Great expectations

antto Vihma & Harro van asselt Fiia BrieFinG paper 109 • 14 June 2012

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

109

UnderstandinG wHy tHe Un

climate talks seem to Fail

• Everyyear,theUNclimatenegotiationsseemtofailthetestofsavingtheglobalclimateinthepubliceye.TheexpectationsplacedontheUNclimateregimearesimplytoohigh.

• ThegreatexpectationsoftheUNclimateregime—andthesubsequentinabilitytomeetthem–aredamaging,astheyresonatewithscepticsofinternationalclimatepolicyandUNmultilateralismingeneral.

• Theworld has changed since the early 1990s,whenpost-ColdWar optimismprovided fertileground for establishing several environmental regimes. The new geopolitical and domesticrealitiesprovidethebackdropfortheprogressthatcanbeachievedthroughmultilateralclimatenegotiations.

• However, theUN climate regime plays a crucial role by catalysing climate action, building acommonvisionbetweendifferentstates,enhancingtransparency,andpromotingthediffusionofnovelpolicyideasandinstruments.

• TheroleoftheUNFCCCcouldbefurtherstrengthenedbyallowingittoactasanorchestratorwhichcoordinatesthearrayofinitiatives.

Great expectations

Fiia Briefing paper 109

14 June 2012

UnderstandinG wHy tHe Un

climate talks seem to Fail

the Global security research programme

the Finnish institute of international affairs

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

antto Vihma

researcher

the Finnish institute of international affairs

Harro van asselt

research Fellow

stockholm environment institute

tHe FinnisH institUte oF international aFFairs 3

IntheyearlyaftermathofUnitedNations(UN)cli-matemeetings,manyreporters,expertsandcivilsocietyorganizations,especiallythosefromdevel-opedcountries,criticizetheUNforanotherdisap-pointingoutcome.SomecallforareformoftheUNmodel ofmultilateral negotiations; others argueforabandoningthetalksaltogetherormovingthenegotiationselsewhere.TheroundofUN climatetalkstypically“failonambition”,“failtoreverseglobalwarming”and“failincuttingglobalcarbonemissions”.1Thesecatchphrasesenter theexpertandpublicconsciousnessalikeviathemassmedia.

TheobjectiveofthisbriefingpaperistoprovideananalysisofthesegreatexpectationsinthecontextoftheUNclimateregime.TheexpectationthattheUNmeetingsassuchwouldreverseglobalclimatechangeisbasedonfaultypremisesandcanpoten-tiallybedamaging.Theunfairexpectationspaintinternationalagreementsasperpetualfailures,pro-vidingammunitionfortheintereststhatopposeanyformofinternationalenvironmentalregulation.ThebriefingpaperpresentsadefenceoftheUNFrame-work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC):If itsroleisproperlyunderstood,theregimemayserveanimportantfunctionintheresponsetocli-matechangeandinworldaffairsingeneral.

1 Forexamples,seeWorldWideFundforNature(WWF)press

release,11December2011;ForeignAffairs,13December2011;

TheEconomist,3September2011.

Climatechangeispossiblythemostcomplexprob-lem—oftencalleda“wicked”or“malign”probleminrationalist literature—that theworld is facing.Acentralissuefromtheveryoutsethasbeenthatclimatepoliciesarenotenvironmentalpoliciesinthetraditionalsense,butarecloselyrelatedtoeco-nomicgrowth,trade,andinnovation.Furthermore,climate changemitigation is deeply intertwinedwithquestionsofenergyproductionandland-use,whichareintimatelyrelatedtonationalsovereignty.Thiscomplexityoftheproblemstructuredoesmakeclimatechangeextremelychallengingforinterna-tionaldecision-making.

