

paradox hinges on the tension between particularity and universality in modern

society. Very generally, to put it in terms borrowed from Rousseau, the paradox

concerns the difficulties of mediating and reconciling the gap between the will

of all (the sum of particular wills) and the general will (the moment of uni-

versality that is common to each particular will), thus highlighting the tension

between the free pursuit of private self-interest and those activities directed at

the realization of the common or public good (Rousseau, 1978). But while

Rousseau (as well as Hegel and Marx in their different ways) strived for a

complete overcoming of this split in any legitimate political order, where indi-vidual freedom would coincide with community and the good of all, he was of

course deeply pessimistic about its realization in actual political orders.1

Indeed, it is clear that the tension pinpointed by Rousseau is still pertinent

today, even though in contemporary theory it admits of a range of possible

permutations and expressions. In rational choice theory, for example, it is

manifest in the difficulties of reconciling the logic of individual, rational self-

interest with the logic of collective action, as the perceived costs of the latter

can outweigh its perceived benefits, or because the goods can be achieved

without acting in concert at all (Olson, 1965). By contrast, in Marxist theory itappears in the rift between the particular interests of a social class (excluding

the proletariat, which is by definition universal) and the ideological expression

of its interests in a purportedly more universal set of ideas and values (Marx

and Engels, 1974). For Antonio Gramsci, it involves the way a specific class or

economic group endeavours to construct a more general common sense that

can actively appeal to and thus win the consent of a wide range of social

classes and groups in support of its particular project or programme by tran-

scending its narrow economic-corporate interests (though he insisted that the

task of constructing hegemony is a contingent and precarious undertaking)(Gramsci, 1971). Finally, in current democratic theory, the tension is often

crystallized around the issues of factionalism and consent, where the former

raises questions about the inherent tyrannical potentiality of majorities, or the

prospect of perpetual losers in the democratic process, while the latter poses the

difficulty of securing the universal consent of those affected by decisions that

do not necessarily represent their interests (e.g. Dahl, 1967). And even when

the issue is apparently resolved by recourse to procedural justifications, it

then reappears in disputes between majoritarian, pluralist, deliberativist and

agonistic accounts of democracy.

More prosaically, the paradox of political engagement often arises from the

difficulty of linking together singular demands or individual wills into more

general projects or collective wills. It is particularly acute for environmental

movements and groups, whether they operate at the local, national or global

level. Many of the demands articulated in the field of environmental politics,

Griggs and Howarth Populism, localism and environmental politics 125



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which we broadly construe as challenges to the logic of industrialization

(Torgerson, 1999), are very often deemed to bepopular, sometimes universally

so. It is unusual, though not unprecedented, for citizens or politicians to declare

themselves openly against cleaner air and unpolluted drinking water, or to

reject rationales for fuel-efficient transport systems, protected wilderness areas

or sustainable growth. However, this popular appeal does not easily translate

into active and universal support and struggle for environmentally friendly

practices and public policies. In Britain, for example, significant numbers of

people acknowledge the problems of global warming and climate change, and

the Labour government has committed itself to reducing carbon dioxide

emissions in line with its Kyoto promises. Nevertheless, in the field of aviation,

people continue to contribute to global warming by flying in ever-growing

numbers, even though the aviation industry is allegedly responsible for the

worlds fastest growing source of carbon dioxide emissions (Tyndall Centre,2005). And, at the same time, governments encourage flying by supporting

policies for airport expansion and by declining to levy a tax on aviation fuel.

Indeed, the recent White Paper on aviation represents a green light for a major

expansion of Britains airport capacity (Department for Transport, 2003). In

short, whilst supporting the general aims of environmental protection, the

public and government appear often unwilling to bear the costs of their beliefs,

and/or more than willing to allow their particular, short-term interests to trump

their more universal environmental concerns.

The paradox is also evident in the difficulties of constructing broad coalitionsto advance environmental demands and interests. Notwithstanding the import-

ant successes of the anti-roads movement in the UK, this task has been far from

unproblematic for the environmental movement, revealing the inherent

tensions in constructing popular and effective alliances to achieve desired

outcomes (Carter, 2001; Doherty, 1999; Rootes, 2002). First, popularity does not

necessarily translate into a practice of politics that is able to build broad politi-

cal projects, whose advocates are willing to endure the opportunity costs of

environmental policies. Second, support for a particular set of demands the

defence of a local beauty site, for example does not necessarily advance moreuniversal demands for environmental protection and challenges to growth.

Finally, the charge of Nimbyism can too readily undermine localized site

protests, labelling them as selfish and instrumental campaigns and masking the

complex motivations of those engaged in such protests (Burningham, 2000;

Wolsink, 1994). Collective action problems, the difficulties of articulating

environmental demands into coherent political programmes, diverse con-

ceptions of the problems and solutions to environmental issues, and so on, can

thus all conspire to impede the construction of political projects that can sustain

demands for a better environment,and which can influence the framing, passingand implementation of more environmentally friendly public policies.

Our investigation of this paradox focuses on the way in which local groups

seek to bring about change in the field of environmental planning. It is clear

that if such groups are to bring about their desired outcomes they must first

endeavour to render visible the issue around which they are campaigning, both




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demand may be constructed in a variety of ways. Indeed, as more radical

theorists of power correctly point out, the operation of the underlying struc-

tures and institutions of society may either militate against the recognition of

interests, or distort the construction and mediation of interests so radically that

they are expressed in less threatening and manageable ways (e.g. Crenson,1971;

Gaventa, 1980; Lukes, 2005).

