GNSS Interference cases’ handling and the fight against ... · NOTE: Ordinance n° 2011-1012,...

GNSS Interference cases’ handling and the

fight against the spread of illegal GNSS

jammers by ANFR, the French spectrum

management and monitoring authority

Catherine GABAY

Deputy Director Spectrum Monitoring and Enforcement

ANFR

[email protected]

RFI 2019

Toulouse, 23 - 26 September 2019

mailto:[email protected]

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Amélioration dans la lutte contre les

brouilleurs illicites

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1. GNSS interferences’ threat 2. ANFR’s experience : 2.1. Legal grounds

2.2. ANFR’s role and organization for spectrum monitoring and enforcement

2.3. GNSS jammers’s spread risk analysis 2.4. GNSS interference cases’ handling 2.5. The fight against the spread of illegal GNSS jammers 2.6. Awareness-raising actions 3. Analysis of the benchmark results on practices (technical, legal,

operational and pedagogical) in GNSS jamming cases investigations and fighting against illegal GNSS jammers by CEPT administrations

GNSS interference cases’ investigations and fighting against the spread of illegal GNSS jammers

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An increasing number of public, safety and scientific services and economic sectors rely

on GNSS for positioning and timing and synchronization services, for example transportation, emergency services, energy, television and mobile operators’ networks and timing community.

A great number of scientific applications rely on GNSS positioning and timing information: Ionospheric monitoring for space weather, ionosphere science, … Atmospheric monitoring from ground receivers, radiocculation from LEO satellites,

meteoroloy, climatology, atmosphere science, radiometer calibrations and/or replacements, …

Geodesy Precise Orbit and Clocks monitoring ( relativity effect checkings, … ) GNSS reflectometry for altimetry, oceanic surface wind monitoring Etc..

1. GNSS interferences’ threat: risk analysis and the case of GNSS jammers

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Therefore GNSS jammers, even low powered ones, are a threat, on economic, safety , scientific and security terms, to an increasing number of services.

The effect of small GNSS jammers may be of a few hundred meters on the ground and more vertically around the equipment where GNSS receivers are blocked

Meanwhile, the easiness to buy jammers notably on

e-commerce web sites is a great matter of concern.

France regards as very important securing GNSS frequencies and fighting against the spread of illegal GNSS jammers.

ANFR, the French spectrum national management and monitoring authority is involved in many different actions, preventive and proactive, on that matter.


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The spread of GNSS jammers is a threat to GNSS services. Spoofers, pseudolites and repeaters must also be considered.

Photo from Strike 3 project presentation

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Article L.33-3-1 of the CPCE (postal and electronic communications code) is the legal basis for

ANFR’s actions against illegal jammers. It forbids importation, advertising, transferring whether for consideration or free of charge, entry into service, installation, possession and use of jammers https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070987&idArticle=LEGIARTI000024506235

Free translation of article L.33-3-1 of CPCE : I. “ Are prohibited any of the following activities : importation, advertising, transferring whether

for consideration or free of charge, entry into service, installation, possession and use of any device intended to render inoperative an electronic communication equipment of any type, for transmission or reception.

II. By way of derogation, these activities are authorised for the needs of public order, defence and national security, or for the public service of justice.

NOTE: Ordinance n° 2011-1012, article 57: These provisions enter into force on 1rst February 2012, however, radio-electric installations able to render inoperative mobile phones of all types, as much for transmission as reception, installed inside performance halls (concert halls, auditoria, theatres, and cinema) at the date of publication of the present ordinance, shall continue to be authorized for a period of five years from this date. Within that period, the use of these installations shall remain subject to the provisions defined by the implementing of article L.36-6 of the same code according to the 2° of article L.33-3 in its version prior to that derived from the present ordinance.”