However, theproblem structuredoesnot single-handedlydeterminethesuccessofaninternationalenvironmentalagreement.Solvingseeminglysim-pleandstraightforwardproblemsmaybedifficultas can bewitnessed, for instance, in the case oftheconservationofAtlantictunaamonggenerallyfriendlystates.Relativesuccessesmaybeachievedinthefaceofsomeofthemostchallengingproblems,one example being the creation of theAntarcticregimeduringtheheightoftheColdWar.2

2 OranYOung(2011).EffectivenessofInternationalEnviron-

mentalRegimes:Existingknowledge,cutting-edgethemes,

andresearchstrategies,Proceedings of the National Acade-

mies of Sciences,vol.108,no.50.

climate negotiators and observers prepare for a long night in cancún. photo: Unclimatechange (flickr)

tHe FinnisH institUte oF international aFFairs 4

Expectations of the climate regime

After the end of the ColdWar in 1989, theWestenjoyedamomentofgreatconfidence,backedupbytheUSwithitsboomingeconomyandunprec-edentedmilitary hegemony. Globalization, pow-ered by theWashington Consensus, acceleratedrapidly,highlightingsocial,economicandpoliticalinterdependence.Thisera,accordingtoProfessorMarttiKoskenniemi,wascharacterizedby“aturntoethics”ininternationallaw.IntheColdWarera,statesweremistrustfulofeachother;formalandneutralnormsweredesignedtoachievepeacefulcoexistenceandminimalstandardsofacceptablebehaviour. By contrast, in the 1990s, Europeancountriesinparticularbegantoexpectanddemandinternationalagreementstopursueawiderangeof”goodcauses”,includinghumanrights, increasedenvironmentalprotectionandtradeliberalisation.As Koskenniemi notes in a satirical tone, “after1989we thought for awhile thatwewere freedfromneutralityandstrictlyformalrules,andthatthegoodlifeitselfwaswithinthegraspofpublicauthorities”attheinternationallevel.3Asaresult,expectationsaboutinternationaldecision-makingandmultilateralagreementsrosetonewunforeseenlevels.

3 MarttiKOsKennieMi(2002).TurntoEthicsinInterna-

tionalLaw.Availableat:http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publica-

tions/Koskenniemi/Ethics.pdf.

This periodmarked the dawn of theUN climateregime,firstwiththeadoptionof theUNFCCC in1992,whichwasrapidlyfollowedbytheKyotoPro-tocolin1997.Inspiredbytheperceivedsuccessesoftheozoneregime,Europeancountriesandtheirprogressivealliescampaignedthroughoutthe1990stoputintoplaceanumberofformalinstitutionsandproceduresforclimatechangemitigationthroughthe UNFCCC. These included the procedures forregularreviewoftheadequacyofcommitmentsinlightofthelatestavailablescience,proceduresforadaptinglegallybindingobligations,andthedevel-opmentofinstitutionsandproceduresforidentify-ingandrespondingtonon-compliance.

Althoughtheoptimismthatprevailedinthe1990sstillresonatesinthetextsanddecisionsadoptedintheclimateregime,overtheyearsithasbecomeevi-dentthatthereareseveralconstraintsfortheinter-nationalresponsetoclimatechange.First,acrucialimplicationofusingalegallybindingtreatyisthatintheUSittriggerstheadviceandconsentprocedure,inwhichatwo-thirdsmajorityintheUSSenateisneededforaninternationalagreementsignedbytheUS executive branch. A bi-partisan consensus onaninternationalagreementisextremelydifficulttoachieve in theAmericandomestic sphere.Moreo-ver,neithertheUSSenatenortheAmericanpeoplewillsupportaclimateagreementthatcreateslegalobligationsfortheUSbutnotforothermajorecono-mies,inparticularChina.Second,thereisnoreasonto believe that China, India, and other emergingeconomieswilldroptheirlong-standingopposition

the high expectations have been contrasted with

concrete evidence on the challenges of multilateral

decision-making. photo: Unclimatechange (flickr)

tHe FinnisH institUte oF international aFFairs 5

to top-down, legally binding targets, even withsignificantincreasesinfinancialandtechnologicalassistance. Both the emergingpowers and theUSessentiallypreferpoliciesthataretailoredtofittheirnationalcircumstances,andfeeluncomfortableasobjectsofastronginternationalagreementimposingaquantifiedclimatechangemitigationambitionlevel.

