Globalization Postcolonial World

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Also by Ankie Hoogvelt THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVELOPING SOCIETIES THE THIRD WORLD IN GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE: An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Concepts and Terms (with A. Puxty) L..-) !:, .of 9,? 6 o:r !lIg939 Globalization and the Postcolonial World The New Political Economy of Development Second Edition Ankie Hoogvelt e, UJ!-\,C' ,.",J (}.)-tl.' f'i).l..; .. tt·, CCF31963

Transcript of Globalization Postcolonial World

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Also by Ankie Hoogvelt

THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVELOPING SOCIETIESTHE THIRD WORLD IN GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT

MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE: An Encyclopedic Dictionaryof Concepts and Terms (with A. Puxty)

C~ UI~O(.)0')q.I{ZL..-) !:, .of 9,?6o:r!lIg939

Globalization and thePostcolonial World

The New Political Economy ofDevelopment

Second Edition

Ankie Hoogvelt

e, UJ!-\,C' ,.",J(}.)-tl.' ~-~,~t[)- f'i).l..; .. tt·,

CCF31963

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*© Ankle Hoogvelt 1997. 2001

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission ofthis publication may be made without wntten permission.

No paragraph of this publicaticn may be reproduced, copiedor transmitted save with written permission or in accordancewith the provisions of the Copyright. Designs and Patents Act1988. or under the terms of any licence permitting lirrutedcopying issued by the Copynght Licensing Agency, 90Tottenham Court Road. London WIP OLP.

Any person who does any unauthorized act m relation to thispublication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civilclaims for damages.

The author has asserted her right to be identified as the authorof this work In accordance with the Copyright, Designs andPatents Act 1988.

Contents

LISt of Figures and Tables

Preface to the Second Edition

Acknowledgements

PART I mSTORICAL STRUCTURES

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First edition 1997Repnnted 1998. 1999. 2000Secondedition 2001

Introduction 3

ISBN 0-333-91419-8 hardbackISBN 0-333-91420-1 paperback

Published by PALGRAVEHoundmills, Basmgstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XSCompanies and representatives throughout the world

This book IS pnnted on paper suitable for recycling and madefrom-fully-managed and sustained forest sources.

:A'.ca-talogue record for tills book IS available from the BritishLibrary.

Pnnted and bound m Great Britain byCreativePrint & Design (Wales), Ebbw Vale

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International political economyThe cntical theory of Robert Cox: historical

structnreHistorical structure and stage theory

The political nature of the capitalist world economyThe dialectical development of capitalism as a world

systemA periodization of capitalist development and

expansionThe mercantile phase of European expansionThe colonial phase of European expansionMarxist theories of capitalist imperialismCritiques of Marxist theories of imperialism

1 The History of Capitalist Expansion

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6 5 4 306 05 04 03

10 9 8 710 09 08 07

2 NeocoIonialism, Modernization and Dependency 29

Global economic pressuresDomestic tensions

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vi Contents COiltents vii

Geopolitical relations 33 6 Globalization 120Modernization theory 34Dependency theory 37 The sociology of globalization 121

Roland Robertson: world compression and global3 Crisis and Restructuring: Tbe New International consciousness 122

Division of Labour 43 David Harvey and Anthony Giddens: time and space 123M anuel Castells: The global. mfonnational network

Material capabilities: global Fordism 44 society 126Neocolonial economic relations 46 The economics of globalization 131Economic nationalism in the Third World 47 A global market discipline 131Changing geopolitical relations 50 A new global division of labour 135Critical theory: diversity and micro-studies 52 Financtartzation 139Gender and development 53 Conclusion 142'Dependency associated' development theory 56Postimperialism and world system theories 57 7 Global Governance: Regulation and Imperialism 144

PART IT CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION Global governance and the internationalization ofthe state 148

Introduction 63 Globalization and globalism 153Globalization and US strategic dominance 155

4 From Expansion to Involution 67 Imperialism and hegemony 159Conclusion 162

World trade: long-term trends 67Foreign direct investment (FDI) and the growth of PARTIII THE POSTCOLONIAL WORLD

multinational enterprises 77World capital flows: other resource flows 80 Introduction 165Global financial deepening and the structural position

of the Third World 85 The postcolonial: condition and discourse 166Core-periphery: from structural exploitation to structural Postcolomal formations 17l

irrelevance 89Conclusion 91 8 Africa: Exclusion and the Containment of Anarchy 173

5 Flexibility and Informationalism 94 Debt and developmentalism 176Debt, globalization and the neo-liberal agenda 178

Pathways ont of Fordism 95 The role of the IMF and the World Bank 180Informational production and the network enterprise 103 Structural adjustment in Africa: the social andThe New Economy 109 economic record 181Theorizing the transition 113 Structural adjustment: intensifying global relations 183Conclusion 118 Democracy and economic reform 185

Economic reform and anarchy 187

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9 Islamic Revolt 197

Spiritual renewal 200The West confronts Islam 203Education and Orientalization 206The failure of dependent development 208The nse of Islamist new intellectuals and the politics

of antI-developmentalism 211Conclusion 214

10 The Developmental States of East Asia 216

The role of the state m econonuc development 218Theories of the developmental state 220ComparatIve political economy 222International political economy 223Globalization and the limits of the East ASIa

developmental model 226Regionalization: the next lap? 229The crash of '97 232Conclusion 238

11 Democracy, Civil Society and Postdevelopment inLatin America 239

The Latin Amencan intellectual left 240Postwar developmentalism and dependency theory 242Military regimes, internationalizatIOn and

US imperialism 244The dance of the millions 246The new democracy: state, civil society and market

reforms 248Civilian rule and political democracy 249The new social movements and civil society 252

Conclusion 258

Contents IX

Imagining postdevelopment 254Conclusion 256

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Reconstructmg universalism, regional mercantilismor postdevelopment? 261

The global and the local 264

Notes and References

Index

Impenalism and resource wars 189The reverse agenda of aid and global management 191NGOs and the politics of exclusion 193Humanitarian relief and complex political emergencies 194Conclusion 195

Contents

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List of Figures and Tables

Figure

10.1 The economic growth of the world's regions

Tables

4.1 The ratio of commodity world trade to worldoutput, 1800-1996 (per cent)

4.2 Share of commodity world trade by economicareas. 1800-1996 (per cent)

4.3 Shares of developing economies m world exportsand imports. by region. 1950--95 (per cent)

4.4 Inter- and intra-group trade, 1876-19964.5 The world population among groups of

countries. 1800-19978.1 Sub-Saharan Africa: selected indicators of

stagnation and decline

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Preface to the SecondEdition

The original aim of this book was to write a text that would be asequel to my book, The Third World in Global Development, pub­Iished m ]982. Like its predecessor, this text would describe recenttrends m world political economy and introduce students to currentdebates regarding the' development prospects of the Third World.The problem With this ambition IS that the Thrrd World as such nolonger exists. That is to say, it is no longer there as a unitaryclassificatory descnptor of the econormc, social and political condi­tions of the countnes of Africa, Latin America and Asia, and withIt, development studies has disappeared. Indeed, as early as 1979,Dudley Seers, one of the doyens of development studies, had writ­ten, 'Development Studies is over the hill or downright dead' .'

At the start of the twenty-first century, we no longer encounterdevelopment studies as a body of knowledge with a coherent iden­tity, or even coherent identities, as m competing schools of theory orparadigms. It no longer has pretensions of being, or becoming, afull-blown academic discipline. Development studies as a discretesubject in degree schools in higher education is gradually beingreplaced by, or mergmg with, other subjects, and one would behard put to find designated Chairs being appointed to the disciplinein universities. I can think of few comprehensive texts on develop­ment or the Third World published since the early 1990s. Ofcourse,there have been collections of essays or readers still loosely gatheredunder the label 'development studies', but such readers reflect thefragmentation of the subject, mirronng the dissolution of the!ThirdWorld Itself, as some regions of the Third World have shamed thepundits of doom by becoming the dynamic growth centres of theworld economy (for example, East Asia), and others have declinedto the point of extinction, snuffing out all belief m progress. As

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I.Xll _Preface to tile Second Edition,Wolfgang Sachs writes: 'The idea of development was once a towe­ring monument inspiring international enthusiasm. Today, thestructure is falling apart and m danger of total collapse."

In the early 1980s, development studies became stranded in whatwas widely referred to as 'the impasse'. and work m the field ofdevelopment studies disbanded into a diverse range of intellectualpursuits without any sense of common direction or purpose. First, itfragmented mto area studies, m which the success of the East ASian'aevelopmental' states offered a promising focus for theoreticalrenewal, albeit rather more to the field of comparative politicaleconomy than to the subject of development studies itself. Second,there were meta-theoretical critiques of those theoretical constructsthat had long constituted the tool box of development theory.Dependency, exploitation, unequal exchange, mode of production,modernization, rationalization. progress - all these came under thedeconstructing axe of postmodernists, postlvlarxists and poststruc­turalists alike. Third, some development literature to all mtents andpurposes merged with international political economy literature,focusing in particular on issues of debt, poverty and penpheraliza­tion, perceived as the downside of a quickening process of global­ization of the world economy. Fourth, other development literaturefound succour in the discovery of gender relations as welcome relieffrom the tedium of class relations that previously had dominated somuch of the development agenda. Fifth, development studiesengaged With environmental studies, as poverty m the poor worldcame to be seen as even more damaging to 'our' ozone layer thanthe pursuit of wealth in the rich world,; This certainly is not an exhaustive list, but it serves to show howdevelopment studies has been scattered by the wmds of change overa wide terrain of intellectual enquiry, making the task of synthesis aprIOri impossible, What, then, should be the purpose of wntmg ageneral mtroductory text on the subject? And if one did find suchpurpose, how would it help to organize the sequencmg.of chaptersm a manner that will ensure that at least some of the new agendasare incorporated In a coherent way?i It seems to me that an important purpose should be to under­stand the processes of crisis and transformation of the world eco­nomy which constitute the wmds of change that are now blowing;development studies mto different directions. Without such an

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understanding we shall lose Sight of the continuity in change of thehistorical process.

At the time of wntmg there are over 1.3 billion people m theworld living in absolute poverty and imnuseration, and their num­ber is growing, increasmgly enveloping those who previouslyformed part of the rich, First World, and of the semi-developedSecond World.' The Human Development Report. 1999, notes thatbetween 1980 and 1996 gross national product (GNP) per capitaldeclined m no less than fifty-nine countnes. It reports that theincome gap between the fifth of the world's population living mthe richest countries, and the fifth in the poorest, widened from 30to I m 1960 to 74 to I in 1997, and that income disparities mcreasedm many countries, including the rich, durmg the 1980s and the1990s: On the other hand, it is also the case that some countnes,notably m East Asia, have grown, and are still growmg, very fastindeed, and that they have managed to translate that growth intoimproved standards of living for the masses of the population.However, the rising fortunes of new regions or groups of countnesin the world economy, and the decline of others, should not blind usto the way that wealth and poverty are connected. I remam con­vmced that poverty and wealth creation are but two sides of thesame histoncal process, even if that historical process itself under­goes fundamental changes in the manner m which it is organized.But when the understanding and interpretation of wealth and pov­erty themselves become fragmented, divorced from one another, asthey are today, there is a danger that we shall end up celebrating, mtrue postmodern style, poverty as 'difference',

While there is continuity in the fact that wealth and povertycreation are connected, it is nevertheless one of the mam organizingthemes of the book that at begmmng of the twenty-first century weare expenencmg a complete, radical break, a qualitative change, inthe histoncal development of capitalism. The world economic crisisthat began m the 1970s has led, not just to a restructuring of theworld economy, but to a major transformation of the way m whichproduction and distribution are organized, There is a new politicaleconomy m the making. But, in contrast to the past, this newpolitical economy is not a political economy that first developedand became organized within one specific territorial space and thenexpanded outwards; rather it is a new political economy that wasglobal from the very beginning. This has consequences for our

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understanding of the locational distribution of wealth aud poverty,of development and underdevelopment. The familiar pyramid of thecore-periphery hierarchy is no longer a geographical but a socialdivision of the world economy. The designation 'postcolonial' worldm preference to 'Third World' serves to artIculate at once the shiftfrom national origin to subject-position in the global political eco­nomy, and a movement beyond a specific period in history, that ofcolonialism and Third World nationalist struggles.

Outline of the Book

Thus, as the subtitle suggests, the book is about the new politicaleconomy of development. These very words beg at least two ques­tions: (i) that there is an understood and generally accepted meanmgof the term 'political economy'; and (ii) that there is an old versionof it, now distinct from and discarded by different interpretations,As we shall see in the introduction to Part I. there is no such thing asa unified methodology or theory of political economy. What thereis, IS a set of questions about the relationship between power andwealth, between politics and economics, between states and mar­kets. Depending on how this relationship has been understood andconceptualized, different theories ofworld order have held sway fora considerable time: namely realism, institutionalism, and Marxism/structuralism. Their common ground was the state-market interac­tion as the embodiment of politics and economics in the modernworld. And a central question became how to grasp the conflictinglogic of an evolving and progressively integrating world market, onthe one hand, with the continuing compartmentalization of theworld political order into sovereign nation states on the other.

Within the Marxist/structuralist traditIon the evolving interna­tional state/market nexus was analyzed in tenus of the dialecticaldevelopment of capitalism in historical periods. Capitalism's inher­ent contradictions were said to be worked out in different phases ofexpansion, punctuated by crises, in which state and interstate rela­tions were time and again rearranged as political structures thatheld m place the exploitative economic relationship between coreand peripheral economies. In Chapters I, 2 and 3, we look back onthis tradition from the vantage point of Robert Cox's critical theoryof historical structures. Thus each phase of capitalist expansion is

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I

described in turn and we review the theories that emerged, whetheras hegernonic, legitimating, ideology or as counter-hegemonic crit­ique, within each evolving phase. In this way the historicalspecificityof theories of imperialism, of modernization and dependency, ofpostimperialisrn, and world system, and of the New InternationalDivision of Labour, will become clarified.

Part II begins, in Chapter 4, with a statistical portrait ofthe dialectical development of capitalism since the beginning of theruneteenth century. We discover that world trade and capital flows,at first expanding to embrace ever more areas of the world, gradu­ally turned into a process of involution when capital relationsbecame intensified within the core, while selectively withdrawingfrom the periphery. Meanwhile, this process resulted in cumul­atively growing differences in income between rich and poor nations.

The historically generated structure of deepening inequality pro­vides the backdrop for our understanding of the present crisis andtransformation debate to which we turn m subsequent chapters. Bythe 1970s, capitalism had reached the limits of its own expansion,and this became the crucible of fundamental change. This change isbecoming visible in an information-technology (IT) driven newpolitical economy that characterizes the production process and itsglobal, though not worldwide, embrace, In Chapter 5, we discussthe changes m economic production and industrial organizationwidely referred to as flexible production, and the emergence of thenew, 'knowledge' or 'digital', economy that by some accounts hasbeen responsible for the renewed growth in the core of the capitalistsystem. Chapter 6 addresses the global aspects of the process oftransformation, Pertinently, in contributing to a theory of global­ization, I privilege the social dimension of globalization over theeconomic dimension. I argue that the reconstitution of the worldinto a single social space today drives the economics of globaliza­tion, even though the preceding period of economic international­ization has itself created the conditions for the emergence of thissingle social space. The contemporary process of globalization Sig­nals a 'higher' level of intensifying economic, financial, cultural andsocial cross-border networks than before. Meanwhile, ever .largersegments of the world population, evident inside advanced coun­tries, but more numerous still inside the Third World, are beingexpelled from the emerging 'thickening' network of human socialand economic interaction. Rather than being a process of expansion,

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the process of globalization appears to be a shrmktng one. How ISsuch a system of widening global disparities managed and perpetu­ated? Who IS m control; who runs this system? Chapter 7 discussesthese questions, examines the emerging forms of transnational gov­ernance and regulation. and points to the increasing geostrategicdominance of the USA m maintaining the stability of neo-liberalregunes.

Part III of the book addresses the Implications of globalizationfor the postcolomal world. The term postcolonial is a recent arrivalm development literature. It IS a term of complex origins and weshall explore these in the introduction to the final part of the book.For now it is sufficient to note that the concept has merits simplybecause it groups together all former colomal societies despite dif­ferences in their relationship to the global capitalist system, while atthe same tune offering a point of entry for the study of thosedifferences. This point of entry IS the 'aftermath' of the colonialrelationship and the manner m which this becomes reconstitutedand contested m the process of the present transformation of theglobal political economy. Thus we may study the postcolomal con­dition as a state of being that is the combined outcome of externalpressures (globalization, the post-Cold War order and so on), andlocally and historically specific characteristics and struggles arisingout of the (neo )colomal relationship.

I consider four types ofpostcolonial 'conditions'. 'situations' or 'so­cial formations', each exemplified in one of four regions of the world,though not necessarily exclusive to that region. Neither are these fourexhaustive of all social formations m the postcolonial world. Thereare plenty of postcolonial conditions that we do not discuss in thisbook - for example, India, China and South Africa. We shall examinein' turn the following regions and conditions: Sub-Saharan Africa:exclusion and anarchy (Chapter 8); the Middle East: Islamic revoltand anti-developmentalism (Chapter 9); East Asia: state-led develop­mentalism and regionalization (Chapter 10); and Latin' America:democracy, civil SOCIety and postdevelopment (Chapter 11).

IThe Conclusion revisits the varIOUS arguments and explores likelyand unlikely scenarios for the future.

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A Word abouttbe Secoud Edition

In a world of busllless@the speed-of-thought, as in the snazzy title ofBill Gates' book. printed texts on globalization are doomed to datepretty quickly. In prepanng this second edition, I have not merelyneeded to find last-minute factual data and statistics. more espec­ially those pertinent to Chapter 4, but have also revised the analyticcontent of substantial sections.

There are several new trends in the global political economy thathave needed to be addressed. First, the appearance of the new,knowledge or digital economy; second, the resurgence of the USAafter decades of putative relatIve decline, and the question ofrenewed US dominance in the global system: and third, the volat­ility of the global financial markets culminatmg m the East Asiacrisis of 1997. In consequence, Part Il of the book has 'been thor­oughly reconfigured and expanded.

One SIgnificant theoretical departure from the previous edition inthis second part of the book, IS the replacement of the concept of'capitalist implosion' by that of capitalist 'involution', Work on thefirst editIon developed in a time frame when the contmumg crisisand instability of the global capitalist system still dominated theor­etical debates. The vigorous growth of the information driven 'new-econorny' and its potential to overcome the crisis of capitalist accu­mutation, was yet to be revealed. E-business and e-commerceexploded only after 1998. Moreover, Manuel Castells' path break­ing oevre, the first volume of which appeared m 1996, had not beenavailable to me when I worked on the first edition. His work hasbeen a profound mfluence on my tlunking since. And thus I havecome to the VIeW, expressed m this edition, that the long capitalistcnsis which began in the 1970s has temporarily been 'resolved',albeit in a manner that provides stability and prosperity for a globalmmonty wlule keeping at bay the global majority.

Also amended and extended are the chapters on East ASIa and onAfrica. Very rmnor updates have been worked into other chapters.The final conclusions of the book have been rethought m light of themushroormng cloud of antI-globalist protests.

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Acknowledgements

To write about so many different parts of the world IS an audaciousundertaking. It would not have come to pass had it not been for theinspiration and help, direct and indirect, that has been given to meby my research and graduate students. who are a pretty interna­tional bunch. They have taught me many things I didn't know andbrought to my attention literature I had never read. Where appro­priate I have referred to their theses in the normal way throughreferences in the text. Here I want to thank them: Masae Yuasa,Rongyan Qi, Lucy Walker, Gillian Koh, Rachel Tibbett, DongSook Gills, Fithri Othman, Anne Holgate Lowe, Mark Chnstianand many others, for pushing me all the time to keep up with them.In so doing they have turned teaching into a real learning experienceand a delightful vocation! I also thank my friend Jan Burgess,managing editor of the Review of African Political Economy forher ready knowledge and the generous use of the ROAPE libraryand Alistair Allan of the University of Sheffeld Library, for his helpin a constant stream of information retrieval!

It hasastonished me that m these times of intensified workloads,and ever more oppressive working conditions in universities, onecan still find colleagues willing to sit down and completely selflesslyread through a long manuscript, make meticulous comments andconstructive criticisms, and tune their minds to somebody else'sintellectual problems. I am deeply grateful to my colleagues TonyPayne, Lena Dominelli and Nick Stevenson, who each wentthrough some or all sections of the first edition and made helpfulcomments and encouraging suggestions as I went aJong. Naturally,they are relieved of any responsibility for the contents. But in thepreparation of the second edition I did not have the heart to askthem again. Therefore, this time the entire burden of reading andadvising on earlier drafts has fallen to my publisher, Steven Ken­nedy. OnJy now that the task is finished do I appreciate fully hIS

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encouragement, patient persistence and good ideas. I have, how-ever, resisted his suggestion that seJections of further reading beadded at the end of each chapter. Instead, I prefer to encourage myreaders to make full use of the detailed notes and references, becauseIt IS these that willguide them to what I believeare the most relevantworks in a field that IS rapidly bemg swamped by a cacophony ofVOices.

If I mention them last It is not because of their contribution beingleast, but because theirs happened to come at the very end of all theother work: scrubbing the text clean and makmg it presentable forthe publisher. Marg Walker, Penny Draper and Sylvia McCoJmhave been variousJy invoJved WIth the 'fiddly' work of presentation,and I thank them a Jot.

ANKlE HOOGVELT

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PART I

HISTORICALSTRUCTURES

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~"

I~: '

._-----~,...__...._-_......_--_....--.-_....

1~2 Crtsis and Transfonnauon

goods and services produced in different nations. Such intemationaltrade dominated the prewar and Immediate postwar periods. It wasessentially complementary - that is. countnes specializing m theexport of one type of product would exchange that product forother types that they themselves did not produce. .

As a result of the growth and orgamzauonal evolution of multi­national companies, this pattern of interproduct trade gradually hasgiven way to tntraproduct trade. There is no longer a neat division oflabour between countnes: there IS nOW export compcunon betweenproducers m different conntries offermg the same product lines.Countries that are high-volume exporters of cars are also high­volume Importers of cars. How did this srtuauon come about?

LiberalizatIOn and technological progress have steadily altered theway in which mternauonal production is bemg undertaken. At first,multinational companies adopted simple integration strategies wherethey set up foreign affiliates producmg, typically with technologyobtained from the parent company, standardized cornmodiues thatpreviously had been subject to cross-border trade. Second, parentcompanies would set up foreign affiliates engaging in a limited rangeof activities m order to supply their parent firms with specific inputsthat they were m a more competitive positron to produce." Next. multinational companies began to adopt complex mtegra­

tion strategies where they turned their geographically dispersedaffiliates and fragmented production systems mto regionally, oreven globally, mtegrated production and distribunon networks.Thus multinational companies (by this time - that is, the 1970s­often referred to as 'transnattonal' companies or even 'global' com­panies) fanned out different parts of the production process toaffiliates ill different national locations. Each subsidiary took partin the production process. bnt no smgle affiliate produced thewhole product from beginning to end. The hallmark of this globalfragmentation and organic integration of the production processwas an enormous increase ID international trade ID components andsemi-processed manufactures. This began in the 1960'; and soonovertook the growth ill world trade Itself2 l Telling evidence oftins global integration at the level of production IS found m data4n intrafirm trade. Whereas in the early 1970s. mtrafirm trade wasestimated to account for around 20 per cent of world trade. by the1arly 1990s that share was around a third, excluding mtra-TNCtransactions in servlces.22

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For many observers and analysts of the world economy, thisdevelopment of an integrated international production system wassufficient evidence of the emergence of a truly 'global economy'.And in some ways It was. That IS to say, it prepared the structuralconditions for the emergence of a global economy. Because It meantthat a global market principle (a dominant standard of price, qualityand efficiency) began to impose Itself on the domestic supply ofconsumer goods, intermediate and half-processed goods, techno­logy, and mdeed the factors of production. capital, labour andraw materials. As a consequence of the shift from interproducttrade to intraproduct trade. global competition intensified. Insteadof being complementary, international trade became predatory or'adversarial', as Peter Drucker put it.z3

The corollary of global competition IS that even goods and ser­vices that are produced and exchanged within the national domesticsphere have to meet standards of quality and costs of productionthat are set globally. A good example IS the USA. the country WIththe largest domestic market. As Stephen Cohen remmds us in arevealing statistic: whereas in the early 1960s only4 per cent of USdomestic production was subject to international competition, bythe early 1990s OVer 70 per cent was. 24 The contrast between theglobal marketplace and the global market principle could nothave been put more sharply, as m the 1960s the US-dommated inter­national manufacturing trade contributed 25 per cent of allmternational trade flows, whereas by the 19905 ItS share of worldmanufacturing trade had dropped to Just 12 per cent.z'

However, of still greater significance IS the manner in which suchstructural integration is becoming tnternalized m the behaviour ofeconomic agents. be they entrepreneurs or workers, consumers orproducers. If the expression 'market principle' refers to a structuralconstraint, I use the expression 'market discipline' to address theinternalization -of this structural constraint by individual agents ill

their own conduct. Writers of the Regulation School, discussed mChapter 5. have tried to stretch their concept of 'mode of regulation'to include the mternalization of relevant social valnes and norms,For example. Aglietta'" speaks of the 'socialisation of the mode oflife', Boccara refers to 'anthroponomic factors,,2? while Lipietz usesthe term 'habitus' borrowed from Bourdieu to indicate that valuesand norms that might sustam a mode of regulation are internalizedm individual conduct." Yet. as Bob Jessop has pomted out. none of

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134 Crisis and Transformation Globalization 35

these writers has succeeded m pmpomting the precise process oftransformation because they have failed to theorise how modesof regulation in fact become internalized in individual conduct."

Our discussion of time/space compression and the 'shared phe­nomenal world' clarifies thts internalization process. It IS the aware­ness of global competinon (an aspect of Robertson's 'globalconsciousness') that constrains individuals and groups, and evennational governments, to conform to internanonal standards ofprice and quality. People are remmded constantiy, m the experienceof their own daily lives, but even more so m the way that thisexpenence is remforced by media coverage, of the experience ofotbers elsewhere, that unless they conform to these standards theywill lose the competition, lose their own jobs. Workers come toaccept that it IS 'proper' that jobs should be lost because the"company 'has to' move elsewhere Where wages and SOCIal conditionsare less demanding.

In 1992, the American company, Hoover. was faced with pressurefor higher wages from 1tS Dijon workforce and decided to move theplant to Glasgow. The point about the 'discipline' of the globalmarket 1S that such companies do not in fact have to move. It ISsufficient for tbem to 'threaten' to move. Time/space compressionhas permitted us all to share in the phenomenal world of the Dijonworkers (and m that of numerous other victuns of company reloca­nons elsewhere). This has imposed a social discipline on workers allover Europe, indeed all over the world, tbat unless they conform,companies bave the power to move plant to another country.Because of the existence of a global market discipline, It IS sufficientfor a company merely to threaten to set up a plant abroad, for it tosuccessfully drive down wages to a globally competitive level.Charles Sabel reports on German plants where charts of defectrates for particular processes are displayed on video screens nextto equrvalent data for thetr Brazilian subsidiancs.'? Th1S establishesa global SOCIal discipline that constrains the behaviour of Brazilianand German workers alike.

Thus, while global competition has created the structural condi­nons for the emergence of a global market discipline, rt is time/spacecompression that creates the shared phenomenal world that sup­ports and reproduces this discipline on a daily basis. And not just onworkers. Companies too know they have to adopt the best qualitymethods and the most efficient costs, and engage m constant inno-

vation, because they know that otherwise they will lose their m:ar­kets and someone else will move in. The same holds true at theconsumer end of the organization of economic life. Consumer~ inChma can see on their satellite TV screens Western lifestyle pro­ducts they want to own, regardless of their government's desire tolimit foreign imports and boost local producers. The Clunese gov­ernment tned to ban satellite television for this very reason, but tono avail. '

A /Jell' globaldivision oflabour; a /Jell' SOCial core-peripheryhierarchy,

As the costs of transporting standard products and of cornmunicat­m' mformation about them continue to drop (another example of"time/space compression), modern factones and state-of-the-art

machinery can be installed almost anywhere in the world. Routineproducers m the UK and the USA are therefore m direct competi­tion WIth millions of producers m other nations. In Ius book, TheWork of Nations. Robert Retch, one time Secretary of State, forLabor m US President Bill Clinton's Adnunistration, gives spec­tacular examples of the speed with which factones and productivecapital investments have become footloose. For example, until thelate 1970s, the Amencan telephone and telecommunications com­pany AT&T had depended on routine producers m Louisiana toassemble standard telephones. It then discovered that producers mSingapore would perform the same tasks at a far lower cost. Facedwith intense global competitton they then had to switch to cheaperroutme producers m Singapore. But by the late 1980s they switchedproduction again, this time to Thailand."

Such transferable routme production IS no longer the preserve ofdeskilled Jobs III 'old economy' industrial plants. The fusion ofcomputer technology WIth telecommumcanons makes it possiblefor firms to relocate an ever-widenmg range of operations andfunctions to wherever cost-competitive labour, assets and infra­structure are available. The new technologies make 1t feasible tostandardize, make routine and co-ordinate activities that previouslywere subject to the friction of space and therefore regarded as non­tradable. They enable such activities to be turned into 'real-time'activities. Take, for example, data processing services of all kmds.Airlines employ data processors from Barbados to Bombay to keym names and flight numbers into giant computer banks located in

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136 Crtsts and Transformatton

Dallas or London. Book and magazme publishers use routmeoperators around the world to convert manuscripts into com­puter-readable form and send them back to the parent firm atthe speed of electronic impulses. The New York Life InsuranceCompany was dispatchmg insurance claims to Castleisland m theRepnblic of Ireland, where routine producers, guided by simpledirections, entered the clanns and determined the amounts due,then instantly transnutted the computations back to the USA. 32

Software firms export much of their development work to Banga­lore m India, which sees itself as the Silicon Valley of Asia.

The 1970s, and still more so the 1980s, witnessed the globalrestructuring of industry and a redistribution of jobs through integ­rated international production enabled by the new technologies.The .haemorrhaging of Jobs m the core countnes benefited theperiphery, particularly Pacific ASia. A French govermnent reportm 1993estimated that in the previous twenty years no fewer than 6.6million Jobs were lost to the EC and the USA and gained by the FarEast. 33 US manufactunng employment in the developing countnesas a whole grew at ahnost five tunes the rate of such employment mthe developed econornies.:"

Optimists argue that the loss ofjobs in manufactunng activities mthe core economies will be compensated by a growth of servicemdustnes, including services related to manufacturing Itself. 'NewU.S ..Factory Jobs Aren't m the Factory' ran a headline m BusinessWeek in 1994, argumg that support industries With their high com­ponent of knowledge skills constitute a second tier of manufactur­mg industries. While a smaller percentage of the US workforce willbe m production, a much larger percentage will be supportmg thisproduction with computer software, robot-making, and countlessservices that will add Jobs to supply the 'leaner' manufacturers." Onthe other hand, pessimists such as Jeremy Rifkin in his book. TheEnd-of Work. point to the wholesale destruction of agricultural andindustrial labour as smart machines replace workers m both of these'old ieconomy' sectors, while the emerging knowledge sector - mRifkin's view - will only be able to absorb a small percentage of thedisplaced labour.'6

But even if the overall equation of job losses and gains is open todispute, there IS no denying that the complex integration strategiesof international producers. coupled With new forms of co­ordination that are enabled by the new technologies, together

Globalization 137

with the operation of the global market principle, are altenng thelandscape of the global division of labour. It IS no longer one thatstrictly follows economic geography.

There was a time when the geography of the global division oflabour ran parallel With the sequential transformation of goods-m­production from low value-added activities to high value-addedacnviues. To explain this we need to first say something about theconcept of value-added.

'Value-added' IS the market value of a firm's output minus themarket value of the mputs It purchases from other firms. Essent­ially, therefore, it is the sum of the factor incomes. the wages andprofits of the firm. The concept of a value-added chain ansesbecause in the transformation of a raw matenal - say, cotton _into an end consumer product - say, a garment in a shop window­there IS a sequence of intermediate stages of fabrication and proces­sing: spinning, running, dyemg, weaving, designing, cutting, sewing,wholesaling, advertising, marketing and retailing. At each stage, thelabour involved adds value to the process of transformation, mak­mg the product progressively more expensive to the final consumer.Moreover, at each stage, capitalist entrepreneurs intervene to organ­IZe the discrete activity in the chain. each in turn adding a mark-upto make some profits for themselves. This implies that the marketpnce for the final product incorporates all the wages and mark-npsof all the previous stages. The history of multinational enterprisemay be summed up by saying that it has moved from trymg tointernalize all these stage-like transactions Within ItS own organiza­tional embrace, to once more, as under global networking, 'extern­alizing' all, or many, of these stages and transactions.

So It may be seen that the concept of a value-added chainexpresses a sequential progression from lower value-added to highervalue-added activities. But there IS more to the hierarchical progres­sion than mere sequencmg of transformation. The Instoncal deve­lopment of capitalism on a world scale. for all the reasons spelt outin the first part of this book, also concentrated 'higher-value activ­ities' at the final, consumer, end of the chain (consumer markets inthe rich countnes), while largely (though not exclusively) leavinglow-value activities in underdeveloped lands. There was a doubleeffect, therefore, in so far as the wages of labour at higher stages ofthe transformation process are likely to be higher, and thereforealso the pass-on pnces, than at the lower end of the production

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chain. Furthermore, the more specialized the final product, againmore typically at the rich-consumer end of the chain, the higher theprofit mark-up for such products because of the effect of limiteddemand. For all these reasons, bulk or volume production, which ISconcentrated at the lower end of the cham, yields lower value-addedthan specialized, high-tech products, WhICh are concentrated at thehigher end of the value chain.

Today something curious IS happenmg. As Paul Krugman putit. It IS now possible to 'slice up' the value cham in a differentway, and locate the labour-intensive slices m the production ofthose goods traditionally viewed as skill-. capital- or technology­intensive, in low-wage locations. A classic example is the notebookcomputer. It looks like a high-technology product, but while theAmerican microprocessor and the Japanese flat-panel display areindeed high-tech. the plastic shell that surrounds them and thewiring that connects them are not, so the assembly of notebookcomputers becomes an industry of the 'newly mdustrializingeconomies'." Furthermore, many mformation-intensrve activitiespreviously classed as high value-added activities have now become'real- time' actrvrties that may be earned out anywhere m the globalsystem.

Thus, the global division of labour IS rendering a core-peripheryrelationship that cuts across national and geographic boundaries,bnngmg on board, WIthin the core. segments of the Third World,and relegatmg segments and groups m both the traditional core ofthe system and m the Third World to peripheral status. Core­penphery IS becoming a social relationship, no longer Just a geo­graphical one.

ThIS new SOCIal core-periphery hierarchy is set to become stillmore uneven than was previously the case. Many high-value-addedactivities that are contributed by so-called 'knowledge workers'. areextremely mobile. Marketing experts, computer consultants, legalaffairs specialists, financial accountants and top managers can go towherever they can obtain the highest pnce for their services. And,because of the operation of the global market principle, paymentsfor their services are bemg equalized across national boundaries,mcreasmgly at the highest price. But at the lower end of the valuecham exactly the opposite IS happening. Low-value-added activitiesare still typically tied to tools and equipment - that is, to knowledgeembodied in capital- and/or to the locatron where raw materials are

iGlobalization 13p

I

extracted. At this end of the mternational production cham it iscapital and not labour that is mobile, a situation perpetuated bypolitical intervention designed to stem the free migration of labour.The mobility of capital here implies that wage rates equalize at thelowest possible denominator, and this mcludes wage rates for suchactivities ill the advanced countries. i

In this way, globalization alters the balance of social classes on laworldwide scale. David Coates is nght to pomt out that, looking atIt tlns way, 'globalization m its modern form IS a process based lesson the proliferation of computers than on the proliferation ofproletariats ... The world proletariat has doubled m SIZe in a gen­eration.r'"

Financiarization

We have referred before to the contemporary phenomenon of'financial deepenmg' or 'financiarization'. which occurs when thegrowth of financial transactions far exceeds the growth of theunderlymg econonuc fundamentals of production and trade (seeChapter 4, page 85). It too IS brought about by the effects of the'shared social space' which, m fact, IS most m evidence in the time­less flows of financial capital, By financial capital we mean capitalthat circulates m pure money form, as distinct from capital tied upin productive assets. The annihilation of space through time byelectromc means enables this money capital to scan the entire planetfor mvestment opportunities and to move from one location toanother m a matter of seconds. However, the sheer velocity ofCirculation of money capital does not explain by itself why thismoney form of capital should have become the dommant form inthe age of informational global capitalism. It does not explain why,m Castells' words, 'firms of all kinds, financial producers, manu­facturing producers. agricultural producers. service producers; aswell as governments and public institutions, use global financialnetworks as the depositories of their earnmgs and as their potentialsource of higher profits'." Why indeed have they become the nervecentre of informational capitalism?

It IS worth trying to unravel the process whereby this has comeabout, if only to debunk a common myth that this IS something of ahistorical accident, not of anybody's doing, and therefore indeednot of anybody's undomg. And the Implication is that we are

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140 Crisis and Transformation

helpless onlookers m an unfolding drama m which the world finan­cial system lurches from cnsis to cnsis, repeatedly delivering shock­mg body blows to the livelihoods of millions of ordinary people.

The reasons are m fact partly political, partly technological.Deregulation of the financial markets put m place by the OECDand developing countnes alike during the 1980seffectively loosenedthe restnctions on the form that money can take. It brought downthe 'Chinese walls that previously had separated the vanous uses towhich borrowed money could be put, 111 particular the distinctionbetween long-term capital and short-term capital mvestments. Thistopic was discussed at some length m Chapter 4. Here we might sumup this process, which was the result of active and collectrve govern­ment mtervention, as one that increased the [uncuonal mobility ofcapital, contrasted with the spatial mobility of capital. Imagine thefunctional mobility of capital as a vertical process: monies tied up mproductive assets can convert in an instant into pure money form.escapmg into the cyberspace of electromc circulation.

So what happens to money circuiating in this cyberspace? Why ISIt so profitable, more profitable indeed than when It is busy makingcommodities and paymg labour? Enter diginzanon, a straightfor­ward technological process. It IS hest explained m a story about ahedge fuud dealer, a 'Master of the Universe', in Tom Wolfe'snovel, The Bonfire of the Vanities. One day this Master of theUmverse IS at a family party and bIS seven-year-old daughter asks,'Daddy, what IS it that you do?' And the Master of the Universe ISlost for words - how indeed would one describe bond dealing to aseven-year-old? And Ius wife jumps in and says, 'Well, darling, Justimagme that a bond IS a slice of cake, and you didn't bake the cake.but every time you hand somebody a slice of the cake a tiny little bitcomes off. like a little crumb, and you can keep that."? Nowthe point about digitizatton IS that, m the physical world, noneof'.the tiny crumbs would be worth picking up and col1ecting, butin the virtual world. where telecommunications combine with com­puter-assisted data processing, money can be made by gathenng upinfinitesimally fractional differences m the movement m prices, bethey interest rates. commodity pnces or currency values.

The upshot IS that money IS increasingly being made out of the, .

ci~culatIOn of money, regardless of traditional restnctions of spaceand tune, as when money transforms into bricks and mortar. Cap­ita',l IS being disconnected from the SOCial relationships m which

I

Globalization 141

money and wealth were previously embedded. It is because of this'disembedding' that globalization entails a process of intensificationof linkages within the core of the global system, while ItS counter­part, 'peripheralization', becomes a process of marginalization andexpulsion that cuts across terntones and national boundaries, ren­denng areas within the traditional core subject to the same processesof expulsion as large swathes of territory ID Afnca, Latin Amencaand Asia. So here too, as was the case With the global orgamzationof work. we see that the structure of core-penphery becomes aSOCIal division rather than a geographical one.

Let us explore the meaning of this heightened mtemationalmobility of money capital a little further. In particular, let usexamme why this should represent a form of Imploding capitalismrather than a further expansion of world capitalism,

When pension funds invest in. say, Hong Kong stocks, they canbenefit from the nsing values of the stocks and. if they are clever fundmanagers, switch out of a stock when It goes down and mvest inanother rismg one somewhere else. There IS no need for them to waitand see what happens to the companies that build skyscrapers inHong Kong, or sell textiles back to Europe. But, of course, theconnections between the world of high finance and the economicfundamentals of wo~ld trade and production are not completelysevered. There is stil1 no such thing as a free lunch. What has hap­pened, rather, IS that the integration of the world's financial marketsand the development ofa whole range ofnovel financial instruments.permitted since the deregulation of these markets. have made Itpossible to connect up the artenes of real production and trade,and thus squeeze the last drop ofsurplus out ofworkers and peasantsal1 over the world, m a manner that makes these innumerable threadsthat lead to our pension fund invisible and therefore unchallengeable.

To stick to the same example: the rise and nse of the Hong Kongstock market pnor to ItS dramatic fal1 ID 1996 was due m largemeasure to Chinese provincial authorities investing borrowed moneym Hong Kong's stock market and real estate, With dire conse­quences for the Beijing government's ability to hold the value ofItS currency and pay the peasants in northern China for ItS gramprocurements. The world IS now like this: if our pension fund workswell for us, the peasants m northern China willJust have to go a bitmore hungry. If people m the West. as they did dunng the consumerboom of the 1980s, push up interest rates through their incautious

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use of credit cards. it has a knock-on effect on the interest rates thatBrazil pays on Its loans, and this in turn prejudices the livelihood ofpeasants in Brazil.