2. ANFR’s experience 2.1. Legal grounds

https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070987&idArticle=LEGIARTI000024506235
















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Criminal sanctions are applicable in the event of non-compliance with Article L. 33-3-1 of the

CPCE and described in article L.39-1 of CPCE Violation of the prohibitions laid down by the I of article L.33-3-1 of the Code (CPCE)

renders the offender liable to 6 months’ imprisonment and a fine of 30.000€ (Article L.39-1 4 ° of the CPCE, Code for Post and electronic Communications).

https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070987&idArticle=LEGIARTI000024506242&dateTexte=20120123

ANFR may also raise a tax of 450 € for its intervention fees if the jammer is found in the

course of a jamming case intervention (Finance Law)

https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000317305

Free translation of the legal text : “Law of Finances n° 86-1317 of 30th December 1986 for 1987. Modified by Law n° 2015-1785 of 29th December 2015. (…) II. Intervention costs incurred by the use of a frequency or of a radio-electric device without authorization when this is required or outside the legal and regulatory conditions, having caused or being capable of causing interference to a frequency assigned according to the rules , give rise the payment of a flat rate tax of 450 € per intervention. This tax is payable by the responsible person.”

































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ANFR, the French Spectrum Agency, is an administrative public body set up by the

telecommunications regulatory law (26th July 1996). The law confers on ANFR a mission of management of the radio-electric spectrum in France. ANFR is present all over French territories, both metropolitan and overseas, thanks to its regional centers and local units.

ANFR has also as one of its tasks spectrum monitoring and enforcement (Articles L.

43 and R. 20-44-11 of CPCE) in order to preserve the use of spectrum by authorized users and to ensure spectrum users’ coexistence. Within this framework, ANFR undertakes preventive and corrective actions. ANFR eligible and sworn agents notably undertake preventive controls of radio-electric stations and radio-electric market surveillance (RED and RTTE directives) and intervene in case of jamming cases reported to ANFR.

For the provisions of articles L.33-3.1 and L.39-1 of the Code for Post and

Electronic Communications (CPCE), ANFR (French Spectrum Agency) is in charge of monitoring and enforcing.


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Spectrum Monitoring and Enforcement : ANFR’s role and regulation

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Preventive monitoring actions

Inspection of Radio Stations

Inspection of Radioelectrical Independent Networks

Control of HF Frequencies bands

Inspection of Radio Equipments onboard Ships

Checking of the conformity of radio equipments available for sale

Curative interventions

Treatment of cases of interference reported by frequencies’ holders (government administrations, regulation authorities, mobile operators, …)

Treatment of cases of border interference reported by foreign countries

Awareness-raising activities Production of documents and dissemination to the actors concerned, to promote a correct use of the frequencies, notably open frequencies

Actions during major events Preventive and curative monitoring actions during the course of main events Temporary spectrum allocation and control

ANFR, the French Spectrum Management Agency, public administrative establishment, has notably the mission of Spectrum monitoring and enforcement, that is the monitoring of the use

of frequencies and the securing of the coexistence between spectrum users.

2. ANFR’s experience 2.2. ANFR’s role and organization for spectrum monitoring and enforcement

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4 strategy, management and expertise departments 7 local centres for a strong local technical presence

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ANFR Spectrum Monitoring and Enforcement Directorate is organized into 4 departments (spectrum monitoring engineering, conformity monitoring, maritime radio equipment monitoring, technical monitoring including interference cases’handling) and 7 local centres in the metropolitan and overseas territories


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ANFR, the French Spectrum Management Agency, public administrative establishment,

has notably the mission of Spectrum monitoring and enforcement,

that is the monitoring of the use of frequencies and the securing of the coexistence between

spectrum users.

Good to know : Use of frequencies without approval (when necessary) or outside the legal and regulatory conditions, having caused or which could cause interference, may give rise to notification of a flat-rate tax of 450 € per ANFR’s intervention, to confiscation by a police officer of the incriminated equipment and to criminal prosecution according to the Article L39-1 3° of the PECC (Postal and Electronic Communications Code). The offender is liable to a penalty of 6 months' imprisonment and a 30 000 € fine. Jammers : Under regulation, the French Post and Electronic Communications Code (CPCE) prevents strictly both using and detaining a jammer (except for the needs of Public Order, Defense and National Security, or for the Public Service of Justice) and is punishable by up to a fine of 30 000 euros and 6 month of imprisonment ( articles L33-3-1 and L39-1 of the code).

