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    A M odest Post-Assad PlanBy D aniel Byman and R enanah Miles

    Should Syrian president Bashar al -Assad fall, Syria's problems will haveonly jus t begun. With the dictator

    gone, crime, score sett l ing and a violentcontest for power likely will ensue, keep-ing the streets unsafe and the people afraid.Iran, foreign jihadists and Syria's neighborsmay meddle to protect their interests or stirup trouble. Assad kept Syria's rival com-munities in check through force, but hisreign created underlying schisms. Now, thecivil war has generated new ones. It alsohas turned the country's economy, alwaysstruggling, into a disaster area. So far thesplintered Syrian opposition has shown noskill in reassuring Syria's minorities, and anynew government's initial legitimacy is likelyto be weak.

    Un l i ke o t he r Arab Sp r i ng con f l i c t sthat have resulted in regime capitulation(Tunis ia, Egypt and Yemen) or regimedecapitation (Libya), the long and bloodySyrian conflict is likely to generate a faileds ta te requi r ing the k ind of l a rge-sca lereconstruct ion efforts seen in Iraq andAfghanistan. Inevitably, some will call forDaniel Byman is a professor at GeorgetownUniversity and the research director of the SabanCenter for Middle East Policy at the BrookingsInstitution. Renanah Miles is a program analystin the Office of the Deputy Chief ManagementOfficer at the Department of Defense. The

    America to step in to establish order. TheUnited States has a long and rather uglyrecord in trying to help countries in Syria'sposition. True, in Iraq and Afghanistan theUnited States has gained hard experiencein the dos and (mostly) don'ts of statebuilding. But the lessons from these andother state-building efforts suggest successrequires considerable resources, excellentcoordination within the government, long-term follow-through and serious planningfor the postconflict period even as the waris being waged. None of these is likely tobe present for any U.S. effort in a post-Assad Syria, given the current political andoperational environment.

    We argue here that the United States andits allies are unlikely to overcome Syria'smyriad problems and establish a peaceful,s table and de m oc rat ic Syria. T he l ikelyl ack o f r e s ou rces , poo r gov e rnm en t a lcoordination and the sheer scale of Syria'sproblems probably would spell failure forany ambitious efforts. Moreover, regime-change i n i t i a t i ves cou l d back f i r e andcomplicate postregime plans.

    T h u s , going in small may be the bestwe can manage. The resul ts also wouldbe s m a l l , bu t be i ng p res en t i n s om ecapaci ty w ould of fer the U ni ted S ta tesmore cred ib i l i ty in suppor t ing reg ionaldemocracy, greater legitimacy to weigh inon key regional issues and a better strategic

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    but also for the possible failure of statebuilding in Syria.This article has four sections. First,we detail the problems Syria is likely toface should Assad fall. Next, we reviewthe potential role of outsiders such asthe United States in ameliorating thesedifficulties. Third, we discuss actual U.S.and allied capabilities and their likelyproblems and limits. Finally, we offerrecommendations for a limited engagementin Syria and assess the probable impact ofsuch an engagement.

    A ssad has ruled Syria by brute force: hehollowed out the country's institutions,making a mockery of political parties, thejudiciary, the media and other core parts ofa functioning state. Now the civil war hasdestroyed cities and turned Syrian againstSyrian. It follows that bringing peace toSyria involves more than toppling Assad;any new regime must also rebuild the stateand mend the nation.The current antiregime violence couldmorph into chaos or a new power struggleamong the anti-Assad victors. The Syrianopposition is famously disunited. Despitehaving its back against the wall in the anti-Assad struggle, and foreign encouragementto unify, the opposition remains divided byregion, ethnicity and political ambitions.No Nelson Mandela of South Africa orDaw Aung San Suu Kyi of Myanmar unitesthe rebels. Once Assad goes, these groupsmay come together through a democraticprocess, but it is far more likely that anynear-term elections would be dubiousaffairs and that at least some of thosefighting Assad would turn their guns oneach other.

    Assad's divide-and-rule methods andfavoritism toward key groups will makecontinued strife even more likely. Favored

    keep what they have. Poorer, disempoweredSunni Muslims, who are doing the bulkof the fighting (and dying) and comprisethe largest community in Syria, willwant more power and wealth. Scoresettling against regime servants is likely tocommence almost immediately. Just as theAssad regime has mobilized the Alawitesin militias to murder other communities,opposition forces will want payback.If a new government reflects the will ofthe majority of Syrians, it may openlydiscriminate against Alawites and otherminorities and exclude those Sunnis, smallin number but powerful, who cooperatedwith Assad.