The speed with which money can move across borders removesthe need to anchor It firmly in (national) social relationships. Glo­balization makes national SOCIal solidanty (as expressed in transferpayments to the old, the sick, the unemployed, and the lowermcome groups) dysfunctional from the point of view of the rationaleconomic mterests of those who participate m the global economy.This process IS being sharpened still further by recent policies ofderegulation m the core countries, which encourage the globaliza­non of small private investors and undercut the last remainingvestiges of national social solidanty. The privatization. for example,of pension schemes (a transition from 'defined benefit' or occupa­tional and state pension schemes, to 'defined contribution' schemesor 'personal' pension schemes) is a case in point.

Thus, m the advanced countnes, the pressures for globalization(maintainmg liberal and deregulated markets for finance and trade,and resistance to policies of protection for national territonal eco­normc activities) come not just from a tiny group of internationalcapitalists - that IS, from those dominant fractions of corporatecapital that have global mterests - but also from a broadly-basedstratum of society, the 13 per cent ofsemor citizens and those with aneye to thetr pensionable future, whose contmued survival, to put Itbluntly, IS better secured m the rismg economies of the Far East thanby reproduction ofthe labour power (and pension premiums paid) bythe shnnkmg younger generation that steps mto their shoes. As TheEconomist has put It: 'Ageing populations m nch countnes and freerflowing capital the world over are changmg the way people save andmvest. American and British instituuonal money IS flooding foreignmarkets.'?' ThIS deterntonalization of economic rationality as Itaffects not just organized capital but also the mass of middle-classmdividuals in bourgeois SOCieties, IS a key consequence of globaliza­tion.

Conclusion

My pnvilegmg of the sociological aspect of globalizatIon IS not todeny the Importance of other factors, more especially the dynamics

[

iI:

Globalization ,143

of historical capitalism which - as Wallerstem and many others inthe Marxist tradition have argued - had a 'globalizing' imperativefrom the begmnmg. The development of transnational corporationsand the growth of international finance in particular. testify to acomplex multicausal logic of globalization. Rather, what has beenargued here IS that, through the reconsutution of the world into asmgle social space, that self-same historical process has now liftedoff and moved into new terntory. If, previously, global mtegrationIn the sense of a growing unification and interpenetration of thehuman condition was dnven by the economic logic of capital accu­mulation, at present it IS the unification of the human condition thatdnves the logic of further capital accumulation. It is a logic thatdraws a new line m the sand, a new primary cleavage in the worldeconomy which is neither one between nations, nor between classes,but mstead between those individuals and groups who can particrp­ate m the timeless, 'spaceless' flows of money, production and con­sumption, and those who cannot, and who are thus, in the words ofZygmunt Baumann, 'glebae adscnpti' - forcibly localized. Bau­mann writes: 'The top of the new hierarchy is exterritorial; itslower ranges are marked by varymg degrees of space constaints,while the bottom ones are, for all practical purposes, glebaeadscnpti.'42

Neither does this SOCIOlogical take on globalization deny the roleof political mtervention whether in the manner of its birth, or in themanner of its future denuse. What It does, however, IS to take issuewith those who believe that the political actors (the global businesselite and their supporting political classes in the nation-states) whohave contributed to ItS emergence can now be called upon to rollback the consequences of their ill-fated actions. For this IS the nub:once the structural power of global financianzed capital was put mplace successfully, It m turn began to limit the scope for action ofnational governments whose previous policies made it happen. Thepolitical dimension ofglobalization IS the subject of the next chapter.

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Global Governance:Regulation and Imperialism

I

In Chapter 5 we began the story of the recent cnsis and transforma­non process by describing the principal features of a new techno­econonuc paradigm of mdustrial production. and a new informa­tional economy. These. however, constitute supply-side innova­tions. What about the demand side? FoIlowmg the perspectIve ofthe Regulation School, we recaIl that long-term macro economicstability also requires a resolution of the demand side of the equa­non, with supply and demand together informing a 'regime ofaccumulation'. Moreover, a regime of accumulation m turn willonly come about through an appropriate mode of regulation, mthe shape of relevant norms, habits and laws, as well asgoverning mstitutions. Crucially, this mode of regulation describesnot only the mlcro-mstItutional context of the organization of pro­ducuon and work, but also the macro-instItutiOnal context m WbIChexpanded economic reproduction takes place, namely a coherentproduction-distribution and consumption relationship,

There are three problems a theory of regulation has to address. Thefirst relates to Its notion of reproducibility, or of stability and sustam­ability. The Regulation School rejects a mechanistic and deterrrunis­tIC form of theonzing, where, for example, one would deduce (andthus predict) the emerging contours of a mode of regulation from anunderstanding of the 'logic' of the techno-econonuc paradigm andthe way this dnves the process of accumulation. Instead, the Regula­tion School has reserved Its opmion about tile shape of things tocome by stressing the voluntaristic genesis of any mode of regulationasi the outcome of locally and historically specific struggles. In so

144

Global Governance: Regulation and Impenalism 145

doing It wants to overcome ItS Marxist. 'structuralist' bearings, andreintroduce the role of human agency into the formulation of whatconstitutes a period of stable economic growth m WhICh cnsis ten­dencies are contained and neutralized. In other words, they couplestability with poliucal legitimacy, and. indeed. in more recent wnt­ings, even WIth ecological balance. All this on an international scale.As D. Leborgne and A. Lipietz put It:

On the ruins of Fordism and Stalinism, humankind IS at thecrossroads. No technological determinism will light the way. Thepresent industrial divide is first and foremost a politIcal divide.The search for social compromise, around ecological constraints,macroeconomic consistency, gender and ethnic equality, all medi­ated by the nature and degree of political mobilization will decidethe outcome ... The macroecononucs of the future may be basedon a downward spiral of social and ecological competition,leading to recurrent financial, business and environmental crises,or an ecologically sustamable and macroecononucaIly stablemodel ... Radical economists and geographers may be part offinding the better pathway, both by identifying the possibilitIesforprospenty ,and by criticizing unrealistic optimism forflexibility as a panacea. 1

Their socio-political engagement has led many to judge, and reject,contemporary neo-liberal regimes as being mternally contradictoryand cnsis-prone, even if according to some they do appear to beable to create a distmctrve ensemble of regulatory practices which isreproducible m the medium term. Bob Jessop, for example, has mostsuccinctly summarized tile emerging nee-liberal, postFordist modeof regulation, describing its various features m respect of the wagerelation. the enterprise system. the money form. the consumptionsphere, and tile state form. The latter be identifies as the emergingSchumpetenan workfare state which IS supply-side orientated. pro­motes inter-nation compeution, displaces welfansm and uses SOCIalpolicy instruments 1I0t to generalize norms of mass consumption.but rather to encourage flexibility and niche marketing for eliteconsumption, Meanwhile econormo powers of the nation-state are'hollowed out'. as powers are displaced upwards (to global and pan­regional bodies) and downwards (to local and sub-regional bodies)which begin to integrate with one another in ways that by-pass the

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nation-state? Such a regime may well balance production and con­surnption at the level of the international economy as a whole, atleast in the medium tenn. But only by excluding ever-growmgsegments of the world population from it, including large socialsectors in the core capitalist economies.

In the opmion of some regulatiomsts, such a social-rnmority­focused regime of accumulation is not a regime of accumulationproper, but a 'monstrosity' that needs weeding out as part of apolitical project to develop an alternative SOCial comprormse, analternative mode of SOCial regulation. Many favour a new 'institu­tional fix' which separates the global from the local.' In this newsocial compromise, social democracy would become embedded mthe sub-national 'local sphere', replacmg the national 'orgarncist'model of Fordist SOCial solidanty and democracy. In a recent contri­bution, Lipietz, for example, has described the characteristics of sucha new social compromise, but m the nature of such debates It doesnot add up to more than a wish list of the good life. In the conclusionof this book we shall take up this theme of an alternative politicalproject implied m the separation of the global from the 10ca1.

The second problem relates to the question of where exactly IS thespace in which the macro-institutional context IS articulated? Is Itlocal, regional, national, supranational, or is It internauonal? Earlyregulation theory had taken ItS clues from the breakdown of thestructural coupling between Fordist production systems and Key­nesian welfare modes of regulation at the national level, and theirsearch for a new 'institutional fix' was at first directed at the nationaleconomic space. But with globalization the space problem has begunto inspire much of the so-called 'second generation' research agendasof the Regulation School, with work focusing on the links betweensub-national (for example, industrial districts), national, and supra­national (for example, the European space) and international levels."

The third, and related, problem IS the one that will occupy us inthis chapter. It is a problem that anses from Regulation Theory'songmal scnpt reading of the golden age of Fordism and IS related tothe question of global hegemony. Co-ordination of the mternationalsystem of global Fordism was achieved under the hegemony of theUSA. US hegemony first presented the Fordist model for develop­ment to other conntnes and then financed these conntnes withMarshall Aid and MacArthur plans for setting up new regimes ofacccumulation. It institutionalized this international configuration

iGlobal Governance: Regulation and Imperialism 1147

,by intertwining it with US national. industnal and financial ihter­ests through the medium of the Bretton Woods agreement and theestablishment ofGATI, the IMF, the World Bank and the Ol:lCD.These contained disturbances and mamtained a set of rules Ithat

,

stabilized the system through US overall hegernornc power (eco­nomic and ideological, as well as political and military). The spreadof the Fordist regime of accumulation to other countries coincidedWIth the strategic mterests of the US financial and mdustnal com­munity, and thus global Fordism formed an mtegral part of the USsocial transformation of Fordism Itself.s

Between 1970 and 1990 the scholarly Consensus was that the crisisof Fordism was accompanied by, and even contributed to, a declinein US hegemony - that IS, the ability of the USA to 'make andenforce the rules for world political economy'." Hegemony IS morethan rule by a dommant state. It mvolves the acceptance by thedommant strata m the states compnsmg the world system of astructure of values which they share With the dominant power,and which they regard as being legitimate and JUst. This US hege­mony. or Pax Americana, was perceived to be declining, III a manneranalogous to the decline of Pax Britannica, which had accompamedthe crises of the mterwar period in the 1920s and 1930s. US hege­monic decline was said to have been caused by a number of factorswhich mdicated a relative decline m America's material strengththat had underpmned its hegemoruc position. For example, ItS lossof strategic nuclear dommance: its decline in conventional militarycapabilities; ItS dimmished economic size m GNP per head relativeto other countries such as Japan, Germany and Sweden; its loss ofproductivity and the erOSIOn of its lead m some areas of high techno­logy, With the gains gomg to Japan; ItS loss of influence m the UNand other international orgamzauons; and its shift from bemg theworld's largest creditor nation to bemg its largest debtor nation."

In this penod of the 'interregnum', much analysis in the disciplinesof mternational relations and of mternational political economywas devoted to speculation about plausible successors. For ex­ample, some considered a possible role for Japan as a world leader(Pax Nippontcai.: others imagined the emergence of a multi-polarworld order With balance of power being divided equally betweenthe three regional blocs? Again, others looked to an oligarchy ofpowerful states that might concert their powers to underpin 'inter­national regimes' formulated under the auspices of international

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bodies.'" Some even hoped for a form of post-hegemonic multi­Iateralism in which there would be a broader diffusion of powerbetween a large number of collective forces, mcluding states, thatmight achieve some agreement on universal principles of an alter­native order WIthout dominance, based on mutual recognition ofdistinct traditions of CIvilization. 11

But behind these diverging speculations, or aspirauons, there wasalso common ground m so far as it was widely recognized that whatwas going on in the meantime was a restructurmg of state and capitalrelations toward a more globally integrated and competitive mar­ket-dnven system involving a transnational process of structuralpower and even of transnational class formation.

Global Governance and the Internationalization of the State

Globalization restructures relations between state and capital. It hasled to what Robert Cox refers to as the zilternaliOllalizalioll of thestate, ill WhICh the state becomes a vehicle for transmitting theglobal market discipline to the domestic economy. 12 Cox argues thatthe .globalization of the world economy gives nse to a global classand social structure that deeply affects the forms of state. He sugg­ests that globalization IS led by a transnational managenal class'"consisting of distmct fractions, but which together constitute whatSusan Strange has called the mternational 'business crvilization' ,14

The term 'business civilization', however, has a positive ethicalconnotation that is arguably not warranted. It is perhaps better torefer to a transnational business 'culture' of shared norms andvalues that underpin and interweave With the structural power oftransnauonal capital. Together these have become institutionalizedill a,plethora of organizational forms and practices: Within interna­tional organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF; ininterstate summit agendas and agreements (for example GAIT,subsequently WTO) and other forms of co-operation betweennations; Within emerging institutional forms of 'elite interaction'between members of the international business class, state bureau­crats and members of international orgamzations." and WIthin theadriunistratlve bureaucracy of national governments. There IS agrowing body of resarch on the nature of these elite interactionsand the manner in which a global business class performs an

Global Governance: Regulation and Impenalism 149

agenda-setting role within the WTO, the EU, the OECD and manyother international forums that are busy deregulatmg and pnvatiz­109 the world economy m the interest of transnational capital. Togive just two examples, the European Round Table of Industrialists(ERT), compnsing the leaders of forty-five key European TNCs haslargely been responsible for the EU's post-1992 move towards flex­ibility, privauzation and deregulation, as well as Monetary UnionWIthItSstnct controls over national fiscal pclicres.!" Meanwhile, theUS Council for International Business, which includes Just 150senior-level private executives WIth IBM and AT&T in the lead,has played a key role m the formulation of the Multilateral Agree­ment on Investments (MAn proposals.!?

As Stephen Gill and David Law" have noted, there are elementsof a common perspective, or a hegernonic ideology, emerging on therole of international business and private enterpnse which cutsacross and umtes all these mstitunonal forums. At the heart ofthis 'neo-liberal' political project IS the idea that private propertyand accumulation are sacrosanct, and that the prune responsibilityof governments IS to ensure 'sound finance" they must 'fight infla­tion' and maintain an attractive 'business climate III which, amongother.things. the power ofumons IS circumscribed. These ideas bothunderpin, and are 'the result of, the 'structural power' of capital thatIS so internationally mobile that the investment climate of eachcountry IS Judged continually by business WIth reference to theclimate that prevails elsewhere.

Under the previous epoch of world order, under Pax Americana,there was also a world economy and internationalization of produc­tion, but the role of the state was still largely autonomous. States hadthe recognized responsibility for domestic economic progress andcapital accumulation. employment and welfare, under the aegis ofthe hegemonic structure of the American-led Bretton Woods­managed world economy, which laid down the rules of mterstatecompetition and co-ordination. All states, advanced and underdeve­loped alike, had a recognized 'developmental' role. Although theprevailing ideology was supportive of free markets and of the mter­nationalization of capital, it was nevertheless, as John Ruggie hasargued, a period of 'embedded' liberalism'? - that IS to say,liberalism 'embedded' in the nation-state. This contrasts WIth pre­sent-day globalization, which we might describe as a period of'unembedded' liberalism.

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Good examples of the institutionalization of 'unembedded' liber­alism may be gleaned from the Uruguay GATT agreements.concluded m 1994, in particular the protocols relating to so-called'trade-related investment measures' (TRIMS) and 'trade-relatedmtellectual property rights' (TRIPS). These circumscribe severelythe sovereign rights of all states (including those of the developingcountries) to regulate foreign mvestment and external trade m thepursuit of perceived developmental needs." Under the TRIMSprotocol, a number of domestic measures which used to be 'normal'and 'accepted' elements in any development strategy must bephased out - for example, local content requirements, domesticsales requirements, trade balancing requirements, remlttance andexchange restricnons."

Equally corrosive of independent developmental state action is theagreement on TRIPS. This agreement strengthens the internationalproperty nghts of foreign investment and it extends intemationalpatent protection to a whole range of products and processes pre­viously not subject to patent. Take. for example, genetic materialcollected by agribusinesses or pharmaceutical companies. which areharnessed to fabricate a particular industnal process or product.These processes and products may now be patented by the corpora­tions and sold back to the country in which the genetic materialoriginated. under international property nghts protection. UnderGATT provisions, the recipient country has to allow free competitiveentry for such processes and products. and, furthermore. It mustprohibit the development and use by local companies of 'identical'products and processes. As Kevin Watkins has argued. this provisionamounts to an act of unbridled piracy by transnational capital:

the main beneficianes will be the core group of less than a dozenseeds and pharmaceutical companies which control over 70 percent of the world's seeds trade ... this attempt to mcorporate mtothe GATT a biotechnology patentmg code dictated by corporatemterest appears an act of unbridled piracy. The overwhelnungbulk of genetic materials used m the laboratories of westerncompanies are derived from Third World crops and wildplants ... Once incorporated into a patentable mvention. theycan become the property of the company which can claim royaltypayments and restnct access to them, even clainung royaltieswhen they are imported mto the country of origin."

\

Global Governance: Regulation and Imperialism llSI

Although developmg countries. spearheaded by India, fought ardduring successive phases of the Uruguay round against both

ITRIMS and TRIPS, they eventually bowed to the hegemony ofthe nee-liberal trade agenda. Nothing illustrates this better thanthe agreed statement of the United Nations Conference on Tradeand Development in February 1992: !

IThe Conference recognizes that the establishment and imple­mentation of internationally agreed standards of protection forintellectual property nghts ... should facilitate internationalflows of technology and technology cooperation amongst allparticipating nations, particularly to developing countries onterms and conditions agreed to by the parties concerned., andnotes the Important role of the World Intellectual PropertyOrganization and the important efforts in the ongoing GATTUruguay Round negotiations in this regard. The Conferencefurther recognizes that a national regime for the adequateand effective protection of intellectual property nghts ISImportant because it can create market incentives for indigenousmnovation and the transfer, adaptation and diffusion oftechnologies.P

Whereas, up to that tune UNCTAD had been the platform wheredeveloping countries had always demanded adjustment of the inter­national patent system to their development needs, It now expressedthe belief that adoption of adequate and effective InternauonalPatent Protection (IPP) laws and related efforts in WIPO, andGATT would facilitate technology transfers to developing coun­tnes. 24

If the Uruguay GATT agreement had already achieved a. far­reaching dispensation for international capital to exercise ItS nghtsover national econonuc mterests, the subsequent proposals for theMAl, work on which was begun by the OECD and the WTO in1995, attempted to complete the institutional framework in whichthe rights of international investors and corporations would prevailat all tunes, in all econonuc sectors and under all circumstances. Forthe MAl not only sought to make It mandatory for all memberstates to treat foreign mvestors at least as well as any local investor:It even wanted to prohibit all national or local policies that nughthave unintended discrimmatory effects - for example, employment,

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labour and human rights, and environmental protection policies.The US Trade Secretary, Charlene Barshefsky, even went so far asto argue that all forms of labelling of consumer products could. beconsidered a 'political' act and hence be treated as contravenmgpro-competition rules. And while the MAl has temporarily beenshelved thanks to a tremendously successful grassroots counter­offensive culnunatmg in a veto by France, more or less identicalproposals have been resurrected through a different route, namelyan IOECD-sponsored amendment to the IMF Articles of Agree­ment which will force all member countries to accept the removalof all' bamers to international capital flows 2

'

Hand m hand with the open trade and capital mobility agreementsfostered by the WTO and IMF, are the various structural adjustmentpolicies imposed by the World Bank and the IMF upon indebtedThird-World countnes since the 1980s. We shall examine these moreclosely in Chapter 8, but here It IS worth pomtmg to the novelty of thepolicy-based loans that have been devised since the 1980s. New loansto help countries to payoff old debts are only disbursed if countriesfollowed strict policy guidelines on how to introduce overall struc­tural reforms of their economies. They are no longer related toinvestment programmes, as in conventional project lending. Further­more, the underlying, or overarching, nee-liberal ideology ensurescross-referencing of separate negotiations between individual coun­tries with different international institutions. The government ofIndia went m the mid-1990s, begging bowl in hand, to the WorldBank and the IMF. and returned with a deregulation and liberal­ization deal (the New Economic Policy) that included the signmg ofthe GATT 1994 agreement as part of the package."

The structural, and indeed institutionalized power of transna­tional capital has not Just informed the policy agenda oLderegula­tion, it IS also responsible for the drive towards privattzation of thestate sector in alJ countries of the world. Throughout the 1980s, theadvanced countries witnessed a vigorous policy of privauzatton ofth~ public sector involving, first, public utilities, and then welfareservices, In Britain, for example, in the 1980s, a total of £60 billionof ~tate assets were sold at knock-down prices to the pnvate sec­torl 27 In addition, Bntain has pioneered 'government by contract',or [arm's-length' government, which involves the government con­tracting out to the pnvate sector everything from the issuing ofpassports to the pnson services, setting up quasi-independent agen-

1

1

Global Governance: Regulation and Imperialism 153

ctes (quangos), unaecountable and undemocratic, for this purpose.When the Conservative government first took office in 1979, therewere about 770 000 civil servants m government service, but by 1995there were estimated to be only around 50 000.08

In the indebted developing world, privatization has been imposedby multilateral agencies within policy frameworks provided bystructural adjustment programmes, The World Bank and the IMFuse the arguments of neo-Iiberalism to impose pnvatization. By1992, more than eighty countries around the world had privatizedsome 6800 previously state-owned enterprises, mainly monopolysuppliers of essential public services such as water, electricity andtelecommunicanons.P Because of the fragility of domestic stockmarkets in these countnes, the shares of these utilities were boughtby international financial conglomerates. The same processes ofglobal governance are m evidence m the former centrally-plannedeconomies of Eastern Europe. In total, the value of global privat­izations in the developing and former socialist world amounted toover US$58 billion between 1988 and 1995.30

Globalization and Globalism

From the point of view of theory, we may conceptualize the emer­gmg governance by the global capitalist class as a complex processwhich institutionalizes structural power through the widespreadadoption of cultural values and legitnnating ideology. But thislegitunatmg ideology, while often parading under the banner of'deregulation', draws governments into an ever-widening circumfer­ence' of 'regulation' m the form of policy initiatives and legislation.These include monetary and fiscal policies, industrial legislation,SOCial policies, the restructunng of the welfare state, and even thereconstitution of social obligations: for example, an ideologicalattack on alternative lifestyles, and priontization of traditionalfamily values through social policy initiatives."

The difficulty for any theorist of regulation IS that the forms ofregulation of the new epoch are - compared with the past - qum­tessentially a form of deregulatIOn. That is the paradox. Deregula­tion in one sense Implies a dismantling of state-sponsored forms ofregulation of the domestic market, a shrinking of the public sector,even a diminution of the public domain. Yet, at the same time,

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national governments adjust their economies to globalization byregulating for deregulation. It is this confusion over regulationand deregulation that explains why there is so much controversywithin international relations theory and mternational politicaleconomy literature between those who hold so called 'declinist'views of the nation-state, and those who observe a strengthemngof national authority.

In an impressive book, The Trouble with Capitalism, Harry Shuttcatalogued the many ways m which state policy in the OECDcountries since the late 1970s has been geared towards keeping thereturn on finaucial assets high, whatever the cost to the underlyingeconomy and the livelihoods of ordinary people. His argument isthat. while capitalism has always been blessed (or has blessed Itself)with a ruling class m power that would look after Its interests, todaythe dominant form of capital is the financial form (which, as wehave seen before, is most completely globalized), and hence publicpolicy is predicated on helping to maintain the value of financialassets as contrasted and even opposed to those of productive andcommercial assets. Shutt's list of policies include bail-outs, as m theUS government's bail-out of the Savings and Loans disaster in thelate 1980s, and the more recent bail-out of the hedge fund LTCM;government purchases of securities on the stock markets: radicalreforms of the pension fund regulations, moving them from pay-as­you-earn systems to other schemes run by private financial institu­nons and invested on the stock markets; tax breaks to investors andsavers: repeal of legislauon that forbade the buy-back of shares bycompanies; curtailment ofcapital gains: cuttmg mterest rates to helpunfortunate speculators to borrow money at lower rates to 'close'their positions: and, most importantly, political legitimation of allof the above through the dispersal of share ownership."

The active regulation and SOCIal manipulation by governments soas to adjust their economies and societies to the forces of globaliza­tion IS an entirely political project that is coherently, even if falsely,framed m an ideology that IS perhaps best summed up as theideology of 'globalism'. The distinction between globalization andglobalism IS all-important. Whereas globalization is an objective,real historical process which marks. m a sentence, the ascendancy ofreal-time, trans-border economic actrvity over clock-time economicactivity (whether domestic or trans-border), globalism IS the reifica­non of this process of globalization as some mcta-historical force

Global Governance: Regulation and Impenalism.l 155

that develops outside of human agency, ccnditionmg and li itmgthe scope for action of individuals and collectivities alike, ~e theynation-states or local groups. Globalism as an ideology adds Jbeliefin the inescapobility of the transnationalization of economic andfinancial flows to the existing credos of neo-liberalism, namely thebelief in the efficiency of free competitive markets and the be~ef thattlus efficiency will maximize benefits for the greatest number ofpeople in the long run. These beliefs are based on what [PierreBourdieu has described as "doxa' - 'an evidence not debated andundebatable'<' I

Globalization and US Strategic Dominance

However, I would argue that the globalism discourse does morethan this: It also serves to obscure the fact that global capitalism ISan American political project serving the interests primarily lof UScapital and the US domestic economy. Set against a backdrop oftwenty years of alleged US hegemomc decline, and the consequentperceived problematic of global governance, globalization is usuallypresented as an anarchic, chaotic. crisis-prone process in WhICh 'thepower of flows take precedence over the flows of power' in Castells'elegant phrase." Global financial markets are variously describedas being irrational, unpredictable and out of control. Recurrentcnses such as the Mexican peso crisis of 1994, the Asian financialcnsis of 1997, and the subsequent financial collapse of Russia, areall presented as testimony to the dnverless machme that globaliza-tion has become. I

There are other ways of looking at this driverless rnachiner In anImportant book, provocatively titled, The Global Gamble: Waslllllg­ton's Faustian Bid jar Global Dominance, Peter Gowan notes thatmost ofthe literature on globalization, on international regimes andon general developments m the international political economy haveSImply iguored the great levers of American power. 35 He argues thatthere IS a dynamic, dialectical relationship between private actors ininternanonal financial markets and US government dollar policy.He calls this interface the Dollar-Wall Street Regime (DWSR). Inchronological order. key features of this DWSR were deliberatelyput m place. first by US President Richard Nixon when he insistedon the recycling of petro-dollars through the Atlantic's' world

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pnvate banks (led by US banks at that time), and next by Nixon'sstrategy of 'liberating' international financial markets, replacingAmerican hegemony based on direct power over states to a moremarket-based or structural form of power." Then came US controlover iMFIWorld Bank and the subsequent Washington Consensus(under President Carter), m which the US government developedways]of extending the influence of Wall Street over internationalfinance without putting its own big commercial banks at risk:'Washington discovered that when its international financial oper­ators! reached the pomt of insolvency through their internationa]activities. they could be bailed out by the populations of the bor­rower countries at almost no significant cost to the US economy',37

Third, under the Reagan and Bush Administrations there came theyo-yoing dollar-yen policy from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s.when first the yen was made to nse against the dollar. drrvingJapanese companies into East ASia. and then a forced reversal ofthis exchange rate was followed by an imposed liberalization of theEast !Asian capital markets." These policies may well be argued tohave icaused the financial collapse that ensued, And finally, thisagam was followed by IMF rescue packages. widely condemnedbut supported and upheld by the USA with very convenient con­sequences for US corporations and the US domestic economy39

Attempts by Japan and China (with strong support from govern­ments m the region) to establish an Asian Monetary Fund tostabilize the currencies of the affected countnes were immediatelyscuppered by the USA4 0 We shall examine these issues more fully inChapter 10,

Thus. mstead of bemg au unstoppable force of nature againstwhich every nation-state IS powerless. Gowan argues compellinglythat the process of globalization has been driven relentlessly bydeliberate US Treasury and business interests m a conscious bid toextend strategic dominance over the world economy,

Since the early 1990s. this reassertion of US power overthe iPtemational economy has begun to pay dividends for theAmerican economy. Joe Quinlan, a senior analyst forthe ~mencan investment bank Morgan Stanley, fears .that global­IZatIOn might be commg to an end precisely because 'no one hasreaped more benefits from globalization than the United States andCo~orateAmerica'."! Here are just a few examples of how the USeconrmy has benefited from its super power position:

i

Global Governance: Regulation and Imperialism 157

1. Since the early 1980s. net capital InflOWS mto the USA havecontinuously exceeded net outflows. and yet at the same time,the economy has frequently been a net exporter of FDI.42 Whatthis implies is that US corporate capital has unique advantagesof leverage. being able to mvest and control direct investmentsabroad while also being able to raise the funds for it from debtm perpetuity.

2. In the short period between 1994 and 1998. US corporationsresumed their previous commanding heights m the .worldwidecorporate hierarchy, with five corporations m the top ten (upfrom three in 1994); thirty-five in the top 100 (up from twenty­three), and 187 m the top 500. up from 12543 - there are noprizes for guessing that the outcome of the East Asian cnsis,when currencies collapsed and businesses were bankrupted, wasthat US corporations were particularly well-placed to pursuetake-over acuvity."

3. The greater the volatility of the global financial system. andhence the greater the perceived risks. the more the 'safe haven"effect kicks in. The nsk premium spread on mtemational secu­rrues is now m the region of 1500 basis points between WallStreet and many 'emerging' stock markets" This has led somestock-market analysts to claim that the Amencan stock marketis even now 'undervalued'. In any case. the consensus of aca­demic opinion is that the relanonslnp between stock perform­ance on Wall Street and economic growth has becomeessentially 'patterntess'." Whatever the US economy does,money from all over the world will go into Amencan stocks,

4. The US dollar enjoys unnvalled dominance in the global finan­cial markets, on allY count: in 1995 It compnsed 61.5 per cent ofall central bank foreign exchange reserves; It was the currency inwhich 76.8 per cent of all international bank loans and 39.5 percent of all international bond Issues were denominated: It con­stituted 44.3 per cent of all Eurocurrency deposits; It served asthe invoicing currency for 47.6 per cent of world trade: and itwas one of the two currencies in 83 per cent of all foreignexchange transacuons.f'.As Antomo Negri aptly stated: 'Moneyhas only one face. that of the boss,,48 No less a person than theUS President, Bill Clinton hunself, has adrmtted that there IS aso-called 'seigneurial' advantage to the dollar's key currency ­and mternational creditor status. This means that the US effect-

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ively gets a zero-interest loan when dollar bills are held abroad.In the President's Economic Report of 1999 this seigneurialadvantage was estimated to amount to $13 billion dollars peryear." In other words, this is a 'gift' from the world to the USevery year to an amount that is about twice the level of total'official' lending and grants to the whole of Sub-Saharan Africam anyone year.

5. Linked to this there IS the huge and continuing benefit of netcapital inflows that permit the perpetual running of a current­account deficit. Commentmg on the large capital mflows, theAmerican President put the srtuation very clearly 'The invest­ment boom that the US enjoyed since 1993... the growth ofoutput and employment ... would all have been smaller had theUS not been able to run a current account deficit m the 1990s.'50Many commentators of the 'new economy' paradigm (see Chap­ter 5) have noted the importance of 'venture capital' m the USAthat has been there at the right time to enable the super-smartSilicon boys to get going.51 And venture capital IS what the USAhas in abundance, but It would not have It had the USA not beenthe pole of attraction for monies from all over the world. Thereis a parallel here with what economic historians such as PanlBaran used to say about the decisive roJe played by economicsurplus expropnated through mercantile adventures from for­eign lands dunng the industrialization of Bntain5 2 If indeedthere proves to be such a tlung as a 'new economy', begmnmgin America in the 1990s, future economic historians maywell attribute a similar decisive role to the abundance offoreign surplus capital that flowed mto the USA at this precisetime.

The fiction that all of this IS the product of a historrcal accident ISconstantly bemg peddled. The US economy Just 'happens' to be thelargest economy in the world; people all over the world have 'con­fidence' ill the dollar (as the American President puts it); globaliza­tion IS creating a level playing field m which the most productiveeconomy with the most competitive conditions wins. and so on.Here is where the globalist discourse performs its most importantfunction: it is designed to make people believem fair play, and whatcould be fairer than the neutral forces of the market? The more wecan be persuaded that 'the markets' control events beyond any

Global Governance: Regulation and Imperialism 'I 159

politician's dream of intervention, the more effectively the idedlogyworks. Indeed, the very accusation that markets behave 'irration­ally'. as when, for example, stock markets m East ASia collapsedespite the economic fundamentals of the affected economiesreportedly being sound, and nobody could have expected. or didexpect, it. the more people believem God or 'neutral' market forcescommanding their destmies, rather than politIcal thuggery. The verynotion that global financial markets are subject to speculative beha­VIOur of which nobody approves (least of all the leading speculatorsthemselves: for example, George Soros)," the very admission thatnobody, not even the cleverest men and women at the Bank forInternational Settlements, quite understands how the financial mar­kets 'work' - all this adds up to a great narrative and theatre behindwhich real power, push and bullymg hides. The American politicalscientist. Samuel Huntmgton, m an article m 1999, catalogues a fullpage of US bullymg tactics that were applied at the latter end of the1990s, including the targeting of thirty-five countnes with economicsanctions." Last. but not least, the resurgence of US strategicdominance IS also in evidence Within those mternational forums ofelite interaction we have described above, and which some analystshave identified as a platform for a new form of global regulation.The World Bank and the IMF are dominated by the USA as aconsequence of a system of voting rights that IS weighted accordingto economic SIZe and contribution, while the WTO, which pridesItself in being an entirely democratic mstitution of over 130 nationsWith a one-member-one-vote system, arrives at decisions through a'consensus' approach m which the capacity of large nations who canafford many legal experts and permanent representations has powerover outcomes of deliberations. Such capacity IS all that matters.For example. m 1997-8 the USA brought more disputes than therest put together, and achieved more settlements m its favour (ele­ven out of fifteem." Dunng the ill-fated MAl drafting, the USAadded over 600 pages of exceptions for itself. including a generalexceptIon for all Its federal, state and local laws.56

Imperialism and Hegemony

What has been described as the 'deafenmg silence over imperial­ism,57 is probably the most cunmng achievement of neo-liberal

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brainwashing that has accompanied US corporate control over theworld economy, Imperialism exists whenever there IS deliberatetransnational political interference, including (though not exclu­srvely) military intervention, for the purposes of the mobilization,extraction and external transfer of economic surplus from onepolitical terntory to another. Those who argue that imperialism isstnctly a feature of interstate relations and therefore no longer onthe agenda of capitalism under the conditions of globalization"simply miss the point that capitalism at all times produces a networkof hierarchical relations m which the wealth of some areas. groupsor peoples are dependent on the transfer of economic sur­plus, and hence the underdevelopment of other areas, groups andpeople,

In the age of globalization. imperialism manifests Itself m waysthat are m some respects distinct from. and additional to, otherforms of unpenalism that have accompanied, respectrvely, pre­colomal, colomal and neocolomal times. For globalization, as wehave seen, IS linked systemically WIth SOCIal exclusion, meanmg thatas globalization proceeds. more and more social groups. segmentsof population, as well as whole areas and regions, are bemgexcluded from ItS benefits,

Tills has two implications for the type of impenalist mterventionthat we see happenmg around us. First, it makes more (and not less)pressmg the need for state-sponsored and militarily-backed strategiccontrol over vital resources ill foreign lands, as host nations ill theperiphery collapse into zones of instability, and fracture into nvalfactions and groups, warlordism and banditry. Tills would explainthe USA's increasingly belligerent geopolitical preparedness aroundthe world. Notably, III 1999 alone. there has been: the enlargementof NATO to reach a new line of defence from Estoma to Bulgana; anew dispensation of NATO's strategic defence commitment. whichnow includes 'out of area' operations: a revised US-Japan securityalliance, which commits Japan's military to an actively supportrverole in the event of US mvolvement m any conflict breakmg out mthe rareas surrounding Japan' Tills revised secunty pact has rightlybeen dubbed: 'the ASian corollary of Natod 9 Next. there IS the newThJatre Defence Missile Defence system m East ASla.60 and thenew 'son of Star Wars' project, the US$100 billion Nauonal MissileDe~ence system, the super-sensitive electronic surveillance centre ofwhich IS located high on the Yorkshire moors in the UK (at RAF

Global Governance: Regulation and Imperialism 161

Menwith Hill), but completely under the control of the AmencanSecurity Agency."

It further explains why, since the collapse of the Soviet Union andthe end of the Cold War, the USA has negotiated 'access' arrange­ments for troop and equipment deployment m thIrty-eIght countnes(thirty m the Third World), m addition to the hundred bases inSIxteen foreign lands that it already possessed, As Dame! Shirmerwrites, the reasons for this type of US 'forward deployment' m theThird Worldhav,e to do WIth what the Pentagon calls 'challenges toregional stability', but they also have direct commercial advantages.and he quotes a senior Pentagon official:

We are protecting those countnes and they owe us, Don't think Itdoes not Come up m our trade negotiations. It gives us leverage.The Japanese know we are protecting their investments in Korea.Taiwan, and all over ASia, and that gets their attention when weask them for money. For years we had an understanding withTaiwan that If an Amencan company's bid came within 10percent ofa Japanese bid. we could get the contracts. They wouldtell us: 'The Japanese make It better, but you're protecting US,62

Second, SOCIal exclusion within nations builds up pressures for theterritorial expulsion of excluded groups. The resultmg spectre ofeconomic and political refugees m turn threatens the social stabilityof the rich natrons to which they 11ee. In this way, globalization,paradoxically, remforces the need to maintain. at all costs, the deJure mterstate system and to uphold the legal sovereignty of states(while crushmg them politically, and wiping them out economic­ally), so as to enforce the obligations of states to keep withm theirborders the people who carry their passports. Here IS where the 'newdoctrine of internatIonal community', coined by the British PrimeMinister. Tony Blair, in hIS speech on the eve of NATO's fiftiethanniversa~l comes Into its own. The 'new doctrine' overrides theUN Secunty Council's general principle of non-interference m thosecases where domestic human rights abuses present 'threats to inter­national peace and security'.63 The application of this doctrine,more aptly. dubbed the 'new military humanism' by NoamChomsky'" m the recent war over Kosovo IS an example that isset to be followed by others,

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Conclusion

By the end of the 1990s It appeared that the long penod of cnsis andtransformation of the world capitalist system had at last come tosome sort of conclusion. New production technologies and newproduct innovations have combined with a reconfigurauon of themap of the world economy through processes of globalizatlon tocreate a new market equilibnum. A new, social rather than geo­graphic, core-periphery ltlerarchy has developed which enablesminonty segments of the Third World to participate m the benefitsof this new capitalist world economy, together with majority popu­lations m Its traditional heartlands. But this reconfignratlon drawsan ever-sharper divide between those who are in and those who areoutside it. The longer-term lHlsustainability of this world order iswitnessed in mcreasmgly chaotic disturbances, violence and conflictm the periphery. International regulation of the globalized core ofthe world economy has drawn in the political class of nch countnesand many poor countnes alike m abandoning national programmesof econorruc development and social solidarity m favour of interna­tional competitiveness and transnational engagement. While thestructural power of international capital has become interwovenwith a culture of 'international busmess civilization' to becomeinstltutionalized in international regimes of governance of theIMF, World Bank and the WTO, none of this adds up to a stable,sustainable regime of geogovernance. Instead, new forms of USImperialism have taken hold, both to direct global markets andthe globalist imperative, and to confront and subjugate the crisesin the penpheries. Whether all this adds up to a new US 'hegemony'IS a moot point, and remains for the time being open-ended. TheUSA prefers to have its geostrategic. and particularly ItS military,operations conducted with the full consent of its NATO allies, andthe role of Britam, for the moment at least, seems to be as a bridgingpartner to an often reluctant European Union. We shall return tothis question of the hegemonic nature of US resurgence m theconclusion to this book, when we discuss possible scenarios forthe future.

PART III

THE POSTCOLONIALWORLD

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Introduction

In Part IT we described the transformatrve directions of the worldcapitalist system. While it is over-ambitious to pID one label on thetotality of all the complex, interactive changes, some writers never­theless suggest that these changes add up to a transformation ofcapitalism from its modern stage to a postmodern stage. j This stageis characterized by new, flexible systems of production; a predom­mance of high-tech industries: econonuc. enterprise orientationtowards mche markets and consumerism: globalization of marketsand of forms of regulation; fictitious capital formation; and theascendancy of a hegemonic neo-liberal ideology.

Crucially, as Fedric Jameson has argued, this transformationdoes not penmt developmg countries to complete the project ofmodernity. For international capital, moving rapidly from onelow-wage situation to the next, only cybernetic technology andpostmodern investment opportunities are ultimately attractive. Yet,ill the new international system, few countries can seal .themselvesoff in order to modernize ill their own tune and at their own pace.Thus the disappearance of the 'Third World' is a constitutional Ifeature of postmodern, or what I prefer to call - globalized capital­lSID.

Acknowledging that the Third World is no longer a umtarycategory or has a homogeneous identity, the aim ill this part ofthe book is to capture the differential unpact on, and responses to,globalization m those regions of the world that used to be gatheredunder the label 'Third World'. Nevertheless, in describing thoseregions and those responses as 'postcolomal' I borrow a theoreticalconcept for which I first must give some Justification and offerclarification. For what indeed is the pomt of erasmg one unitarylabel, only to scribble in another?

Part of the answer, pragmatically, lies m the popularity that theconcept enjoys today. And since a central purpose of this book is tointroduce key contemporary trends and issues, I cannot ignore the

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rising tide, even institutional endorsement." of postcolonial studies,which claims as Its special provenance the field that used to go bythe name of 'Third World studies' or 'development studies',

But over and above this, I do believe that the concept has heur­istic value because of its timeliness: it has entered the lexicon ofdevelopment studies simultaneously as the product of. engagementwith, and as contestation of globalization. In the reshuffled order ofthe global economy, where First Worlds have appeared in the ThirdWorld, and Third Worlds m the First World, postcolonial studiesopens up three windows. or angles of VISion. First, suchstudies dispute that one can infer 'identity' by looking at matenal

\, relations alone. The politics of cultural identity and recognition, have become as Important as the politics of redistribution: and. as

N ancy Fraser argues. they can support the politics of redistribu-

\tIOn3 Second. postcolomal studies puts a referent emphasis on thecultural 'complexity of identity formation. Cross-border migrationshave resulted m fragmentation and heterogenous rruxes of belong-ing, and loyalties and political allegiances. in which class and nationhave become 'decentred' as a source of identity. Third. postcoloni­alism is suggestive and reflexive of a world no, longer structuredalong binary axes, be they First World/Third World; North/South.East/West or SOCialist/capitalist.