Equally, however, once constituted, demands have to be understood in

relational terms, that is, they can be combined together into broader projects,

or addressed and processed individually by the existing system of power in

different ways, or they may be displaced and not considered at all. This arises

partly because the identity and content of demands is always contingent,

and partly because they are always articulated by certain agents in particular

historical circumstances. But it is also because the articulation of demands pre-

supposes a certain disjunction between the context of its initial articulation andits subsequent representation and thus reiteration in different social and insti-

tutional settings. In short, demands can be connected together, or related to the

existing authorities or systems of power, in various ways.

Indeed, it is possible on this basis to discern and distil various logics in this

regard.2 At a high level of abstraction, we can start by fixing two basic logics,

which in ideal terms form opposite poles of a continuum along which various

concrete logics can be positioned. On one side of the continuum, we can

position the logic of combining different demands together into chains of

equivalentially related elements, while on the other side we can place theway in which demands are registered and processed by an existing political

authority in a singular and punctual fashion. Following Laclau, the logic of

linking demands together into an equivalential chain involves the production

of empty signifiers signifiers such as freedom to fly, sustainable aviation or

demand management with which subjects can identify. As empty signifiers

are forms of representation that are progressively emptied of ideological and

semantic content as new demands and identities are attached to them, they

serve as points of symbolic identification for a range of different groups and

subjects with divergent identities and interests. This contrasts with a logic ofdifference in which demands are dealt with individually without disturbing the

existing institutional system (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).

Somewhat controversially, Laclau names the logic of combining demands

into equivalential chains populist, while the logic of differential incorporation

may be deemed a more institutional or democratic form of politics (Laclau,

2005a). Along with Laclau, we agree that these terms avoid some of the

confusion surrounding much of the existing literature on populism, which in

general is either so indeterminate that it proves to be of little explanatory or

critical use, or is so specific as to generate a raft of exceptional cases (Laclau,2005b). However, it is not so clear why Laclau equates institutional and demo-

cratic logics, as this seems to preclude the possibility of a radical democratic

project that articulates populist and democratic or agonistic forms of struggle

(Howarth, 2008). By contrast, in the approach developed here, a populist

form of politics is not to be confused with a specific ideological content the




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demand for a referendum via a purely rhetorical appeal to the people for

example or with certain types of movements or organizations, such as

Jean-Marie Le Pens Front National or Jrg Haiders Austrian Freedom Party.

Instead, populism and institutionalism are better understood as two political

dimensions of social relations, which are to be situated at the ontological, rather

than the ontical, level of social analysis. In other words, they endeavour to

capture processes that are common to all forms of political activity, rather than

particular sorts of organization, movement or ideology.

More fully, if politics refers to the ongoing process of instituting and contest-

ing social relations, then populism names that specific dimension which

contests social relations by dividing society, or at least various sites of it, into

opposed camps in the ongoing struggle for hegemony. A populist politics

involves the construction of a collective agency such as the people by creating

antagonisms between subjects, thereby establishing a political frontier(Howarth, 2005). This means that populist discourses invariably speak in the

name of the people, the nation or the local community, and their rhetoric

seeks to galvanize a common set of values, beliefs and symbols, which can

advance the interests of such collective subjects. In short, the people is a

theoretical, rather than ethnographic concept, and captures the practice of

constructing equivalences between dispersed social demands, which are then

linked together in a more universalistic discourse.

As we have insisted, populist politics contrasts with institutionalist or trans-

formist politics, which are informed by a logic of difference. In an institutional-ist form of politics, demands are put forward in a piecemeal or punctual fashion,

and addressed by powerholders without altering the existing consensus. In the

case of transformism, on the other hand, the granting of concessions by the

powerholders, or the brokering of compromises that maintain the status quo,

means that demands are absorbed into the existing system of power, thus

dissolving equivalential chains of demands and weakening populist logics.

These reflections suggest that the overall political import of social demands is

not given, but ambiguous. This means that their overall significance depends

upon the hegemonic practices and specifically the forms of politics that fixtheir identity in specific historical contexts.

At least three implications follow from this approach. First, populism refers

to the degree of division and contestation brought about by a political mobiliz-

ation or practice. Or, to put it in quantitative terms, the greater the numberof

demands articulated into an equivalential chain, coupled with the particular

salience or intensity of each demand, the greater the degree of populism.

Importantly, however, in Laclaus purely formal theoretical model, the salience

or intensity of a demand is not stressed (Howarth, 2008). Yet this aspect is

crucial, especially when evaluating particular campaigns and groups. Singularbut intensely felt demands may predispose and orientate groups to pursue a

more institutional form of politics, while less intense, but multiple and

dispersed demands may incline groups in a more populist direction.

The second concerns the relationship between populist politics and the

outcomes of such practices. At the outset, it is important to stress that a populist




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form of politics does not guarantee significantly different political effects. For

example, the production of equivalential effects linking together diverse

demands, identities and interests in a populist discourse does not guarantee the

realization of these demands in specific policy outcomes. There is many a slip

twixt cup and lip so to speak. But what then are the criteria to assess whether

populist forms of political struggle result in significantly different outcomes? It

is here that the category of hegemony is useful. In our framework, we shall

define the achievement of hegemony as the production of common sense in a

particular site or sphere of the social, or indeed in society as a whole. In

Gramscis terms, this involves the winning of intellectual and moral leadership

in society, and not just the achievement of political power (Gramsci,1971: 578).

