Global Asset Allocation: The Case For International Investment
description
Transcript of Global Asset Allocation: The Case For International Investment
1
Global Asset Allocation:Global Asset Allocation:The Case For International InvestmentThe Case For International Investment
Campbell R. Harvey, Ph.D.,Professor,
Duke Universityhttp://www.duke.edu/~charvey
Global Asset Allocation and Stock Selection
2
The PlanThe Plan
• International track record
• Returns and diversification
• Long horizon vs. short horizon
• What can we expect from U.S. equities?
• What to expect from international?
• Alternative views: dynamic strategies, hedge funds
• Research frontier – changing views of diversification
• Importance of GPR
3
6.0%
7.0%
8.0%
9.0%
10.0%
11.0%
12.0%
13.0%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Volatility(May 1986 to June 2002)
Ret
urn
(May
198
6 to
Ju
ne
2002
)
One Year Treasury STRIP
Two Year STRIP
Five Year Treasury STRIP
Seven Year Treasury STRIP
Ten Year Treasury STRIP
Twenty Year Treasury STRIPThirty Year Treasury STRIP
MBS Credit
AggregateGovernment
Three Year Treasury STRIP
Wilshire Small Cap
Wilshire 5000Wilshire Large Cap
Wilshire Mid Cap
EAFE X-Japan
U.S. Investments Versus Non-U.S. Equities
The International Track RecordThe International Track Record
Source: Erb and Harvey (2002)
EAFE
4
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
Australi
a
Austria
Belg
ium
Canad
a
Den
mar
k
Finlan
d
France
Ger
man
y
Hong K
ong
Irelan
d It
aly
Japan
Nether
lands
New
Zea
land
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Swed
en
Switzer
land UK US
World
World
ex-U
S
EAFE
Expansion geometric mean Recession geometric mean
Average Annual Returns During U.S. Business Cycle Phases
Returns and DiversificationReturns and Diversification
Data from MSCI
5
Returns and DiversificationReturns and Diversification
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
Argen
tina
Bahrai
n
Brazil
Chile
China
Colombia
Czech
Rep
ublic
Egypt
Greece
Hungary
India
Indones
ia
Israe
l
Jord
an
Korea
Mala
ysia
Mex
ico
Moro
cco
Nigeri
a
Oman
Pakist
an
Peru
Philippin
es
Poland
Russia
Saudi A
rabia
Slovak
ia
South A
frica
Sri Lan
ka
Taiwan
Thailan
d
Turkey
Venez
uela
Zimbab
we
Composite
Expansion geometric mean Recession geometric mean
Average Returns During U.S. Business Cycle Phases
AnnualReturnU.S. $
Data from IFC
6
Returns and DiversificationReturns and Diversification
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Australi
a
Austria
Belg
ium
Canad
a
Den
mar
k
Finlan
d
France
Ger
man
y
Hong K
ong
Irelan
d It
aly
Japan
Nether
lands
New
Zea
land
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Swed
en
Switzer
land
UK USW
orld
World
ex-U
S
EAFE
Expansion std.dev. Recession std.dev.