The concept IS. however, far from bemg unproblematic. While Itseems to be succeeding in 'destabilizing' the development debate. Ithas also been accused of intellectual escapism and critical paralysis:Let us first examme the concept and these debates more fully beforedeciding on how we can best make use of It in orgamzmg thechapters m this part of the book.

The Postcolonial: Condition and Discourse

The term 'postcolorual' is a member ofa family of 'post' literature. ofwhich 'postmodernism' IS the all-embracing genenc term. And, as ISthe case with all this 'post' literature, the word 'p~st.JlUlls us mto asemantrc trap. It expresses an eprstemologicakbreak "with the all­encompassmg totality of Western thought andscientific traditionwhile also SIgnalling an epochal sequentiality. The problem, how­ever. is that those who make the epistemological break rejectthe 'foundationalism' and the 'essentialism that underpms the his-

Introduction 1167

Itorical analysis by which the epochal succession IS diagnosed. Need-less to say, this has led to largely fruitless debates between the twocamps,

In her critique of postmoderrusm. Ellen Meiksms Wood remindsus of how the sociologist C. Wright Mills had formulated! thisintellectual conundrum: the crisis of reason and freedom whichmarked the onset of the postmodern age. he said. presented 'struc­tural problems. and to state them requires that we work in theclaSSIC terms of human biography and epochal history, Only insuch terms can the connections of structures and milieux that affectthese values today be traced and causal analyses be conducted"But, comments Meiksins Wood, 'this statement IS in nearly everyparticular anti-thetical to the current theones of postmodernitywhich effectively deny the very existence of structure and structuralconnections and the very possibility of "causal analysis" l 6 Exactlyso, and thus it is With postcolonial theory! In fact, much of the ,debate surrounding the use of the term 'postcolomal' repeats muta- 'lis mutandis the debates around the term 'postrnodem'.

With regard to postmodermsm, those wnters who have engagedwith it from a historical structural. or Marxist, perspecuve, - forexample, David Harvey and Fednc Jameson - have done so byresorting to the only theoretical opuon available under the circum­stances, namely to distmguish between postmodernism as 'condi­non' and postmodernism as 'critique'. And. again, so It is with theconcept 'postcolonial'. Following Arif Dirlik, who has tried to bnngthe postcolonial discourse into the arena of global political eco­nomy," I mtend to treat postcolonial discourse as a 'cultural condi­tion' or 'logic' that corresponds to the specific geopolitical andeconomic configuration of what we have earlier referred to as post-.modern or globalized capitalism. In short, we shall understand what''postcolonial' is from an understanding of how, and why it all began.

Based on a stnct semantic mterpretation one would tlunk that theword 'postcolonial' refers to the penod after independence - that IS,after formal colonialism has ended. Yet this is not what the term ISintended to mean now. Ella Shohat, in her cnsp interrogation of theconcept, describes It as 'a designation for cntical discourses which the­matize Issues emerging from colorual relations and their aftermath,covering a long historical span (including the present)." This alsocovers, pointedly, the postindependence, neocolonial, period whichwas stabilized under the American-led Bretton Woods postwar order.

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,!

168 ITh~ PostcO/Ollia/ World

Thusl 'postcolonial' implies a movement going beyond ann-colonialnatronalist theory as well as a movement beyond a specific point inhistory, that of colonialism alldTlurd-World nationalist struggles.

Noting how historical specificity collapses under chronologicaldiversity, Shohat asks, somewhat impatiently, 'When, exactly, then,does the "post-colonial" begin?" To which ArifDirlik quips, 'WhenThird World mtellectuals have arnved m First World academe

d O

The term originated, in the mid-1980s, among Tlurd-World scholarsIn First-World universities. who were caught up m diasporic err­cumstances caused by the crisis of the Tlurd World and the failureof the developmental and democratic project m many Third-Worldcountnes. Whether forced into exile, or as voluntary emigres, theyhave regrouped around a discourse of identity that owes less togeographicJocation and national origin than to subject POSIt1011. Thisconfluence of historical and biograplucal details explains much ofthe epistemology and substantive theory that was to emerge.

As Arif Dirlik notes, the release of postcoloniality from the fixityofThird-World location. means that the identrty of the postcolonialIS no, longer structural but discursive. That IS to say, It IS the parti­cipation m the discourse that defines the postcolonial. The postco­

Ilonia'l discourse or critique resonates With concerns and orientattonsI that have their origins in a new world situation created by transfor-

mations witlun the capitalist world economy, by the emergence ofwhat has vanously been described as 'global capitalism', 'flexibleproduction", 'late capitalism' and so on, terms that have disorga­nized earlier conceptualizations of global relations, especially rela­tions comprehended earlier by such binaries as colonized/colomzer,First WorldlThird World, and 'the West and the Rest', m all of

I which the nation-state was taken for granted as the global unit ofIpolitical orgamzation.. . ' .But here comes the epistemologICal twist: even as postcolonial

discourse thus engages with global times, postcolonial cnttcs, withfew exceptions, do not interrogate that relationship because theyrepudiate a foundational role to capitalism III history." By ignormg

\

the political economy approach they have invited cnticism of beingapoytical and ahistorical, and even complicit m the 'consecration ofhegemony' ,12

S6 much for the 'condition' ofpostcoloniality. Let us now turn topostcolonial discourse, or postcolonial critique, Itself.

I

Introduction 169

In First-World academe, Third-World scholars found a welcomehome and symbiotic environment in the burgeoning discipline, andpolemics, of 'cultural studies'. Cultural studies began as literaturecritique in English literature and linguistics departments, as didpostcolonial studies subsequently. The central terrain and mode ofquesnonmg in studies such as The Empire Writes Back,!3 ColonialDiscourse and Postcolonial TheOli 4 and Decolonistng the Mind'?are literature and literature criticism. Tlns too matches the careersof Third-World intelligentsia, many of whom first found a voicethrough literary wrinng.!"

Cultural studies, in Raymond Williams' claSSIC definition, invest­igates the creation of rneanmg m, and as a formative part of, awhole way of life, the whole world of sense-making (descnptions, Iexplanations, interpretations, valuations of an kinds) in societiesunderstood as historical material organizations.'? Its terrain ofinquiry IS 'mass' or 'popular' culture in an Its manifestations: lan­guage, film, magazines, TV soap operas, shopping, advertising andso on. It IS political and polemical (and massively irritating tostructural Marxists) in so far as It argues that the masses are notmerely passive recipients of a culture wickedly designed by capital- \IStS to suck them.into consumensm, exploitation and subjugation,but instead are actively participating and contributing. Their parti- -v.,

cipation can be deliberate, creative, selective and even subversive. f-Culture IS also the vehicle or medium whereby the relationship

between groups IS transacted. The emancipatory promise and pur­pose of cultural studies IS to discover resistance and subversivecreativity m the cultural relationship between dominant and sub­ordinated groups, and help to reverse it, as when Frantz Fanon onceargued that Europe is literally the creation of the Third World.Cultural studies does this first by deconstructing the texts, words,names, labels and definitions of the situation that have beenauthored by the dominant groups, and next by givmg people of ansubordinated groups - women, blacks, gays, peasants and indigen­ous peoples - their voices back through a 'new historicism', orthrough a new style of anthropology, as in ethnographic accountsof local cultural practices of resistance and protest. Third, culturalstudies IS emancipatory in so far as It links, through its interven­nons, the experience of these diverse SOCial groups, and potentiallybrokers new political alliances between them.

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Postcolonial Formations

170 The Postcolonial World

Within this broad field and style ofenquiry, postcolonial discoursenestled organically to engage m a radical rethmk and reformulationof forms of knowledge and SOCIal identities authored and authonzedby colonialism and Western domination. For example, It critiquesboth the idea and the practice of 'development' as well as the conceptof the Thud World as part of a Eurocentnc discourse ofcontrol andsubordination. Much of this literature rewrites and 'counter-appro­priates' the history of the 'subalterns' (the subordinated 'others'),makmg their voices of resistance heard (past and present), reversingonentalist thought, and decolonizing the mind. The goal is to undoall partitioning strategies between centre and periphery as well as allother 'binarisrns that are the legacy ofcolonial ways of thinking, andto reveal societies globally in their complex heterogeneity and con­tmgency. In this way, postcolomal discourse alms to reconstruct theidentities ofsubordinated peoples, give them back their pride of placem history, and with it the confidence to build on the record of theirown 'hybrid position of practice and negotiation' 18

The concept of 'hybridity' occupies a central place m postcolonialdiscourse and It IS a good example of the 'reverse value-coding' thatGyan Praleash speales ofas one of the strategies of the discourse. 19 Incolonial days, 'hybridity was a term of abuse, signifying the lowestpossible form ofhuman life: mixed 'breeds' who were 'white but notquite' 20 In postcolomal discourse, by contrast, hybridity IS celeb­rated and privileged as a kind of supenor cultnral mtelligencethrough the advantage of 'in-betweenness', the straddling of twocultnres and the consequent ability to 'negotiate the difference'.Remterpeting Fanon. for example, HOlm Bhabha argues that theliberatory 'people' who mitiate the productive instability of revolu­tionary cultural change are themselves the bearers of hybrid iden­tlty.2l In development studies, an analysis m terms of hybrid culturesleads to a reconceptualization of established views. Namely that,rather than being eliminated by modernity, many 'traditional cul­tnres' survive through their transformative engagement Withmoderruty.P In the ensumg chapters of this book we shall encounterillustrations of this 'hybridization' in each of the 'zones' of develop­ment that we shall be discussing, whether It be the Confucianizationof modernity, as in East ASIa, or the postdevelopment trajectories ofLatm-American peasant communities and slum dwellers.

Introduction

iI

One does not have to buy into the whole of the postcolonial discourseto appreciate that the concept has merits in helping us to understandthe diversity of development and underdevelopment trajectories mthese global times. It IS the colonial and neocolonial expenence land

"the manner in which the aftermath interacts With globalization, ,thatillummates the different outcomes, namely a different postcolonialformation m various parts of the world system at the same tune. Asthe titles of these chapters suggest, we shall stndy these differentforms of the postcolomal condition in four major zones of theworld. While the word "zone' still carries WIth It a notion of area­specific location, there is nevertheless a certam fluidity and ambiguitybetween the area-referennal emphasis and the subject-positional one.

Thus, in Cbapter 8, we loole at the penpheralizmg consequencesof globalization prevalent in many parts of the Third World, but wefocus on how these have become exemplified and, in a manner ofspeaking, bave gone furthest in Sub-Saharan Afnca. Debt, andderegulation following punitive structural adjustment programmes,have more tightly integrated the wealth of many Tlurd-World elitesm the global economy, while emasculating politically the states inthese regions, thus undermmmg their capacity to relaunch 'anynational territorial developmental project. Moreover, the ImpOSI­non of the neo-liberal orthodoxy, coupled WIth tbe insistence onelectoral reform and democracy, has not only underrruned the statebut has also contributed directly to tbe descent into anarchy andCIvil war of many countnes in Africa. The ensumg political emer­gencies have drawn m the international donor cornrnunity m a formof contamment activity that may be summed up as the managementof exclusion rather tban a programme of development and mcor­poration. It IS a management of exclusion that IS becommg char­actenstic of the manner m which other areas at the edge of'theglobal system are also being treated.

In Chapter 9 we examine the postcolorual condition of militantIslam. We argue that the failure of the neocolomal, developmental­1St period has interacted WIth the historical cultural tradition ofIslamic spiritual renewal and ItS subjection to cultnral imperialism.feeding a process of cultural denial of globalization and modernity.While we sball not develop the theme of its resonance m other partsof tbe world, including the diasponc Muslim communities of tbe

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West. It IS dear that this anti-developmental postcolomal posinon,again, IS one m which the area referent and subject positron becomefused. The anu-devetopmentatism of militant Islam IS different m ItSorigins and expression from both the managementofexclusion m Sub­Saharan Afnca and the postdevelopment response m Laun Amenca.

The global process of transformation IS neither even nor unop­posed. In Chapter 10 we look at the expenence of the 'dev­elopmental' states in East Asia which testify to the possibilities ofnational territorial accumulation and defensive regional alliances. ItIS an experience that owes as mnch to the end of the Cold War andPax Americana as it does to the very same historical process ofcapitalist expansion and integration that penpheralized and margin­alized other areas and communities m the world system. Here toothere are lessons to be learnt from the locally-specific contestationofthis postcolorual condition that may hold out the promise ofsuccessful replication m other areas of the periphery of the globalsystem too.

Chapter 11 looks at Latm America, where the postmodern turn mdevelopment studies has gone furthest in promoting a postdevelop­mentalist philosophy of liberation. Postdevelopment theory andpractice IS different from anti-development sentiments in so far asIt does not deny globalization or modernity, but wants to find someways oflivmg With It and imaginatively transcending it. Muchofthecreative thinking about new social movements and thedevelopmentof crvi! society ongmates on this continent. Yet, as before, thehybrid forms of struggle and local experimentations with alternallvesocial and economic organization are not exclusive to Latin Amer­tea] but are also found elsewhere, including the heartland of thetraditional core of the capitalist system. Thus, these 'postdevelop­ments' also reflect conditions, and inspire responses, that may be ofrelevance to other social groups and localities withm the globalsystem.

ri"\.

,II

I

8

Africa: Exclusion and theContainment of Anarchy

Debates on Sub-Saharan Afnca (SSAj usually begin with a "enu­flexion, to .the size and vanety of the continent, and the conse~uentunpossibility of making generalizatIOns. Yet once such qualifica­nons are out of the way, the commonality of Africa's colonial andpostcolonial history asserts Itself soon enough, to reveal comparableecononuc structures and political dynanucs.

Sub-Saharan Afnca contains thirty-two out ofthe UN's forty 'leastde~eloped' member countnes. Early post-mdependence growth,while still externally dependent, was nevertheless a source of hopeand optmusm. But tills was followed by stagnation and negativegrowth In all but a very few countnes (for example, Mauritius,Botswana) as earlier forms of mcorporation into the internationaldivision of labour were rendered obsolete when the world economicsystem globalized and entered what Manuel Castells has referred toas the 'newest' international division oflabour. I Since the mid-1970s,Afnca's primary commodities trade has collapsed, from Just over 7per cent of world trade to less than 0.5 percent m the 1990s,2Its shareof manufacturmg trade never really got a chance to lift off and wentdown from an already puny 1.2 per cent m 1970 to 0.4 per cent inthe late 1990s. The exclusionary logic of the present globalizedworld order IS most dramatically attested in foreign direct invest­ment (FDI) flows. Africa's share of all FDI flows to developingcountnes has dropped from 13 per cent in 1980 to less than 5per cent in the late 1990s. Pnvate (non-public guaranteed)finance now contributes less than a tenth of the resource flowsinto the continent, the rest being made up of various forms of

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180 The Postcolonial World

investment wars. However, the prevailing monetarist ideology WIthIts emphasis on deregulation and privatization, and on the reduc­tion of the SIzeand influence of the public sector, pernuts only oneinstrument to achieve this objective: manipulation of interest rates.

It is therefore no coincidence that the 1980s, at least until theLouvre Accord in 1986, stand out as a period of historically unpre­cedented tngh and nsing interest rates of tbe core currencies, Mostof the outstanding stock of Thud-World debt was ongmaIJy con­tracted at low, fixed interest rates m the mid-1970s. They were,however, rescheduled m the early 1980s when floating (and rIS1Og)interest rates prevailed. The sharply increased conunercial world­market interest rates of that period (of between 13 per cent and 16per cent) coupled WIth tbe resuJtmg improvement m the value of thecore denommation currency (tbe US dollar) throughout the 1980sadded to the debt service burden of the Third World.

The outcome was that, since 1983, and for the first tune in thepostwar penod, officially recorded capital outflows from the ThirdWorld countries to the core countries annually exceeded the moniesflowing into them.'? F C. Clairrnont and J. Cavanagh.P m anarticle published m 1987 and covering the period 1981-6, haveadded to these figures an estimate of flight capital and profit remitt­ances. Togetber these lifted tbe total net financial transfers over theperiod 1981-6 to a figure weIJ over US$250 billion, representing thetotal financial contribution of the Third World to the advanced,core countnes over that penod. Allowing for pnce inflation, tlusfigure was four times that oftbe US$13 billion m Marsball Aid withwhich the United States financed postwar recovery m Europe.

The Role of the IMF and tbe World Bank

Since the debt cnsis broke m 1982, the year MeXICO first declared amoratorium on its internauonal debt payments, the IMF and WorldBank bave been commissioned and dispatcbed to tbe frontiers of tbeglobal economy to exact payments from and supervise tbe credits tothe Thud World. In this capacity tbey have been able to affectprofoundly the organization of production and trade m the pen­phery to tbe benefit of the core of tbe world capitalist system. In alldebt rescheduling exercises m tile 1980s it bas been tbe seal ofapproval of the IMFlWorld Bank as expressed in official mernor-

Africa: ExclUSIOn and the Containment of Anarchy 181

anda of agreement and letters of intent exchanged between tbemand the debtor countnes tbat bas released, in complex and inter­active packages, official and commercial credit flows. 14

Structural adjustment is the genenc term used to describe apackage of measures which the IMF. tbe World Bank and indi­vidual Western aid donors persuaded many developing countnes toadopt dunng the 1980s, in return for a new wave of loans. AsAdrian Leftwich notes, tbe aim of adjustment was to shatter thedonunant postwar, state-led development paradigm and overcomethe problems of developmental stagnation by promoting open andfree competitive market economies. supervised by mimmal states, IS

Between 1980 and 1990, World Bank structural adjustment loansmcreased from seven to 187 m sixty countnes.!"

The inventory of IMFlWorld Bank prescriptions IS by now weIJknown. It includes currency devaluation, deregulation of pnces andwages, reduction of public spending on social programmes and statebureaucracies, removal of food subsidies and others on baSIC neces­sities. trade liberalization, pnvatizanon of parastatal enterprises.and the expansion of the export sector: the latter - in the case ofagriculture - often at the expense offood production. The officially­stated aims of these policies was to stabilize domestIc economies. tostimulate economic growth, and to ensure the country's ability toearn the foreign exchange needed to service Its foreign debts.

However, there is anotber way of looking at tills. According tocntics.!" debt peonage has given the international financial msutu­tions (IFIs) a stranglehold over states and economies, especially inAfrica. In a joint declaration to UNCTAD IX, held in Midrand,South Africa m 1996, African NOGs condemned the Imposition oftbe nee-liberal paradigm through structural adjustment programmes(SAPs) as no less than a form of recolonizatIon of the continent. 18

SAPs, It IS argued, amount to the pillage of what remains of Africa'seconomic wealth.

Structural Adjustment in Africa: tbe Social and Economic Record

The 1980s saw twenty-nine Sub-Saharan African countries acceptthe IMFlWorld Bank medicine. Even m the stated objectives of themultilateral agencies themselves, the results were very disappoint­ing. Hewitt de AIcantara and Dbaram Glial estimated that, m the

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region as a whole, per capita incomes declined by 30 per cent overthe period 1980-8,19 and while It IS true that political cnses and civilwars in many countnes have contributed to thrs staggenng loss ofincome, the adverse international economic environment (as partlymediated through structural adjustment and debt management poli­cies) can be held responsible for most of it. They argue that this isso, first, because of the simultaneous deterioratron in nearly all ofthe countries of the region, including those relatively free frominternal turmoil; and second because of the magnitude of the dete­riorating external financial position of Sub-Saharan Africa over thepenod. Based on UN figures, they note an annual loss of US$6.5billion over the penod, even without taking into account capitalflight. This total amounted to roughly a tlurd of total annual Im­ports, 45 per cent of export earmngs, 10-1 I per cent of the region'scombined GDP, and 60 per cent of gross caprtal formanon."

The result was, in fact, so disappointing that a World Bank­sponsored report m 1992, given the frank title 'Why StructuralAdjustment Has Not Succeeded in Sub-Saharan Africa', wasretrieved from the publishers, reissued with a less controversialtitle and embellished WIth an introduction WhICh pointed out thatthe analysis was in any case flawed, because It failed to distmguishcountnes that merely SIgned up to a reform programme from thosethat carried it out." It next Issued a more optimistic report on thelessons of structural adjustment in Sub-Saharan Afnca?2 Unsubtlyshifting the blame for failure on to the governments of the countriesthemselves (for not having implemented the World Bank/IMFadjustment policies properly), it argued that only six countries gottheir macro-economic fundamentals 'about' right (Ghana, Tanza­nra, Gambia, Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Zimbabwe). ThIS, thereport claimed, has resulted in restored export competitivenessWIth low inflation and unproved fiscal balance. But even these starperformers, although eventually returning to positive GDP percapita growth rates, had deteriorating rates of investment. Theother countries which Implemented the policies only partially ornot at all, or which backslid. the report argued, paid the priceWIth negligible or deteriorating growth. But, as UNCTAD notedfive years later, the 'recent faster growth' that has taken place mSub-Saharan Afnca 'has occurred in countries that were not amongthe World Bank's "core group of adjusters" and most of thecountnes that were thought to be pursuing relatively sound policies

Africa: ExcluSIOII and the Containment of Anarchy i 183!

at the time, are not among the strong performers today' 23 In: anycase, the UNCTAD report argues that the observed surges ofgrowth can be explained by one-off factors and are unlikely to besustained. The critical point IS that, despite the implementation ofstructural reforms in about two-thirds of the Sub-Saharan Africacountries, the private investment response to SAPs contmues to beweak."

By the end of the millennium, the average growth rate for thecontinent had yet to catch up with population growth.25 Its debtburden in relation to both GDP and m relation to export earningshad nsen steeply. Indeed, as a proportion of GDP and of exports,

I '6the debt burden IS the highest for any deve opmg country."Outside IMFfWorld Bank circles, few observers have a positive

word to say about structural adjustment. Non-government organ­izations (NGOs) working m the field m Afnca are particularlyscathing in their criticism, none more so than Kevin Watkms ofBntish Oxfam. He sums up his devastating critique as follows;

the application of stnngent monetary policies, designed to reduceinflation through high interest rates, has undermmed mvestmentand employment. At the same time, poorly planned trade­liberalisation measures have exposed local mdustnes to extremecompetition. Contrary to World Bank and IMF claims, theposition of the poor and most vulnerable sections of SOCIetyhave all too often been undermined by the deregulation oflabour markets and erosion of SOCIal welfare provisions, andby declining expenditures on health and education. Womenhave suffered m extreme form. The erOSIOn of health expendi­ture has increased the burdens they carry as carers, whilefalling real wages and rismg unemployment have forcedwomen into multiple low-wage employment in the mformal

'7sector."

Structural Adjustment: Intensifying Global Relations

Even if the structural adjustment programmes (SAPsj achieved littleor nothing from the point of VIew of national terntonal develop­ment and the Improvement of standards of living of the masses m

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184 The Postcolonial World

Afncan countries. the programmes were a resounding success whenmeasured in terms of the acceleration of the process of globaliza­tion. Structural adjustment has tied the physical resources of Afncamore firmly into servicing the 'old' segment of the global economy.At the same time, It has oiled the financial machinery by whichwealth is being transported out of the region. thereby removing thevery resources which are needed by dynamic adjustment to the 'new'global economy.

i Commodity specialization and debt go hand in hand. Both theWorld Bank and the IMF have used their leverage on indebtedness torequire that production be concentrated on commodity exports. Theconsequence of this has been a flooding of the commodity marketswhich forced prices downwards. Dunng the 1980s. the terms of tradefor Sub-Saharan African commodities fell more rapidly than for anyother region of the globe. 28 In fact, the terms of trade ofSub-SaharanAfnca in the late 1990s were lower than in 1954.29 ThIS is by far themost pertinent cnucism to make against the SAPs. namely that theexcessive focus on export-orientated production has contributed to adecline m food production, thus making many countnes vulnerableto famme and epidenucs dunng periods of drought, war or othercatastrophes. Food production per head was lower at the end of the1990s than It was m the early 1970s.3o

i Second. forced privatization was a standard feature of all SAPs.In the words of one senior World Bank manager who resigned aftertwelve years' service: 'Everything we did from 1983 onwards wasbased on OUf new sense ofmission to have the south "privatised" ordie; towards this end we ignominiously created economic bedlam inLatm America and Africa.'!' According to the World Bank, 400mdustries were privatized m Afnca m the 1980s. These includedpublic utilities such as telecommunications, electncity companies,railways and credit orgamzations.Y Inevitably, while national stockmarkets are still small and in the process of being formed. theseprivatization policies ensured that foreign investors got a large sliceof the action. The under-capitalization of the emerging stock mar­kets proved an attractive hunting ground for the active moneymanagers of core countnes' mvestment funds and more speculativeinstruments such as hedge funds." The World Bank reports thatbetween 1989 and 1995 US$1630 million-worth of foreign exchangewas raised through pnvauzation m Sub-Saharan Africa. well overh~lf of the total of pnvatization revenues m the contment.34

I

IAfrica: Exclusion and the Containment of Anarchy 185

Third, imposed devaluations and interest rate liberalizations havebeen Justly criticized as encouraging lugh profits for the largelyforeign-owned financial sector. while production IS undermmed.PDevaluation mcreases foreign debts m local currency terms whileinterest rate liberalization means that governments have to payhigher interest rates on domestic debt. The net result IS that budgetdeficits actually worsen, and because governments are not all­owed under SAP rules to pnnt money they find themselves even­tually borrowmg more from the IFIs and the pnvate financialmarkets."

Democracy and Economic Reform

As the debt decade of the 1980s wore on, the political nature of thestructural adjustment programmes, and of bilateral and other multi­lateral (for example. EU) programmes, became ever more stridentand outspoken. Previously, Western governments and multilateralagencies, while professing a genuine interest m liberal democracyand human rights, had nevertheless been qurte happy openly tosponsor repressive. authoritarian regunes for the sake of a stablepolitical climate. US President Bill Clinton, on tour m Afnca m1997. m candid contntion, even apologized for past US 'support'for brutal Afncan despots because of his country's obsession withthe Cold War. The World Bank. forbidden by ItS own articles ofagreement to use overtly 'political' critena, had sunilarly been unin­terested m the nature of regimes.

However, in the drive for structural adjustment. Western govern­ments from the late 1980s became increasmgly outspoken in theirpreference for electoral, multiparty democracy as a precondition forfurther loans and grants. The World Bank. while still unable toinsist on 'political' adjustment. began to favour a none-too-subtlefonu of 'good governance' . which it defined as including the follow­ing features: an efficient public service: an independent Judicialsystem and legal framework to enforce contracts; the accountableadmimstration of public funds; an independent public auditor,responsible to a representative legislature; respect for the law andhuman rights at all levels of government: a pluralistic institutionalstructure; and a free press. All this adds up. as Adrian Leftwichwntes, 'to a comprehensive statement of the minunnm institutional,

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legal and political conditions of liberal democracy, though the Banknever stated this explicitly'. 37

For its part, the European Union (ED) formally adopted politicalconditionality as an 'aid regime principle' in 1989, while the UnrtedStates added a 'democracy initiative' under the auspices of USAIDm 1991.

38At the time of writing, almost withont exception. African

states have moved in the direction of competitive multiparty sys­tems, WIth contested elections either having been held or due to beheld in the near future. Between 1988 and 1993, the United Nationsmonitored ballot-box elections in some thirty Sub-Saharan coun­tnes.

What could explam this curious change of heart? Adnan Leftwrchidentifies four main mfluences: the expenence of structural adjust­ment lending; the resurgence of neo-Iiberalism m the West: thecollapse of official Communist regimes; and the nse of pro-democ­racy movements in the developmg world and elsewhere. In short, wemight say: the new world order. 39

How does this 'democracy IS good, state IS bad' agenda assistecononuc reform? The link between democracy and debt restructur­ing m the case of Africa IS very puzzling, since it assumes a positivecorrelation between democracy and economic development. Butsuch assertions were not made by the leading mternanonal organ­izations when commenting on and 'explaining' the Success of eco­nomic development m the newly-industrializing countries of EastAsia. As we shall see in Chapter lOon East Asia, in relation to thatpart of the world, the new orthodoxy singled out the VIrtues ofstrong) authoritarian and dirigiste states as the most importantfactor contributing to the development of the region.

Many analysts have focused on this apparent contradiction,arguing that while prescriptions of a minimal liberal state treat thestate as a pariah, economic reforms nevertheless depend on a proact­ive mtervenuornst government. Reform cannot be delivered withoutlocal capable hands bolstered by an efficient bureaucracy.f''

For such authors, the suspicion then anses that there IS a hiddenpurpose behind the ostentatious ignoring of this obvious contra­diction, Falling back on classical structuralist explanations, somehave explamed away the contradiction in terms of concepts such as'low mtensity democracy', argumg that electoral reforms merelypermit changes acceptable to mternational capitalism to be put inplace with greater case and less resistance than m more overtly

Africa: Exclusion and the Contauunent of Anarchy i 187ii

authoritanan regimes." They have also pomted out that economicreform policies benefit certain factions of African elites withl closelinks to international capltal.42 Others have argued that the ernpha­SIS on quality of governance merely serves 'as an efficient means offocusing responsibility on governments of developmg countries,both for past ills and for Implementation of reform packagesj."

While thus, one view in the academic literature regards the newpolitical conditionalities m the manner of serving up old wmes innew bottles - that IS, as new ways of servmg the mterests oflinter­national capital - there is also a new turn m the analytical literatureon Africa which explores the 'new donor agenda' more widely andrather differently, namely as being reflectIve of a generalized recon­sideration and reformulation of bilateral and multilateral relationsWIth Africa and, indeed, WIth other marginalized, politicallyunstable, areas of the global economy. As we shall see furtherbelow, there is a new kind of postmodernist type of analysis thatexammes the political conditionality of the economic reform agendaas a discourse which, whether Intended or not, both creates andmanages a new relationship between the 'new world order' andAfrica. This IS a relationship of exclusion, rather than of continuingincorporation. But before we turn to this literature, we examine howfar economic reform Itself has contributed to fragmentation andpolitical mstability.

Economic Reform and Anarchy

In many African countries, the imposition of a neo-liberal ortho­doxy, including pnvatization of the public sector, the emasculationof the state apparatus, and the insistence on electoral reform, hascontributed directly to the descent into anarchy and civil war.Recent wars have scarred Angola, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia,Somalia, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and EthIO­pia and Eritrea. Banditry, warlordisrn and low-intensity conflicthave come to prevail m some other parts of the continent too.

What IS the link between nee-liberal reform and the descent intochaos? Surprisingly, there is relatively little theoretical literatureavailable that addresses this question. Although there are studiesthat report on the empiricalconnection between structural adjust­ment and food nots.?" there are few attempts to theorize the link

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between reforms, weakened state apparatuses and disintegratingstate-civil relations. One plausible explanation, however, is offeredby William Reno:'

In a compelling study of the reform process m Sierra Leone, Renoargues that neo-liberal reforms dissolve the 'patrimonial' state formthat emerged after decolonization and encourage disaffected elites tostrike out on their own. After independence. the newly-independentstates in Afnca were typically weak, they lacked legitimacy and wereconfronted by formidable coalitions of rent-seeking strongmenusing alternauve, often tribal, power bases. The patrimonial stateform emerged naturally to deal With this srtuation. In the patrimo­nial form, rulers use the state's resources available to them to buyoff .the opposition. The larger the state sector, the greater theamount of money and lucratrve posinons of privilege m the gift ofthe rulers. Undoubtedly, this state form created unwieldy, ineffi­cient and corrupt administrations, and led to economic decline anddebt. But what IS often overlooked IS that 11 also kepI the peace.

Imposed neo-liberal reform, by contrast, attacks the patnmomalstate, removes the corrupt bureaucracy and pulls state officials outof the framework of patron-client politics. In its efforts to get thestate bndget under control, the IMF has even negotiated withgovernments to subcontract tax collection to foreign firms. But thismanner of reining in the rent-seeking state and ItS officials dissolvesthe patrirnonial glue that holds the society together. It bnngs aboutfragmentation as erstwhile clients are forced to seek their own bene­fits independent of the central authonty. This hastens the collapseinto 'warlordism'. As Reno sums up the situation for Sierra Leone:

much recent fighting, especially ItS terntorial spread, is directlyrelated to the elimination of opportunities for powerful strong­men under 'reform' and the efforts of these strongmen to strikeout on their own for personal gam. Meanwhile, ordinary citizensconclude that Freetown has less and less to offer in the. way ofservices or protection from predations of wayward elites. Thereformist state IS attacked from two sides - from below, by thoseW!lD believe It wi11 have little to offer them, and from above, byclients who make irresistible claims on reform policies:'

II

Workl Bank and IMF officials protest their innocence as countryafter country tumbles into Civil strife and despair. After all, all they

I

Africa: Exclusion and the Containment of Anarchy 189

want to do IS to 'free' poor peasants from corrupt state marketingboards, and liberate urban enterprise from the punitrve shackles ofbureaucratic licences and petty government regulations. Theirgrand design IS to use the economic discipline of global markets topromote SOCIal restructunng. But this strategy backfires, becauseAfrica IS simply too far behmd to make a living m the global market.Because of ItS structural Irrelevance to the global economy, anyenforced return to global markets as agents of economic disciplinecannot even be excused on the grounds that the adverse effects ofadjustment will be 'temporary'

Nor, it seems to me, can the officialdom of the internationalmstitutions be excused on the grounds that they could not haveforeseen the political consequences of their neo-liberal programmes.Theories of the patrimonial state and the positive function of cor­ruption were part of mainstream political development literature mthe 1960s and 1970s. Political SCIentists such as Samuel Huntmgtonhad commonly Viewed political corruption as the only means ofmtegratmg marginal groups into a disjointed SOCIal system." Somewere objective enough to recognize that the growth of corruption,for example in England m the seventeenth and eighteenth centunes.was a necessary alternative to VIOlence, an historically inevitablestep m the long haul towards the mstitutionalization of a politicalstructure and administration relatively independent of the compet­ing demands of economic agents." It IS the tragedy of Afnca thathistory has not given it time to catch up.

Imperialism and Resonrce Wars

Even when critical academic analyses do have a background under­standing of the wider adverse international context, the portrayal ofcontemporary Afncan communal Violence Itself is nevertheless onethat IS often focused, even if not entirely blamed, on the victims. ItIS an analysis that stubbornly Ignores the direct imperialistconnections that stoke the fires, supply the weapons, purchase thecommodities (oil, diamonds, gold) and in so doing erect a self­reproducing architecture of a war economy. The expanding ki11ingfields of Afnca are ultimately attributed to resource scarcity push­ing primordial ethnic cleavages towards escalatmg violence, whilethe battlefield itself is often characterized as being of a premodern

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'formlessness', or as 'criminal anarchy', in which hordes of menmove around like 'loose molecules in a very unstable socialfluid',"" and for whom fighting and killing becomes, not a meansto an end. but a purpose In itself and even a 'liberating' expenencc.P''To the casual observer, this descent into barbarism IS completewhen one encounters evidence of a revival of the Irrational spmtpower of animist beliefs.51

Belatedly, however, analysts are beginnmg to describe, as Renoindeed himself does, 52 the numerous ties that cement the pnvateinterests between state officials. rulers and warlords on the onehand, and foreign commerce and investors on the other. In SierraLeone, for example, where rebels have controlled the diamondareas, the profits of war have been fostered by clandestine suppliesof diamonds smuggled across the border into Libena and sold to anumber of Canadian companies. with links to the central sellingorganizatron of the De Beers Company.53 There are other studiesthat lay bare the murderous intertwmmg of international rivalnesfor Afnca's mineral wealth, and the fractinous explosion of resourcewars on the ground.54

Angola IS probably the country that has most clearly advanced toa self-perpetuating war economy. On one side there is the MPLAgovernment m Luanda, and a war oligarchy comfortably endowedwith oil wealth obtained through the operations of Shell, while onthe other side, Jonas Savnnbi's UNlTA rebels control the diamondareas in the mtenor which wind their way through circuitous routesto the central selling organization of De Beers. Arms are smuggledthrough equally circumspect and illicit trails from Eastern Europe.P

The essential characteristic of a functioning war economy IS thatneither side has any real incentive to end the fighting, not even WIththe prospect of winning a decisive victory. Since an arms-for­resource economy IS relatively simple In its transactional infrastruc­ture, it offers massive opportunities for pnmitrve accumulatton by avery small social minority. War also offers an eminent excuse for theneglect of expenditure on public works or social welfare, or onforms of national productive accumulation. At the same time, thetechnological affluence of the globalized world economy enables theelites of each warlord domain to mamtam a comfortable and securelifestyle amid the debns of the public landscape. Cocooned withintheir gated enclaves they SImply import all the technological fixesnecessary for their own pnvate state-of-the-art participation m the

Africa: Exclusion and the Containment of Anarchy 191

global system: foreign bank accounts, computers, mobile phones,advanced technological secunty systems, electric generators, twatersupplies, helicopters and even private Jets to take their families outof the country for hospital treatment in the West, and their childrento schools abroad. !

As two recent reports on the wars in West Africa conclude, uotilthe international connections of the war economies are dealt WIthdecisively by the international community, the prospects for peaceare bleak." A tlnrd study confirms tlus finding with an instructivecounter-example. Braathen, Boas and Saether compared the civilwars in Mozambique and Angola. They point out that, in the caseof Mozambique, a UN-mounted peace operation was genumelysupported and completed successfully, whereas m the case ofAngola, UN intervention proved to be a complete failure. The bigdifference is that, in the case of Mozambique, the FRELIMO statewas almost entirely dependent on foreign aid, and the OppOSItIOnparty RENAMO, WIth little outside funding, had to make do with a'beggar's barefoot army' ThIS meant that both parties were amen­able to a foreign-assisted peace deal. By contrast, m Angola, theMPLA finances 95 per cent of its state and war machinery throughoil revenues, and UNITA has become one of Africa's largest tradersin diamonds and ivory. This encourages both sides to pursue the

"7war indefimtely."

The Reverse Agenda of Aid and Global Management

As was intimated earlier, some ofthe present-day analytical literatureon Afnca explores the political conditionality of the 'new donoragenda' in a wide sense as articulating a generalized reconsiderationand reformulation of bilateral and multilateral relations WIthAfricaand, indeed. WIth other margmalized areas of the global economy.Ground-breaking theoretical work by Mark Duffield, for example,theorizes that the new aid agenda reverses earlier developrnentalistgoals of 'incorporation' of penpheral areas mto the world system,and instead now serves as a policy of management and containmentof politically insecure territories on the edge of the global economy. 58

What IS particularly striking about some of this literature IS Itsepistemological orientation. which is reminiscent of, though notopenly indebted to. postmodern 'discourse' cnttque, That IS to

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say, there is a preoccupation with when and why particular state­ments, such as 'pluralist democracy'. or 'institutional capacity'.'strengthening civil society', and 'human rights' came about, howthese statements have merged into a consensus agenda mediatedthrough collective structures of consultation and co-ordinationbetween previously disparate donor countries, and last but notleast - how these statements translate into practices of policy which,using Michel Foucault's phrase, 'systematically form the objects ofwhich they speak'." For this IS the epistemological differencebetween the modem (Marxist) and postmodern critiques of know­ledge, namely that, where the former merely expose the use oftheories, policy statements or doctrinal assertions as ideologiesthat legitimate anterior, existing SOCIal practices, the latter studysuch statements as constituting the very conditions of their histor­ical appearance. And thus, some analytic studies of the 'new aidagenda' now seem to appreciate that SOCIal relations within Africancountries, and between Africa and the global economy, are beingshaped through the discourse of the new aid agenda Itsele'o

Political condinonality is the deliberate use of 'aid' to improve'governance' We have already discussed the definition of 'govern­ance' m World-Bank-speak. Ostensibly, It IS aimed at creating anenabling environment for economic reforms. Leverage through 'aid'may be achieved through threats of Withdrawal of promised momesin the event that certain conditions of project or programme Imple­mentation are not met. Some people may be quick to retort that, mthis sense, aid was always politically conditional. TIllS IS true, butthe difference is that, m the past the recipients of aid were mainlynational governments or programmes designated With their appr­oval, and this offered the donors the excuse to say that aid was 'non­political' - that IS, not interfering in the internal affairs of state.

However, what characterizes the new political conditionality, ISthat through ItS own conceptualization of good governance and anenabling environment, It wilfully and openly does meddle in theinternal affairs of state, targeting a plurality of actors, be they non­governmental organizations, micro-busmesses, local communitiesor grassroots organizations. In addition, they pay for programmesan~ projects that stimulate and strengthen pluralist local structures.This redirection of 'aid' away from national governments andtowards civil society has become known as the 'reverse aid agenda'.As the British Overseas Development Institute (ODI) put It in 1995:

Africa: Exclusion and the Containment 0/ Anarchy 193

One manifestation of a growing common ground has been theway that most donors have broadened their aid objecti­ves ... [they] now view actron to enhance human rights anddemocratic processes as a constituent part of their developmentagenda. Additionally, many donors have taken up 'strengthemngCIVIl society' as a specific aid objectrve.P'

NGOs and the Politics of Exclusion

In Symphony of the Damned, Mark Duffield'f uses discourse ana­lySIS to deconstruct the new, or reverse, aid agenda. He argues thatWith economic globalization has come a new discourse of develop­ment. Previously, development was theonzed as a process ofsocietalconvergence between hierarchically conceptualized state-societies(rich-poor; developed-underdeveloped). In this theortzation thestate was seen as the accepted engine of growth. The failure ofmodernization in many parts of the Third World, however, broughtcriticism of 'top-down' approaches, and the disparagement of biggovernment and the state, thus making way for 'bottom-up' inter­ventions concerned with the vulnerability of the poor, which ann tostrengthen local structures and empower local commumties.

