Goode Progress

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G G o o o o d d e e P P r r o o g g r r e e s s s s The Honorable W. Wilson Goode, Jr. City Councilman At-Large Publication # 2014-01

Transcript of Goode Progress

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GGooooddee

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The Honorable W. Wilson Goode, Jr.

City Councilman At-Large

Publication # 2014-01

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INTRODUCTION

On the first Friday afternoon in January of 2000, after being sworn-in as the youngest

member of Philadelphia City Council that week, I gathered my staff for our first official

meeting – at 4 o’clock sharp.

I was focused on two objectives – to state my legislative and policy agenda, and to also

see which of my staff members would be looking at their watches to see when 5 o’clock

arrived.

My staff was initially comprised of five positions: a chief of staff, a special assistant for

policy and planning, a legislative assistant, and two executive assistants. All of them were

engaged in the policy discussion which lasted well beyond the 5 o’clock hour. Three

terms later, I now only have three members of my staff - the two executive assistants

hired in January 2000, Sadique Akbar and Latrice Bryant, who now serve as my chief

operating officer and chief administrative aide – as well as Leslie Ann Adorno, who

began as a welfare-to work intern in February 2000 but now serves as my senior

administrative aide.

In that meeting, I articulated our mission statement as concisely as possible. I told my

staff that our legislative agenda was, in fact, the same as my life work – “to create new

opportunities for the economically disadvantaged”.

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My challenge was to take my experience as an economic development administrator in

local government and to have it result in meaningful new public policy and enacted

legislation.

I posed a policy question to open up the discussion. The question was, “Who shall be

poor? And after our work is done, will we have changed the answer to that question?”

The first response was that there was no way to know who will be “poor’. So I rephrased

the question, “Not specifically, but in general, who shall be poor?” No one wanted to

answer.

Then I simply asked, “Don’t we already know, in general, who will be poor? Won’t it be

mostly women, children, and people of color? And won’t that still be true in 10 years and

in 20 years from now?”

They simply nodded. Then I reiterated, “That’s why we’re here - to create new

opportunities for the economically disadvantaged”.

So I’ve crafted over 125 laws…creating several new economic opportunities.

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Fair Lending and Community Reinvestment

Within weeks of being sworn-in on January 3, 2000 – my office released our first policy

paper titled, “Greater Philadelphia Capital Access Report”. The Capital Access Report

was an examination of small business lending patterns within the region. The report data

came from information required from banks and financial institutions under the federal

Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). An amendment to CRA regulations made small

business loan data available as of 1998. Before that, the submission of home mortgage

data had been required since 1977. Ironically, the small business loan data from 1998

became publicly available as I was being elected to City Council, so my first policy

initiative promised to be groundbreaking. It was no coincidence that the special assistant

that I hired was a doctoral candidate at the University of Pennsylvania who had already

purchased the data and was developing the methodology to produce the report.

E. Matthew Quigley (Matt), my special assistant, worked within my office for over two

and a half years, quickly rising to the position of chief legislative aide. Matt authored five

policy papers for my office and then went on to work for the Federal Reserve Bank

system and the United State Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Matt’s first report

was groundbreaking, as promised, and it created instant credibility for my office.

The Capital Access Report proved that there were stark disparities in small business

lending within the region when examined by the race or income of neighborhoods. In

fact, in 1998, about 90 percent of small business lending was done in middle-and upper

income areas and over 90 percent of the loan dollars went to areas with less than a twenty

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percent population of African-Americans. The comprehensive report was featured in the

Philadelphia Business Journal, as well as other local news publications, and the local

banking and financial services industry was intrigued by the policy work. Rather than

being embarrassed by its findings, the industry sought more information about those

under-served markets that could represent new opportunities for business growth.

Most people who became familiar with the report were focused on its findings and

comprehensiveness, so they lost sight of its policy recommendations. Matt did the

research and writing, but I developed the recommendations for the report.

There were two models presented as recommended strategies to address the lending

disparities disclosed by the report.

The CDFI Model

The first strategy recommended was the increased utilization of community development

financial institutions (CDFIs) as financial intermediaries to reach those under-served

markets. Most CDFIs specialize in providing access to capital within low-and moderate-

income and predominantly minority neighborhoods. In fact, Matt purchased the small

business lending data, utilized for the report, to act as a consultant to a CDFI created by a

minority-controlled bank. The consulting relationship was never finalized, but the data

was definitely put to good use.

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Both the federal and state governments had programs to support CDFIs, but there was no

local counterpart other than an oversight structure for the local CDFIs created as part of

the federal Empowerment Zone program. I successfully advocated, along with others, for

the establishment of Empowerment Zone CDFIs in the 1990s during my work at the

Philadelphia Commercial Development Corporation and the city’s Commerce

Department. I was not as successful in advocating for a broader local CDFI program

during the mayoral administrations of Edward G. Rendell and John F. Street.

