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Great Britain's 'Blue-Water' Policy, 1689-1815Author(s): Daniel A. BaughReviewed work(s):Source: The International History Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Feb., 1988), pp. 33-58Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40107088.
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8/10/2019 Great Britains Blue-Water Policy, 1689-1815 - Daniel a. Baugh
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Great
Britain's
'Blue-Water5
Policy,
1689-1815
DANIEL
A.
BAUGH
almost
three
centuries
(from
about
1650
to
1920),
Great
Britainhad available o
it
a
highly
distinctive
ystem
of
national
security.
The
general
attributes
of this
system
are
widely
known,
if
often
vaguely,
but
the
integrating
ogic
behind
it
is not at all
clearly
understood.1
erhaps
his is
not
surprising.
As the
system
evolved
from
1650
onwards,
there
were
disagreements
sometimes
profound
ones
-
as to its
goals,
instruments,
nd
strategies.Surveying
he
long
history
of debate,it is easy to form the impression hat there was not much
common
ground
and that
the
basic
issues were
never
resolved. One
might go
further,
and
postulate
that
they
were
impossible
o
resolve
becauseof
Great
Britain's
geopolitical
ituation.The 'island
realm',
as
Churchill
iked
to call
it,
could
not
afford
to
ignore
political
conditions
in
western
Europe
any
more
than it could
ignore
the
opportunities
summed
up
by
Sir Walter
Ralegh's
oft-quoted
maxim,
'Whosoever
commands the
sea
commands the
trade;
whosoever commands
the
trade
of
the
world
commands
he richesof the
world,
and
consequently
the world itself.'2
Ralegh
wrote these
words
near
the
beginning
of
the
seventeenth
century,
and some of that
century's
events,
most
notably
the
expansion
of
oceanic trade and the
amazing
rise of
the Dutch
Republic,
seemed
emphatically
o
support
him.
On the
other
hand,
the
influence
of French
military
power
upon
western
Europe
after
1670
suggested
hat
his idea
might
have serious
imitations,
and
understand-
ably,
opposing
schools of
thought grew up
-
'Maritime' and 'Con-
tinental'
which
had an
impact
on
British
foreign policy throughout
1
I am
currently
writing
a
book on
this
subject.
In
the
limited
space
here
it
is
pos-
sible to
specify only
a
small
portion
of
the
direct
evidence for
my judgements
and
and to indicateonly some of the detailedqualifications.
2
Quoted by
R.H.
Tawney,
Business and Politics
under
James
I
(Cambridge,
1958),
p. 3-
The International
History
Review, x,
1,
February
1988, pp. 1-172
cn
issn
0707-5332
The
International
History
Review
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34
Daniel
A.
Baugh
the
eighteenth
century.
The
bold claims issued
on
both
sides
have
long
attracted the attention
of historians.
As,
undeniably,
these claims
played
a role
in
shaping
British
policy,
it is
important
to
grasp
what
that role amounted
to. The Maritime
orientation
was
generally popular
and
much
touted
in the
House
of
Commons. The Continental
orientation,
however,
was
steadily
favoured
by
the
Hanoverians,
at least the
first two
Georges,
and
they
were
able
to find
leading politicians
who shared or were
willing
to
support
their
view.
However,
these
politicians
were
usually
unable
to
gain
sufficient
support
in Parliament for a
strongly
Continentalist
policy.
It is all
very
well to
say
that 'the Crown
never lost a
general
election
in
the
eighteenth
century',
but that
fact,
if
it
is a
fact,
did not translate
into
full
support
for the
king's
favourite line of
policy.
The role of the
two schools
should
therefore be seen as
setting
limits
on what kinds of
diplomatic
and
strategic
plans
would
be allowable.
In
the
course of the
century
the
plans
leaned
one
way
or the other
according
to
circumstances of domes-
tic
politics,
to
diplomatic conjunctures,
and to
strategic opportunities.
On
balance,
the decisions
tended
against
military
commitment
on
the
Continent.
In
the form
of
constitutional
monarchy
that
developed
in
England
after
1650,
the
means of
warfare
were
only
obtainable
through parlia-
mentary
vote;
therefore,
the contours
of British
national
security
were
bound to
be
shaped
by
necessity,
convenience,
and
compromise.
In
other
words,
the
historicity
and the main
outlines
of the British
system
of
national
security
between
1689
and
181
5
are best
ascertained
by
keeping
one's
eye
on the decisive
policy
arguments
and the
actual
com-
mitments
(and non-commitments)
of
funds
and
force.
A
system
that
is
not
easily
identified
and
delineated
is,
by
the same
token, not easily labelled. Of the great naval historians who wrote at
the turn of the
century,
Sir
Julian
Corbett came
closest to
producing
a
comprehensive
analysis.
In
Some
Principles of
Maritime
Strategy
( 191
1
)
,
a work whose
analytical
framework was
deeply
influenced
by
Clausewitz's
writings,
Corbett
argued
that
the
important
distinction
that
(eventually)
Clausewitz discerned
between
wars for 'a
"Limited"
object
and those whose
object
was
"Unlimited"
'
had laid
open
'what
are the
radical and essential
differences
between
the German
or Con-
tinental
School of
Strategy
and
the
British or Maritime
School
-
that
is,
our own
traditional School'.
Corbett,
entirely
in
agreement
with
Clausewitz that strategy must grow out of policy, left no doubt as to
his
opinion
that
the
'British or
Maritime
School'
had
dominated
British
policy
in
the
past
and had been
patterned
upon
the
plan
of
'Limited
war'. It
was a
plan
whose
advantages
were
consistently
available
to
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'Blue-Water'
Policy
35
Great
Britain,
thanks to
her
insular
situation,
but
not
to
Continental
powers.
Aside from
occasional
references
o the 'Britishor
Maritime
School',
the term 'Limitedwar' was as
close as he
came to
giving
the
time-honoured
British
ystem
a
name,
and he was not
at
all
happy
with
it.3
Its
inadequacy
s
obvious,
f
only
because t
conveys
so
little.
Within five
years
of the
publication
of
Some
Principlesof
Maritime
Strategy,
GreatBritain
was
fighting
an
unlimitedwax on
the continent
of
Europe.4
The
reaction
of the
Britishnation
to
the First World War
did
not reach
full
flood
until
about a
decade after
it
had
ended,
and
in
the
sphere
of
strategic
tudiesthe most remarkable
esponse
was
surely
that
of
the famous
militaryjournalist,
analyst,
commentator,
and
his-
torian,
Sir
Basil
Liddell
Hart.
In
a lecturetitled
'EconomicPressureor
Continental
Victories'offered to
a
meeting
of the
Royal
United Ser-
vice
Institution
n
1931,
Liddell Hart
concludeda
rapid
historical ur-
vey
by
asking
which
line of
strategy
was
heresy
the
one
pursuing
Con-
tinentalvictories
espoused
by
Great
Britain
n
the First
World
War,
or
the one
'proved
by
three
centuries'
experience
of
warfare'
from
which
she
should never have
departed?