This does not mean that all sectors in all spheres of the social need actively to

consent to a particular set of values and beliefs. Instead, it involves the winning

of a strategic measure of popular support in a particular domain, even thoughthe accomplishment of such a new historic project is never finished and settled,

but always contingent and revisable (Hall, 1988: 7). These changes in the

production of common sense, which in turn determine what is normal and

acceptable, bear a relationship to specific policy outcomes, as they constitute a

necessary though not sufficient condition an ideological context so to speak

for the proposal and implementation of legislation, such as giving the go-ahead

for a new runway at an airport, or indeed for blocking such proposals.

Finally, it is important to stress that in this perspective there is no a priori

privileging of populism or institutionalism/non-populism on critical orevaluative grounds. Instead, the two logics are no more, though no less, than

two formal, regulative ideals (which in practice can never be fully realized),

where populism involves the construction of equivalences (logic of combi-

nation), while non-populism involves little or no equivalence between demands,

or their disarticulation by the existing system of governance (logic of substi-

tution). Thus there is no way of saying that populism is normatively preferred

over a more institutional form of political engagement. Instead, the critical and

normative implications of these logics are strictly contextual and perspectival,

that is, our normative evaluation of a particular strategy or movement dependson the particular circumstances and conditions under consideration; it is quite

possible that in a particular situation,and from a particular perspective, an insti-

tutional form of political engagement can be preferred over a more populist

form. Indeed, it is equally possible for a group to engage in different sorts of

political logics at the same time, and even to combine these different logics in

a single campaign, though this will require great political skill and ingenuity.

Notwithstanding our belief in the fecundity of these theoretical remarks in

helping to explain the activity of groups in the policy process, they only take us

so far. The concrete analysis of the translation of values and common sense intospecific proposals and public policies demands further analysis, which involves

the pinpointing of specific logics and mechanisms. This requires careful empiri-

cal research into the interaction of different political forces and their mediation

in specific institutional contexts. Thus, having briefly introduced what we mean

by populism and institutionalism, and their connection to hegemony, we return




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to a description and problematization of the character and dynamics of the

SSE campaign.

Characterizing the SSE campaignThe roots of the SSE campaign extend back to 1965, when the development of

a major airport in the Stansted area was first mooted. Local communities joined

forces to establish the North West Essex and East Hertfordshire Preservation

Association (NWEEHPA), which campaigned against airport expansion and,

following the decision to make Stansted Londons third airport, co-ordinated

local efforts to limit the airports impact on the area, focusing on the curtail-

ment of night flights, noise pollution, and the monitoring of adherence to

defined take-off paths (see Hall, 1980; McKie, 1973). When in July 2002, the

government announced a consultation exercise to determine the future ofaviation in the UK, it was left to NWEEHPA to spearhead the launch of a new

campaign. Within two weeks, it had joined forces with parish councils, Friends

of the Earth (FoE) and other environmental groups to launch Stop Stansted

Expansion (SSE).

Emerging from the social and political networks of NWEEHPA, SSE was

able to call upon established networks of community activists, including

professional political lobbyists, professional and experienced environmental

campaigners and barristers etc.3 The SSE team included within its ranks, for

example, a former parliamentary commissioner, an emeritus professor ofclinical virology and a legendary libel lawyer. In the first seven weeks of its

campaign, it organized eight public meetings attended by over 2000 people;

demonstrated outside the Department for Transports local exhibition; and

produced 26,000 posters, 5000 car stickers and 100 t-shirts.4 It appointed, in

February 2003, its own communications officer, Carole Barbone, who had pre-

viously worked with the likes of ICI, the Body Shop and the European

Commission.5 Indeed, only one year after its launch, it claimed 4200 members,

and the support of 60 parish and local councils, local members of the British

and European parliaments, and over 20 environment and heritage groups, aswell as strong backing from local newspapers, especially the Herts & Essex

Observer.6 Its community calendars alone raised 340,000 in support of the

campaign between August 2002 and May 2004.7

In determining its response to the threat of expansion, the SSE leadership

firmly embraced the logic of oppositional politics, mobilizing local communities

to raise the perceived political costs of expansion at Stansted and make further

development of the airport politically unacceptable both for government and

for the British Airports Authority (BAA).8 Norman Mead, the groups first

chair, urged supporters to make enough noise to ensure that expansion atStansted was not perceived by government to be the easy option, declaring

that Stansted cannot and must not be the soft target.9 However, the SSE

leadership was concerned to maintain public opposition to expansion of the

airport within the boundaries of legitimate democratic politics.10 In so doing,

campaigners reproduced the sedimented values and practices of NWEEHPA,




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invoking the success of past campaigns to legitimize their popular appeals to

local community opposition.11 The SSE leadership warned against direct action,

advocating instead an extensive non-partisan communications and lobbying

campaign, and claiming that whilst some may wish to dig tunnels or chain them-

selves to trees, it was [p]robably . . . not the right time for this kind of action.