Duffield next contextualizes these donor adaptations within awider, reshaped world view, in which cultural pluralism has replaceduniversalist preoccupations and goals. In the West, cultural plural­Ism, or muluculturalism. has been the liberal establishment's answerto racism. Tbat IS to say, it has replaced biologically-derived notionsof racial supenority WIth an appreciation of cultural difference. Onthe pOSitive side, the discourse of multiculturalism alms to promotesocietal harmony and integration by encouraging mutual respectand recognition. The idea that violence can be avoided fosters theorganizational adaptations among mternational aid agencies anddonor governments towards civil SOCIety and democratization in theperiphery, m the same way as it supplies the motivation and opera­tional logic for multicultural acuvities at home.

Unfortunately, the fundamental prermse of multiculturalism hasalso bred a darker, opposrtional structure of beliefs that has beenlabelled 'the new racism' " The basic, generic assumption, namelythat cultural difference IS both natural and unavoidable, has also fedinto notions that these differences are unmutable and that they have

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an innate and non-rational qnality that leads 'inevitably' to inter­ethnic conflict. This new racism has come to underpin popularexplanations of growing political instability and intercommunalconflict m the marginal areas of the global economy. A specialvariant of the new racism as applied to contemporary Africa hascome to be called 'the new barbarism'.

One mfluennal version of thrs theory appears m the work ofRobert Kaplan." who interprets the collapse into anarchy as anunfocused and mstmctrve response, to mountmg pressures resultingfrom environmental and economic collapse. However, other writersgive the 'new barbarism' a positive connotation. Paul Richards,who is credited with having comed the term in 1995,65 in factwelcomes the new barbarism as a form of Iiberation. He describesthe often grotesque acts of warlord violence and terror as rationalresponses to the failure of modernity, and as exhibiting poteutiallynew and innovative ways of knowing and interacting with theenvironment. Thus, argues Duffield, both assertive cultural plural­Ism and the new racism are mirror Images of a common structure ofbeliefs. They share a common glass of cultural pluralism, yet eachforetells a different future.

Humanitarian Relief and Complex Political Emergencies

Drawing conclusions from the previous sections, we may argue thatboth the economic reforms imposed under structural adjustmentand the new or reverse agenda of aid have, at the minimum, put anextra spin on the centrifugal forces already present in the weak,underdeveloped states of Africa. The advent of humarutanan reliefto cope WIth the ensuing political emergencies, furthermore, has theeffect of protracting such crises by making them more 'complex'.According to Duffield, the possibility that hurnanitarianmterven­tion encourages fragmentation is a factor that makes a politicalemergency 'complex'.66

Since the mid- 1980s, as several countries m Afnca have fallen intochaos and political conflict, humanitarian relief operations havemcreased sixfold. As emergency food and medical aid has beenrushed III to support war VIctims, the legal mandates of relief agen­cies (UN-connected and independent NGOs) have been refrarned:whereas previously it was nearly impossible to operate m non-

Africa: ExclUSIOn and the Containment of Anarchy 195

- . Igovernment controlled areas, today the organizational optionsjhavebeen widened to mclude effectively all SItuations of contestedIgov­ernance. ThIS further undermines the responsibilities previouslyheld by governments. I

The agenda of cultural pluralism agam informs the nature anddirection of relief operations. That is to say, It is avowedly apolitical- less concerned with power and power relations, or with rights andwrongs, or with human rights abuses, than with managing andcontammg the SItuation. Relief agencies intervene in the hope -that,by feeding the victims, they will in some way free the warring partiesand allow them to resolve the conflict eventually. In this way,cultural pluralism translates into cultural functionalism: the: ideathat natural order and stability will resume m due course.

However, because of their robustly apolitical stance these agen­cies are unaware that. their humamtarian aid IS gradually beingincorporated mto the socio-political fabric of the internal conflict.For cultural functionalism prescribes a stance of balance and even­handedness that legitimizes both, or all, of the warring factions.Such legitimation operates not only at the ideological level, but alsomaterially. For example, humamtanan relief agencies negotiateaccess for emergency deliveries of food and medicme equally. WIthall warrmg parties, routinely having to offer a proportion of the aidto warlords. Such aid IS diverted immediately and commutes iuto afresh supply of arms. A further step in this process of 'incorpora­tion' occurs when warnng parties use the promise of relief aid as ameans of mobilizing local populations for practical and politicalpurposes.

Conclusion

Thus, WIth Duffield, we conclude from this sorry tale of the West'srecent relations WIth Afnca that there IS an emerging system ofglobal governance WIth methods and mstruments geared to contain­mg and managmg symptoms rather than removmg causes." Thelack of poliucal will to remove such causes attests to a process ofdisengagement from the periphery of the world economy. The ago­nizingly thm line of UN peace-keeping in countnes such as SierraLeone ('keeping the peace' that IS not there, while lacking themandate or military wherewithal to enforce peace) has been con-

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trasted rightly with the swift and decisive NATO intervention ill

Kosovo WhICh is within the heartland of the global system.A further cynical example of this disengagement IS reflected in the

politics surrounding the AIDS epidemic. The World Health Organ­ization estimates that 23 million people are infected by AIDS inSub-Saharan Africa, with new cases running at 5000 per day. One infour AIricans IS expected to die of the disease. Even so, 90 per centof AIDS research and investment is spent on the development ofexpensive drugs for the treatment of the 8 per cent of people whohave contracted the disease m the rich countries. thus squeezing outthe funds and the research agendas for cheap vaccmes to prevent itsfurther spread m the Thud World. When the govermnent of SouthAfrica, where the rate of AIDS IS nsmg fastest, passed legislation toenable the domestic production of genenc drugs, the USA and theEU immediately applied pressure to have the legislation rescinded,on the grounds that the South African legislation violated themternational patent nghts of the big international pharmaceuticalfinns. 68

It was only when a US government study identified theAIDS pandemic m Africa as a potential national security problemfor the USA69 that a dramatic change of heart followed and phar­maceutical companies were anntwisted into making their drugsavailable at very low concessionary prices. on condition that therecipient countnes would desist from contravemng establishedinternational trade laws. Profits definitely remain more importantthan the lives of millions m Africa where. as one World Bankofficial observed: 'if Aids disproportIonately fan on the poor inthese countries then the fact they they will die of it will have apositive Impact on the economic growth of these nauons'."

II

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9

Islamic Revolt

Today there are twenty-eight countries m the world. WIth a totalpopulation of 836 million. ill wluch Muslims have an overall major­ity, and many more countnes have sizeable Muslim mmorities. Thetotal world Muslim population IS around 1.2 billion, ora quarterof the total world population. Even m Europe. the heartland ofChristianity, Muslim immigration and conversion has led to Islambeing the second largest religion.

Since around the mid-1970s a number of apparently related polit­ical and SOCial events all over the world have led Western comment­ators to speak of a militant Islanuc revival. The definmg momentwas no doubt the overthrow, m 1979, of the Shah of Iran's pro­Western monarchy, and the establishment there of the modernworld's first theocratic Islanuc Republic. In Lebanon, the Hamasmovement sponsored by the Muslim Brotherhood has since forcedan mcreasmgly brtter split WIthin the Palesnman struggle againstIsrael. In Sudan, Islanusts are preventing the military Junta frommaking concessions to the non-Muslims of the south, thus draggingout the civil war there. In Algiers. the fundamentalist party, the PIS,won the elections in 1990 onJy to find ItS victory at the ballot boxsnatched from it by the unposition of martial law (backed byWestern governments), resultmg m near CIvil war. In Egypt, thetourist industry has been badly affected by attacks from fundamen­talists, and the Mubarak regime onJy holds on to power by amassive, and precarious. security clampdown involving the impri­sonment, WIthout tnal, of thousands of fundamentalist Muslims. InIndia, tensions between Muslims and Hindus, always simmermgJust below the surface. have been threatening to boil over since theMuslim revolt in Kashmir, and the destruction by Hindus of the

197

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mosque m Ayodhya. The dismtegration of the Soviet empire hascreated new Muslim states searchmg for an identity m Islam. InAfghanistan, an especially virulent and extreme fundamentalistIslamic movement, the Taliban, have taken power, and allegedlygiven sanctuary to Osama bm Laden. widely suspected of havingmastermmded the bombing of the Amencan embassies in Kenyaand Tanzania m 1998. Terronst attacks m the West, alleged or real,have raised the spectre of the jihad. or holy war. bemg fought outabroad as well as at home. As The Economist m 1995 summed up mcolourful language: 'Islam at its most ferocious IS cutting a blood­stained path to the front of the world's attention.' 1

In a provocative article m Foreign Affairs m 1993, Samuel Hun­tington predicted a new clash of civilizations." The nation-state,he said, IS disappeanng as the primary unit of international rela­tions and therefore conflict and competition between the world'speoples will m future be worked out at a different level, chieflyamong the larger units known as cultures or CIvilizations. He iden­tified as the most important among a total of eight, three suchcrvilizations: the West (the Euro-American culture); the East (theConfucian culture); and Islam. His artrcle is well worth reading,particularly as a counter-argument to the facile statements of the'end of ideology' or 'end of history' theologians (for example,F. Fukuyamaj.:' The latter are based on an economic/technologicaldeterministic mterpretation of an inevitable course of human evolu­tion. Huntmgton, on the other hand, says. 'The great divisionsamong humankmd and the dommatmg source of conflict will becultural."

Huntmgton argues that, precisely because of economic modern­ization and social change throughout the world, people are beingseparated from long-standing local identmes, while at the same timethe nation-state is weakened as a source of identity. Religions movein to fill the gap left by the nation as a source of identity. Acomplementary factor about which he theonzes relates to whatAnthony Giddens, David Harvey and other writers on globalizationhave variously referred to as the 'time/space compression' or 'dis­tantiatron' phenomenon.l Increased cross-border social interactionof people around the world has the paradoxical effect of signifyingthe larger social, cultural or ethnic group to which people belong asa source of identification for 'the other', By way of example, Hun­tmgton quotes Donald Horowitz: 'an Ibo may be... an Owerri Ibo

Islamic Revolt 199

or an Onitsha Ibo m what was the Eastern region of Nigeria. InLagos he is simply an Ibo. In London he is a Nigerian. In! NewYork, he is an African', !

Civilization. according to Huntmgton, IS the 'highest' culturalgrouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity peoplehave short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. ItIS defined both by common objective elements, such as language,history, religion. customs and institutions, and by the subjectrveself-identification of people, 6 '

As far as the immediate future IS concerned, Huntington expectsthe clash between civilizations to rage between the West and Islam.However, it IS a mistake to argue, as he does, that this is so becauseof the potent contradiction between oil and poverty, since, apartfrom the combined population of 10 million who live m SIX very nchGulf states, the vast majority of Muslims live m countries WIthmmimal or no oil resources. These countnes belong to the world'spoorest and middle-income groups.

More decisive for a correct analysis of the roots of the contempor­ary Islamic revolt, in my VIew. is the circumstance that the Islamicworld contains withm It millions upon millions ofpeople who do nothave any prospect of being mcorporated mto the new global system,while - Similarly- Muslim mmorities in the advanced countries oftenfind themselves also excluded from the global system. The analysispresented in this chapter IS that, rather than the West's domination ofoil, It IS the failure of the national developmental strategies m theneocolomal period, coupled WIth the recent episode of globalization.that drives the contemporary Islamic crescent. Islamic resurgence isbest understood as a politics of identity in response to exclusion,rather than (as was the case during the heyday of Arab nationalism)as a response to subordinated incorporation. But thrs politics ofidentity has not brought a new model of society, nor has the orgarn­zational programmatic umty become a geostrategic factor.

In developing this analysis I put forward two themes thatappear to prevail m much recent discourse about the Islamicrevolt:

1. The contmuity of spmtual renewal throughout Islam's history;and

2, The cultural impact of the West's historical confrontation WIthIslam.

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Spiritual Renewal

Islam IS more than a religion: It IS a complete way of life. It concernsnot only God's relationship with His people, but It also orders SOCIalrelations among people. including legal, contractual institutions,social and politIcal instrtutions. and Issues of economic propnetyand practice. G. H. Jansen, ill hIS book, Militant Islam, quotes twofundamentalist Islamic scholars as saying that 'Islam provides guid­ance for all walks of life, individual and social. matenal and moral,econonuc and political, legal and cultural, national and mterna­tional'." Islam IS particularly detailed about matters relating tofamily, marriage, divorce and inheritance; It also addresses ques­nons of dress and etiquette, food and personal hygiene - ill short,the obvious and public signifiers of identity and belonging, poten­tIally therefore the msigma of lifestyle politics.

The two principal sources for Islam are:

I. The Ou'ran, the book of direct revelations by God to theProphet Muhammed through the Archangel Gabnel: and

2. The Sunna, literally, the 'trodden path'. a compilation andcodification of the sayings of the Prophet plus the official bIO­graphy of the Prophet's life, IhIS Including all the things He did

as well as said.

After the Prophet's death m 632BC (AH 10) naturally It took sometime to compile and codify the entire body of holy scnptures. Therewas confusion, mterpretatIon and counter-InterpretatIOn, by com­peting schools of law. until, some tune around Ao900. consensusamong the scholars triumphed. From that moment 'the Gates of theijtihad were closed' (ijtihad meaning independent Judgement). ThisImplied that. from then on, no further augmentation to the scnp­tural body could be countenanced. and that henceforth only past

precedent counted.As an aside we should note at this pomt that while the above

descnption of religious authority holds for the vast majonty ofMuslims. who are called Sunni, there IS a SIZeable minority, calledShi'ites, for whom, by contrast, religious authority centres on aninspired person, the Imam. Shi'ites have constituted themselves as aseparate sect since the early days of Islam, and at first traced theauthority of religious inspiration through a direct line of succession

II

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Islamic Revolt 20I

from A1i.cousm and son-m-law of the Prophet Muhammed. The factthat the twelfth and last Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, disappearedm Ao878, did not become an effective bar to this divine basis ofauthonty. On the contrary, He became the 'Hidden One', still in thisworld and In contact WIth Ius chosen agents. who have the right topronounce ex cathedra an opinion on any matter affecting the Sharia,or canon law. In Persia, at an early date, the Shi'ites lent themselvesto the nationalist movement, which in time displaced Arab domina­uon by purely Persran rule. In this way, Shi'ism ultimately becamethe national religion of Persia, later Iran." The Ayatollah Khomeinisuccessfully led the revolution that overthrew the Shah, With theAyatollah claiming to be the incarnation of the twelfth Imam.

Although the system of authority thus differed between Sunnisand Shi'ites, and led to mutual enmity between them, both systemshave features that make for powerful religious revivals. In the caseof the Shi'ite religion, the Withdrawal of the !mam and his continuedexistence as the 'Hidden One' would periodically fire up hopes of amessianic return and salvation that enabled strong personal leadersto emerge as new Imams leading a SOCIal revolt against the orthodoxestablishment. In the case of the Sunni religion, as we see below. itwas the doctrine of the ijtihad that allowed social protest to bebattled out at the level of theological disputes, and m this waychallenge existing powers.

According to Ernest GeHner; the sociological SIgnificance of theijtihad was twofold, and it implanted a deep dialectic into the veryheart of Islam: on the one hand It provided a power-base for thescholar/jurists, the learned men, ulema. who could pontificate on thebasis of analogous reasonmg, and declare any conduct or event inchanged historical Circumstances to be, or not to be, in accordancewith Islamic law. This gave them a power-base independent oftemporal authorities, and there was therefore always an institu­tional separation between political and religious authority. On theother hand. the subordination of the former to the latter meant that,m principle. as Gellner has put it. :« socially and politically trans­cendent standard of rectitude was ever accessible, beyond the reachof manipulation by political authority, and available for condemn­ing the de facto authority if sinned agarnst it'. 10

Thus, despite the institutiona! separation between politics andreligion, there was never a cultural separation between the two. Intills sense. Islam was not a secular civilization. Where Christ had

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accepted the separation between God and Caesar and had advisedpeople to 'render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's', Muham­med and Islam never recognized such separation III their universe ofdiscourse and belief.'! Further, the non-mampulability of divine lawproved time and again to be a source of legitimacy for acts of self­correction, as when the disgruntled, oppressed masses could trans­late their grievances mto the discourse of theological disputation,challenging political authonty On those grounds, As we shall seebelow, much of the present-day Islamic revolt may be mterpreted mprecisely those terms,

Thus the spirit of renewal has been Immanent m Islam as acultural belief system. But It was also sourced by the peculiarmaterial circumstances and social relations of production of thehistoncal environment m which It developed and was consolidated.As Simon BromJey wntes, m the course of ItS history, Islamiccivilization came to straddle two SOCIal formations, each groundedin a different ecology and economy, On the one hand, there wasthe urban society of the Sultanates (consolidated during a five­century-long penod of rule m the Ottoman Empire), It was asociety of state officials, military personnel and Islamic scholars(ulema), Together. m tacit co-operation WIth the merchants, theymaintained order, networks of trade and finance, and exactedtribute from the surrounding peasantry. On the other hand, beyondthe compass of the urban social formation lay the tribal forces thatremained outside central control. In these regions. 'the tributarystate was unable to control the rural areas, essentially because of thegreater weight of pastoral nomadism with its mobile means ofproduction, armed populations and absence of urban growth', 12

These two different social fonnations, Gellner states WIth abso­lute confidence, gave nse to, 'the really central, and perhaps mostImportant feature of Islam namely that it was internally divided intoa High Islam of the scholars and the Low Islam of the people' 13

While high Islam was puritamcal, scnpturalistic and mindful of theprohibition of claims to- mediation between God and man, lowIslam (or folk Islam) was SImple, adaptive and flexible, inspired bysaintlike mystic heroes (SllftS) and centred on grassroot tarikas(Muslim brotherhoods). Periodically the two religious styles wouldclash, as when the scholars of high Islam would launch 'a kind ofinternal purification movement' in an attempt to reimpose itself onthe whole of society. 14

Islamtc Revolt 203

The West Confronts Islam

iCompared with all other areas of the world, the world of Islam hashad the unique, if dubious. distinction of havmg always been r,ega­rded by the West as a cultural adversary- a cultural 'other'. No doubtnvalry over exclusive claims to a smgle, indivisible transcendent Godhad a lot to do WIth this, as had their claims on the Holy Land" andtheir geographic proximity. And no doubt the onginal contest ofwills on the battlefield dunng the Crusades helped to strike enduringterror in the hearts and minds of Europeans and Muslims alike,

But probably of greater SIgnificance is the fact that, m confront­ing Islam, from the ume of the Crusades and m distinct episodessmce, the West has come to define Itself, The need to know theenemy also became an inspiration for self-identification, While itcan be argued, as in Edward Said's celebrated account.P that'orientalism' was a product of Western culture, equally it may besaid that the West's concept of its own culture and society denvedfrom the same discourse, It is this dependency engendered throughbinomial opposition, m different phases of their intertwmmg his­tories, that explains the West's special fear of Islam, and Islam'sendurmg search for self-identity.

In his overview of the history of the West's Image of Islam,Maxime Rodinson opines that: 'The Image of Islam arose, not somuch as some have said from the Crusades, as from the slowlywelded ideological unity of the late Christian world which ledboth to a clear view of the enemy's features and also to a channel­ling of effort towards the Crusades."6 The fight havmg becomemore concentrated and better-focused, the enemy must of necessitybe given sharper, more specific, features and thus ItS Image simpli­fied and stereotyped. In these stereotypes, Islam was given a sys­temic civilizational unity It did not possess.

Later, m the medieval period, when Latin Europe was beset byinternal factions and struggles. the ideological conflict WIth Islamlost ItS pre-emmence. But in Europe, intemal ideological strife alsosowed the seeds of a relativity of belief that m fact opened up acertam ideological space for Christian scholars to pursue the studyof Islam WIth some 'objectivity' From there, Islam graduated tobecome a subject of cunosity and exoticism, as witnessed in theflourishmg of Arabian scholarship, notably 10 the fields of philo­logy, arts and religion. With the birth of the SCIences, followed by

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the Age of Reason, Islam even became an unwitting partner ill theproject of Enlightenment: 'People could now view the religious faithwhich competed with Christianity in an impartial light and evenWithsome sympathy, unconsciously seeking (and obviously finding)in it the very values of the now rationalised trend of thought thatwas opposed to Chnsuanity.' 17

However, m the nineteenth century, specialist knowledge aboutArabia and Islam turned mto rorientalism'. a special discipline dev­oted to the study of the East. But It was a special discipline whichwould serve European imperialist conquest from that time onwards.While buttressing the confidence ofEurope m its own cultural super­iority, it cast the Muslim ill the role ofcontemptible VIctim, m need ofcorrection. This was so because the specialist knowledge of Arablanguage, customs, religion and art transmitted Itself to other fieldsof SCIentific enquiry (notably social philosophy, later sociology andecononucs) m ItS most vulgarized, mechanistic form, dnven as It wasby the general ideas of the time, which attributed a boundless mflu­ence to religion, language and race as explanatory factors m thediverse trajectories of human social evolution. IS

ThIS particular form of social theonzmg climaxed m MaxWeber's enduringly authoritative typification of West and East,whereby the Oriental became no more than a nurror image of theaccidental. As Edward Said writes:

Weber's studies ... threw him into the very terntory onginallycharted and claimed by Orientalists. There he found encourage­ment amongst all those nineteenth century thmkers who believedthat there was a sort of ontological difference between Easternand Western economic (as well as religious) 'mentalities' ,19

ThIS ontological difference became theonzed ill a self-serving con­trast of identity and progress: while the West was economicallydynarmc because It was universal, rational, pluralist and secular,the Onent was economically stagnant because It was particulanstic,traditional, despotic, wallowing ill religious obscurantism, andtherefore stagnant.l As Rodinson writes:I

In the Middle Ages, the Oriental had been regarded as a fierce! enemy, but nevertheless on the same level as Western man; in the

r Islamic Revolt 205

eighteenth century enligbtenment and tbe resulting ideology ofthe French Revolution tbe Oriental was, underneath his disguise,essentially a buman being; but ill the 19th century he became acreature apart, impnsoned m hIS specificity, an object ofcondescending praise. Tbus tbe concept of homo islamtcus wasborn, and IS still far from being overthrown.r"

The end of the First World War resulted m the demise of the Otto­man Empire. Against the backdrop of fierce competition betweenEuropean nations, tbe scramble for the Middle East and ItS vast oilresources began. Everywbere the Europeans established two newprinciples: the freezing of boundaries, and the freezmg of dynasties.Arbitrarily drawing lines in the sand, they made permanent terntor­tal boundaries tbat had either been non-existent or were constantlyshifting." In a cynical move that would pre-empt any future pan­Arabism or pan-Islamism, the colonial powers drew the borders ofstates m such a manner as to ensure that there were oil-rich territor­ial states WIth small populations and oil-scarce states with largepopulations.

This new age of imperialism again changed tbe cultural andpolitical relationship between the West and Islam. ThIS time It wasmarked by an 'active tide of Imposing responsibility on the localpeoples'. turning the unchanging Onental passivity into militantmodern life.22 In the creation of Arab protectorates, mandates andoutright colonial terntones there began the process of imposedpolitical state formation, which grew dialectically into independencemovements.P and was sealed by constitutional sovereignty grantedat various moments in the mterwar and postwar epoch.

We, shall return to the refractory effect of the imposition ofartificial nation-states shortly. First a word about how the impactof the West was received and resisted m the Islamic world. G. H.Jansen renunds us tbat smce 1500 scarcely a decade. or even half adecade, bas passed without a Muslim area somewhere fighungagamst encroachment by some Western power.i" Rioting and inter­nal armed upnsrngs were endermc, especially after the First WorldWar, For the Muslims tbese were a1J wars, both in defence of Islamand in defence of hearth and home. They mainly took place at tbelocal level, at the grassroots of popular 'low Islam'. ratber than attbe level of tbe urban scholars of 'high Islam'. This was hardlysurprising, since European conquests were frequently accompanied

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by a vigorous policy of support for the Chnstian missionary effort,Many a time this forced the Muslim brotherhoods to go under­ground, and to become 'secret' societies. The creation, throughconversion, of Christian communities, deliberately fostered andfavoured by the colonial powers and living as separate enclavesamid the mass of Muslims, had the paradoxical effect of keepmgIslam militant.25

Education and Orientalization

It IS probably a function of the nsmg pre-ernmence of culturalstudies m the Humanities that recent literature on the Arab worldsingles out European education and European cultural dominationgenerally as the most Important, lasting and damaging legacy ofthe colonial penod. In the introduction to the third part of thisbook we have referred to cultural studies and Its connection withpostcolonial studies, so we shall not dwell on that here. EdwardSaid, in hIS ground-breakmg book, Onentalism. and agam in itssequel, Culture and Impenatismi" has probably done more thananyone to redefine imperialism in terms of cultural power. Takmgas his frame of reference Michel Foucault's notion of "discourse'.he has examined Orientalism as a discourse m which power andknowledge are linked dialectically. European imperialist power mthe nmeteenth and twentieth centuries drew on knowledge ofthe Orient to rule and manage, and m so domg produced theOrient: politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, SCIentific­ally and imagmanvely. While European culture gained in strengthand identity by setting Itself off agamst the Orient as a sort ofsurrogate and even underground self, the Onent itself became'Orientalized' 27

The most tangible concretization of thrs Orrentalization waseffected through colomal educational policies. Jansen writes; 'foreignrulers with rare unanmuty and unusual purposefulness and pertma­city, sought to give as little education as possible, the wrong sort ofeducation when It had to be given, and also to bring about a schism inthe soul of the Muslim community' 28 The local education systemwas either destroyed or allowed to collapse through benign neglect,while new schools using European languages and curricula weremtroduced. A new breed of intellectual elite was selected, nurtured

IIslamic Revolt 1207

and sent abroad for higher education, including, perversely, fori thestudy of subjects such as 'Islamic' and 'Oriental' studies. There theylearnt to see the Onent through accidental eyes. Jansen turns up,thearrestinz statistic that until 1955, 95 per cent of all books written

.0 ')9 Iabout Islam were written by Western scholars." ,

The colonially-imposed. yet arbitrary, process of state-formationcombined with this conscious policy of educating native eliteswho would see their own world through European eyes; it succeededin forging a deep rift between modernizers and reformers on' theone hand and traditionalists and neofundamentalists on the other.Nevertheless, all these movements also had a common ongm. Indeed,in one sense, all these groups may be classed as 'Islamists'. or repre­sentatives of'political Islam', As Oliver Roy pomts out, from a SOCID­logical and mtellectual point of view they were products of themodern world, and more particularly of their subordinated positionin the West-dominated world system, Thus, m this sense, the Islamistmovement was and still IS a Third-Worldist movement. It conceivesof Itself explicitly as a SOCIOpolitical project, founded on an Islamdefined as much in terms ofpolitical ideology as m terms ofreligion.30

But where the modernizers (in different ways and WIth differentemphases on seculanzation) sought to reform or rationalize Islamicthought and mstitutions m order to bring them mto line withthenew order introduced by the Europeans (particularly the 'order' ofthe interstate system and of developmentalism), and the reformerssought to Islamize the Western model, attemptmg to create a synth­esis between modernity and Islam, the neofundamentalists andtraditionalists are obsessed with the corrupting mlluence of Westernculture. They reject the Western model and eschew any compromisewith it. Instead, they seek a return to the scnptures and a lifestylesignifying, in dress, in body language, in SOCIal practices of convivi­ality and prayer, and most prominently m respect of the status ofwomen, the exclusivity of the true believer as a member of a selectand holy commumty. As Roy says, 'Neofundamentalism entails ashrinking of the public space to the family and the mosque.r"

After mdependence, in the neocolomal period, the modernizerswere in the ascendancy, but in more recent times radical reformersand neofundarnentalists have begun to hold sway. The reasons forthis are both external and internal; the dependent developmentproject of the modernizers was corrupted by continning and divisiveinterventions of the West m the pursuit of its strategic interests m

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oil, and 'legitimated' with reference to the Cold War. For Its part,the political establishment failed to deliver matenal benefits or acoherent system of meanings.

The Failure of Dependent Development

The defeat in the Yom Kippur War and the economic cnsis thatfollowed put paid to fragile attempts at pan-Arab unity which hadbeen the hallmark of the radical reformers in the immediate post­independence era. It meant that everywhere Arab nationalism badto give way to ever more 'pragmatic' and corrupted leadershipsdancing to the tune of the USA and IMFfWorld Bank donors andaid givers: As their hold over their populations weakened, theybecame still more dependent on military and other handouts fromtheir Western masters.

Meanwhile, the conservative regimes of the oil-rich Gulf statesbecame mcreasmgly implicated m the geostrategic interests of theUSA and the West. The Shi'ite Islamic revolution m Iran wasfollowed by a cynically-exploited divide-and-rule-backed war WithIraq which did much to identify the Iranian revolution With Shi'ismand Iranian nationalism. Conservative Arab states financed a Sunnifundamentalist pole of attraction outside their own borders m orderto break the momentum of the Islamic revolution. The second GulfWar spread even more confusion in the Arab world by organizing aconservative Arab and Western coalition against Iraq.

A structuralist understanding of the geopolitical dynamics thatled to the Gulf War of 1991 may help us to understand the forcesthat gave nse to the present-day neofundamentalist crescent as welLIn the structuralist perspective we have adopted in much of tlusbook, the advanced capitalist countries. with the USA at the bead.form the core of the system. the rest IS either semi-periphery orperiphery. But we have also seen that the capitalist world systemIS continually developing towards higher, more complex forms ofmtegration. Periodically this forces a reshuffling of the relationshipsbetween the parts, and a destruction and reconstruction of thefprmal political organization of these relationships,! Following the Second World War, and withm the context of the

emerging bipolar world order, the process of decolonization andthe creation of a multitude of sovereign states within the periphery

Islamic Revolt 209

of the capitalist system was an appropriate reconstruction offormal political relations which served to maintam the mterests ofthe core within the periphery. But inevitably It also opened upopportunities for national development and liberation for thoseperipheral states wluch played the sovereignty card to the full, andwhich knew how to play off the superpowers to their nation'sadvantage. There is no doubt that Saddam Hussain and his Ba'ath­1St Party had succeeded in doing Just that. Wc may not like the wayhe set about tlns task, and morally condemn the fascist brutalitythat accompanied the building of a militarily-powerful, industrially­advancmg and even socially-commendable welfare state, but we can­not deny that national economic and social progress had been made.

The pertinent historical, as opposed to moral, question onc shouldask IS: what was it that blocked internal advance towards progressivedemocratization and mstead propelled this brutal leadership mtoexternal aggression? It IS here that a structuralist analysis, withoutcondemrung or condoning, directs attention to the entire web ofcore-peripheral and semi-peripheral relations m the region whichhad reached a crisis point because of the combmed effect of globalcapitalist integration and the collapse of the bipolar world order.What was the structure of these relations and why was It m crisis?

The core has, of course, economic interests in the oil of theMiddle East. But this is only a startmg pomt. In order to accessthe oil, m the past it was m the interest of the oil compames backedby the political power of the imperialist core countries to make dealswith local feudal rulers, kinglets or sheiks in exchange for conces­sions for exploration and so on. Now, when one is only interested ma raw material such as oil. and not in labour or consumer markets,one's profit strategy at that stage dictates a preference for dictator­ships rather than democratic regimes. A sovereign ruler is all that iswanted: Oil and dictatorship go together.

Similar reasons prompt a divide-and-rule strategy - that IS, anuneven distribution of populations over the oil-rich regions. Smallcountries With large quantities of oil and small populations are lessdemanding than large ones. After the demise of the OttomanEmpire at the conclusion of the First World War, such deliberatelyuneven diVISIOns of states were drawn up under Bntish and Frenchcolonial rule. Tbere are six very rich Gulf states (joined together mthe Gulf Co-operation Council) with a combined population of tenmillion: and six very populous states outside with a combined

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population of about 200 million. It IS these latter states that parti­cularly have to cope with the displaced and restless Palestinianswithin their borders who lost their land to the Israelis.

When, however, oil pnces did eventually mcrease as a result oforganized cartel-type rebellion in the oil-producing countries(1973), the links between the peripheral and senu-peripheral statesm the region, and between them and the core became more complex.Arms trade and financial links, III addition to oil now formed atriangle of interests, consolidatmg the mterests of the rulers of thesmall states with the core. Tlus is the significance of the developingintegration of the world capitalist system.

For every hundred US dollars the West spends on oil in the MiddleEast, US$40 comes back through the arms trade, and roughlyanother US$40 comes back mto Western banks, underpinning thefinancial system m the core nations. Noam Chornsky nicely illus­trated this pomt with a joke gomg around on Wall Street at the timeof the second Gulf War: 'Why do the United States and Kuwait needeach other? Answer: Kuwait is a banking system without a countryand the United States IS a country without a banking system,'32

While a blanket of secrecy is wrapped around the exact amountof oil dollars invested in the West, the highest estimate of Gulfcountries investments m the USA alone amounts to US$1 trillion.In 1989, Kuwait earned more income from its vast overseas invest­ments located m the capItalist metropoles than from its domestic oilproduction (US$8.8 billion, compared with US$7.7 billionj.P

The mterwovenness of the 'reformist', 'modernising' Muslimelites m the Third World WIth the core of the Western capitalistsystem widened the gap mcreasmgly between them and the massesof the population whom they rule and who are dispossessed. Muchof the rise of neofundamentalist Islam can be understood as apopular and anti-imperialist protest movement. But two featuresthat are unique to the Islamic tradition give it its VItality: thetradition of spiritual renewal and the concept of 'unnna' (the corn­mumty ofthe faithful). While the former perrmts, at least m pnnci­ple if not in practice. as we shall see below, the conversion andreabsorption of governmental elites and 'exploiters' m the revivalistmovement, the latter gives priority to the WOrld-wide community ofIslam and denies its nationalist or even supranationalist (as m pan­Arabic) pretensions. This, I believe, makes a historical fit with thedenatlOnalizmg forces of globalization.

Islamic Revolt 211

What has been worrymg the West smce the late 1980s i~ thatmcreasmgly withm Sunni territory a fundamentalist mterpretationof Islam as a potent, popular, anti-Western force IS nsmg, For thereal strength of neofundamental Islamists lies in their peaceful,community,based activities. The Muslim Brotherhoods, so-called,offer welfare, health care and educational services to thousands ofpeople neglected by the secular state.

The Rise of Islamist New Intellectuals and the Politics ofAnti-developmentalism

After independence, having been grven the mantle of sovereignty,the modernizing, Westernized elites set about the task of SOCIal andeconomic development. As Simon Bromley has noted, whether theyadopted a capitalist or a SOCIalist model, the outcomes m terms ofsocial structure were not all that different. First of all, the stateeverywhere became the mam site of surplus appropnation. ThIS wasthe case regardless of whether the source of revenue was oilexported under the aegis of international oil cartels, WIth the statethus becoming a 'renner-state', or whether, in the absence of oil,nationalist elites - as in Egypt, Iraq and Sudan - occupied the statecentre to secure more or less complete control over internal resourcemobilization, ifnot state control over all property. The pomt IS that,m both cases, what was lackmg was a degree of separation betweenthe mstitutions of rule and surplus appropnauon. ThIS, as Bromleypomts out, led everywhere to an absence of the conditions fordemocratic participation, and ushered m the politics of clientel­ism." Second, m the oil-poor, populous countries, strategies ofimport-substitutrve mdustrialization became stranded on the. samerocks of deepened foreign indebtedness as they had in Latm Amer­ica. By contrast, the oil-nch countnes WIth small populations hadan income far in excess of their needs. Possession of vast oil reservesm fact reduced the incentive to rely upon the skills and quality of thepeople, The oil-rich Gulf states invested their money in the metro­politan countnes, and Imported labour from elsewhere in Arabiaand the Indian subcontinent, thus creatmg enclaves of second-class,disenfrancluzed non-citizens. The obvIOUS solution should havebeen some form of regional economic integration, and for a timepan-Arab nationalism was a potent rallymg force III the postwar

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settlement. But, time and again, the West, and more especially theUSA and Its bridgehead client state, Israel, managed to divide andbreak the incipient regional solidarities.

A third charactenstrc consequence of the dependent developmentstrategies of the neocolomal period was the process of urbanizationcoupled with a rapid population explosion. Dependent incorpora­tion into the world capitalist economy implied a neglect for sub­sistence agriculture, rural-urban migration, and swelling numbersof unemployed and underemployed city-dwellers. This movement ofthe social location of Islamism engendered an important shift m theideological realm as well. Today's masses who follow the Islamistsare not 'traditionalists', wntes Oliver Roy, instead:

they live with the values of the modern city - consumensm andupward social mobility; they left behind the old forms of convivi­ality, respect for elders and for consensus, when they left theirvillages ... they are fascmated by the values ofconsumerism impa­rted by the shop windows of the large metropolises; they live m aworld of movie theatres, cafes, Jeans, video and sports, but theyliveprecariously from menialjobs or remain unemployed in immig­

.rant ghettos, WIth the frustration inherent m an unattainable con­sumenst world ... Their militant actions exist in symbIOSIS With

.their urban environment: except m Afghanistan and Kurdistan, theguerillas of the contemporary Muslim world are crty-dwellers."

A fourth social structural charactenstic of dependent developmentm the neocolonial period is the emergence of a new category ofeducated individuals produced by the expansion in state-fundededucation established along Western lines. Roy variously refers tothis class of intellectuals as 'lumpen intelligentsia', or the 'Islamistnew intellectuals' or 'neofundamentalists'. They are young peopleWith school, and even umversity, education who cannot find pOSI­tions or professions that correspond to their expectations or VISIOnsoftthemselves, either m the saturated state administrative sector orin, industry because national capitalism IS weak, m the traditionalnetwork because of the devaluation of religious schools, or inmodern unrversiues which are also saturated and' experiencing aloss of social status. Thus, the newly-educated of the Muslim worldfind no social ratification, either real or symbolic, for what theyperceive as their new status."

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Islamic Revolt 213

In an unusual and provocative analysis of the Islamic worldtoday, Roy dissects the ideological pretensions, the SOCial basisand the political project, of this lumpen intelligentsia that formsthe core of the contemporary neofundamentalist crescent. In domgso, he debunks as a myth the theory that It could consolidate into anew force m mternatronalrelations or indeed pose a threat to the West.

According to Roy, the lumpen intelligentsia are differentiatedfrom, and resent, the clerical scholars (the ulema. or scholars ofhigh Islam) because, unlike these scholars, they have no state­legitimated and supported relationship to that corpus of know­ledge." At the same tune they have smatterings ofWestern educationwithout, again, having an mstitutional connection to that body ofknowledge.

Roy makes the important point that there is a direct relationshipbetween the configuration of the new intellectual's 'conceptual'space and the SOCIal space that he occupies. As a self-proclaimedmullah or as a militant he preaches among the urban poor. Heoperates in meetmg houses, sites of worship, educational centres,and new suburban settmgs not yet socialized by the state. He rejects,and is marginalized by, both the Westernised professionals and thegovernmg class on the one hand, and the state-legitimated clerics(the ulema) on the other. His conceptual apparatus reflects how heoperates on the fringes of both.

The Western-style intellectuals and the clerical scholars have mcommon the fact that both their social status and their methodologyis guaranteed by processes of investiture and authorization thatdistinguish them from the masses. Their claims to truth, each mtheir own way, albeit m methodological opposition to each other,have an assured connection to their own procedures of acceptanceand institutional validation, whether these are the rules oflogic andobjectivity and peer scrutiny, as WIth Western SCIence and intellec­tual positions. or the norms of analogous reasoning and peer con­sensus within the clerical community of the ulema. They are bothvalidated by exammatron and titles that accord social positions tothem. But the neofundamentalist. small-time mullahs operate out­side these approved networks of knowledge transmission. And thus,argues Roy, the neofundamentalist intellectual IS quintessentially anauto-didact. He is a tinkerer, creatmg a montage of fragments ofknowledge combined from these different conceptual universes.using a method of invocation and incantation as emblematic display

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of knowledge, rather than as an object of systematic study. Frag­mentary modern knowledge drawn from an immense variety ofimmediately accessible (through TV, newspapers and so on) fieldsof Western knowledge, including economics, sociology, nuclearphysics and biology, is Immediately mtegrated withm a Qu'rarucframework in which claims to truth drawn from the Qu'ran or theTradition and cited as verses. are positioned as the equivalents ofconcepts drawn from modern science and ideologies.

There is nevertheless a unity in this montage of borrowed frag­ments. It is the mystical site of the divine Tawhid, the Oneness of Godwhich extends to all his Creation, including, most Importantly, thePerfect Man (Insan Kamil i, According to the myth of the PerfectMan, it is the ethical disposition of one's soul that gives umty to one'sknowledge and practice. Hence there IS an emphasis on mentalconversion. on devotion, on lifestyle and on punty. But there is nopolitical programme of action, no model of a new CIVIC society, noworked-out alternative system of economic and social organization.

As the radical or 'political' Islam of the postindependence yearsslides into neofundamentalism, it assembles the outcasts of a failedmodernism, mobilizing them around the myth of a return to anIslamic authenticity that has never existed'. Such Islamism, Royconcludes, is not a geostrategic factor: it will neither unify theMuslim world nor change the balance of power in the MiddleEast. For It cannot withstand power. What today's Islamists advoc­ate: 'is not the return to an incomparably rich classical age. butthe establishment of an empty stage on which the believer strivesto realize with each gesture the ethical model of the Prophet'r"The empty stage is that of civic SOCIety which IS non-exrstent.The Islamization of officially secular and moderate regimes targetspersonal law and penal law, leaving intact the existmg econormcformation and the political model mherited from previous regimes.Through processes of globalization, the business elites and govern­mg classes may contmue to be picked off, divided agamst oneanother, corrupted and incorporated into the global system.

