Gifts to Men and Gifts to God: Gift Exchange and Capital Accumulation in ContemporaryPapuaAuthor(s): C. A. GregorySource: Man, New Series, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Dec., 1980), pp. 626-652Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and IrelandStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2801537 .Accessed: 23/05/2011 17:00

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=rai. .

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserveand extend access to Man.

http://www.jstor.org

GIFTS TO MEN AND GIFTS TO GOD: GIFT EXCHANGE AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION

IN CONTEMPORARY PAPUA

C. A. GREGORY

University of Cambridge

Boas's thesis that potlatch gift exchange is governed by the principle of interest has been accepted by many people as the general principle underlying all competitive gift exchange systems. In the Melanesian context some have argued that 'traditional thriftiness' has 'preconditioned' Melanesians to capital accumulation in the context of a modern economy aimed at development. This article develops a theoretical and empirical critique of that argument. The principle of interest does not underlie competitive gifts-to-men systems and, paradoxically, it is the principle of destruction inherent in a gifts-to-god system that offers the greatest potential for capital accumulation. Competitive gift exchange flourishes and develops under the impact of money.

Among the first group of beings with whom men must have made contracts were the spirits of the dead and the gods. They are in fact the real owners of the world's wealth (Mauss I925: I3).

Men say that gift-exchange brings abundance of wealth (Mauss I925: I2).

What distinguishes the Kwakiutl potlatch from other competitive gift exchange systems is that it involves 'gifts to god' as well as 'gifts to men' (Mauss I925: I2). As Mauss notes, 'It is not simply to show power and wealth and unselfishness that a man puts his slaves to death, burns his precious oil, throws coppers into the sea, and sets his house on fire. In doing this he is also sacrificing to the gods and spirits, who appear incarnate in the men who are at once their namesakes and ritual allies' (I925: I4). It is this gifts-to-god element, and the destruction of wealth involved, that sets the potlatch apart from most other systems. Competitive gift exchange systems that culminate in the destruction of wealth are extremely rare. However, as a gifts-to-men system, potlatch has much in common with the exchange systems of Melanesia and elsewhere. Indeed, Boas's description and analysis of the gifts-to-men potlatch has had a profound effect on the description and analysis of Melanesian exchange. According to Boas, the ideal operation of the gifts-to-men potlatch is as follows: A gives I0 blankets to B; after an interval of time B gives 20 blankets to A; after a further interval of time A gives 40 blankets to B, and so it goes on with the number of blankets being given increasing at a geometric rate 8o,

Man (N.S.) I5, 626-52.

C. A. GREGORY 627

i6o, 320, 640, and so on. It was this perception of potlatch that led Boas to argue that 'The underlying principle is that of interest-bearing investment of property' (I897: 77).

This principle has been accepted by many as generally underlying all competitive gifts-to-men systems. For example Pospisil (I963) discovered that it operates in the Kapauku Papuan economy, and Epstein (I968) in Tolai. For both it was proof that Melanesians were 'primitive capitalists'. For Epstein this fact was the key to understanding Tolai economic development. Tolai big- men, argues Epstein, were 'primitive capitalists ... who displayed an overruling passion for accumulation' (I968: 27). 'This traditional thriftiness,' she continues, 'preconditioned them to capital accumulation in the context of a modern cash economy aimed at development' (I968: 34). A similar argument has been put forward by Finney. 'Gorokan society,' he argues, 'was preadapted for economic change, ... traditional values and institutions were positive assets rather than liabilities in the adoption of cash cropping and commerce' (I973: x).

This article develops a critique of this type of argument by presenting data on a gifts-to-man/gifts-to-god system that operates in contemporary Papua, and by contrasting the principles of this system with those of potlatch. It is argued that the principle of interest does not underlie gifts-to-men systems, and that, paradoxically, it is rather the principle of destruction inherent in a gifts- to-god system that offers greatest potential for capital accumulation in the context of a 'modern cash economy aimed at development'. Pace the Bohannans (I968) and others, gift exchange systems have flourished and developed under the impact of western money and western gods.

The contemporary Papuan gifts-to-god/gifts-to-men system is first described. It is then analysed in comparison with the potlatch and other systems. In this second part the various theories of gift exchange are critically examined, and an alternative theory put forward.

Description Gifts to god in Papua There is perhaps no village in Papua New Guinea that has been more affected by the impact of colonisation than Poreporena (Hanuabada as it is popularly but incorrectly known-see fig. i). Situated in the middle of the capital city, the social structure of the village has been transformed by the impact of money and missionaries. The story to I95I has been told by Groves (I954) and Belshaw (I957). What follows briefly summarises their accounts and brings them up to date.

In pre-colonial times people survived by fishing, hunting, cultivating yams and trading. It is the latter for which they are most famous. The arid land that surrounded their village was incapable of producing sufficient food and they were forced to engage in long trading expeditions westwards across the Gulf of Papua.' This economy is no more. Some women still cultivate gardens, but almost all the men have been absorbed into the Port Moresby workforce. The weekly wage is now the primary source of subsistence. In I950 82 per cent. of

628 C. A. GREGORY

all men from Hanuabada village were employed, almost all of these in skilled or semi-skilled jobs. Since the I95 o'S there has been an increase in the number of women employed in the workforce and an increase in the number of unemployed, especially those of school-leaver age.

In spite of these changes in the village, the kinship system does not appear to have changed very much, in that the traditional 'clan' (iduhu)2 structure is still very strong. Today, there are about thirty iduhu in Poreporena. Most are now Christian and the structure of these Christian iduhu is shown in fig. i. It can be seen that Poreporena is thought of as divided into three village districts, Elevala, Tanobada and Hanuabada, and the latter two districts further subdivided into five groupings. These groupings have little social significance. Of much more importance are the iduhu and sub-iduhu groups. In I979 there

VILLAGE VILLAGE DISTRICTS IDUHU CODE

Tupa -Taurama a Hohodae Geakone }a

Dubara

Kahanamona b

-Hanuabada Laurabada -Mavara c Kwaradubuna d Tubumaga e

-Gunina h -Lahara -Vahoi }

Botai g

Botai Idibana k Poreporena -Botai Laurina m

Tanobada -Abisiri 1 -Gunina j

-Kuriu Gaibudubu/Kaevaga }

unina Pore Idibana n -Gunina Pore Laurina o

Gunina Hagwaipi p -Elevala -Gunina Hoboimo q

-Botai Idibana r -Botai Laurina s

Vahoi t

FIGURE I. Clan structure of Poreporena village, I 979.

Note: This is constructed from a I 979 Poreporena Church handout and therefore excludes non- Christian iduhu.

C. A. GREGORY 629

were 54 sub-iduhu with an average of I04 people in each. As these sub-iduhu are roughly equal in size, the larger iduhu tend to have more subdivisions. For example, Hanuabada Gunina is the largest iduhu and has eight subdivisions, whereas Tupa, being one of the smallest iduhu, has only one subdivision.

Members of these iduhu still live in a line of houses running out from the beach to the sea and it is possible to identify each line of houses with a particular iduhu.3 Elevala, for example, consists of 96 houses, most attached to one of the eleven piers belonging to seven iduhu.

The iduhu is not necessarily an exogamous group. You can marry within an iduhu so long as the person you marry is not your taihuna. The latter is a cognatic kindred group that includes third cousins.4 Marriage involves a complex system of gift giving between the bride's and the groom's families. The net flow is in the direction of the bride's parents and as such it can be called 'bridewealth'. A large number of items is included in the bridewealth payment today and the quantity and value of this payment has risen dramatically since colonisation. For example, in I904 a bridewealth transfer consisting of 43 armshells, 3 pigs, and IOO dogs' teeth was recorded (Seligman I9Io: 77); whereas in I975 one bridewealth transfer consisted of K3, 245,5 67 bags of rice, I4 hands of bananas, 836 armshells, and 3 I bags of sugar (Pacific Islands Monthly, 20 June, I975). Some indication of the relative size. of the monetary component of this bridewealth payment can be gauged from the fact that it was 2,5 times the annual income of a minimum wage earner in that year. Such high bridewealth payments effectively prevent outsiders marrying into this village;6 it also means that the young men become heavily indebted to their clansmen for they have no hope of raising such a sum independently of them.

The principal significance of the iduhu comes from the role it plays in the exchange system: it is the basic unit of competitive gift exchange. There has been a profound change in the form of gift exchange practised in Poreporena and it is necessary to begin with a brief summary of Groves's account of the traditional system.