Average Annual Volatility During U.S. Business Cycle Phases
Data from MSCI
7
Returns and DiversificationReturns and Diversification
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Australi
a
Austria
Belg
ium
Canad
a
Den
mar
k
Finlan
d
France
Ger
man
y
Hong K
ong
Irelan
d It
aly
Japan
Nether
lands
New
Zea
land
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Swed
en
Switzer
land
UK USW
orld
World
ex-U
S
EAFE
Expansion correlation with US Recession correlation with US
Correlations During U.S. Business Cycle Phases
Data from MSCI
8
Returns and DiversificationReturns and Diversification
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Australi
a
Austria
Belg
ium
Canad
a
Den
mar
k
Finlan
d
France
Ger
man
y
Hong K
ong
Irelan
d It
aly
Japan
Nether
lands
New
Zea
land
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Swed
en
Switzer
land
UK US
World
World
ex-U
S
EAFE
Expansion covariance with US Recession covariance with US
Covariances During U.S. Business Cycle Phases
Data from MSCI
9
Returns and DiversificationReturns and Diversification
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
Australi
a
Austria
Belg
ium
Canad
a
Den
mar
k
Finlan
d
France
Ger
man
y
Hong K
ong
Irelan
d It
aly
Japan
Nether
lands
New
Zea
land
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Swed
en
Switzer
land
UK US
World
World
ex-U
S
EAFE
US+ geometric mean US- geometric mean
Average Returns During U.S. Up and Down Markets
Data from MSCI
10
Returns and DiversificationReturns and Diversification
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
Argen
tina
Bahrai
n
Brazil
Chile
China
Colombia
Czech
Rep
ublic
Egypt
Greece
Hungary
India
Indones
ia
Israe
l
Jord
an
Korea
Mala
ysia
Mex
ico
Moro
cco
Nigeri
a
Oman
Pakist
an
Peru
Philippin
es
Poland
Russia
Saudi A
rabia
Slovak
ia
South A
frica
Sri Lan
ka
Taiwan
Thailan
d
Turkey
Venez
uela
Zimbab
we
Composite
US+ geometric mean US- geometric mean
Average Returns During U.S. Up and Down Markets
AnnualReturnU.S. $
Data from IFC
11
Returns and DiversificationReturns and Diversification
Evolution of Correlation with U.S.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
19701972
19741976
19781980
19821984
19861988
19901992
19941996
19982000
2002
Corr(WorldXUS, US) Corr(IFC,US)
Data from IFC and MSCI
12
The Long HorizonThe Long Horizon
100 Years of Real Equity Returns
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Australi
a
Belgiu
m
Canad
a
Denmark
France
German
Irelan
d Ita
ly
Japan
Netherl
ands
South A
frica
Spain
Sweden
UK
U.S.
World
World
X-U
S
Data from Dimson, Marsh and Stauton (2002)
13
The Long HorizonThe Long Horizon
100 Years of Real Equity Returns
-5
0
5
10
15
20
1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
U.S. equity World X-US equity
Data from Dimson, Marsh and Stauton (2002)
14
The Long HorizonThe Long Horizon
100 Years of Real Bond Returns
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Australi
a
Beligum
Canad
a
Denmark
France
German
Irelan
d Ita
ly
Japan
Netherl
ands
South A
frica
Spain
Sweden
UK
U.S.
World
World
X-U
S
Data from Dimson, Marsh and Stauton (2002)
15
The Long HorizonThe Long Horizon
100 Years of Real Bond Returns
-10
-5
0
5
10
1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
U.S. World X-US
Data from Dimson, Marsh and Stauton (2002)
16
What to ExpectWhat to Expect
Dividend Yields Correlated With Future Returns
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Div
iden
d Y
ield
1900 Yield 2000 Yield
Data from Dimson, Marsh and Stauton (2002)
17
What to ExpectWhat to Expect
Price to Trailing Peak Earnings Vs 5 Year Average CPI(overlapping annual data)
Pri
ce t
o T
raili
ng
Pe
ak
Ea
rnin
gs
Source: Bloomberg, Standard & Poor’s
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
-10.0% -5.0% 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0%
.