    In Iraq after Saddam Hussein fell,crimeeven more than political v io le n ce -led to national collapse. Similarly, in Syriaarmed gangs masquerading as freedomfighters capture wealthy and middle-classcitizens, demanding ransom or bribes beforefreeing them. One Aleppo resident toldthe New York Times, "Chaos, lawlessness,fear, it is just so chaotic, and with all thethugs in the streets, you never know whomight kidnap you and ask for a ransom."Such problems may grow exponentially asSyria's police, tainted by their associationwith Assad, will likely prove incapable ofenforcing order and preventing massivelooting or other crime.Recent figures from the QuilliamFoundation estimate that the Syrian waralso has attracted several hundred foreignjihadists, whose ideology is akin to that ofAl Qaeda. Some (no one knows how many)owe their loyalty to Al Qaeda leader Aymanal-Zawahiri or to Al Qaeda of Iraq. Thesefighters want an Islamic state in the parts ofSyria they control, and they will try to swayor coerce Syrians into joining their group.

    As former ciA official and terrorism analystBruce Riedel points out, "Look at Iraq,

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    The current antiregime violence could morph into chaosor a new power struggle among the anti-Assad victors.

    impor t ing t e r ro r i s t s to expor t ing them,wi th Al Qaeda and o ther g roups us ingter r i to ry they con t ro l to l aunch a t t ackson neighboring s tates and perhaps evenWestern targets outside the region. Already,Assad partisans and their enemies conductaeeacks in Lebanon againse one anoeher, andehis violence may grow as pareies jockey forpower in Syria. Gompounding ehese fears,the Washington Post reports that Syria hasat least several hundred tons of chemicalweapons dispersed across roughly f i f tytowns and cities. Israel fears they might fallinto the hands of Hezbollah, and the worldfears Al Qaeda and other j ihadist groupsmight acquire them.

    Foreign s tates l ikely wi l l cont inue tomeddle in Syria. Saudi Arabia and Turkeynot only want Assad out but a lso wanttheir favored Syrian groups to replace him.Meanwhile , I ran wi l l want to retain atleast a toehold of influence even if Assadfalls and will support Alawite rejectionistsand others willing to do Tehran's bidding.Some states will fear instability while otherswill see it as an opportunity. Large refugeepopulat ions may fear returning home ornoe have homes eo reeurn eo, adding to theconcerns of neighboring states bearing thebrunt of the ongoing refiigee flow.

    The war's devastation, the surge in crime,the risk of political violence and the overallcivic uncertainty will make Syria's economya basket case. All this will worsen thecountry's poli t ical problems. Even beforethe violenc e, Syria ran ked 151st in GD Pper capita. It clearly has fallen even further.

    Man y o f t h e s e p o s t -A s s ad p ro b l emsh av e b eco me mo re l i k e l y b ecau s e o fpresent regime-change efforts . Numerouss an c t i o n s h av e h e l p ed s p eed Sy r i a ' seconomic implosion. They have devastatedSyria's middle class and rendered the blackmarket as vital as the legitimate economy.It took nearly a decade following the Iraqinvasion to rebuild that economy, and i tr eq u i r ed t r emen d o u s U .S . i n v es t men t s ,even with Iraq's massive oil resources. Layersof sanctions are also difficult to roll backquickly. In Libya, i t took months afeerMuammar el-Qaddafi 's fall for the UN, EUand United States to unfreeze assets fromLibyan banks and Qaddafi 's former innercircle.

    Ar m s f looding in to Syria also wi l lcon foun d s tabi l izat ion efforts . In 20 1 1,before the fighting began, Syria had a strongmilitary, effective police, and a cowed andunarmed population. After Assad falls, thesecurity forces will be weak and devastated,while popular groups will be well armed andemboldened. Ie is uncertain if weapons willstay in the hands that received them or evenremain in Syria. A poorly secured cache ofweaponry in Libya, including man-portablesurface-to-air missiles, made i ts way outof the country to AI Qaeda in the IslamicM aghreb, according eo news repo rts.

