Government E-1275: Nov. 6, 2007Session #7. The Korean Peninsula

Balance of Power on the Korean Peninsula

• ’60s-’70s: ROK-DPRK as “relative equals” (Cha, p. 49, 59-60).– June ’50: DPRK’s strategic “window of opportunity.”

• U.S. conventional & nuclear forces in ROK: – nuclear cannons, nuclear-tipped missiles, Atomic Demolition Mines

(ADM).– frequent joint military exercises (Cumings, pp. 52-54).

• Declining position of DPRK: – End of Cold War; China’s role (Cumings, p. 58).– Economic crises/famines in the 90s; ROK’s economic miracle.

• DPRK’s provocations: – Troop maneuvers in Joint Security Area (JSA) in Panmunjom (’95);

Taepodong missile test over Japan (Aug. ’98); naval incursions into ROK waters (June ’99).

• Cha’s interpretation: DPRK resorts to military provocations due to its declining relative power vis-à-vis ROK/U.S.

• Cumings’ interpretation: DPRK reacts to U.S. military exercises/ provocations.

The 1st Nuclear Crisis

• DPRK’s announcement to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in March ’93.

• Response to U.S. provocations (Team Spirit exercises, nuclear weapons, war games); IAEA’s demands for “special inspections” of undeclared sites (Cumings, p. 65).

• DPRK’s withdrawal of fuel rods into cooling ponds (May ’94); Clinton administration’s preparations for war (June ’94).

• Former President Jimmy Carter’s visit to Pyongyang (June ’94).

• The October 1994 Framework Agreement: in return for suspension of nuclear activities, light-water reactors (LWR) provided by Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

Second Nuclear Crisis (Oct. ’02-)

• U.S. policy:– Pres. Bush’s “Axis of Evil,” State of the Union Speech (Jan. ’02).– Assistant Sec. State James Kelly’s visit to Pyongyang (Oct. ’02-).– refusal to arrange for bilateral talks/deals toward U.S.-DPRK diplomatic

normalization. – Proposal for a “grand bargain” (M. O’Hanlon/M. Mochizuki).

• DPRK’s motivations: provocative gestures to extract concessions.– Missile test (Aug. ’98): over northern Japan.– Missile test (July ’06): Nodong succeeded, Taepodong failed; Carter/Perry

op-ed. – Explosion of small nuclear device (Oct. ’06).

• ROK diplomacy: – President Kim Dae Jung (’97-’02)’s “Sunshine Policy”; President Roh

Moo-hyun inherited this policy (’02-’07).– Certain level of distrust b/w Seoul & Washington, D.C.

The Six-Party Talks (Aug. ’03-)• U.S.: DPRK’s nuclear weapons as a global threat.

– Links to the “global war on terror”; DPRK’s transfer of nuclear weapons to terrorists.

– Unilateral disarmament (Libya) without concessions as a model (Park, p. 79).

• Japan:– Concerns about DPRK’s missile capabilities (Nodong).– Politicization of the abduction issue; fear that U.S. may abandon Japan.

• ROK: – Anti-Americanism and President Roh Moo-hyun’s election in Dec. ’02. – DPRK: weakness and state failure as a main problem.– Korean nationalism: Oct. ’07 summit b/w Roh and Kim Jong Il.

• China:– Skepticism about DPRK’s nuclear weapons capability.– Strong interest in status quo: strikes/protests in northeast China; food & oil

supplies to DPRK. – Beijing’s interest in taking leadership in Asia’s multilateral forum.

• The Paradox: Who can and want to apply pressure to DPRK.