The latter had been denounced
as
heresyby
the
'rulingmilitary
eaders
n
1914-18'.
'Yet
in
the
light
of
Britain's
history,'
he
asked,
'who were the real
heretics,
he violators
of
tradition?
Has
any
other
theory
than
the one we have here traced
the
historic
itle
to
be
called "British
Strategy"?'
n
1931
that
was the
only
phrase
he could
think of: 'historic .. "British
Strategy"
. But
a
year
later
when
he revised he
lecture
and
assigned
t
the lead-off
position
n
a
collection
of
his
essays,
he came
up
with 'The British
Way
in
War-
fare',
which
he made the title of the
book.5
t is safe
to
say
that Liddell
Hart,
though
he remains best known
for
his
work in
the
1920s
on
mobile
infantry
actics and
the
strategy
of 'indirect
approach',
devoted
3
Julian
S.
Corbett,
Some
Principles
of
Maritime
Strategy
(London, 191
1
,
Part
I,
Theory
of
War*,
esp. p.
38;
also
52-63,
73.
On
p.
81
he
comments:
*The
expres-
sion
"Limitedwar" is
no doubt
not
entirely happy.
Yet no other has
been found
to
condense
the
ideas
of limited
object
and
limited
interest,
which are its
special
characteristics.'
One of
his
fears
was
that
it
might
be
construed
as
implying
that
battles should
be
regarded
as
unnecessary,
and he did not
mean that at
all
(pp.
81-2).
4
For
a brief sketch of Corbett's reaction
to
this
fact,
see
Donald
M.
Schurman,
Julian
S.
Corbett,
1854-1922
(London,
1981), p.
172.
Readers
should
take
spe-
cial note of Schurman's
tatement in the Preface that
for
particular
reasons
his
biography *shamefully> eglects
Some
Principles of
Maritime
Strategy,
a book
whose
strengths
can
only
be
appreciated,
he
says, by
reading
it *first hand'
(p. viii).
5
B.H. Liddell
Hart,
The British
Way
in
Warfare
(London,
1932),
quotations
on
p. 37.
In
the book he titled the
essay
The
Historic
Strategy
of Britain'.
The
original
'Economic
Pressures
r
ContinentalVictories'
was
published
n the
Royal
United ServicesInstitution
Journal,
xxxvi
(
1
93
1
.
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36
Daniel
A.
Baugh
much of the
later
part
of
his
career
to
proselytizing
for doctrines derived
from
his
concept
of
'The
British
Way
in
Warfare'.6
For
reasons
that
have
mostly
to
do
with the nature of the Second
World
War and its
aftermath,
the
concept
as an historical
tool has
suffered an
eclipse, along
with Liddell Hart's
reputation.
One
reason,
perhaps,
is the name
itself;
although
'The British
Way
in
Warfare'
has
a nice
literary ring,
it is
obviously
a
mouthful,
and
for
purposes
of either
broad
strategic
application
or
analysis,
sounds too historical and
is too
particularist.
Besides,
the
essentially
non-Continentalist
character
of the
system
ought
to be
stressed; therefore,
a
preferable
name,
herewith
pro-
posed,
would be
'blue-water'
policy.7
Specialists
have not
forgotten
Liddell
Hart's formulation.
Michael
Howard
brought
it forward for examination
in
his
Ford
Lectures,
pub-
lished
in
1972
as The Continental
Commitment,
and
again
in
his Neale
Lecture
of
1974,
'The British
Way
in
Warfare:
A
Reappraisal'.8
In
both
instances the examination was critical.
A
passage
from the
latter
sets the
tone
:
But it
would be
doing
Liddell Hart an
injustice,
both
as
a
historian
and
a
controversialist,to suggest that this analysis of British strategy was any-
thing
more than a
piece
of
brilliant
political pamphleteering,
sharply
argued,
selectively
illustrated,
and
concerned
rather to
influence
British
public opinion
and
government policy
than
to illuminate
the
complexities
of the
past
in
any
seriousor
scholarly
way.9
Howard went on to
suggest
that
Liddell
Hart had
seriously
misinter-
preted
the
true
balance of traditional
British
strategy
by failing
to
give
appropriate weight
to
Great Britain's
long
history
of
military
and
diplo-
matic
involvement on the
Continent.
Nor,
in
this
regard,
does
Liddell
6
I
am
including
his
anti-Clausewitzian
writings
as
part
of
this
intellectual
mission.
He
remained
passionate
on the
subject
of
Clausewitz;
see
especially
The Ghost
of
Napoleon (London,
1934)
and
the
lecture
he offered at
the
Naval
War
College
in
1962, printed
in
War,
Strategy,
and
Maritime
Power,
ed.
B. Mitchell
Simpson
III
(New Brunswick,
N.J., 1977), pp. 31-48.
7
Although my
formulation differs in one or
two
important
aspects
from Liddell
Hart's,
that
alone would not have induced
me
to
find
another label.
No historical
label can avoid
being
misleading
in one
way
or
another,
and the one I
have
chosen,
while it
has the
merit
of
announcing
more
plainly
to a
non-specialist
readership
what it is
really about,
has the demerit of
becoming
confused
with
the
concept
of a
purely
maritime
strategy.
It will become
evident that
by
'blue-
water
policy'
I
do not mean
'purely
maritime
strategy'.
8 Michael
Howard,
The Continental Commitment
(London,
1972);
The British
Way
in
Warfare:
A
Reappraisal
(London, 1975);
this lecture
is
reprinted
in
The
Causes
of
Wars,
ed. Michael
Howard
(2nd
ed.,
Cambridge,
Mass., 1984),
pp.
169-87.
9
Ibid.,
p.
172.
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'Blue-Water'
Policy
37
Hart's
biographer,
Brian
Bond,
come to his
subject's
rescue. Far from
it;
he
is
highly
critical.10
he
important
point
is not that both men have
expressed
doubts about the
scholarly
depth
and
grounding
of Liddell
Hart's
history,
for those doubts
are
well
warranted,
but
that
they
are
inherently
unsympathetic
o
his
views on
policy
and
grand
strategy.
Indeed,
Howard
has disinterred
The
British
Way
in
Warfare'
n
order
to
display
ts fundamental
rrors.
An
interesting
nd commendable
eature
of Howard's
critique
s
that,
notwithstanding
he
title,
it
grapples
more
intensively
with Corbett's
Some
Principlesof
Maritime
Strategy
han withLiddellHart'swritings.