The Rendell Administration would not consider local CDFI investment, pointing to state

and federal programs which already benefited the city – but lending disparities revealed

through the 1998 data clearly demonstrate that there was a need to employ new strategies

at that time.

The Street Administration took office in the same month as the release of the capital

access report. A few months later, my office also released a report on the CDFI industry.

The first bill that I crafted, which became law, simply authorized the City of Philadelphia

to invest in promissory notes issued by federally certified CDFIs. Mayor Street signed

that bill on May 16, 2000. Street also signed an appropriations bill that I crafted to

capitalize a local CDFI fund with $5 million on November 2, 2001. But the Street

Administration made only one investment of $1.5 million in a CDFI operated by

Resources for Human Development, a local non-profit organization. The administration

never formalized a local CDFI Fund program and was non-responsive to a proposal

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submitted by the National Community Capital Association (NCCA) to administer the

fund. NCCA, which was locally based, had already provided technical and financial

services to scores of CDFIs nationwide.

Not utilizing NCCA’s capacity proved that the Street administration did not intend to

seriously invest in the CDFI strategy – in part, because the administration didn’t fully

understand it. But the administration did not offer any other strategies to address

disparities in small business lending, although the city was clearly at an economic

disadvantage without one, because of the city’s demographics.

The Empowerment Zone CDFIs did have moderate success during the Rendell and Street

years including the development of a major inner-city shopping center in the West

Parkside section of the zone. The shopping center was developed largely due to an equity

investment by the West Philadelphia Financial Services Institution, a zone CDFI. A

substantial portion of West Parkside zone dollars was invested in the zone CDFI not

because of the immediate capacity for small business lending, but because of the

proposed investment in the shopping center. The shopping center would have immediate

impact in terms of job creation and the provision of goods and services, while continuing

to build future capacity for small business lending in the zone.

The Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC), the city’s economic

development agent has, at my urging, also created a CDFI to bolster small business

lending in under-served areas.

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The Loan Consortium Model and New Landmark Legislation

The other strategy recommended in the capital access report was the loan consortium

model patterned after the Delaware Valley Mortgage Plan (DVMP, now called the

Delaware Valley Housing Partnership). The DVMP was created during the initial CRA

movement of the 1970’s by a number of affordable housing advocates, including my

father. Banks and financial institutions, along with other stakeholders, created the DVMP

as a vehicle for financial and technical assistance to economically disadvantaged

borrowers in under-served areas.

Around the time that I released the capital access report, I met with Sharmain Matlock-

Turner, in her capacity as director of the Greater Philadelphia Urban Affairs Coalition

(GPUAC). I discussed the small business loan consortium model with her, particularly

since GPUAC oversaw the Delaware Valley Housing Partnership which I was seeking to

replicate for small business development. We agreed to work together, and several

months later, she invited me to present my idea to GPUAC’s Committee on Community

and Economic Development (CED) in September of 2000. The presentation was well-

received. Ray Desiderio of PNC Bank, co-chair of both GPUAC and its CED committee,

promised that he would provide the leadership to implement the loan consortium strategy

for small business development. He was probably sincere at the time but his interest

shifted when anti-predatory lending legislation was later introduced by Councilwoman

Marian Tasco, angering the banking and financial services industry - and the industry

declared war on the legislation. The small business loan consortium idea became a

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temporary casualty of that war, particularly since I was a co-sponsor of the Tasco

legislation. The local banking community decided that all local legislation regarding that

industry should be pre-empted by state and/or federal law. The Tasco ordinance was

quickly pre-empted by a subsequent state law sponsored by State Representative Dwight

Evans. From 2000 into 2001, my loan consortium idea lost almost all of its previous

momentum. My only hope was to craft local legislation and policy measures that would

not be pre-empted by state or federal law – and 2002 turned out to be a good year for me.

On March 20, 2002, Mayor John F. Street signed Bill # 020047 into law requiring that all

banks authorized to receive deposits from the City of Philadelphia must submit an annual

statement of community reinvestment goals to the City. The community reinvestment

statement must include goals for small business and home loans within low-and

moderate- income neighborhoods. Of course, the Pennsylvania Bankers’ Association

claimed that we were pre-empted from enacting that requirement by previous state

legislation, but a City Law Department opinion upheld our right to legislate on city

depository issues under authority granted by the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter.

The enactment of that landmark legislation, affirming that the local authorization of city

depositories can require community reinvestment statements, was crucial to my future

policy work. Yet, it also created further distance between me and the local banking

community. In order to still implement my vision for a small business loan consortium, it

would require a full-scale war.

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That summer, in 2002, I “googled” the term “community reinvestment” and I stumbled

upon the website of the National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC). I decided

to make a phone call to the NCRC policy director, Josh Silver. Less than 3 years later, I

would receive the NCRC National Achievement Award for a government leader

advocating for consumer rights and economic justice. The award was the result of

several years of work with NCRC on fair lending and community reinvestment policy

and legislation.