Conclusion

Islarmc fundamentalist projects have emerged in all Muslim societ­ies, and among Muslim mmorities in non-Muslim SOCIeties. These

Islamtc Revolt [215

projects have originated as a socio-cultural movement of pr1testand frustration of a generation of youth that has been excludedSOCIally, economically and politically from the accelerated mdder­mzation of Muslim societies and their partial and disjointed art}1icu­lation to the global economy. However, for reasons to do witl thecultural history Islam, the exclusion from modernity takes a, reli­gious meaning, and self-immolation becomes the way to fightagainst. excluslOn.39 In this way, as Castells writes, 'Through thenegation of exclusion. even in the extreme form of self-s~cnfice, anew Islamic identity emerges III the historical process of building theumma, the communal heaven for the true believers.'40 But the.pre­occupation WIth the politics of identity by makmg politics sacredand by transformmg Islamic pseudo-legal institutes into 'socialdevotions'. also means that Islamic fundamentalism cannot betaken senously as a geostrategic counter-hegemonic project, '

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The Developmental States oJ East ASia 217

10

The Developmental States ofEast Asia

In the 1980s and 1990s, and until the cnsis of 1997, the fast andsustained pace of growth of seven countries m East Asia, collect­ively sometunes referred to as the seven 'Dragons', had forced amajor rethink in development studies. The seven countnes were:Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailandand Indonesia. Cunously, It took rather a long time for the rethinkto occur. Because, as a World Bank study in 1993 discovered, smce1960 these high-performmg East ASian countnes (HPEAs) hadgrown faster than any other group of countries m the world, includ­ing the rich countries (see Figure 10.1).

One reason for this Iag hetween reality and our perception of itowes something to the statistical presentations of world order pro­duced annually by international organizations in their 'state of theworld' reports. For over thirty years It had been commonplace torank the nations of the world not by growth rates or economicperformance. but by economic groupings based on mcome. 11,erankmg of the world's economies m ascending order of grossnational product (GNP) per capita yielded classifications of eco­nomic groupings by arbitrary cut-off pomts in the ascending orderof GNP per capita.

Conventional World Bank rankings used to be low-income. mid­dle-income and high-income countries but, as the World Bank itselfacknowledged m ItS 1993 report. The Eost Asian Miracle, classifica­tion by income does not necessarily reflect development status.Moreover, 'once the classification IS fixed for any publication, allthe historical data presented are based on the same economic

216

East ASIa

HPEAs

EastAsiawithout HPEAs

South ASia ~1IIIII1IIIi1IIIi1IIIi

Middle EastandMediterranean

Sub-Saharan Africa

OEeD economies

Latin America andCaribbean

o 1 2 3 456GNP per capita growthrate (per cent)

Source: World Bank. The East ASIan Miracle (New York: Oxford Unr­versity Press, 1993) p. 2. Reproduced withpermission,

Figure10.1 The economic growth of the world's regions (average growthof GNP per capita, 1965-90)

grouping'.' Thus, presentation by economic mcome groupmg canhide and prevent other possible classifications. such as those basedon growth, changmg composition of structure of production, dis­tribution of income, and so on.

Classifications are the cornerstone m any theonzmg. For a longtime, development theory took as ItS starting pomt the income gapbetween nch and poor countries, between North and South. FirstWorld and Third World. It was this gap that prompted the searchfor the 'sameness' within each group as well as the differencesbetween them. The task which development theory set itself was totheorize, and explain, what made the former rich, and what thelatter had to do to become rich (modermzauon theory), or whatmade the former rich and kept the latter poor (dependency theory).Modernization theory was closely allied to neoclassrcal liberal eco­nomics, which stressed the benefits to developing countries of part­icipatmg in the mternational economy, on the baSIS of theircomparative advantage arising from natural factor endowments.This theory advocated the pursuit of open-door policies towardstrade and investment, emphasizing the growth-related benefitsof'-recervmg technology and capital mputs from the advanced

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218 The Postcolonial World

countries. Modermzation theory added to this the argument that.because of the structural compatibility between economic institu­tions and practices on the one hand, and political, social and cul­tural institutions on the other, less-developed countnes shouldmodel their SOCIal and political structures after the example of theWest (see Chapter 2).

Dependency theorists argued exactly the opposite: they pointedto the debilitatmg limitations of the historically-developed mterna­tional division of labour, the resultmg deterioration of the terms oftrade for less-developed countries, and the distorted internal socialstructure dommated by transnational class alliances WhICh pre­vented internal autonomous development and industrialization.Their policy prescnption was either a radical break with the worldsystem or, in watered-down, more pragmatic versions. policies ofself-reliance and selective delinking. Thus they placed emphasis onimport-substitutive industrialization with all the pnce-distortingstate intervention m the economy that this entails.

The Role of the State in Economic Development

By the mid-1970s, some East ASIan states - South Korea, HongKong, Singapore and Taiwan, collectively known as the 'fourTigers' - had notched up a decade of near double-digit growth. Incontrast to the Latm American newly-industrializing countries(NICs) of that period, this growth was export-led, and at first glanceseemed to confirm the thesis of orthodox neoclassical writers, thatthe fast pace of economic development in these countnes resultedfrom liberal, 'market conforming' regimes and 'open-door' policiestowards inward investment and foreign trade. But the neoclassicaltradition gradually had to come to terms with the incontrovertibleevidence of extensive direct govenunent intervention in the EastAsian economies. In an effort to salvage the neoclassical tradition,the nature of state intervention was at first argued to be m line withthe prevailing orthodoxy, rather than going agamst it. Thus BelaBalassa.r Chalmer Johnson," E. K. Y, Chen," and vanous WorldBank documents of the period argued that government interven­tions were merely of the kind that aimed at creatmg macro­economic stability, and a suitable environment for entrepreneursto perform their functions by providing certain public goods, such as

The Developmental States of East Asia 219

basic education. Where Interventions m credit and fiscal policies didoccur, these were said to be mainly in order to 'get the prices!right'(in line with international prices and not as a distortion of them).

Eventually, some writers within the neoclassical tradition,dubbed revisionists or instItutiOnalists, came to admit that stateinterventions in East Asian economies were not merely 'market con­forming' hut rather 'market guiding', even deliberately 'marketdistorting' 5 It was beginning to be appreciated that East ASIancountries used very selective financial instruments (credit and taxpolicies), trade policies, inward investment screenmg policies, andmdustnal relations policies to channel investment decisions intodirections that conformed with national pnonties. These interven­nons did not just remain at the level of macro-econorruc policies but

were sector- and firm-specific.This marked the begmning of an understanding of the nature of

'state capitalism', in which the primary purpose of governmentintervention was to promote the interests of the business sector asa whole, and to do so by creating conditions for capital accumula­non and productIvity improvement, even if this meant extensivebureaucratic regulation and neglect (or repression) of the interests

of specific sectors and groups.For their part, neo-Marxlst dependency writers had for a time

dismissed the success of the East Asian Tigers as an underdevelop­ing by-product of the productive decentralizatiOn of multinationalcorporations from the core of the world system. These wnters hadargued that the 'success' of these countries resulted from a tempor­ary comparative advantage based entirely on the super-explOItatiOnof cheap labour m specially-desiguated 'free export processingzones' WIth few linkages to the surrounding economy, and that iteventually deepened inequalities and margmalizatlOn. This positioncame to be known as the new international division of labour

(NIDL) thesis (Frobel et al.).6 ,In applying the dependency paradigm to dirnrnish the achieve­

ments of the observed process of industrializatIOn, NIDL theoristscontended that the stimulus for the industrialization of certainperipheral countries came from the deepenmg crisis in the coreeconomIes of the world system. and the associated problems ofvalorization of capital. This pushed core capital into the peripheryIII search of large amounts of unskilled labour power. TechnologICaladvances m global communications and transport permitted the

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220 The Postcolonial World

spatial dispersal of mtermediate production processes, creatmgbranch-plant mdustnalization massively dependent on corporatedecisions and techmcal inputs from the core economies. The origin­ators of the NIDL thesis (Frobel et al.) asserted that the 'worldfactory' had overtaken the world market. As to the question of whysome penpheral nations were selected in tills way rather than others,or all, NIDL theorists merely pointed to the availability m thesecountries of vast armies of cheap, unskilled labour helpfully offeredto international capital by repressive regnnes that restncted tradeuniomzauon and offered tax incentives to boot.. In the course of the 1980s, as the economic success of thesecountnes was consolidated in real, autonomous upgrading of pro­ductrve capacity as well as m undeniable, if yet limited, social andCIvic advance of the masses, the NIDL thesis looked increasinglythreadbare. In the generalist versions of the world system anddependency theses, the states of tbe core countnes had beenregarded as being 'strong'. while those in the periphery were natur­ally assumed to be 'weak' - that IS, a mere instrument of mterna­tional capital. But m the more detailed, specific examinations of realcases, It was now adnutted that, while some developing states were'weak', others were 'strong'. Wnters standing in the neo-Marxisttradition began to take a closer look at the SOCIal origins andfunctions of the state in these countnes. Historical structuralistanalysis showed that strong states were associated WIth a degree ofautonomy of the state bureaucratic apparatus that owed to a spe­cific class composinon, coupled with a specific geopolitical situa­tion.?

Theories of the Developmental State

The two intellectual traditions converged somewhat m theones ofthe developmental state. This convergence broke the .debilitatingmould that had dommated the agenda of development studies forso long and that had up to that point equated capitalism WIthdemocracy, and state bureaucracies with socialism. But this is notito say that the convergence settled on only one theory of the devel­iopmental state. Rather, there were vanations on a theme: neoclas­~ICal and neo-Marxist traditions did not so easily relinquish theirmethodologies or their world views.

I

The Developmental States of East Asia 221

One way m which the neoclassical argument tned to square thecircle was by reintroducing Listian political economy into thedebate." Fnedrich List was a nineteenth-century German politicaleconomist who was concerned with how Germany could fashionnational policies to develop Its manufacturmg mdustry m the face ofcompetition from the more advanced industnes in Britain, III aworld where a belief ill free trade was enshrined ID the canons ofclassical economics. List had argued that when societies at differentlevels of development come into contact with one another, the morehighly-developed SOCIety and the more productive economyunleashes a process of 'displacement competition' wrthm the less­developed and Iess-efficient SOCIety and economy. Tills results inperipheralization and structural deformation unless It IS counter­acted by effecnve political steering (strong state intervention) aimedat temporarily 'dissociating' the economy and society from theinternational compennon.

Neo- Listian theory added to tins the observation that, m thecontemporary world, 'delayed' development had become increas­mgly more difficult, and m the process the salience of dissociativeconditions for such development has become more pronounced.As a' result, development strategy had to become even more'political'. That IS to say, the social agents of delayed develop­ment had changed, from pnvate enterpnse needing a .little mer­cantilist state protection Cas in List's days) to the strong nationaliststate.

Neo-Listian theory explained the success of the East Asian coun­tries with reference to the strategic role of the state in tamingdomestic and mternanonal forces and harnessing them to a nationaleconomic interest. coming the tenn 'the developmentalist state' forthis purpose. It was pointed out that the developmentalist state hada role different from that of the Keynesian welfare state m thealready advanced countries. The Keynesian welfare state, it wasargued, serves to restrain market rationality by measures to protectgroups vulnerable to the consequences of market rationality. Bycontrast, the devetopmentalist state restrains market rationality inorder to pursue a policy for mdustnalization per se.9 The differencebetween the two forms IS made evident m the difference in the sizesof the public sectors: m the advanced countries the public sectors aretwice as large as those in the developmentalist countnes. In thedevelopmentalist state u IS not the size of the public sector that

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268

Notes and References

Preface,

1. .Dudley Seers, 'Introduction', in D. Seers (ed.), Dependency Theory, ACnucat Assessment (London: Francis Pinter, 1979).

2, Wolfgang Secus. 'Development: A Guide to the Ruins". The NewInternationalist, June 1992, p. 5.

3. In 1991 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) esti­mated that about 100 million people in the neh industnalized countriesand another 100 million livmg in the erstwhile socialist countnes ofEastern Europe had joined the ranks of the poorest m the world(UNDP, HI/man Development Report. 1991 (Oxford University Press,1991), pp. 23-6). The 1999 Report notes that, measured by the HumanPoverty Index, 'one m 8 people living In the nch, OEeD countnes,IS-affected by some aspect of poverty: long term unemployment, a life.shorter than 60 years. an Income below the national poverty line, or alack of the literacy needed to cope In SOCIety' (UNDP, Human Devet­opment Report. 1999 (Oxford Urnversity Press, 1999), p. 28).

4. See UNDP, Human Development Report, 1999 (Oxford UniversityPress, 1999) overview and eh. 1.

Part I Introduetion

1. is. Horvat. 'Political Economy'. in Encyclopaedia oftile SOCial SCiences,(New York: Collier Macmillan. 1968), p. 611.

2. T. Mun. England's Treasure by Forraign Trade (1664) (Oxford:'reprinted for The Economic History SOCIety by Basil Blackwell,'1928), p. 5. ..

3. '1.Wallerstetn. The Capitalist World Economy (Cambndge Uruversity''press, 1979). .

4. lA. Smith, The Wealth ofNations, book IV, quoted III B. Horvat (1968),'I'Politlcai Economy', p, 611.

5. A. Smith, The Wealth ofNations (New York: Random House, i937),[p. 423, quoted in T. Sowell. 'Adam Smith m Theory and Practice', III

IOerald P. O'DnscolI, Jr (ed.), Adom Smun and Modern PoliticalIEc01lOmy: Bicentenntal Essays 011 The Wealth of Nations (Ames,I Iowa: Iowa State Umversrty Press, 1979).

I

1Notes and References 269

6. On Marxs concept of mode of production and Its hrstorical evolution,see Eric Hobsbawm's edition of Marx and Engels' Pre-capitalist Eco­nomic Formations (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1964); see alsoBarry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst, Pre-capttalist Modes of Productio~l(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), and Umberto Melotti,Marx and the Third World (London: Macmillan, 1977).

7. R. Gilpin, The Political Economy ofInternational Relations (Pnnceton,NJ: Pnnceton Unrversity Press, 1987), p. 15.

8. K. Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1959), and Theory of World Politics (Reading, Mass.: AddisonWesiey, 1979). Among the prmcrpal early prophets of these realistperspectives are H, Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York:Knopf. 1948); K. Thompson, Political Realism and the CriSIS of WorldPolitics (Pnnceton. NI: Princeton University Press, 1960); and E. H.Carr, The Twellty-Years' Crisis. 1919-1939: All Introduction to tileStudy ofInternationalRelations (London: Macmillan. 1939).

9. R. O. Keohane. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in theWorld Political Economy (pnnceton, NJ: Pnnccton Umverstty Press,1984).

10. S. Amin, Class and Nation, Historically and in the Current Cnsis (NewYork: Monthly Review Press, 1980).

11. C. Chase-Dunn, Global Fannauou. Structures of the World Economy(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989).

12. For a schematic companson of the three conceptions of politicaleconomy. see Robcrt Gilpm, US Power and the Mnttmauonal Cor­poration: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (Lon­don: Macmillan, 1976), p. 27, table 6.

13. See J. George and D. CampbelL 'Patterns of Dissent and the Celehra­tion of Difference: Critical SOCIal Theory and International Rela­nons'. International Studies Quarterly, 34, 1990, pp. 269-93.

14. For example. the relatively recent Journal Review of IncernattonalPolitical Economy claims to represent ttus 'new' international politicaleconomy; see the Editors' Statement, 1. Issue 1.

IS. In a seminal paper In 1981, Robert Cox outlined the first brush strokesofthe new theory. The diSCUSSIOn that is presented here is based onthis article: R. Cox, 'SOCial Forces, States and World Orders: BeyondInternational Relations Theory'. Millennnun: Journal of IntemauonalStudies, 10(2), 1981, pp. 126-55. See also his 'Multilateralism andWorld Order', ReVIew of International Studies, 18, 1992, pp. 161-80.and his book Production. Power and World Order: Social Forces 11l theMakmg ofHistory (New York: Columbia Unrverstty Press, 1987).

16. A. Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks (originally wntten1929-35) (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971).

17. R. Cox, SOCial Forces, (Note 15 above), p. 135.18. Ibid.

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270 Notes and ReferencesNotes and References 271

20.

I!.

18.

19.

22. See Fieldhouse on the difference and complementanty of peripheral orcore explanations of colonial impenalism, in D. K. Fieldhouse,Economics and Empire 1830-1914 (London: Macmillan, 1973), esp.ch. 4. j

23. See V. 1. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage a/Capitalism (MO:sCQw:Progress Publishers, 1978; first published 1916); N. Bukharin, Imperi­alism and World Economy (New York: International Publishers,' 1929;first published 1917); and R. Hilferding, Finance Capital. a Study III

the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development (London: Routledge &Kegan Paul, 1981; first published 1910). '

24. J. A. Hobson, Imperialism. a Study, 3rd edn (London: Unwm Hyman,1988 first published 1905).

25. 'Necessity' as being a necessary policy of finance capital, not, however,in the sense of 'not bemg able to be overcome'. Bukharin condemnedthis meaning of 'necessity' as a limit to action, as serm-impcnalism.Impenalism was the policy of finance capitalism which was itselfa highly-developed capitalism implying the ripeness of the object­ive conditions for a new socio-economic form. And while financecapital cannot pursue any other policy (this is the meaning ofnecessity)it IS not necessary In terms of not being able to overcome it. Bukhann,Imperialism and World Economy (Note 23 above), pp. 141-3.

26. N. Bukharin. ibid.. p. 28.27. V. G. Kiernan, Marxism and Imperialism (London: Edward Arnold,

1974).28. Fieldhouse. Economics and Empire, (Note 22 above), p. 66.29. For example. France after the the Franco-Prussian war - see H.

Daalder, 'Irnpenalism', in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (NewYork: Collier Macrnillan, 1968).

30. Ibid., pp. 103-4.31. For a cnuque of the alleged refutations of econorruc theories of

imperialism. see P. Baran and P. M. Sweezy, 'Notes on the Theoryof Imperialism'. Monthly RevleIV, 17 (March 1966), pp. 15-31. Theauthors argue that there IS a fatal methodological error in companngcosts and rewards for nations as a whole, because the relevant actorson the imperialist stage are classes and their sub-divrsions down to andincluding their individual members.

32. B. Warren, Imperialism. Pioneer of Capitalism (London: Verso, 1980).33. J. A. Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes (New York: KeIley,

1951).34. B. Warren, Imperialism. Pioneer of Capitalism (Note 32 above), p. 65.

Note. however, Anthony Brewer's observation that this line of criti­cism follows In part from a semantic confusion caused by differentuses oftbe term 'imperialism'. For Lenin in particular, imperialism didnot refer specifically to the possession of colonies. He recognisedexplicitly that earlier stages of capitalism also involved colonial expan­SIOn - Just as he recognized that the 'serru-colomes' of South Americawere really VIctImS of imperialist control and dormnatron, See A.Brewer. Marxist Theories of Imperialism (London: Routiedge &Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 117.

1 The History of Capitalist Expansion

1. S. Kuznets, 'Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth ofNations: X-levels and Structure of Foreign Trade: Long-term Trends',ECOn01JHC Development and Cultural Change, 15 (2) part If, January1967, pp. 1-45.

2. In 1996, the latest year for which the trade figures are available. Seech. 4, table 4.2 for notes and references.

3. 1. Wallerstem, The Capltalisl-'fVorld Economy (Cambridge UmversityPress, 1979), p. 15.

4. 1. Wallerstem, ibid. For an excellent diSCUSSIOn on Wallerstem's addi­noes to Marx's model, see Christopher Chase-Dunn, Global Forma­tion. Structures a/the World-Economy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991),esp. part I, eh, l.

5. S. Armn, Imperialism and Unequal Exchange (New York: MonthlyReview Press, 1977).

6. A. G. Frank, Dependent Accll1lllllation and Underdevelopment (NewYork: Monthly Review Press, 1979).

7. E. Mandel, Late Capitalism (London: New Left Books, 1976).8. A. Szymanski, The Logic ofImperialism (New York: Praeger, 1981).9. H. Magdoff, Imperialism: From the Colontat Age to the Present (New

York: Monthly Review Press, 1978),10. For a diSCUSSIon of these periodizations, see C. Chase-Dunn, Global

Formation (Note 4 above), eh. 3. .P. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: MonthlyReview Press, 19671 (originally published m Spanish III 1957).

12. See \V. Rodne¥, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Dar es Salaam:Tanzania Publishing House; and London: Bogle L'Ouverture, 1972).See also A. M. M. Hoogvelt, The Sociology of Developing Societies(London: Macmillan. 1976), eh. 4.

13. Ibid. for a more.extensive diSCUSSIOn.

14. H ..Magdoff, Imperialism, (Note 9 above), p. 102.15. Ibid., pp. 29-35.

16. See B.. Thomas, 'The Histoncat Record of Capital Movements to1913', In J. H. Adler (e~.), Capital Movements and Economic Develop­ment (London: Macmillan. 1967), pp. 3-32, repnnted m John H.Dun?mng, International Investment (Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1972),pp. _7-58.

17. A. K. Carrncross. Home and Foreign Investment (New York: HarvesterPress, 1975), pp3; first published by Cambridge University Press, 1957.Quote~ ID A. A • Thomton, The Imperial Idea and its Enemies (London:Macmillan, 1985), p. 76.See H. Wesselinck. Verdeel ell Heers. De Deting VQ11 Afrika 1880-1914(Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1991), openmg citation.B. Kidd. The Control a/the Tropics (1989), quoted m A. P Thomton,Doctrmes o/Impenalism (New York: John Wiley, 1965), p. 85.A. P. Thornton, The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies. (Note 18 above),p.76.

21.

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272 Notes and References

T

Notes and References 273

35. A. Lipretz. 'New Tendencies ill the Intemattonal Division of Labour:Regimes of Accumulation and Modes of Regulation", in A. SCOll. M.Storpor and contributors. Production. Work. Territory: The Geogra­pineal Anatomy of Industnal Capitalism (Winchester. Mass.: UnwmHyman. 1988), p. 21.

2. i Neocolonialism, Modernization and Dependency

1. J. O'Connor. 'The Mearung of Econonuc Impenaiism'. m R. Rhodes.Imperialism Gild Underdevelopment (New York: Monthly ReviewPress. 1970). See esp. p. 117, which lists the chief manifestauons ofneocolonialism as identified by the African leaders at the conference.

2. For confirmation of both the long-term downward trend, and thefluctuations of all non-oil commodity prices SInce 1950. see \VorldBank, World Development Report (Oxford University Press, 1987),p. 17, fig. 2.3. and the Appendix on the tenus of trade, p. 176.

3. ErnestMandel firstcomed tills term.He defined 'technological'rentsas

surplus profits denved from the monopolization of techrncalprogress, from discovenes and inventions which lower the costprice of commodities but cannot (at least in the medium run)become generalised throughout a given branch of production andapplied by all competitors, because of the structure of monopolycapital Itself: difficultres of entry, size of minimum Investment,control of patents, cartelarrangements and so on. See E. Mandel,Late Capitalism (London: New Left Books, 1978), p. 192.

4.. P. Worseley, The Third World (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson,1964), p. 52.

5. F. Fanon, The Wretcned of the Earth (Harmondsworth: Pengum,1963), eh. 3.

6., N. Chomsky, 'Foreword' III Y. Flu. A. Faire and J. P. Vigter, TheWorld Economic Crisis (London: Zed Press, 1972), p. 4.

7. Quoted 10 Jenny Pearce. Under the Eagle: US Intervention .m CentralAme1'lca and tne Caribbean (London: Latm Amenca Bureau, 1981),p.27.

8. D. Harnson, The Sociology of Modermzauon and Development (Lon­don: Unwm Hyman, 1988).

9.' See W. W. Rostow, TheStages ofEconomic Growth- somewhat super­fluously subtitled 'A non-Communist Manifesto' (Cambridge Unrver­srty Press, 1960). This work has no doubt been the most influential.Otherunportant econouusts who brought social andevenpsychologicalvariablesmto their economic development tbecnes were; A. Lewis, TheTheory ofEconomic Growth (London: AlIen & Unwm. 1955),and E. E.Hagec. 011 lite Theory ofSocial Cltallge(Homewood. Ill.: Dorsey, 1962).

I By far the most comprehensrve of all these approaches was Gunnar, Myrdal et al.. Asian Drama, vols r-ru (New York: Pantheon. 1968).

10. See N. J. Smetser, 'Towardsa Theory of Mcderruzation', in A. Etzroniand E. EtZIODl. Social Change (New York: BaSIC Books. 1964), pp.258-74. This IS probably the most widely quoted theoreucat text onmodermzation. Another early work of great influence was B. F.Hoselitz and W. E. Moore (eds), Industrialisation and Society (TheHague: Mouton, 1963). For an extensive diSCUSSIOn on modermzancntheones. see A. M. M. Hoogvelt, The Sociology ofDeveloping Societies(London: Macmillan, 1976), eh. 3.

11. For an excellent diSCUSSIon on the mstorical specificity of the idea ofdevelopment as a form ofWestern-nnposed adtrunistrauve reform ofthe Third World, see P. \V. Preston, Theories ofDevelopment (London:Routledge, 1982), eh. 2 (the idea of development).

12. L. Trotsky, The Permanent Revolution (1928) (New York: Merit Pub­lishers, 1969). See also M. Lowy, The Politics ofCombined and UnevenDevelopment (London: Verso, 1981),eh. 2.

13. P. Baran. The Political Economy of Growth (New York: MonthlyReview Press, 1967) (first published m Sparush m 1957).

14. A. G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment 11lLatin America (NewYork: Monthly Review Press. 1967).

15. T. dos Santos. 'The Structure of Dependenee', m C. K. Wilher (ed.),The Poltucai Economy of Development and Underdevelopment (NewYork: Random House. 1970).

16. L. Pearson et at.. Partners ill Development (London: Pall Mall, 1970),p.81.

17. R. Jenkins, Exploitation (London: Paladin, 1971).18. For a further diSCUSSIOn, see Chapter 11 of this book.19. For a diSCUSSIOn on autocentnc versus peripheral development, see S.

Anun, Unequal Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976).20. R. Prebisch. The Economic Development of Latin Amenca and the

Pnncspal Problems (New York: UN Econonuc Comrrussfon forLatm Amenca, 1950); and H. Singer, 'The Distribution of Gainsbetween Investing and Borrowing Countries', American EconomicReView, Supplement, May 1950.

21. A. Emmanuel. Unequal Exchange. A Study oftlTe lmpenalism ofTrade(London: New Left Books, 1971).

22. For an extensive diSCUSSIon on the programmatIc achrevements ofthe Third \Vorld in putting its case on the agenda of the Inter­national community, seeA. M. M. Hoogvelt, The Third World ill GlobalDevelopment (London: Macmillan, 1982), eh. 2. See also P. Willets, TheNon-aligned Movement: Tile Origins of a Tlurd World Alliance (Lon­don: Frances Pinter, 1978); and M. Ul Haq, 'Intelleetual Self-Reliance',opening speech at the establishment ofThird World Forum ID Karachi,January1975; pnnted in InternationalDevelopment Review,!. 1975,pp.8-13. About a hundred leading Tlurd-Wcrld scholars and officials ofmternational orgarnzations attended this conference.

Page 147: Globalization Postcolonial World

274 Notes and References

3 Crisis and Restructuring: The New International Division ofLabour

1. See S. Arnin, The Law of Valueand Historical Materialism (New York:Monthly Review Press. 1978), eh, 6.

2. D. Becker, 'Development, Democracy and Dependency in LatinAmerica: A Postimpenalist View', Third World Quarterly, 6(2), April1984, pp. 411-31.

3. S. Amm. 'Towards a New Structural Crisis of the Capitalist System';Paper submitted to the Third World Forum, Karachi, Pakistan, 5-10January 1975; and The Law of Value Gild Historical Matenalism,(Note 1 above).

4. We shall return to the defimtion and description of 'Fordism: exten­sively in Chapter 5 of this book.

5. D. Harvey, The Condition of Postmodermty (Oxford: Basil BIackwell,1989), p. 135.

6. See A. Lipietz, 'How Monetansm has Choked Third World Indus­tnalization', New Left Review, 145. 1984. pp. 71-88, 73.

7. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report (1981), p. 102.8. P. R. OdeIl, Oil and World Power 7th edn (Harmondsworth: Penguin,

1983) figure, p. 138.9. For a discussion of the relative pnce movements between primary

products and manufactures over the colonial and neocolonial periods,see M. Barratt Brown, The Economics of Impenaiism (Harmonds­worth: Penguin, 1974), ch. 10.

10. On the concept of the social wage, see L Gough, The Political Econ­amy of the Welfare State (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 108ff. andAppendix D. On the link between the social wage and Imperialistprofits, see R. Sutcliffe, Hard Times (London: Pluto Press, 1983).

I!. An oft-quoted study by Vartsos m 1970 propelled 'technologicat rents'to the forefront of the dependency debate. Vaitsos discovered that, mthe pharmaceutical mdustry in Colombia, for example, as little as 3.4per cent of effectrve returns to the parent company consisted of'declared' profits. Another 14 per cent were accounted for by royaltypayments. while 82.6 per cent were contributed by the parent compa­ny's overpricmg of its sales to the affiliates. See C. V. Vansos, 'Bar­gaining and the Distribution of Returns in the Purchase ofTechnology by Developmg Countries', Bulletin of the Institute ofDevelopment Studies, 3(1), 1970, pp. 16-23.

12. S. Amm, The Law of Value and Historical Matertalism, (Note Jabove), p. 77.

13. See, for example, the argument developed by J. Toye in 'DevelopmentPolicy In the Shadow of Keynes", eh. 2 in his book Dilemmas ofDevel­opment (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987).

14. ThIScalculation IS based on the statistical tables in Annexes of the 1970and 1982 ISSues of Development Cooperation: ReView of the OECDDevelopment ASSIstance Committee (pans: OECD, 1970 and J982).

INates and References !275

!IS. S. George, A Fate Worse than Debt {Harmondsworth: Pengum, 1?88),

esp. ch. L ""bll J16. The term <world market factory' was first coined by F. Fro ~. .

Hemnch and O. Kreye, The New International DivISIOll of L~bolll'

(Cambridge Uruversrty Press. 1980), p. 6. I17. P. Jalee. Imperialism III the Seventies (New York: The Third Press,

1972), p. 83.. .. . AG18. See G. Arriglu, 'A CriSIS of Hegemony'. m S. Amin, G. A(Nrnghl,y' k'

Frank and 1. Wallerstem, Dynamics of Global Crtsis ew or:Monthly Review Press. 1982), pp. 55-108. .

19. F. Halliday, Cold War. Third World (London: Hutchmson RadIUS.1989), p. 33. I f h

20. P. Evans, "Transnational Linkages and the ECO?OffilC Ro e ~ t eState: An Analysis of Developing and Industrialised Nations in thePost-World War IT Period', In P. Evans and D. Rueschemeyer et at.,Brmging the State Back In (Cambridge Umversity Press. 1985).

21. A good example are the regional volumes of the 'SOhCIdO!bogyMOf De1vlel-opmg Societies' senes, edited by T. Shanin, publis e y acrrn an

and the Monthly Review Press In varIOUS years m the 1980s.22. A pathbreakmg essay on the new approaches to developmsent thleory

m this period was D. Booth, 'Marxism and Development OCID ogy:Interpretmg the Impasse', World Development, 13(7), 1985. See alsoIns contribution to F, J. Schuurman (ed.), Beyond the Impasse, NewDirections 1Il Development Theory (London: Zed Books, 1993).

23. For examples of this bottom-up 'empowerment ap(Lproacdh', sLee R.Cbalmers. Rural Development, Putting the Last First on on: _ong­man, 1983); and P. Oakley and D. Marsden. Approaches to Parttcipa-tton m Rural Development (Geneva: ILO. 1984). .

24. E. Boserup is widely credited with havmg been the fidrst wI

nter t~

explore systematically the role of women III economic eve opmen .While her work was a lour de force III ItS novelty. It ~a5 underdevel­oped theorettcally. Nevertheless, it alerted donor agencies to the ~xciu­

S10n of women from the benefits of progress and 1S said tohave inspired the 'UN Decade for Women' that was to follow. E.Boserup, r.:voman's Role 111 Economic Development (London: Earth­scan, 1970).

25. M. Mies, Pamarctty ond Accumulation on a r1'orld SBcalek' HI01'91l8e161)lfl theInternational DiVISiOJl of Labour (London: Zed 00 5, , pp.122ff. See also B. Mass, The Polincal Economy ofPopulation Control111 Latin Amenca (Montreal: Women's Press, 1975);.and N. Kardam,'Bringmg Women In'. in fVomell"s Issues l1J 1lllernall?nalDew:[opmelllProg;ams (Boulder, CoL: Lynne Riermer, 1991). WhIle mos~ literatureis confident about the 'double' burden of women III the Third ~orId,

the concept of'tnple' exploitation has been developed by D. Gills I?'The Forgotten Workers: Rural Women III Korean Development,(phD thesis, University of Sheffield, 1994).

Page 148: Globalization Postcolonial World

276 Notes and References Notes and References 277

26. M. Mies, Patriarchy and Accumuianon Oil a World Scale. Women 111 theInternational Division ofLabour (London: Zed Books. 1986); see alsoV. Bennholdt-Thompson. 'Investment m the Poor: Analysis of WorldBank Policy'. Sacral SCientist, 8(7), February 1980, part I: and 8(8),March 1980, part 11: C. von Werlhof, 'The Proletarian IS Dead. LongLive the Housewife?', ID 1. Wallcrstem et al. (eds), Households and theWorld Economy (New York: Sage, 1984); and K. Young et at. (eds), OfMarriage and tile Market: Women s Subordination 11l InternationalPerspective, 2nd cdn (London: Routledge, 1984).

27. M. Mies, Patriarchy and Accumulation, (Note 25 above), p. 127.28. For a good coverage of the Issue of women versus gender m develop­

ment, see G. Waylen, Gender 11l Ttnrd World Politics (Buckingham:Open University Press. 1996); a good introduction IS also R. Pearson,'Gender Matters m Development', m T. Alien and A. Thomas (eds),Poverty Gild Development m the 1990s (Oxford Umversuy Press andOpen Umversity Press, 1990).

29. M. Mitra. 'Women In Dairying In Andhra Pradesh', Term paper,Mimeo, institute of Social Studies, The Hague (1984), CIted m Mies,Patriarchy and Accumulauon, (Note 25 above), p. 131.

30. C. Mohanty, 'Introduction', In C. Mohanty, A. Russo and L. Torres(eds), Third World Women and The PoliticsofFeminism (Bloonungtonand Indianapolis, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 11.

31. J. H. Momsen and J. Townsend, Geography 0/ Gender m tne ThirdWorld (New York: SUNY Press, 1987).

32. C. Mohanty, 'Under Western Eyes', m C. Mohanty, A. Russo and L.Torres (eds], Third World Women, (Note 30 above), pp. 51-80.

33. A. Ong, 'Colonialism and Modernity: Feminist Re-presentations ofWomen In Non-western Societies', Inscnpuons. 3-4, 1988, pp. 79-93;cited ID J. Townscnd. 'Gender Studies: Whose Agenda?', 10 F. Schuur­man (ed.), Beyond the Impasse, New Directions m Development Theory(London: Zed Books, 1993), pp. 169-86,183.

34. The Brazilian SOCIOlogIst and poliucian (later elected President ofBrazil) Fernando Heurtque Cardoso was one of the key contributorsto the 'dependency associated development' VISIon. See F. H. Cardoso,'Associated-dependent Development: Theoretical and PracticalImplication', ID A. Stepan (ed.), Aumontanan Brazil: Ongms. Poiicies.and Future (New Haven. Corm .. Yale University Press, 1973).Together with Enzo Faletto he wrote the classic text Dependency andDevelopmentin Latin Amel'lca (Berkeley, Calif.: Umversity of Califor­rua Press. 1979; translation, with new mtroduction and post-scnptumof their original Spanish volwne published m 1969).

35. D. Becker (1984) 'Development, Democracy and Dependency m LatinAmerica' (Note 2 above).

36. J. Wallerstem, The Capztalist World Economy (Cambridge UnrversttyPress. 1980), p. 5.

37. jfhlS section IS a summary of Wallcrstein's arguments In Chapters 4and 5 of The Capitalist World Economy.

I

Part IT Introduction

I. A. M. M. Hoogvett, The Third World in Global Development (London:Macmillan, 1982), p. 208.

2. R. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond Interna­tional Relations Theory'. Millennium: Journal ofInternational Studies.10(2), 1981, pp. 126-55.

3. See B. Warren, Imperialism. Pioneer oj Capualism (London: New LeftBooks, 1980); and F. H. Cardoso and E. Faletto, Dependency andDevelopment 11l Latin Amenca (Berke1ey, Calif.: University of Califor­rua Press. 1979), esp. the Preface to the American edition.

4. For an example of the restatement of this VIew. even after the collapse ofthe SOCialist experience. see S. Amm. 'The Future of SOCialism', mMonthly RevlelV. July/August 1990; also S. Armn, G. Arrrght, A. G.Frank and 1. Wallerstem, Transforming the Revolution. Social Move­ments and the World System (New York: Monthly Review Press. 1990).

5. For a repeat of this mgrained View, see S. Amm. G. Arnghi. A. G.Frank and 1.Wallerstem. Transformmg tile Revolution. (Note 4 above).

6. P. Sweezy, 'Globalization - To What End?', Monthly RevlelV. 42(9),February 1992, p. 1.

7. R. Boyer, 'Technical Change and the Theory of "Regulation"', in G.DOSI and C. Freeman et al.. (eds), Technical Change and ECOl1Ol1l1C

Theory (London: Pinter, 1988).

4 From Expansion to Involntion

1. I am indebted to Dr Rongyan Qi for her land help with some of thetables m tlns chapter.

2. P. Dicken. Global Shift. The Intemanonattsauon of Economic Activity(London: Paul Cbapman. 1992), p. 16.

3. S. Kuznets. 'Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of'Natrons:X-level and Structure of Foreign Trade: Long- Term Trends', ECOllOl1HC

Development and Cultural Change, 15 (2), part u, January 1967.4. Ibid.. pp. 7-8.5. For a diSCUSSIOn, seeShigeru Otsubo, Glooaltzauon. Accelerated Integ­

ration through World Trade. A New Role for Developing Countnes m anIntegrating World, (Washington DC:World Bank. International Eco­nomics Department, DiSCUSSIOn Papers. November 1995).

6. World Development Report (Washington DC: World Bank, 1999), table20.

7. Otsubo. Globalization, calculates that, of the 16% nse In the tradeintegration ratio of low and middle income countnes smce the mid­1960s, 15% was observed only after the mid-1980s and resulted fromthe developing countries' shift 10 development strategy.

8. World Trade Orgamzanon. Annual Report 1998 (Geneva: WTO,1998), p. 29.

Page 149: Globalization Postcolonial World

278 Notes and References Notes and References 279

9. A.Yeats, Just How Big IS Global Production Sharing? World BankPolicy Research Paper No. [87[, (Washington DC: World Bank,[988), cited m WTO, Annual Report 1998, (Note 8 above), p. 36.

[0. WTO, Annua! Report 1998, pp. [5 and [6.11. For a good example, see David Held et al., Global Transformations

(Cambridge: Polity Press, [999), p. [67, where the authors cite T.Nierop, Systems and Regions m Global Politics: All Empmcal StudyDJDiplomacy, International Organization Gild Trade 1950-1991 (ChI­chester: John Wiley, [994). As Held et al. put it: 'over the postwarperiod. trade has become much more extensive than ever before as aworld widenetwork of trading relations between regionsandcountneshas developed.'

12. S. Kutznets, 'Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth ofNations' (Note 3 above), p. 10.

13. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report 1999 (UN: New York andGeneva, [999), p. 85.

14. Other academic authors have come to similar conclusions. For ex­ample, Paul Hirst and Graharne Thompson, In Globalization ill Ques­non (London: Polity Press, [995), p. 28, argue that usinggross figuresof ratios of trade relative to output 'confirms unequivocally that"openness" was greater dunng the Gold Standard period than evenm the 1980s' The second edition (1999) of this book confirms theirposttion even regarding the 1990s and they cntique In even greaterdetail than before the methodologies used by those who take trade/GDP ratios as a proxy for 'globalization'.

15. UNCTC, Transnauonat Corporations 11l World Development, Trendsand Prospects (New York: UN, 1988), p. [6.

16. C. Tugendhat, The Multinanonais (London: Eyre & Spotttswoodc.[971), p. 24.

17. UNECOSOC, Mulnnanonal Corporations 111 World Development(New York: UN, 1973), pp. 13-[4.

18. For a discussion of the methodology used, see the footnote on p. 135of the sequel to the report, UNCTC, Transnational Corporations 111

World Development, a Re-Bxammatton (New York: UN, 1978).19. UN Department of Economic and SOCIal Affairs, Economic Report

1947 (Lake Erie, NJ: United Nations, 1948).20. J. H. Dunning, Studies m International Investment (London: Allen &

Unwm, [970), see pp. 23 and 19, respectively. See also The Problem ofInternational Investments. A Report by tile Study Group ofMembers ofthe Royal Institute of International Affairs (Oxford University Press,1947).

21. For the 1960 figure, see M. Barratt Brown, The Economics of Impen­alism (Harmondsworth: Penguin, [974), pp. 206-7. For 1966, see L. B.Pearson, Partners 11l Development (London: Pall Mall Press, (970),p. lOO. For 1974, see Transnattonai Corporations 111 World Develop­ment (as m Note 18 above), p. 242, tahle m.For [989, see UNCTC,World Investment Report (New York: UN, 1991), p. l I. table 4.

22. See UNCTC, World Investment Report ([991), p. I r, table 4.23. Ibid., p. 68.

24.

25.26.

27.28.29.

30.31.32.

33.

34.

35.36.

37.

38.

39.40.41.

42.

43.44.

45.46.47.