We must first use the democratic process and take it through to the end.12

Indeed, Norman Mead repeatedly beseeched local residents to send as many

letters as possible to their national and local elected representatives, suggesting

that thousands of letters will send the clearest possible signal that we are not

prepared to sit silently by whilst our lives are blighted by unnecessary airport

expansion.13 Such popular community support was recognized as the lifeblood

of this campaign.14

This call for a concerted collective agency involved rhetorical appeals to the

local people and the local community to oppose its common enemies; appealswhich sometimes functioned to mask over any competing demands that were

voiced across the local villages surrounding Stansted Airport. The SSE leader-

ship constructed expansion at Stansted as a common and immediate threat to

all residents in the region and to all aspects of their quality of life. As Norman

Mead put it to his fellow campaigners:

People must realize the knock-on effect of the airport expansion is not just an

unimaginable increase in airborne noise and pollution, but also an intolerable

pressure on their day-to-day lives. Just driving to another local town or village could

become a mission . . . .15

In such rhetoric, the defence of local communities becomes the collective

responsibility of all local people, who are charged with a duty to protect their

common local heritage from the short-term interests of the aviation industry

and the government. Thus in an August 2003 press release, the SSE leadership

stated that:

Our heritage, environment and ecology belong to everyone and should not be given

away to the aviation industry for its own short-term gain. These are assets, which are

of great value and importance both to people today and to many future generationsand we must remember that once they disappear, they would be gone forever.16

These mobilizing appeals were interwoven with appeals for unity, with its

leadership declaring from campaign platforms that if the local community

fiercely opposes the plans, remains united and challenges the proposals at every

turn we are capable of ensuring that a second runway never sees the light of

day.17

The SSE leadership also made frequent use of the populist rhetoric of the

underdog fighting an unresponsive and corrupt London-based establishment.For example, local communities were portrayed as opposing irresistible

demands for a third Heathrow in a battle against covetous airports,18 a land

grab19 and act of environmental vandalism,20 and the spread of the metrop-

olis extending its urban tentacles in all directions and without limit.21 Equally,

the Department for Transport (DfT) was accused of over-indulg[ing] the




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aviation industry demands for growth,22 of engaging in cosy23 relationships

and stitch ups24 with BAA that disregarded heritage and environmental issues

in favour of pursuing the aviation industrys agenda.25 Populist appeals to

government to put people before planes26 were deployed to rouse opposition

to a government that in the rhetoric of the SSE leadership had said to hell with

protecting the environment, our national heritage and local communities:

planes take priority.27 As such, the openness of the consultation process was

called into question as the SSE leadership condemned the DfT for having

clearly been overwhelmed by representations from BAA and the aviation

industry and ha[ving] completely ignored the voice of the people.28

In deploying this rhetoric of the underdog, the SSE leadership endeavoured

to construct a political frontier between local communities and the favoured

interests of the aviation industry, which it defined as BAA. BAA was charac-

terized by the SSE campaign as a privileged monopoly that exploited itsposition to employ bullying tactics against local residents. Its alleged campaign

of intimidation and misinformation was symbolically condemned as Lord

Haw Haw tactics, conjuring up the national struggle against the Third Reich

during the Second World War.29 Invoking a climate of dirty tricks and

espionage, Norman Mead alerted local residents at a public meeting that:

I wont be going into detail here because almost certainly we have within our midst

at least one representative of BAA who will report back to Terry Morgan

[then Managing Director of Stansted Airport] in the morning. So if the person

sitting next to you is wearing a grey suit, taking lots of notes and suddenly looking

very embarrassed, you might just wish to whisper NO WAY BAA into his ear!

[emphasis in the original]30

As part of its media campaign, and to counter such alleged dirty tricks, SSE

activists, dressed as city gents, travelled to the City of London to brief insti-

tutional City investors and financiers on the dismal financial record of BAAs

Stansted Airport.31 In fact, SSE campaigners exploited shareholder resolutions

within BAA to end the practice of free car parking at airports for Members of

Parliament, peers and Members of the European Parliament,32

to try and forcethrough a vote on the companys political donations, and to oblige the

companys Directors to obtain shareholder approval for major investments.33

As the campaign evolved, the SSE leadership also sought to inscribe its

particular demands in the wider discourses forged by other protest groups

opposed to the proposed expansion of airports outside the Stansted region.

At its first meeting, the campaign group acknowledged the existence of

AirportWatch the national campaign to prevent airport expansion and

recognized the need to establish close links with other protesters at Heathrow

and Gatwick.

34

And during the period of consultation leading to the 2003 WhitePaper, and beyond, SSE participated in a number of joint actions with other

local campaigns. Significantly, it endorsed a more universal struggle against the

construction of inland runways anywhere in the south-east of England,

advocating alongside AirportWatch and HACAN ClearSkies the campaign

against expansion at Heathrow the policies of demand management, while




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condemning expansion through the policies of predict and provide. In so

doing, SSE sought to render equivalent a number of demands and grievances.

