Global soft power and the adaptive state: Global soft power and the adaptive state: China’s...
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Transcript of Global soft power and the adaptive state: Global soft power and the adaptive state: China’s...
Global soft power andGlobal soft power andthe adaptive state:the adaptive state:
China’s differing pathways of adaptation to international norms
Titus C. ChenIIR-NCCU, Taiwan
October 2009
Human rights and rule of law: a natural pair?
Presupposed relations between liberal HR and rule of law Liberal HR as the moral purpose of rule of law Rule of law as the expression & guarantee of
liberal HR Adopted by academia & advocacy groups
They seem to be right…
And the graph seems to…
But China defies the pattern
Percentile Rank Governance Score
(0-100) (-2.5 to +2.5)
Voice and Accountability 2007 5.8 38.4 -1.7
Political Stability 2007 32.2 39.4 -0.33
Government Effectiveness 2007 61.1 37.2 0.15
Regulatory Quality 2007 45.6 36.9 -0.24
Rule of Law 2007 42.4 37.7 -0.45
Control of Corruption 2007 30.9 37.4 -0.66
Governance Indicator Year Income Average, Percentile
China’s two pathways of adaptation
Human rights: Adaptation through outward argumentation External pressure (1989) – prescriptive recognition
(2009) Prescriptive recognition as the result
Rule of law (good governance): Adaptation through inward, selective learning Prescriptive recognition (1997) – external engagement
(1998) Prescriptive recognition as the beginning
Explaining the China conundrum
What accounts for uneven socialization of global norms into China’s domestic practices?
What accounts for the variation of China’s adaptation strategies?
Constructivist IR theories of state socialization
Identity-based constructivism (Path I) Finnemore, Klotz, Wendt, Katzenstein, Zehfuss social construction of state identity—uncritically
internalizing the “social terms” of international society Socialization through identification
Rule-based constructivism (Path II) Risse, Sikkink, Reus-Smit, Hawkins, Brysk Behavioral change through conscious & contentious
engagement From institutional embedment to conceptual entrapment Socialization through argumentation
Constructivist IR theories: “bringing the domestic back in”
Endogenous constructivism (Path III) Legro, Beyers, Hooghe, Lewis, Checkel, Avedeyeva,
Sundstrom Previous socialization in domestic politics matters Conceptual and/or bureaucratic match Socialization by matching
Interpretive constructivism (Path IV) Lynch, Yanow, Blyth, Widmaier, Seabrooke Locally-generated diagnosis & prescription Actively seeking solutions compatible with prescription Socialization by learning
Observations
Path-dependent factor: Pre-socialization conditions @ t-1 influenced the state’s perception & coping strategy to socialization @ t
Process-generated factor: effects of engagement @ t bear upon later development @ t+1
Propositions
China’s adaptation to human rights pressure: Rule-based constructivism: socialization through
argumentation China’s adaptation to int’l rule of law movement
Interpretive constructivism: socialization by learning Endogenous constructivism: socialization by matching
Human rights pre-socialization conditions
A materialist & class-based understanding A nationalist understanding A state-centered understanding Unfamiliarity with human rights norms
Dismantling of the Cold War
Human rights pressures & denial
Began with post-Tiananmen pressures Initial perception: ideological & power struggle Initial coping strategy: denial through argumentation Initial agenda: anti-liberalization Changing modes of engagement:
t—Denial (1990-1995) t+1—Tactical concessions (1996-2009) t+2—Prescriptive recognition (2004-2009)
Human rightseffects of engagement (a)
1. Institutional embedment (i): Lessons learned from 1990 UNCHR A Marxist HR argument after 1991—the rights to
subsistence and development Specialized HR agencies & bureaucrats HR research institutes & programs Regular issuance of HR white papers after 1991 Changing int’l HR agenda:
Bangkok Declaration, Vienna Declaration, 1993
Human rightseffects of engagement (b)
1. Institutional embedment (ii): Enticement—invitation of bilateral HR dialogue, ‘95- Counterattack—Group of like-minded states, ‘96-’97 Major victory at UNCHR, ’97 Regularization of bilateral HR dialogue, ‘97- Ratification of HR conventions & protocols Active engagement in UN HR institutional reform
Engagement bred more engagement Engagement formed a “common life world”
UNCHR voting records, 1990-2004
18
24
22 22
26 26
15
21 1 1
17
27
22
20
22
27 27
22 2223
28
15 15
1716
22
20
17 1718
1716
1110
12
17
9
6
9
14
12 12
9
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 2004
Vot
es
Year
UNCHR voting records on China resolutions (1990-2004)
SPONSOR
PRO NO-ACTION
ANTI NO-ACTION
ABSTENTION
Ratification of HR conventions by year
1 1
2
4
0 0 0
1 1
0
1
0
1
0 0 0 0 0
1
0 0
1
5
0 0 0 0 0