    I n theory, outs iders could help Syriamaintain the security of its borders, as-sist with internal security, provide economicaid, encourage democratization, and other-wise assist Syria in its efforts to go from war,

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    Syria's borders are porous, and they maygrow more so if the Syrian army deterioratesfurther. Refugees flow out while fighters,arms and terrorists flow in. Even beforethe latest conflict, smuggling was commonbetween Syria and Lebanon and betweenSyria and Iraq. In Iraq after SaddamHussein, jihadists entered from Syria, SaudiArabia and beyond, while Iran sent inhundreds of paramilitary and intelligencepersonnel. All made a bad situation worse.By policing borders, foreign forces couldreduce the scale of neighboring states'meddling, making it harder for them tosend arms and paramilitary forces to Syria.Jihadists could be stopped at the border andarrested or perhaps deterred from enteringSyria at all.But securing borders can require largenumbers of troops. Borders have physicaland political components. Neighborings t a t e s ' i n t e r e s t s a n d t h e i rown capacity for security willdetermine the diff iculty. Sowill terrain and internal Syriansecurity considerations. Troopswould a l so need exce l len tintelligence and training. ButSyria's army is in disarray, andmuch of its officer corps will(or should) be purged if Assadgoes, though Iraq has taught usto avoid a wholesale dissolutionof the military, as Secretary ofDefense Leon Panetta recentlynoted in an interview with CNN.This also holds true for Syria'spolice force. Purges of Syria'suniformed servicesviewed bymany within Syria as little morethan an Alawite militiawouldleave an immediate vacuum. Given thesocietal schisms caused and exacerbatedby the conflict, an "impartial" outside role

    Syria's armed forces still do one valuablething: secure Syria's chemical-weaponsstockpiles. Even though chemical weaponsare less dangerous than conventionalweapons in most cases, their psychologicalimpact is massive. Should Assad's regimefall and the army collapse with it, securingthese weapons would be a vital task foroutside forces.Protecting borders, securing chemical-weapons caches and fighting criminalitycould require sizable external forces, RANDstudies on stabilization operations findaverage force-to-population ratios rangingfrom 2:1000 to 13:1000, depending on thelevels of violence, ambition of objectivesand number of contested areas. For Syria'spopulation of more than twenty-twomillion, this could mean a range of 44,00 0-286,000 troops and will probably be onthe larger end given the myriad problems

    there. Of course, force-sizing considerationsdepend largely on the percentage ofpopulation significantly affected and the

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    Disarmament , demobi l iza t ion andrintgration (DDR) will be difficult, yetfailure to do these things could provedangerous. Tribal and sectarian interest insettling scores and redistributing power willmake fighters reluctant to lay down arms,as will fear of retribution. Unemploymentalso could prove dangerous. With nothingto do once fighting subsides and beforethe economy restarts, battle-hardenedfighters must be effectively and productivelyengaged.

    DDR efforts must be coord inated withtransitional-justice efforts. A properlyconstituted court system to try thoseresponsible for atrocities could forestalltemptations for former victims to settlematters on their own. However, rushing toput large numbers of individuals on trial orconducting a mass purging of governmentofficials such as in Iraq can be similarlydestabi l iz ing. The two object ivesstability and accountabilityare mutuallysupportive, but without coordination oneeffort can undermine the other.The in te rna t iona l communi ty canprovide near - te rm suppor t th roughforums such as truth and reconciliationcommissions. It also can assist witharbitration if it becomes unclear who isthe victim or the perpetrator. Though

    the United States is clearly rooting forthe opposition, and Assad's forces andparamilitary shabiha are committing thebulk of the killing of civilians, the atrocitiesare not one-sided, and rebel reprisals mayincrease as the war drags on.An international presence in Syria canhelp discourage secessionisma dangerthat can spread across borders and, for thatreason, invite meddling from neighboringstates. Syria's Kurds could seek to secedenot because the demand for their ownstate is overwhelming but simply becausethe Syrian state is dysfunctional anddenies them just rights. They may alsobelieve that Iraqi and Turkish Kurds, oreven sympathetic governments, can helptheir quest. Outside powers, by providingsecurity and preventing foreign meddling,can dampen this enthusiasm.The most pressing initial need for aidwill be humanitarian assistance. This alsois likely to overwhelm any remaining ornascent governmental capacity. The needfor shelter, food and health care will bemost acute with internally displacedpo pu latio ns an d refugees. Gu rren t UNfigures estimate over 2.5 million peopleneed assistance within Syria's borders, whileover two hundred thousand have fled thecountry. Many will return to destroyedhomes and l ivel ihoods,

    throwing them at the mercyof external support.Outsiders can also helpeconomical lyand wil lbe expected to do so. Aprovincial-reconstruction-team member in I raqcommented in conversationon the chal lenges she

