Governing Boards in Public Higher Education Institutions: A perspective from the United States

This article was downloaded by: [University of Guelph]On: 09 November 2014, At: 08:45Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Tertiary Education and ManagementPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rtem20

Governing Boards in Public HigherEducation Institutions: A perspectivefrom the United StatesJames S. Taylor a & Maria de Lourdes Machado ba Center for Research in Higher Education Policies (CIPES) ,University of Aveiro , Portugalb Center for Research in Higher Education Policies (CIPES),Instituto Politécnico de Bragança , PortugalPublished online: 18 Sep 2008.

To cite this article: James S. Taylor & Maria de Lourdes Machado (2008) Governing Boards inPublic Higher Education Institutions: A perspective from the United States, Tertiary Education andManagement, 14:3, 243-260, DOI: 10.1080/13583880802348824

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13583880802348824

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to orarising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rtem20

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/13583880802348824

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13583880802348824

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Tertiary Education and ManagementVol. 14, No. 3, September 2008, pp. 243–260

ISSN 1358-3883 (print)/ISSN 1573-1936 (online)/08/030243–18© 2008 European Higher Education SocietyDOI 10.1080/13583880802348824

Governing Boards in Public Higher Education Institutions: A perspective from the United States

James S. Taylora and Maria de Lourdes Machadob*aCenter for Research in Higher Education Policies (CIPES), University of Aveiro, Portugal; bCenter for Research in Higher Education Policies (CIPES), Instituto Politécnico de Bragança, PortugalTaylor and FrancisRTEM_A_335049.sgm10.1080/13583880802348824Tertiary Education and Management1358-3883 (print)/1573-1936 (online)Original Article2008Taylor & Francis0000000002008Maria de [email protected]

Governing boards have a long tradition and prominent role in U.S. higher education. The diversityof institutional types, and thus governing boards, represents a multifaceted tapestry of functions,roles, and responsibilities. This paper will attempt to define the parameters of public higher educa-tion governing boards in the USA and offer critical insights into their degree of effectiveness. It isthe author’s position that both positive and negative lessons can be learned through an examina-tion of these public governing boards in the USA. The recent emergence of university boards inEurope is examined and their characteristics are compared against the characteristics of public andprivate boards in the USA.

Historical Perspective

With the founding of Harvard College nearly 370 years ago, U.S. higher educationbegan its relationship with external governing boards. Initially, a board of overseerswas created that consisted of ministers and other government officials. The legisla-ture soon changed this and created a second governing board devoid of governmen-tal actors. The original model, however, that best defines the governing boards oftoday came from Yale. An external board of trustees was created through the Yalecorporation model. Essentially, all colonial colleges that followed adopted this model(Peterson & Mets, 1987).

Throughout time, the states have grappled with and argued about the proper roleof governing boards. Everything from the creation of a superboard to oversee alllevels of education from pre-school to doctoral studies to the complete eliminationof all types of boards has been debated. Education’s penchant for seeking the ulti-mate panacea that will cure all of its ills is never more evident than in the endless

*Corresponding author. Rua 10 de Dezembro, no. 399, 4450-227 Matosinhos, Portugal. Email:[email protected]

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 08:

45 0

9 N

ovem

ber

2014

244 J. S. Taylor and M. de Lourdes Machado

search for the perfect structure for governing boards of higher education institutions(HEIs).

The U.S. higher education is recognized for several enduring features that make itdistinct from other systems throughout the world. The enormity of the system withapproximately 4,000 institutions serving more than 15 million students is clearlyone feature. Its emphasis on access and availability is another. In recent times, onemight wish to add its, perhaps, overzealous affinity for a market-driven philosophy.Finally, its mechanism for control through governing boards consisting of citizen-trustees that has endured since the beginning at Harvard College must be notedwith emphasis.

A major organization that supports governing boards in the USA which hasexisted for more than 80 years is the Association of Governing Boards of Universitiesand Colleges. The AGB, as it is referred to, serves as a national resource for univer-sity and college presidents, board chairs and individual trustees in both public andprivate higher education. It conducts and disseminates research and provides valu-able consultation and seminars.

Zwingle (1980) points to two important factors that have led U.S. higher educa-tion to place such emphasis on external governing boards. First, is the belief that anymonopolization of power endangers the public good. Second, higher education istoo important to society to be governed exclusively by the faculty.

In earlier times, governing boards enjoyed relative quiet and anonymity. In morerecent times, internal and external demands have created great pressure on thesebodies. Today, it has become vital for institutions to have governing boards thatfunction properly, professionally, and with the needed expertise to oversee thesuccess and vitality of the institutions of learning that they are entrusted to serve. Atthe same time, it is recognized that different types of governance structures arebetter suited to varying situations and environments. A priority on communityinvolvement might suggest the need for local governing boards for each HEI. On theother hand, if a single authority is desired to oversee a system of HEIs, then a singlegoverning board may be more appropriate. The purposes that the state expects fromits HEIs, the size of the system, the fiscal resources available to the state for thesupport of higher education, and the degree of governance redundancy the state canafford are among other factors that must be considered (Manning, 1989).

The Structure of U.S. Higher Education

The system of higher education in the USA is made up of numerous different typesof HEIs. The pre-eminent research universities, such as Harvard, Yale, Princeton,Stanford and California at Berkley, among others, are most often thought of andrecognized throughout the world. They, of course, are most often noted because oftheir successes and notoriety in research, discoveries and the prominence of thestudents they graduate. There is also a like number of approximately 50 world-renowned liberal arts colleges in the USA that stand apart from the majority. Thesestellar institutions represent a very small percentage of the total HEIs in the USA.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 08:

45 0

9 N

ovem

ber

2014

Governing Boards in Public Higher Education 245

The system of higher education comprises both public and private HEIs. The publicHEIs are represented by two-year community colleges, four-year bachelor’s degreecolleges and universities, regional comprehensive universities offering the bachelor’sand master’s degrees (and occasionally the specialist’s degree), and several levels ofdoctoral-granting HEIs. Private HEIs vary from the most prestigious to the least recog-nized. The overall hierarchy of the U.S. system is concisely articulated by the CarnegieClassification, which periodically updates its categorizations, the most recent updatebeing made in 2006 (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2007).