The Motu residents distinguished between an 'elder' (kwarana) and a 'big man' (lohia). More often than not the iduhu kwarana was the iduhu lohia but this was not always the case. They had two major feast-and-dance cycles, hekara and turia. Hekara was a competitive gift exchange system not unlike the Highlands moka, and turia was held to honour the memory of a deceased kinsman.

By means of the hekara, and indirectly by means of the turia, powerful men fought for social supremacy.... A hekara was fought out until one man had no further food to distribute. Success thus depended on the wealth, talent, range of acquaintance, ancestral power, and magical resources (or luck) of the sponsor and his iduhu. Like the Kwakiutl potlatch, the Motu dance was a device for adjusting social standing; it was part of a battle that never ended (Groves I954: 8).

An old man explained the principles of hekara to me in the following terms: Suppose Vahoi and Hoboimo iduhu decide to make hekara. Hoboimo will go to their gardens and collect 40 bundles of bananas and place them between the two clans. Vahoi will then dance around the bananas and take them back to their clan. Then Vahoi go to their gardens and collect 5o bundles of bananas. The big-man of Vahoi says to the big-man of Hoboimo, 'Here are 50 bananas'. Hoboimo dance around them and take them back to their clan. This

630 C. A. GREGORY

goes on until they decide to end it by having a big celebration. Both clans go to their gardens and bring back 500 bundles of bananas each. These are placed on display and both clans dance around them. At the conclusion of this both big-men say to each other 'We are equals now'.

The happy ending aside,7 it is clear that this system embodies the principle of what A. Strathern has called 'alternating disequilibrium' (I97I: 222). After the first gift Hoboimo is dominant, after the second Vahoi, after the third Hoboimo, and so on.

This gifts-to-men system has been replaced by a gifts-to-god system of the classic potlatch type with the difference that the gifts take the form of money and are appropriated by the church instead of being destroyed. The replacement of one system by another was the product of a long conflict between missionaries and big-men. The missionaries emerged as the eventual victors8 and thereby succeeded in completely transforming the political structure of the village. Nowadays big-men are no longer. They have been replaced by the church deacons, the 'neo-big-men' of the new gift exchange system. It was the rise of these men that saved the iduhu system from collapsing. As Groves reported in I954, 'the iduhu structure ... has persisted most effectively ... in the election of church deacons, whose power in the village draws much of its force from the iduhu structure' (I954: I 3). These deacons compete with each other for status in a system called boubou, established in I948. After the war a locally trained pastor was appointed to replace an expatriate as head of the Poreporena church. Faced with the problem of raising money for his church, he designed a flag called Boubou Kwalim Toana (collection-winner-sign) and arranged for the deacons to compete for it in an annual gift-giving competition. The iduhu that raised the most money was given the flag to fly. In I950 the church raised 38 per cent. of its money by this method, Since then the system has 'taken off'. In I950 K736 was raised in this way (table i). This compares with K45, I37 in I974 and K70,090 in I979. This last figure was 95 per cent. of the church income for that year. It is clear then that the system has grown enormously both in relative and absolute terms. Its organisation has evolved too. Nowadays two cross-cutting competitions are held-one at iduhu level, the other at sub-iduhu level between deacons.

Results of the I974 competition are shown in table 2. Gunina iduhu (h) was the clear leader in I974, and two of its sub-iduhu heads, Areni Tutura, and Morea Hila, came second and third in the deacons' competition. The money collected is not used to improve the general conditions of health, sanitation and such. 'It is a gift', the people say, 'and it is wrong that we should benefit from it'. What is not earmarked for the financial development of the church is donated to some cause. In I973, for example, a large gift was made to the Darwin Relief Fund to help the victims of the cyclone that devastated that city. Some of the young university-educated villagers are less than happy with this arrangement and are pressing for changes in the way the money is distributed.

A special day is set aside each year for the actual ceremony of handing over the money. This is a great festive occasion and villagers look forward to it with excitement. At the I974 ceremony I attended, the atmosphere in the church was that of a carnival. Everybody was dressed up for the occasion. The men were in outrageous fancy dress: one deacon wore a woman's dress; another

C. A. GREGORY 63I

TABLE i. Gifts to Poreporena church, Central District, PNG, I950.

K

Hohodae iduhu 4905 Tupa Dubara 22-40 Taurama I4-50 Geakone I2 I5

Poreporena iduhu 495'9I Kahanomona 55*35 Mavara Kwaradubuna 5I 25 Tubumaga 6I*2I Apau 32-30 Vahoi 28-20 Botai I40o88 Gunina I22'20 Geavana 4 52

Elevala village I9I 49

Total iduhu 736-45 Other Sources IJ,73 70

Grand Total I,9I 0I5

Allocation LMS* general funds 400-00 Pastor's pocket money 30-00 Hanuabada mission teachers 56 oo Church building fund I,354-22 Unknown 69-93

Total I,9I 0I5

Source: Belshaw I957: I84 *London Missionary Society

wore odd shoes, odd long socks, a white lap-lap cloth, ten belts of different size, shape and colour, face paint, a fancy head-dress and had a pair of binoculars hanging around his neck. The women, on the other hand, were very soberly dressed. They wore the uniform of their iduhu: a simple cotton dress of a standard design. The striking feature of their appearance was their makeup. They had applied liberal doses of powder to the face and painted their cheeks rosy red. The ceremony began with prayers and hymns and ended with the handing over of the money. The various sporting clubs and other organisations gave first. After this was finished, the names of the iduhu were called out. A representative of the iduhu called then danced up to the altar carrying a huge multi-coloured cotton swag containing the money-notes and coins-that the iduhu was able to raise during the year. On the outside of the swag was a tag displaying the iduhu's name and the amount of money inside the swag. This tag is kept well concealed by the carrier and is only for the public eye after the event. Secrecy has been heightened in recent years following an event in the early I970's. On that occasion, the amount of money collected by the iduhu that usually wins, Gunina (h) of Hanuabada, was leaked to another iduhu. This

632 C. A. GREGORY

TABLE 2. Gifts to Poreporena church, Central District, PNG, I974.

Iduhu Deacon Amount (K) Ranking

Iduhu Deacon

a. Hohodae Udu Hedu I,507 64 Auie Sarahu 650o50 Nou Igo 939-50 Daera Ganiga III I 8 I I 4,2 I 5 75

b. Kahanamona Reva Lou 476-60 476&60

c. Mavara Reva Boge Vagi Douna Douna Manoka Ruma Vai f 2,786&73

d. Kwaradubuna Rei Vagi 9690oo Dai Guba I,I II I00 2,080o00

e. Tubumaga Nou Sisia Kora Lohia Lakani Oala Nou Heni I,455-56

f Vahoi/Apau Paulo Toua I,293 89 Lohia Roni 662-5o Tau Vagi 668-20 Daroa Boga 527-60 3,I521I9

g. Botai Ikupu Ovia 86195 Mea Hila 6o6&oo Gavera Mea 502-20

Oape Heagi I,28o0o f 3IP50 Boa Arua { I,224-40 4,46I-05 THIRD

h. Gunina Morea Hila 2,I I 3 00 THIRD Dago Morea I,523 03 Areni Tutara 2,2 I I *20 SECOND Rarua Tau I,820o00 Lahui Ako 577-60 Mahuru Morea 4380oo 8,682-83 FIRST

i. Kuriu Kore Auie 37-20 Gudu Idau 68-oo I05-20

j. Gunina Vai Igua 553'50 552'50

k. Botai Idibana Kamea Dikana 4,3I7.47 4,3I7.47 FIRST

1. Abisiri Ravini Daure IJ,3785 IJ,3785

m. Botai Laurina Tom Taru 354.39 354.39

n. Gunina Pore Idibana Raho Misi 752-64 752-64

C. A. GREGORY 633

TABLE 2.-contd.