According
o
Howard,
Corbett's
analysis
s 'more
subtle',
and
Corbett
is to be considered at least
as
much
a critic
of the maritime chool as
he
was
a
spokesman
or
it',
becausehe
saw
'that
"maritime
trategy"
was
not an alternative o "Continental
trategy"
but
an
extension
of
it'.11
Readers
of Corbett'sbook
may
judge
for themselves
he
sense
n which
these
interpretations
re accurate.
The
parts
of
Howard's
critique
that
pertain
o the
eighteenth-century
ituationare
taken
up
in
what
follows.
*
*
*
Blue-water
policy
rose
to
a
position
of
primacy
n
England
in the wake
of
the
English
Civil War.
This
occurrence
was
signalled
by
the
Rump
Parliament's
enactment
of
the
Navigation
Ordinances
of
1650
and
1
65
1
and
the
outbreak
of the
First Dutch War
in
1652.
Its motto
may
be
found
in
the
Preamble
o
Articles
of War
issued
n
that
year:
'It is
upon
the
navy
under
the
Providence
of God
that
the
safety,
honour,
and welfare
of
this realm
do
chiefly
attend.'12
Many
people
think that
English
defence
policyacquired
ts maritime
accent at
some earlier
date,
particularly
t the time of the
Elizabethan
war
against Spain,
when the
Hawkinses ndSir FrancisDrakepressed or it. In fact, one greatevent
(the
Armada
campaign)
and
excessive
enthusiasm
n the
part
of
some
naval historianshave combined to
distort the
historical
picture.
Al-
though
no
Elizabethan
denied the
importance
of
the
floating
'Wooden
Walls',
he
queen
and
her
leading
adviser,
Lord
Burghley,
eliedon
three
lines of
defence:
first,
expeditionary
fforts
o
preventSpanish-Catholic
League
forces
rom
controlling
he
opposite
shoresof the
English
Chan-
nel;
second,
the
navy;
and
third,
military
forces for
coast
defence.13
10
Brian
Bond,
Liddell Hart: A
Study of
his
Military
Thought
(London,
1977).
He
characterizes
Howard's
reappraisal
as
'a restrained criticism of
Liddell Hart's
historical
arguments' (p. 70).
11
Howard,
'Reappraisal', pp.
1
73-4.
12
Frequently
repeated
in various
preambles
concerning
maritime
policy
thereafter,
with
'strength'
substituted for 'honour'.
18
The
sketch
given
in
J.G.
Black,
The
Reign of
Elizabeth,
1558-1603
(Oxford,
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38
Daniel
A.
Baugh
They
committed
England's
resources
heavily
to all
three,
and had
sound
reasons
strategic, echnological,
and commercial
for
doing
so.
Under the
Early
Stuarts,
however,
England's
military
and naval
forces
were
feeble,
and her
inviolabilitydepended
chiefly
upon
the unsettled
situation
of
monarchical
and
imperial
politics
n
Europe:
there
was
no
defence
policy
deserving
of the
term.
The duke
of
Buckingham's
on-
duct of
war and
diplomacy
n
the
1620s
may
be
fairly
describedas a
sequence
of
catastrophes,
nd
England
was fortunate hat
the Bourbons
and
Habsburgs
had more
important
hings
to
do
elsewhere.14
Nevertheless,t was
during
the first half of the seventeenthcentury
that
two
indispensable
onditionsfor a
viable blue-water
policy
were
achieved.
First,
English
commercemoved
away
from its
overwhelming
dependence
on
the marketsof north-western
Europe: plantation
prod-
ucts
from
Virginia
and the
Caribbean
played
a small
role;
East India
Company
rade
a
greater;
and Mediterranean nd
Iberiantrade
by
far
the
greatest.
(The
tremendous
rowth
of
English
rade
and
shipping
n
the
Mediterranean
during
the seventeenth
century
may
be
classed
as
one of
those
important
facts that
scarcely
anyone,
other than a few
specialists,
eems
to
know.
Second,
the
Parliamentary avy during
the
Civil War
-
a
fleet of
all-weather,
manoeuvrable,medium-sized,
men-
of-war
proved remarkably
ffective
in
enforcing
solation,
that
is,
in
preventing
outside
military
aid from
reaching
the
royalists.
Thus the
1
640s
witnessed
a
prolonged
test
of the 'Wooden Walls'.
As
already
noted,
the
government
of
Elizabeth
had
regarded
he fleet
as
a second
line of
defence
among
three,
but after the
1640s
the
idea
that the
navy
might
functionas the
'first
ine
of
defence'
no
longer
seemed
dangerous
and
unrealistic.
Though
this
phrase
did not come
into use until
later,
936), PP- 354-5 has not been substantiallymodifiedby more recent research.
For
a
thorough
study
of the
accent then
placed upon controlling
the
opposite
shores,
see
R.B.
Wernham,
After
the
Armada:
Elizabethan
England
and the
Struggle
for
Western
Europe 1585-1505
(Oxford, 1984).
14
This
paragraph
and the next
constitute an
extreme
distillation
of
points
addressed
in
a
paper
that I
presented
in
April 1983
to
the
Shelby
Cullom
Davis
Center,
Princeton
University,
Towards a "Blue-Water"Defense
Policy
in
Seventeenth-
Century England'.
There are two
highly
useful
published surveys:
G.M.D.
Howat,
Stuart and
Cromwellian
Foreign Policy (London,
1974),
and
J.R. Jones,
Britain
and
Europe
in the
Seventeenth
Century
(New
York, 1966).
Recent
studies
of note
are:
Hans-Christoph
Junge,
Flottenpolitik
und
Revolution:
Die
Entstehung
der
englischen
Seemacht wa.hrnd der
Herrschaft
Cromwells
(Stutt-
gart, 1980); Roger
Crabtree,
The Idea of a Protestant
Foreign Policy',
in
Cromwell:A
Profile,
ed. Ivan Roots
(New
York,
1973)
;
CharlesP.
Korr,
Crom-
well
and the
New Model
Foreign
Policy
(Berkeley
and Los
Angeles, 1975)
;
J.L.
Price,
'Restoration
England
and
Europe',
n
The Restored
Monarchy,
1660-1688,
ed.
J.R. Jones (Totowa,
N.J., 1979)
;
Phyllis
Lachs,
*Advise nd
Consent: Parlia-
ment and
Foreign
Policy
Under the Later
Stuarts',
Albion,
vii
(1975).
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'Blue-Water'
Policy
39
English
naval
superiority
was
from the middle of
the seventeenth cen-
tury
considered
the sine
qua
nan of defence
of
the realm.
The Restoration
of 1660 not
only
left
blue-water
policy
in
place
but
contributed to
its
enhancement.
The
Navigation
Ordinances became
the
Navigation
Acts and
were
improved
and
tightened. Royal
policy
continued
to
regard
the
Dutch
Republic
as a
prime
adversary,
which
made
adherence
to
a
blue-water
emphasis
logical
because,
of
course,
Dutch
power
was
chiefly
maritime and
could be
most
conveniently
addressed
by
naval means.