Thus, the U.S. system of higher education comprises public and private HEIs,single and multi-campus HEIs, highly specialized and multipurpose HEIs, two-yearand four-year HEIs and comprehensive university institutions. The governance andmanagement of HEIs within such a large and complex national system is formidable.

Typically, within each of these HEI categories, institutions are overseen by agoverning body. These governing bodies represent the ultimate authority for theinstitutions, and thus have an extremely important role to play with respect to overallpolicy and direction. The general hierarchical structure for U.S. higher education isillustrated in Table 1 (El-Khawas, 2002).

Governing Boards in Higher Education

Broader Perspective

While governing boards represent a strong and enduring tradition in U.S. highereducation, they are not unique to the USA. Historically, lay boards have been usedin Italy, the Netherlands and Scotland. When Oxford and Cambridge were governedby senior faculty (to the serious detriment of the institutions), government interven-tion resulted in the establishment of lay governing boards. Since then, all universitiesestablished in England have lay boards. For an insightful and critical analysis of theemergence of external stakeholders (including governing boards) in Europe, seeAmaral, Jones, and Karseth (2002).

Also from an international perspective, it is more common to find control of insti-tutions coming from the government in the form of ministries. The approach in theUSA is designed to protect HEIs from this potential political interference (Duderstadt,2000). Maassen and van Vught (1994) suggest two governance models that effectivelydifferentiate the USA and continental Europe—the state control model and the statesupervising model. The former model reflects the European governance structuredominated by the authorities of the government bureaucracy and faculty guilds. The

Table 1. The organizational hierarchy of U.S. higher education

A board (of governors, regents, trustees, visitors, etc.)The CEO and administrationMajor sub-units (schools, colleges devoted to specific academic areas)Academic departments, centres, institutes and similar entitiesAcademic senate (serving the entire institution)

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 08:

45 0

9 N

ovem

ber

2014


latter model more closely represents the U.S. approach where far less governmentalinfluence and interference is seen.

The U.S. Perspective

There are several types of authoritative bodies that exist in U.S. higher education—consolidated governing boards, coordinating boards (regulatory and advisory), andplanning services or agencies. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss and differ-entiate between each of these types of distinctions. It is worthwhile to note, however,that the greatest power to exercise legitimate governance responsibilities resides withthe governing boards. Appendix A shows a breakdown of the type of authorityutilized by each of the 50 states, plus Washington, DC, and Puerto Rico. Governingboards in one form or another are evident in 22 different states (McGuinness,2000).

In the USA, the combination of state, rather than national control, and the use oflay boards is intended to lessen the extent of government intervention (Johnstone,1997). The term “lay board” refers to the fact that members are laypersons, mean-ing they do not necessarily have a background or expertise in the governance ofhigher education. This creates both opportunities and challenges, as addressed inAppendix B. These boards are given responsibility for final authority with respect topolicy development. It is assumed that they will delegate to and through the HEI’sleadership, responsibility for issues surrounding the management of the institution.They are accountable for the institution’s fiduciary and legal well-being. Boards arealso the final decision point regarding the appointment of the institution’s chiefexecutive officer, or CEO (president or chancellor). Generally, the governing boardis entrusted with protecting, defending, and advocating the best interests of the insti-tution to its various publics. A report prepared for the Colorado (USA) Departmentof Higher Education (NORED, 2000) suggests an institutional board has six broadfunctions:

(1) it has responsibility for the overall welfare of the HEI,(2) it serves as a buffer between the HEI and external groups,(3) it is the final arbiter of institutional disputes,(4) it promotes change in what is typically a conservative institutional environment,(5) it is responsible for the financial well-being of the HEI, and(6) it provides institutional governance.

Fisher and Koch (1996) expand upon these functions by including several others:

(1) it appoints the CEO,(2) it evaluates the HEI,(3) it assesses board policies,(4) it reviews the performance of the CEO,(5) it approves strategic plans, and(6) it determines board performance.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 08:

45 0

9 N

ovem

ber

2014


Public Boards in the USA

Important distinctions should be drawn between governing boards for private andpublic institutions. In the private sector, board members are typically alumnae of theHEI with loyal ties and also influential corporate and foundation leaders. They areselected for their institutional loyalty or influence with important outside groups andalways for their ability to contribute financially in significant fashion to the institu-tion’s prosperity. Their mission is more focused and their assistance more predict-able. Public governing boards represent a much more complicated situation.

The public board often comprises political appointments. Often, they are selectedby the governor of the state where the institution resides. As a result, their motiva-tions can often be directed at pleasing their political constituencies more thanserving the HEI. Agendas designed to promote themselves personally or theirconstituents collectively can easily override their commitment to the institution.Beyond personal mis-directions, public boards have other constraints that hampertheir ability to lead and direct their institution(s). Some states have what are termed“sunshine laws” that require all minutes from meetings, all discussions and all docu-ments to be open and available for public scrutiny. This essentially negates the possi-bility to have candid and open dialogue regarding issues of a sensitive naturesurrounding the HEI they govern.