Iduhu Deacon Amount (K) Ranking Iduhu Deacon

o. Gunina Pore Avaki Bani I,02I*89 Laurina Sioa Vani

p. Gunina Lou Bau 454136 Hagwaipi

Keni Heni 256&oo Kakuna Raha so6&oo I,2i6'36

q. Hoboimo Ganiga Darai Doura Raka'ani 5,509-75 SECOND Raho Pipi )

r. Botai Idibana Maraga Boe 8o5 oo s. Botai Laurina Morea Doura I42'59 t. Vahoi Morea Mea I,910i56

Total 45,I36&9i Other 995-58 Grand Total 46,I32-49

Source: Poreporena church handout.

iduhu had a last minute fund raising drive and managed to beat Gunina (h) by just a few Kina. The event caused much argument. This bit of history explains, perhaps, the mode in which Gunina (h) presented its money in I 974. Their bag was carried by Morea Raka who was preceded by a woman carrying a large sign showing the amount of money that the bag contained. She waved this sign around and poked it under the noses of the members of competing iduhu. But this was a deliberate tease because the sign was in Japanese! The sign was made by Morea just back from a short study course inJapan. After all the money was presented the winners were announced and they held celebrations that lasted several days, at which they drank many gallons of beer.

Details of the growth of the system over the period I974 to I979 are shown in Table 3. K45,I36 was raised in I974, compared with K70,09o in I979, an increase of 5 5 per cent. This increase was unevenly distributed throughout the various iduhu. Four iduhu were unable to match their I974 level, but the rest all managed to surpass it, some by considerable margins. The differential performance of the various iduhu affected their relative rankings. Hanuabada Gunina (h) was top in I974 and in I979, increasing its annual gift by K9,I 7I over the period. No other iduhu was able even to approach the KI7,85 3 it raised in I979. Thus the top position has been stable. However, the next two places are far less so. About eight iduhu compete for these places and there is quite a bit of movement up and down the ladder here. For example Hoboimo (q) came second in I974 but had dropped by three places to fifth by I979. Botai (g) moved up one place to take second position and Mavara (c) moved up four places to take up the third position. At the other end of the ladder Kuriu (i) is consistently last.

634 C. A. GREGORY

TABLE 3. Gifts to Poreporena church, I974 and I 979.

Iduhu I974 I979 Change Rank K Rank K Rank K

a. Hohodae sth 4,2I5'75 8th 4,39005 -3 I74'30 b. Kahanomona I7th 476&60 I4th I,054-86 +3 578 26 c. Mavara 7th 2,786&73 3rd 6,056I2 +4 3,269-39 d. Kwaradubuna 8th 2,080o00 4th 5,369oo +4 3,289oo e. Tubumaga ioth I,455 56 6th 4,5360oo +4 3,o80o44 f. Vahoi/Apau 6th 3,I521I9 7th 4,398 94 -I I,246&75 g. Botai 3rd 4,46I05 2nd 7,I83 34 + I 2,722-29 h. Gunina Hanuabada Ist 8,682-83 Ist I7,853-96 0 9,I7I I3 i. Kuriu 20th I05 20 20th 573 52 0 468-32 j. GuninaTanobada i6th 552'50 I2th I,2II o0 +4 658-5o k. Botai Idibana 4th 4,3I7'47 gth 3,2I3 06 -5 -I,J044I 1. Abisiri I2th I,J37 85 igth 648-97 -7 -488 88

m. Botai Laurina i8th 354 39 i8th 732'3I 0 377'92 n. Pore Idibana Isth 752 64 Isth I,022-95 0 270-3I o. Pore Laurina I 3th I,02I89 I7th 926o90 -4 -9499 p. Hagwaipi i ith I,26136 i ith I,845-89 0 629 53 q. Hoboimo 2nd 5,509'75 sth 5,00057I -3 -509'04 r. Botai Idibana I4th 8050 ?? 3th i,iI6i8 +I 3IIi8 s. Botai Laurina igth I42'59 i6th 944 42 + 3 8oI83 t. Vahoi gth I,9Io 56 i oth 2,0I2 44 -I ioI88

45,I36 9I 70,090-62 +24,953 7I

Source: Poreporena church handouts I974 and I979.

The position of a deacon is by no means stable either. They are elected every four years by means of a secret ballot among the members of a sub-iduhu. Only thirty-one of the men who were deacons in I974 were deacons in I979. Thus seventeen of the forty-eight deacons of I974 failed to secure re-election. The number of deacons also increased by six over the five year period to 1979, reflecting increase in the population and change in the internal structure of the iduhu.

This system is not restricted to Poreporena village. The United Church has colonised a large number of villages up and down the coast where similar gift exchange systems are operating. Large sums of money, by Papua New Guinean standards, are raised in these villages too. Boera, for example, is a small village consisting of about 700 people and I 3 iduhu. In November I979 they managed to raise Ki I,487.

The new exchange system is similar to the old in that it establishes a ranking of the iduhu and the sub-iduhu leaders. It differs in that it is a gift-to-god system rather than a gift-to-men system, a modern variation of the classic potlatch. The nature and significance of this variation is analysed below.

Gifts to men in Papua The traditional gifts-to-men system that operated among the Motu and Koita people of Papua was the hekara. This, as already explained, was suppressed by the Church and replaced by a gifts-to-god system. To my knowledge no

C. A. GREGORY 635

detailed study of this former system exists and it is not possible to elaborate on what has been said above. However, bananas seem to have been the principal instrument of gift exchange and they were consumed by the clan members at the end of the contest. In this respect it invites comparison with Highlands systems where pigs were slaughtered at the end of an exchange cycle. One must assume that the 'banana cycle' was inevitably shorter than the 'pig cycle'.

However, while traditional hekara no longer exists, a new gifts-to-men system did emerge in the early I970's. Impressed by the success of the United Church at raising money by the gift exchange system, a young university- educated Papuan set up a village Development Corporation and tried to raise money in the same way. Every fortnight the fourteen villages9 of the Hiri Local Government Council would get together for a Moale hebou, gaukara hebou, ani hebou (fun-work-food gathering). The villages would take it in turns to host the occasion, the primary aim of which was to raise money by competitive gift giving between them.

At the ceremony I attended on I5 September I 974, in Roku village, KI,427-50 was raised. Ten of the fourteen villages were in attendance.10 The meeting was chaired by the village pastor who opened it with prayers and a hymn. The fun then started. A blackboard with the names of all the villages was placed on a table in the centre of the gathering. As the name of each village was called out the members of this village would move forward and place their contribution on the table. This was duly counted and recorded on the blackboard. The presentation of the money was done with great ceremony: the donors would congregate together and slowly move towards the table singing traditional songs and waving their paper money contributions in the air. At the end of the first round the host village, Roku, had raised the greatest amount, K447. Second was Boera with Ki 65 5o and third Papa with KI 550 IO. Papa then decided to try to beat Boera to second place by making another contribution. This raised K27-52 to bring their total to Ki82-62. Boera responded to this challenge by giving another K3 I7i, raising their total to Ki97-2i and thereby consolidating their second position. Roku, whose position of supremacy was never in doubt, then decided to show off by making a second contribution too. This added another K6o08o to their contribution, bringing their total to K507 8o and the combined total to KI,427-50.

All the money collected belonged to the host village. They decided how it should be distributed. In this case most went to the village Development Corporation in the form of share capital. Roku become indebted to the other villages to the extent of their contribution less what Roku contributed to the other villages when it attended their hebou.

This system never 'took off. It had a very short life and was non-existent in I979 when I returned for a visit. The Development Corporation was still going, but only just. Some of its businesses had closed down and others were floundering. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider the details of the rise and fall of the Development Corporation. It is sufficient to note that whereas the Church received a money gift with no strings attached, the Development Corporation did not. The gift exchange system facilitated the raising of some capital in the form of share capital. This did not harm the

636 C. A. GREGORY

running of the Corporation, but it did not help it much either. The Corporation obtained most of its capital from the Development Bank in the form of an interest-bearing loan. However, the unprofitable nature of the Development Corporation was probably a contributing factor in the downfall of the gift exchange system for reasons that will be analysed below.

Analysis The theoretical problem addressed here is the relationship between gift exchange and capital accumulation in the contemporary historical context. The aim is to determine the general principles that govern competitive gift exchange. This requires that the Papuan system be compared with the potlatch and other systems as they have existed in different places at different times, for it is only by noting the apparent differences between the various gift exchange systems that the essential similarities can be discovered. This necessarily involves a discussion of ideas, for the facts of a case do not have an existence independent of the theory used to describe it. This is especially so with potlatch because much of the so-called ethnographic 'fact' on potlatch transactions is of a hypothetical nature and therefore itself theory.