Spectrum Monitoring and Enforcement : ANFR’s role


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Evaluation, trend and dynamics of the number and technicity of GNSS jammers in

circulation

Strike3 project (under H 2020-Galileo) (2016-2019). In countries participating in the project, including France, some specific sensors have been installed, notably along roads. ANFR is itself experiencing GNSS jammers’ sensors installed in specific places to

count GNSS jammers passing by and collect information about their spectral signatures

Research and development in GNSS jammers’ sensors :

ANFR manufactures its own sensors to detect GNSS jammers as part of its innovation activities in spectrum monitoring engineering or when investigating GNSS interference cases

ANFR experiments off-the-shelf sensors

2. ANFR’s experience 2.3. GNSS jammers’s spread risk analysis

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Sensor built by ANFR :GPS receiver with RS-232 interfaces and USB connector and built-

in active antenna. It records and analyses variation of the SNR (Signal to Noise Ratio) in the NMEA standard.

2. ANFR’s experience 2.3. GNSS jammers’ spread risk analysis

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Sensor built by ANFR : horn antenna connected to a receiver. The spectrum shape is checked for possible RFI on L1.


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2. ANFR’s experience 2.3. GNSS jammers’ spread risk analysis ANFR experiments a DETECTOR product from NSL

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ANFR experiments a CTL3520 product from Chronos

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GNSS interference cases are reported to ANFR for investigation Assigned authorities for GNSS frequencies in France are Civil Aviation (DGAC, Directorate for

Civil Aviation), Space (CNES) and Defence (Ministry of Defence).

Most GNSS interference cases investigation requests received by ANFR are from Civil Aviation).

ANFR controllers operate technical equipment fixed or projectable on-site (transportable or mobile) to monitor the use of spectrum, to detect possible non authorized emissions and to diagnose interference cases.

To complete the jamming case investigation, they may need to seek assistance of a judiciary police officer, i.e. for the seizure of a GNSS jammer, for finding the identity of the driver of a vehicle by its plate number, vehicle in which ANFR is suspecting the use of a GNSS jammer thanks to its technical measurements, or for organizing an operation to intercept the jammer’s user in obvious offence (“flagrante delicto”). In these interception operations, ANFR can act as an expert (checking the seized jammer, analysing the jamming signal, ..) and help the police characterize the infringement.

The judicial follow-up of the operation, is decided by the public prosecutor. If applicable, it may be the occasion for ANFR to intervene, for example as an expert or a witness in court.

2. ANFR’s experience 2.4. GNSS interference cases’ handling

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Most GNSS interference cases encountered so far are caused by GNSS jammers used

by drivers who want to escape the surveillance organized through a tracker by their employer for privacy or for criminal activities.

This means that GNSS jammers are in moving vehicles which makes it difficult for monitoring and enforcement purposes.

In recent cases, ANFR has experienced innovative processes including sensors placed by high traffic roads and close cooperation with police forces.


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Examples of GNSS interference investigations undertaken and resolved by ANFR 2015 Lyon- Bron / Lyon airport 2016 Rouen airport 2017 Nantes Airport 2017 Isle d’Abeau near Lyon airport End 2018 / GNSS interference report from the Civil Aviation directorate to ANFR / GNSS

interference impacting Lyon-Bron airport 2019 / GNSS interference report from the Civil Aviation directorate to ANFR / GNSS

interference impacting Lyon-Bron airport 2019 / GNSS interference report from the Civil Aviation directorate to ANFR / GNSS

interference mainly impacting helicopters near Marignane airport


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• The Lyon Regional Centre of ANFR intervened in March 2015 on a GNSS jamming case reported by the French Civil Aviation Authority (DGAC) in March 2015.