Just a few months after my initial contact with NCRC, both the president and policy

director of the organization agreed to testify at my hearing on lending disparities in

Philadelphia during the fall of 2002. At that time, I had just hired Solomon Jones, a

Philadelphia Weekly writer and novelist, as senior legislative aide and director of public

affairs (coinciding with Matt Quigley’s departure from my office for the Federal Reserve

Bank system.) The hearing was Solomon’s first real opportunity to help me impact a

major public policy issue. He did well.

Solomon invited the local bank presidents to testify at the hearing, and they promptly

declined. Instead, a “delegation” was sent to meet with me - it included Matlock-Turner

from GPUAC, Desiderio from PNC Bank, as well as Dede Myers of the local Federal

Reserve Bank. The delegation, insisting that it represented the entire local banking

community, suggested that the departure of Matt Quigley from my staff gave them the

upper hand. They suggested that my office didn’t have the technical capacity to challenge

their policy position, which would be supported by new data to be presented by Myers of

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the Federal Reserve Bank. Rather than immediately respond, I looked forward to sharing

the new data received from NCRC at the hearing.

Solomon did an excellent job of garnering media coverage for the hearing, coordinating

advocate support in the presence of small business owners, and providing the “spin”

supporting NCRC’s policy position. In short, NCRC testified on the stark disparities that

it had uncovered from recent data on lending patterns in Philadelphia, consistent with

earlier findings from the Greater Philadelphia Capital Access Report. The Federal

Reserve Bank witness could not refute any of NCRC’s findings.

Furthermore, I asked Mr. Desiderio, for the hearing record, if he had reneged on a

commitment to provide leadership in advancing the loan consortium strategy. He

admitted that he had reneged on his promise, and recommitted to doing so before the end

of the year. GPUAC subsequently formed a Small Business Lending Task Force

(SBLTF). The SBLTF, over the next several years, developed a three-tier strategy that

resulted in a $23.5 million GPUAC Business Builder Program targeting low-to-moderate

income and predominantly minority neighborhoods. The launch of the program took

almost seven years from my first meeting with GPUAC, but it is now defunct.

Other Fair Lending and Community Reinvestment Initiatives

It should be noted that my first legislative initiative was a non-binding resolution calling

on the City Controller’s Office to conduct an annual study of small business lending. The

resolution was unanimously approved by City Council at my first session. Under the

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administration of Jonathan Saidel, the controller’s office issued several reports based on

small business lending data from 1998-2004, in compliance with the resolution.

I have also amended the fair lending and community reinvestment requirements for city

depositories several times, including a mandatory compliance provision in 2003 and a

fair lending strategic plan provision in 2005.

All of these efforts contributed to an increase in the percentage of small business lending

within low-and moderate-income neighborhoods within the city from 42% in 2002 to

55% in 2003, in terms of the number of loans provided by neighborhood income. The

percentage of loans has remained around 55% since that time. To build upon this effort,

PIDC created a local small business loan guarantee fund as a result of my advocacy.

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CDC Economic Development and Job Creation Tax Credits

CDC Economic Development

The decision to become a legislator meant that I had to quit my job as Economic

Development Administrator for the City’s Commerce Department and resign from the

Philadelphia Commercial Development Corporation (PCDC). Furthermore, as my father

clearly explained – my run for City Council would automatically “politicize” my

economic development track record. If I won, it might further validate it – but if I lost,

my track record could be both politically and professionally scarred. In reality, my

political capital, other than my name, was built upon my professional track record

administering community economic development (CED) grant programs - and my work

with neighborhood business associations and community development corporations. My

expansion of those CED programs was well-documented in the Community Development

Block Grant (CDBG) Study and Community Reinvestment Report, the two other policy

papers released by my office in 2000. Those policy papers found that expanding the use

of CDBG resources for economic development would leverage more private investment

into low-and moderate-income neighborhoods. Economic development investments have

always had greater leveraging ability than low-income housing subsidies. Additionally,

the utilization of community development corporations (CDCs) to undertake certain

economic development activities in disadvantaged neighborhoods would bolster those

organizations and their overall revitalization efforts.

In the fall of 2000, I introduced legislation to mandate that a percentage of CDBG

resources be allocated to economic development. Ironically, my legislation amended the

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portion of the Philadelphia Code crafted by then-freshman Councilman John Street,

which placed a limit on the economic development use of CDBG dollars. Councilman

Street was right, at the time, when he crafted that provision because resources were being

taken away from affordable housing development to be invested in economic

development projects that did not directly benefit low- and moderate- income

neighborhoods. In 2001, I amended my legislation to allocate at least 5 percent of CDBG

resources to economic development activities undertaken by CDCs on an annual basis –

while removing the cap on CDBG economic development spending. The amended

version was unanimously approved by City Council as part of a broader package of CDC

economic development legislation.

That fall, the Philadelphia Association of CDCs was also granted membership on the

city’s Vacant Property Review Committee (VPRC), which is responsible for land

disposition.