Gifts to men If the underlying principle of competitive gift exchange were, as Boas claimed, that of 'interest-bearing investment of property', and the aim of a gift transactor was to accumulate, then the lender would be motivated to raise the interest rate as high as possible and the borrower to keep it as low as possible. In other words, the motivation of any individual transactor would be to maximise net incomings. However, the motivation of a gift transactor is precisely the opposite: it is to maximise net outgoings. This aim implies an altogether different 'underlying principle'. But before this principle is stated it is necessary to establish empirically that the aim of a gift transactor is indeed to maximise net outgoings; if so, the underlying principle of gift exchange is not that of interest.

Consider the potlatch. Boas's account of potlatch transactions are all hypothetical, which makes it impossible to demonstrate from his data that his theory was wrong. However, it is possible to raise questions about his analysis by highlighting the contradictions in it. He says, for example, that 'Possession of wealth is considered honorable, and it is the endeavor of each Indian to acquire a fortune' (i 897: 79), a statement consistent with his claim that gift exchange is about capital accumulation. But in the next sentence he adds, 'But is not as much the possession of wealth as the ability to give great festivals which makes wealth a desirable object to the Indian'. Here Boas is saying that an Indian accumulates so that he can de-accumulate, which is to say that in some transactions the aim of the transactor is to maximise net outgoings while in others the aim is to maximise net incomings. The implication is that there is not one underlying principle but two, yet this seems wrong. I would argue

C. A. GREGORY 637

that there can only be one underlying principle of potlatch, and this is the one that generates the aim to maximise net outgoings. This point can be substantiated by examining the evidence of other anthropologists who have worked in north-west America.

Curtis's study, first published in I9I 5, sharply contradicts certain of Boas's propositions:

It has been said of the potlatch that 'the underlying principle is that of interest-bearing investment of property'. This is impossible. The potlatch and the lending of property at interest are two entirely distinct proceedings. Property distributed in a potlatch is freely given, bears no interest, cannot be collected on demand, and need not be repaid at all if the one who received it does not for any reason wish to regulate the gift (I9I5: I43).

Further support for Curtis's interpretation can be found in Barnett's account:

Potlatch presents are not capital investments... They may be considered as prestige investment; but their more immediate character is that of a gift, a favour unconditionally bestowed. This soon becomes apparent to anyone attempting an inventory of a series of reciprocating potlatches (I 93 8: 3 5 3).

Drucker writes:

Internal evidence from detailed descriptions of potlatches and data from informants of groups who potlatched until recent days agree that the loans at interest were quite apart from potlatch gifts. The amount of each potlatch gift had no relation to any previous gift except in the general sense that a potlatch gift should be adequate, not niggardly (I965: 486).

This empirical evidence contrary to the 'interest principle' thesis is so overwhelming that it is difficult to comprehend how such a misunderstanding has managed to stay in circulation for so long. One reason is that while these authors have told us what the principle of potlatch is not, they have not substituted a satisfactory account of what the underlying principle is. Another reason is that Boas's data have been rationalised through a series of ingenious but fallacious hypotheses by Codere (I950). It is her theories, rather than the empirical evidence of Curtis et al., that have influenced the thinking of many anthropologists. A landmark in the development of an alternative theoretical perspective on potlatch is Drucker and Heizer's reexamination of the Southern Kwakiutl potlatch (I967). This book is a sustained empirical and theoretical critique of the Boas/Codere position and demolishes it. The book is less successful in constructing a viable alternative because of its lack of comparative perspective; but it does lay the necessary foundation stones.

The question to be confronted now is that of the underlying principle of potlatch and other gifts-to-men systems. The answer must specify a relationship between a gift given at one point in time (call it G,) and a counter-gift given at some later time (call it G't+). According to the Boas/Codere theory the relationship is G'+. = (i + i)n Gt, where i is the rate of interest and n the number of years. According to this formula 2 blankets given today at ioo per cent. interest requires 4 blankets to be returned after one year, 8 after two years, i6 after three, and so on. But if this is the incorrect relationship then what is the correct one? The clue is to be found in A. Strathern's discussion of moka:

638 C. A. GREGORY

The theoretical progression in the size of the gift, at least as some informants explain the matter, is X, 2X, 4x, 8x, and so on; but in practice smaller increments are added. The increment alone is taken as the debt for the next gift, so that the situation is controlled, as can be seen from the following scheme:

A gives x to B B gives 2X to A Thus A owes x to B Next A gives 2X to B And B owes x to A Next B gives 2X to A and so on (A. Strathern I97I: 98).

This sequence implies the following relationship between a gift and a counter- gift: G+1= G+1 + G, where G,+1 is the new gift, the increment that is taken as debt for the next gift. If A gives 2 blankets and B makes a counter-gift of 4 blankets then a new debt (Gt+1) of 2 blankets is created and the sequence starts again. This process creates an 'alternating disequilibrium' in the status of the transactors: now A is debtor, now B, now A. But for this to happen the counter-gift must exceed the last increment. If it does not the debt relation between the transactors is unchanged and the giver loses status. The ideal sequence, then, is not a series of gifts but a series of counter-gifts.

A counter-gift exchange sequence can rise, fall or remain stable (as in Strathern's hypothetical example). The variable that determines rise or fall in the sequence is abundance or scarcity of the instruments of gift exchange. The ideal instruments are scarce and durable, such as the coppers used in potlatch or the pigs and shells in moka. If the gift transactors lose control over the supply of these things the sequence will show an inflationary tendency. If the over- supply becomes too great then a different instrument, whose supply can be controlled, will be substituted. This is precisely what happened in the Highlands. In pre-colonial times shells were used. These found their way up to the Highlands via the traditional trade routes. Colonisation enabled large numbers of shells to enter the Highlands by alternative routes. Inflation followed and the shells were eventually replaced with money (A. Strathern I97I: I06-IiI).

The accumulation of capital, whether in the form of pigs, blankets or money, is not the aim of a gift transactor. To the extent that gift transactors accumulate at all it is in the form of gift-credit. The big-man is the one with the most gift-credit for he has been able to maximise net-outgoings.12 Pospisil's data on transactions among the Kapauku demonstrate this point. Table 4 summarises the net credit position of the sixteen households of Enona clan, Botukebo village, as at August I955. Household 6, the big-man's household, has the largest net credit position. This household gave away I340 shells during the period under review and received only I 30 in return, giving a net credit of I2 I0.13 Data collected by Meggitt (I974: I86) on Enga te transactions tells a similar story. A 'complete big-man' had a net credit of 27 pigs, a 'little big-man' a net credit of- 2, a married man a net credit of 4, and a bachelor a net credit of o. But Meggitt has a different interpretation of these data. In the Boas/Codere tradition he argues that the 'shrewd man is the one who can adjust all his transactions to parity or, better, to profit [i.e. negative net credit]

C. A. GREGORY 639

TABLE 4. Net credit position of Enona clan with other clans as at August I955.

Household Outgoings Incomings Net outgoings (credits) (debits) (net credits)

I 60 I30 70 2 I2I I I20

3 I I 60 49 4 60 - 60 5 76 22 54 6 I340 I30 I2I0

7 I20 I05 I 5 8 20 - 20

9 6o 6i -I Io I 64 - 63 II 2I 60 -39 I2 20 - 20

I3 I33 6 I27 I4 365 6o 305 I 5 65 65 i6 i65 6o I05

Total 2638 759 I879

Note: This table only records the credits created by the traditional cowrie shells, the top ranked gift. Pospisil (I963: table 46) gives details of the net credit created by the other instruments.

Source: Constructed from the data in Pospisil I963: table 3 I .

over the long run' (I974: I86). This formulation of a big-man's aims contradicts the data he collected, and he explains the contradiction in terms of the 'selective amnesia' (I974: I 86, f 38) of his informants. However I would suggest that it is Meggitt's theory that is wrong, not his data.

It is necessary to enquire into the nature of the obligations created by gift- credit. This can be done by contrasting gift-credit (debt) with commodity- credit (debt). By commodity-credit is meant those obligations created by the lending and borrowing of interest-bearing capital. To distinguish between these different types of obligation it is necessary to focus on the social context of the transactors rather than on the physical nature of the objects transacted. This is because things such as coppers and paper-money are symbols. They can be used to symbolise either commodity-credit or gift-credit wvith equal ease. As Godelier correctly notes (I 973: I28), things are now gifts, now commodities depending upon the social context. The tendency for gift-credits to be expressed in terms of paper-money today changes the nature of gift-credit not one iota.