• This GNSS jamming case was impacting Lyon airport.

• ANFR intervened with Vaulx-en-Velin police officer who confiscated a GPS jammer in a truck and held the offender in custody.

• The offender wanted to escape his employer’s surveillance.

• The offender was judged by the Court of First Instance of Lyon on 15th October 2015 and condemned to a suspended fine of 1000 €.

• The offender has also received on October 20th 2015 from ANFR a notification to pay an administrative fee of 450 euros.

• This case resulted in an article in the local press (Le Progrès)

GNSS jamming case in Lyon airport in 2015 (1/3)

2. ANFR ’s experience 2.4. GNSS interference cases’ handling

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GNSS jamming case in Lyon airport in 2015 (2/3)


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• Lyon-Bron / Lyon Airport (March 2015)

GNSS jamming case near Lyon airport in 2015 (3/3)


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• The ANFR’s Regional Centre of Villejuif intervened in August 2016 on a GNSS jamming case reported by the French Civil Aviation Authority (DGAC).

• This GNSS jamming case was impacting Rouen airport

• It was detected by the inspection plane for GNSS procedures.

• ANFR located and identified a GNSS jammer in an individual’s professional car parked in the city of Blainville Crevon .

• The offender, who refused to admit to ANFR’s agents he was using a GPS jammer, wanted to escape his employer’s surveillance.

• ANFR has reported the facts to the prosecution department.

• The Public prosecutor has issued discontinuation of prosecution

GNSS jamming case in Rouen airport in 2016


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Authorized and sworn ANFR’s officers intervened on-site on April 2017 the 21rst with the Air and Border Police.

ANFR intervened in Nantes airport upon a request received from Civil Aviation, which complained on April 21st of interferences of GPS L1 frequencies (1572,42 MHz).

GNSS jamming case in Nantes airport in 2017 (1/6)

Identification of the jammer location in a car parked in the vicinity of the airport


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• ANFR’s officers established the use of a GPS jammer which was installed in a car parked in the vicinity of the airport, as the cause of the interferences

• ANFR’s team could locate in the trunk of the car and deactivate the jammer



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• This jamming has, in the present case, prevented the flight programming of some airplanes and caused the late take-off for some planes.



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• The offender has been summoned to appear in front of the 6th Division of the Nantes Court of First Instance on August 2017 the 9th.

• During this hearing, Civil Aviation, the original complainant, was represented by the Department of Aviation Safety for West France. ANFR was also present and could express itself during the hearing as an expert.

• The Public Prosecutor requested a suspended prison sentence for 3 months and a 2000 euros fine as well as the confiscation of the jamming equipment



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• The Court judged the offender guilty of several offenses: having detained, installed and used a GPS jammer, and condemned him to a 2000 euros fine as well as the confiscation of the jamming equipment.

• The offender had already reimbursed fees for the opening of his car

• The offender has also received from ANFR a notification to pay an administrative fee of 450 euros.



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A large media coverage



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• On 5th Jul 2017, during a checking of the GNSS frequency while getting back from another intervention, the ANFR Regional Centre of Lyon detected near Isle d’Abeau (38), the use of a GNSS jammer onboard a truck.

• As the truck was moving, ANFR agents could not intervene at that particular time and took note of the lisence plate number .

• ANFR contacted the Bourgoin-Jallieu Public prosecutor for an investigation to be opened in order to find the driver’s identity. ANFR also asked for assistance of a judicial police officer to confiscate the jammer.

• An investigation was carried out by the police, in order to find the owner of the vehicle who was finally summoned on March 7th 2018 by St-Quentin-Fallavier police.

• ANFR was present in order to bring its expertise and measure the emissions of the device under investigation (notably the frequencies on which the device emits) to establish its illicit nature

• The driver recognized the facts and its GPS jammer was confiscated. He will have to explain himself before justice in April.