1996-2001
5 yr Average CPI
(1920- August 2002)
Current environment:
Inflation: 2.3%
P/E: 17.0x
Source: Goldman Sachs (2002)
18
What to ExpectWhat to Expect
• Ten-year risk premium around 3.5% and stable whereas one-year risk premium quite variable
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
6-Jun-00 7-Sep-00 4-Dec-00 12-Mar-017-Jun-01 10-Sep-01 4-Dec-01 11-Mar-024-Jun-02 16-Sep-02 2-Dec-02
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
6-Jun-00 7-Sep-00 4-Dec-00 12-Mar-017-Jun-01 10-Sep-01 4-Dec-01 11-Mar-024-Jun-02 16-Sep-02 2-Dec-02
10-year premium 1-year premium
Source: Graham and Harvey (2002)
19
What to ExpectWhat to Expect
y = 0.794x + 0.0791
R2 = 0.167
-15.00%
-10.00%
-5.00%
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
40.00%
-15.00% -10.00% -5.00% 0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00%
Rolling Five Year Long Term Bond Return(June 1932 to June 2002)
Rol
ling
Fiv
e Y
ear
S&
P 5
00 R
etu
rn
U.S. Equity and Bond Returns are Positively Correlated
Source: Erb and Harvey (2002)
20
What to ExpectWhat to Expect
World Real Equity and Real Bond Returns are Positively Correlated
Source: Erb and Harvey (2002)
y = 0.6783x + 4.815
R2 = 0.3984
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20
Ten Year Real Bond Return
Ten
Yea
r R
eal S
tock
Ret
urn
21
What to ExpectWhat to Expect
Inflation Negatively Related to Real Bill Returns
Source: Erb and Harvey (2002)
y = -0.7078x + 0.0294
R2 = 0.5373
-20.0%
-15.0%
-10.0%
-5.0%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
-15.0% -10.0% -5.0% 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0%
Inflation
T-B
ill R
eal R
etu
rn
22
What to ExpectWhat to Expect
Inflation Negatively Related to Real Intermediate Bond Returns
Source: Erb and Harvey (2002)
y = -0.9873x + 0.0545
R2 = 0.3639-20.0%
-15.0%
-10.0%
-5.0%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
-15.0% -10.0% -5.0% 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0%
Inflation
Inte
rmed
iate
Bon
d R
eal R
etu
rn
23
What to ExpectWhat to Expect
Inflation Negatively Related to Real Bond Returns
Source: Erb and Harvey (2002)
y = -1.3027x + 0.0664
R2 = 0.2767-30.0%
-20.0%
-10.0%
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
-15.0% -10.0% -5.0% 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0%
Inflation
Lon
g B
ond
Rea
l Ret
urn
24
What to ExpectWhat to Expect
Inflation Negatively Related to Real Equity Returns
Source: Erb and Harvey (2002)
y = -1.1054x + 0.1299
R2 = 0.0546
-60.0%
-40.0%
-20.0%
0.0%
20.0%
40.0%
60.0%
-15.0% -10.0% -5.0% 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0%
Inflation
S&
P R
eal R
etu
rn
25
What to ExpectWhat to Expect
Inflation Negatively Related to Real International Bill Returns
Source: Erb and Harvey (2002)
y = -0.9226x + 4.7819
R2 = 0.8021
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
100 Year Inflation Rate
100
Yea
r R
eal B
ill R
etu
rn
26
What to ExpectWhat to Expect
Inflation Negatively Related to Real International Bill Returns
Source: Erb and Harvey (2002)
y = -0.6731x + 3.9725
R2 = 0.6097
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
100 Year Inflation Rate
100
Yea
r R
eal B
ond
Ret
urn
27
What to ExpectWhat to Expect
Inflation Negatively Related to Real International Equity Returns
Source: Erb and Harvey (2002)
y = -0.6333x + 8.3176
R2 = 0.4935
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
100 Year Inflation Rate
100
Yea
r R
eal E
qu
ity
Ret
urn
28
What to ExpectWhat to Expect
Inflation Negatively Related to Real International Equity Returns