    observed on the job, saying,"Democracy does not mean

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    As the most immediate security andhumanitarian needs subside, expectationswill grow apace. Restoringor, moreaccurately, establishing for the first timeareal economy will be an important partof reconstruction as well as longer-termdevelopment efforts. A corollary is the needto manage expectations. In Iraq, whenexpectations were not met the result wasanger and frustration.Finally, outside powers also can offerexpertise for the myriad problems any newregime would face. Syria's governmentalways functioned poorly, and many of themore apolitical and competent civil servantswill have fled. Whether it is designing aconstitution, rebuilding the electric grid ortraining military forces to defend borders,the United States and its allies can help theSyrians.

    The United States is far from ready,politically and institutionally, to bearthe burden of helping Syria. But the Unit-ed States has several key strengths when itcomes to state building. Perhaps most sig-nificant is its long history of involvement insuch missions, in particular using the U.S.military. From the Mexican-American andSpanish-American wars through both worldwars, the military conducted postconflictreconstruction and military government,albeit, as historian Earl Ziemke noted, as"a kind of reluctant afterthought." Sincethe end of the Cold War, the tempo hasincreased. A 2007 RAND study found theUnited States launching a new stability op-eration roughly every other year, while UNpeacekeeping missions increased from onceevery four years to once every six months.Afghanistan and Iraq also have offered pain-ful experiences that generated tremendousstudy. Coordination of diplomatic, develop-

    and its operationally focused culture),these skills present a new kind of "opera-tional diplomacy."Another significant improvement in U.S.capabilities is the creation of stabilizationand reconstruction committees. In 2004,the State Department created the Officeof the Coordinator for Reconstructionand Stabilization, followed last year bythe Bureau of Conflict and StabilizationOperations. Together with the DefenseDepartment's recent embrace of stabilityoperations, the U.S. executive branch has

    undertaken notable, if limited, efforts todevelop and mainta in s ta te-bui ld ingcapabilities.Still , the U.S. government remainsplagued with structural shortcomings instate building. There remain indicationsof failure to institutionalize lessonslearned from Afghanistan and Iraq. Thegovernment seems unsure of what its role instate building can or should be.Civilian capabilities remain particularlyweak. One reason discussion of alternativecourses often swings between doing noth ingand military intervention is the persistentabsence of a robust nonmilitary capability.The underlying premise in Iraq was thatthe military would stabilize the countryand then hand the mission over to civiliansfor reconstruction, but the handoff neveroccurred. Civilian organizations dedicatedto s tab i l i za t ion and recons t ruc t ionmaterialized too late. Beltway turf battlesdo not help either; the State Department'spowerful regional bureaus refused to givethe predecessor organization to the Bureauof Conflict and Stabilization Operationscontrol of any missions, thus contributingto its demise.

    Although planning and coordinationhave improved, weaknesses remain. How

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    closely held. The biggest lesson from Iraq isthe imperative to plan early and inclusively.Many of the missteps and breathtakingoversights following the Iraq invasion areattributed toflawedplans that failed to takeinto account critical outside perspectives.Another potential pitfall is in dispensingaid. In Iraq, aid dollars flowed through asingle sourcethe U.S. government^withsubstantial delays reaching target recipientsor achieving desired economic conditions.Afghanistan saw a web of donor countriesand nongovernmenta l o rgan iza t ionsachieve similarly poor results, sometimesundermining the Afghan governmentalcontrols. The danger in Syria is that dollarscould be used in ways that could put itseconomic viability further out of reach orcreate unsustainable expectations. A Senatereport last year found that 97 percent ofAfghan G D P derived from military spendingand international support. Without thatsupport, it concluded Afghanistan couldsuffer "a severe economic depression."

    Even when presidents generate politicaland public support for intervention, theUnited States historically has lacked thewill to stay committed. Without strongsupport for war, domestic tolerance forcasualties is near zero, and interestin spending large sums on foreigndevelopment has never been strong. Theidea that nation building can be done onthe cheap largely has been debunked, andthe crippling bills racked up in Afghanistanand Iraq make for a nasty reality. Fatigueand overextension resulting from thoseconflicts make the likelihood of domesticsupport for a long, costly engagementnearly nil. Pew Research Center polls foundonly 25 percent of Americans believed theUnited States should intervene in Syria(with only 14 percent calling for deploying

    The U.S. military also believes it isoverstretched, and with the risks ofsignificant cuts and even "sequestration"on the horizon, it will not be eager for acostly, troop-intensive mission that has littlesupport at home and no clear end date. Thenew D efense Strategic G uidance puts itbluntly: "U.S. forces will no longer be sizedto conduct large-scale, prolonged stabilityoperations."