Inthislight,theannualexpectationsthatincreasedmitigationambitionswillemergetop-downfromaUNmeetingareutopian.Therehasnotbeenasingleclimatemeeting in thehistoryof climatenegotia-tionsinwhichaninternationaldecisionwastakentoreduceacertainamountofemissionsaccordingtoalevelsuggestedbyscience,andthentodistributetheresultingemissionreductioneffortstocountriesaccordingtoobjectively-definedcriteria.EventhehistoricKyotomeetingin1997producedanessen-tially ”bottom-up” agreement, based on horse-tradingwithinasmallgroupofdevelopedcountries,wholistedtheirownnationally-determinedtargetsintheAnnextotheProtocol.Anyanalyticallookattherealityandthehistoryofmultilateralnegotiationsconfirmshowthebasicpoliticalconstraints,togetherwiththedominantnormofstatesovereignty,havelimitedtheroleoftheUNclimatetalkssincetheverybeginning.Intheabsenceofaseismicshiftinglobalclimatepolitics,thebigpicturedoesnotseemtobeevolving towards more favourable conditions formultilateral decision-making. Experts and practi-tionersalikemakeaconvincingcasethatwearecur-rentlydealingwithincreasingmultipolarcompetitionbetweentheUS,Europe,Chinaandemergingpowers.

Anatomy of the annual hype

Overthepasttwentyyearsofnegotiations,thehighexpectationsheldbytheprogressiveactorsintheclimatearenahavebeencontrastedwithconcreteevidenceonthechallengesofmultilateraldecision-making. The optimism about tackling environ-mentalproblemsthroughframeworkconventions,protocols and continuous negotiations has beencounteredwithdeep scepticism towards theUN-basedregimes,particularlyfollowingthelandmarkclimatemeetinginCopenhagenin2009.

ThediscussionsurroundingtheannualUNclimatemeetings currently entails a schizophrenic posi-tion:Weseemtobestuckindestructivedialecticsof great expectations and perpetual failure.Theclimate regime builds on the multilateral opti-mismof the 1990s.Progressive actors are afraidto give up on their high expectations for eachannualmeeting,fearingthatwithoutthispressuretheywouldloseallmeaningfulclimateactionandmodest compromises at the international level.However, theunfair expectations are painting ableakpictureofclimatenegotiationsasfailuresinwhatevertheydo,losingthenuancesoftherealityof policy-making.The image ofUN talks alwaysfailingprovidesammunitionforcynicalviewsthatdoubtthepossibilitiesofglobalclimatepoliticsandmultilateraldecision-makingasawhole,whichisuseful for vested interests that argue against alltypesofenvironmentalregulationinthenationalandinternationalspheres.

climate talks seem to be stuck in destructive dialectics of

great expectations and perpetual failure, much like england’s

football team after 1966. photo: todd awbrey (flickr)

tHe FinnisH institUte oF international aFFairs 6

Examplesoftheoversimplificationsthatthehighexpectationscreateareplentiful.Althoughrecentclimate meetings in Copenhagen, Cancún andDurban have achieved progress and witnessedrathercomplexpoliticalgames,ifcontrastedwiththe expectation of an ambitious top-down deal,analysts and observers are only left with disap-pointment.Amongotheritems,criticshavepointedoutthefailurestoguaranteelimitsofwarmingto2degrees,theinabilitytodealwithnon-compliers(ordefectorslikeCanada),andtheconvolutednatureofmultilateraldecision-making.