The third bill in my fall package of CDC economic development legislation was

originally opposed by the Street Administration – and its eventual passage has been one

of my most meaningful accomplishments – the CDC Tax Credit Program.

The CDC Tax Credit Ordinance established a pilot program under which a credit against

the City's business privilege taxes is given to certain businesses that contribute monies to

community development corporations undertaking economic development activities

within the City Philadelphia. Up to ten businesses would receive a 100% tax credit for

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contributing $100,000 in cash per year for ten years to a qualifying CDC. The businesses

would have to enter into a multi-year one-million dollar contribution agreement created

by the City’s Revenue Department to participate in the program. The program was

patterned after the Philadelphia Plan of the 1990’s, a state tax credit initiative that

focused on providing core operating support to CDCs mostly engaged in affordable

housing development. Many CDCs felt left out of the Philadelphia Plan due to the limited

opportunities, so the response to the local CDC Tax Credit Program was so

overwhelming that the City had fifteen applicants for the original ten slots. So, the

program was made permanent and expanded to twenty-five slots within a couple of years.

Effective Tax Year 2009, the number of participants was again increased from twenty-

five (25) to thirty (30). Also in 2009, Bill No. 090353 was enacted, allowing 2 businesses

to jointly enter into a contribution agreement.

Beginning with Tax Year 2011, up to 3 Nonprofit Intermediaries were allowed to apply

for the CDC Tax Credit through another amendment to the ordinance.

After the first decade of the program, effective Tax Year 2012, Bill No. 110561 increased

the number of contribution agreements from thirty (30) to thirty-five (35) and decreased

the contribution and credit amount from $100,000 to $85,000.

Effective tax year 2013, Bill No.130012 then increased the number of participants from

thirty-five (35) to forty (40). Also effective 2013, Bill No. 120796 amended Philadelphia

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Code § 19-2604 to include two (2) additional applications for Nonprofit Organizations

Engaged in Developing and Implementing Health Food Initiatives.

By December 31, 2013 there were forty-one (41) participants in the Community

Development Tax Credit Program which include thirty-seven (37) Community

Development Corporations, three (3) Nonprofit Intermediaries and one (1) Nonprofit

Organization Engaged in Developing and Implementing Health Food Initiatives. The

application for the one (1) remaining Nonprofit Organization Engaged in Developing and

Implementing Health Food Initiatives was submitted in 2014 and a fully executed

contribution agreement was subsequently signed with the City.

Bill No. 130853 was then introduced in 2013 to in increase the number of Nonprofit

intermediaries from three (3) to four (4) and was subsequently passed with an effective

date of 2014.

Each business partner is required to submit a renewal application each year to provide

information about the use of the contributed funds in the current year and the proposed

use in the next year. At the end of each year, the renewal applications are reviewed to

verify that the businesses and their CDC partners continued to meet all requirements

under the legislation, regulations, and contribution agreements.

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Job Creation Tax Credits

The CDC Tax Credit Ordinance was landmark legislation – it created a local business tax

credit for investing in economic development in a fair, transparent, and objective manner.

For that reason, then-City Controller Jonathan Saidel asked to meet with me, early in

2002, regarding another local business tax credit that he had previously recommended –

a local job creation tax credit. I agreed to “shepherd” the legislation through the

legislative process. The legislation would establish a pilot program patterned after the

state job creation tax credit which offered businesses that create new jobs - a $1000 per

new job credit against business tax liability.

The legislation, based upon the state tax credit, was one of the only bills from my office

that was mostly authored by a member of my staff, Matt Quigley. Matt left my office

during an intense period of tax reform debate in City Council – and the intensity of the

debate created unanimous support for the job creation tax credit before he left. The

debate began when Mayor Street wanted to slow wage tax reductions in order to

accelerate reductions in the business gross receipts tax.

The Job Creation Tax Credit program was established in May 2002 to encourage

businesses to expand employment within the City of Philadelphia. As mentioned, it is

based on the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Job Creation Tax Credit program and

offers a credit against the firm’s Business Income and Receipts Tax liability for each new

job created. The program can be utilized by companies of any type or size located

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anywhere in the city. The Department of Revenue is designated to implement and oversee

the program.

In general, the program allows firms to receive a credit of either $1,000 or two-percent

(2%) of annual wages paid, whichever is higher, for each new job. The program was

amended in 2006 to provide a $5,000 credit for the hiring of ex-offenders. In connection

with applications filed after June 24, 2009, there was a Special Tax Credit Opportunity

for Job Creation in 2010 and 2011 whereby a firm may receive a tax credit in the amount

of $3,000 or two-percent (2%) of annual wages paid, whichever is higher, for each new

job. This Special Tax Credit Opportunity was extended for job creation in 2012 and 2013

for applicants filing after January 5, 2011. The Special Tax Credit Opportunity now gives

$5,000 or two-percent (2%) of annual wages paid, whichever is higher, for Job Creation

in 2012 and each year thereafter for any applications filed on or after March 15, 2012.