• The case resulted in an article in the local press (le Dauphiné Libéré, 14 th March 2018)



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End 2018 / GNSS interference report from the Civil Aviation directorate to ANFR / GNSS interference impacting Lyon-Bron airport (1/3)

Searching while driving with technical vehicle equiped with spectrum analyzer and

goniometer , on roads around Lyon-Bron airport

Some GNSS jammers’ emissions detected but difficult to identify the vehicle in the heavy flow of vehicle

Finally a vehicle, with a GNSS jammer on board, was identified by ANFR controllers

The file (with the plate number) was passed on by ANFR to the police for investigation, notably the identification of the offender


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End 2018 / GNSS interference report from the Civil Aviation directorate to ANFR / GNSS interference impacting Lyon-Bron airport (2/3) The police organized in October 2018 an interception a flagrante delicto, with ANFR for

technical help. Present for operation : the 2 police officers from the special « aviation transport

brigade » (BGTA) plus 4 police officers from the PSIG (snatch squade), and 2 ANFR controllers.

The driver of the vehicle where the GNSS jammer has been detected by ANFR is arrested by the police and the jammer is further inspected by ANFR controllers on police’s request.

PSIG (« peloton de

surveillance et d’intervention

de la gendarmerie »)


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End 2018 / GNSS interference report from the Civil Aviation directorate to ANFR / GNSS interference impacting Lyon-Bron airport (3/3) The driver of the vehicle where the GNSS jammer has been detected by ANFR is arrested by

the police and the jammer was further inspected by ANFR controllers on police’s request.

The driver told the police he brought its jammer on the Internet (action against the web site in process by ANFR)

The device jammed the following bandwidth : 1557 – 1594 MHz


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2019 / GNSS interference report from the Civil Aviation directorate to ANFR / GNSS interference impacting Lyon-Bron airport (1/5)

Searching for GNSS jammers with a ANFR developed sensor (collecting the spectrum for

analysis) placed by a high traffic road

Analysis of the data collected : deduction of regular times when vehicles equipped with GNSS jammers are passing by the sensor

Installation of ANFR controllers by the road, with the technical vehicle equiped with spectrum analyzer and goniometer at these regular times, in order to confirm the detection and to positively identify the vehicle at stake with following it in the flow of vehicles


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Cooperation with police forces for the organisation of an interception in the flow of trafic

ANFR’s vehicle was parked by the road to inform the police when the vehicle equipped with a

GNSS jammer passes by. The police would then intercept the vehicle in the flow of traffic.


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Two vehicles were intercepted by the police.

The offenders were summoned by the police and will have to answer to justice


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Two jammers were seized by the police and analyzed by ANFR


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2019 / GNSS interference report from the Civil Aviation directorate to ANFR / GNSS interference impacting Lyon-Bron airport (5/5) Large media coverage

Newspaper : https://www.leprogres.fr/rhone-69-edition-villeurbanne-et-caluire/2019/03/16/des-chauffeurs-de-vehicules-utilitaires-interpelles-pour-avoir-utilise-un-brouilleur-de-gps ANFR newsletter: https://www.anfr.fr/fr/toutes-les-actualites/actualites/laction-de-terrain-de-lanfr-pour-debusquer-des-brouilleurs-gps-genant-le-guidage-des-avions/


https://www.leprogres.fr/rhone-69-edition-villeurbanne-et-caluire/2019/03/16/des-chauffeurs-de-vehicules-utilitaires-interpelles-pour-avoir-utilise-un-brouilleur-de-gps



































https://www.anfr.fr/fr/toutes-les-actualites/actualites/laction-de-terrain-de-lanfr-pour-debusquer-des-brouilleurs-gps-genant-le-guidage-des-avions/

































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2019 / GNSS interference report from the Civil Aviation directorate to ANFR / GNSS interference mainly impacting helicopters near Marignane airport (1/5)

Searching for GNSS jammers with a

ANFR developed sensor (NMEA frames analysis and SNR measurement) placed by a high traffic road

Analysis of the data collected : deduction of regular times when vehicles equipped with GNSS jammers are passing by the sensor


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Installation of ANFR controllers by the road, with the technical vehicle equiped with spectrum

analyzer and goniometer at these regular times, in order to confirm the detection and to positively identify the vehicles at stake with following it in the flow of vehicles


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Cooperation with police forces for the organization of an interception in the flow of traffic

ANFR’s vehicle was parked by the road to inform the police when the vehicle equipped with

a GNSS jammer passes by. The police would then intercept the vehicle in the flow of traffic.