Based on UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report ([999), jI. lI6,chart 5.10. I

Ihid .. p. [[6. IP. Hirst and G. Thornpson, Globalization in Question, 2nd edn,j(Note14 above), pp. 73/4. :Ibid., p. 74. :UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report (1999), p. 107.J. Henderson, 'Danger and Opportunity III the Asra-Pacific', in G. FThompson (ed.), Economic Dvnannsm 111 tile Assa-Paciftc (London:Routledge, [998), Cited m Paul Hirst and Graham Thompson, Global­tzation m QllestlOn, 2nd edn (London: Polity Press, 1999), p. [56.UNCTAD, World Investment Report (1997), figure 1.2.UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report (1999), p. [18.The term 'emerging markets' refers to those countnes m the develop­ing world as well as among the so-called transinon economies ofCentral and Eastern Europe which have either set up or opened theirstock markets to foreign penetration Since the wave of free marketreforms began in the 1980s. The main emerging markets are: Chma,Malaysia. South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia. I~dia, "MeXICO,Brazil, Korea, Argentina. Russia and the Czech Republic, 'For this classification. see International Monetary Fund, Balance ofPayments Siansncs Yearbook. (Washmgton: IMF: 1997), annex Ill.B. Thomas, 'The Historical Record of Capital Movements to 1913', mJ. H. Adler (ed.), Capital Movements and Economic Development(London: Macmillan, [967), pp. 3-32, repnnted m J. H. Dunlll~g,

IntemanonalInvestment (Harmondsworth: Pengum. 1972), pp. 27-)8.34, table I.C. Crook, 'Fear of Finance'. The Economist, 19 September 1992,State of the Union Address, Economic Report ofthePresident (Washing­ton DC, US Government Pnntmg Office, January [999), p. 224.UN, World Economic and Social Survey 1997 (New York: UN; 1997),p. 267, table A31.International Finance Corporation, Emerging Stockmarkets Factbootc.1997 (Washington DC: IFC, [997).UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report (1999), p. 99.lbid.. p. 106.The term 'net capital inflow' denotes acquisitions rrunus sales ofdemesne assets by non-residents. while the term 'net capital outflow'denotes acqursmons of foreign assets mmus sales of foreign as~ets byresidents. Thus the term net capita! flow refers to net capttaltinflowmmus net capital outflow. See ibid., p. 100.Economic Report of tile President, 1999 (Washmgton, DC; US Gov­ernment Printing Office, 1999), pp. 22[-2.UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report (1999), p. 101.United Nations Development Programme. Human DevelopmentReport 1999 (New York: UN; 1999), eh, I, figure I.!.Ibid., ch. I.UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report (1995), p. 77.UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report (1999), p. 61.

Page 150: Globalization Postcolonial World

280 Notes and References

48. Dani Rodrik. 'Who Needs Capital Account Convertability?', Essaysm International Finance, 20-27. May 1998, p. 55. See also, EconomicReport of the President, (see Note 42 above), p. 241.

49.. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report (1990), p, 110.50. F. F. Clairmont, The Rise and Fall of EC01l01JllC Liberalism (Penang:

Southbound Press/Third World Network. 1996), p. 29.51. On the orthodox economics distmction between 'real' and 'monetary'

economy. see H. Magdoff and P. M. Sweezy, 'Production andFinance', Monthly Review, May 1983, repnnted m H. Magdoff and

, P. M. Sweezy, Stagnation Gild the Financial ExpLOSIOn (New York:Monthly ReviewPress, 1987), pp. 93-105. See also S. Strange, CasinoCapitalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 118, where she says theconsequences for the real economy, for production, trade and employ­ment can 'only be guessed at'.

52. P. Vo1cker, Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board during much· of the 19805. is quoted in an interview with Anthony Sampson assaying: 'it seems to be easier to make money in some sense. with

: paper chasing paper. than In investing In real goods and services. Ifyou're doing some research and the pay-off is commg in fifteen yearsor twenty years at today's interest rates. It's hard to envisage a big

-enough pay-out to Justify the investment that you make today'Quoted in A. Sampson, The Midas Touch: Money, People and Powerfrom West 10 East (London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1989), p. 13.

53. .For a simple explanation of secunnzation, see A. Hamilton, The, Financial Revolution (Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1986), esp. pp. 71-· 2. See also Barclays Bank Briefing No. 87, January 1992 and TheEconomist, 'Corporate Finance', June 1986, pp. 7-13.

54. Longmans. Dictionary 0/ English.55. The Economist, 'Corporate Finance'. Survey, 7 June 1986, p. 23.56. The Economist, 19 September 1992, p. 30.57. Quoted In A. Sampson, The Midas Touch, (Note 52 above), p. 179.58. A. Sampson, ibid., p. 179.59. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report (1990), p, 35, table 17.60. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report (1999), p. 107.61. For example, after the East ASian CriSIS of 1997, the governments of

both Japan and Hong Kong piled taxpayers' monies into their stock'markets to buy falling stocks and support the markets. The US, Federal Reserve bailed out LCTM, the hedge fund that collapsed ast a result of the cnSIS, with US$3 trillion worth of 'uncovered' IpOSI_, trons', For details about the regular support for financial markets by

governments, see Harry Shutt. The Trouble wall Capitalism (London:: Zed Press, 1998), pp. 124-31.

62. UNDP, Human Development Report 1992 (Oxford Umversity Press,1992), p. 36. Note that the UNDP III this report includes the countnes

i of Eastern Europe and the SOVIet Union In the mdustnalized group., For confirmation of the widening gap ill Incomes between traditional!core and periphery countries. see also P. Sweezy, 'Globalization to· What End?'. part 11, MOll/My ReVIew, 43(10), March 1992, p, 10,

Notes and References 281

table IX; and G. Amgtu. 'World Income Inequalities and the Future ofSOCialism', New Left RevIe"" 189, 1991.

63. P. Bairoch, The Economic Development of the Third World smce 1900(London: Methuen, 1975), p, 193.

64. UNDP, Human Development Report 1991 (Oxford Umversrty Press,1999), p. 23.

65. UNDP, Human Development Report 1999 (Oxford Univensty Press,1999), p. 38.

66. UNDP, Human Development Report 1992 (Oxford University Press,1992), p, 35.

67. WTO, Annual Report 1998, pp. 62-3.68. See P. Mos1ey, 'Globalization, Economrc Policy and Growth Perform­

ance', In UNCTAD, International Monetary and Financial Issues fortile 1990s, voL x, UN publications. ref. E.99. n.D.14. (New York andGeneva: UN, 1999). For a critical assessment of the empincal evi­dence. see also F. Rodnguez and D. Rodrik. 'Trade Policy and Eco­nomic Growth; A Skepuc'a Guide to the Cross-national Evidence',National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 7081(Cambridge, Mass.. April 1999).

69. UNDP, Human Development Report 1999, p, 3.70. Ibid., p. 39.71. M. Castells, 'The Informational Economy and the New International

Division of Labor, III M. Camoy, M. Castells. S. S. Cohen and F. H.Cardoso, The New Global Economy ill the Information Age (NewYork: Pennsylvania State University Press and London: Macmillan,1993), p. 37.

5 Flexibility and Informationalism

1. Throughout the 19705 and 19805, 'crisis' literature dominated thegeneral social SCIence agenda. In Journals such as the Marxist MonthlyReView not an Issue could pass without some reference to It. Forcomprehensive guides to the 'crisis'. see Y. Fitt. A. Faire and 1. Vigier,The World Economic Cnsis: US. Imperialism at Bay (London: ZedPress, 1980); S. Anun. G.. Arngfu. A. G. Frank and L Wallerstem,Dvnanucs of Global CrISIs (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982);R. J. Johnston and P. J. Taylcr (eds), A World III Crisis? (New York:Basil Blackwell, 1986); and R. Sutcliffe, Hard Times. The Warld Eco­nomy m Turmoil (London: Pluto. 1983).

2. J. P. Womack, D. T. Jones and D. Roos, The Machine that Changedthe World (New York: Rawson Associates. 1990), p. 27.

3. J. P. Womack et 01.. ibid., p. 37.4. D. Harvey, The Condition of Postmoderntty (Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

1989) p. 142.5. See D. Harvey, ibid. The summary of 'Fordism' ill this chapter owes

much to Harvey's excellent discussion ID eh, 9 of hIS book.

Page 151: Globalization Postcolonial World

43.

44.

41.42.

45.46.47.48.

!Notes and References I, 283

[

dUCti011 Systems? JVh)' Are They a Strategic Issue for Europe? ReportEUR 13968 EN (Brussels; 1992). IIbid .• p. 3. 1

Ibid .• p. 2. I,

Labour Research Department, Human Resource Management Survey,Bargammg Report (London: February 1995), I

UNCTAD. World Investment Report 1994, Transnanonal Corpora­tIOns, Employment and tile Wortcplace (New York and GenevaiLlrutedNations, 1994), p. 271. . 'M. Castells, The Rise 0/ tile Network SOCIety, vol. 1 of a trilogy TheInformation Age: Economy, Society and Culture (Cambridge; Mass.and Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996).Ibid .• p. 171.Ibid .. p. 170.R. Jaikurnar and D. Upton, 'The Co-ordination of Global Manufac-tunng' (Note 10 above), p. 169.A. Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Bantam Books. 1970); ~ndH. Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations (Englewood Cliffs,NJ: Prennce Hall. 1979).F, Ostroff, The HOrizontal Organization: What tile Organization of theFuture Actually Looks Like and How It Delivers Value to Customers(Oxford Umversity Press. 1999).R. Moss Kanter, 'The Future of Bureaucracy and Hierarchy', In

P. Bourdieu and J. S. Coteman, SOCial Theory for a Changmg Soctety(Boulder. Col.. WestviewPress. 1991).UNCTAD World Investment Report 1994. (Note 28. above), pp. 193-4.'Benetton: The Next Era', The Economist, 23 April 1994.K. Ohmae, Triad Power, tile Conung Shape a/Global Competition (NewYork; The Free Press and Collier Macmillan, 1985), pp. xvi-xvii.J. Womack et al.. The Machine that Changed (Note 2 above), pp.218-22.See for example, Th. Malone and R. Laubacher. 'The Dawn of theE-lance Economy', Harvard Business Review. September/October

1998. pp. 145-52.Ibid •. p. l46.C. Freidheim. 'The Global Corporations - Obsolete So Soon'?', quotedin The Global Firm R.IP. " The Economist, 6 February 1993.C. F. Sabel. 'Expenmental Regionalism and the Dilemmas of RegIO­nal Economic Policy', Paper presented to the Conference on SOCIO-

Economic Systems of Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom,Germany and France, at the Institute of Fiscal and Monetary Policy,Tokyo. Japan. 16 February 1996. ' .C. Leadbeater, Living all Thin Air: The New Economy (London: Vlk-mg, 1999), pp.137-8.Ibid .• p. 143.M.Castells. The Rise ofthe Network: Society. (Note 29 above), p. 199.C. Leadbeater, Livmg on TIllS Air (Note 44 above), p. 143.R. Putnam, Making Democracy fVork: Civic Traditions m ModernItaly (Princeton, NI.: Pnnceton UmversIty Press. 1993).

40.

39.

36.37.38.

35.

34.

33.

30.31.32.

29.

28.

25.26.27.

6. M. J. Piore and C. F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York:Basic Books. 1984).

7. Ibid .. p. 265.8. Ibid .• p. 266.9. For a full diSCUSSIOn. see F. Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and

tile Creation of Prosperity (London: Harmsh Hamilton, 1995).10. R. Jaileumar and D. Upton, 'The Co-ordination of Global Manufac­

turing', in S. P. Bradley, J. Hausman and R. NoIaD. Globalization.Technology, and Competition (Boston, Mass.: Harvard BusinessSchool Press. 1993), pp. 178-9.

11. The description of the Toyota model III this chapter draws substan­tially on the excellent book by J. P. Womack et al. The Machine thatChanged the World (Note 2 above) on the same subject.

12. K. Dohse et al.. <From "Fcrdism" to "Tcyotism"? The SOCial Orga­nisation of the Labour Process in the Japanese Automobile Industry',Politics and Society. 14 (2), 1985. pp. 115-46.

13. I.P. Wornack et.at., Tlte Machine that Changed the World, (Note 2above), eh. 3.

14. A. Toffler, Power shift. Know/edge. Wealtlz and Violence at the Edge ofthe 21st Century (New York: Bantam Books, 1992) pp. 102 and 239.

15. J.P. Womack et 01.. The Machme that Changed the World (Note 2above), p. 62. Note the authors' use of the word 'machine' in thiscontext. A deliberate, if mistaken analogy.

16. R. Murray, 'Fordism and Post-Fordism'. in'S. Hall. D. Held andT. McGrew. Modernity and us Futures (Cambridge: Polity Press andOxford: Basil Blackwell In association with Open University Press1992), p. 218. •

17. Good examples of such advocacy are J. MacDonald and J. Piggot,Global Quality. The New Management Culture (London: Mercury,1990). See also C. Lorenz, 'Power to the People', Financial Times. 30March 1992; T. Stewart, 'A User's Guide to Power', Fortune. Spring1991; A. Toffler. POlI'ershift. (Note 14 above) p. 210.

18. See the collection of contributions m T. Eiger and C. Smith (eds),Global Japantzanon: The transnational transformation of the labourprocess (London: Routledge, 1994); see also R. Delbridge. P. Thurn­bull and B. Wilkrnson, 'Pushmg Back the Frontiers: ManagementControl and Work Intensification under JITrrQM Factory Regimes',New Technology, lYork and Employment, Autumn 1992, pp. 97-107;and H. WilIiamson and G. Coyne. New Management Techniques: NewUnion Strategies. (LIverpool: CAITSIMTUCURC; 1991).

19. UNCTC. Transnanonal Corporations, Fourth Report, 'Trends andProspects' (New York: UN. 1988). p. 42.

20. UNCTC. ibid.. p. 42.21. J. Tldd, Flexible Manufacturing Technologies and International Com-

petitiveness (London: Pinter, 1991).22. Ibid .• p. 92.23. Ibid .• p. 96.24. Commission of the European Commumnes, Directorate General

SCience, Research and Development. 'What Are Anthropocentric Pro-

282 Notes and References

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284 Notes and References

49. There arc many 'Silicon Valley' imitations all over the world. fromCambridge m England to Bangalore m India; see C. Leadbeater,Living 011 Ttun Air. (Note 44 above), p. 143.

50. From the annals ofgeneral business and management literature the neweconomy VOIces have been heard for longer than thoseemanatingfromthe general econorruc discipline. Among the fanner. useful generalintroductory books are: D. Coy le, The Weightless World (Oxford:Capstone, 1997); JOhn III Hagel, and A. Armstrong, Net GOIll (Boston,Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1997); K. Kelly, New Rulesforthe New Economy (New York; Vikmg, 1998); and B. Davis andD. Wessel. Prosperity: The Coming 20-Year Boom and What It Meansto You (New York: Times Business. 1998); Bill Gates. Business @theSpeed ofThought, Succeeding ill the DigitalEconomy (Hannondsworth:Penguin. 1999). Among economists. see R. Lester, The ProductiveEdge: How u.s. Industries Are POinting The Way to a New Era ofECOll0l111C Growth (London: W.W. Norton, 1998). For a sober assess­ment of pros and cons, see GEeD, The Future ofthe Global Economy,1999. Surveys of the new economy debates may also be found in recentIssues of The Economist: for example, 'Business and the Internet Sur­vey', 26 June 1999, and 'The New Economy'. 24 July 1999.

51. Cited in 'How Real Is the New Economy?', The Econonust, 24 July1999; p. 17;also III 'The New US Economy, Part I', Financial Times, 13December 1999, p. 8.

52. C. Leadbeater, Ltvtng on Thin Air, (Note 44 above), p. 9.53. The Economist. 24 July 1999. p. 21.54. M. Castclls. The Rise of the Network Society, (Note 29 above), p. 91.55. W. Arthur, 'Increasmg Returns and the New World of Business',

Harvard Business RevlCw, Julyl August 1996.56. Ibid., p. 100. Also Dan Schiller, m Digital Capitalism: Networking tile

Global Market System (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999) arguesmuch the same thing and points to the consequences of increasedcorporate control over expression and education.

57. The Econotrust; 24 July 1999, p. 21.58. In a glowing article on the new economy, Willam Sahlman says

'inflation IS dead - dead as a doornail'. He lists a number of onlincauction companies that push prices down. There IS even one m whichconsumers themselves post what they are willing to pay for productsor services (www.priceline.com).SeeW. Sahlmnn, 'The New EconomyIs Stronger Than You Thmk'. Harvard Business Review, November/December 1999.

59. M. Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, (Note 29 above), p. 92.60. M. Elam, 'Puzzling out the Post-Fordist Debate: Technology, Mar­

kets and Instituuons'. m A. Anun (ed.), Post-Fordism (Oxford, UKapd Cambridge, Mass .. Basil Blackwell, 1994), pp. 43-70.

61. J~ Schumpeter. Busmess Cycles; A Theoretical, Historical and Statis­[{cal AnalYSIS of tne Busl1less Cycles (New York: McGraw-Hill,1S39).

62. G. Freeman and C. Perez. 'Structural Crises of Adjustment, BusinessCycles and Investment Behaviour'. ill G. DOSl et at. (eds), Techmcol

r

!

Notes and References 285

Change and Economic Theory (London and New York: Pinter, 1988),pp. 38-66. See also C. Freeman, 'Preface' to part u of that volume.

63. S. Hall and M. Jacques (eds), New Times: The Changing Face ofPolitics 111 the 1990s (London: Lawrence and Wlsuart. 1ll associationwith Marxism Today, 1989).

64. P. Hirst and 1. Zeitlin, 'Flexible Specialization versus post-Fordism:Theory, Evidence and Policy Implications', Economy and Society,20(1), 1991, pp. I-55, H.

65. See Hall and Jacques, (Note 63 above), p. 129.66. Ibid., p. 127.67. For a concise summary of the Regulation School's main conceptual

apparatus, see R. Boyer, 'Technical Change and the Theory of"Regulation" " In G, DOSI et al. (eds), Technical Change and EconomicTheory (London and New York: Pinter, 1988). For a comprehensivereview of the diverse approaches loosely federated under the label"Regulation School". see R. Jessop, 'Regulation Theories m Retro­spect and Prospect', Economy and Society, 19(2), May 1990, pp. 153­216. See also Ius more recent update III R. Jessop, 'Twenty Years ofthe (Pansian) Regulation Approach: The Paradox of Success andFailure at Home and Abroad', New Political Economy, 2(3), Novem­ber 1997. For a cruicat reVH~W of regulation theories III comparisonwith other contemporary CrISIS and transformation theones, see P.Hirst and J. Zeitlin, 'Flexible Specialization versus Post-Fordism:Theory. Evidence and Policy Implications'. Economy and Society,20(1) February 1991 pp. I-55. A thorough critique of the substantivetheses of the Regulation School has been written by R. Brenner andM. Glick, 'The Regulation Approach: Theory and History', NeJI' LeftReview, 188, pp. 45-99. Finally, some more recent regulation conrn­bunons can be found III the excellent Reader edited by A. Amm, Post­Fordism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994).

68. A. Lipretz, 'New Tendencrea III the International Division of Labor:Regimes of Accumulation and Modes of Regulation', m A. Scott andM. Storper et al., Production. JVork, Terntory (Loudon; AlIen &Unwm, 1986), pp. 16-39, 19.

69. K Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles (London: Verso, 1987), pp. 12-/6.70. R. Jessop, 'Post-Fordism and the State', In A. Amm, Post-Fordism,

(Note 60 above), pp. 251-79.

6 Globalization

I. D. Held and A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt and J. Perraton. GlobalTransformauons: Politics. ECOllOflUCS and Culture (Cambridge: PolityPress, 1999), p. 8.

2. A clear exposition of the Sceptics' VIew is III P. Hiret and G. Thomp­son. Globalization 11l QuestlOll, (London: Routledge: 1999).

Page 153: Globalization Postcolonial World

286 Notes and References

3. For a classic statement see S. Strange, The Retreat of the State: TheDiffusion of Power III the World Economy (Cambridge UniversityPress: 1996).

4. M. Castells. The Rise of the Network: Society (Cambridge. Mass. andOxford. UK, 1996), p. 92.

5. For a compact review of sociologrcal theories of globalizatton. see M.Waters, Globalization (London: Routledge, 1995).

6. See R. Robertson, Globalization (London: Sage, 1992), and J. Nett!and R. Robertscn, International Systems and tile Moderntzatmn ofSOCieties (London: Faber, 19681.

7. D. Harvey, The Condition ofPostmodernity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,1989). The summary here IS based on chs. 14, 15 and 17 of lus book.

8. R. Delbridge, P. Tumbull and B.Wilkmson, 'Pushing back the Fron­tiers: Management Control and Work Intensification under JITfI'QMFactory Regimes", New Technology, Work and Employment, Autumn1992, pp. 97-107, 104.

9. Dava Sobel, Longitude (London: Fourth Estate, 1998).10. D. H.arvey, The Condition ofPosnnodernity, (Note 7 above), p. 241.1I. A. Giddens, The Consequences ofModernity (Cambridge: Polity Press,

1990), p. 64.12. M. Castclfs. The Information Age. Economy, Society and Culture,

volume r, The Rise of tile Network Society (Cambridge, Mass. and Ox­ford, UK. Basil Blackwell, 1996); vol n, The Power DJ Idenuty (BasilBlackwell, 1997);and vol. JIl, End DJMillelll/lI/Ill'CBasilBlackwell, 1998).

13. M. Castells, End DJ Millennium, (Note 12 above), p. 336.14. M: Castells. The Rise of the Network Society (Note 12 above), p. 106.15. Ibid.. pp. 471-2.16. Ibid., pp. 436--7.17. Ibid., p. 14.18. M. Castells, End of Millennunn, (Note 12 above), p. 82.19. New Political Economy, 4(3), November 1999, p. 385.20. M. CastelIs, End ofMillennium. (Note ]2 above), p. 93.21. UNECOSOC, Multinational Corporations tn World Development

(New York: UN, 1973).22. UNCTAD, World Investment Report. 1993 (New York and Geneva:

UN, 1994) p. 143.23. P. Drucker, The New Realities (London: Hememann, 1989),pp. 123-5.

See also K. Ohmae. Triad Power. the Coming Shape ofGlobal Compen­tton (New York: Free Press, 1985); and The Borderless World: Powerand Strategy 11l the Interlinked Economy (London: Collins. 1990).

24. S. S. Cohcn. 'Geo-econorrucs and America's Mistakes', m M. Carnoyet af. The New Global Economy III the Information Age (London:Macmillan. 1993), p. 98.

25. For the figure for 1990, see P. Dicken. Global Shift, The Internationa­lization of Economic Activity, 2nd edn (Manchester: Paul Chapman.1992) p. 30, table 2.5.

26. M. Aglietta, The Theory of Capitalist Regulation (London: Verso,1976), p. 122.

Notes and References I 287i

27. P. Boccara, 'Qu'est-ce-que l'anthroponomie?', III Calners du l'~RM,

Individues et Societe. 1; and CIted in R. lessor, 'Regulation Theories In

Retrospect and Prospect', In Economy and Society, 19(2), May 1990,pp. 153-216, 168. i

28. A. Lipretz. Mirages and Miracles (London: Verso, 1987), p. 15.29. R. Jessop, State Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp. 317-18.30. C. Sabel, 'Ex penmental Regionalism and the Dilemmas of Regional

Economic Policy') Paper presented at the conference, 'Soda-Eco­nomic Systems of Japan, the United States. the United Kingdom,Germany, and France', at the Institute of Fiscal 'and Monetary Policy,Tokyo, Japan, 16 February 1996.

31. R. Retch, The Work DJ Nations (London: Simon & Schuster, 1991).32. Ibid., p. 211.33. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1994, Transnanonal Corpora­

nons, Employment and the Workptace (New York and Geneva: UN.1994), p. 188. The report refers to the much-publicized study by aspecial committee of the French Parliament under the direction ofSenator Jean Arthurs, winch gave a very pessmusuc assessment of thelink between relocation and unemployment.

34. P. Dicken. Global Shift, (Note 25 above), p. 67.35. Business Week, 19 December 1994 pp. 28-30.36. J. Rifkm, The EndDJ Work, The Decline DJthe Global LaborForce and

the Dawn of tile Post-Market Era (New York: G. P, Putnam's Sons,1995).

37. P. Krugman. 'Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences', inBrookings Papers on Economic Acnvny, 1, 1995 pp. 327-77.

38. D. Coates, Models ofCapztalism, Growth and Stagnation in the ModernEra (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 256.

39. M. Castells, End ofMtllemnum. (Note 12 above), p. 343.40. Tom Wolfe, The BOilfire DJ the Vanities (London: Pan 1988), p. 260.41. Tlte Economist, 27 November 1993.42. Zygmunt Baumann, Globalization, the Human Consequences (London:

Polity Press, 1998), p. 105.

7 Global Governance: Regulation and Imperialism

1. D. Leborgne and A. Liptetz, 'Conceptual Fallacies and Open Ques­tions on Post-Fordism'. In M. Storper and A. Scott (eds), Pathways IT1

Indusmalizanon and Regional Development (London: Routledge,1992), p. 347-8. Cited m J. Peck and A. Tickell, 'Searchmg for aNew Institutional Fix: The After-Fordist Crisis and the Global­Local Disorder'. In A. Amm. Post-Fordistn. A Reader (Oxford. UK..and Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1994), pp. 280-315, 283-4

2. Bob Jessop, 'Post-Fordism and the State', m A. Amm, Post-Fordtsm. AReader, pp. 251-97. See also Bob Jesscp, 'Post-Fordism and FlexibleSpecialisauon: Incommensurable, Contradictory, Compjem~ntary,orJust Plain Different Perspectives?'. ill H. Ernste and V. Meider (eds),

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288 Notes and References Notes and References 289

Regional Development and Contemporary Response: Extending FlexibleSpecialisation, (London: Bclhaven Press), pp. 25-44.

3. J. Peck and A. Tickell, 'Searching for a New Institutional Fix' (Note Iabove), pp. 280-315.

4. For a review of the second and third generations of regulation theory,see R. Jessop, 'Twenty Years of the (Parisian) Regulation Approach'.New Poltncal Economy, November 1997, pp. 503-26.

5. M. Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience(London: Verso, 1979), p. 32.

6. R. Keohane. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord 11l the WorldPolitical Economy (princeton, NJ: Prmceton University Press. 1984),p.37.

7. For vanous conceptions of the term 'hegemony', see D. Rapkin (ed.),World Leaders/up and Hegemony (London: Lynne Rienner, 1990). Fordebates on US hegemomc decline, see A. O. P. Kennedy, The Rise andFall of tile Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from1500 to 2000 (London: Fontana, 1988); R. Keohane, After Hegemony,(Note 6 above); R. Gilpm. The Political Economy of InternationalRelations (prmceton, NJ: Pnnceton University Press, 1987).

8. See, for example, E. Vogel, 'Pax Nippomca?'. Foreign Affairs. 64,1986.

9. See R. Gilpm, The Political Economy of International Relations(Pnnceton, NJ: Pnnceton University Press. 1987).

10. R. Keohane. After Hegemony, (Note 6 above).11. R. Cox. 'Civilisations in World Political Economy', New Political

Economy, 1(2), July 1996; and 'Towards a Post-hegemoruc Concep­tualisatton of World Order; Reflections on the Relevancy of IbnKhaldun', m J. Rosenau and E. Czempel, Governance WiUlOut Gov­emmem: Order am! Change III World Politics (Cambridge UnrversityPress, 1992).

12. R. Cox, 'SOCial Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond Intema­tionai Relations Theory', Millennium, 10(2), 1981 pp. 126-55, 139.

13. R. Cox, 'Structural Issues of Global Governance: Implications forEurope', in S. Gill (ed.), Gramsci. Historical Materialism and Interna­tionat Retanons (Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 261.

14. S. Strange, 'The Name of the Game', ill N. Rizopoulos (ed.), Sea­changes: American Foreign Policy in a World Transformed (Washmg­ton, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 1990), p. 260.

15. See S. Gill, 'Hegemony, Consensus and Trilatenalism'. Review ofInter­national Studies. 12. pp. 205-21; and K.V.D. Pijl, The Making of all

Atlantic Ruling Class (London: New Left Books, 1984). See also H.SkIar (ed.), Trilaterialism. tile Trilateral Comnussion and Elite Planningfor World Management (Boston, Mass.: South End Press, 1980).

16. On the elite interactions m the European UIDon. see L. Sklair. 'Trans­nauonal Corporations as Polincat Actors" New Political Economy,3(2), 1998, and B. van Apeldoorn, 'Transnatronal Class Agency andEuropean Governance: The Case of the European Round Table ofInduetnalists', New PoliticalEconomy. 5(2), 1999. pp. 157-81.

17. See J. Davis and Ch. Bishop, 'The MAl: multilateralism from above',m 'The Threat of Globalism', Race & Class, special Issue, 40(2&3),1999, pp. 159-70, 168.

18. S. Gill and D. Law, 'Global Hegemony and the Structural Power ofCapital', International Studies Quarterly, 33, 1989, pp. 475-99.

19. J. Ruggie, 'International Regimes. Transactions and Change ­Embedded Liberalism in the Post War Order'. huemauonal Orgamsa­ttan, 36, pp. 379-414.

20. K. Watkms. Fixing tile Rules. North-South Issues 11l InternationalTrade and the GATT Uruguay Round (London: Catholic Institute forInternational Relations, 1992).

21. GATT, Uruguay, Final Protocol, quoted in L. Walker, 'Gatt: TheUruguay Round and the Developing Countries', PhD thesis, Unrver­sity of Sheffield (19961 eh. 7, section 4.

22. K. Watkins. Fixing the Rules, (Note 20 above), p. 95.23. UNCTAD. Strengthening National and International Action and Mul­

tilateral Cooperation for a Healthy, Secure and Equitable World Eco­nomy, Eighth session. Cartegena de Indias. 8 February 1992,UNCTADrrDIL339, 24, pp. 62-3; quoted passim In J. van Wijk andG. Junne, Intellectual Property Protection of Advanced Technology,Changes l!1 the Global Technology System: Implications and Options forDeveloping Countries. Report prepared for the United Nations Um­versny's Institute for New Technologies, INTECH, contract no. 91/026, Maastrtcht, The Netherlands, October 1992.

24. J. van Wijk and 9. Junne Intellectual Property Protecuou, (Note 23),p.61.

25. J. Davis and Ch. Bishop, 'The MAl', (Note.!?), p. 168.26. See M. Thekaekara. 'Global Free Trade, the View from the Ground',

New PoliticalEconomy, 1(1), 1996 pp. 115-18,116.27. H. Hyman. 'Pnvatizauon: The Facts', m C. Veljanovski, Pnvattsanon

and Competition: A Market Prospectus (London: Hobart Paperbacks,1989). See also J. Vickers and G. Yarrow, Privatization. an EconomicAnalysts (Cambridge, Mass .. MIT Press, 1988). Note, however, thatthe 1990s saw further swingeing pnvatizaticns (for example. the rail­ways) not mcluded m the total here.

28. B. Hugill, 'A Civil Service on Its Last Legs', Tile Observer, 29 May1994, p. 22.

29. D. Sandberg, 'The Pirate Pnvateers', New Internationalist, September1994; see also R. T. Naytor. Hot Money and the Politics of Debt(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1989).

30. World Bank, Global Development Finance, 1997 (Washmgton DC;World Bank, 1997), p. 121.

31. For examples of this, see A. Showstack-Sassoon (ed.), Women and theState (London: Hutchmson, 1987).

32. H: Shutt, The Trouble wuti Capitalism. An Enquiry into the Causes ofGlobat Econonuc Failure (London: Zed Books, 1998), esp. cb. 8.

33. Pierre Bourdieu, 'L'Archrtecte de l'euro passe aux aveux', Le MondeDiplomatique; September 1997. p. 19, cited in Z. Bauman. Globaliza­tion. The Human Consequences (Cambridge: Polity Press 1998), p. 99.

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290

34.

35.

36.37.38.

39.

40.41.42.43.44.

45.46.47.48.49.50.51.

52.

53.

54.

55.56.57.

58.

59.

60.

61.62.

Notes and References

TvI. Castells. The Rise of tile Network SOciety (Cambridge, Mass.: andOxford, UK. 1996), p. 469.P. Gowan, The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian Bid/or rYorldDommallce (London: Verso, 1999) p. 5.Ibid., p. 23.Ibid., p. 29.Ibid., p. 104. ThIS argument has also been made by others see RonaldMcKi~non and Kemclu Ohno, Dollar and Yen: Resolvl1;g EconomicConflict Between the Umted States and Japan (Cambridge. Mass.: MITPress, 1997).There IS no doubt about the strong US backing for the IMF course. Seethe nngmg endorsement of it In the Econonnc Report of the President~ashmgton DC. February 1999), pp. 245ff. See also Stephen Gill,The Geopolitics of the ASian CrISIS'. Monthly ReVIeW. 50(10), 1999.

For further discussion, see Chapter 10 of tfus book.Cited m Gowan, The Global Gamble. (Note 35 above), p. 3.UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, 1999. p. 107.See 'The Fortune 500', Fortune Magasme. May 1994 and May 1998.W. K. Tabb, 'The East ASIan Financial Crisis', Monthly Relllell', 50(2)1998. p. 25.UNCTAD, Trade l'f!ld Development Report, 1999, p. 57.D. Henwood. Wall (London and New York: Verso, 1998), p. 125.Gowan. The Global Gamble. (Note 35 above), pp. 35-6.Antonio Negri, quoted m Henwood, (Note 46 above), p. 231.Economic Report of the President. 1999. (Note 39 above), p. 302.Ibid .• p. 262.See. for example. W. A. Sahlman, 'The New Economy IS Strongerthan You Thmk', Harvard Busmess RevIew, November-December1999, p. 100.See P. Baran, The Political Economy ofGrowth. (New York: MonthlyReview Press. 1957), eh. 4.G. Sores. The Cnsts of Global Capitalism (London: Little Brown1999). • .

S. Huntmgton, 'The Lonely Superpower', Foreign Affairs. March/April 1999, pp. 35-49.WTO. Annual Report 1999 (Geneva: WTO, 1999), ch. VII.J. Davis and Ch. Bishop, 'The MAl'. (Note 17 above), p. 164.P. Patnaik, 'Whatever Happened to Imperialism'. Monthly Rel'lell'.November 1990. p. I.A. Gamble, 'Marxism after Cornmunrsm: Beyond Realism and His­toricism', Revtew ofInternational Studies, 25, special issue, December1999. pp. 127-44.S. Crispin and S. Lawrence. 'In Self-Defence', Far Eastern EconomicReview, I July 1999. pp. 22-6.J. Wolf. 'Going Ballistic', Far Eastern ECOIlOl1UC Review, 18 February1999, p. 26-7; and 'The New Star Wars'. Newsweek; 22 February 1999.http://www.channeI4.org.uk (December 19991-D. Shrrmer, 'Access: Post-Cold War Imperialist ExpansIOu',lvfonthlyReVlelt',45. 1993. pp. 38-51.

INotes and References I 291

63. http://www,fco.gov.uklnews/speechtext.html I64. N. Chomsky, The New Military Humanism: Lessonsfrom Kosovo (Com­

mon Courage Press, 1999); http://www.commoncouragepress.com.

Part ill Introduction

1. For example. F. Jameson. 'Actually Exrstmg Marxism', Polygraph: all

International Journal of Culture and Politics, 617,1993, pp. 171-95. InhIS earlier, best-known, work. Jameson focused on postmodem cul­ture as the logic of late capitalism. Today, Jameson appears to equatea subsequent development in late capitalism, 'late, late' capitalismwith postmodern capitalism. E Jameson. Postmoderntsm, or, tileCultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Durham UniversityPress, 1990).

2. 'Institutional endorsement' is particularly noticeable In the US wherecourses in 'postcolorual studies' and 'postcoloniai' literature abound.See E. Shohat. 'Notes on the "Post-Colomal"'. Social Text. 31!32.1993, pp. 99-113, 99. In the UK too the term 'postcolornal' is begin­nmg to work its way onto curricula of university courses.

3. For an excellent argument, see N. Fraser, 'From Redistribution toRecognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a "Post-socialist Age" ', NewLeft Remll'. 212, 1995, pp. 68-93. I

4. A. Partes and D. Kincaid, 'SOCIOlogy and Development m the 1990s:Cnttcat Challenges and Ernpmcal Trends', SOCIOlogical Forum, 4(1989) pp. 479-503; quoted In M. J. Watts, 'Development I: Power.Knowledge. Discursive Practice', Progress 111 Human Geography, 17(2), 1993. pp. 257-72. 262.

5. C. Wnght Mills. The Sociological Imagination (Oxford & New York:Oxford University Press, 1959). pp. 165-7.

6. E. Meiksms Wood, 'What IS the "Postmodem" Agenda? An Intro­ductIon', Monthly ReVIeW. July/August 1995. special Issue <In Defenseof History'. pp. 1-12.

7. A. Dirlik. 'The Postcolonial Aura: Thud World Criticism in the Ageof Global Capitalism'. Cntical Inqutry, 20 (2), 1994. pp. 328-56.

8. E. Shahat, (Note 2 above), p. 101. .9. Ibid., p. 103.

10. A. Dirlik, (Note 7 above), p. 329. I

11. A. Dirlik, (Note 7 above). pp. 330-1. Dirlik notes. however; theseexceptions: A. Appadurai, <Global Ethnoscapes: Notes and Queriesfor a Transnatronal Anthropology', III R. G. Fox (ed.), RecapturingAnthropology: Working ill tile Present (Santa Fe, N. Mexico: 1991);and A. Ahmad who, like Dirlik himself, relates postcolomaliry tocontemporary capitalism, see A. Ahmad, III Theory: Classes, Nations.Literatures (London: Verso, 1992).

12. E. Shohat, (Note 2 above), p. 110. Also. A. McClintock. 'The Angel ofProgress: Pitfalls of the Term "Post-Colonialism" ', Social Text'131132.1993, pp. 84-97. I

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292 Notes and References Notes and References 293

13. B. Ashcroft, G. Griffiths and H. Tiffin, The Empire Wraes Bactc:Theory and Practice III Post-cotonial LIteratures (London: Routledge.1989).

14. P. Williams and L. Chrisman (eds), Colonial Discourse and POSlcoJO­

nial Theory (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993).15. Throngo'o Ngugt wa, Decolonssmg tile Mind: The Politics ofLanguage

III African Lueraturc (London: lames Currey/Heinemann, 1986).16. J. Nedervecn Pieterse and Bhikhu Parekh, 'Shifting Imagmanes:

Decolomzauon. Internal Decolomzatton. Postcoloruality', in J.Nederveen Pieterse and Bhikhu Parekh (eds}, Decolonization of Ima­gmatlOn, Culture, Knowledge and Power (London: Zed Books, 1995).

17. Quoted in F Mulhern. 'The Politics of Cultural Studies', MonthlyReview, July/August 1995, pp. 31-40,32.

18. H. Bhabha has been especially important In the diSCUSSIon of hybrid­ity, sce 'The Commitment to Theory', New Fonnanons, 5. 1988, pp.5-25.

19. G. Prakash. 'Postcolonral Cnticisrn and Indian Historiography'.Social Text. 31/32, 1992, p. 8.

20. H. Bhabha, passim, III R. J. C. Young, Cotonuu Desire: Hybridity 1Il

Theory, Culture and Race (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 175.21. H. Bhabha. 'Corrumtment to Theory'. (see Note 18 above), p. 21.22. A. Escobar, Encountering Development, the Making and Unmakmg of

tile Tturd World (Pnnceton, N]: Pnnceton Umverstty Press, 1995),p.219.

8 Africa: Exclusion and the Containment of Anarchy

L M. Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Cambridge, Mass. andOxford, UK; Basil Blackwell, 1996), p. 106.

2. Centre d'Etudes ProspectIves et d'Informatrons Intemationales(CEPI!), L "ecollolllle mondiale 1990-2000: l'imperatif de la crOISSGnCe

(Pans: Econormca. 1992), cited in M. Castells, The Rise oftile NetworkSOCiety (Note I above], p. 134.

3. See UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report. 1998 (New York andGeneva: UN; 1998) p. 127.

4. World Bank, Global Development Finance. 1997 (Washington. DC. World Bank, 1997), p. 202.

5. .Kof Annan. 'The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable. Peace and Sustainable Development In Africa' (www.un.org/ecosoc­dev/genmfo/afrec), cited m S. Lone, 'Confronting Conflict tu Africa',Africa Recovery, August 1998, p. 20.

6. J. Ihonvbere. ECOII0J111C Crisis, CivilSOCIety, and Democrauzauon: TheCase of Zambw, (Trenton, NJ: African World Press, 1996), p. 25.

7. Tills calculation IS based on the statistical tables III Annexes of the1970 and 1982 Issues of GECD, Development Cooperation, Review ofthe DEeD Development Assistance Comnuttee (Paris: OECD, 1970and 1982).

8. R.T. Naylor, Hot Money and the Politics of Debt (Toronto: McClel­land & Stewart, 1987).

9. Bank for International Settlements. 59th Annual Report 1989 (Basle:BIS, 1989), pp. 135-6.

10. M. CastelIs, End of Millenmum (Cambridge, Mass. and Oxford, UK:Basil BlackwelI, 1998), p. 135.

11. R. T. Naylor, Hot Money (Note 8 above), p. 59.12. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report. 1989 (New York: United

Nations. 1989), p. 38, table 19.13. The Guardian, 9 January 1987.14. For a thorough discussion on the process and effects of these HvrF­

and World Bank-imposed reforms, see M. Chossudovsky, The Globa­lisatton ofPoverty, Impacts ofLNIF and World Bank ReformsCLondonand New Jersey: Zed Books, 1998).

15. A. Leftwrch, 'Governance, Democracy and Development ill the ThudWorld'. Third World Quarterly, 14(3), 1993, p. 607. .