From the inception of the program in 2003 through the end of 2013, one hundred fifty

(150) businesses have applied to participate in the program; one hundred and four (104)

firms were approved for participation in the program, promising the creation of 6388

jobs. The five year period allowed by the Ordinance to create new jobs has expired for

forty five (45) of these one hundred and four (104) businesses, as of the end of 2013. As a

result, promised job creation may be reduced from 6388 to 3091, forty (45) businesses

either did not create the promised number of jobs or verification of job creation is in

progress. To date, 1,057 jobs have been verified as new job creation, resulting in the

issuance of $1,786,136 in tax certificates, of which $1,546,373has been claimed.

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How the Job Creation Tax Credit Works

The Job Creation Tax Credit program offers credits against firms’ Business Receipts and

Income Tax liability if they create either 25 new jobs or increase the number of

employees by at least 20 percent within five years of the designated start date. Program

participants must also commit to maintaining operations in Philadelphia for five years.

The annual amount of credits available for award is now limited to two percent of the

prior year’s Business Income and Receipts Tax collections. Of that amount, 25 percent is

reserved for small businesses and firms that hire ex-offenders.

Interested firms submit applications to the Department of Revenue. Upon acceptance to

the program, an agreement is executed between the business and the City that sets forth

the designated start date and the number of jobs to be created. A business has up to five

years to create the agreed upon number of jobs. Upon doing so, the firm asks the

Department of Revenue to certify the number of jobs created and wages paid. The

Department of Revenue conducts a payroll review of the company’s records to compare

the number of jobs when the firm entered the program with the number of jobs at the time

of review. Firms that fail to substantially maintain existing operations for five years from

the date the Certificate is first submitted to the Department or that fail to create the agreed

upon number of jobs are required to refund the total amount of the credit or credits issued

unless a waiver is granted by the Department of Revenue.

If the Department of Revenue is satisfied that the appropriate number of jobs have been

created, the Department issues a certificate stating the amount of credit the firm is

entitled to, either $1,000 or two-percent (2%) of the annual wages for each job. For

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applicants applying after June 24, 2009, the tax credit for job creation in 2010 and 2011 is

$3,000 or two-percent (2%) of annual wages for each job, whichever is higher. For those

applying after January 5, 2011, the tax credit for job creation in 2011, 2012 and 2013 is

$3,000 or two-percent (2%) of annual wages paid, whichever is higher, for each new job

created. For those applying after March 15, 2012 the tax credit for job creation in 2012

and each year thereafter is $5000 or two percent (2%) of annual wages paid, whichever is

higher for each new job created. The firm can redeem the certificate for a tax credit

either all at once or over five years from the issuance of the tax certificate. The program

allows companies up to 8 years from the designated start date to claim the tax credits.

Job Creation Tax Credit Program Activity

PARTICIPATING COMPANIES

As of the close of 2013, one hundred and four (104) companies have a fully executed a

Job Creation Commitment Agreement (“Agreement”) with the Department. Of these,

forty five (45) have had the five year period to create the new jobs expire. There are fifty

nine (59) remaining participants – seven which are new in 2013. The chart reflects the

year in which the approved applicants applied and the number of applicants/participants

whose Agreement was fully executed as of the end of 2013.

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Participating firms represent at least a dozen industries. Companies engaged in Retail

Trade and Professional Services represents the largest segment of participants, with 43

firms. Information, Finance & Insurance, and Real Estate entities are nearly a quarter of

the participating businesses. Although Healthcare and Education are significant segments

of the Philadelphia economy, they represent less than 10 percent of participants. This

may be explained by the fact that many organizations in these sectors are nonprofits that

do not have Business Income and Receipts Tax liabilities..

0

5

10

15

20

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

JCTC Participants 11 8 10 9 4 12 7 5 19 12 7

JCTC Participants

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INDUSTRY

NUMBER OF

PARTICIPANTS

Construction 1

Manufacturing 9

Retail Trade 13

Transportation 1

Information 10

Finance &

Insurance 10

Real Estate 4

Professional

Services 30

Administrative

Services 4

Educational

Services 1

Healthcare 6

Food 4

Other 11

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JOB CREATION

Overall, participating firms have committed to generating 6388 new jobs in the City.

Forty Five (45) participants, whose five year period to create jobs have expired, have not

fulfilled their commitment. Hence, 3297 of the promised 6388 new jobs are not expected

to be created. The chart below illustrates the number of proposed new jobs by businesses

with fully executed Agreements as of the end of 2013 and the number of jobs certified as

created. In 2003, the first year of the program, 1,266 jobs were proposed, of which 40

have been created to date. Approximately half the positions committed to in 2003 were

by a firm that is no longer in business, and thus the full 1,266 jobs will not be created.

Through 2013, 1,057 (17%) of all proposed new jobs have been certified as created by

the Department of Revenue. As firms have 5 years from the designated start date to

create the positions, the percentage of jobs actually created may grow in the coming

years.