Because public board members are usually appointed for political reasons, there isno assurance they have either an understanding of or commitment to higher educa-tion, let alone the institution they have been entrusted with. Many bring a strong,bottom-line mentality from the business sector that fails to recognize the nuancesinherent in higher education governance. This is not a problem if the HEI has astrong, authoritative CEO (B. Johnstone, personal communication, 2003). Typically,however, that is not the case. Without a solid grounding in the world of higher educa-tion, lay board members often try to institute simplistic solutions to complex prob-lems. Sometimes, their ulterior motivation to be personally visible as a leader drivesthem to impulsive actions for publicity’s sake.

It is important that governing boards properly embrace the concepts of academicfreedom and shared governance. Academic freedom provides professors with theright to teach and interpret their subjects without restriction. Shared governanceallows professors to contribute to institutional decision-making. In more and moreinstances, boards have been seen granting extended rights to faculty, staff, andstudents in the name of “campus democracy” that have traditionally been privilegesgranted only by the president. When academic freedom and shared governance areallowed to operate beyond the bounds of reason, the presidency becomes weakenedand the HEI tends to drift unproductively.

Attracting the right people to assume roles on public governing boards is difficult.Many competent and capable individuals who would serve HEIs with distinctiondecline to do so. As Duderstadt states (2000, p. 245), “They refuse to be a part ofpoliticized boards that function in all ways and at all times in the public fishbowl andoperate under the heavy regulatory hand of state bureaucracies”.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 08:

45 0

9 N

ovem

ber

2014


The public governing board is often relatively small as compared with the privateinstitutions, and thus, has more limited expertise to draw upon for policy develop-ment and decision-making. As is true with all group interactions, the influence ofone assertive individual is magnified as the size of the group is reduced, thus animbalance of leadership becomes a potential problem.

Overall, the selection process for public boards needs to be revisited and revised.As the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges (1996)declared, there is a strong need for relevant criteria in the selection of boardmembers, a preference for larger governing bodies to negate the inordinate influenceof individual members and the implementation of limited and single terms ofservice. Beyond this, boards should be held accountable for their trusteeship of insti-tutional fiscal management. Clearly, the public boards as constituted today in theUSA are far from the exemplary status to which they should aspire. At the sametime, it is true that their role in the total scheme of higher education governance islegitimate and worthy of preservation.

Public trustees are typically elected by the public or appointed by the governor orother elected official of the state as a reward for past service (see Appendices C andD). These appointments are not always based on the individual’s expertise orcommitment to the institution he or she will be entrusted to serve. To think other-wise is “… as naïve as to suggest that all trustee appointments to the boards of inde-pendent institutions are made without regard to the personal wealth or influence ofthe candidate” (Fisher & Koch, 1996, p. 232). Thus, it is more often the case to findpublic trustees who possess less dedication to the institution and sometimes morediminished influence than is found in trustees of independent, private institutions.

As mentioned previously, board members are laypersons. As such, they dependheavily upon the board staff that surrounds them for information, guidance, andadvice. Often, there is an executive director with other staff officers reporting to himor her. This individual can amass enormous power and influence with the boardmembers. In fact, an executive director can subtly gain control of the board andeffectively orchestrate a personal agenda through the membership. As a former gover-nor of one state said, “An unelected director of a lay board can be one of the mostdangerous people in state governance” (J. Carlin, personal communication, 1994).

It is not uncommon to find public governing boards that oversee several HEIs.Often, they govern all public institutions, or those of a particular type, within a state-wide system. Berdahl (1971) suggested this model served as an effective protectionagainst legislative interference. It is the author’s opinion, however, that time hasshown this belief to be overly optimistic. As a general rule, the state-wide board ismore problematic and less effective. Clearly, the members will not all have attended,be loyal to or otherwise support a given HEI. In many instances, members will beblatantly transparent in their biased support of one institution at the expense of theothers within the group. Often, the institutions being served are quite diverse,consisting of flagship research universities and, perhaps, comprehensive regionalones, among other types. Simple probability suggests that an imbalance in boardrepresentation is likely, with an inordinate number of members having alliances with

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 08:

45 0

9 N

ovem

ber

2014


the largest research HEI. This creates a voting block that can produce unfair favou-ritism towards one HEI at the expense of the others. CEOs quickly realize broad-based board support for their HEI will be hard to find. The opportunities for apresident or chancellor to demonstrate leadership, share a vision or otherwise inter-act meaningfully with individuals on the board can be greatly reduced. Limitedunderstanding and expertise by board members can also result in blanket policiesthat are applied to all HEIs within the group uniformly. As Fisher and Koch (1996,p.233) state, “Everything is reduced to a midpoint”. When institutional diversity ofmission is not factored into decision-making and policy development, seriousdamage can be done to many of the institutions. The result is too often a systemcomprising undistinguished institutions that have effectively been homogenized.This type of unhealthy structure forces the CEO to establish other external supportbases to advance the institution. Of course, this can be seen as an action that under-mines the board’s power and influence, and can become confrontational. As ageneral rule, CEOs that confront their boards—lose.

Governing boards that serve only a single HEI are often found to be more effective(Smoot, 2003). In these instances, the HEI is essentially free to recruit and appointboard members of their choosing. This can help to ensure commitment, loyalty, andsupport for the institution. Of course, this advantage is tempered with the HEI’sability to make wise appointments to the board.