But to be of
any long-term significance,
blue-water
policy
had to be
answerable
to
threats mounted
by
a
power
great
upon
land as well as
upon
sea.
France attained
such a
position
by
the
1670s,
and
for two
centuries
thereafter
France
was
generally
regarded
as the source
of
greatest
danger
to
England.
It is
pertinent
that the
English people,
as
represented
in
the
House
of
Commons,
came to this
conclusion before
their
kings
did;
suddenly,
in
the
year 1673,
the
Commons refused
to
vote
the
necessary
revenues
to
continue the
Third
Dutch
War,
in
which
England
and France
were allies.
This sudden alteration
of
opinion
took
place against
a
background
of
dismaying
events
-
the
disclosure of
the
duke of
York's Catholicism and
the
outrageous
inaction of the French
fleet
in
the battle off
the Texel
-
but there
were
deeper
reasons.
First,
Louis
XIV,
under
Jean
Baptiste
Colbert's
guidance,
had
by
the
early
1
670s
built
a
powerful navy.
Second,
he
was
attempting
during
that
same decade
to crush
the Dutch
Republic
by
force of
arms,
and French
domination
of
the
Low
Countries
could never be
in
England's
interest.
Third,
Louis
XIV's
escalating persecution
of the
Huguenots
con-
tributed an
element of
moral
outrage,
and
the
English
court's secret
dealings
with him
amplified religious
and constitutional
fears.
Thus,
political concerns became entwined with and served to reinforce geo-
political
ones.
Although
the
House
of
Commons
asked Charles
II to
commence
hostilities with
France
in
1677-8
and to
form
alliances
suit-
able to
the
purpose, nothing
much
came
of
it.
The
king's
heart was not
in
it,
and he
suspected, rightly,
that
the Commons
would fail to vote
him
anything
near
the level of resources such a war would
require.
(The
excitement did
generate,
however,
a
huge
appropriation
for
build-
ing thirty
new
ships
of
the line.
)
A
serious
confrontation did not occur
until the
Glorious
Revolution of
1688-9
brought
William of
Orange
and
his
English
wife
Mary
to
the
throne of
England.
William,
as Dutch
Stadtholder, had spent his young manhood struggling in the field against
French armies
bent on
destroying
the
independence
of
the Dutch Re-
public,
and his
installation
on
the
English
throne led to
immediate
hostilities between
England
and France.
Along
with this
new
era
in
the
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40
Daniel
A.
Baugh
history
of the
English
constitution here came
a new era
in the
history
of
English
warfareand
warmakingpower.
Before
examining
he
period
between
1689
and
18
15,
it
is
vital that
we set forth
the essential
eaturesof blue-water
policy
as
they
stood
at
the
outset.
First,
to reiteratea
point
that
is too
easily
forgotten,
ts basic
rationale,
both
at the time it
originated
and
thereafter,
was
pitched
upon
defence of
the realm
against foreign
invasion;
the central
point,
to
which
all other
objectives
and
considerations ere
subsidiary,
was naval
command of
the
English
Channel and
North Sea.
European
waters
came first.Second,blue-water
policy
rested
upon
a
particular
system
for
sustaining
he
expense
of
the
prodigious
naval
force it
required.
The
keys
here
were trade
and
shipping.
Trade
supplied
the
liquid
funds,
taxable
and
lendable,
as well
as a source
of
government
evenue
n
the
form
of customs
duties,
and the
shipping
ndustry
provided
our
things:
profits
o
be
taxed or
lent,
auxiliary
vessels
n
time
of
war,
shipbuilding
skills
and
facilities,
and
above all trained eamen.
The
indispensable
ole
of
the
Navigation
Act
to
blue-water
policy
is thus evident.
Colonies,
t
should
be
noted,
were seen as useful
n
seventeenth-century
alculations
only
insofar
as
they
contributed
o the
enhancement
or
protection
of
trade.
Obviously,
blue-water
policy
entaileda
concept
of cost-effective-
ness,
for
it
was
designed
to minimize internal
impositions
and taxes
(therein
lay
its
appeal
to
the
country gentry,
however
distasteful
t
might
seem
to them
on
ideological
or
social
grounds)
and
it
promised
to
minimizethe
need
for
military
recruitmentand a
standing
army.
A
land
force
was
admittedly
required
to
capture
and
garrison
colonial
possessions
and
overseas
bases,
to
keep
a
steady eye
on
Ireland
and
Scotland,
and
to be
ready
on
occasion
to
deal
with invasion
threats
(in
a
manner
we
shall
examine
later).
Such a
policy
implied
that
the Englishpopulationwould be largely destitute of military train-
ing
or
experience
and the
English
aristocracy
would
be
no
longer
at-
tuned
to
calls of
military
virtue.But
in
England
these
things
had
pretty
well
gone by
the board
during
the sixteenth
century,
never
to
make a
lasting
recovery:15
s
Stephen
Baxter
has
remarked,
since the late
Middle
Ages,
'the
English
had
become,
as
they
remained,
one
of the
most
stubbornly
civilian
societies
on
the face
of the earth'.16
The
splendidly
effectiveNew
Model
Army
seems to
have made
little
moral
or
cultural
mpression
on
the
nation, unless,
perhaps,
a
negative
one,
15 See the
interesting
article
by
Jeremy
Goring,
'Social
Change
and
Military
Decline
in
Mid-Tudor
England',
History,
lx
(1975), 185-97.
The
recovery
of
military
skills in the
1580s (p. 197)
lasted
only
to
the end
of
Queen
Elizabeth
I's
reign.
16
Stephen
B.
Baxter,
WilliamIII and the
Defense
of
European
Liberty 1650-1702
(New
York, 1966), p. 249.
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'Blue-Water'
Policy
41
and
James
Harrington's
eo-machiavellian
roposal
n
Oceana
(
1656)
proved
o
be a non-starter.
n
sum,
blue-water
policy,
aside from reduc-
ing
military
necessities,
was
cost-effective,
practical,
and
mundane;
it
installeda
calculating
commercialism
t
the
heart of
the
most
impor-
tant task
of
government.
Although
some of its
earlier
militantly
Prot-
estant
proposers
ad entertaineddreams
of
a
Protestant
League
on
the
Continent,
his
aspectgave
way
to blue-water
practicalities
n the
1650s,
if not before.
Truly,
a revolution
n
English
defence
policy
had
been
accomplished.
The
English
grand
strategy,
n line with these
principles,
was essen-
tially
defensive
n
Europe
(and
European
waters)
and
aggressive
ver-
seas. Overseas
aggressiveness
as aimed at
enlarging
he maritimeand
commercial
base of
England's
naval
power
while at the same time
reducing
that of actual
or
potential
enemies.