16. Ihid., p. 608.17. Besides a mountain of country case studies, cntical 'genenc' reviews

of structural adjustment programmes have appeared m special issuesof the Journal ReVIew of African Political Economy (ROAPEj, 47,1990 and 62, 1994. More recently, ROAPE has published goodoverviews by: P. Carmody; 'Constructmg Alternatives to StructuralAdjustment ill Africa', ROAPE, 75, 1998, pp. 25-46; Stefano Ponte,"The World Bank and "Adjustment ill Africa" " ROAPE. 66, 1995;and S. Bromley, 'Making Sense of Structural Adjustment', ROAPE,65, 1995, pp. 339-48. For more general cntiques that are not restrictedto Africa, see E. Hellemer, States and tile Re-emergence of GlobalFinance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Urn­versuy Press, 1994); S. George and F Sabelli, Faun & Credit, theWorld Bank's Secular Empire (Boulder, CoL Wcstvicw Press, 1994);D. Ghai (ed.), The IMF and the South (London: Zed Books, 1991).

18. African NOO Declaration to UNCTAD IX, prepared by the parallelNGO Conference to UNCTAD IX, held 2+-28 April 1996, Midrand,South Africa; circulated by email - contact [email protected]

19. D, Ghai and C. Hewitt de Alcantara. 'The Crisis of the 1980s 10 Africa,Latin America and the Caribbean: An Overview', m D. Ohm (ed.), TheIlvIF and the South (London: Zed Books, on behalf of United NationsResearch Institute for Social Development, 199[), pp. 1+-[7.

20. D. Ghat and C. Hewttt de Alcantara 'The Crisis of the 1980s' (Note 19above), p. 16.

21. Reported III The Economist, 5 March 1994.22. World Bank, Adjustment III Africa: Reform. Results, and tile Road

Ahead. a World Bank: Palicy Research Report (New York: OxfordUmversrty Press, 1994).

23. UNCTAD. Trade and Development Report, 1998, p. 125.24. UNCTAD, ibid., p. 125.25. Inrernanonal Monetary Fund, World Econonnc Outlook: (Washington

DC. IMF, October, 1999), statisncal appendix.26. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, (Note 23 above), p. 127.

Page 157: Globalization Postcolonial World

294 Notes and References

27. K. Watkms. 'Debt Relief for Africa'. Review of African PoliticalEconomy, 62, 1994, pp. 117-27, 126. For further reading on theevolution of poverty, social conditions and Income inequality understructural adjustment, see also G. Corma, S. JoJIy and F. Stewart(eds), Adjustment WIth a Human Face: Protecting the Vulnerable andPromoting Growth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); and P. Gibbon,'The World Bank and African Poverty 1973-91', Journal of ModemAfrican Studies. 30(2) 1992, pp. 193-220. See also M. Chossudovsky,The Globaltsanon of Poverty, Impacts of IMF and World BankReforms, (Londou and New Jersey: Zed Books. 1998).

28. D. Avramovtc, 'Depression of Export Commodity Prices', ThirdWorld Quarterly, July 1986.

29. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, (Note 23 above), p. 119.30. M. Castells, End ofMillennium, (Note 10above), p. Il7.31. B. Martin, 'Gains without Frontiers", New Statesman and Society, 9

December 1994, pp. 22-3. The senior manager whom Martin quotes IS

Davison Budhoo. See also B. Martm, In the Public Interest? Pnvatisa­ItOIl and Public Sector Reform (London: Zed Books, 1994).

32. B. Martin. 'Gain without Frontiers', (Note 31 above), p. 23.33. See B. Riley, 'Funds Pour Into New Growth Regions', The Economist,

7 February 1994.34. World Bank, Global Development Finance (Washington DC: World

Bank, 1997), pp. 120-1.35. See M. Mandant, 'Uganda: Contradictions .in the IMF Programme

and Perspective'. ill D. Ghat (ed.), The IMF and the South: TheSocial Impact of CriSIS and Adjustment (London: Zed Books, 1996);P. Lewts and H. Stem, 'Shiftiug Fortunes: The Political Economy ofFinancial Liberalization in Nigeria', World Development, 25(1),1997,pp. 5-22.

36. P, Carmody, 'Construcung Alternatives to Structural Adjustment IIIAfrica', (Note 17 above), p. 29.

37. A. Leftwtch, <Governance, Democracy and Development In the ThirdWorld'. Third World Quarterly, 14(3), 1993, pp. 605-24, 610. Forfurther reading on the pressures towards democratrzation III Africa,see ot~er cont~ibutions to .the same issue of Third Ti/orld Quarterly,mcluding the literature review by E. Remierse, pp. 647-64.

38. C. L. Baylies, <Political Ccndinonaliry and Democratisation', ReviewofAfrican Political Economy, 65, 1995, pp. 321-37.

39. A. Leftwich, 'Governance, Democracy and Development', (Note 37above), p. 606.

40. For an excellent review of the literature on the links between politicaland economic reform in Africa, see CiL. Baylies, 'Political Condition­alityand Democratisation', (Note 38 above).

41. B. Gills, J. Rocamora and R. WiIson (eds), Low Intensity Democracy,Political Power in the New World Order (London: Pluto Press, 1993).

42. A. Sawyer, 'The Politics of Adjustment Policies', ECLA DocumentECAllCHD/88/29, quoted m Ghai and Hewitt de Alcantara. 'TheCnsts of the 1980s' (Note 19 above), p. 27. See also J.-J. Barya, 'The

Notes and References 295

New Political Conditionalities of Aid: An Independent View fromAfrica'. lDS Bullettn, 24(1), 1993, pp. 16-23. .' I

43. For example, R. Sandbrook, The Politics of Africa 's EcononucRecovery (Cambridge University Press, 1993); C.L. Baylies, I'Polit­teal Conditionality and Democrausation' (Note 38 above), p. 333passim. I

44. J. Walton and D. Seddon, Free Markets and Food Riots: The Politicsof Global Adjustment (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994). See also M.Chossudovsky, who holds the World Bank team in Rwauda directlyresponsible for the political and SOCIal repercussions of shock therapythat brought the country to Civil war, m 'IMFlWorld Bank Policiesand the Rwandau Holocaust', Third World Resurgence, 52, 1994. Hemakes a .similar argument ID the case of Somalia.. !

45. W. Reno, 'Markets, War, and the Reconfiguration of PoliticalAuthority in Sierra Leone', Canadian Journal of African ~tudies,

29(2), 1995. See also W. Reno Corruption and State Politics in SierraLeone (Cambridge University Press, 1995).

46. Ibid., p. 217. .47. S.P. Huntmgton, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven,

Coun. and London: Yale University Press, 1968). I

48. J.c. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs. NJ:Prenttce-Hall, 1972) p. 35. i

49. R. Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity. Crime, Overpopu­lauon and Disease are Rapidly Destroying the SOCIal Fabnc 'of OurPlanet', Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, pp. 44--76, 46. i

50. Ibid., p. 72, Kaplan approvingly quotes Martin van Creveld, whosuggests in the Transformation of War that by compelling the sensesto focus on the here and now, people at the edge of existencecan findliberation in violence.

51. Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy', (Note 49 above), p. 46.52. W. Reno, 'Corruption and State Politics m Sierra Leone', (Note 45

above). describes the involvement of the Nimba Mining Company(NJMCO).

53. 1. Smillie, L. Gberie and R. Hazelton, The Heart ofthe Matter: SierraLeone, Diamonds and Human Security (Toronto: Partnership' AfricaCanada: 1999), available at www.web.netJpac

54. See C. CoIlins, 'Reconstructing the Congo" Review ofAfrican PoliticalEconomy, 74. 1997, p. 591-600; Quentm Outram, 'It's Termmal EitherWay: Au Analysis of Armed Couflict III Libena, 1989-1996'. ReviewofAfrican Political Economy. 73, 1997; pp. 355-71. On Angola, see lanHunt, 'Rough Diamonds', The Guardian, 14 September 1999. Also, mAfrica Report 1998 (Note 5 above) Kofi Anuan observed (while notnaming names) that foreign interests contmue to play a large role ID

sustaining some conflicts in the competition for oil and other Africanresources.

55. 'A Crude Awakening: The Role of the Oil and Banking Industnes in'Angola's Civil War and the Plunder of State Assets', Global Witness,December 1999. .

56. See Notes 53 and 55 above.

Page 158: Globalization Postcolonial World

296 Notes and References

57. E. Braathen, M. Boas and G. Saether, Ethnicity Kills? The Politics ofWar, Peace andEthmczty ill Snb-Sanaran Africa (London: Macmillan;2000).

58. M. Duffield, The Symphony of the Damned: Racial Discourse. Com­plex Political Emergencies and Humannanan Aid. Occasional paper,School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham, 2 March 1996.

59. See M. Barrett, Tile Politics of Truth (Oxford: Polity Press, 1991),p. 130 passim.

60. Examples of tbts 'discourse analysis' approach to the new aid agendaare A. Leftwich, 'Goverance, the State and the Politics of Develop­ment', Development and Change, 25, 1994, pp. 363-86: M. Robinson,'Aid, Democracy and Political Conditronality ill Sub-Saharan Africa',ID G. Sorensen (ed.), Political Conditicnaiity (London: Frank Cass.1993), pp. 85-99: and 'Strengthening Civil SOCIety ill Africa: The Roleof Foreign Political Aid', IDS Bulletin. 26(2), 1995, pp. 70-80.

61. OD!, NGOs and Official Donors. Briefing Paper 1-4, August 1995,(London: Overseas Development Institute), quoted m M. Duffield,(Note 58 above). p. 8. For a comprehensive review and detailedadvocacy of the NGO approach to 'development' see M. Edwardsand D. Hulme (eds), Makmg a Difference. NGOs and Development Ell aChanging World (London: Earthscan, 1992). See also J. Clerk, Demo­cratizmg Development: The Role of Voluntary Organtsattous (London:Earthscan, 1991). Clark notes some 4000 development NGOs workingm OECD member countnes, dispersing almost US$3 billion-worth ofassistance every year. and that they work with between 10000 and20000 southern NGOs. For a entreat assessment on the role ofNGOsIn development. see A. Fowler. 'Distant Obligations: Speculations onNGO Funding and the Global Market', ReView of African PoliticalEconomy. 55, 1992, pp. 9-29.

62. M. Duffield, The Symphony of tile Dawned (Note 58 above). Much oftills section of Chapter 8 is based on Duffield's thesis as developed 1U

this work. Note. however, that Duffield has also elaborated his thesisin connection with other zones of insecurity on the edge of theglobal economy, notably the Balkans. In an outstanding report forUNICEF m 1994, DulIield first developed his theory of 'complexpolitical emergencies', WIth reference to both Angola and Bosrua.See M. Duffield. 'Complex Political Emergencies', An ExploratoryReport for UNICEF' (School ofPnblic Policy, University of Birnung­ham, 1994).

63. R. Richards. Tire New Racism (London: Junction Books, 1992).64. R. Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crone, Overpopu­

lation and DISease are Rapidly Destroying the Socral Fabnc of OurPlanet', Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, pp. 44-76. This articleFormed the baSIS of the BBC's dramatic documentary Puln FuturesIn 1995. ' 'r: •

65. ¥. Duffield, The Symphony ofthe Damned, (Note 58 above), p. 10. See1'. Richards, 'Fighting for the Ram Forest: Youth, Insurgency andEnvironment ill Sierra Leone', Mimeo (London: Universrty College.feparlment ofAnthropology, 1995); For a critique ofRichard's thesis,

I

Notes and References 297

see Yusnf Bangura. 'Understanding the Political and CulturalDynamics of the Sierra Leone War: A Critique of Paul Richard's"Fighting for the Ram Forest" '. Africa Development. Afrique &Devel­oppement.wxu (3 &4),1997. pp. 117-47.

66. M. Duffield, The Symphony of the Damned. (Note 58 above). p. 12.For a discussion of 'complex emergency' theory, see J. Edkins, 'Leg­ality with a Vengeance: Fammes and Humanitarian Relief m"Complex Emergencies?", m S. Owen Vanderslurs and P. Teras,Poverty m World Politics (London: Macmillan ID association withMillennium: Journal ofInternational Studies, 2000), pp. 59-90.

67. M. Duffield (Note 58 above), pp. 42-3.68. Ed Vulliamy, 'How Drugs Giants Let Millions Die', The Observer, 19

December 1999.69. The Guardian, I May, 2000.70. Comment III an interview on the BBC TV documentary programme,

'Horizon: The Battle for Aids'. 4 December 1995.

9 Islamic Revolt

1. Tile Econonust, Editorial, 'Living with Islam', 18 March 1995.2. S. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', Foreign Affairs, Sunamer

1993, pp. 22-49.3. F. Fukuyama, The EIId ofHistory and tile Last Man (London: Hamish

Hamilton, 1992).·4. S. Hunttngton. The Clash of Civilizations', (Note 2 above),p. 26.5. See the diSCUSSIOn of this m Chapter 6 of this volume.6. S. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations', (Note 2 above), p. 24.7. G. H. Jansen, Militant Is/am (London: Pengmn, 1978) p. I, quoting K.

Ahmad, 'Islam, Its Meaning and Message'.8. See W. M. Patton, 'Shi'ahs'. m J. Hastings (ed.), Encyclopaedia of

Religion and Ethics (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908), pp. 453-8.9. E. Gellner, Postmodemism. Reason and Religion (London: Routledge,

1992).10. E. Gellner, ibid., p. 7.11. G. H. Jansen. Militant Islam, (Note 7 above), p. 29.12. S. Bromley, 'The Prospects for Democracy m the Middle East', III

D. Held (ed.), Prospects for Democracy (Oxford: Polity Press, 1993),pp. 380-412, 383. See also S. Bromley, Rethinking Middle East Poli­ttcs, State Formation and Development (Oxford: Polity Press, 1994).

13. E. Gellner, Postmoderntsm. Reason and Religion. (Note 9 above), p. 9.14. E. Gellner, ibid., p. 10.15. E. W. Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978).16. M. Rodinson. 'The Western Image and Western Studies of Islam', m

J. Schacht with C. E. Bosworth (eds), The Legacy of Islam (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 9-62, 11.

17. M. Rodinson, ibid.. p. 37.18. M. Rodinson, ibid., pp. 49-50.

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10 The Develnpmental States of East Asia

298 Notes and References

L World Bank. The East Asian Miracle (New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1993), p. xv.

2, B. Balassa, 'Trade Policies m Developing Countries', Amencan Eco­nomIC ReView, 61, May 1971; Policy Reform m Developing Countries(New York: Pergamon Press, 1977); and The Newly IndustrializingCountries 11l the World Economy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981),

3, C. Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford, CaIiL Stan­ford University Press. 1982). See aiso 'Polincal Institutions and Eco~

nomic Performance: The Government-Busmess Relationship III

Japan. South Korea and Taiwan', ID F C. Deyo (ed.), The PoliticalEconomy of the New ASIan Industrialism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UnI­versity Press, 1987), pp. 136-64.

4. E. K. Y. Chen, Hyper-growth 11l ASIan Economies: A ComparativeStudy of Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Tmwan (NewYork: Holmes & Meier, 1979).

19.20.21.22.23.24.25.26.27.28.

M' 29.30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.36.37.38.39.

40.

E. Said, Ortentalism (London: Penguin Books, 1985), p. 259.M. Rodinson 'The Western Image'. (Note 16 above), p. 48.M. Rutven, Is/am 11l the World (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 292.E. Said, Onentalism. (Note 19 above), p. 240. quotmg T. E. Lawrence.See Chapter 2 of thrs book on the roots of neocolornalisrn.G. H. Jansen, Militant Islam, (Note 7 above), p. 14.G. H. Jansen, ibid., p. 62.E. Said. Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Press, 1994),E. Said, Orientalism. (Note 19 above), p. 3.G. H. Jansen, Militant Islam, (Note 7 above), p. 68.G. H. Jansen. ibid., p. 75.O. Ray, The Failure of Political Islam (London: 1. B. Tauris, 1995),p.3.O. Ray, ibid., p, 83. For similar classifications, see also G. H. Jansen,Militant Islam, (Note 7 above), p. 134.P. Aarts, quoting N. Chomsky, in 'Democracy, Oil and the Gulf War',Third World Quarterly, 13(3), 1992, p, 527.S. Brcmley, American Hegemony and World Oil: The Industry, the StateSystem and the World Economy (Oxford: Polity Press. 1991), p. 250.S. Bromley, 'The Prospects for Democracy in the Middle East', mD. Held (ed.), Prospects Jar Democracy (Oxford: Polity Press, 1993),pp. 380-406.O. Ray, The Failure of Political Islam, (Note 30 above), p. 4.Ibid., p. 93.Ibid., pp. 98-9.Ibid., p. 196. ,Khosrokhavar. m M. Castells. The Power of Identity (Malden. Mass..USA and Oxford. UK: Basil Blackwell. 1997), p. 20 passim,Castells. ibid., p. 20.

Notes and References ! 299

5, A. Amsden, 'The State and Taiwan's Economic Developrnebr. mP. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (eds}, Bnngtng th~ StateBack III (New York: Cambridge Umversuy Press, 1985), pp. 78-106.See also A. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Indus-trtaliztation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). !

6. F. Frobel, J. Hemnchs and O. Kreye. The New International DlVlSrOIl

of Labour: Structural Unemployment ill Industrialized Countries andIndustnalization lfl Developing Countries (Cambridge UmversiryPress.1980).

7. See M. Castells, 'Four Asian Tigers with a Dragon Head: A Compara­uve Analysts of theState, Economy, and Society m the Asian PacificRim', in R. P. Appelbaum and J. Henderson, States and Development111 the ASlall Pacific Rim (California: Sage. 1992), pp. 33-70.

8. One of the first such attempts was D. Senghaas. The EUrOpeQlI Expert­ence: A Histoncai Cnnque of Development Theory (Leamington Spa:Berg, 1985). The nec-Lisnan pOSItIOn IS fully developed by G. Whiteand R. 'Wade in their introduction to G. White (ed.), DevelopmentalStates 111 East Asia (London: Macmillan. 1988).

9. See R. Wade, 'State Intervention in "Outward-looking" Development:Neoclassical Theory and Taiwanese Practice', m G. White (ed.),Developmental States, (Note 8 above), pp. 30-67.

10. P. L. Berger, The Capitalist Revolution. Fifty Propositions about-Pros­penty, Equality and Liberty (Aldershot: Wildwood House. 1987).

1L See for example. L. Pye, 'The New ASIan Capitalism: A PoliticalPortrait', in P. L Berger and Hsin-Huang M. Hsiao (eds), In Searchof an East Asian Development Model (New Brunswick: Transaction.1988), pp. 86-7.

12. P. L. Berger, 'An East ASian Development Model?' eh. L ID P. L.Berger and HSID,Huang M. HSIao (eds), III Search of all East AsianDevelopment Model (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1988; secondpnntmg, 1990), p. 7.

13. See R. MacFarquhar. <The Post-Confucian Challenge', The Econo­mist, 8 February 1980; M. Monsfurna. fVhy has Japan Succeeded?fVestern Technology and the Japanese Ethos (Cambridge UniversityPress, 1982); G. Rozman (ed.), The East ASIa Region: ConfucianHeritage and us Modern Adaptation (Pnnceton. NJ: Pnnceton Uni­versity Press, 1991); Wong Siu-Iun, 'Moderrnzauon and Chinese Cul­ture In Hong Kong', The Cluna Quarterly, 106, 1986, pp. 306-25; andJ. P. L. Jiang (ed.), Confuaomsm and Modernization: A SympOSIUm(Tarper: 1987).

14. See W. Bello and S. Rosenfe1d. Dragons ill Distress: Asia's MiracleECOTIOIIIles 11l Crtsts (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990): ill Taiwan.more than 2900 labour disputes were registered in 1987 and 1988atone, and over 4540 disputes went into arbitration in the districtcourts (pp. 227. 223); emigration from Singapore, negligible III the1960s, rose to 2000 families a year In the mid,1980s, and to 4700 by1989 (p. 333); and In South Korea. between 1987 and 1989 more than7100 labour disputes erupted, while the number of umons more thandoubled, from 2725 to 7358 (p. 41).

Page 160: Globalization Postcolonial World

300 Notes and References Notes and References 301

15. See New Internationalist, January 1995; and W. Bello and S. Rosen­feld, Dragons in Distress: ASIa'sMiracle Economies m C1'lSlS (Note 14above).

16. This section on the geopolitical factors affectmg East ASIan develop­ment draws on an mterestmg essay by an MA student on the Urn­versity of Sheffield's graduate programme III international studies,Anne Holgate Lowe. 'Geopolitical and Historical Factors ill theEast ASian Development Model'. University of Sheffield,Departmentof Politics, 1995.

17. CIA figures CIted by B. Curnnungs. 'The Origins and Development ofthe North East Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors, ProductCycles and Political Consequences', m F. Deyo (ed.), The PoliticalEconomy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca, NY: Camel! VOl-

. vcrsrty Press, 1987), pp. 44--83.18. S. Haggard and Tun-jen Cheng, Newly Industrializing ASia m Transt­

, lion. Policy Reform and Amencan Response (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute. of International Studies, University of Califorma Press, 1987).

19. M. Castells, 'Four ASian Tigers wun a Dragon Head', (Note 7 above),p.53.

20. , S. Krasner. 'Trade Conflicts and the Common Defense: The UnitedStates and Japan', ill S. Haggard and Chung-m Moon (eds), PacificDynamics: The International Politics of Industrial Change (Boulder.Col.. Westview Press, 1989), pp. 251-74, 252.

21. S. Haggard, 'Introduction', m S. Haggard and Chung-in Moon (eds),Pacific Dynamics, (Note 20 above), pp. 1-21, 8.

22. S. Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni­verstty Press, 1990).

23. : P. Berger. The Capitalist Revotuuon (Aldershot: Wildwood House,, 1987), p. 142.

24. W. Bello and S. Rosenfeld, Dragons III Distress, (Note 14 above), p. 337.25. W. Bello and S. Rosenfeld, ibid.26. New Internationalist, 'Unmasking the Miracle', January 1995.

pp. 18-19.27. See World Bank, The East ASIan Miracle, (Note 1 above), figure 1.3.

p. 31, and table 1.1, p. 33. For ItS data, the World Bank relies onsubmissions by governments. Authontanan governments are hardlylikely to admit to shortconungs III SOCial distribution and equity.Meanwhile, local cnucs are often censured and cowed, making Itdifficult to achieve a correct assessment of tbe situation.

28. W. Bello and S. Rosenfeld, Dragons 111 Distress, (Note 14 above),I pp. 37, 38. Here they CIte Choi Jang-Jip, 'Interest Control and Political

Control m South Korea: A Study of the Labor Unions III Manufac­tunng Industries 1961-1980', PhD Dissertation. Department ofPoli­tical Science, University of Chicago, August 1983, pp. 270-1; andSong Byung-Nak, 'The Korean Economy' (unpublished manuscnpt,Seoul, 1989), p. 27.

29. Kim Dae lung, Mass-participatory ECOIIOI1IY (Lanham. Md.: UmversuyPress of America, 1985), p. 37, quoted m M. Hart-Landsberg, 'SouthKorea. The Fraudulent Miracle, Monthly ReVIew, December 1987.

30.

31.

32,

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.38.

39.40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

E. Paul. 'Prospects for Liberalization in Singapore', Journal of Con­temporary Asia, 23(3) 1993, pp. 291-305, 294.N. Harns, 'States. Economic Development, and the Asian Pacific Rim',in R. P. Appelbaum and J. Henderson (eds},States and Development III

tile Asian Pacific Rim (California and London: Sage, 1992), p. 78.UNCTAD. World Investment Report, 1994 (New York: UnitedNations, 1994), p. 76.J. Yam.Cited In P. Gowan. The Global Gamble. Washington's FaustianBidfor World Dominance(London: Verso, 1999), p. 52.Ngai-Ling Sum, 'The NICs and Competmg Strategies of East ASIanRegionalism', III A. Gamble and A. Payne. Regionalism and WorldOrder (London: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 207-46.P. Bowles and B. Macl.ean. 'Understanding Trade Bloc Formation:The Case of the ASEAN Free Trade Area', ReVIew of InternationalPolitical Economy, 3 (2), pp. 319-48. See also R. Higgott and R.Stubbs, 'Competing Conceptrons of Econonuc Regionalism: APECversus EAEC U1 the ASIa Pacific', ReVIew of Internanonal PoliticalEconomy, 2 (3), 1995, pp. 516-35,523.Bowles and MacLean, 'Understanding Trade Bloc Formation', (Note35 above), p. 343.Ibid., Note 35.P. Bowles and B. Macl.ean, ibid. (Note 35 above), p. 333, quotmgJ. Reidel. 'Intra-Asian Trade and Foreign Direct Investment'. AsianDevelopment ReVieW, 8 (1), 1991, pp. 111-46.OECD, ECOIIOI11I, Survey, Japan, (pans: OECD, 1995), p. 154.W. K. Tabb, (Japanese Capitalism and the ASIan Geese', MonthlyReV/eJV, 45 (10), March 1994, pp. 29-40, 32. See also M. Bemardand J. Ravenhill, 'Beyond Product Cycles and Flying Geese: Regie­nalisation, Hierarchy, and the Industrialisation of East ASIa'. WorldPolitics, 47 (2), 1995: and W. Hatch and K. Yamamura, ASia 111

Japan's Embrace: Building a Regional Production Alliance (CambridgeUniversity Press, 1996).K. Fukasaku, Economic Regionaliztuton and Intra-industry Trade:Pacific Asian Perspectives, OEeD Technical Papers, No. 53 (paris:OECD Development Centre, 1992); quoted m P. Bowles andB. MacLean, 'Understanding Trade Bloc Formation', (Note 35above), p. 336.P. Bowles and B. Macl.ean, 'Understanding Trade Bloc Formation'(Note 35 above), pp. 336-7, quoting L. Lim. 'ASEAN: A New Modeof Economic Cooperation', Paper presented to the conference 'ThePolitical Economy of Foreign Policy in Southeast ASIa in the NewWorld Order', University of Windsor, Canada, September 1992.P. Bowles and B. Mncf.ean. 'Understanding Trade Bloc Formation'(Note 35 above), p. 341.For authontative papers on these two opposmg camps, see the specialIssue of Cambridge Journal ofEcononncs. 2. 1998.For a blow-by-blow debunkmg of these various Western explanationsof the 'Asian' cnS1S, see Ha-Joon Chang, 'The Hazard of Mora!

Page 161: Globalization Postcolonial World

302 Notes and References

~.: 51.;:j!';-,.",'

52.

53.

54.55.56.

Hazard, Untangling the ASian CrISIs', World Development, 28(4),April 2000, pp. 775-88.

46. US Government, Economic Report a/the President, transmitted to theCongress, February 1999. p. 279.

47. Cited by W. Bello, 'The Asian Economic Implosion: Causes,Dynamics, Prospects', in Race & Class, 40(213), March 1999, specialISsueon 'The Threat of Globalism', p. 138.

48. Between 1994 and 1996 net external financmg into Asia-5 (Indonesia,Malaysia, the Philippines. the Republic of Korea and Thailandincreased from US$47.5 billion to US$92.8 billion. See Institute ofInternational Finance, Capital flows to emerging market eC01l0mIes

(Washington, DC: 29 January 1998, p. 2) cited m UNCTAD, Tradeand Development Report, (New York and Geneva: United Nations,1998), p. 66.

49. For a discussion on how short-term flows and particular risk arbitragedominated such flows, see J. Kregel. 'Derivatives and Global CapitalFlows: Applications to ASIa', Cambridge Journal of Economics; (22),1998, pp. 677-92.

50. Within one year of the crisis, a net inflow of US$97.1 billion mtoAsia's emerging markets In 1996 had become a net outflow of almostUS$12 billion. See UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report. (Note48 above), p. 69.Robert Wade, 'From Miracle to Cronyism: Explaining the GreatASIan Slump" Cambridge Journal of Economics (22), 1998. pp. 693­706,693.For an easy-to-read explanation about the role of hedge funds m theEast Asia crisis, see Paul Krugman. The Return ofDepression Econom­ICS, (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1999), pp. 133 ff.On the implication of custom-based denvatives In the East ASia Crisis,see J. Kregel, 'Denvanves and Global Capital Flows'. (Note 49above).UNCTAD. Trade and Development Report, (Note 48 above), p. 103.P. Gowan, The Global Gamble. (Note 33 above), p. 104.R. McKinnon and K. Ohno, Dollar and Yen: Resolving the EconomicConflict between the United States and Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: MITPress. 1997), cited In R. Mclcinnon. 'Wading In the Yen Trap', TheEconomist, 24 July, 1999, pp. 83-6. See also R. Taggart Murphy, TheWelgllt of the Yen: How Dental Imperils America's Future and Rllmsand Ailiiance (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996).

57. There IS no space In this chapter to discuss the decline and longrecession of Japan m the 19905. But for a quick resume see PaulKrugman's chapter on Japan's crisis in The Return of DepressionEconomics, (Note 52 above), And Chalmers Johnson, 'Economic Cri­SIS In East ASia: The Clash of Capitalisms', in Cambridge Journal ofEconomics, 22, 1998, p. 653-61.

58. P. Gowan, The Global Gamble, (Note 33 above), pp. 97-9.59. W. Bello, 'The ASian Econonuc ImplOSIOn'. (Note 47 above), p. 136.60. IMF, World Economic 011tiook(Washmgton DC: IMF, October 1999),

p. 64, box 2.6. Note that the IMF has estimated these output losses on

Notes and References I 303

. - - Ithe baSIS ofa non-cnsis output scenano of4 per cent per year from 1997onwards. This non-cnsrs scenano assumed a slowdown in the growthrate of about 4 per cent. I

61. See World Bank. fVorld Bank Poverty Update: Trends m Poverty,(Washington DC: World Bank, 1999), available on the Internet athttp://wb.forumone.com/poverty/dataltrends See also T. ManuelyanAtine and M. Walton. Sacral Consequences ofthe East Asian Fi11allcralCrisis, (Washmgton DC World Bank, 1998) available at http://www.worldbank.org/poverty

62. SeeW. Bello, 'The ASIanEconorruc lmplosion', (Note 47 above), p. 139.63. P. Gowan, The Global Gamble. (Note 33 above), p. 128.64. For discussions on the failed AMF initiatives. and the US role m this,

see R. Higgott, The ASIan Economic CnSIs: A Study m the Politics ofResentment', New Political Economy 3(3), 1998, pp. 333-57; S. Gill,'The Geo-politics of the Asian Crisis', Monthly Review. March 1999.pp. 1-9; and \V. K. Tabb. 'The East ASIan Financial CriSIS', MonthlyReview. June 1998, pp. 24-38.

65, J. Garten, 'Lessons for the Next Financial Crisis', Foreign Affairs.March/April 1999, pp. 76-92, 84.

66. The distinguished neo-Iiberal economist. J. Baghwati, provides a com­pelling demonstrauon of how the actors. values and interests 'of thegroup he identifies as the 'Wall Street-Treasury' complex have been atthe heart of the US and IMF policy response. J. Bhagwan, 'TheCapital Myth: The Difference between Trade m Widgets and.Tradem Dollars', Foreign Affairs. 77(3), 1998, CIted m R. Higgott, 'TheAsian Economic Crisis' (Note 64 above), p. 344; J. Garten too hasargued that. when ASIa blew up, It was the Treasury Department, andnot the State Department WhICh had 'the crucial relationships withfinance rmmsters and central bank directors. and understood both thetechnical details and policy issues" 'Lessons for the Next FinancialCriSIS' (Note 65 above), pp. 84-5. See also Gowan, The Global Gamble(Note 33 above), pp. 107ff. In all this literature two names are reg­ularly CIted as key actors - Robert Rubin and Larry Summers of theUS Treasury Department.

67. Cited m P. Gowan, The Global Gamble, (Note 33 above), p. 115.Korea ID particular has been forced to grant foreign investors controlover Korean companies and banks. something It steadfastly refused todo until forced by the crisis. For examples, see W. K. Tabb. 'The EastAsian Cnsis', Monthly Review. June 1998. pp. 24--38, 37.

68. The Economist. 'Survey of South East Asra', 12 February 2000.69. World Bank, World Bank Poverty Update. (Note 61 above).70. IMF, World Economic Outlook (October 1999), p. 54, box 2.4.,71. Thrs IS the view of Alan Greenspan ofthe US Federal Reserve Bank, as

expressed in Far Eastern Economic Review. 14May 1998,p. 65. Cited inR. Higgott, 'The ASian Economic Crisis', (Note 64 above), p. 349.

72. For a balanced assesment of the 'regional' effects of the Crisis, seeR. Higgott, (Note 64 above).

Page 162: Globalization Postcolonial World

27.28.

"i

.1

29.

I

I 30.,31.

j32.

33.34.

304 Notes and References

11 Democracy, Civil Society and Post-development in Latin Amer­ica

1. N. Lechner. 'De la Revoluci6n a la Democracia', La Ciudad Futura, 2,1986, p. 33, quoted by R. Munck, 'Political Programmes and Devel­opment: The Transformative Potential of Social Democracy', ID F. J.Schuurman, Beyond the Impasse: New Directions 111Development The­ory (London: Zed Books, 1993), pp. 113-21, 115.

2. J. G. Castafieda, UtoPIQ Unarmed (New York: Vintage Books, 1994),p. 177.

3. Ibid., p. 177.4. Ibid.. p. 183.5. Ibid., p. 183.6. Ibid., p. 179.7. Ibid., p. 196.8. V. 1. Lenin, Impenaltstn. the Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York

and London: International Publishers, 1939; first published 1916),p.85.

9. R. Prebrsch. The ECOllOl1llC Development of Latin Asnenca and ItsPnncipal Problems (New York: Economic Commission for LatinAmerica. 1950). This paper was later reworked and served as thefounding document for the United Nations Conference on Tradeand Development (UNCTAD), of which Prebisch became the firstSecretary General. See R. Prebiscn, 'Towards a New Trade Policy forDevelopment'. vol. 11 of Proceedings of the United Nations ConferenceOil Trade and Development (Geneva: UNCTAD, 1964).

10. A. M. M. Hocgvelt, The ThIrd World in Global Development (London:Macmillan, 1982), pp. 167-8.

11. D. Green, Silent Revolution. tile Rise of Market Economics III LatinAmerica (London: Cassell and Latm Amenca Bureau, 1995), p. 16.

12. Ibid., p. 17.13. A. G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment 111 Latin America (New

York: Monthly Review Press, 1967) (ongmally published m Spanishm (957).

14. T. dos Sautes. 'The Structure of Dependence', m C. K. Wilber (ed.),The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment (NewYork: Random House, (970).

15. C. Furtado, Diagnosis of the Brazilian Cnsts (Berkeley, CaUL Uru­versity of California Press, 1965).

16. N. Girvan, 'The Development of Dependency Economics III LatinAmerica', Social and ECOn0J111C Studies, 22 (1),1973.

17. O. Sunkel, 'National Development Policy and External Dependencyin Latin America', Journal ofDevelopment Studies, 6(1),1969.

18. For a review of these arguments, see A. M..M. Hoogvelt, The ThirdJ¥orld 11l Global Development, (Note 10 above), Ch. 5.

19. R. Gott, 'Introduction', Rural Guerillas in Latin Antenca (Harmonds­worth: Penguin, 1973), pp. 51-2.I

i

Notes and References 305

20. K. Roberts, 'Democracy and the Dependent Capitalist State in LatmAmerica', MOll/lily Revrew October 1985, pp. 12-26.

21. J. Schatan, World Debt: Who Is to Pay? (London: Zed Books, 1987),p.74.

22. P. Calvert, 'Demilitarisation In Lann America', Third World Quar­terly, 7(1), January 1985, pp. 31-43.

23. See E. Galeano, Open Vems ofLatin America. especially ills introduc­non to the new edition (New York: Monthly Review Press. 1978),reprinted m Monthly Review, 30(7), December 1978. On the Amencanbacking for the coup that toppled President Allende m Chile, see alsoA. Sampson, Sovereign State, the Secret History of [TT (London:Hodder & Stoughton. (973).

24. N. Chomsky and E. S. Sherman, The Washington Connection (Not­tmgham; Spokesman, 1978). Note m particular the illummatmg pIC­ture of 'the Sun and Its Planets' on the inside cover of-the book. Tillsgives statistics on US financral backing and army trarrung for coun­tnes using 'torture on an admmistratrve basis ID the 1970s'. In Chile, agroup of economists who came to power with Pinochet were dubbed'the Chicago Boys' because many of them had studied at ChicagoUniversity under Milton Friedman, guru of neo-iiberal econonucs (seeS. Branford and B. Kucmski, The Debt Squads, the Us. tile Banks andLaWI America(London: Zed Books, 1988), p. 85.

25. E. Galeano, Open Vellls of Latin America, (Note 23 above), p. 21.26. Jackie Roddick presents figures for the respectiveshares ofpublic and

pnvate net mflows mto the region, 1961-78. In the period 19.6~-5.

banks contributed only 2.1 per cent of a total of US$1.6 billion,while public flows (bilateral and multilateral lending) contributed60.2 per cent. In 1978, of a total of US$21.8 billion, public flowscontributed a mere 7.3 per cent, while banks contributed the lion'sshare of 56.6 per cent. See J. Roddick. The Dance ofthe Millions. LaunAmerica and the Debt CriSIS (London: Latin America Bureau, 1988),pp. 27-8.Quoted m J. Roddick, ibid., p. 65.See S. Branford and B. Kucmski. (Note 24 above), esp. eh, 9, 'Rea­ganormcs against Latin America'.J. Petras, 'Chile and Latin America', Monthly ReView, 28(9), February1977, pp. 13-24, 17.Ibid., p. 18.A term ongmally corned by G. O'Donnell In Modermzauon andBureallcratic-Allthorirarzamsm. Studies lit Soutu American Politics(Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1973).See. III parucular, F. Cardoso and E. Faletto, Dependency and Devel­optnent 111 Latin America (Berkeley, Calif.: University of CaliformaPress, 1979), esp. their mtroducuon to the American edition.D. Green. Silent RevolWlOll, (Note 11 above), p. 164.See in particular, N. Bobbio, Democracy and Dictatorship (Minneapo­lis. Minn.: University of Minnesota Press. 1989),and D. Held. 'Democ-racy, the Nation-state and the Global System', m D. Held (ed.), PoliticalTheory Today (Oxford: Polity Press, 1991). Both are referred to In D.

Page 163: Globalization Postcolonial World

306

35.36.

37.38.

39.

40.41.42.

Notes and References

Slater's excellent review of the region's new SOCIal movements: D.Slater, 'Power and Social Movements In the Other Occident', LatinAmerican Perspectives, issue 81. 21(2), Spring 1994, pp. 11-37.D. Held. ibid., p. 231.R. T. Naylor, Hot Money and the Politics ofDebt (Toronto: McClel­land & Stewart, 1987), eh, 22.J. Roddick. The Dance of the Millions (Note 26 above), p. 109.In 1982, Ronald Reagan launched a new project 'exporting democracyworld wide'. setting up a special orgamzation for the purpose. Thefunction of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was todistribute government money to citizens. organizations and unionsfighting for the 'restoration of democracy m totalitarian countries'or in countries where democracy is still precancus', see InternationalLabour Reports, 13, January/February 1986, p. 7.Eduardo Galeano grves a vivid description of this in the new edition ofOpen VeillS ofLatin America (Note 23 above):

To operate effectively, the repression must appear arbitrary, Apartfrom breathing, any human activity can constitute a cnme. InUruguay torture IS applied as a routine system of interrogation:anyone may be its victim, not only those suspected or guilty ofacts of opposition. In this way panic fear of torture IS spreadthrough the wnaie population, like a poratyzmg gas that invadesevery home and Implants itself in every ctttzen 's soul . . . Each crimebuilds horrible uncertainty in persons close to the victim and 1S alsoa warlllng for everyone else. State terrorism alms to paralyze tilepopulation wult fear.

(Gaieano, p. 32, emphasis m original)

Cited In J. G. Castafieda, Utopia Unarmed. (Note 2 above), p. 202.J. G. Castafieda, ibid., p. 197.There is a plethora of statistics on the region's economic decline andIncreased poverty over the whole of the period 1970-95. Here I shallmention just a few salient facts ofthe crincal penod in the 1980s whenstructural adjustments were imposed:

• In the penod 1980-8, the combined GDP for Latm Americaand the Caribbean declined by 6.6 per cent. Add to tills thelosses incurred as a result of a detenorauon of the terms oftrade (-3 per cent) and those caused by resource transfers outof the region (-6 per cent), and the fall ID per capita incomewas 16 per cent over the period. Meanwhile. the rate ofinflation rose from 46 per cent in 1978-9 to 336 per cent m1987-8. Breaking down the decline in per capita income bytwo sectors. owners of capital. and workers, their respectivedeclines were 12 per cent and 26 per cent. See D. Ghai and C.Hewttt de Alcantara, The IlvfF and the South, the SOCialImpact of Cnsts and Adjustment (London: Zed Books, 1991).The authors base therr calculatrons on CEPAL. Notas sobre laeconomic y e/ desorrollo, December 1987 and 1988.

43.

44.45.46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

51.52.53.

54.

55.

56.