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Num
ber o
f rati
ficati
on
YEAR
Yearly Number
Ratification of HR conventions by period
1
7
3
1 1
6
21
8
1112
13
19
21
0
5
10
15
20
25
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7
Pre-1981 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2009
Periodic total
Total
Human rightseffects of engagement (c)
2. Conceptual entrapment (i): Recognized the validity of universal HR norms, ‘95 Admitted HR violations after ‘95 Accepted Western democracies & IGOs as legitimate
interlocutors after ’95 Agreed to discuss specific HR cases after ‘97 Emphasized the fulfillment of int’l HR obligations
Human rightseffects of engagement (d)
2. Conceptual entrapment (ii): Prescriptive recognition:
Amendments of State Constitution, ‘04 Amendment of Party Constitution, ‘07 National HR Action Plan, ’09
Remained in rhetorical mode of engagement Symbolic declaration, not enforceable commitment Lack of bureaucratic support HR violations by central & local authorities
Initial agenda stands
Human rightsAdaptation, not liberalization—ESS cases
769
690725
686
336
426
296
604
742
1623
660
683
886
766
456 467
349 561619
1327
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Num
ber
Year
NUMBER OF ARREST
NUMBER OF INDICTMENT
Rule of lawpre-socialization conditions (a)
Resurgence of law & development movement in the 1990s
Rule of lawpre-socialization conditions (b)
China’s transitional political economy (i) Decentralization & deregulation in the ‘80s
Local & departmental protectionism Expanding but fragmented administration
Admin. rationalization in the ‘90s Adjusting central-local relationship Streamlining government structure Moving to a regulatory & service-oriented state
Rule of lawpre-socialization conditions (c)
Unintended results of rationalization Underfunded local gov. became predatory Understaffed local gov. perform poorly reg. power Unprofessional local gov. could not provide services Local gov disregarded state laws & central orders Rampant corruption, rising social discontent
Rule of lawpre-socialization conditions (d)
Self-generated diagnosis by central ruling elites Entrenchment in parochial interests Lack of a sense of legality Poor capacity of law enforcement and supervision
Rule of lawpre-socialization conditions (e)
Policy prescriptions by central ruling elites Urging “全局意识” since 1994 Promoting awareness of legality Promoting the idea of administration by law Promoting legal services (lawyers, legal aid) Formalization: “Administrating the state by law” written
into Party Constitution (‘97) and State Constitution (‘98) Interests in learning from Western legislation &
bureaucratic professional training Adaptation by strategic learning
Rule of lawpre-socialization conditions (f)
Reformist leadership of legal-judicial system Bureaucratic & professional interests MOJ promoted legality & legal services after 1994 Liberal scholarship in legal education SPC pushed for structural reform &
professionalization after 1999 NCPSC & its Legal Work Commission
Adaptation by professional/bureaucratic matching
Rule of lawadaptation through selective learning (a)
Began with prescriptive recognition Initial perception: domestic governance Initial coping strategy: selective learning Initial agenda: policy cohesion & admin.
rationalization Changing modes of engagement:
t—Prescriptive recognition (1994-1998) t+1—Selective learning (1998-2008) t+2— Reassessment ? (2008-)
Rule of law selective learning (b)
Sino-Western legal-judicial programs, ’97- Bilateral, intergovernmental cooperation
US Presidential Rule of Law Initiative EU-China Legal-Judicial Programme Canadian AID, GTZ
Cooperation with IOs & INGOs UNDP, World Bank, ADB Non-governmental donors (Ford, Carnegie) Legal professional organizations (ABA, TAF, IBJ) Academics (Yale, Cornell, Columbia, Temple)
Rule of law effects of engagement (b)
Institutional building Economic legislation Legal services (lawyers, legal aid) Criminal justice reform:
Procedural reform in death penalty—recentralization Lawyers’ Law Proposed reform in RETL—judicialization
Professionalization of legal workers Conceptual change
A large reservoir of reform proponents Judicial independence, rights awareness
Rule of lawEngagement by the US
Rule of lawEngagement by the EU
Rule of law Reassessment by the Party-state
Repression against public interest lawyers since 2005 New leadership in SPC since March 2008
“Three supremes” “Democratization” of judicial work
Reappearance of legal populism Rebound of death penalty: 1010 (‘06), 470 (‘07), to 1718
(‘08) Adaptation, not liberalization Disagreement of reformist judges, lawyers, &
scholars
Rule of law Reclamation of Party control
Rule of law Resurgence of legal populism
Conclusion: China’s capped socialization
Multiple pathways of state socialization The relevance of pre-socialization conditions The relevance of internal dynamics: admin.
rationalization and anti-liberalization