Success
n
war could be
achieved
only
by
economic
pressure.
Against
an
adversary
ike Holland
whose
power
base was
maritime,
thus
highly
vulnerable
o
blue-water
strategy,
successcame
quickly
n
most
instances;
against
an
adversary
like
France,
a
successfulwar was bound
to
be a
long
one,
regardless
f
what
some blue-waterenthusiasts
iked to think.
In our
analysis
of the
period
rom
1689
to
18
15,
we shall take note
of
the
ways
in
which blue-
water
policy
had to be
adapted
to confrontationwith
a
major
land
power.
*
# *
The
important
historical est
of blue-water
defence
policy
would
lie
in
its
capacity
to meet
the
challenge
of
a
great
land
power,
and
after the
1
670s
Francewas
usually
he
greatest
and
power
n
Europe.
There was
a
time
(
from about
1716101733)
when GreatBritain
and Franceoften
co-operated,which is well to remember,becausenothingillustrateshe
'kaleidoscopic
ature
of
Europeanpolitics'
more
emphatically.17
till,
if
17
Jeremy
Black,
British
Foreign
Policy
in the
Age of
Walpole
(Edinburgh,
1985),
p. 5.
This
is
now
the best
general
study
of
the
period.
See
also
Black's Natural
and
Necessary
Enemies:
Anglo-French
Relations in the
Eighteenth
Century
(Athens, Ga., 1986)
and his 'The British
Navy
and British
Foreign
Policy
in the
First Half of
the
Eighteenth
Century',
n
Essays
in
European History
in
Honour
of Ragnhild Hatton,
ed. Karl Schweizer and
Jeremy
Black
(Lennoxville,
Que.,
1985).
There are two
important
recent
surveys
of
British external
policy:
J.R.
Jones,
Britain
and the
World
1649-1815
(Glasgow,
1980),
and Paul
Langford,
The
Eighteenth
Century
1688-18
15
(London, 1976).
For
a
recent
bibliographical
guide
to
European
oreign policy
see Derek
McKay
and H.M.
Scott,
The Rise
of
the GreatPowers
1648-1815
(Harlow,
1983).
Among other things, it gives the
locations
of
important
articles
by
G.G.
Gibbs. Recent work
on British
policy
is
very
thoroughly
covered
in
a
bibliographical
essay
by Jeremy
Black,
'British
Foreign Policy
in
the
Eighteenth Century:
A
Survey',
Journal
of
British
Studies
xxvi
(1987).
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42
Daniel
A.
Baugh
therewas some
truth
n
the
general
dea
that
Austriawas
GreatBritain's
'natural
ally',
there
was far
more truth
in
the idea
that
France
was
Great
Britain's
natural
enemy'.
This second
truth
rested not
only
on
France's
potential
o dominate
affairson the
Continent,
but
also
on
the
strategic possibilities
nherent
in
France's
geographicalposition:
like
the
Netherlands,
France
was
conveniently
ituated
to
launch invasions
of
GreatBritain
and Irelandas well as
to
maintain
sea
communications
with transoceanic heatres
of war.
It was the
triple
combination
of
France's
military
power
in
Europe,
possession
f
much of the
opposite
shoreof the Channel,anddifficult-to-interdictceanic access hat made
her
Great
Britain's
natural
enemy'.
To discover
how
blue-water
policy
adjusted
o these
challenges,
t is
neither
necessary
nor advisable o
go through
the whole
period
1689-
18
1
5,
war
by
war. With the
exception
of two or three
major changes
in
circumstances nd
orientation,
he situation remainedstatic
during
the
century
and a
quarter,
and
will
be
analysed
here
under two broad
headings:
objects
and
grand strategy.
In
the
eighteenthcentury
t
was common o
speak
of 'British
bjects'
that Great Britain
ought always
to
fight
for 'British
objects'
was a
familiarrefrain
n
the House of
Commonsand
the
press.
The
popular
mind
fondly
posed
the issue
in
terms of British
objects
versus Con-
tinental
objects,
magining
that all
Continental
dealings
were necessi-
tated
by
the narrow
and
foreign,
probably
Hanoverian,
concernsof
the
Georgian
monarchs.But the
real
issue was whether
the
objects,
where-
ever
pursued,
would serve to
enhance British
prosperity
and
national
security.
Politicians
and statesmenof
course do not deal
just
in
coolly
calcu-
lated
assessments
f
this
kind:
they
also deal
in
special
interestsand
morallysuffusedpassions. t is thereforenecessary o acknowledge he
existence,
ndeed the
seemingprevalence,
of
these influences.
Naturally,
the
widespreadpopular
opinion
that
the
only
genuinely
British
objects'
were
commercial,
colonial,
and
oceanic
-
never
European
served
the interestsof
those
who
hoped
to
profit
from the
lottery
of
privateer-
ing,
and more
importantly,
hose
who
pursued
ar-flungprofits
behind
a
publicly
inanced
naval and
military
shield.
This should
not
make us
forget
that
many
people
were
caught up
in
a bona
fide infatuationwith
the
possibilities
f
maritime-commercial
xpansion,
which
during
the
second half of
the
eighteenth
century
ed to some dubious
pre-emptive
flourishes nd acquisitionsn distant locales.18Althoughthe objectsin
18
See
my
Clark
Library
lecture of
1983, 'Seapower
and Science:
Perspectives
on
the
Motives of
Pacific
Exploration
in
the
Eighteenth Century',
to be
published
in
a volume edited
by
Derek
Howse
(forthcoming).
The
impulse
towards
far-flung
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'Blue-Water'
Policy
43
view were
indisputably
British',
he
bearing
of
many
of
them on
na-
tional
security
was
often remote and
speculative.
There
was a
high
incidence
of
political opportunism
transoceanic
objects
were
popular,
and
opposition
politicians
often
played upon
them;
to borrow
an
image
from
George
Kennan,
striking
attitudesbefore the mirrorof domestic
political
opinion'.19
ndisputably,
he
spokesmen
for
maritime,
com-
mercial,
and
colonial
objects
were
often
self-serving,passionately
de-
luded,
or
both,
but
given
the
unarguablepremise
that naval
strength
depended
heavily
upon
commercialreturns and
shipping,
there
was
senseaswell assillinessn their
arguments.
Opposition
follies
are
loud
and
strident;
government
follies are
usually quiet,
indeed often hushed
up,
or at least
soberly
exhibited.
Prior
to
the
accessionof
George
III in
1760,
the
government
view was
heavily
nfluenced
by
the
personalpredilections
f William
III,
George
I,
and
George
II. Bornand
brought
up
in
Europe,
still
formallyrespon-
sible
for the
safety
of their native
realms,
and
deeply
attachedto
things
military,
heir
perspective
was
indelibly
European.