The fact that public boards of trustees are often less effective than desiredhas spawned many recommendations for change. Observations will clearly showthat bad boards produce weak institutions, without exception (Manning, 1989).Recommendations are seen particularly with respect to the selection process andthe orientation and education of newly appointed members. The Association ofGoverning Boards of Colleges and Universities (2003a) recently published recom-mendations on Merit Screening of Citizens for Gubernatorial Appointment to PublicCollege and University Trusteeship. In essence, the AGB advocates the establishmentof an independent council charged with screening worthy prospects and ultimatelyproviding the governor (or other appointing entity) with a minimal list of, perhaps,three candidates for each vacancy. Naturally, it would be possible to decline anappointment for all recommended candidates and request a new screening process.However, it is assumed that in almost all instances, an appointment would emergefrom the list submitted. The intent is to provide a more objective outside reviewand screening process that would reduce the infusion of political motivations andthe possibility of making inept appointments. The AGB further suggests all newlyappointed trustees be oriented to their roles and responsibilities, as well as to therelevant issues surrounding higher education generally and their institution(s)particularly. An especially important part of this process is to distinguish betweengovernance and management. It is vitally important that governing boards notengage in day-to-day management of an institution; that being the responsibility ofthe CEO (Association of Governing Boards of Colleges and Universities, 2003b).

In some ways, these recommendations reflect the growing concerns that govern-ing boards are evolving into less of a buffer against outside intervention and more of

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 08:

45 0

9 N

ovem

ber

2014


a mechanism for public accountability and political meddling. Some states havetaken actions to slow or at least minimize this evolution. Boards’ and the state-widesystem’s powers have been reduced in New Jersey and Illinois through decentraliza-tion. Minnesota, Pennsylvania and Virginia, on the other hand, have centralizedand consolidated their governance structures. Wisconsin and Maryland have main-tained their existing governance models, but have dispersed and delegated muchauthority to individual campuses and away from the governing boards. At theextreme end of the continuum, Montana and Oklahoma have considered eliminat-ing governing boards and placing higher education under the state secretaries ofeducation (Lyall, 2001).

A dilemma governing boards also face is the impact of the hierarchy of authority(Peterson, Dill, Mets, & Associates, 1997). By design, governing boards workdirectly with the CEO of each HEI, who reports to and is accountable to them. Thechain of command is strictly enforced. At no time it is appropriate for anyonebeneath the CEO to directly contact a member of the board without being grantedpermission. Similarly, it is improper for board members to make contact with insti-tutional personnel without first notifying the CEO. Board members, being at the topof the hierarchy, have the ability to abuse this rule, but wise members do not do so.Unfortunately, this vertical hierarchy also severely limits channels of communica-tion. Board members are effectively cut-off from many institutional levels of inputunder most circumstances. Often, only input that is funnelled through the CEOreaches the board. The growing tendency for governing boards to demand docu-mentation of institutional progress and initiatives may well be exacerbated by thiscommunication gap. Insightful CEOs find ways of bringing as much informationabout all levels of the HEI to the attention of the board as possible for this reason.

The Boards in European Universities

In Europe boards of trustees are a relatively recent development in the higher educa-tion governance of some countries, namely those where the emergence of NewPublic Management has promoted the adoption of management practices importedfrom the private sector (Amaral, Magalhães, & Santiago, 2003). In the Netherlands,the 1997 Act “Modernising University’s Governance Structures” (MUB) hasremoved all collegial governance bodies and replaced the old democratic system ofelections with an appointment system, the highest governance body being the raadvan toezicht (“supervisory board”), composed of five members appointed by theminister but nominated by the university. The supervisory board appoints the rectorwho then appoints the deans of faculties creating a top-down structure with heavilycentralized power (de Boer, 2003; Maassen, 2002). In Austria, each university has agoverning board (Universitätsrat) that varies in size between five and nine members,according to the statute, part of the members being appointed by the minister. Thegoverning board elects the rector from a proposal by the academic senate (Pechar,2005). In Norway, there is a board and institutions can choose either to elect orappoint the rector. When the institution elects the rector, the rector also serves as the

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 08:

45 0

9 N

ovem

ber

2014


board chairman. When the institution appoints the rector, an external boardmember appointed by the minister serves as chairman. The institutions are allowedto submit proposals for external board members and the board chairman, but theministry makes its appointments independently (Stave, 2007). In Sweden, thegoverning body consists of the chairman, the vice-chancellor, and not more than 13other members (Higher Education Ordinance). The government appoints the chair-man and the majority of the other members of the governing body. Teachers andstudents at the HEI shall be entitled to representation on the governing body. Staffrepresentatives shall be entitled to attend and speak at meetings of the governingbody (Higher Education Act). More recently, the Portuguese Parliament passedLaw 62/2007 of 10 September, establishing the new legal framework for the highereducation system and its institutions. The new law creates a general council at eachinstitution with 15–35 members depending on the size and complexity of the institu-tion, with at least 30% of its members being external. The council elects its presidentfrom the external members and also elects the rector of the university.

Therefore it is possible to argue there is a new trend in European higher educationthat creates a central governance body (board or council) with representation ofexternal stakeholders while authority is reinforced at central level and collegiality isweakened or even abandoned.

In Table 2 the major characteristics of university boards in a number of institu-tions from four European countries, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Austriaare analysed. In Table 2 the size of the boards, and the methods used to choose therector, the members of the boards and the chairman of the board are presented. Thefirst conclusion is that boards are in general small, with a number of memberscomprising between 5 and 15 and all have a representation of external stakeholders.

The Netherlands presents the most extreme case as all the members of the boardare appointed by the minister and respond to him, although the university proposesthem. The board members have a somewhat varied background with the predomi-nance of people from industry and academics and in a significant number of cases,also a representative of the region. The board appoints the rector.

In Norway the board has 11 members with a majority being elected by the univer-sity as representatives of the academic staff, students and non-permanent academicstaff while the minister appoints the external members. However, universities areoffered two alternatives: if they elect the rector then he becomes the chairman of theboard; if the board appoints the rector then the minister appoints the chairman ofthe board and the rector responds to the board, assuming a role more similar to thatof a CEO.

In Sweden the boards have in general 15 members with its majority beingappointed by the minister—the minister appoints the chairman of the board and itsother seven external representatives while the university elects the internal represen-tatives. The minister appoints the rector following a proposal from the board.

