Government 1740 INTERNATIONAL LAW Summer 2008 Individual Human Rights: The Problem of Enforcement.
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Transcript of Government 1740 INTERNATIONAL LAW Summer 2008 Individual Human Rights: The Problem of Enforcement.
Government 1740INTERNATIONAL LAW
Summer 2008
Individual Human Rights:
The Problem of Enforcement
OUTLINEI. Multilateral “enforcement”
A. International human rights monitoring bodies1. Duties of oversight committees2. The individual complaints process
B. The Human Rights Commission:1503 proceduresC. General AssemblyD. The security Council
II. LitigationA. Domestic courtsB. Foreign courts
IV. Political mechanismsA. Hegemonic pressureB. Multilateral pressureC. The role of NGOs
I. MULTILATERAL “ENFORCEMENT”
MECHANISMS
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING
BODIES•Charter based bodies:
•Commission on Human Rights
•Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
•Treaty-based bodies:
•Committee against Torture Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights•Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women•Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination•Committee on the Rights of the Child •Human Rights Committee*
Duties of the Treaty Oversight Committees
• receive reports
• receive individuals complaints
• issue general comments
The Individual Complaint Process
(ICCPR)• First Optional Protocol
• Patterns of individual complaints
• Findings
Jamaica
Finland
0
5
10
15
20
25
Leastdemocratic
moderatelydemocratic
mostdemocratic
degree of democracy
Average number of individual complaints to the UN Human Rights Committee
Closed cases Active cases
UN Human Rights Commission
The Torture ScaleType of activity:
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 Category 5
Psychological mistreatment
Frequent, often
Used without reference to frequency
Sometimes, occasional
Isolated reports with disciplinary response
Rough handling, other abuse
Frequent, routine
Regular brutality, sever maltreatment of prisoners
Sometimes, occasional
Isolated reports with disciplinary response
Beatings Frequent, routine
Common (or not uncommon), numerous reports
Allegations or indications (any reported – regardless of redress)
Isolated reports with disciplinary response
torture Prevalent, widespread, repeated, methodical
Common, several reports, numerous allegations
Some, occasional (unless redressed)
Unsubstantiated; unlikely true; isolated, with redress
None
Abused to death
Common, frequent, many, widespread
Some, occasional incidents, several reports
Isolated reports
None None
Source: Oona Hathaway, 2002
Torture trends of the UNHR Commission
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
To
rtu
re s
cale
UNCHR members UNCHR nonmembers
1503 PROCEDURES
• ECOSOC Resolution 1503, (1970)
• Consistent pattern of gross violations
• Investigations can be initiated by the UN Human Rights Commission
1503 PROCEDURESStates Investigated Under the 1503 Procedure
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
19
67
19
70
19
73
19
76
19
79
19
82
19
85
19
88
19
91
19
94
19
97
20
00
Year
Nu
mb
er
of
Inv
es
tig
ati
on
s
Number of Countriesinvestigated
1503 Subjects: Practice of Political Terror
00.5
11.5
22.5
33.5
44.5
Po
litic
al T
erro
r S
cale
UNCHR member 1503 subjects
States Investigated under 1503 Procedures by the Commission on
Human Rights (through 2003)
• Afghanistan, 1981 - 1984
• Albania, 1984 – 1988, 1995
• Antigua & Barbuda, 1997
• Argentina, 1980-1984
• Armenia, 1994-1996
• Azerbaijan, 1994 - 1996
• Bahrain, 1991-1993
• Benin, 1984-1985, 1988
• Bolivia, 1977-1981
•Botswana, 1977•Brazil, 1974-1976•Brunei, 1988-1990•Burma, 1979-1980, 1990-1992•Burundi, 1974-1975•Central African Rep., 1980-81•Chad, 2002-2003•Chile, 1975-76, 1978-79, 1981,
2000
1503 INVESTIGATIONS• Czech Republic, 1997• Djibouti, 2003• El Salvador, 1981• Equatorial Guinea, 1976-79• Estonia, 1994, 1997• Ethiopia, 1978-1981• Gabon, 1986• Gambia, 1997-1999• German Dem. Rep., 1981-83• Germany, 1994• Grenada, 1988• Guatemala, 1981• Guyana, 1974-1975• Haiti, 1981-1987
•Honduras, 1988-1989•Indonesia (and East Timor),
1978-81, 1983-85•Iran, 1974-1975, 1983•Iraq, 1988, 1989•Israel, 1975-1977•Japan, 1981, 1998•Cambodia, 1979•Kenya, 1993, 2000•Korea, Rep. of, 1977-1982•Kuwait, 1994•Kyrgyzstan, 1997-1998•Laos, 1995