INotes and References I 307

I

• Absolute poverty: Durmg 1980-9 the estimated number of theabsolute poor in Latin Amenca increased from 136 million to183 million. See C. Reilly, New Pat/Is to Democratic Develop­me/It 111 Latin America(Boulder. Col.: Lynne Riennerj.p. 5. By1993 the figure had risen to over 200 million. or46 per ceIl;t of thetotal population (D. Green. Silent Revolution, (Note 11 above),p.202). I

IS. Ellner, 'Introduction', in B. Carr and S. EUner (eds), The LatinAmerlcafl Left: From the Fall ofAllende to Perestroika (Boulder, CoLWestview Press, 1993).See D. Green, Silent Revolution, (Note 11 above), p. 188.lbid., p. 192.R. Munck, Politics ami Dependency m Latin Amenca (London: ZedBooks, 1985), p. 117. . " .Cited by C. Reilly (ed.) in 'Introducnon' to New Paths to DemocraticDevelopment ill Latin Amenca, the Rise ofNGO-Nfwllclpal Collabora­non (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Riermer. 1995) p. l.J. G. Castafieda. Utopza Unarmed. (Note 2 above), eh. 7. 'The GrassRoots Explosion',J. Daudelin and W. E. Hewrtt. 'Churches and Politics In Latin America:Catholicism at the Crossroads', Third World Quarterly, 16(2) 1995, pp.221-36, 224. Note the decline of these groups in recent years, whichthese authors blame III part on the Vatican's response (stimulated alsoby the contemporary Protestant Evangelical Invasion), and partly bythe general failure of the Catholic left to set the social agenda of theChurch firmly. They argue that today there IS developing somethmgmore akin to a throwback to traditional state-Church relations.P. Berryman, 'Basic Chnstian Communities and the Future of LatinAmerica", Monthly Review, 36(3) July/August 1984 pp. 27-40. 28.Ibid.. pp. 29-30.J. G. Castafteda, Utopia Unarmed, (Note 2 above), p. 223.H. Oporto, La Revolucioll democnitica: WIa lluel'a man~ra de pensorBolivia (La Paz: Los Arnigos del Libro, 1991), CIted In D. Slater,'Power and Social Movements'. (Note 34 above), p. 23.C. Reilly, New Paths to Democratic Development, (Note 42 above),

p.13.Food noting and the deterioration of the urban poor led the WorldBank in 1990 to mitiate a senes of SOCIal emergency programmes In

some Latin Amencan countnes to cushion the worst effects of thestructural adjustment programmes. As Reilly observes. 'these emer­gency funds occasioned the Bank to begin dealing directly with sub­national political actors and NGOs - perhaps mttiatmg new ~att,ern,s

for a multilayered presence for the development bank m the region'.(C. ReiUy, ibid., p. 14).A recently published Guide to Directories ofNGOs by the Inter-Amer­rcan Foundation refers to over 11 000 Latin Amencan NGOs. ~arious

Page 164: Globalization Postcolonial World

308 Notes and References Notes GIld References 309

57.

58.

59.

60·

61.

62.63.

64.

65.

contributorsill C. Reilly's edited volume tracethe mteracnons betweenNGOs and their financial backerswith the municipalauthonues.See C. Reilly, New Paths to Democratic Development, (Note 42 above),p.263.J. S. Jacquette, 'Conclusion', III J. S. Jaquette (ed.), The Women.Movement m Latin Amel'lca (Boston Mass.: Unwin Hyman, 1989).The best-known example was the 'Madres de la Plaza de Mayo' inArgentina - the mothers of the disappeared who held rallies for yearsin Buenos AIres. They becamea symbol not only of the 'need to know'but also of the necessity for Argentine society to come to terms withthe dirty war.There were similar groups in other countries. for exam­ple the 'Confederationof Widows' of Guatemala; see J. G. Castafieda,Utopia Unarmed, (Note 2 above), p. 227.The emancipatory story of Domitla Barnos de Chugara, leaderof theHousewives Comnntteeof the Siglo xx Mines In Bolivia, becameworldfamous, partly also as an example of the power of the ethnographicmethodology in WhICh Latm Americanscholar intellectuals went out oftheirway to recordthe authentic voice of the people:see D. Bamos deChungara (with M. Viezzier), 'Let Me Speak', Monthly Rel'lell' (NewYork; 1979) (see also 'Excerpts'. Monthly Rel'leIV.30(9), February 1979.F, Calderon (ed.), Los Movinnentos Soaales ante ia Crtsts (BuenosAires; CLASCO, 1986). Cited m A. Escobar, 'Imagmmg a Post-Devel­opment Era? Critical Thought, Deveiopment and Social Movements'.Social Text. 31132. 1992, pp. 20-55.32.A. Escobar, ibid .. p. 33.A. Peterson, 'SOCial Movement Theory', Acta Sociologica. 32(4), 1989.pp. 419-26, cited in D. Slater, 'Power and Social Movements; (Note 34above), p. 29.A. Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking oftlte Third World(pnnceton.NJ; PrmcetonUniversityPress. 1995),p.221.R. MangabeiraUnger, False Necessity, Anti-necessuanan Social The­ory 11l the Service of Radical Democracy (Cambridge University Press.1987), p. 362. See also his SOCial Theory: Its Situation and its Task(Cambridge Unrversny Press. 1987). A1tbough Unger acknowledges nodebt to Foucault, the message and the effort of his anti-enlightenmentproject is much the same as that of other postmodermsts. Where hediffers.however, IS ill the illusion of revolutionary refornusm, in whichthe developmentof new participatory democracycan be a path of cum­ulatrve institutional mnovauon that can reconcile objectives of eco­nomic growth with the overconung of the present brutalmequalities.A. Escobar. 'Imaguung a Post-Development Era', (Note 61 above),p.27.A. Escobar. Encountenng Development. (Note 64 above), p. 219.Ibid., p. 216.A. Escobar, 'Imaguung a Post-Development Era', (Note 61 above),p.44.D. Slater. <Power and Social Movements', (Note 34 above), p. 29.

71. \V.I. Robinson. 'Latin Amenca and global capitalism'. Race & Class.special ISsue. "The tbreat of globalism'. 40 (2/3), October1998-Marcb1999. pp. 133-144.

72. Economic Comnussion for Latm Amenca and the Caribbean(ECLAC), 'SOCial Pauorama of Latin America, 1999'. httpv/www,eclac.cl/conferencelg-2071

73. {Great reforms, nice growth. but where are the Jobs?', The Economist,21 March 1998. cited in W. 1. Robmson, 'Latm America and globalcapitalism' (Note 71 above).

Conclusion

1. These are,of necessity, veryrough calculations. WillHuttonhasargued.as othershavedone, that In therichcountnes thereIS an emerging SOCialstructure of40-30-30%, while theconsensusamongThird Worldobser­vers is that the the proportions thereare reversed. See W. Hutton. TheState We're III (London; Jonathan Cape, 1995), pp. 105fT. The World­watch Institute. quoting the International Labor Organization. hasestimated that over 1 billion people. or about a third of the globalworkforce, areunemployedor under-employed, working substantiallyless than full-time. or eammg less than a living wage. The global work­force is set to swell by f.5 billion new Job seekers by 2050. almost allliymg ID the developing world. where about half of the population isunder tbe age of25. See http://www.worldwatch.orglalerts/pop2.htmJ

2. P. Kennedy, 'The Global Gales Ahead', New Statesman/Society, 3May 1996. pp. 28-9.

3. For a balanced, sensitive and detailed account of the differencesbetween the SOCial policy discourses of various global agencies, seeB. Deacon, with M. Hulse and P. Stubbs, Global SOCial Policy, Inter­national OrganizationS and tile Future 0/ r-Velfare (London: Sage.1997). Also B. Deacon, Globalization and Soctat Policy, The Threatto Equitable Welfare, United Nations Research Institute for SocialDevelopment, Occasional Paper 5 (Geneva; UNRISD, 2000).

4. POSItive grassroots strategies are documented In M. Barratt Brown,Africa's ChOICes (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995); In W. Rau, FromFeast to Fannne, Official Cures and Grassroots Remedies to Africa'sFood Crisis (London: Zed Books, 1991); and In J. Gelinas, Freedomfrom Debt. The Re-appropriation of Development through FinancialSelf-reliance (London aud New York; Zed Books; Ottawa: InterPares; and Dhaka: University Press; 1998).

5. The Guardian. 22 June 2000.6. For a robust defence of this position, see A. Giddens, The Third fVay

and lis Critics (London: Polity Press, 2000).7. See Ch. Leadbeater, Ltvmg 011 Ttun Air. The New Economy (London:

Viking, 1999), p. 109.8. D. Harvey, Justice. Nature & the Geography ofDifference (Cambridge.

Mass. and Oxford. UIe; Basil Blackwell, 1996), p. 360.

Page 165: Globalization Postcolonial World

310 Notes and References

9. A. Hoogvelt, 'Prospects In the Periphery for National Accumulationm the Wake of the Cold War and the Debt Crisis', m B. Gills and S.Qadir (eds), Regimes m Crisis (London: Zed Books, 1995), pp. 72-81.Fora similar argument, see also C. Hines and T. Lang, The NewProtectionism (London: Earthscan, 1993).

10. A. Quijano, Estettca de la Utopia, David J' Gnliatl1 (Lima: Sociedad yPolitica Endiciones, 1990) p. 37; quoted passim In A. Escobar,Encountering Development, The Making and Unmaking of tile ThirdWorld (Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 221.

11. See D. Boyle, 'Time Is a Great Social Healer', New Statesman, (23August 1999), p. 18. There IS now a growmg literature on such localexchange trading schemes. See, for example. P. Lang, LETS lYork:Rebuilding The LocalEconomy (Bnstol: Grover Books, 1994);J. Croall,LETS Act Locally: The Growth of Local Exchange Trading Systems(London: Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 1997); M. Pacione, 'LocalExchangeTradingSystemsas a Responseto theGlobalization ofCapit­alism', Urban Studies, 34(8), 1997, pp. 1179-99. And C. Williams. 'TheNew Barter Economy: An Appraisal of Local Exchangeand TradingSystems (LETS)' ,Joumal ofPublic Policy, 16(1), 1996, pp. 85-101.

12. Cited, passnn, m G. Mulgan, 'Creatmg a Twin Economy', Demos, 2,1994. See also D. Boyle. Funny Money: In Search of Alternative Cash(New York: HarperCollins, 1999).

13. P. Hawken, A. Lovins and L. Hunter Lcvms. Natural Capitalism:Creating tile Next Industrial Revolutio/l (London:Little, Brown, 1999).

14. Cited,passim. in U. Beck. 'Beyond the Nation State" New Statesman,6 December 1999, pp. 25-7, 26. The New Statesman 's article IS anedited extract from Beck's book fI1wt Is Globalizanont (London:Pluto Press, 1999). A semor staff member of the IMF, V. Tanzi, haswarned that there are 'termites' working away at the foundations ofthe fiscal house of governments. He lists the growth of e-commerce,the use of transfer pnce mechanisms. the spread of tax havens andhedge funds. and the mobility ofcapital and labour. He concludes thatthe world must prepare Itself for what could prove to be significantfalls m tax levels. See V. Tanzr, International Dimensions of NationalTax Policy, Paper presented at the Expert Meeting on InternationalEconomic and Social Justice. UN Division for Social Policy andDevelopment, New York. 12-14 November, 1998; cited m B. Deacon,Globalization and SOCial Policy, (Note 3 above), p. 3.

IS. Personal communication from Environmental Information Services.London, 1997.

16. World Utatch. 1999, cited in The ECOIlOll!iSt, 11 December 1999, p. 24.17. An. NGO swarm has been defined by a recent RAND study

as 'amorphous groups of NGO's, linked OIl line. descending on atarget - It has no central leadership or command structure; It ismulti-headed. impossible to decapitate'; cited In The Economist,(Note 16 above).

18. Yearbook of International OrgamzotioJlS. CIted m The ECOllOl1l1St.

(Note 16 above).

Index

accumulation 21, 22, 29. 44, 64,92,116,118,144.146,147,261

accumulation model 44, 256global capital accumulation 46.

60, 89. 143national temtonal

accumulation 3, 26adhocracy 104advanced manufacturing

technology (AMI) 102Africa 173-96

economic refann andanarchy 187-9

Aglietta, M. 115, 133aid

and economic reform 192new aid agenda 191-3political condittonality of, 192reverse agenda 191-3

AIDS 196All-African People's Conference.

Third 30Allende, S. 246Amm, S. 9,16,43,47,64Angola 190--1Annan, K. 175annihilation of space through time

125,131, 139anthropocentric production system

(APS) 103anti-imperialist revolt 51, 211Arab nationalism 199Arabia scholarship 203area studies xiiArgentina 245, 247am15 for resource economy 190'arm's-length' government 152Arnglu, G. 50

Arthur, B. HI ,ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)

230-1 I

ASIancnsis of 1997 83,85,89,155ASian Tigers 73. 74ASiaPacificEconomic Cooperation

Forum (APEC) 69.230,238ASIan Monetary Fund 156Association of South East Asian

Nations (ASEAN) 230, 238AT&T 135, 149austenty programmes

in Africa 182in Latin America 248

autocentnc development 40automation 100Ayatollah Khomeini 201

Ba'athtst Party 209Bairoch, P. 90Balassa, B. 218Bangkok International Banking

Facility 234Baran, P. 17,38,64, 158Barshefsky, C. 152Baumann, Z. 143Becker, D. 43, 57Bello. W. 226. 227Benetton 105Berger, P. L. 222-3,226Bhabha. H. 170Blair, T. 161Boas, M. 191Boccara. P. 133Boff, L. 253Bolivia 245Bourdieu, P. 123, 133, 155'Bowles, P. 231-2

311

Page 166: Globalization Postcolonial World

312 Index

Boyer, C. 115Braathen, E. 191branch plant economies 47,220Braudel Center 58Brazil 245. 247Bretton Woods system 34, 50, 82,

147. 149. 167.246Britain see under Great BntamBritishLabour Research

Department survey 103Broqiley.S. 202.211Bukharin, N. 21.22. 23. 37bureaucratic authoritarian

'regunes 247businesscivilization 148Business Week 136

Cairncross, A. K. 18-19capital accumulation 18,22, 89,

92. 118capital exports 24. 27. 37capital flight 89. 180capital flows 80-5. 139. 179. 180capital, mobility

functional mobility versusspacialmobility 140

mtematronal mobility 85, 139.140. 229. 259. 262

capital. structural power of 149,152

capitalismcapitalist rmpenalism 21-8, 64.

160capitalist world economy 15.

59. 165.210centralization of capital 23-4concentratIon of capital 23-4cnsis and transformation

65-6development of xv, 8. 15. 16-17.

37.57.58.210.225.258East Asian 222expansion 63-64.66. 141historical stages of xiii, XlV,

6, 14--28. 137mformational 129. 139. 265Implosion 141

;!

inherent contradictions of 4,25, 115-16

integration 121mvolution xv. 66. 89-90laws of rnotion of 6, 16.23monopoly capitalism 23penphery 64profit rates 21. 22, 24reproduction of 115

Calderon, F. 254Cardoso, F. H. 64Carter. J. 156.249casino SOCiety 86Castells, M. 92. 104. 109. Ill.

112.121.126-31,139,173.215Castenada, J.G. 240-1. 250, 252Cavanagh.J. 180CEPAL 242Chase-Dunn. C. 9Chen, E. K. Y. 218Chile 245. 247China 79. 135, 141

Greater China CIrcle 230Greater China concept 230

Chomsky, N. 161. 210crvilizanon 199civil SOCiety in Latin

Amenca 252-4Clatrmcnt, F.F. 86. 180Clinton. W. 157-8. 185Coates, D. 139Cohen. S. S. 133Cold War 34.35. 172colonialism 18. 19. 26. 28. 29. 30.

32.170.240colonial period 17. 18-21Commission of the European

Commuruties 103commodity markets 184commodity specialization '184cannnunidades ectesiasncos de base

(CEB) 252-3comparative political

economy 222-3complex political emergencies 194computer-aided design

(CAD) 102. 105

computer-aided manufacturing(CAM) 105

computer numerical control(CNC) 102. 105

concertaaon 56.251Confucianism 198. 222

Confuciamzation 170Confucian ethic 222-3postf'onfuncianism 223

continuous improvement practices100. t03

contract government 152core-periphery

economic exchanges 19explottation of penphery 59hierarchy in world system XlV,

13.15.20-1,59.64.89-90.91.93.135-9.141.209-10.219,258

relauons 63trade stausucs 7Q.-4

corporate taxes 266corruption 179. 189Cox. R. XIV. 10-13.63. 65.148.

258cntical SOCIal theory 10-12, 65.

253 .critical theory of historical

structures 10-12. 65Crash of '97 83.85,89.155,232-7crisis and transformation 65-6creative destruction 108cross-border activity 121cross-border alliances 106. 126cross-border mergers and

acquisitions (M&A) 79cross-border migrations 166cross-border services trade 70cross-penetration of financial flows

82-3Crusades 203Cuba 245cultural functionalism 195cultural pluralism 193-4. 195cultural studies 169culture of creatrve destruction 108currency

interest rates 180

Index 313

trade 82value 179

customer care 103customized production 97,99. 102

data-processing services 135-6De Beers 190debt cnsrs

III Africa 176-85m Latin Amenca 180.246-7.

249debt-equity ratio 49debt pconage 49. 50. 176. 181deht restructurmg 186declining rate of profit 21. 22Delbridge, R. 124de-linking 42democracy.

III Africa 185-7consociational democracy 253democratization 64, 223formal democratization 57low-intensity democracy 186m Latm Amenca 57. 239,

248-52multi-party 186political democratization 249SOCIal democrauzauon 57, 249substantive democratization 57

dependencydependency and

underdevelopment 38-4-2'dependency-associated'

development theory 56Latin American aependtsta

wnters 56, 64theory 37-42.48. 58. 217-18.

219,242-4deregulation 87.89. 140, 142. 152.

153-4. 179detenoratmg terms of trade 41deterntonalizanon 142development studies 166. 172. 216

antidevelopmentalism 172. 260development aid 35development theory 31. 52. 53.

217

Page 167: Globalization Postcolonial World

314 Index

developmentstudies (com.)developmental state 60, 172,

220-2, 226-9developmental ism 31, 52, 178,

242-4developmentalist

bureaucracy 222developmentalist state 48, 207,

221gender Issues 53-6identity Xl, xiipostdevelopmentalism 172,

254-5dialectic 11

dialectical development ofcapitalism 16

digital economy xv, 112. 140digital education 130digttization 140

digital computability 112, 140Dirlik, A. 167,168'disappeared', the 254disintermediation 87doctrme of domicile 57dollar-yen policy 156, 234Dollar-Wall Street Regime

(DWSRl 155-6Dommican Republic 246'dOL corn' company 107'doxa' 155dragons of East Asia 216,227Drucker. P. 133Duffield, M. 191, 193, 194, 195

East ASIa Economic Caucus(EAEC) 230, 238

East ASIa Economic Grouping(EAEG) 230

East ASIan capitalism 222East ASIan cnSIS of 1997 83, 85,

89, 155,232-7East ASIan Tigers 218,219,

223e-business 111,121ecclesiastical base communities

(CEBs) 252-3e-commerce Ill, 121

Economic Commission for LatinAmenca (ECLA) 242, 243

Economic Cornrrussion for LatinAmenca and the Caribbean(ECLAC) 256

economic globalization 112, 173,193

economic nationalism 47-50economic networking 103-9Econonuc Report of the President

(USA) 232-3economic surplus 17, 40, 49economics of place 266economies of scale 44, 96, 99economies-of-scope 99Economist. The 87, 142. 198,257economy

knowledge-based 110-13'weightless: 93

Ecuador 245Egypt 211Elam, M. 113e-Iance economy 107, 108Ellner, S. 251Emrnanuel, A. 41employment. changing patterns of

135-7empowerment 54encryption technology 107environment

costing of 265environmental

associations 254,266-7Escobar, A. 255eurodollar 49Euro-Amencan culture 198European Round Table of

Industrialists (ERn 149European Uruon 69, 149, 186Evans, P. 51exclusion

management of exclusion 161,171, 172, 187

politics of exclusion 65, 130,160, 259

export-oriented mdustrialization(EOn 227,243,261

extractive resource sector.nationalization of 51

Faletto, E. 64Fanon. F 32fermnists 55-6fertility 55ficunous capital formation 86finance capital 23, 24, 139financial architecture 87financial deepernng . 85financial flows 80-5

cross-penetration 82-3net flows 83-5

financial instruments 82. 88. 141financianzatton 85, 139-4-2First-World racism 54flexible production xv, 93. 97,

98-102flexible specialization 97-8flight capital 178, 180'flymg geese' pattern of trade 231Ford, H. 95Fordism 45,95-7, 98, 114, 124,

147Fordist model of

production 44, 98, 100Fordist rigidities 96Fordist-Keynesian modes of

regulation 116Fordist-Tayionst production

paradigm 45,95, 124global Fordism 44,45,47, 147peripheral Fordism 47, 226

foreign direct Investment(FDIl 49,69,77-80, 173,228, 231

Foucault, M. 192,206'four Tigers' 218,219,223Fourth World 92Frank, A.G. 16,38,58,64,244Fraser, N. 166Freeman, C. 113Freire, P. 253FRELIMO 191'friction of space' 131Friends of the Earth 267

Index 315

Frobel, F. 219-20Fukuyarna, F. 11, 198Furtado, C. 244future time 129

garrison states 245Gates, Bill xviiGellner, E. 201gender

blindness 55issues in development

studies 53-6General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade (GATT) 34, 75, ,147,148, 150, 15t, 152

Gesell, S. 264Gh ai, D. 181Giddens, A. 123-6,198Gill, S. 149Girvan, N. 244global banking 234global capital accumulation 46,

60, 89, 143global capitalism 129, 165,260,

267'global' companies 106, 131, 132,

133, 136global competition 129, 133, 134,

259,262global consciousness I22-3global division of labour 13t,

135-9, 178, 259global financial deepening 85global financral markets 234global financial network 128global Fordism 44,45,47,147global formations 9global governance structure

144-62, 194-5global hegemony 146global informationalism 129,265global management 191global market discipline 131, 133,

134global markets 105,106,132-3,

134, 137, 155, 159, 189global networking 126-31

Page 168: Globalization Postcolonial World

316 Index

global political economy 154, 167global production structures 70.

132global reforms 30, 136, 139global social formations 9global sourcmg 105global village 125globalism 153-5,265globalization 19, 64, 65, 120-43,

184,233,258defined 65,83,120economics of xv, 29-31, 85-9,

,92,120,127,131-42,154,173,'193,260

implications for postcolonialworld XVI

integration of markets 66pertpheralization 171politics of 120sociology of xv, 121-31, 142-3and globalism 153-5, 265and space 146and US strategic

'dominance 155Garden, R. 11 0Gorz, A. 266Gott, R. 245Goulart, President 246governance (industrial) 108'government by contract' 152Gowan. P. 155-6, 234, 236Gramsci. A. 10Grand Area Plan 33grassroots movements 40, 250,

252,254,266Great Bntam 152Green, D. 243,248,251greenfield Investments 79Greenpeace 267Greenspan, A. 110Gross Domestic Product (GDP),

idefined 5-6GrossNauonal Product

I(GNP) 216growth triangle 230guerilla movements in Latin

IAmenca 245

Gulf Cooperation Council 209Gulf War 208

Habermas. J. 255habitus 133Haggard, S. 225Hall, S. 114Halliday, F. 51Hamas movement 197Hams, N. 228Harnson. D. 35Harvey, D. 123-6, 167, 198,262Hawken, P. 265Hegel, F. 252hegemony 10, 33, 50, 51, 56,

146-7, 151, 155, 162hegemomc ideology 149

Held, D. 120Hewitt de Alcantara. C. 181'Hidden One' 201high performing East ASian

countries (HPEAs) 216,227highly indebted poor countnes

(HIPCs) 175Hi1ferding, R. 21,22, 24, 37Hirst, P. 79histoncal matenalism 11historical structure 11, 12, 13, 63.

258Hobson. J. A. 21Hong Kong 79, 141,224Hoover 134'horizontal orgamsauon' 104Horownz, D. 198-9Hoselitz, B. F. 35Human Development Index

(UNDP) 92human resourcemanagement

(HRM) 103human rights 193, 249, 250humarutanan relief 194-5Huntmgton, S. 159, 189, 198-9hybridity 170Hyperglobist thesis 120hypotlucated taxation 266

IBM 149

Ihonvbere, J. 175ijlihad 200-1IKEA 105[mum 200~1

imperialism 159-61, 189-91, 205classical theories of 20,21-8,37formal 25ideology of 63-4informal 34necessity of impenalism

thesis 20, 22, 64and resource wars 189-91

imperialist profit 46Implosion 89unport substttutron 242Import subsnmnve

Industnalizatron (IS!) 39,211,218,243-4

India 151, 152Indian-rights groups 254indigenization policies 48Indonesia 235, 236, 238mdustnal district model 97-8industnal governance 108mdustnaf relocation 46, 134-6mdustnalizauon

export-oriented strategy.(EOl) 227, 243

import substitutrve 39.211,218, 243-4

mformauonas source of value 111mformation-dnven

economies 97mfonnation teehno1ogy (IT) xv,

102, 104, 105, 107-9.110-12, 126, 135-6, 178,267

mformauonal capitalism 129, 139mformational mode of

production IIIinformanonal network

society 126-31mformauonalism. spmt of 109Insan Kamil 214mstitutionalism. In mtemational

relations theory 7-8'intelligent regions' 108

Index 317

inter-group trade 74, 75mtcrnatronal 'business

civilization' 148mternauonal division of

labour 14,30,40,58,131,173mternauonal financial msutunons

(IFIs) 181international Iinancrat

markets 51, 141, 143mternauonal market

exchange 131mternauonal mobility of

capital 85International Monetary Fund

(IMF) 34,89, 147, 148, 153.156,159, 176, 180, 188,233,235-6,238

Articles of Agreement 152International Patent Protection

(!PP) Laws 151mternatronal political

economy 6-10, 154,223-6mtemational production 23,77,

133mtemauonal property nghts 150,

151international relations

theones 10, 154mternattonal trade 77,131-2internationalizati 0 n

of capital 25, 37of production 23, 77of the state 148of the world economy 67, 81

Internet 107, Ill, 121economy 265

mter-unpenalist rivalry 51,56mterproduct trade 132. 133mtra-firm trade 132mtra-group trade 74, 75mtraproduct trade 132, 133investment

measures 150, 151portfolio 27

involution xv, 89-90Iran 201Iraq 211

Page 169: Globalization Postcolonial World

nation-state 48, 145-6, 149,176,198

national developmentalism 36.228

National Endowment forDemocracy 249

nattonal Iiberatton forces 51National Missile Defence system

160-1national taxation 266national terntona!

accumulation 3, 26national territorial

development 183nationalism 23, 32nationalization policies 48, 177native peasant movements 254Naylor, R.T. 177, 179neighbourhood associations 253

319i

Index I

iI

230. 233ii

Mchamed, MahatirMohanty, C. 55Momsen, 1. H. 55Monetary Union 149money

changmg nature of 131laundenng 179

monopoly capitalism 23MOSANTO 267Mozambique 191MPLA 191Muhammed-al-Mahdi 201Mulgan. G. 264multiculturalism 103Multilateral Agreement on

Investments (MAI) 149,151,159

multmational corporations(MNCs) 77, 132

evolution 131, 137postwar 77

multiregional companies 106multr-skilling 103Mun, T. 4Murray, R. 100,264Muslim Brotherhood 197. 202.

206,211

Malaysia 216.223Malone, Th. 107-8Mandel, E. 7market deepening 129market-guiding regimes 219

versus market-conformmgregimes 219

versusmarket-distortingregimes 219

market placeversus market discipline 131-5versus market principle 131-5

Marquez. G. 241Marshall Aid 146Mar>, K. 5-6, 15, 124

labour theory of value 41Marxism

historical and dialectncalmaterialism 115

Marxist left m LatmAmenca 250

Marxist theories of impenalism20-1,21-8.37,64

SOCial change 9mass production 44,96,99,100,

114McNarnara. R. 246Meiksms Wood, E. 167mercantilism 3-4, 5, 225

mercantile phase 17-18Mexico 247

peso crash 89, 155Microsoft IIIMiddle East 205Mies, M. 54military developmental states 245militarydictatorships. III Latin

America 245Mimstry of Industryand Trade

(M1TI) of Japan 234mobility of capital 85, 139. 140Monroc doctnne 33modermzauon 193

modemizatton theory 31. 34-7.48,217-18

modes of development 129modes of production 6.219

·if

MacArthur plans 146MacLean, B. 231-2Magdoff, H. 16. 18

or digital economy xvKorea 51,226--8.235,236Krasner, S. 224Krugman, P. 138Kuwait 210Kuznets, S. 68-75

labour, individualized 262Latin America 39, 172,239-57,

261civilsociety 252-4colomalisrn 240Intellectual Left 240-2, 250SOCial SCIence Council

study 254Laubacher, R. 107-8Law, D. 149Jaws of motion 6. 16,23lean production 93, 100. 102-3Leborgne, D. 145Leftwich, A. 181, 185-6Lenm, V. L 21,22,24,27,37,242liberalism 63

liberal economics 5embedded versus

unembedded 149. 150nee-liberalism 145,151, 153,

155. 187-8,241.248liberalization of capital

accounts 235. 238Lirn. L. 231LINUX 107Lipietz, A. 28,115.116--17,133,

145. 146List, F. 221

Listian politicat economy 221neo-Listian theory 221

loan selling 87'long night of the generals' 245Louvre Accord 180Lovens, A. 265Lovens, L. Hunter 265Luxemburg, R. 37

kanban (just-in-tune) 99Kaplan, R. 194Keynes. J. M. 264Keynesiamsm 44.45,48, 96, 21Kidd. B. 20Kieman. V. G. 25Kipling, R. 20knowledge

added value III-based economy llO-13

318 Index

Jacques, M. 114Jaikumar, R. 104Jalee, P. 50Jameson, F. 165, 167Jansen, G. H. 200, 205, 206Japan 73-7,98-102,230,231,236

dollar-yen exchange rate 234-5Japanese Ministry of Trade and

Industry (MITI) 198Jessop, R. ll5, 119, 133-4, 145jihad 198Job rotation 103Johnson, C. 218Jubilee 2000 267Junta 247, 249just-in-time (TIn 99, 100, 102

Islam 171, 197-215antidevelopmentalism 172,

211-14, 260as politics of identity 198, 199,

207,260as religious precept 200-2, 207,

210high Islam versus low

Islam 202, 205homo tslamicus 205Islamist New Intellectuals

212-14militant revival 197neofundamentalists 207,210,

212-14scholarship 203, 207urbanization 212West's Image of 203

Israel 212

Page 170: Globalization Postcolonial World

-----_ .._---_.__ ..

320 Index

neoclasstcat econonucs 5neocolorualtjsrru 17,29,30--4,44,

49neocolomai economic

relations 47-8neo-libcralism 145, IS!. 153, 155,

187-8,241,248,256neo-Listian theory 221nee-Marxist 16,64, 113, 114, 115neomercantilism 48nco-Schumpetenans 113neo-Smithsonians 113. 114networkenterpnse 103-9network society 126-31networked firm 107-9new aid agenda 191new barbarism 194new doctnne of international

community 161new donor agenda 174,187,191-3new economy 93,109-13,121. 158new 'hrstoncrsm 169new international division oflabour

(NIDLl 46, 50,51,219-30New InternationalEconomic Order

(NIEO) 42, 177new military humanism 161new political economy XlV, 10New Political Economy 129new racism 193new social movements. m Lann

America 252'new times' theorists 114new world order 187newly industrializing countnes

(NICs) 60newly mdustnalizing economies

(~nEs) 50, 73. 138,226MKE 105Nixon, R. 155-6'no strike' clauses 103'uomudt scrence 256N onanka. H. 237'non-bank' banks 87non-governmental orgaruzauons

(jNGOs) 53, 181. 183, 193--4,252, 253, 267

North American Free TradeAgreement (NAFrA) 69

North Atlantic TreatyOrgarnzauon (NATO) 34,160, 161

North-South relations 43

off-balance-sheet acnvities 87Offe, C. 264Ohmae, K. 106oil 205,209-10, 260

and dictatorship 209Ong, A. 55open-door policy 33, 217Organization for Econonuc

Cooperation and Development(OECD) 83, 140, 147, 149,151

Organization of PetroleumExportmg Countnes(OPEC) 51

Onentalism 204, 206-8Osama bin Laden 198Ottoman Empire 202, 205outsourcing 104over-production 22Overseas Development Institute

(OD!) 192-3Oxfam 183, 267

pan-Arabtsm 208, 211paper entrepreneunalism 86patriarchy 54patnmoniaJ state form 188, 189patron-client politics 188Paul, E. 227Pax Americana 34, 147. 149, 172Pax Bruannica 147Pax Nipporuca 147pension schemes 142Perez, C. 113penodizauon 16peripheral economy/society 40penpheral mdustnalization 47,

59, 64penphery 16, 19,64, 89-90, 93,

136, 140,208-9,210

.'!

j

Peru 245Peterson, A. 255Petras. J. 247petrodollar recycling 49, 155, 177Pinochet. A. 247Piore. M. J. 97-8, 114Plaza Accord 231, 234pluralism 7-8, 193, 195

pluralist 8pluralist democracy 192

Pomt Four Programme ofDevelopment Aid 35

political economy xiv, 3. 5international 6-10IT dnven xvlaws of motion 6modes of prcductron 6

politics of cultural identity 166politics ofexclusion 65,193--4,259politics of incorporation 65politICS of place 266, 267politics of redistribution 166popular movements 10 Latin

America 252populism 243postcolonial

definition XIV, XVI, 165-70discourse 166-70formation 171implicauons of globalization XVI

in East Asia 223mtellectuals 168studies 166

postConfucianism 223postdevelopmentIsm 172, 264'post-entrepreneurial' firm 104postFordist 93,94, 114, 119, 145postimpenalism 17, 43, 57postmdustrial 94postlvlarxrsm 53postmatenalisr 94postmodcrmsm 9-10, 53, 94, 114,

166, 167,255,262post structuralism 53Prakash. G. 170Prebrsch, R. 40,41. 242President's Economic Report 158

Index 321

privatization 89, 152-3In Africa 177, 184In Bntam 152-3In Latin Amenca 184,261In the Third World 89,153,

177-8, 184production

consumer goods 31flexible XV, 93, 97, 98-102intemauonalizauon 23producer goods 31specialization 97-8, 184

profit rates 21. 22, 24, 180Programme of Action for the

Establishment of a NewInternauonal Economic Order(NIEO) 42

Prophel Mnhammed 200-1prosumer 99protecuve tariffs 24Putnam, R. 109

quality assurancemanagement 101quality CIrcles 100, 101quasi-independent orgaruzanons

(quangos) 152Qutnlan, J. 156Qu'ran 200, 214

racism. new racism 193-4Reagan, R. 249

Reaganomics 246realism 7real trme 104, 112, 127, 128, 135,

138J'erSIlS material actrvrttes 131.

264-5versus physical tune 121

Reed, J. 88regionalization 229-32,238,261,

263open regionalism 230

regulation theory 65,144,146,153mode of regulation 116,1l7,1l8,

134, 144, 145, 146, 153--4,261regime of accumulation 116,

117, 119, 144, 146, 147,261

Page 171: Globalization Postcolonial World

322 Index

Regulation School 45,65, 115-18,133, 144-5

Reich, R. 135relationship enterpnsmg 106relief agencies 194--5relocation of industry 46, 134--6RENAMO 191Reno, W. 188.190rent-seeking state 177resource bondage 30. 34resource wars 189-91reverse agenda of aid 191-3reverse value-coding 170Rhodes. C. 19-20Richards, P. 194Ritkm, J. 136Robertson. R. 121-3Robinson, W. 256Rodinson, M. 203, 204--5Rodney, W. 17Rosenfeld, S. 226, 227Roy, O. 207, 212-14Ruggie, J. 149RUSSIa, financial collapse 155

Sabel. C. 97-8.108, 114, 134Sachs. \V. xiiSaddam Hussain 209Saether, G. 191Said, E.W 204.206Samoya, S. 250Sautos, T. dos 38, 244Sceptres 120Sohumpctcr, J. 27. 113

Schumpeterian workfare state145

Seattle 267secunnzauon 87Seers, D. Xl

self-help associations 252'semi-colony: 242serru-penpherial nations 59Sbana 201Shaw. B. 20Shell 267Shi'ites 200-1Shirmer, D. 161

Shohat, E. 167, 168snort-terrmsm 86Shutt, H. 154Sierra Leone 188. 190Silicon Valley lOB. 262Singapore 135, 224, 226-8Singer, H. 40'single' enterpnse unions 103Slater, D. 256Smith, A. 3. 4--5Sobel, D. 124--5SOCIal capital 108. 109social change, theory of 9social evolunon 35SOCial mclusion 130SOCial reform 22, 255social wage 47Soros, G. 159,233South Korea 224stage theory 12-13.44. 57state, declinist View of 120state capitalism 219state-centrism 48. 247state-led developmentalisrn 48.

207,221State University of New York's

Braudel Ccntcr 58stausm 7Strange, S. 148strategic alliances 106structural adjustment

programmes (SAPs! 89, 181,183; and debt rescheduling152, 181-2; as imposedecononuc reform 152

devaluation 185prtvatrzation 184

structuralism 8-10, 263'subaltern' 170Suo-Saharan Africa 130, 173-5,

179, 1B1, 259commodities 184food production 184foreign debt 175.182,183growth 182pnvatrzation 184trade 184

Sudan 211sufi 202Sultanates 202Summers, L. 233Sunkel.D. 244SWUla 200Suntu 200-1supply and demand 41surplus extraction 31Sweezy, P. M. 64systemation 100Szymanski, A. 16

Tabb, W.K. 231Ta~van 224. 226-8tarilca 202Tawhid 214Taylor. F. C. 95taxation

of corporate profits 266hypothecated 266

teamworkmu 103technical m~ovatlOn 113techno-econormc paradigm 65,

96,113. 144technological dependency 34technological rents 34technological trajectory 113telecommunications 125, 135territorial annexations 18. 20Thailand 135, 236Theatre Defence Missile defence

system 160'thin air' economy 93Third All-African People's

Conference 30'ThIrd' Italy 105Third World

bourgeoisie 89debt 49. 176. 177-8.180developmentalism 51, 177division 52economic development 60economic nationalism 47fermmsts 55-6grassroots movements 40, 250,

252, 254, 266

I

Illdexl 323I

identity 165 imdusnal progress 46 Ipopulation explosion 53 ischolars 168, 169 Isolidanty 30, 34 Istudies 166Third Wor1dism 42.48, 207world trade 14

Thompson, G. 79Thornton. A.P. 19Tidd, J. 102'Tiger' economies 73, 74time-and-motion studies 95. 124time-dollar projects 264time/space compression 121,

123-6, 127, 134, 198time/space distantration 125timeless time 127, 128Toffler. A. 99Torres, C. 253Torvalds, L. 107total quality management

(TQM) lOO, 101,103,Townsend, J. 55Toyotism 98-102trade 77, 131-2

currencies 82derivatives 82inter-group 74, 75Inter-product 74,75intra-firm 132Intra-group 74,75Intra-product 132, 133loss 76supply and demand 41

trade-related intellectual propertyrights (TRIPS) 150, 151

trade-related Investment measures(TRIMS) 150, 151

transfer of wealth 5transformation, process of xvtransformattonalist thesis 121transnational business culture 148transnational corporate

bourgeoisie 56transnational corporations (TNCs)

51,57"-8, 131, 132, 143, 149

Page 172: Globalization Postcolonial World

-----_ .._.. _---_. __..

324 Index

transnattonal expansion of UScapital 50

transnanonal loan capital 51transnauonal political

interference 160transnational managerial class

148transuauonalism 148Triad countries 79. 106Trotsky, L 37

Law of Combined and UnevenDevelopment 37

Truman Doctrme 34trust, role of 98. lO8turnover time of capital 124

utema 201, 202. 213ultra monetarism 247wnma 210under-consumptton 22unequaJ exchange 40.41,47,59unequal trade 31Unger. R. 255UNITA 191DOlledNations

Centre on TransnationalCorporations 102

Charter of ECOllOIlllC Rights andDuties of States 42, 177

Conference on Population 53Conference on Trade and

Development (UNCTAD)46,73,76,79.84,85.89,91,151, 182-3,234

Decade for Women 53Declaration on the Establishment

of a New International.Economic Order (NIEO) 42,177

Development Programme(UNDP) 90, 92

Econormc Commission for Latini America and the CaribbeanI(ECLAC) 256

WorldConferenceon Women 53Yearbook of International Trade!Statisucs 71

United States of AmencaCouncil for Intemauonal

Business 149destabilizatron of regimes 34dollar-yen exchange rate 234-5East Asian crisis of 1997 235-7hegemony 33,50,51,56, 146-7,

155,162;cnSlsofhegemony 51military mtervenuon 34, 244Pacific dommance 224power 156, 157-62resurgence xviisecuntyarrangements 160-1,

224Washmgton Consensus 156

UNIX 107unsustamability 162Upton, D. 104urban dwellers' movements 253Uruguay 245

GATT agreements 150. 151USAID 186

value-added chain 137-8Iugh versus low value

added 137. 138-9Venezuela 247Vietnam 51virtual firms/teams 107-9virtual shopping 111volume-through-bulk 99volume-through-variety 99voluntansm

In theories of development 56m Regulation School 116

voluntary organizations 10 LatinAmenca 252

Wade, R. 233Wall Street 156. 157Wallerstem, L 4,9, 15. 58-9, 143warlordism 190-1Warren, B. 27-8, 64Washington consensus 248waste elimmation 100Watkms, K. 150. 183Watteville. M. de 3

Weber, M. 126.204'weightless' economy 93welfare state 221Western-educatedclass 32WhIte Man's Burden 20Williams. R. 169Wolfe, T. 140Womack, J. P. 99, 100, 106women 10 development (WID)

54women's movement In Latm

Amenca 254UN Decade for Women 53UN World Conference on

Women 53women's studies 53work mtensificauon 100. 124workfare state 145World Bank 34, 68. 89. 147, 148,

153, 159, 176. 180, 182, 184,185,188,216-17,227,236,246, 249, 253

world capital flows 80-5direct flows 80Indirect flows 80

Index 325

world capitalist development 58.165

world compression 122-3world-economy 15,59, 121'world-e.cprre' 58world factory versusworld

market 50World Health Organization

(WHO) 196World Intellectual Property

Orgarnzation (WIPO) 151world population 75-6world system 4.9,38, 59

world system theory 58, 60world system wnters 63

world trade 67, 68-75World Trade Organization

(WTO) 70,76,91, 148, 149,151, 159

World Wide Web 107Wnght Mills. C. 167

Yam, J. 229

zero defect principle 100