These included calls for sustainable development, the demands for an end to

the excessively favourable tax regime which aviation enjoys and its exemption,

contrary to the polluter pays principle, and a challenge to government fore-

casts about the predicted growth in air traffic and the alleged economic benefits

of the aviation industry.35 It rejected a narrow localized campaign in favour of

a more populist politics that did not seek to displace the development of

runways onto other inland sites. Its campaign was directed against inland

runways anywhere in the south-east.36

However, despite these more populist gestures and rhetoric, the SSE leader-

ship persistently emphasized its more particular demands to stop expansion at

Stansted Airport. For example, it dismissed the case for the unsustainable

growth of Stansted as illogical, rejecting what it regarded to be a weakcommercial case for expansion that would not respond to the needs of a region

where there were few employment and regeneration pressures.37 More

importantly, while arguing against the expansion of inland airport capacity, it

promoted the case for the development of an offshore airport as the least worst

option, as the positive-sum solution to expansion that:

would benefit rather than compromise communities across the south-east by largely

eliminating the problems associated with giant airports, namely gridlocked roads,

constant noise and air pollution from both planes and cars, health problems and the

loss of substantial countryside and heritage sites. . . . giving a major boost to Britainslong-suffering engineering industry in the process. It would also give the aviation

industry what it is looking for 24 hour take-offs and landings.38

Support for an offshore airport, and no additional inland airport capacity,

potentially offered the leadership of SSE the opportunity to extend its popular

appeal to other campaigners and protests. Yet, the demand for an offshore

airport was not included by government in the consultation process and stood

in opposition to the more universal, environmental demands and strategies

endorsed by AirportWatch and its supporters, who rejected increased airport

capacity anywhere in the UK in favour of demand management.In short, the demand for an offshore option ultimately weakened the capacity

of SSE to produce equivalential chains with other struggles, thus exposing

potential divisions with other groups who have contested the building of any

additional airport capacity in the UK. Nonetheless, the SSEs revised submission

to the government consultation process maintained the option of a new offshore

airport as the most appropriate solution to airport expansion, even though it

recognized how such support provoked tensions even within its own ranks:

It is our firm conviction that no further runway expansion should be allowed in the

south-east. If, however, the Government fails to rise to the challenge, if it fails tointroduce and implement serious demand management measures, then it will have to

face up to the appalling consequences of a massive increase in unconstrained

demand. A minority of our members, among them Friends of the Earth, believe that

in this event the Government should be left to make its own decisions about the

location of any new runway capacity and that it would be wrong for us to submit any




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views. For the majority, however, the siting of any new development would be a

matter of profound concern, and we argue that there must be no expansion at

Stansted, or at any other inland airport, but that the Government should explore

more thoroughly the various options for an offshore airport in the Thames estuary.39

In fact, the populist appeals of the leadership of the SSE campaign were

primarily confined to the delimited sphere of the local communities surround-

ing Stansted Airport. Concerns over the wider global environmental impacts of

aviation were persistently brought back to the confines of the local region, to

the unthinkable outcome that its [the regions] beauty and tranquillity should

be destroyed as part of a highly questionable response to an unconstrained and

reckless growth in air traffic.40 Threats were specifically attached to the local

community such that expansion at Stansted would mean that jumbo jets

dominate localskies,41 bringing localroads to a standstill42 [our italics]. Their

primary struggle remained within the boundaries of the region: We will not let

this region of Englands green and pleasant land become a sea of concrete43

[our italics]. Sally Oliver, the mother of the celebrity chef Jamie Oliver and SSE

campaigner, equated the campaign to a war against our community: There is

a real threat of invasion into ourenvironment and a threat to ourchildrens

health44 [our italics]. Even more so, SSEs successful judicial review to include

consideration of the expansion of Gatwick Airport in the consultation process

betrayed the dynamics of a particular rather than universal struggle. Here SSE

campaigners successfully argued that the 1979 planning agreement between

BAA and West Sussex County Council, which stated that there would be nofurther runways at Gatwick before 2019, could not prohibit consideration of

expansion at Gatwick as the White Paper was to plan airport expansion beyond

2019, and the government predicted a third runway would be required in the

south-east in 2024.45

Given these contradictory logics and discourses, where ultimately are we to

position the SSE campaign on the spectrum of populist and institutionalist

forms of political engagement? There is no easy answer to this question, so let

us begin by considering a couple of comparable cases. Consider, for example,

the campaign of local residents to oppose the construction of a second runwayat Manchester Airport in the mid-1990s. The initial stages of this campaign

conformed to a classically institutionalist form of mobilization and protest as

local action groups concentrated their attention on influencing local politicians

and shaping the outcome of a Public Inquiry, thus doing little to link their

opposition to other demands and struggles.46 However, after the Public Inquiry,

this more non-populist form of engagement gave way to a nascent but restricted

form of populist politics, as local residents extended their demands to include

more explicit environmental concerns, as well as the struggles of direct action

groups (Griggs and Howarth, 2002).In contrast, the campaign of HACAN ClearSkies against the expansion of

Heathrow Airport pursued a more developed form of populist politics during

the New Labour governments 2002 consultation exercise to determine the

future of aviation in the UK.47 Not only was this movement instrumental in

linking different groups together under the banner of HACAN ClearSkies, but




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it was also integral in the formation of AirportWatch, which brought together

various anti-airport groups into a single campaign and widened the scope of the

airport struggle beyond the confines of aviation policy and politics to broader

environmental issues, demands for social justice, equality and better quality of

life for all (Griggs and Howarth, 2004). In so doing, it laid the foundations for

potential hegemonic struggles such as those evident in the struggles around the

building of Narita Airport in the Sanrizuka area of Japan during the 1970s,

which condensed a wide range of demands and struggles, responding to

numerous contradictions in Japanese society (Apter and Sawa, 1984).