    The idea of allies taking over in lieu ofU.S. leadership is similarly implausible.European capabilities for such missionshave been steadily deteriorating for sometime as the Continent's economic crisis haslingered on. Even if willing, NATO seemsunlikely to have the capacity to shoulder theburden, given its capability shortfalls andleast-common-denominator approach toaction. Robert G ates's stinging remarks inhis last policy speech as secretary of defenselaid the blame on lack of will and lack ofresources, resulting in European defensebudgets "chronically starved for adequatefiinding for a long time."

    Turkey is the country likely to do themost. It has large numbers of competentforces, its economy is robust and its citizenscare about the fate of Syria. Most important,Turkey fears massive refugee flows, thespread of secessionist sentiment to itsown Kurdish population, terrorist activityand other evils that could emanate froma chaotic Syria. A Turkish role should beencouraged, while remembering that Turkeyis not an impartial power and it will favorSyrian groups that may be anti-American,or at least not eager to embrace W ashington.The United States will also pushdemocracybut here Syrians likely will takea different course than Washington wants.

    The big issue is whether the civic structurewill be liberal, guaranteeing individual

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    A Turkish role should be encouraged, whileremem bering that Turkey is not an impartial power andit will favor Syrian groups that may be anti-Am erican.

    particularly the Alawites but also Ghristians,Druze and others who enjoyed some favorduring the Assad yearslikely will losetheir special privileges and may also sufferopen discrimination or even persecueion.Eleceions can make ehe problems worse.Groups may rally againse one anoeher, makechauvlniseic eleceoral promises and sow fearwiehin eheir own communieies. Warlordswill attempt to control and manipulate theprocess, with power coming out of the barrelof guns. If the new government is Islamist inorientation, the discrimination may be evenmore intense. While Islamists in Egypt sofar have shown respect for minority rights,in Syria there likely will be more pressure todiscriminate because minority communitieswill be painted as sympathizers of the oldregime. Assad's regime has stoked sectariantension, and those to whom evil is doneoften do evil in return.

    Whi l e oppos i t i on fo rces a r e i ndeedvocal in requests for lethal aid to breakthe regime's back, it is not at all clear towhae degree U.S. assiseance will be solicieedto fashion a post-A ssad s ta te. Lack ofgovernment legitimacy is one of the mainproblems facing a new Syrian nat ion. Aconspicuous foreign presence propping upa new government, possibly ae the perceivedexpense of certain minorities, may furtherundermine legitimacy.

    These considerat ions suggest that anystate-building effort should be approachedwith restraint, but a limited U.S. role mayactual ly encourage neighbors to meddle .

    intervening presence. An absent Americaplays Into a broader narrative of a weakand faltering superpower, strength sappedby foreign battlefields in Afghanistan andIraq. Gonversely, an expansive U.S. rolemay likewise provoke external interference,particularly from Iran and foreign jihadists.

    H ow the United States supports regimechangeand whether i t should sup-port Assad's fall at allshould depend inpart on U.S. plans for the aftermath. Thelong-term polit ical objective should be astable and democratic (or at least repre-sentat ive) government that both Syriansand their neigh bors can live w ith. H elp -ing neighbors manage refugees, police theirborders, go afier terrorist groups and solveother problems should be central consider-ations in any U.S. strategy for Syria.

    Effect ive planning for the day afterAssad's fall, despiee all the uncertainties andcontingencies, is essential now. Planninginvolves more, however, than small cells inlarge bureaucracies such as the Pentagono r S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t . I t i n v o l v e s acomprehensive effort across agencies thatincludes the highest decision makers. Thebig decisions, and the big fights, must bedone in advance.

    Get t ing s ignif icant resources for sucha mission is unlikely given current fiscalconstraints and the polit ical environment.To invoke the admoni t ion a t t r ibu ted toWinston Ghurchi l l , "Gent lemen, we haverun out of money. Now we have to ehink."