In Austria the size of the board varies between five and nine members dependingon the size and complexity of the institution, and the board elects the rector followinga proposal from the academic senate.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 08:

45 0

9 N

ovem

ber

2014


Therefore the composition of the boards of European universities, where theyexist, tries in general to combine a representation of both internal and external stake-holders or at least a consultation with the university when the minister appoints allits members. In half of the cases the external stakeholders dominate the board (theNetherlands and Sweden); in the case of Norway internal stakeholders dominate theboard, while in Austria there is apparently an equilibrium situation.

In the case of Portugal the new higher education law (Law 62/2007 of 10 September)is very recent and institutions are still in the process of drafting their new statutes, soit is not possible to analyse individual situations. However, the law established thatthe first step would be the election by the university of the internal members of theboard. In a second step the elected members will co-opt the external members thatwill represent at least 30% of the total. As the law also establishes that the represen-tatives of academics and researchers must represent more than 50% of the total thismeans that the academy will have control over the board that also elects the rector.Therefore, we may consider that the Portuguese law is the one that is less drastic inthe approach to a more managerial mode of governance.

Conclusions

When the boards of European universities are compared against their U.S. counter-parts, it is possible to conclude that they are following a path that is midway to that

Table 2. University boards in European higher education

Country University RectorBoard

members ChairmanInternal members

External members

The

Net

herl

ands Utrecht

DelftGroningen

AppointedAppointedAppointed

555

Ap. MinisterAp. MinisterAp. Minister

000

555

Nor

way Oslo

TromsøTrondheim

Electedb

ElectedAppointed

111111

RectorRectorAp. Minister

777

4 (Minister)4 (Minister)4 (Minister)

Sw

eden Gothenburg

UppsalaKarlstad

Appointedc

AppointedAppointed

151515

Ap. MinisterAp. MinisterAp. Minister

777


Aus

tria Vienna

SalzburgInnsbruck

Electedd

ElectedElected

997

1 (elected)e

1 (elected)1 (elected)

443


aThe rector is appointed by the board.bThe rector can be elected by the university or appointed by the board.cThe rector is appointed by the minister following a proposal from the board.dThe rector is elected by the board following a proposal of the senate.eThe other elements of the board elect the chairman.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 08:

45 0

9 N

ovem

ber

2014


of the two extremes of public and private boards in the USA. In Europe the compo-sition of the boards in general tries to find a balance between pure political appointmentas in public boards in the USA and total institutional choice as is the case with privateboards in the USA with members selected for their institutional loyalty or influencewith important outside groups. And in Europe boards in general include (the exceptionbeing the Netherlands) some representation of internal stakeholders (academic andnon-academic staff and students). However, the implementation of boards in Europeis much more recent than in the USA and more empirical research will be needed tofully understand its effects on institutional governance and management.

The future arena within which higher education must play out its role is changingexponentially and is uncertain at best. How well higher education navigates theseturbulent rapids will clearly depend on the visionary leadership and foresight of thepolicymakers that oversee the enterprise. Striking an acceptable balance betweenmarket forces that are changing and escalating, and academe’s heritage and valuesthat are steeped in centuries of tradition, will pose governance challenges unseen inthe past.

Governing bodies can serve a vital role, but it is up to higher education and societyto ensure their role is properly defined and executed. Ultimately, whether governing,coordinating or advisory board; ministry; coordinating or administrative council;council of rectors, presidents, vice chancellors, chancellors or presidents; the bottomline and the prime objective for higher education is to create functional, effective,efficient and defensible leadership that will drive the higher education enterpriseforward. To do less is to abandon responsibility for the institutions under their gover-nance, and to leave the HEIs adrift in a backwash of perpetual mediocrity. This isclearly unacceptable by any reasonable and intelligent standards one might want toimpose. Clearly then, if higher education (in the USA, Europe or elsewhere) wants toprosper in order to serve the populace that indisputably demands its services, it muststep up and be heard. The leadership—be it institutional, state, system, council ornational—cannot hide from its responsibility to provide long-term, strategic focus onthe future of higher education. The higher education community and society in generalshould accept nothing less. Some difficult questions need to be asked for the futureprosperity of higher education. Let us hope some have the vision and courage to do so.

References

Amaral, A., Jones, G., & Karseth, B. (Eds.). (2002). Governing higher education: National perspectiveson institutional governance. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Amaral, A., Magalhães, A., & Santiago, R. (2003). The rise of academic managerialism in Portugal.In A. Amaral, V. L. Meek, & I. Larsen (Eds.), The higher education managerial revolution?(pp. 131–154). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges. (1996). Stronger leadership for toughertimes: Report of the Commission on the Presidency. Washington, DC: AGB.

Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges. (2003a). Merit screening of citizensfor gubernatorial appointment to public college and university trusteeship. Washington, DC:Author.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 08:

45 0

9 N

ovem

ber

2014


Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges. (2003b, September). State policybrief no. 1. Washington, DC: Author.

Berdahl, R. (1971). Statewide coordination of higher education. Washington, DC: AGB.Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. (2007). Classification of U.S. higher educa-

tion institutions. Stanford, CA: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.de Boer, H. (2003). Who is afraid of red, yellow and blue? In A. Amaral, V. L. Meek, & I. Larsen

(Eds.), The higher education managerial revolution? (pp. 89–108). Dordrecht: Kluwer.Duderstadt, J. (2000). A university for the 21st century. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan

Press.El-Khawas, E. (2002). Governance in US universities: Aligning internal dynamics with today’s

needs. In A. Amaral, G. Jones, & B. Karseth (Eds.), Governing higher education: Nationalperspectives on institutional governance (pp. 261–278). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Fisher, J., & Koch, J. (1996). Presidential leadership: Making a difference. Phoenix, AZ: AmericanCouncil on Education and the Orxy Press.