Source: Erb and Harvey (2002)
y = -0.9226x + 4.7819
R2 = 0.8021
y = -0.6731x + 3.9725
R2 = 0.6097
y = -0.6333x + 8.3176
R2 = 0.4935
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
100 Year Inflation Rate
100
Yea
r R
eal R
etu
rn
Real Bill Real Bond Real Equity
29
Alternative VehiclesAlternative Vehicles
Alternate Asset Classes Often Involve Implicit or Explicit Options
-4-3-2-101234567
1 2 3 4 5
S&P 500Global Macro
Source: Naik (2002)
30
Alternative VehiclesAlternative Vehicles
Alternate Asset Classes Often Involve Implicit or Explicit Options
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
1 2 3 4 5
S&P 500Trend Followers
Source: Naik (2002)
31
Alternative VehiclesAlternative Vehicles
Alternate Asset Classes Often Involve Implicit or Explicit Options
-4-3-2-101234567
1 2 3 4 5
S&P 500FI Arb
Source: Naik (2002)
32
Alternative VehiclesAlternative Vehicles
Alternate Asset Classes Often Involve Implicit or Explicit Options
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
1 2 3 4 5
Delta(BAA-10yTBond)x10FI Arb
Source: Naik (2002)
33
Alternative VehiclesAlternative Vehicles
Alternate Asset Classes Often Involve Implicit or Explicit Options
Panel B: PRAM Returns, 1990 - 1998
Ris
k A
rb R
etu
rn -
Ris
k-f
ree
Rat
e
Market Return minus Risk-free Rate
-.2 -.16 -.12 -.08 -.04 0 .04 .08 .12 .16 .2
-.1
-.08
-.06
-.04
-.02
0
.02
.04
.06
.08
.1
9808
9008
9001
9009
9607
9703
9106
9403
9111
9411
9708
97109004
94069805
9304
98079203
9402920892069409
93119010
9007
961295109109
9606900692019702930791049309
98019306
93029205
9508
9405
9804
9404960394129210
9002
9209
96109301951292029204
9410
9602
9110
9712
9212
9310
9501
9312
9003
9604
9504
9108
9503
96059303
9012
96019103
950697119305
9407
96089505
9401
980695099502
91059507
93089207
9211
9704
9511
9408
970691079101
9803
9701
9609
9709
9811
9812
9809
9011
9611
970598029810
91029707
90059112
Source: Figure 5 from Mitchell & Pulvino (2000)
34
Alternative VehiclesAlternative Vehicles
Alternate Asset Classes Often Involve Implicit or Explicit Options
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10
Russell 3000 Index Returns
Eve
nt D
riven
Inde
x R
etur
ns
LOWESS fit
Source: Naik (2002)
35
Rethinking RiskRethinking Risk
• Traditional models maximize expected returns for some level of volatility
• Is volatility a complete measure of risk?
36
Rethinking RiskRethinking Risk
• Much interest in downside risk, asymmetric volatility, semi-variance, extreme value analysis, regime-switching, jump processes, ...
37
Rethinking RiskRethinking Risk
• ... These are just terms that describe the skewness in returns distributions.
• Most asset allocation work operates in two dimensions: mean and variance -- but skew is important for investors.
• Examples:
38
Rethinking RiskRethinking Risk
1. The $1 lottery ticket. The expected value is $0.45 (hence a -55%) expected return.– Why is price so high? – Lottery delivers positive skew, people like
positive skew and are willing to pay a premium
39
Rethinking RiskRethinking Risk
2. High implied vol in out of the money OEX put options.– Why is price so high? – Option limits downside (reduces negative
skew).– Investors are willing to pay a premium for
assets that reduce negative skew
40
Rethinking RiskRethinking Risk
3. Some stocks that trade with seemingly “too high” P/E multiples– Why is price so high? – Enormous upside potential (some of which is
not well understood)– Investors are willing to pay a premium for
assets that produce positive skew– [Note: Expected returns could be small or
negative!]