Set against these available logics of airport protest, the SSE leadership

appears to have chosen to focus its efforts on influencing the planning process

by operating mainly within the existing institutional rules of the game, and only

partially engaged in what we have termed a more populist politics. Now of

course it is important to stress that the complex negotiation between the moreinstitutionalist and more populist forms of politics is the very substance of

political engagement: campaign leaderships have to articulate and balance

short-term interests against the potentially longer-term dividends promised by

wider coalitions, while seeking not to alienate their core constituency by

watering down or even jeopardizing their own particular demands. Yet, in

embracing the solution of an offshore airport, and in its highlighting of threats

to the local quality of life, SSE tended to eschew the populist construction of

equivalential demands and ties with other struggles against airports, choosing

to downplay broader demands for the environment, social justice and equality.It therefore did not privilege the task of integrating its demands into a wider

set of struggles. Indeed, the more sceptical attitude towards a more populist

form of politics arguably intensified, at least in the short term, after the publi-

cation of the White Paper, as SSEs oppositional politics became further focused

on battles over legal mechanisms, planning provisions and compensation for

local residents, with its leadership invoking for example localized concerns of a

housing blight.48 In sum, it appears that the campaign of SSE had more in

common with the more institutionalist form of politics evidenced in the

Manchester case than the more populist struggles of HACAN ClearSkies andAirportWatch.

Explaining the rhetoric and strategy

How, then, do we account for the fact that the SSE leadership tended to adopt

this more institutional-bound type of politics, while downplaying a more

populist rhetoric and strategy? And how are we to evaluate these decisions both

in terms of the Stansted case and the wider environmental movement? Here we

must move to an explanation of why the SSE leadership pursued its particularmodel of campaigning, which will then enable us to evaluate the SSE campaign

in light of our discussion of populism and the environmental movement.

In theory, at least three possible types of explanation can be put forward to

account for the essentially non-populist campaign strategy of an environmental

group or movement such as SSE. One type of explanation suggests that a group




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is unable to pursue a more populist style of politics because it lacks the capacity

to do so. For example, such a politics may not be on the agenda, or the group

may lack sufficient resources to follow it. Another explanation might suggest a

movement is unwilling to do so, because a populist strategy is perceived not to

be in the groups interests, or is deemed to be implausible or too risky. And a

final explanation might focus on the fact that a group may alter its approach

during the campaign as a result of a dislocatory experience or a transformative

dynamic. In other words, its initial strategies may fail and may then change, or

its leadership may perceive that a different strategy is likely to be more

effective in a particular context and transform its strategy accordingly. In

actuality, of course, a complete explanation of a concrete phenomenon can

involve an interplay of all three ideal types.

In order to assess the campaign of SSE, let us begin by recalling the

strategies that were actually available at the start of its latest campaign (whichwe must emphasize were not mutually exclusive). As we have intimated, the

SSE and the communities surrounding Stansted more generally could have

responded in three different ways to the impending threat of airport expansion

and the further development following in its wake. The first was to mount a

challenge to the plans for expansion by challenging the hegemony of airport

expansion per se. This would have meant taking on the aviation industry and

its supporters, as crystallized by the Freedom to Fly coalition, which had been

formed to advance the latters interests. Freedom to Fly had sought to articu-

late the notion of sustainability within the framework of a socially responsiblecorporate capitalism that was sensitive both to environmental and social

concerns, as well as to the economic development of the UK as a whole

(Howarth and Griggs, 2006).

Ultimately, this strategy would have involved a direct challenge to the logic

of unbridled industrial and economic development, and would have meant the

elaboration and assertion of a clear set of environmental demands, as well as

the adoption of a radical environmental stance. More practically, it would have

involved building equivalential links with other campaigns, both those opposed

to airport expansion, as well as those pursuing other environmental campaigns.This approach may not be as outlandish as it first sounds. This is because, as we

have shown, there were actual attempts to develop a broad campaign against

airport expansion that sought to present a unified front against expansion

throughout the UK. Indeed, there were also successful precedents of this type

of politics, evidenced in the anti-roads campaign of the late 1980s and 1990s,

which strongly contributed to the overturning of the Conservative Partys

Roads for Prosperity programme (Wall, 1999).

But, before we examine this option in a little more detail, let us consider the

two other possibilities available to the SSE. The second strategy could havebeen to seek to displace the proposed plans for airport expansion to another

site, preferably one that carried less environmental or social cost. This strategy

could have been prosecuted either by developing alliances with other like-

minded groups or constituencies, and then putting pressure on government and

political parties, or by opposing the plans by the existing legal and political




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means in a more singular fashion. Finally, it could have sought to ameliorate the

situation at Stansted as best it could by working within the existing institutional

parameters so as to modify and influence the proposals. But implying that some

expansion would go ahead, this would at best constitute a second-best solution

to the problem.

Our characterization of the SSE suggests that it did not pursue the first

strategy, at least not exclusively. Although populism was an available and

feasible type of politics, and even though the SSE did not lack the resources to

prosecute it, it chose ultimately to downplay this aspect. Instead, with the

publication of the White Paper,and the ending of consultation, there was a clear

dissipation of a common enemy, as specific proposals and negotiations led to

the gradual loosening of equivalential ties with other protests, thus disaggregat-

ing popular demands (Laclau, 2005a, 2005b). In short, we must consider the

possibility that the SSE leadership was ultimately unwilling to embrace fully thelogic of populist politics, and/or that its partial engagement with populism gave

way to a politics of operating within the existing rules of the game, and that it

has not (yet) been confronted with a dislocatory experience that might cause it

to change strategic direction.