Johnstone, B. (1997). The United States. In M. Green (Ed.), Transforming higher education: Viewsfrom leaders around the world (pp. 134–149). Phoenix, AZ: American Council on Educationand the Oryx Press.

Lyall, K. (2001). Recent changes in the structure and governance of American research universi-ties. In W. Hirsch & L. Weber (Eds.), Governance in higher education: The university in a state offlux (pp. 17–25). London: Economica.

Maassen, P., & van Vught, F. (1994). Alternative models of governmental steering in highereducation. An analysis of steering models and policy-instruments in five countries. In L.Goodebuure & F. van Vught (Eds.), Comparative policy studies in higher education (pp. 35–65).Utrecht: LEMMA.

Maassen, P. (2002). Organisational strategies and governance structures in Dutch universities. InA. Amaral, G. Jones, & B. Karseth (Eds.), Governing higher education: National perspectives oninstitutional governance (pp. 23–41). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Manning, P., (1989). Colorado policy guide to higher education governance. Golden, CO: IndependenceInstitute.

McGuinness, A. (2000). State authority in higher education governance. Washington, DC: EducationCommission of the States.

NORED. (2000). Higher education governance in Colorado at the dawn of the 21st century. Olympia,WA: Author.

Pechar, H. (2005). University Autonomy in Austria. HOFO Working Paper Series. IFF_hofo.05.001.

Peterson, M., Dill, D., Mets, L., & Associates. (Eds.). (1997). Planning and management for achanging environment. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Peterson, M., & Mets, L. (Eds.). (1987). Key resources on higher education governance, managementand leadership. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Smoot, J. (2003). Self study report. Pittsburg State University, USA.Stave, G. (2007). The challenges of governing increasingly diverse higher education systems—Implications

for institutional strategies. Retrieved May 15, 2007, from http://www.uhr.no/documents/Gunnar_Staves_EUA_foredrag_2007 _10_27__endelig.pdf

Zwingle, J. (1980). Evolution of lay governing boards. In R. Ingram & Associates (Eds.), Handbookof college and university trusteeship: A practical guide for trustees, chief executives and other leadersresponsible for developing effective governing boards (pp. 14–26). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 08:

45 0

9 N

ovem

ber

2014


Coo

rdin

atin

g bo

ards

Pla

nnin

g/se

rvic

e ag

enci

es

Con

solid

ated

gov

erni

ng b

oard

sR

egul

ator

y co

ordi

nati

ng b

oard

sB

oard

s w

ith

prog

ram

me

appr

oval

aut

hori

ty

Adv

isor

y bo

ards

Boa

rds

wit

h no

pro

gram

me

appr

oval

Aut

hori

ty—

only

aut

hori

ty t

o re

view

and

rec

omm

end

(Thr

ee s

tate

s pl

us

Was

hing

ton

DC

and

P

uert

o R

ico

have

ag

enci

es in

add

itio

n to

gov

erni

ng b

oard

s)

One

boa

rd f

or

all p

ublic

in

stit

utio

ns

Tw

o bo

ards

en

com

pass

ing

all

publ

ic in

stit

utio

ns

Con

solid

ated

or

agg

rega

ted

budg

et

Bud

get

revi

ew

and

reco

mm

enda

tion

No

stat

utor

y bu

dget

rol

eC

onso

lidat

ed

or a

ggre

gate

d bu

dget

Bud

get

revi

ew

and

reco

mm

enda

tion

No

stat

utor

y bu

dget

or

pro

gram

me

appr

oval

rol

esA

lask

ab

Haw

aii

Idah

oa

Kan

sasd

Mon

tana

Nev

ada

Nor

th D

akot

aR

hode

Isl

and

Sou

th D

akot

aD

Cb

Pue

rto

Ric

ob

Ari

zona

Geo

rgia

c

Iow

ac

Mai

nec,

e

Min

neso

tag

Mis

siss

ippi

c

New

Ham

pshi

reN

orth

Car

olin

ac

Ore

gonc,

j

Uta

hV

erm

ontl

Wis

cons

inW

yom

ing

Ala

bam

aA

rkan

sas

Col

orad

of

Flo

rida

a

Illin

ois

Ken

tuck

yL

ouis

iana

Mar

ylan

dM

assa

chus

etts

k

Mis

sour

iO

hio

Okl

ahom

aS

outh

Car

olin

aT

enne

ssee

Wes

t V

irgi

nia

Con

nect

icut

Neb

rask

aN

ew J

erse

yT

exas

f

Vir

gini

af

Was

hing

ton

New

Yor

kaA

lask

ab*

Cal

ifor

nia

New

Mex

icoh

Del

awar

eM

ichi

gana

Min

neso

tag*

New

Ham

pshi

rec*

Pen

nsyl

vani

aa,i

Ver

mon

tl,*

DC

b,*

Pue

rto

Ric

ob,*

Ap

pen

dix

A.