There was
as
much
scope
for
politicians
to
exploit
a
Continentalist
tance at
court
as
a
Maritimeone
in
the
public
forums.Yet
it was seldom a
matter of
pure
opportunism.
There
was a
Whig
ideal,
first
implanted
when
William
III stood at the head
of
the Grand
Alliance,
that not
only
spoke
of the
necessity
of
preserving
he 'balance
of
power'
but
also
expressed
a
fer-
vent moral
concern or
the
'liberty
of
Europe'.
It
may
not be too
much
to
say
that
these
sentimentsamounted
to
a secular
resurrection
f the
old
passion
or a
Protestant
League.They
were
genuineenough.Among
Whigs
in
opposition
n
the
1730^
here were
Continentalist
s well as
Maritime votaries.20
Whig
Continentalism
may
well have
found its
finest
expression,
however,
after
1760,
when Edmund Burke
in the
early1770s'denouncedLordNorth[theprimeminister] orsayingthat
maritime
expansion
at the
end
of
the
century
is covered in
David
Mackay,
In
the Wake
of
Cook:
Exploration,
Science
and
Empire ij8o~i8oi
(New
York,
1985).
19
George
F.
Kennan,
Memoirs,
1
925-1
950
(Boston, 1967),
p.
54.
On
the
degree
to
which Pitt's
shifting
enunciations
of
policy
and
strategy during
the Seven Years
War arose
from the
difficulty
of
dealing
with intractable
popular prejudices,
see
the invaluable
study by
Marie
Peters,
Pitt and
Popularity:
The Patriot Minister
and London
Opinion
during
the
Seven Years' War
(Oxford, 1980).
The
diffi-
culties
posed by public
attitudes in
William Ill's
reign
can
be
extracted
from
Henry
Horwitz's
definitive
study,
Parliament,
Policy
and Politics in the
Reign
of
William III
(Newark,
Del.,
1977).
Popular misgivings
during
the
reign
of Anne
are
expertly
exhibited in
Douglas Coombs,
The Conduct
of
the
Dutch:
British
Opinion
and the Dutch Alliance
during
the War
of
the
Spanish
Succession
(The
Hague,
1958).
20
Black,
British
Foreign
Policy, p. 84.
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44
Daniel
A.
Baugh
the national honour
did not consist
of
being
busy
meddlers
in
every
European
quarrel';
such
an
attitude,
Burke
claimed,
was bound to
undermine
European respect
for
Great
Britain,
'once
the
refuge
and
protectoress
of
distressed nations'.21
As
so
often,
Burke's
arguments
from
sentiment walked hand-in-hand
with national
security
arguments.
He
went on to
warn
that the stance
of
Lord North's
government
would
in
time cbe
seen
in
all its
impotence
and
folly;
and
when
the
balance of
power
is
destroyed,
it will be found of what infinite
consequence
its
preservation
would
have
been'.22
Great Britain's fundamental national
security
problem
during
the
eighteenth century
was how
to
coexist
safely
with French
power
while
maintaining
British
power.
The
duke
of
Newcastle,
Thomas Pelham-
Holles,
and William
Pitt,
later earl
of
Chatham,
stood for
diametrically
opposed approaches,
and
their
example
at
mid-century
serves
to illus-
trate
the extreme
polarity
of
possible
objects.
In
1749
Newcastle
expressed
his
anxiety
about
France's
proceedings
in
Europe
now that
a
compromise
peace
had
been
signed.
The French
were
offering
subsidies
right
and left to
gain
allies,
and
in
due
course,
he
predicted,
all
Europe
and
finally
Great Britain would
be
reduced
to
'a
state
of
dependency'
:
If
they go
on
in
buying up
all the
powers upon
the Continent when
they
have
bought
those
which
are
to
be sold
they
will
get
the
others
from
fear,
and
therefore France will
reasonably
then conclude that
they may impose
what
condition
they please upon
us
without
our
daring
to
dispute
them
and
therefore
in
reality
run no
risk
of
engaging
themselves
in
a new
war;
whereas if
we had a
tolerable
system
and force
upon
the Continent
...
[they
would be
deterred].23
A
week later
he
answered the
objection
that
priority
had to be
given
to
naval
expenditure by
acknowledging
the
necessity
of a
strong
navy,
but
only
to add
that:
21
Gaetano L.
Vincitorio,
'Edmund Burke and the First
Partition of Poland : Britain
and the Crisis
of
1772
in the "Great
Republic" ',
Crisis in the 'Great
Republic3
ed. G.L.
Vincitorio
(New York,
1969), pp.
36-7.
The
first
quotation
is
Vinci-
torio's
summarizing,
the
second from Burke's
speech
in the House of
Commons,
18
May
1774.
The 'Great
Republic'
is a
name Burke
gave
to
civilized
Europe.
The
linkage
between
these sentiments
and Burke's
advocacy
of a
'holy
war*
against
Jacobinism
in
Europe
in the
1
790s
is
fairly
obvious.
22
Ibid.,
p. 37.
Richard
Pares's
article,
'American
versus Continental
Warfare,
1739-63',
first
published
in
1936
and
reprinted
in
Pares,
The Historian's Business
and Other
Essays
(Oxford, 1961),
pp.
130-72,
offers a rich texture of evidence
exhibiting
the
interplay
of
doctrinal
prejudices
and national
security
realities.
23
Newcastle to Lord
Chancellor
Hardwicke,
25
Aug.
1749,
quoted
by
D.B.
Horn,
'The
Cabinet
Controversy
on
Subsidy
Treaties in
Time
of
Peace,
1
749-50',
The
English
Historical
Review,
xlv
(1930), 463-4.
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'Blue-Water'
Policy
45
a naval
force,
tho5
carried never
so
high, unsupported
with even the
appearance
of a force
upon
the
continent,
will
be
of
little use ...
France
will
outdo
us
at
sea,
when
they
have
nothing
to
fear
by
land ... I
have
always
maintained
that our
marine
should
protect
our alliances
upon
the
con-
tinent;
and
they, by diverting
the
expense
of
France,
enable us
to
maintain
our
superiority
at
sea.24
At the
opposite
extreme
William
Pitt,
commenting
on the
peace
of
1763,
told the
House of Commons:
Franceis
chiefly,
if not
solely,
to be dreaded
by
us in the
light
of a maritime
and commercial
power
...