Instead, it concentrated more of its attention on preventing the expansion at

Stansted, either by challenging the need for any future expansion,or by suggest-

ing better alternatives. The pursuit of this logic of difference, rather than

equivalence, can in part be explained by concentrating on the interests of the

SSE and its constituencies. In other words, it can plausibly be argued that theysought to displace the expansion somewhere else,or strived to reduce the extent

of the expansion, because it was in their immediate, particular interests to do

so. However, whilst this interest-based explanation looks superficially

compelling, it is by no means exhaustive or decisive. For one thing, all interests

have to be constructed politically. This means that the SSE could possibly have

construed and constructed its interests as being against all airport expansion

both for environmental reasons, and as the best means of securing its particu-

lar short-term interests. This possibility was on the agenda, had been pursued

by HACAN ClearSkies, and was considered by SSE itself.Equally, from our perspective, interests are relative to particular identities

(Griggs and Howarth, 2002). That is to say, they are the interests of a specific

group with a particular (socially constituted) identity. Given this, the strategies

and tactics of the SSEs campaign its unwillingness to adopt a populist

strategy, for example cannot be divorced from issues of group identity. A

strong case can be made for the claim that both the group identity of the SSE

leadership, its articulation of middle-class, establishment and professional back-

grounds, and its constituency, were not commensurate with the endorsement of

direct action and the broad coalition politics of radical environmentalism. Notonly that, but the SSE had available its own repertoire of community protest

which, in its own view, it had and has successfully deployed over the last 40

years. In short, the combination of historical context and group identity provide

important elements for an alternative explanation of the direction of the SSE

campaign.




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Problematizing the campaign

To return to some of the issues we raised at the start of this article, what are

some of the (necessarily tentative) conclusions we can draw about the inter-

section of politics and environmental planning, and what does our analysis

mean for environmental politics in general? In answering this question, we need

to make our evaluation of the SSE campaign a little more explicit. Any evalu-

ation at this stage is necessarily speculative, as it is still contingent on the actual

outcomes of the struggle. Equally, it depends on whether one views the matter

from the perspective of the SSE or from the environmental movement in

general (such that we can legitimately speak of the latter). From the perspec-

tive of the SSE, our evaluation is necessarily narrower, as it must be restricted

to an assessment of the effectiveness of its campaign in achieving the goals it

set itself. Here the focus is on whether or not expansion takes place, or theextent of such expansion. Indeed, the answer can be understood in binary terms:

no expansion or (degree of) expansion. The key counter-factual evaluative

question in this regard is whether or not a populist style of politics is better or

worse at achieving the goals laid down by the SSE than a non-populist politics.

And, as the SSE has adopted a more non-populist approach, we would need

further comparative research investigating campaigns and movements, which

did adopt a more populist approach, for example to answer the question with

any degree of confidence.

For the time being, then, as the definitive outcome on airport expansion inthe UK has not yet been decided, we must ultimately remain agnostic on this

question. Nonetheless, there is a growing expectation that the SSE may be

successful in the short-term in pursuing its particular interests, and thus blocking

the current expansion plans. Indeed, at the time of writing in the summer of

2007, SSE is vigorously putting its case to the Public Inquiry into expansion

plans for the existing runway at Stansted Airport, as BAA is seeking, first, to

raise existing limits on passenger numbers at the airport, so that by 2014 around

35 million passengers are expected to use the airport each year, and second, to

increase the number of permitted aircraft movements to 80,000 per annum.49

But while some of this success must be attributed to the concerted actions of

the SSE and its campaign, it may also be the contingent outcome of a series of

decisions and factors beyond its control or influence. The latter include the

difficulties in persuading budget airlines to finance the Stansted expansion and

the then Chancellor Gordon Browns growing support for a further runway

(and possibly another terminal) at Heathrow.50 But it is also the result of the

changing political climate, in particular the increased concern about the role of

the aviation industry in fuelling global warming. In short, the SSE may succeed

in its campaign to prevent expansion at Stansted, and one effect of this outcome

may well be to reinforce its political identity, and thus its chosen strategy and

tactics, as campaigners possibly misread the reasons for their success.

Viewed from the perspective of the environmental movement, the situation

is much more complex. Just posing the question in these terms raises interest-

ing dimensions of environmental politics because, from an environmental point




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of view, even a victory for the SSE the blocking of airport expansion at

Stansted is not automatically a success for the environmental movement as a

whole or for the environment as such. This is the case for the obvious reason

that airport expansion can simply be displaced to other sites with even greater

costs to the environment, and the very logic of airport expansion may remain

unquestioned, even bolstered. Through its expression of more particular

demands and its oppositional politics, not least its recourse to judicial review,

the SSE campaign may potentially ward off the construction of further runways

at Stansted Airport. However, its tendency towards a more traditional and

institutional form of politics possibly impedes the construction of the broader

political projects necessary to advance demands for more environmentally-

friendly public policies. In this scenario, paradoxically, SSE becomes more of a

quality of life, rather than an environmental, campaign. And thus, successful or

not, it does not necessarily advance the cause of the environment.Finally, what if SSE had adopted or does adopt a more explicitly environ-

mental perspective? From this point of view, even a failure to stop the expan-

sion could be viewed as a success. This might be the case if the campaign could

serve as a paradigm of environmental protest, which was then followed by other

groups, or if the issue was connected to other environmental campaigns that

eventually put the brakes on airport expansion. In other words, losing the battle

of Stansted may have advanced the war on airport expansion in general. As we

have argued, this is because the political success of environmental concerns and

demands depends not just on their popularity, or the intensity with which theyare asserted, but crucially on their insertion in an equivalential chain along with

other social and economic demands. Of course, on the other hand, we have to

allow for the possibility that failure may well just be a failure both for SSE and

the environmental movement as airport expansion continues.