Au

thor

ity

of S

tate

Boa

rds

of P

ost-

seco

nd

ary

Ed

uca

tion

, 20

02

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 08:

45 0

9 N

ovem

ber

2014

256 J. S. Taylor and M. de Lourdes MachadoA

pp

end

ix A

.(C

onti

nued

)

Coo

rdin

atin

g bo

ards

Pla

nnin

g/se

rvic

e ag

enci

es

Con

solid

ated

gov

erni

ng b

oard

sR

egul

ator

y co

ordi

nati

ng b

oard

sB

oard

s w

ith

prog

ram

me

appr

oval

aut

hori

ty

Adv

isor

y bo

ards

Boa

rds

wit

h no

pro

gram

me

appr

oval

Aut

hori

ty—

only

aut

hori

ty t

o re

view

and

rec

omm

end

(Thr

ee s

tate

s pl

us

Was

hing

ton

DC

and

P

uert

o R

ico

have

ag

enci

es in

add

itio

n to

gov

erni

ng b

oard

s)

Sta

tes

= 9

, plu

s D

C a

nd P

RS

tate

s =

13

Sta

tes

= 1

5S

tate

s =

6S

tate

s =

1S

tate

s =

0S

tate

s =

2, p

lus

(1)

Sta

tes

= 3

, plu

s D

C

and

Pue

rto

Ric

o

a Sta

te b

oard

/age

ncy

resp

onsi

ble

for

all l

evel

s of

edu

cati

on (

Pre

-K-1

6/20

).b S

tate

has

bot

h co

nsol

idat

ed g

over

ning

boa

rd(s

) an

d co

ordi

nati

ng o

r pl

anni

ng/s

ervi

ce a

genc

y.c O

ne o

f th

e tw

o bo

ards

is a

sta

te-w

ide

coor

dina

ting

or

gove

rnin

g bo

dy f

or c

omm

unit

y co

llege

s an

d/or

pos

t-se

cond

ary

tech

nica

l ins

titu

tion

s.d K

ansa

s B

oard

of R

egen

ts is

a c

onso

lidat

ed g

over

ning

boa

rd fo

r un

iver

siti

es a

nd c

oord

inat

ing

boar

d fo

r lo

cally

gov

erne

d co

mm

unit

y co

llege

s an

d W

ashb

urn

Uni

vers

ity.

e Mai

ne M

arit

ime

Aca

dem

y is

the

onl

y pu

blic

inst

itut

ion

wit

h it

s ow

n go

vern

ing

boar

d ou

tsid

e a

syst

em.

f Coo

rdin

atin

g bo

ard

deve

lops

the

for

mul

a th

at is

the

bas

is f

or in

stit

utio

nal a

lloca

tion

s.g M

inne

sota

Hig

her

Edu

cati

on S

ervi

ce C

orpo

rati

on h

as n

o st

atut

ory

plan

ning

aut

hori

ty.

h New

Mex

ico

Com

mis

sion

’s p

rogr

amm

e ap

prov

al a

utho

rity

is li

mit

ed t

o gr

adua

te p

rogr

amm

es.

i Pen

nsyl

vani

a S

tate

Boa

rd o

f E

duca

tion

’s p

rogr

amm

e ap

prov

al a

utho

rity

is li

mit

ed t

o sp

ecifi

c ar

eas

(e.g

., te

ache

r ed

ucat

ion)

. Boa

rd a

lso

mus

t ap

prov

e ne

w c

ampu

ses

or s

ites

. Dep

artm

ent

of E

duca

tion

has

bud

get

resp

onsi

bilit

y fo

r co

mm

unit

y co

llege

s an

d re

gula

tory

res

pons

ibili

ties

re

gard

ing

for-

profi

t in

stit

utio

ns.

j Ore

gon’

s ag

ency

is w

ithi

n th

e O

ffice

of

the

Gov

erno

r.k M

assa

chus

etts

Boa

rd o

f H

ighe

r E

duca

tion

is c

oord

inat

ing

boar

d fo

r pu

blic

sys

tem

and

gov

erni

ng b

oard

for

com

mun

ity

colle

ges

and

stat

e co

llege

s.l V

erm

ont

has

no s

tatu

tory

pla

nnin

g/co

ordi

nati

ng e

ntit

y. V

erm

ont

Hig

her

Edu

cati

on C

ounc

il is

vol

unta

ry.

Not

e. (

1) S

tate

s lis

ted

in m

ore

than

one

col

umn

are

note

d w

ith

an a

ster

isk

“*”

wit

h th

e to

tal n

umbe

r of

dup

licat

es a

t th

e bo

ttom

of

the

colu

mn.

(2

) P

erm

issi

on t

o ex

cerp

t gr

ante

d by

EC

S N

ovem

ber

17, 2

003.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 08:

45 0

9 N

ovem

ber

2014


Appendix B. Responsibilities of the Governing Board

Legislation that sets the responsibilities of public institution and system governingboards typically does not reflect the full range of contemporary expectations andsometimes confuses management with governing functions. Laws that have been onthe books for many decades should be reviewed and, if necessary, clarified andexpanded. It is good practice to include a contemporary “job description” in boardbylaws (one that is not inconsistent with existing laws, of course) that explainsboard responsibilities and helps reduce confusion and ambiguity. The following is agenerally accepted list of responsibilities that can be adapted to fit institutional ormulti-campus settings. It may be used to help in the process of recruiting promisingcandidates for board membership.

Approve (determine, reaffirm, or change) the institution’s statement of missionafter consultation with appropriate internal and external constituencies and agencies.

Appoint, support, assess the performance of, and terminate, if necessary, the chiefexecutive (president, chancellor, or executive director).

Approve and periodically review the appropriateness and consequences of allmajor institutional policies. These include decisions concerning the addition ordiscontinuation of major academic programmes and major services consistent withthe institution’s mission and financial capacity.

Ensure that good planning is done periodically by management and faculty,participate in the process, assess the quality of the outcomes, approve final plans,and monitor progress against goals.

Fulfil fiduciary responsibilities by approving and monitoring the annual budget,protecting the institution’s financial and capital assets, ensuring responsible andprudent investment of all restricted and unrestricted funds, and ensuring a compe-tent and comprehensive annual audit process.

Ensure accountability on behalf of all citizens who support and depend on theinstitution. By monitoring the institution’s performance, the board helps ensure thatthe institution enjoys a large measure of autonomy, an arm’s length relationshipwith state government and partisan politics, and otherwise serves its broad publictrust.