[and]
by
restoring
to
her all
the valuable West-
India
islands,
and
by
our
concessions
n
the Newfoundland
fishery,
we had
given
to
her the
means
of
recovering
her
prodigious
losses
and of
becoming
once
more
formidable to
us at sea.25
Upon
the
outbreak
of
hostilities,
he had
inveighed
against anything
even
remotely
directed
towards
broad Continental
objects
and en-
gagements:
We have sufferedourselves to be deceived by names and sounds, the bal-
ance
of
power,
the
liberty
of
Europe,
a common
cause,
and
many
more
such
expressions,
without
any
other
meaning
than to
exhaust
our
wealth,
consume
the
profits
of
our
trade,
and
load
our
posterity
with intolerable
burdens.26
If
policy
consists
of
what
is
decided
and then
supported
by
genuine
effort,
Newcastle's
extreme
interventionism
was
persistently
rejected.
In
1749,
the
rejection
was
categorical;
the
objections
of
his
brother
Henry
Pelham
and
Lord Hardwicke were
decisive,
though
the
duke
was
allowed
to
offer one
or two subsidies to German
principalities
as a
consolation.
(They
stirred
up
nothing
but
trouble).27
On the other
hand,
Pitt's
comments
on
the
peace
of
1763
and his
pronouncements
at
the outset
of
the
1755-63
war
may
seem
inconsistent
with the
policy
he
actually
pursued
when
he
was
given
charge
of
its direction.
After
all,
24
Newcastle
to
Hardwicke,
2
Sept.
1
749, quoted
by
Philip
G.
Yorke,
The
Life
and
Correspondence
of Philip
Yorke,
Earl
of
Hardwicke
(
3
vols., Cambridge,
1
9
1
3
)
,
ii.
23.
25
Quoted by
H.M.
Scott,
'The
Importance
of Bourbon Naval Reconstruction
to the
Strategy
of
Choiseul after
the Seven
Years'
War',
The International
History
Review,
i
(i979),
17.
26
Quoted by
Pares,
American versus Continental
Warfare', p.
1
38.
27
See
Horn, 'Subsidy
Treaties', p. 466
: It 'resulted
in a futile
subsidy competition
between
Britain
and
France,
set
Germany
in
an
uproar,
and contributed
to the
alienation
of Austria
from
Britain,
and
the
break-up
of
the old
system
of alliances
which Newcastle
had intended to confirm
and consolidate'.
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46
Daniel
A.
Baugh
he had
approved,
and
against
Lord
Bute
emphatically
supported,
size-
able subsidies
to Prussia and the
use of
British
military
force
in
Ger-
many.
As
is well
known,
it was
a
point upon
which
he did
change
his
mind,
for he feared that Canada
might
otherwise be
given
back,
as
Cape
Breton
had been
given
back
in
1748.
The Prussian alliance
appeared
to
offer
an
efficient means
of
preventing
that
:
when
Pitt
said
that
his
purpose
was
to
conquer
America
in
Germany,
he meant
it.
His
conception
of
the
object
of the
war
never
changed;28
what
changed
was
his
view
of
strategic
and
diplomatic
methods,
but we are
concerned
here
with
objects.
Pitt never
thought
that Great Britain was
fighting
for a
European
balance
of
power.
It is
to
the
purpose
to allow
Henry
Pel-
ham,
the
first
lord
of the
treasury,
the
last
word.
Defending
the
peace
of
1
748
in
the
House
of
Commons,
he
asked
:
Will
any gentleman
say
that it was not more
for the
interest
of this
nation
to restore to France the
possession
of
Cape
Breton than to
leave
her in
possession
of
Hainault,
Flanders,
Brabant and
Namur,
and
consequently
of
the
whole coast from Zealand
to
the westernmost
part
of
Bretagne[?]
..
Our
restoring
of
Cape
Breton
upon
this consideration
was
for the
interest
of England,without any regardto our allies, or to the balance of power in
Europe.29
Henry
Pelham's
point
is of
central
importance.
While not
everyone
considered
French
possession
of the Netherlands
to be
fatal,
few could
ignore
the increased
danger
it
presented,
with
regard
both to
invasion and the
safety
of sea-lanes and
commerce.
This
leads us to
an
understanding
of
the
true nature of Great Britain's
European
concerns. In
accordance with the
principles
of
blue-water
policy,
Great
Britain had no
territorial ambitions on the
continent
of
Europe, but there were particular areas not to be ignored. Excluding
Minorca because it
was an
island and
patently
defensible
by
sea
power,
these
were
Gibraltar,
Portugal,
the
Baltic
Sea,
the
Netherlands,
and
Hanover. In
the
earlier
part
of
the
eighteenth century,
control
of
the
Mediterranean Sea
was also
very
much
coveted,
but
commercial and
diplomatic
trends
made that somewhat less
important
later
on. In
the
defence of
all
these
except
the
Netherlands and
Hanover,
sea
power
was
decisive.
Gibraltar's
road
communications with
the
Spanish
mainland
were
so bad that
sea
communications could
readily
outsupply
a
besieg-
28
Cf.
Pares,
'American
versus
Continental
Warfare',
p.
168:
'However, though
their reasonsand their spirit were very
different,
Pitt and Newcastle
agreed
in
defending
the
policy
of the
whole war
against
the new
party
[led
by Bute]
which
had
arisen
for
contracting
t*.
Italics mine.
20
Quoted
by
Herbert
W.
Richmond,
The
Navy
in the War
of
1739-48 (Cambridge,
1920),
iii.
241.
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'Blue-Water'
Policy
47
ing
army. Portugal,
whose reason to fear Bourbon
power
(whether
Spanish
or
French)
remained
onstant,
was a
steady,
ndeed
dependent,
ally
-the
only
one,
in
fact;
its interior
terrain facilitated
military
defence;
and sea
power
could
decisively
affect the defence of Lisbon.
Great Britain'saccess
to
Baltic
ports
had
to be
maintained
by
diplo-
macy
and
occasionally
by military
orce,
but
in
both
respects
ea
power
had a decisive
influence. The most
expensive
area to defend
was
the
Netherlands,
nd
the
preservation
f 'the Barrier' nd the
independence
of
the
Netherlands
nevitably
posed
a
problem.
So did
Hanover.
All of thesesphereswere of serviceto blue-waterpolicy, except one.
Gibraltar's
ey
role was
of course o
monitorthe movementsof French
fleets;
Portugal
not
only provided
an
advanced station
to
assist Medi-
terranean
voyages,
but also stood near the
primary
sea-lane
for
out-
bound
voyages
to
the
West Indies and North
America;
the
Baltic was
a
primary
ourceof masts and
naval
stores or all
the
maritime
powers
of
Europe;
and
the Netherlandscontained he best
ports
and estuaries
for
hiding
and
sheltering
invasion
barges.
These
were
the
specific
objects
of
British
policy
n
Europe,
and
in
additionthe
general
concern
to
keepEurope'sports open
to
British rade.