The first difference between gift-debt and commodity-debt is that the latter grows exponentially over time whereas the former does not. For example, if

1io is given as a loan at a rate of interest of io per cent, /?i i must be returned at the end of the year in order to cancel the commodity-debt; but ?io given as a gift only requires ?io to be returned after a year in order to cancel the debt, and if ? i i is returned a new debt of Li is created and the relationship between the transactors continues. The very definition of moka is a particularly

640 C. A. GREGORY

good illustration of this: 'It is the increment, strictly, which can be referred to as moka; the rest is there simply to meet "debt"' (A. Strathern I97I: I0).

The second difference between gift-debt and commodity-debt is that the former can be cancelled only in terms of the instrument that created it whereas the latter can be cancelled in terms of any instrument. In other words, a gift- debt created by the giving of pigs can only be cancelled by giving pigs in return. Consider Hill's discussion of the biki gift transaction of Hausaland for example: 'Contributions are not necessarily in cash, but may take such forms as clothes, threshed grain, bundles of grain, small livestock, food together with money, or enamelware; but like must always be "exchanged" for like, so that, e.g. a donor of threshed grain must be given such produce in return' (Hill I972: 2I i). This like-for-like principle also extends metaphorically to bridewealth and other gift transactions that have the appearance of commodity purchases.

In moka, pigs and shells are exchanged for each other, but ideally a reversal of the initial transaction should effect an eventual transfer of pigs for pigs and shells for shells. In the same way, while at each marriage bridewealth is given for a woman, a second woman should ultimately be given in return for the first, and thus bridewealth for bridewealth (M. Strathern I972: 73).

The implication of this is that gift-debt cannot be reduced to a single measure.14 Every gift is its own numeraire and thus there is a distinct sphere of exchange for every rank of gift.15

The third difference between gift-debt and commodity-debt is that the latter is created by the exchange of alienable objects between transactors who are in a state of reciprocal independence, whereas gift-debt is created by an exchange of inalienable objects between people in a state of reciprocal dependence. This distinction was first hinted at by Marx in his discussion of the social pre-conditions for commodity exchange:

Objects in themselves are external to man, and consequently alienable by him. In order that this alienation may be reciprocal it is only necessary for men, by tacit understanding, to treat each other as private owners of those alienable objects, and by implication as independent individuals. But such a state of reciprocal independence has no existence in a primitive society based on property in common (Marx I867: 9I)

The implication is that in a 'primitive' (i.e. gift) economy things are inalienable and people are in a state of reciprocal dependence. This is a principal theme of Mauss's The gift (I925). He repeatedly16 refers to the 'indissoluble bond of a thing with its original owner' (I925: 62). A gift is like a tennis ball with an elastic band attached to it. The owner of the ball may lose possession of it for a time but the ball will spring back to its owner if the elastic band is given a jerk. Among the Kachin,

The best way to acquire notoriety as the owner (ruler) of an object is publicly to give possession of it to someone else. The recipient ... then has the object, but you retain sovereignty over it since you make yourself the owner (madu) of a debt (Leach I954: I42).

The inalienability of a kula gift is captured by the term kitomu (or kitoum, Damon I980). As Munn notes: 'Men emphasize that kitomu are personal possessions, sometimes describing them metaphorically as "naval" (pwasora) to

C. A. GREGORY 64I

emphasize their inalienability from their owners' (Munn I977: 46). It is also interesting to note that kula canoes, even though they may be permanently separated from their producers, are never alienated from them (Munn I977: 45). Thus when kula canoes are traded they are exchanged as gifts rather than commodities.

The inalienability of pigs used in the te (or tee) gift exchange system of Highlands Papua New Guinea is captured linguistically:

Tombema [an Enga group] make a distinction between pigs produced at home, and those received through exchange channels. Home raised pigs are called mena palo anda, 'pigs of the house sleeping stall', while those coming via tee partners are called tee kaila mena, 'pigs on tee roads' or simply 'other pigs'. Pigs that come from other sources have in most cases been financed from elsewhere, so that while they may be in transit at a given place, or in a person's temporary possession, their ultimate destination is to another place. They are being held, not owned. But pigs raised at home are 'owned' by the woman whose labour produced them (Feil I978: 222).

It follows, of course, that the 'pigs on tee roads' are the inalienable property of other women who have lost possession of the pigs but not control. But the key fact that this example brings out is that inalienability is to be understood in terms of the social relationship between a product and the labour17 that produced it.18 In a commodity economy the worker's product is alienated from him or her by the capitalist employer; in a gift economy there is no wage-labour/capital relation and the labourer's product is not, in general, so alienated. To anticipate later discussion on this crucial point: alienation is a pre- condition for accumulation, and while alienation is impossible in a gifts-to- man system, it is the very basis of a gifts-to-god system-which means that the potential for accumulation exists in a such a system.

It needs to be emphasised that the relationship between producer and produced is not necessarily restricted to one between people and things. Where the producer is a clan and the produced are people, the inalienable gifts are people. This point is the essence of Levi-Strauss's argument that women are the 'supreme gift' (I949: 65). Women as gifts are the inalienable property of the clan that produced them. Many such examples exist. Among the Motu, for example, a proverb expresses the proprietary interest of the iduhu in the women born to it: 'You can buy our sister's body, but you cannot buy her bones' (Groves I963: 28).

A fourth difference between gift-debt and commodity-debt is that while the former must be explained with reference to the social conditions of the reproduction ofpeople, the latter must be explained with reference to the social conditions of the reproduction of things. In other words, gift-debt must be explained with reference, for example, to clan structure and the principles governing kinship organisation, while commodity debt must be explained with reference to class structure and the principles governing factory organisation. Furthermore, the different types of gift-debt must in turn be explained in terms of the different types of kinship systems. For example, marriage systems based on the exchange of 'sisters' cannot support a big-man system with incremental gift exchange.19 A marriage system involving bridewealth is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for incremental gift

642 C. A. GREGORY

exchange, that is incremental gift exchange implies bridewealth but the opposite is not necessarily true. However, a discussion of these issues takes us far beyond the scope of this article.20

In the light of the above comments it is now possible to analyse the Papuan gifts-to-men system. To understand its workings, consider a simplified and idealised version. Suppose that there were only three villages involved-A, B and C-and that at the first meeting at A's village B gave Kio to A, and that C gave K20 to A. These transactions can be represented graphically as follows:

A -- B

.20 Diagram I

C

Thus K30 is raised and A owes B Kio and C K20. Suppose that the second meeting was at B's village and that A gave B K20

and C gave B K30. In this case B has K5o but owes C K3o and A Kio.

A 20 B

Diagram 2

C

Suppose now that at the third meeting at C's village B gave C K4o and A gave C K40. The situation is as follows:

20 A

vo j Diagram 3

C

C. A. GREGORY 643

C raises K8o but has a debt of K20 to A and Kio to B. In other words A and B are now his creditors whereas before the exchange they were his debtors. The gifts can keep going on like this forever without any accumulation taking place because the system is a three-person zero-sum game21. In this case total debt is Ki6o and this equals total credit as shown in Diagram 3. As such it is nothing more than a complicated variation of moka-type exchanges. This can be seen by focussing on the relationship between A and B. After the first round (Diagram i) A owes B Kio. After the second round (Diagram 2) the situation is reversed when A gives B K2o because this creates new debt of KIO. If in a third round (not shown) B gives A more than Kio the situation will be reversed yet again, and so on. This is the principle of'alternating disequilibrium'. What distinguishes this system from other gifts-to-men systems such as moka, is that in moka the transactors link up to form a 'rope',22 e.g.

A B C D- E F

whereas here (supposing there are six transactors now) they link up to form a cobweb', e.g.

A

F B3

E C

D

Another difference, of course, has been in the role of the Development Corporation. In order to analyse the role of the Development Corporation in the system it is useful to refer back to round one (Diagram i). After the meeting A has K3o but gift-debt of the same amount. Suppose that this K30 were given to the Development Corporation as share capital. This transaction differs from the others in that it represents an investment in interest-bearing property. In other words, from A's perspective, it creates a commodity-credit and A expects a return each year on the investment in the form of dividends. A also expects the return of the original capital of K3o some time in the future too. This can only be returned when A sells its shares in the Development Corporation. However, because the K3 o is risk capital there can be no certainty that the original amount will be returned. It will depend upon the profitability

644 C. A. GREGORY

of the Corporation. The annual dividend will also more or less depend upon the profitability of the Corporation. The impact of the Development Corporation on the system, then, was to siphon off capital from the gift exchange system and to return smaller amounts of money in the form of dividends in the event of making a profit. Thus the net effect was to siphon off money and to create a complex interlocking of commodity-credit and gift- debt with a single instrument of circulation, money. This required money to change its social form when it ceased to mediate relations between villages and came to mediate relations between the villages and the Development Corporation. There is no evidence at all that people found this ambiguous role of money confusing. They knew exactly what type of obligations were being created in the different transactions. It is very confusing for the outsider though. Blankets circulated among the Kwakiutl in the same ambiguous way. Sometimes they were lent as interest-bearing capital, sometimes they were given as gifts in a potlatch transaction. Failure to perceive this distinction has led to much confusion.