Certainly, the internationalclimatechangenego-tiationsundertheUNaretakingplaceagainstthebackdropofthecontinuinggrowthofglobalgreen-housegasemissions,thealreadyobservableimpactsofclimatechangeandtheriskofrunawayclimatechange. It is undeniable that the internationaleffortstoaddressgrandenvironmentalchallengessuch as climate change have so far proved to begrosslyinadequate.However,thetake-homemes-sageofdecadesofacademicresearchonthepoten-tialof internationalenvironmentalagreements isoneofcautiousoptimism.TheUNclimateregimecanmakeadifference.However,itdoesnotoperateinanidealistvacuum,butisempoweredandlim-itedbyothercausalforces,suchasgeopoliticsandthedomesticpoliticsofkeycountries.Thecritiqueshouldbecentredmoreonindividualactorsratherthanthewholeregimeitself.

What can the UN climate regime do for us?

Soistherearoleforthetreaty-basedframeworkprovidedbytheUN inthecurrentpoliticalsitua-tion?Wefirmlybelievethatthereis.Severalimpor-tant functions for theUN climateprocess canbeidentified.

Keeping climate change on the international policy agenda

ThemostbasicfunctionoftheUNclimateprocessshouldnotbeunderestimated.Yearafteryear, itbrings together a variety of governmental andnon-governmentalactorstoaddressthecollectiveproblemofclimatechange.Althoughthemeetingshavebeencharacterizedbyseriousdisagreementsover how the problem should be addressed, thefocus on this limited progress overlooks the factthat194countries,includingallmajorgreenhouse

gasemitters,seektojointlydealwiththeproblem.Themomentumcreatedensuresthatallcountrieshavemovedforward—albeitslowlyandincremen-tally—towardsthecommongoalofavoidingdan-gerousclimatechange.4Negotiationsarestillongo-ing,havingsurvivedmeetingswhichwerewidelyconsideredasfailures,suchasthemeetingsinTheHaguein2000andinCopenhagenin2009.Despitethedisappointingoutcomesofthesemeetings,theclimateregimeshowedremarkableresilience,keep-ingtheissueontheinternationalpolicyagenda.

Working towards a shared vision on targets and responsibilities

Bybringingtogetherdifferentactors,theUNFCCCalso plays an important role in fosteringmutualunderstanding and allowing parties to worktogether—albeit slowly, once again—towards asharedvisionoftheproblemanditspossiblereso-lution.Moreover,countrieshavestartedtomoveawayfromthestrictdeveloped/developingcountrydichotomy,acknowledging that therearecharac-teristicsofcountrieswhicharemoreimportantfortacklingtheproblem.Thisacknowledgementbecameincreasinglyclearinthe2007BaliActionPlan,andwas reaffirmed in the 2010 Cancún Agreement,which saw major developing countries pledging”nationallyappropriatemitigationactions”.Theissueoftargetshasalsoseenprogress.WhentheUNFCCCwasadoptedin1992,thesharedvisionincludedtheneedtoprevent“dangerousanthropogenicinterfer-encewiththeclimatesystem”,aswellasrecognitionofthefactthatdevelopedcountriesaremorerespon-siblefortheproblemthanothers,andshouldhencetaketheleadinclimatechangemitigation.Thisdoesnotmeanthattherewasconsensusonwhatpreciselyconstitutes”dangerous”,ortheamountofemissionreductions that should takeplace indevelopedordevelopingcountries—thesearethedisagreementsthatarelikelytopersistforsometimetocome.How-ever,itisnotablethattwentyyearslater,countrieshave beenwilling to embrace a 2 °C temperaturetarget (andapossibilityofa 1.5 °C target),whichcouldformthebasisforestimatinghowmuchemis-sionreductionsareneededintheshortandmediumterm.Thesearejusttwoexamplesofwaysinwhich

4 JOannaDepleDgeandFarhanaYaMin(2009).TheGlob-

alClimateChangeRegime:ADefence.In:DieterHelmand

CameronHepburn(eds.)TheEconomicsandPoliticsofCli-

mateChange,Oxford,uK,p.439.

tHe FinnisH institUte oF international aFFairs 7

theUNclimateregimeisfosteringasharedvision,eventhoughitshouldbekeptinmindthatatruly”shared”visionmaynevermaterialize.