Conclusions

There is much debate about the environmental consequences of the aviation

industry in todays increasingly globalized world. The rhetoric is certainly in-tensifying. Some opponents of aviation expansion argue that flying kills, and

connect its inexorable growth with a range of environmental and social evils,

including climate change, uneven development and famine.51 Supporters of the

industry counter by challenging the war on tourism, and downplay its impact

with arguments that technological innovations and emissions trading schemes

can offset negative effects.52 One emergent trend that is clear, however, is the

growth of a vigorous local opposition to the expansion of airports, which has

spilled over into struggles at the national, regional and international levels. A

key issue that emerges from these developments is the overall import of thesestruggles for the intersection between environmental planning processes and

the political practices of the wider environmental movement.

Our analysis of SSE shows that the campaign has at times embraced a more

populist politics that articulates its particular demands with a more universal

challenge to the aviation industry and the logic of unbridled economic growth




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as a whole. On the other hand, we have also demonstrated the difficulties of

engaging in such politics given the obvious attraction for local groups to pursue

their narrower interests, as well as the fact that such campaigns must be rooted

in the concerns and interests of local people. But equally, however, what we

might term the circumstances and constraints of localism may militate against

the aims of the broader environmental movement. In our view, this paradox of

engagement could feasibly be negotiated through a populist form of politics

that constructs equivalential linkages between dispersed social demands, thus

articulating the particularity of each struggle in a more universal discourse.

Indeed, such a populist struggle would require the defence of localized

interests, which would not be construed as evidence of Nimbyism, even though

these interests would have to be connected to the wider aims of the environ-

mental movement via the construction of an equivalential chain of related

demands. Rather than contradictory and opposed logics, localism and populismcould thus work to reinforce one another, as particular demands are inscribed

into a more universal project.

AcknowledgementsAn earlier version of this article was presented to the ECPR General Con-

ference in 2005 in Budapest. We would like to thank those attending for their

helpful comments and criticisms. We are also grateful to Jean Hiller for her

encouraging thoughts, as well as to three anonymous reviewers who made

constructive remarks on the article.

Notes1. Only special circumstances, such as a small state, rough equality among the citizens,

an accepted civil religion, and so on, would enable his ideal to inform the activities

of citizens. But even these conditions fail fully to overcome the paradox of political

engagement: In order for an emerging people to appreciate the healthy maxims of

politics, and follow the fundamental rules of statecraft, argues Rousseau, the effect

would have to become cause; the social spirit, which should be the result of the

institution, would have to preside over the founding of the institution itself; andmen would have to be prior to the laws what they ought to become by means of

laws (Rousseau, cited in Connolly, 1988: 56).

2. A fuller exposition of the concept of a logic, as well as different types of logic, is

developed in Glynos and Howarth (2007).

3. Roger Clark, notes of public meeting 1 August 2002, see

[www.broxted.org/pages/arpt/NWEEHPA20020801.doc].

4. SSE, Press Release, 14 September 2002. All press releases unless indicated are

available online at: [www.stopstanstedexpansion.com].

5. SSE, Press Release, 17 February 2003.

6. SSE, Press Release, 1 August 2003.7. Figures available at: [www.stopstanstedexpansion.com].

8. Clark, notes of meeting, 1 August 2002.

9. SSE, Press Release, 5 August 2002.

10. Interview with Carole Barbone, Campaign Director SSE, 13 August 2004.

11. SSE, Press Release, 20 May 2003.




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46. Interview with Jeff Gazzard, Chair of Manchester Airport Environment Network,

30 January 1998.

47. Interview with John Stewart, Chair of HACAN ClearSkies, 17 June 2003.

48. See SSE, Press Releases, 9 March 2004, 5 April 2004, 24 May 2004, 11 August 2004,

21 September 2004, 2 October 2004, 2 January 2005 and 23 August 2005.49. BAA and Stansted Airport submission to Public Inquiry, see

[www.stopstanstedexpansion.com/documents/BAA_opening_statement.pdf].

50. The Observer, 1 January 2006.

51. The Guardian, 28 February 2006.

52. The Guardian, 3 March 2006.

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Steven Griggs is a Lecturer in Public Policy at the Institute of Local Government

Studies at the University of Birmingham. As well as his research into aviationpolicy in the UK, he is also currently working on community participation and

neighbourhood governance. He is general editor of the journal, Critical Policy

Analysis.

Address: School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birming-

ham B15 2TT, UK. [email: [email protected]]

David Howarth is a Senior Lecturer in Political Theory in the Department of

Government at the University of Essex. He is also Co-Director of the Centre for

Theoretical Studies and Director of the Masters Programme in Political Theory.

He is author ofDiscourse (Open University Press, 2000) and co-author ofLogics

of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory (Routledge, 2007), as well as

numerous publications on political theory, poststructuralism, and environmental

politics.

Address: University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, UK. [email:

[email protected]]


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