1503 INVESTIGATIONS• Latvia, 1995, 1997, 2000
• Lebanon, 1997
• Liberia, 2002-2003
• Lithuania, 1997
• Malawi, 1977-1980
• Malaysia, 1984
• Maldives, 2001
• Mali, 1996
• Moldova, 1995
• Mozambique, 1981
• Nepal, 1996, 1999
• Nigeria, 2002
• Pakistan, 1984, 1985, 1988
•Paraguay, 1978-90, 1998
•Peru, 1998
•Philippines, 1984-1986
•Portugal, 1974-1975
•Republic of the Congo, 2000, 2001
•Rwanda, 1993-1995
•Saudi Arabia, 1995-1999
•Sierra Leone , 1996-1999
•Slovenia, 1995, 1996
•Somalia, 1989-1994
•Sudan, 1991-1993
•Syria, 1989, 1992, 1997
1503 INVESTIGATIONS• Tanzania, 1974-1975, 1997
• Thailand, 1995, 1996
• Togo, 2001-2002
• Turkey, 1983-1986
• Uganda, 1975-81, 1995, 2000-01
• United Arab Emirates, 2000
• United Kingdom, 1974-1975
• United States of America, 1997
• Uruguay, 1978-1985
•Uzbekistan, 1996-97, 2003•Venezuela, 1982•Viet Nam, 1994, 2000•Yemen, 1998-1999, 2000•Zaire (Dem. Rep. of the Congo)
1985-89, 1991-93•Zimbabwe, 2000
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/8/stat1.htm
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
• Condemnatory resolutions
UNGA State-Specific Human Rights Resolutions by Year
02468
1012141618
1946
1952
1958
1964
1970
1976
1982
1988
1994
2000
Year
Nub
er o
f Res
olut
ions
P
asse
d
Number of Resolutions
Political Terror Practices of UNGA Members and Their Resolution Targets
0
1
2
3
4
5
Po
litic
al T
erro
r S
cale
named in UNGA Resolution UNGA average
THE SECURITY COUNCIL
• Human rights role is growing
• Chapter VIII enforcement power against threats to international peace and security
• Can refer cases to the International Criminal Court
Darfur, Sudan
II. LEGAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
DOMESTIC COURTS
• Example: Israeli Supreme Court decision, 1999.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
year
Chilean Court Cases on Torture (Corte Suprema and Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago)
Mentions CAT Does not mention CAT
Pinochet Extradition,1998
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
number of Supreme Court
cases
1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Year
Torture litigation in Israel
Cases Filed Cases Decided
1991:Israel ratifies
CAT
1999:Landmark
torture ruling
USE OF OTHER COUNTRIES’ LEGAL
SYSTEMS
The Alien Tort Statute:FILARTIGA V. PENA-
IRALA• Background: foreign nationals, incident of
torture on foreign soil
• Alien Tort Statute (ATS)
• Torture is a breach of customary international law, enforceable in US courts
THE CASE OF THE BURMA GAS PIPELINE
0
5
10
15
20
25
Alien Tort Claim Act Cases Initiatedin United States Courts
Source: USA*Engage – a pro-business NGO opposed to “unilateral sanctions” in US foreign policy. http://www.usaengage.org/legislative/2003/alientort/alientorttpcases.html
III. POLITICAL MECHANISMS
• Peer (state) pressure•Bilateral•multilateral
•Domestic (internal) pressure
•Transnational (NGO) pressure
Number of States with Amnesty International Sections
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Year
Num
ber o
f Sta
tes
Sections
HUMAN RIGHTS NGO GROWTH
Human Rights Watch Sections and Offices
0
2
4
6
8
10
1219
78
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
Year
Numb
er of
Se
ction
s/Offic
es
Watch
Office
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Number of Internet Users (Millions)
US and Canada Western Europe Rest of the World
NGOs: BOOMERANG EFFECT
REPRESSIVE STATE
XXXXXXXXXXdomestic human rights demands
Coalition with transnational NGOs
Intergov.Organ.
Foreign gov’t
Multilateral or bilateral pressure
SUMMARY• The international human rights regime is characterized by weak enforcement.• Multilateral fora to hear individual complaints and render recommendations
exist, but often have no teeth.• Domestic enforcement is preferable in theory, but is the judiciary
independent?• The use of foreign courts is a theoretical possibility, but has been only rarely
used.• Bilateral political pressure usually takes a back seat to foreign policy goals.• Treaty commitments can change domestic politics and empower demands of
locals for rights realization.• NGOs are a crucial form of external vigilance; especially important in
extremely repressive political regimes.