The
exception
was
Han-
over,
whose
dynastic
connectionwas railed
against
not
only
because t
affronted
he
chauvinismand isolationism
of
the British
populace,
but
also
because
t often obstructed he best
diplomatic
and
strategic
choices
for
preserving
British
nterests
n
the Netherlandsand the Baltic. Han-
over
was a
millstone,
ts
only
strategic
value its
(and
Hesse-Cassel's)
capacity
to
provide
loyal
mercenaries.
In
sum,
when
we scrutinize
Great
Britain's
European
objectives,
we are driven
to
the same con-
clusions
hat
caused the British
public
in
the
1670s
to
regard
France
rather
than
Holland
as the most
menacing neighbour:
first,
because
Francehad built a battle-fleet;and second,becausepowerfulFrench
armies were
attempting
to
bring
the Low
Countries
under
French
dominion.
What, then,
of the balance
of
power?
The
short
answer,
evinced
repeatedly
by
policy
decisions
of
the
British
government during
the
eighteenth
centuryespecially
n
the terms
of
peace
settlements,
was
that
the
'balance
of
power
was worth
a certain
price,
but a
very
low one'.30
Counterpoise
and
equipoise
were
objects only
so
long
as
they
were
achievable
by
minor naval
and
military
efforts or
by diplomatic
ges-
tures
and
linkages
of
mutual convenience.31
30
Pares,
'American versus Continental
Warfare', p.
138.
Pares did not
say,
as I
do,
that
this
represented
the
prevailing
policy
doctrine.
31
Vincitorio,
'Edmund
Burke and the
First
Partition
of
Poland',
p. 37.
Burke
played
to
this
disposition
in
1774
when he
alleged
that adverse
trends
in
Europe
'might
have been
prevented
by
mere
force
of
negotiation'.
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48
Daniel
A.
Baugh
It
may
be
argued
that the
distinctiondrawn here
between
specific
Europeanobjects
(consonant
with blue-water
policy)
and the
general
structure of
European politics
(the
balance
of
power)
disappeared
when
it
came to actual
practice;
that even
limited
Continental
objec-
tives were seen to
require
a
favourable
power
balance. Such
reasoning
rests, however,
on
the fallacious
idea
-
entertained
by
Newcastle,
as
we have seen
-
that an adverse
tipping
of the balance would
probably
lead
to
a calamitous
slide
(today's
'domino
theory');
that because
national
defence
based on
naval and commercial
upremacy
ould
not
be successfullyarriedon
against
an establishedContinental
hegemony,
the
danger
was too
great
to be
ignored.
This
argument, usually
laid
down
as an
axiom,
was
as
specious
n
its
eighteenth-century
ontext as
it is
in
today's.
Regarding
Newcastle's
allacy,
we
may
note that
some theoristsof
the
eighteenthcentury
argued
the
precisely
opposite
case,
that
the bal-
ance
was
invariably
self-adjusting:32
he
historical acts of
the
period
1
689-18
15
tend
to favour
the
self-adjustment
heory
over the domino
theory.
The conduct of
the smaller
polities
near
France's
borders
n-
volves
intricacies
hat cannot be delved into
here;
with
respect
to
the
larger
powers,
the
crucial issue was
whether
they
feared France more
than
they
feared
each other.
Newcastle,
for
instance,
was
always
in-
clined to
think
that
other
powers
viewed France as the main menace
because
GreatBritaindid.33
He
was
wrong.
When William III
formed the
Grand
Alliance
at
the
outset
of the
period,
he could
draw
upon
western
Europe'swidespread
ear of Louis
XIV's ambition.
And
when
that ambition extended to
upholding
a
dynastic
connection
with
Spain,
it was difficulteven for
Tories,
who
detestedWilliam's
Continentalism,
o
oppose
a
war
aimed at
preventing
it, becausepracticallyeveryonefeared that commercialaccessto the
Spanish
Empire
overseas would
otherwise fall under the
sway
of
France.34
he British
public's
enthusiasm aded
during
the
courseof
the
war
as this
sway
came
to
appear
ess
plausible.
After
1714,
the
circum-
stances for
creating
a
Grand
Alliance
disintegrated:
the
war-weary
Netherlands
eased to
regard
France as
its
only
source of
danger,
and
Austria and
Prussia
came to
fear each
other
more
than France.
By
32
See
M.S.
Anderson,
'Eighteenth-Century
Theories
of the
Balance
of
Power',
Studies
in
Diplomatic
History:
Essays
in
Honour
of
D.B.
Horn,
ed.
Ragnhild
Hatton
and
M.S.
Anderson
(London, 1970), pp. 189-90.
33 Pares, 'American versus Continental
Warfare', p. 135.
34
A
good
account
of the
degree
to which
maritime
objects,
especially
the
question
of access to
the trade
of the
Spanish
Empire,
influenced
public
support
for the
war of
the
Spanish
Succession
may
be
found in
Admiral Sir Herbert
Richmond,
The
Navy
as an
Instrument
of
Policy, 1558-1727
(Cambridge,
1953),
pp. 276-81.
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18/27
'Blue-Water'
Policy 49
mid-century
he
Austrianswere
causingpractically veryone
n
London
to
despair except
the duke of
Newcastle,
who was ever
disposed
to
propitiate
hem
in
hopes
of
restoring
he
'good
old
system'.
(The
word
'system'
n
the
eighteenth century
was
commonly
used
to
describe a
diplomatic
plan.
After
George
HI
came
to
the
throne
in
1760,
Court
pressure
or
European
alliances
essened;
George
III,
born not in
Hanover
but in
England,
was not
a
Continentalist,
nd
'gloried
n
the
name
of Briton'.
Neither
he
nor
his ministers
gnored
Hanover and
Europe,
but their
policies
stuck
closely
to 'British
objects'
(Burke was in opposition).
When
Frederick
f
Prussia
expostulated
n 1
768
: 'The
English
System?
The
English
have no
system',
he was
speaking nothing
less than
the
truth with
regard
to the
period
after
1760.
This
diminutionof
British
concern or
European
connectionswas matched
three
years
ater
by
an
equally important
diminution of French
aggressiveness
n the Con-
tinent;
the
policy
of
the
duke
of
Choiseul
and of the
count
of
Vergennes
after
him
aimed
at
keeping Europe
contentedand
unthreatened,
hus
creating
a
situation
n
which
Great
Britain would
find
it less
easy
to
fashion useful alliances.35
Not
until
Jacobinism
arose
in
France and
Bonapartism
howed
Europe
an ambition
and
intransigence
more com-
pelling
than Louis
XIV's,
did
the
possibility
f
forming
a coalition
with
purposes
akin
to those of
the GrandAlliance
(let
alone
with a
view to
overthrow)
reappear,
and
even
then it took a
long
time
before
Prussia
and
Austria were
disposed
to dread France as
much as
they
dreaded
35
Their
object,
as
noted
below,
was
to build
up
Bourbon maritime sinews with a
view towards
reducing
Gr