Ensure adequate resources and their effective management. This includes settinga good collective example in personal philanthropy commensurate with personalmeans and otherwise serving as advocates for institutional needs with governmentleaders; the board also should assist the foundation in its work on the institution’sbehalf.

Interpret the institution to the public that contributes to its purposes and defendthe institution, when necessary, from inappropriate intrusion. Conversely, the boardalso helps interpret society’s needs and expectations for the institution’s faculty andmanagement. It serves as both a buffer and a bridge.

Ensure that the board’s reputation is exemplary in the course of meeting itsresponsibilities. By keeping its own house in order, the board contributes to theinstitution’s reputation and standing in the community and state.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 08:

45 0

9 N

ovem

ber

2014


Ensure that the institution serves as a good citizen in its relationships with othersocial, educational, and business enterprises through appropriate collaborations andpartnerships.

Periodically assess the board’s performance through an appropriate process thathelps ensure objectivity and an action agenda for follow-up.

Appendix C. Responsibilities of Individual Trustees

All higher education boards should adopt their own standards of conduct to clarifythe expectations their members hold for one another. In a similar vein, panelsempowered to search for and screen candidates for trusteeship should agree on thesubstance of a generic trustee job description. This helps inform the panel’s identifi-cation of the qualifications to be sought in outstanding candidates. It also helpscandidates understand the obligations of the position. The following list can beadapted and expanded, but it is a place to start for this unique form of public calling.

● To have the time and energy necessary to faithfully and diligently prepare for andparticipate in the board’s meetings. This includes certain ceremonial and specialmeetings that require the trustee’s presence between regular board meetings. In[your state], trustees are expected to devote approximately hours each year totheir responsibilities (or the equivalent of days).

● To believe in the institution’s mission and responsibilities to serve the diversesociety that supports and depends on it.

● To ask substantive and timely questions of management and colleague boardmembers in the course of committee and board meetings.

● To speak candidly but also to be willing to support decisions and policiesapproved by the board’s majority—even if the trustee did not vote for them. Onlythe collective board has legal authority; individual trustees have none. In a similarvein, trustees should avoid asking the administration for special favours.Although trustees are afforded respect and occasional expressions of appreciationfor their volunteer and philanthropic service, they are due no special prerogatives.

● To remember that only the board chair speaks for the board and ordinarily ispresumed to be delegated the responsibility to address controversial issues orboard decisions with the media. In a similar vein, the chief executive ordinarilyspeaks for the institution. Individual trustees should not presume to speak for theboard or the institution.

● To avoid personal agendas or being seen as a representative of any internal orexternal constituency, special-interest group or cause, community, or specific partof the institution. All trustees have a responsibility to use their best judgement andconscience in the interests of the institution as a whole. “Single issue” trustees areineffective trustees.

● To support the chief executive while at the same time exercising critical judge-ment as an active, discerning, energetic, and probing trustee. Board membersshould be able to distinguish between management and governance issues.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 08:

45 0

9 N

ovem

ber

2014


● To communicate any significant concern or complaint promptly to the chief exec-utive. Trustees should be mindful of protocols and procedures for handling ofsuch matters (ordinarily at the lowest appropriate levels of administration).Substantive matters that may affect the chief executive should be called to theboard chair’s attention.

● To be respectful of the opinions of others and to restrain from public criticismof them or their views. At the same time, do your part to contribute to a trustrelationship among board members and help the board to “keep its house inorder”.

● To avoid any possibility of even the perception of a possible conflict of interestwith their financial, personal, and family interests. Trustees should inform theboard chair and chief executive promptly of any such possibility. Early disclosureis essential.

● To defend the institution’s and the board’s autonomy while working with othertrustees to provide accountability and advocacy in equal measure.

Appendix D. Qualifications to be Sought in Outstanding Appointees

Serving as a trustee or regent is one of our society’s highest callings. It signalsachievement, accomplishment, influence, success, selflessness, prestige, and manyother things we value in our culture. Although many citizens think they would like toserve on a board, trusteeship is not—and should not be—for everyone. Enormousresponsibilities accompany each and every appointment. Further, the sheer size andcomplexity of the public university requires that only the most able, committed,deserving, and experienced citizens be considered. Finding the best individualscannot be done haphazardly. There are essential and specific qualifications thatshould be sought in candidates. Among them, in no particular order of importance,are the following.

Recruitment and screening panels should look for men and women for whomthere is evidence that they possess:

● Experience with large, complex organizations and an understanding of how tointerpret the financial condition of such organizations.

● An ability to recognize the sometimes ambiguous distinction between manage-ment and governance.

● A record of particular interest in higher education that presumes a deep under-standing of its place in our diverse society, particularly some connection with theinstitution they may be privileged to serve as a board member—for example, as analumnus or member of the institution’s affiliated foundation.

● Intelligence, wisdom, breadth of vision, and a record of independent judgement.● An inquiring mind and an ability to speak articulately and succinctly.● A capacity to function within a collegial group as a team member; to be a good

follower as well as a leader.● A record of accomplishment in his or her life and career or profession.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 08:

45 0

9 N

ovem

ber

2014


● A record of understanding of the importance of advocacy and philanthropy inensuring institutional vitality, responsiveness, and progress in meeting private andpublic needs.

● The time and energy required to be a conscientious and attentive board member.● Willingness to forego partisan political activity in trustee service that could prove

detrimental to the institution’s and the board’s reputation as fundamentally non-partisan enterprises.

● An ability to consistently sustain a total institutional perspective in his or her andthe board’s work, without allegiance or commitment to anything except the broadpublic good.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f G

uelp

h] a

t 08:

45 0

9 N

ovem

ber

2014

Governing Boards in Public Higher Education Institutions: A perspective from the United States

Documents

Transcript of Governing Boards in Public Higher Education Institutions: A perspective from the United States