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2019 / GNSS interference report from the Civil Aviation directorate to ANFR / GNSS interference mainly impacting helicopters near Marignane airport (4/5) One vehicle was intercepted by the police. The offender was arrested by the police and will

have to answer to justice

One jammer was seized by the police and analyzed by ANFR : multiband jammer

Tanker trucks equipped with GPS jammers stole gasoline from oil refineries, in fact, deliverymen stole gasoline during deliveries


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2019 / GNSS interference report from the Civil Aviation directorate to ANFR / GNSS interference mainly impacting helicopters near Marignane airport (5/5) Large media coverage

Newspaper: Magazine : “L’express” News broadcast: channel 1 (TF1) ANFR newsletter: https://www.anfr.fr/fr/toutes-les-actualites/actualites/laction-de-terrain-de-lanfr-pour-debusquer-des-brouilleurs-gps-genant-le-guidage-des-avions/

2. ANFR ’s experience 2.4 GNSS interference cases’ handling


































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Market surveillance of illegal selling of GNSS jammers is a complex issue. The

subject of GNSS jammers for use in vehicles being easily found notably on e-commerce sites is a concern.

Fighting against the illegal selling of jammers on the Internet is a highly complex issue, as many end providers are from far away countries and web pages hosting their commercial activity are being responsible only on an a posteriori basis in EU countries (European e-commerce directive). Further exchanges between CEPT administrations about strategies and good practices to fight illegal selling and advertising of GNSS jammers on the Internet are of interest.

Cooperation with other administrations in charge of fighting illegal activities

(customs, police, prosecutors as penal sanctions are at stake, ..) : operations undertaken in cooperation between different administrations to strenghten the means and the experience

Awareness-raising activities may be useful for preventing the spread of GNSS jammers : deterring buyers and sellers. (see 2.6)

2. ANFR’s experience 2.5. The fight against the spread of illegal GNSS jammers

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Communication and awareness-raising activities are

specific preventive actions aimed at deterring present and future jammers’ users (i.e. pedagogical leaflet, large mailing towards companies tracking the position of their vehicles, press coverage of repressive actions undertaken by ANFR).

Communication may be directed to the public, professionals, administrations in charge of repression of illegal activities (police, customs, prosecutors), ..

ANFR’ pedagogical leaflet : https://www.anfr.fr/controle-des-frequences/brouillages/actualites/actualite/actualites/brouilleurs-gps-lanfr-sensibilise-aux-dangers/

Explaining the risk of collateral effects, possibly critical, of a GNSS jammer on other services around which rely on GNSS.

Reminder of the legal background for prohibition

and the penalties incurred.

2. ANFR ’s experience 2.6. Awareness-raising actions

https://www.anfr.fr/controle-des-frequences/brouillages/actualites/actualite/actualites/brouilleurs-gps-lanfr-sensibilise-aux-dangers/

















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3. CEPT benchmark Sharing best practices (technical, legal, operational and pedagogical) in GNSS jamming cases investigations and fighting against illegal GNSS jammers in EU countries and beyond

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A questionnaire to CEPT administrations on how GNSS Jamming and illegal GNSS issues are

handled technically, legally and operationally in CEPT countries, initiated by France in FM22, was adopted in the FM (Frequency Management) working group #92 which took place in Vilnius, Lithuania, on 24-28 September 2018.

The questionnaire was addressed in October 2018 to CEPT administrations.

