Go v. CAG.R. No. 101837February 11, 1992Rule 113: Arrest

FACTS:On 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan, the victim was driving his car along Wilson St. San, Juan. On the other hand, Rolito Go, petitioner, entered Wilson St., which is a one-way street and started travelling in the opposite or “wrong” direction. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos St., petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Petitioner then alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene.

A security at a nearby restaurant was able to take down the plate number of the car and the police arrived shortly at the scene of the shooting to retrieve an empty shell and one round of live ammunition (9 mm caliber pistol). The car was then verified to be registered under the name of an Elsa Ang Go. The police returned to the scene of the shooting the next day to find out where the petitioner came from. The police were informed that petitioner had dined in Cravings Bakeshop shortly before the shooting

They obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by petitioner at the cashier. The security guard of the bakeshop was shown a picture of the petitioner and positively identified the same as the person who shot Maguan.

The police later on launched a manhunt for petitioner. On July 8, 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan police, accompanied by two lawyers, to verify news reports regarding the manhunt. The police detained him and an eyewitness, who was at the police station that day, verified that petitioner was indeed the same person who shot Maguan.

The police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide. The prosecution informed petitioner that he can avail of the right to preliminary investigation as long as he sign a waiver of Article 125 of the RPC but petitioner refused to sign such waiver. Hence, no preliminary investigation was conducted.

Facts just in case sir asks but its related to Rule 112 more than Rule 113

Petitioner would pray at the office of the Prosecutor for bail and contend that the warrantless arrest was unlawful and no preliminary investigation was conducted. The provincial prosecutor had granted such request and filed it with the RTC. The RTC had granted such, but the following day had recalled the grant of bail and likewise cancelled the preliminary investigation asked for by the petitioner.both later on granted and then recalled, the preliminary investigation likewise cancelled.

Petitioner would file certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the Supreme Court assailing the July 17 Order that recalled his bail, cancelled his preliminary investigation, considered his earlier immediate release (when his bail was granted) as a mere petition for bail, and set a hearing for such. The motions were remanded to the Court of Appeals, but respondent judge issued an order already setting the arraignment of petitioner.

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This arraignment pushed through on August 23, 1991 despite motion of petitioner to restrain the same. The criminal case commenced and prosecution even presented witnesses. The Court of Appeals denied the earlier motions of petitioner. It held that the warrantless arrest was valid because the offense had been “freshly committed” and that his identity had been established. It also held that he actually waived any irregularity of his arrest when he posted for bail. This included waiving his right to a preliminary investigation.

The OSG submitted in this case that petitioner was validly arrested six days after commission of the offense and invoked the case(s) Nazareno v Station Commander et al consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil etc v Ramos (together with seven other cases) where the Court upheld the validity of the warrantless arrest even after 14 days from the time of the killing.

ISSUES: 1) Whether the petitioner’s warrantless arrest was valid?2) Whether petitioner waived his right to preliminary investigation?

HELD: No.

1) Nope. The general rule is that there must be a valid warrant before one can be arrested. Rule 113 Sec. 5 is an exception. It is however required to meet the requirements under Sec. 5 before one can be validly arrested without a warrant.

Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceed against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

a)Both petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, where the Court upheld the warrantless arrest even if the arrest was only 14 days after the actual commission as the offense is a “continuing crime” i.e. subversion, membership in an outlawed organization, etc. Thus, it is not applicable to this crime. (It means that until arrested the person is still committing the crime.)

The petitioner's “arrest” taking place on 6 days after the shooting. The crime not also being a continuing crime. Thus, it cannot be construed that the “arresting” officers obviously were present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan.

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b)Neither could the “arrest” effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected “when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed” within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the “arresting” officers had any “personal knowledge” of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute “personal knowledge.”

c)Lastly, the petitioner is not a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

2) No.

In view of the above, the allegation of the prosecution that petitioner needs to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code before a preliminary investigation may be conducted is baseless. In this connection, petitioner has all the right to ask for a preliminary investigation to determine whether is probable cause that a crime has been committed and that petitioner is probably guilty thereof as well as to prevent him from the hassles, anxiety and aggravation brought by a criminal proceeding. This reason of the accused is substantial, which he should not be deprived of.

On the other hand, petitioner did not waive his right to have a preliminary investigation contrary to the prosecutor's claim. The right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a pleas at arraignment. The facts of the case show that petitioner insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment and he, through his counsel denied answering questions before the court unless they were afforded the proper preliminary investigation. For the above reasons, the petition was granted and the ruling of the appellate court was set aside and nullified. The Supreme Court however, contrary to petitioner's allegation, declared that failure to accord the right to preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the information charging the latter of the crime of murder.

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