41
Rethinking RiskRethinking Risk
0
5
10
15
Variance
- 2
- 1
0
1
2
Skewness
5
7.5
10
12.5
Expected Return
0
5
10
15
Variance
Source: Harvey and Siddique (2000)
42
Rethinking RiskRethinking Risk
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Australi
a
Austria
Belg
ium
Canad
a
Den
mar
k
Finlan
d
France
Ger
man
y
Hong K
ong
Irelan
d It
aly
Japan
Nether
lands
New
Zea
land
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Swed
en
Switzer
land UK US
World
World
ex-U
S
EAFE
Average Skewness in Developed Markets
Data from MSCI
43
Rethinking RiskRethinking Risk
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Argen
tina
Bahrai
n
Brazil
Chile
China
Colombia
Czech
Rep
ublicEgy
pt
Greece
Hunga
ry
India
Indo
nesia
Israe
l
Jord
an
Korea
Mala
ysia
Mex
ico
Mor
occo
Nigeria
Oman
Pakist
an
Peru
Philipp
ines
Poland
Russia
Saudi
Arabia
Slovak
ia
South
Africa
Sri Lan
ka
Taiw
an
Thaila
nd
Turke
y
Venez
uela
Zimba
bwe
Compo
site
Average Skewness in Emerging Markets
Data from IFC
44
U.S. Has Become a Riskier Global InvestmentU.S. Has Become a Riskier Global Investment
• The U.S. has become much more risky– High sensitivity to some GPRs– Disagreement on strength of economy– Financial information less credible
• These factors suggest shifting exposures from equity to safer fixed income
45
U.S. Has Become a Riskier Global InvestmentU.S. Has Become a Riskier Global Investment ICRG Political Risk
Data from PRS
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
Equally-weighted world G-7xUS Switzerland United States
46
U.S. Has Become a Riskier Global InvestmentU.S. Has Become a Riskier Global Investment ICRG Political Risk
Data from PRS
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
Equally-weighted world Japan Switzerland United States
47
U.S. Has Become a Riskier Global InvestmentU.S. Has Become a Riskier Global Investment ICRG Political Risk
Data from PRS
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
Equally-weighted world Japan
Germany Switzerland
United States
48
U.S. Has Become a Riskier Global InvestmentU.S. Has Become a Riskier Global Investment
Risk Ratings December 2002
Data from PRS
Luxembourg 94.5 Netherlands 88.5 Bahamas 84.5Finland 94.0 Singapore 88.5 Spain 83.0Ireland 92.5 Portugal 87.5 Hungary 82.5Switzerland 92.5 Australia 87.0 France 81.0Iceland 92.0 Belgium 87.0 Italy 81.0Sweden 91.5 Japan 87.0 Slovenia 81.0Denmark 91.0 United Kingdom 87.0 Brunei 80.5New Zealand 91.0 Malta 86.5 United States 80.0Austria 90.5 Canada 86.0 Bahrain 79.5Norway 90.0 Germany 86.0 Poland 79.5
49
U.S. Has Become a Riskier Global InvestmentU.S. Has Become a Riskier Global Investment
Risk Ratings May 2001
Netherlands 96.5 Portugal 90.0 Chile 81.0Finland 95.0 Norway 90.0 Slovak Rep. 81.0Luxembourg 95.0 Singapore 89.5 Uruguay 81.0Denmark 93.5 Germany 88.0 Brunei 80.5Iceland 93.0 Japan 88.0 France 80.0Sweden 93.0 Australia 87.0 Qatar 80.0Switzerland 93.0 Belgium 87.0 U.A.E. 80.0United Kingdom 92.5 Malta 87.0 Hong Kong 79.5Canada 91.0 Bahamas 84.5 Poland 79.5Ireland 90.5 Costa Rica 83.5 Botswana 79.0New Zealand 90.5 Italy 83.0 Cyprus 79.0Austria 90.0 Spain 82.0 Czech Rep. 79.0United States 90.0 Slovenia 81.5 Greece 79.0
Data from PRS
50
R2 = 0.2976
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
II Rating
Ave
rage
ret
urns
U.S. Has Become a Riskier Global InvestmentU.S. Has Become a Riskier Global Investment
Higher risk means equity investors require a higher rate of return
Risk Ratings from Institutional Investor
51
• Equation implies an increase in the medium-term risk premium of 240bp– This helps explain the recent decline in the
equity market– This helps explain the recent behavior of the
U.S. dollar– This helps explain the slow down in real
investment (hurdle rates are up)
U.S. Has Become a Riskier Global InvestmentU.S. Has Become a Riskier Global Investment
52
• International investment is mainly about returns – diversification, while important, is often “oversold”
• Expected returns depend on fundamental values today – not just historical return performance.
• U.S. risk has increased suggesting a reallocation from equity to fixed income
ConclusionsConclusions
53
• All articles on www.duke.edu/~charvey– The Drivers of Expected Returns in
International Markets (2000)– Global Tactical Asset Allocation (2001) with
Magnus Dahlquist– The Term Structure of Equity Risk Premia
(2002) with Claude Erb
ReadingsReadings