28 of them answered the questionnaire : Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Malta, Montenegro, The Netherlands, Norway, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.

The answers were analyzed within the FM22 group for a presentation in FM working group in June 2019

3. CEPT benchmark Technical, operational and legal actions undertaken by CEPT administrations against GNSS interference and GNSS illegal jammers

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CEPT

The European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations

- CEPT - was established in 1959 by 19 countries, which expanded to 26 during its first ten years. Original members were the monopoly-holding postal and telecommunications administrations. CEPT's activities included co-operation on commercial, operational, regulatory and technical standardisation issues. Today 48 countries are members of CEPT.

ECC : ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS COMMITTEE

The ECC considers and develops policies on electronic communications

activities in European context, taking account of European and international legislations and regulations.


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FM22 : working group on Spectrum Monitoring and Enforcement

FM : working group on Frequency Management (WG FM) : responsible for developing strategies, plans and implementation advice for the management of the radio spectrum.


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Legislation in Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Malta, Montenegro, The Netherlands, Norway, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United Kingdom

The national legal situations are diverse as regards to the prohibition of GNSS jammers

The prohibition regimes relevant to jammers, the responsible monitoring enforcement

bodies and the enforcement powers of spectrum authorities are variable not only according to countries but also within countries themselves.

The legal background has to be considered according to the situation looked at (possession,

use or marketing, marketing being considered as a global notion incorporating selling, importation, advertising, giving, putting onto market).

The legal background can rely on one code, in this case usually the national electronic

communications code, or on several legal codes at the same time, i.e. the electronic communications code, the EMC directive and its transposition, sometimes the RED directive and its transposition, the consumer protection code, the code on arms and weapons.

Most countries where prohibition is applicable have mentioned exemptions to the general prohibition, for instance for national security, defence and prevention of mobile phones’ use in prisons (in this latter case, mobile phone jammers are to be considered).


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Legislation in Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Malta, Montenegro, The Netherlands, Norway, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United Kingdom

Possession of jammers : very diverse answers

Use of jammers : all answering countries forbid the use of jammers. Marketing of jammers : generally prohibited


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GNSS interference investigation cases in Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Malta, Montenegro, The Netherlands, Norway, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United Kingdom

National spectrum monitoring authorities have indicated few (average of 5 per year) or

sometimes no GNSS interference investigation requests in the last years.

When they received GNSS interference investigation requests, they were mainly initiated by their national aviation authority and therefore critical services were at stake (i.e. aircraft navigation and notably approach, landing, and take-off phases of flights).


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GNSS interference investigation cases In regards to the potential number of GNSS jammers in circulation based on 1 to 5 jammers per

day in average as collected by monitoring units installed on high traffic roads or other relevant areas by some countries’ spectrum agencies or within the European Strike3 project, the low number of GNSS interference reported in the last years, may have several reasons that are listed below:

GNSS is yet not “authorized” at all airports for approach, landing, and take-off phases of flights, however the deployment is ongoing;

Civil aviation authorities filter the GNSS interference cases they report to spectrum authorities : When a GNSS interference is being under investigation, they may not send over and over new interference cases reported by pilots as the case is being under treatment, even if occurrences may happen every day as long as the interference source has not been made to stop ; Some GNSS interferences may not be sent to spectrum authorities because they are not permanent and considered impossible to resolve (i.e. GNSS jammers on board moving vehicles)

Some GNSS interferences may not be sent to spectrum authorities, because treated directly by other administrations or by the victim;

Services other than civil aviation may not have yet developed and installed monitoring equipment to alert in case of GNSS interference and may not be aware of it being the cause of unavailability or impairment of one of their services. This may change if they equip themselves in the future and for new services which are under development, like autonomous transportation and 5G mobile services, that will be extremely reliable on GNSS and will certainly check for possible interferences of the GNSS signals


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Over time, the number of GNSS interference cases reported to the spectrum authorities can

be expected to increase as more and new services will rely on GNSS and might want to equip themselves with monitoring units to check the status of GNSS and report potential interferences to the spectrum authority for investigation.