Providing transparencyTheUNFCCCischaracterizedbyahighleveloftrans-parency.Itallowsnon-governmentalobserverstoparticipatein(someof)thenegotiations,increas-ingthepossibilitytoholdstatestoaccountfortheiractions.Moreimportantly,theConventionandtheProtocolhaveputinplacesystemsformonitoring,reportingandverifyinggreenhousegasemissions,with a view to ensuring that countries complywiththeircommitments.Althoughcollectingandreviewingdatainitselfdoesnotnecessarilyresultin compliance with emission reduction targetsor increase theambitiontoadoptmorestringentmitigationpolicies, it doesprovide an importantindication of the performance of countries.Thistransparencynotonlyservestobuildtrustamongthepartiesandenablecomparabilityofefforts,butcouldalsomobilizeprogressivedomesticconstitu-enciesifacountryisnotlivinguptoitspromises.Eveninaworldwhereemissionreductiontargetsare submitted in a bottom-up system, enhancedtransparencycanfulfilthisfunction,particularlyifitincludesthepossibilitytoprovideanearlywarn-ingwhencountriesarestrayingoffcourse.

Facilitating learningFromacognitiveperspective, theclimateregimeprovidesanimportantmarketplaceforideas.Thewealthofinformationhasfacilitatedthediffusionofnewclimatepolicy instruments,mostnotablymarket-basedmechanisms.Whereas greenhousegasemissionstradingwasinitiallyadvocatedmainlybytheUnitedStates,theeuhasbecomeitsmainprotagonist since the adoption of the Europeanemissions trading system in 2003, and by nowsomedevelopingcountries,suchasChinaandSouthAfrica, have also started to experimentwith theinstrument.Submissionsbygovernmentsallowforthesharingofdomesticexperiences,andalsopro-videaplatformfornewideas.Especiallyduringthepost-2012negotiationsofthelastfewyears,avastamountofinformationonpolicyoptionsfortack-lingclimatechangehasbecomeavailablethroughsubmissionsandreportsbygovernments,academia,scientificbodiesandothernon-stateactors.Thisis,for instance,how the issueof reducedemissionsfromdeforestationandforestdegradation(reDD)emergedontheagendainthenegotiations.

Reconciling ambition and realism

Theurgencyformeaningfulclimateactionhasbeenhighlightedbyanumberofauthoritativesources,includingtheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange, the International Energy Agency, andarticles published in leading academic journals.TheworldisgrowingincreasinglywearyofUNcli-matetalks,which,whencontrastedwithutopianexpectations,seemtoachievenotangibleprogresstowardsaneffectivesolution.Theunfairexpecta-tionsprovideammunitionforscepticswhoargueagainstmultilateralenvironmentalcooperation.

Similar concerns have been raised in the case oftheUNMillenniumDevelopmentGoals,whichsettargetsthatwereimplausibleforalargenumberofcountries.Manyaidrecipientswillmissthegoals,eventhoughtheyhaveachievedrapidprogressbyhistoricalstandards.Whenothernecessarycondi-tions fail to materialize, aid advocates may findaid blamed for false ”failures”, undermining theconstituencyforsustainedengagementwithpoorcountries.5

Many important stepshavebeen taken since thelong-term climate discussions officially beganin Montreal in 2005. Mitigation by developingcountries isnowfirmlyontheagenda,asarethecritical questions of enhanced transparency andclimatefinance.Partieshavefoundasharedvisionon the need to limit the global average tempera-ture increasetobelow2degreesandhaveagreedto review the ambitiousness of this goal by 2015.Adaptation has been given the same priority asmitigation,andnewinstitutionshavebeenestab-lishedtopromotetechnology-relatedissues.Whilemanyoftheseincrementaladvancesareimportant,hard-foughtandcompellingtothose“inside”theprocess,theyfailtocreateanarrativeforthewiderpublic.While therecentadvances inCancúnandDurbanhave“rescued” theUNFCCC process andmultilateral climate change cooperation fornow,inthenextfewyearstheprocesswillfaceacriticaltest:Itmustcontinuetodelivertangibleresultsandcommunicatethemeffectivelyinfaceofhigh—and