This particular arrangement helped the Development Corporation in that the gift exchange system provided it with capital with which to operate, but the existence of the Development Corporation hindered the operation of the gift exchange system. Consider Diagram i once again. At the end of round one A had K30. In round two A gives away K20, and after the third meeting, (Diagram 3) K40, a total of K6o. Thus before the intervention of the Development Corporation A only has to find K3o. But if the Development Corporation intervenes and siphons off the original K3o A has to find K6o. A similar problem develops for the other villages too, and the fact that the Development Corporation did not pay any dividends was a further complication. None of these problems existed in the relationship that the Church had with the gift exchange system that it created, as will now be seen.

Gifts to god A distinction must be drawn between the idiom in which a direct relationship between the giver and god predominates and the idiom in which the relation of giver to god is manifestly a vehicle for the expression of relations between men. In discussing competitive gift exchange in the Papuan context, it will be seen that only the latter idiom is directly relevant, since it is used very explicitly as a means to an end-the attainment of prestige and rank. Gifts of this latter type occur among the Kwakiutl and many useful insights can be obtained by comparing and contrasting the mode of giving gifts to god in this society with the Papuan system described here.

Among the Kwakiutl 'rivalry between chiefs and clans finds its strongest expression in the destruction of property. A chief will burn blankets, a canoe, or break a copper, thus indicating his disregard of the amount of property destroyed and showing that his mind is stronger, his power greater, than that of his rival' (Boas I897: 93). Mauss (I925: I4) was justified in describing this destruction as a 'gift to god'. A gift to god is a sacrifice, and a sacrifice is, in the

C. A. GREGORY 645

words of the Oxford dictionary, the 'surrender of a possession'. The surrender of possession involves the transfer of ownership23 (i.e. alienation) of something from a natural person to a non-natural person ('god'). It is possible for another person to receive the gift on god's behalf but that intermediary is not placed in a gift-debt relationship because the gift is alienated from the original owner. Given that a gift is an inalienable thing, is clear that what a gift to god accomplishes is the alienation of the inalienable. In a potlatch the destruction of property results in the alienation of gifts and in this sense it can be called a gifts- to-god system.

But what is the purpose of this alienation via destruction? Codere has developed an ingenious argument that links the potlatch gifts-to-

men system with the gifts-to-god system. Her argument is as follows:

Had ten blankets been 'given' in the original potlatch, 4320 would be required for the potlatch ten years later.... The reason a collapse did not occur and that potlatching as a financial system remained meaningful and tied to reality was that the system had as well developed means for the destruction of credit as it had for its phenomenal growth (Codere I950: 75).

This argument contains two propositions both of which can be challenged.24 The first, that gifts to men are governed by the principle of I00 per cent. interest, has already been critically examined; the second, that gifts to god 'destroy credit', must now be examined.

The proposition that gifts to god destroy credit has been shown to be empirically false by Drucker and Heizer (I967: 68). But the argument can also be challenged on a priori grounds. Gifts to god simply reduce the stock of circulating instruments of gift exchange. No credit of any sort is wiped out when gifts are destroyed. Credits created in the past will continue to exist. Gifts to god of this type affect potential credit, not past credit. By reducing the stock of gifts they make it harder for an opponent to reply with a bigger and better gift to god. An example can clarify this point. In one village of i5o people, Boas found that gift-credit totalled 75,ooo blankets while the actual stock of blankets circulating as instruments of exchange was only 400. This phenomenon is common to gift exchange systems all over the world and simply illustrates the fact that instruments of gift exchange have an extremely high velocity of circulation.25 The velocity can be calculated from the following equation: gift-credit = circulating stock of gifts x velocity. In this example, velocity is i87 5 (400 times i87 5 equals 75,000).

This equation captures A. Strathern's (i 969) distinction between 'production' and 'finance'. A gift transactor who wants to make a prestation must obtain some of the circulating stock of gifts and there are two strategies that he can follow: he can raise the gifts by getting his family to help him produce them or he can acquire existing stock by using the exchange network. The first-the production strategy-raises the stock of gifts and increases total gift-credit without changing the velocity of circulation. The second-the finance strategy-raises the velocity of circulation and increases the total amount of gift-credit without changing the stock of gifts.

But what happens to the equation when a gift is given to god? Suppose, for

646 C. A. GREGORY

the moment, that in the Kwakiutl village it was impossible to produce blankets and impossible to import them from neighbouring villages. In this case the number in circulation would be fixed at 400. If big-man A, in an attempt to outsmart his rival B, destroyed 250 of these blankets, then it is clear that B could never outdo A for there are only I 5o blankets left in circulation. Thus gifts to god-the alienation of some of the stock of gifts-is a third strategy that big-men can employ. It liberates the transactor from the two limited strategical options logically imposed by the equation though destroying the equation and thereby opening up a third option. Before the gift to god the equation is 75,000 = 400 x I 87 5, and after the destruction of 250 blankets it becomes 75,000$ I50 x i875. Giventhat i5o x i875 =28,I25,itistempting to argue that gift-credit totalling 46,875 (75,000-28,I25) is destroyed. This is what Codere argues. However, this is wrong because the equation before the destruction of the blankets is an historical summary of the transactions that have occurred over a certain period of time, and the destruction of some of the blankets at the end of the time period does not render some of the transactions null and void.

The above analysis might seem faulty because the assumption that blankets cannot be produced (or imported) is unrealistic. However, it is precisely to eliminate the production strategy that gift exchange systems throughout the world develop scarce durable symbols such as the potlatch coppers and the pearl shells used in moka. These things invariably have the top ranking of all the gifts available because they are so difficult to obtain. Within the class of these top ranking gifts there is a sub-ranking. For example, in Boas's time the Ma'xts'6lEm copper was the most sought after, then the L'a'xolamas copper, and then the LU'peLila (Boas I897: 82). If the third ranking copper was destroyed a rival could go one up by destroying the second ranking copper. But the undisputed winner of the contest is the one who destroys the top ranking copper. Of course this all presupposes that the rivals have access to the top ranking gifts. If they are middle level big-men it is most unlikely that their financial networks would ever be good enough to give them a chance of obtaining a top ranking gift.

The te system in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea provides an interesting contrast here. Live pigs are the principal instruments of gift exhange in this system. Every so often-about every four years in the ideal case-an exchange cycle culminates in a massive slaughter. The effect of this is precisely the same as the destruction of coppers and blankets in a potlatch.26 Indeed, Meggitt (I974) analyses the nature and significance of this slaughter in much the same terms as Codere: he argues that the pig slaughter destroys credit. However,just as the destruction of blankets in potlatch leaves the stock of gift-credit untouched, so too does the slaughter of pigs. It merely reduces the current stock of pigs and limits the potential credit that can be created. The fact that the pigs are eaten rather than burnt is an important difference, of course. Cooking a pig does not necessarily 'alienate the inalienable' because the giving of cooked pigs can create gift-credit in some circumstances. (A. Strathern I97I: I23). However, cooking a pig does definitely destroy its durability as a gift and thus places an upper limit on its potential velocity of circulation.

C. A. GREGORY 647

The Highlands pig slaughter invites a comparison with the banana ceremonial that used to be practised in the Papuan hekara. However the lack of data on this now defunct system precludes any systematic analysis.