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Proposed Jobs 1266 356 945 322 425 1011 189 67 1038 491 278

Jobs created 40 263 54 35 20 540 0 0 11 94 0

0

500

1000

1500 Jobs Proposed and Created through 2013

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Since the inception of the program, the Department of Revenue has issued $1,778,136 in

tax certificates, of which $1,546,373 tax credits have been claimed by (20) participating

firms against Business Income and Receipts Tax liability. Businesses have 5 years from

the date of issuance of the certificate to claim the credit, but in no case can it be longer

than 8 years from the designated start date.

Incentive for Higher-Paying Jobs

The New Jobs Tax Credit is an economic development tool that set a standard for job

quality because only full-time positions that pay at least 150 percent of the federal

minimum wage are eligible for tax credit purposes.

Subsequently, as mentioned, the tax credit ordinance was amended to include an

alternative to the $1000 per new job credit. The amendment, titled “Keep Philadelphia

Competitive (KPC) Tax Credit”, offers a credit of two percent of the annual wage of each

new job or the original $1000 credit, whichever is greater.

The KPC Tax Credit was conceived by center city building owners in response to the

proposed development of a new Comcast headquarters as a virtually tax-free site under

the state’s Keystone Opportunity Zone (KOZ) program. The building owners feared that

Comcast would not utilize all of the proposed office space and would be able to steal

some of their current and prospective tenants by offering them KOZ benefits, which abate

most taxes. The building owners felt that approval of KOZ benefits by local and state

government would give Comcast an unfair advantage – and they were right. Instead, they

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sought the enactment of the KPC Tax Credit legislation creating a multi-year benefit for

anyone creating new jobs, as a replacement for the KOZ legislation which would offer

benefits to only a few. The building owners lobbied City Council to approve the KPC

legislation and to reject the KOZ legislation. Of course, City Council simply approved

both measures, after the Street administration forged a compromise on the KPC bill. The

administration believed that the multi-year benefit would be too costly, so the legislation

was amended to make it a one-time credit like the New Jobs Tax Credit. I voted against

the Comcast KOZ legislation but it was overwhelmingly approved by City Council –

only to be rejected by the state legislature. Instead, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

gave Comcast a $30 million grant for the development project.

The Keep Philadelphia Competitive Tax Credit, as amended, was unanimously approved

by City Council and signed into law by the mayor. It was a better incentive for businesses

creating higher-paying jobs over $50,000 annually.

Ex-Offender Job Creation Tax Credit

In the summer of 2006, as the murder rate was rising, and the next municipal election was

approaching, there was an abundance of law-and-order policy posturing from prospective

candidates. The competition began over who would hire the most police – in order to

reduce the murder rate.

Any rational and objective analysis of murders in this city will always point to a trend of

victim-specific crimes that occur mostly among male ex-offenders of color – within a

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certain age group of high school drop-outs – at certain times of day, in certain places.

Even if you deploy more police based upon that analysis, they are certainly not needed

citywide to stop most of the murders, which are not random. Similar to the question of

“who shall be poor”, we generally know already who shall kill or be killed in

Philadelphia – they are mostly ex-offenders.

As a tool to stem the tide of recidivism for ex-offenders, and hopefully, to save and

change their lives, I amended my New Jobs Tax Credit program to reserve a portion of

the tax credits for the employment of ex-offenders in 2004. It didn’t work. So, during the

summer of 2006, I decided to increase the tax credit amount, as mentioned, to $5000 per

hire for ex-offenders. I e-mailed Mayor Street about the idea and he responded with

immediate support. The amendment creating the increased incentive was unanimously

approved by City Council and signed into law by the mayor – but it didn’t work either.

Nevertheless, it balanced the debate over how to deal with crime and gun violence in this

city. More people now acknowledge that recidivism and ex-offender re-entry efforts are

as important as the number -and deployment - of police.

PREP Tax Credit

Among those who embraced more balance between better policing and prisoner re-entry

efforts was mayoral candidate Nutter, who crafted the Philadelphia Re-Entry

Employment Program (PREP) as part of his campaign platform. Nutter voted for my

earlier legislative efforts when he was a councilman, but he decided to design his own

program for his mayoral administration.

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After he won the Democratic nomination to become mayor, he called me during the

summer of 2007 and asked if I would introduce his PREP legislation in the fall and

shepherd it through the legislative process. I gladly accepted the challenge.

After negotiations with the Greater Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce, and despite the

objections of the Street Administration, the PREP legislation was unanimously approved

by City Council and signed into law by Mayor Street. In fact, Nutter returned to City

Council to testify on behalf of the PREP bill as the first witness. It remains to be seen

how effective the PREP law will be.