5 MichaelcleMens,charlesKennYandtODDMOss

(2007).TheTroublewiththeMDgs:ConfrontingExpecta-

tionsofAidandDevelopmentSuccess,World Development

35(5),pp.735–751.

tHe FinnisH institUte oF international aFFairs 8

likelyunfair—demands.Themessageofcommuni-cationshouldbe:theUNFCCCisnotdoingthisalone.Thereareleaderstatesthathelpitinaddressingcli-matechangeproblem,laggardstatesthatcounterit,non-stateactorsandotherinternationalinitiativesthat could help it, and so forth. For the climateinsidersandmediaalikeitiscrucialtofightclimateapathy—inotherwordsthinkingthattheproblemwillbeorshouldbesolvedbysomeoneelse,suchastheUNFCCC.

WebelievetheUNFCCCstillhasacrucialroletoplayinthecomplexsystemofglobalclimategovernance.Various important functions fulfilled by the UNclimateregimehavereceivedonlyscantattention.Theseincludeitsroleinagenda-settingandmainte-nance;thefactthatitbringscountriestogetherinacontinuousdialogue,allowingthebuildingoftrustandacommonvisionbetweenthem;itsabilitytoensurecountriescanbeheldtoaccountiftheydonottakeclimateaction;anditsroleinthediffusionofpoliciesandideas.

Thesefunctionscouldbestrengthenedbyensuring,inaddition,thattheUNclimateregimecanfunctionasan”orchestrator”thatcouldkeeptrackofthevarietyofinitiativesbypublicandprivateactorsatdifferentlevelsofgovernance,andensuretheycom-plementeachother.If it indeedbecomesincreas-inglyclear that theclimate regimecanno longerplaytheroleofregulator—i.e.prescribingtheemis-sionreductionsrequiredforeachcountry—itmay

insteadplayanimportantpartasorchestrator6.Thismeans,forinstance,thatthroughthemonitoringandreportingfunctionmentionedabove,itcouldkeeptrackofthevarietyofgovernanceinitiativesoutsidetheclimateregime,andassesswhetheradd-inguptheeffortsoftheseinitiativesisinlinewithcommonobjectives,suchaskeepingtemperatureincreasesbelow2°C.Orchestration—orcoordina-tion—could also seek to reduce inefficiencies byavoiding the duplication of efforts, and decreasetheriskofdoublecountingofefforts.Forexample,throughtheestablishmentofcommonguidelinesand accounting frameworks, theUNFCCC couldensurethecompatibilityofexistingandemergingemissionstradingsystems.Similarly,throughcoor-dinationwithcleantechnologyinitiativesoutsideoftheUNFCCC,linkscouldbeestablishedbetweenfunding mechanisms under the climate regime(notablythenewlyestablishedGreenClimateFund),andtechnologytransferprojectsontheground.Insodoing,theUNFCCCcouldimprovethecoherenceoftheinstitutionalcomplexforclimatechange,andensurethatglobalclimategovernanceasawholeremainslegitimate.

6 KennethabbOttandDuncansniDal(2010).Internation-

alRegulationwithoutInternationalGovernment:Improving

iOPerformancethroughOrchestration,Review of Interna-

tional Organizations 5 (3),pp.315–344.

the potential function of the UNFCCC as ‘orchestrator’ has so far received scant attention. photo: US national archives and records administration.

tHe FinnisH institUte oF international aFFairs 9

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cover: Juha mäkinen

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with thanks to dr. Fariborz Zelli for commenting on the draft.

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