The problem now is to fit the Papuan gifts-to-god system described above into the scheme of things. At one level of analysis it is identical to potlatch in that its primary purpose is to achieve the ranking of clans and men. In both cases a sacrifice is made whose religious significance is secondary. The gifts are not given with the aim of trying to elicit a counter-gift from the gods, in the form of good weather for crops, or some such similar benefit that involves getting the gods to control the uncontrollable. It is inter-clan rivalry that primarily motivates the giving of gifts in both cases. The potlatch and the Papuan system are also alike in that the gifts to god involve alienation of top ranking items. They constitute real sacrifices to the givers because having given, for example, the money they never see it again. The sacrifices are also real in that they do not put other people in debt. However, the Papuan gifts are symbolic in so far as the intermediary is concerned. In the potlatch case the intermediary is fire and this destroys the gifts; but in the Papuan case the intermediary is the Church and it symbolically destroys the money by ensuring that it does not get back to the donors. Thus the Church, by modifying the traditional gift exchange system, has perpetuated a ranking system of clans and men that enables it to accumulate assets for the Church without incurring liabilities, that is, to accumulate capital. Paradoxically it is the 'destruction' element of a gifts-to-god system that enables this accumulation to take place. The potlatch also has this potential for accumulation. If some intermediary were developed for removing all the items sacrificed from the system, accumulation could take place outside this system, and the internal principles governing the system would not be affected. It is the ranking achieved by the alienation that is important, not the mode of alienation, and it is a difference in the latter that distinguishes the potlatch from the Papuan system.

To understand the relationship between alienation and accumulation a distinction must be drawn not only between real and symbolic alienation, but also between alienation in the sphere of production and alienation in the sphere of exchange. Alienation via the sphere of exchange, as in a gift-to-god system, merely redistributes existing wealth. The actual creation of capital requires the appropriation of a worker's surplus without the generation of debt. In other words, it requires that a worker's surplus be alienated from him. This is precisely what the wage-labour/capital relationship achieves. It enables the employer to accumulate assets without the accumulation of liabilities. Marx has outlined this process in detail in Capital and has outlined the social conditions necessary for its existence: namely, the separation of a producer from his means of production and the creation of a proletariat forced to sell their labour-power in order to survive (i 867: Ch. 26).

M. Strathern's account of the plight of Hagen migrants in Port Moresby contains a number of examples of how Hagen workers perceive this process of alienation. For example: 'People nowadays speak of having been tricked by Europeans who "ate" the profits of their labours, putting aside only a minute proportion for wages' (I 97 5: 3 3). By 'eating' the profits of the worker's labour

648 C. A. GREGORY

the employer is alienating the worker's surplus product. The workers realise that they benefit in the form of wages but 'reiterate the point that however much they as wage-earners benefit, the owners of the business (employers) benefit more' (I 975: 38, f i). Furthermore, the money they get does not stay on their 'skins'. 'All our money goes on food and we are fed up', they complain (I975: I i o). Thus the surplus product of a worker is his total product minus that which is necessary for his subsistence.

Some workers, the skilled in particular, are able to win for themselves a wage in excess of subsistence. They are therefore able to share in the surplus product of their labours with the employer. In Port Moresby a sizeable proportion of the skilled workforce is supplied by men and women from Poreporena village. The money these people earn is the basis of the gifts-to-god system that the Church has established in Poreporena. The Church's great achievement, then, has been to set up a system that enables it to alienate some of the surplus wages that these workers receive.

The analysis of change The analysis of change raises the question of the impact of colonisation on gift economies. The principal agents of change have been foreign churches, foreign states and foreign capital. These are the basic institutions of the European capitalist system and their establishment in non-European countries has been accompanied by the emergence of commodity production and the development of the wage-labour system.27 Money keeps the wheels of this system turning. The pound and the dollar epitomise the power of capitalism. Yet they are only symbols. They have no intrinsic value nor any predetermined rate of exchange with other symbols. They acquire objective social validity because of state power and the power of capital. In those areas outside the immediate control of the foreign state and foreign capital it is possible for paper money to change its social form and to function as an instrument of gift exchange. As a gift, money is governed by the principles of gift exchange and not the principles of commodity exchange. This fact is the key to understanding the impact of money on a gift economy. Some anthropologists have failed to grasp this point and have argued that the nature of money is such that it destroys gift economies. However, there is nothing in its nature that causes money to destroy gift exchange systems. They are destroyed by the political power of foreign institutions when conflict emerges. More often than not gift exchange systems flourish and develop under the impact of such opposition.

Bohannan and Bohannan are among those who argue that money necessarily destroys a gift economy. They correctly note that a gift economy is characterised by the existence of ranked spheres of exchange that cannot be compared one to the other in any quantitative way. The introduction of money destroys this multi-centric economy because 'it is in the nature of a general purpose money that it standardises the exchangeability of all items on a common scale' (I968: 246). A similar argument was put forward to explain the predicted demise of the te system of the Enga. The Enga have five spheres of exchange. Pigs and cassowaries are in the top sphere, vegetable foods are in

C. A. GREGORY 649

the bottom sphere, and various other items in the other spheres. When money was introduced paper notes were classified as belonging to the top spheres, silver coins to a middle sphere, and copper coins to the bottom. This fact, argued Meggitt (I97 i), reduced the spheres to one.

This argument is persuasive and logical, but fails to explain the empirical facts. Meggitt himself came to realise this when he re-visited his fieldwork area. He has now abandoned the attempt to predict the demise of the te system (Meggitt I 974: I 8 i). So what is wrong with the theory? What these theorists have failed to realise, it seems to me, is that when money functions as an instrument of gift exchange it may function as a qualitative measure, whereas when it functions as an instrument of commodity exchange it functions as a quantitative measure. When Melanesians place paper money in the top sphere, silver coins in a middle sphere, and copper coins in a bottom sphere, they are using money as a qualitative measure. This classification of money ensures that like will be exchanged for like: notes for notes, silver for silver, and copper for copper. There is no exchange of notes for silver or of silver for copper when money is classified as a gift in this way.28 For example, the Siane of the Highlands of Papua New Guinea for a while classified money in this way, and, as Salisbury (I962: I26) reports, they did not treat the notes and coins as interchangeable.29

Such a use of money in no way precludes its use as a quantitative measure when buying rice at the trade store where notes and coins are interchangeable. On the other hand there is no a priori reason why money should function as a gift at all. It only enters the gift exchange sphere if the transactors decide that it should. It has not entered the kula gift exchange system for example (see Leach & Leach in press). The reason is that the big-men in this Island region did not lose control over the production and distribution of shells used in gifts, whereas in the Highlands Districts the big-men did.

Money did not enter the potlatch system either. The establishment, however, of a canning industry in the area in I 882 led to a rapid increase in the per capita income of the Kwakiutl, a rapid increase in the number of blankets that could be purchased, and hence a rapid increase in the number of blankets given away in potlatch ceremonies. Before I849 the largest potlatch consisted of 320 blankets, but during the period I930-I949 the largest potlatch consisted of 33,000 blankets, a hundredfold increase (Codere I 950: 94). This rapid growth in potlatch occurred despite the institution in I885 of a law prohibiting potlatch (Drucker & Heizer I 967: 47). However, this law, and other influences, did bring about many qualitative changes in the system. For example, the form of the ceremonial has changed and coppers are now no longer used (Drucker & Heizer I967: 47-5 0). But as Drucker and Heizer note,

despite all the variety of outward changes of form connected with the expansion of the institution and with its going underground, nowhere is there a suggestion of deviation from the original prime purpose of the potlatch-the formal presentation of a claim to hereditary right to a specific social status (I967: 52).

The same could be said of the gifts-to-god system in Papua. The outward form of the system has changed much in the past one hundred years, but the essential purpose-the ranking of men and clans-is still the same.

65o C. A. GREGORY

NOTES

In writing this article I have been greatly helped by comments from Frederick Damon, Andrew Strathern and Piers Vitebsky. I should also like to thank my many friends in Elevala, especially Morea, without whose help this article could never have been written. I am responsible for all errors of course.

1 The annual trading expedition was called hiri and is described in Barton (i 9 Io). 2 The rights and obligations of iduhu membership, and recruitment norms, are discussed in

Groves (I963). 3 During the second world war the Poreporena people were evacuated to Manumanu and

their houses were burnt down by the government. After the war they were rebuilt-by the government. This gave the people the opportunity to plan their village.

4 Belshaw (I957: 2 i) and Rosentiel (I95 3: I 4) report that the iduhu are exogamous. This does not accord with what I was told nor with what Seligman (I9Io: 82) was told; but there may be an overlap between the taihuna and the iduhu as Seligman notes (IgIo: 82).

5 The Papua New Guinean currency is the kina (K). This was introduced in I975 and replaced Australian currency. The kina had a par value with the Australian dollar initially but was subsequentially revalued.