Also to be noted : The number of GNSS jammers said to have been detected, either GNSS only or

multiband, is consistent to the number of GNSS jamming cases sent for investigation in the last years, except for countries which have counted in the number of GNSS detected those which were found by other administrations (i.e. customs or police principally) and brought for expertise to the spectrum authority.

For example, the Netherlands thus declare more than 100 GNSS jammers detected per year, only 2% of them being seized during GNSS interference investigations, the others by the police in the course of other activities.


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Other sources of interference in GNSS RFI cases investigated have been found by the

spectrum authorities, mainly due to equipment in default or frequency band sharing (example: E6 band shared with radio-amateurs). Examples include JTIDS/MIDS and DME, radio-amateurs in L2 Band, faulty antenna coupler AIS / GNSS, indoor TV amplifier in default, unauthorized radio links, unauthorized wireless camera transmission and a faulty radio transmitter of a public local radio broadcaster.

Mobile telephony frequency bands interferences cases also often permit finding GNSS jammers, as the jammers involved are often multi bands and are also impacting GNSS frequencies.

Photo : Example of a multiband jammer detected during an ANFR’s investigation in 2018


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GNSS jammers market surveillance in Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Malta, Montenegro, The Netherlands, Norway, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United Kingdom

The subject of GNSS jammers being easily found on e-commerce sites is a concern Fighting against the illegal selling of jammers on the Internet is a highly complex issue, as many end providers are from far away countries and web pages hosting their commercial activity are being responsible only on an a posteriori basis in EU countries (European e-commerce directive). UK specifically pointed out figures of removed jammers from e-commerce market places. Their figures (229 in 2016; 348 in 2017; 1335 in 2018) do not differentiate GNSS jammers from other jammers uncovered but anecdotally, the vast majority of jammers sold through websites appear to be GNSS jammers for use in vehicles. Further exchanges between CEPT administrations about strategies and good practices to fight illegal selling and advertising of GNSS jammers on the Internet are of interest.


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Awareness-raising activities aimed at preventing the spread of GNSS jammers in Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Malta, Montenegro, The Netherlands, Norway, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United Kingdom

The questionnaire addressed the subject of dissemination and communication actions undertaken by spectrum monitoring and enforcement authorities, alone or in partnership with other entities, in order to increase awareness of the risk of GNSS jammers among all interested parties notably the general public. In effect, two messages seem to be important when reaching the general public: the risk of collateral effects, possibly critical, of a GNSS jammer on other services around which rely on GNSS, and notably because the impact area of a jammer is generally much bigger than what people think; the legal background for prohibition and the penalties incurred by a GNSS jammer’s user. It has also been raised the importance of regular exchanges of knowledge and information with other administrations involved in the course of enforcing the legislative framework related to GNSS jammers, i.e. police forces, customs and members of the justice system. Some countries presented examples of pedagogical practices (i.e. web sites, pedagogical leaflets, media coverage, ..)


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CEPT analysis of the benchmark results :


Agence nationale des fréquences

78, avenue du Général de Gaulle

94704 MAISONS-ALFORT CEDEX

+33 (0)1 45 18 72 72

www.anfr.fr

Join us on :

/anfr

Thank for your attention.

Catherine GABAY Directrice Adjointe du Contrôle du Spectre / Deputy Director Spectrum Monitoring and Enforcement Agence Nationale des Fréquences (ANFR) / French Spectrum Agency Direction du Contrôle du Spectre 112, rue Edouard Vaillant 94815 Villejuif Cedex FRANCE Tel : + 33 (0) 6 32 17 70 22 [email protected]

http://www.anfr.fr/

mailto:[email protected]

GNSS Interference cases’ handling and the fight against ... · NOTE: Ordinance n° 2011-1012,...

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Transcript of GNSS Interference cases’ handling and the fight against ... · NOTE: Ordinance n° 2011-1012,...