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Philadelphia Minimum Wage Standard

I have introduced over 140 bills in City Council – and about ninety percent of them have

already been signed into law. But 2004 was not a very successful year in my legislative

career. Only three of the seven bills that I introduced became law which is the reason that

I compromised on the KPC Tax Credit. The unsuccessful year came after all eighteen of

the bills that I previously introduced had become law, including one that required a veto

override. I began to reevaluate my work – but things got worse before they got better.

In spring of 2005, I saw a news report that a man named “James Goode” was arrested for

holding a woman hostage and beating her in the head with a hammer while on a crack

binge. There were a few people named “James Goode” in our family but only one that fit

the description. I called my immediate family to find out if it could be him. No one was

sure. Then, I received a call from the police commissioner, Sylvester Johnson, who asked

to visit me in my office. I knew what that meant. The commissioner informed me that it

was one of my cousins who had been arrested. I was stunned.

It was not difficult for many people to understand how something like this could happen

because the crack epidemic has impacted so many families throughout Philadelphia. Yet,

it was still hard for me to reconcile how my family was, in many cases, leading divergent

lifestyles. I decided that I should seclude myself for awhile – and rethink my legislative

agenda. I took the first day to review my work from my first term, as well as my original

goals. I concluded that my legislative track record was substantial with regard to

community economic development. But I was still practicing “trickle-down” economics,

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even if the “trickle-down” starting point for me was at the community level and in

disadvantaged neighborhoods. Other than the New Jobs Tax Credit – there was nothing

that I had done that was directly linked to opportunities for individuals. So I then focused

on the New Jobs Tax Credit program, and thought, what else within it could be expanded

to create new opportunities for the individuals who are most at-risk?

I eventually had a breakthrough – I realized that the job quality provision of the program

needed to be extended beyond the tax credit. The tax credit only applied to jobs that paid

at least 150 percent of the federal minimum wage. I decided that a similar standard

should be used for other jobs supported by local tax dollars. The idea eventually

developed into the 21st Century Minimum Wage Standard Ordinance, unanimously

approved by City Council and signed into law by the mayor on May 26, 2005.

I spent my time, in seclusion at home, researching various models of living wage

legislation. After learning from those models, I began to outline my legislation, mostly

based upon the Sonoma, CA model that I found on the Living Wage Resource Center

Website. The site was developed by ACORN (Association of Community Organizations

for Reform Now). I then forwarded my draft to city council’s technical staff to have it put

in proper form for introduction.

When I returned for the next council meeting, I was ready to introduce the legislation, but

I wanted it to be co-sponsored by every member of council. I was concerned about the

new measure because a previous attempt to enact living wage legislation failed during the

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1990s, before I was a member of council.

After the legislation was co-introduced and sponsored by all seventeen members of

council, I quickly arranged for separate meetings with the mayor, the Greater

Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce (Chamber) and ACORN.

The Chamber blocked legislation in the 1990s, in part, because the federal minimum

wage had just been raised. Almost a decade later, the state and federal minimum wage

had not moved above $5.15 per hour. The local standard, set at 150 percent, would make

$7.72 the minimum hourly wage for covered employees in Philadelphia. The legislation

was crafted, setting the local standard at 150 percent of the state or federal minimum

wage (whichever is higher), taking into consideration the changing political dynamics in

both the state and federal legislatures. After amendments were negotiated with various

stakeholders, we were ready for the hearing. The legislation was referred to the

Commerce and Economic Development Committee which I chaired since 2004. The

Chamber did not testify at the hearing but both ACORN and the Street Administration

testified in favor of the amended version.

On June 19, 2014, over nine years later, Philadelphia City Council unanimously approved

my New Living Wage Standard Bill permanently raising the city’s minimum wage

standard which was then set at $10.88 per hour. The new standard requires that the

employer shall pay each employee an hourly wage equal to at least the higher of: (a)

150% of the federal minimum wage or (b) $12.00 multiplied by the CPI Multiplier.

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The CPI Multiplier shall be calculated by the Director of Finance for wages to be paid on

or after January 1 of each year by dividing the most recently published Consumer Price

Index for all Urban Consumers (CPI-U) All Items Index, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, as

of January 1 of each such year, by the most recently published CPI-U as of January 1,

2015.

The employers that shall comply with the minimum compensation standards established

by the proposed ordinance are: (1) The City of Philadelphia, including all its agencies,

departments and offices; (2) For-profit Service Contractors, which receive or are

subcontractors at any tier on contract(s) for $10,000 or more from the City in a twelve-

month period, with annual gross receipts of more than $1,000,000; (3)Non-profit Service

Contractors which receive or are subcontractors at any tier on contract(s) from the City of

more than $100,000 in a twelve-month period; (4) Recipients of City leases, concessions,

or franchises, or subcontractors or subrecipients thereof at any tier ; (5) City financial aid

recipients. Compliance shall be required for a period of five (5) years following receipt of

aid; and (6) Public agencies which receive contract(s) for $10,000 or more from the City

in a twelve-month period.