6 See M. Strathern (I 975: 269) for a discussion of some of the problems Hagen migrants to Port Moresby have obtaining Papuan wives.

7 Compare Seligman: 'If the two piles are adjudged even, the hekarai [hekara] is finished, if not, another hekarai must be held, and it was stated that a number of hekarai might be held until the rivals provided an equal number of bananas, when the contest finished' (I9Io: I45).

8 Groves I954: 2, I I-I2. The former London Missionary Society is now the United Church. 9 Five of these villages are Motuan (Gaire, Tuberserea, Boera, Barakau, Lealea), four are Koita

(Kouderika, Gorohu, Papa, Roku) and there are five others (Dagoea, Manugora, Senunu, Kalaki, Sabua).

10 Absent were Sabua, Barakau, Gorohu and Kalaki. 11 The final contributions were as follows: Dagoea Ki80oo, Manugora K535o, Gaire

KIO9-93, Tuberserea Ki58-4I, Kouderika K83y83, Boera KI97-2I, Papa Ki82-62, Lealea KIoI20, Senunu Ki5oo, Roku K5o78o.

12 While the person with the largest net credit is always the big-man, the person with the largest net debit is not necessarily the rubbish-man. It may be a big-man who is temporarily down on his luck. The rubbish-man is the one who has had few, if any, transactions. His net credit is usually zero.

13 It should be noted that these figures refer to inter-clan transactions. Intra-clan gift giving is governed by altogether different principles and their analysis is not the concern of this article. For example, a gift from a father to a son has a different social significance from a gift from one big-man to another. Household 6, in this case, has a net debit of 5 i on intra-clan account. This net debt can be interpreted as a measure of the support the big-man gets from his clan. Thus intra-clan credit (debt) must be sharply distinguished from inter-clan credit (debt) when trying to get the measure of a big-man.

4 See Leach (I 954: I 46) for a concrete example of this. 15 There is an extensive literature on this point, a guide to which can be found in Meggitt

(I97I: I99, fn. I3). 16 See Mauss (I925: 9-IO, II, i8,24, 3I, 42, 46). 17 The sex of the labourer is of crucial importance for understanding male/female relations

(see Feil I978: 222). 18 Among the Siane any dispute as to who is the owner (amfonka) of an article is settled by

ascertaining who actually made the object (Salisbury i962: 62). 19 Many of the tribes in the Sepik District of PNG are based on 'sister exchange' and these

tribes provide an illustration of this point. See Gell (I975: I7-i8, 27) for example. 20 Discussion of some of these issues can be found in Gregory (in press). 21 The actual system was a I 4-person zero sum game. 22 This is the case with kula too as Damon's (I980) recent article demonstrates, if only

implicitly. The essence of his argument is that while kula can be described as 'generalised exchange' from the perspective of the islands, it is 'restricted exchange' from the perspective of kitoums (Munn's kitomu (1977)), i.e. it is circular from the geographical perspective and linear from the social perspective.

23 The Oxford dictionary defines 'alienation' as the 'transference of ownership'. 24 Her arithmetic is also wrong. I O compounded at I 00 per cent for I O years returns I 0,240

not 4320. 25 This is especially so in those societies where shells are used as instruments of gift exchange

C. A. GREGORY

(see Armstrong I924). In places where pigs are used the velocity is lower but, nevertheless, pig- credit still exceeds pig stock (Salisbury, I962: 93).

26 The Melanesians of Banks' Islands alienated 'shell money' (i.e. instruments of gift exchange) by scattering them in a deep hole in a stream when they made sacrifices (see Codrington, I 89 1: I40-I42, 323-328).

27 For an account of this process in Papua New Guinea see Gregory I979. 28 Money is not always classified in this way. In Poreporena, no significance is attached to the

fact that money consists of paper and coins. 29 But Salisbury's report seems to be somewhat contradictory because he goes on to note that

money's divisibility destroys the spheres of gift exchange (I962: I35-7).

REFERENCES

Armstrong, W. E. I924. Rossel Island money: a unique monetary system. Econ.J. 34, 423-9. Barnett, H. G. I938. The nature of potlatch. Am. Anthrop. 40, 349-58. Barton, F. R. IgIo. The annual trading expedition to the Papuan Gulf. In The Melanesians in

British New Guinea by C. G. Seligman. Cambridge: Univ. Press. Belshaw, C. S. I957. The great village: the economic and social welfare of Hanuabada, an urban

communtiy in Papua. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Boas, F. I897. Kwakiutl ethnography (ed.) H. Codere. Chicago: Univ. Press (i966). Bohannan, P. & L. Bohannan i968. Tiv economy. Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press. Codere, H. 950o. Fighting with property. New York: Augustin. Codrington, R. H. I 891 . The Melanesians. New York: Dover (I972). Curtis, E. S. I9I 5. The Kwakiutl. In The north American Indian, vol. IO. New York: Johnson

(I 970). Damon, F. H. ig80. The kula and generalised exchange: considering some unconsidered aspects

of the elementary structures of kinship. Man (N. S.) 15, 267-92. Drucker, P. i965. The potlatch. In Tribal andpeasant economies (ed.) G. Dalton. New York: The

Natural History Press (i967). & R. F. Heizer i967. To make my name good: a reexamination of the southern Kwakiutl

potlatch. Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press. Epstein, T. S. i968. Capitalism, primitive and modern: some aspects of Tolai economic growth.

Canberra: Australian National Univ. Press. Feil, D. K. I 978. Enga women in the tee exchange. In Trade and exchange in Oceania and Australia

(eds) J. Specht & J. P. White (Mankind II :3, spec. Issue). Finney, B. R. I 973. Big-men and business. Honolulu: Univ. Press of Hawaii. Gell, A. D. I975. Metamorphosis of the cassowaries: Umeda society, language and ritual. London:

Athlone Press. Godelier, M. I973. Perspecives in Marxist anthropology. Cambridge: Univ. Press (I 977). Gregory, C. A. I979. The emergence of commodity production in Papua New Guinea. J.

contemp. Asia 9, 389-409. in press. Gifts and commodities. London: Academic Press.

Groves, M. I954. Dancing in Poreporena.J. R. anthrop. Inst. 84, i-i6. i963. Western Motu descent groups. Ethnology 2, I5-30.

Hill, P. I 972. Rural Hausa. Cambridge: Univ. Press. Leach, E. R. I954. Political systems of highland Burma: a study of Kachin social structure. London:

Athlone Press. & J. L. Leach in press. New perspectives on the kula. Cambridge: Univ. Press.

Levi-Strauss, C. I949. The elementary structures of kinship London: Eyre & Spottiswoode (i969). Marx, K. I 867. Capital. Moscow: Progress Publishers. Mauss, M. I935. Thegft. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul (i974). Meggitt, M. J. I 97 I. From tribesmen to peasants: the case of the Mae-Enga of New Guinea. In

Anthropology in Oceania (eds) L. R. Hiatt & C.J.Jayawardena. Sydney: Angus & Robertson. I 974. 'Pigs are our hearts !'. The te exchange cycle among the Mae Enga of New Guinea.

Oceania 44, I65-203. Munn, N. I977. Spatiotemporal transformations of Gawa canoes. J. Soc. Ocean. 54/55:33, 39-

53. Pacific Island Monthly. 20thJune I975. Poreporena Church handout I974, I979. Stencilled sheets giving the results of the boubou (gift

giving competition) held in I974 and I979 [in Motu].

652 C. A. GREGORY

Pospisil, L. I963. Kapauku Papuan economy (Yale Univ. Publ. Anthrop. 67). New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.

Rosentiel, A. I 95 3. The Motu of Papua New Guinea: a study of successful acculturation. Thesis, Univ. of Michigan.

Salisbury, R. F. I962. From stone to steel. Cambridge: Univ. Press. Seligman, C. G. I9IO. The Melanesians of British New Guinea. Cambridge: Univ. Press. Strathern, A.J. I969. Finance and production: two strategies in New Guinea highlands exchange

systems. Oceania 40, 42-67. I97I. The rope of Moka. Cambridge: Univ. Press. I979. Gender, ideology and money in Mount Hagen. Man (N. S.), 530-48.

Strathern, A. M. I972. Women in between: female roles in a male world, Mount Hagen, New Guinea. London, New York: Seminar Press.

I975. No money on our skins: Hagen migrants in Port Moresby (New Guinea Res. Bull. 6i). Port Moresby.