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    has failed to fully grasp this imperative.It has underestimated the challenge,overestimated its own capabilities, andoverpromised in extending pol i t icalpledges and impassioned, intermittentpleas for intervention. All this can result inoverextension. Or the United States couldfind itself in a middle ground on resourcesand commitment , with i ts exposuremaximized and its ability to achieveits objectives limited. This would be theworst of both worlds. Instead, the best theUnited States is likely to manage will be alimited engagement with modest aims and amodest commitment of resources, workingwith the larger international community. Itis better to go small and achieve less thanto launch large, ambitious projects that areultimately unsustainable.

    But this does not suggest an entirelyhands-off approach. Inaction has i tsown costs. One emerges in the battle forpublic opinion as Arab publics look forevidence that the United States is crediblein its claims to promote democracy andhuman rights. Criticism already has beenlevied over NATO and U.S. willingness toengage in Libya, ostensibly to prevent massatrocities, but not in Syria, where atrocitiesalready committed long since overtook themere threats that were present in Libya.Standing by as chaos enveloped Syriawould further diminish opinion of theUnited States. Providing some help lendsWashington greater legitimacy (and access)to weigh in on issues that it cares about,such as securing Syria's chemical weaponsand reducing Iran's influence in a post-Assad Syria. With people on the ground,the United States also gains an intelligenceadvantage and is less likely to be blindsidedshould things go awry.The United States also has interests in

    greater concern for Syria's neighbors and theWest than for Syrians, who understandablywould put more focus on immediate issuesof security and economic rebuilding.Washington also will be concerned aboutthe security of Israel, which most Syrianssee as an enemy. The United States shouldprepare for the possibility that a post-Assad crisis involving the compromise ofchemical-weapons arsenals could trigger anintervention.

    Any effort would require both soldiersand civiliansthough preferably as fewsoldiers on the ground as possible.Given U.S. weaknesses on the civilianside, reaching out to the internationalcommunity is essential, though it too isweak on this score. Moreover, an American-led stabilizing force would probably not bewelcome in Syria, and there would be littlesupport for a sustained presence among theAmerican people. The United States shouldconsider being part of a multinationalbody and playing a supporting role todemonstrate it is contributing to Syria'ssecurity. Recognizing U.S. intent inpursuing a limited course of action nowwould help focus attention on unity ofeffort with partners who will augment and/or lead external state-building efforts.But what should these people do?A multinational body of uniformed andcivilian personnel could help reconstituteSyrian uniformed forces, lend expertise insetting up impartial and functional politicalinstitutions, and help restore basic services.Washington should also work with any newSyrian government to fight terrorists. HereYemen is a model, with the United Statesproviding a broad range of assistance andconducting unilateral actions with the figleaf of a government claiming them as itsown. Perhaps most important, the United

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    foreign investment, and coordinatingassistance from Syria's neighbors and otherparties to ensure that aid is used efficiently.

    The United States also could coordinateefforts of U.S. allies. Each will come toSyria with its own interests, and a modestU.S. role means the United Statescannot impose its agenda. Washingtoncan, however, try to prevent inevitabledifferences from getting out of hand andpush for a sensible division of labor.

    Among U.S. allies, Turkey is bestpositioned to intervene rapidly. The so-called golden hour after Assad falls willbe critical, and Turkey already will bepresent. Also, Turkish forces are prepared tooperate in an integrated way with civiliansand NATO partners, as they have done inleading two provincial reconstruction teamsin Afghanistan. Gaining a NATO mandateand UN support for Turkish activities wouldembolden Ankara and give its moves morelegitimacy. Turkey, of course, will pursueThis article was derived entirely from open-source,unclassified material. The authors are happy toprovide extensive original footnotes and abibliography upon request.

    its own interests in Syria, but for the mostpart these coincide with America's: Ankarawants a stable and secure Syria that hasa legitimate government. The moderateIslamist regime in Turkey is likely tocontinue supporting moderate Islamists inSyria, but the weakness of pro-Americansecular forces makes this the best outcomeWashington could reasonably expect.

    Washington also should prepare forfailure. It is possible that Assad's fall willbe the beginning, not the end, of a longand chaotic period in Syria's history, withcivil war continuing and the conflagrationinflaming neighbors. Even withneighboring states such as Turkey capableof intervening, by the time the internationalcommunity determines how to respond,the honeymoon period may have passed,severely raising the costs of intervention andreducing the likelihood of success.

    Part of why the Iraq War went so wrongwas that U.S. leaders misunderstood notonly Iraq but also U.S. capabilities. Toavoid repeating this mistake in a post-AssadSyria, Washington must better anticipatewhat might go wrong and be more humbleabout its own capacity to remake Syria, D

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