The new ordinance requires that every City contract, lease, license, concession

agreement, franchise agreement or agreement for financial aid with an employer

described in the bill shall contain provisions requiring the employer to comply with the

requirements as they exist on the date when the employer entered into its agreement with

the City or when such agreement is amended. Such agreement provisions shall require the

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employer to promptly provide to the City documents and information verifying its

compliance with the requirements, and provide for sanctions for non-compliance. Such

agreement provisions shall also require the employer to notify each of its affected

employees with regard to the wages that are required to be paid. Such agreement

provisions shall also require the employer to pass along the requirements to

subcontractors and subrecipients at any tier.

The employers must also offer comparable health benefits to full-time employees and up

to 56 hours of earned sick leave as the minimum benefits standard.

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Diversity in City Contracting

The Minority Business Enterprise Council (MBEC) was created in the early 1980s before

the city had elected its first African-American mayor. Before its creation, businesses

owned by people of color and women received next to nothing in terms of city

contracting dollars used to purchase goods and services. There was no diversity in city

contracting, business owned by white males received over 99 percent of purchasing

dollars. Not much was changed by the original MBEC ordinance until it was used as a

diversity tool by my father’s administration, after he was elected mayor.

Mayor W. Wilson Goode, Sr. (1984-1992) was responsible for more contracting with

minority- and women-owned businesses – over $500 million – than all of his

predecessors combined. He set the bar higher for his successors, but neither Ed Rendell

nor John Street had a passion for diversity in city contracting. Their track records speak

for themselves. In fact, one disparity study conducted related to their tenures showed that

almost 98 percent of purchasing dollars was still being spent with businesses owned by

white males.

Coming into office, almost two decades after the MBEC ordinance, one of my primary

legislative goals was to increase city contract participation for disadvantaged business

enterprises (DBEs). I was given an early opportunity to promote that agenda with the

construction of new sports stadiums for football and baseball. Before City Council gave

final approval to the stadium projects, aggressive goals were set for increased DBE

participation. But, there were no such goals set for city contracting by Mayor Street.

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The biggest challenge to expanding DBE participation in city contracting was simply

getting basic information. If we couldn’t even receive accurate data on current

participation levels, and on a consistent basis, how could we expand participation? The

situation became so ridiculous that MBEC testified at budget hearings without offering

any new data, year after year, claiming that it was still awaiting the completion of a

disparity study that began under the Rendell administration and was not yet completed.

The strategy appeared to be that by withholding information, MBEC would avoid any

analysis of the administration’s track record. In 2003, during an election year for mayor,

City Council took legislative action by approving a new ordinance to replace the original

MBEC ordinance. The mayor signed the legislation into law in a public ceremony. After

he was re-elected, the Law Department, under his supervision, issued an opinion that the

ordinance was invalid because City Council had exceeded its authority under the Home

Rule Charter. In that opinion, it was illegal for us to craft legislation on city procurement

procedures because that was the exclusive purview of the mayor and his administration.

City Council battled the administration for several years over the matter, still not

receiving consistent information on DBE contract participation. In 2006, I decided to

introduce legislation that would change the Home Rule Charter. The charter amendment

would not take any procurement power away from the executive branch, but instead, it

would add responsibilities to the executive branch. The amendment would require the

Finance Director to issue an annual report that analyzes DBE participation and sets

participation goals for the next fiscal year. The legislation was unanimously approved by

council on June 1, 2006 and the charter amendment was approved by the voters.

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Through City Council’s pressure on the Street Administration, and the charter change

approved by voters, DBE participation has risen above 20 percent of total contract dollars

but remained stagnant under the Nutter administration. The annual disparity study and

goal-setting requirement at least offers transparency in terms of diversity in city

contracting.

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CONCLUSION

There is no question that “I do the type of work that I do" because I believe that there

should be a direct connection between the political empowerment of disadvantaged

people and the creation of economic opportunities for them. That’s simply what I

understand as the purpose for politics.

I have been constantly encouraged to write about my legislative and policy work by my

father and others – to document how interconnected that work has been over the last 15

years - not just locally, but nationally.

In the Spring of 2012, I travelled to Washington, D.C. to meet with a dozen City Council

members from across the country at the Center for American Progress – all of us were

“self-identified” progressive lawmakers. Within six months, we formed Local Progress,

the national municipal policy network.

Within two years, Local Progress grew to over 350 local elected officials representing

municipalities in 40 states. Our membership includes the mayors of New York, Los

Angeles, Pittsburgh, and Seattle; a majority of the San Francisco City Council; and strong

blocks of the city councils in Atlanta, Chicago, Denver, New York, Philadelphia,

Phoenix, San Diego, and Seattle. We have an active 15-member Board and I serve as a

Founding Board Member. I also serve as National Chairman of the Local Progress on

Good Jobs Campaign.

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I mention all of this because our local action is, in fact, part of a growing national

movement to address income inequality and other progressive issues – and Philadelphia

has a leadership role in that movement. That’s Goode Progress!

Local Progress 2013 Annual Conference Photo

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