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5886presented here just a-s Rappaccioli present-ed it al the Seventh Congress of the Popu-lar A-lliance, the Spanish ConservativeParty, ;hrcn i: currently underway inMadrid:The Political parties that have signed ihisdocument, inspired by the besb and mosiconstructive patriotic splrit to achieve Ni-caragua's pacification and ensure ik futuredevelopment based upon ihe Nicaraeuans'authentic wishes, declare their firm andpublic decision to make every efforl toachie.:e these objectives.AJso supported are the Contadora Group'sefforts recently reiterated in the Carabal-leda message issued on 17 January 1986, es-peciauy Seclion II, Clause B.For this purpose the government is urgedto join lhe people in attaining the followinggoals within lhe shortest time possible:]. An agreement to immediately suspendhoslilities between the government forcesand the irreenrlar forces opposed to them asa preliminary step toward a definite peaceagreement and the country's demilitariza-tion.2. Approval of an effective general aru:les-ty las' for political crimes and relatedconunon crimes that will result in an effec-tive reconciliation of the Nicaraguan family.3. Aboiition of fhe state of emergency, andfull reesbablishment and implemenEation ofthe Nicacaguans' rights and guarrmtees.4. Signing of an a8TeemenL between thecountr.v's political parties for 0he prepara-tion and fuliillment of a new elerjtoral proc-ess that will lead to general lections irlwhich all of the political pariies or groupsthat desire to l)srticipate may do so, oncethey have ol)tained political and iegal recog-nition.5. Effective fulfillment of inlernationalcornmitments in favor of Nicarag:ua's democ-ratization.6. The invitation to existing continentalorganizations and ad hoc groups that havedemonstrated an interest in peace and jus-tice in thc Central American area, a-s well a-sto international political organizations, sothey can express their concurrence with im-plementa0ion ol the points demanded.Signed:Independent Liberal Party: VirgilioGodoy, president.Social Christian Party: f'rancisco Ta-boada.Social Democratic Party: Luis Rivas Leiva,Secretary general.Constltutionalist Liberal Party: RodolfoMejia Ubilla, adjunct secretary general.Democratic Conservative Party of Nicara-gua tnonruling parCy): Eruique Sotelo 8.,national political secretary.Nicaraguan Coruervative Party: MarjoRappaccioli, national president.

FREEDOM'S FT]TUR,E: THE T'REEWOR.LD AND THE SOVIETEMPTREThe SPEAKER pro tempore. Undera previous order of the House, the gen-tlemarr from Georgia [Mr. Grncnlcn]is recoEnized for 60 minutes.Mr. CiINGRICH. Mr. Speaker, thisspecial order and one other whieh willfollow is on freedom's future, the freeworld and the Soviet empire.I want to focus on the reality of theSouiet empire, the Soviet trarxna-tional threat to freedom and securityand the necessity for a sophisticated

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSEfree-world response led by the UnitedStates.There are three propositions to thisanalysis. First, the reality of theSoviet empire, the Cuban colonialarmy, and a transnational strategy fortyranny, Second, the need for revolu-tion in Arnerican idea.s, in Americanpolitical understanding, in Americanpolicies, in American institutions tomatch on the side of freedom thistrarunaiional Soviet imperial threat.Third, the deg:ee to which the Reaganadrninistration as well as the Congressand the American people has failed tounderstand iniellectually the scale ofthe Soviet trarunational threat andhas failed to develop a response of suf-ficient power.Let me expand: First, on proposition1 that there is a Soviet empire whosethreat is real and whose transnationalstrategy has made obsolete our con-tainment policies and has made inef-fective and out-of-date our political,diplomatic, legal, and military doc-trines and that our difficulty in recog-nizing and responding to this transna-tional reality is first intel.lectual andsecond psychological.Second proposition, that it is possi-ble to design a new transnationalstrategy of freedom to defeat theSoviel empire's transnational strategyof tyranny, that this new transna-tional strategy of freedom requires arevolution in ideas, in doctrine, and ininslitutions coinparable to the 1945 to1950 Truman-Ivlarshall-Vandenbergcycle Erhich defined the Soviet threatto freedom, filled the vacuum of poweraround the world to contain the Sovietempire, explained pro-democratic anti-communism to the American people sothey accepted it, invented the CentralIntelligence Agency, the Marshallplan, the Point F our Program, theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization,created the unified Department of De-fense, raised the most powerful peace-time forces in American history, begandecolonizing the old Western Europe-an empires in the Third World, helpedestablish Israel, and helped lay theseeds of the European CornrnonMarket, develolled a democratic Japanand West Germany, used Americancovert aid to defeat communism peace-ably in Italy and in Flance and usedAmerican overt aid to help defeat com-munism militarily in Greece and thePhilippines, helped integrate ourWorld War U enemies into a pro-free-dom, anti-Soviet a,lliance and recog-nized that there really were Sovietspies, that some people really were se-curity risks, and that we really didhave to protect ourselves from en-emies within as well as without.These enormous achievements, bheachievements of the Tru-rnan-Mar-shall-Vandenberg team were irrunenseand the conJlict wibhin American soci-ety was a,s vivid and emotional as one

March 21, 1986would expecf for a change of thatscale.The saga of bhe Harry Truman-Hubert Humphrey-R,onald ReaganDemocrats, as Reagan then was aDemocrat, in recognizine and identify-ing leftwing radical elements in theirown party, in labor unions, and inAmerican life, and in fichting themovertly through argumenls, throughfree democratic methods is a sagawhich the modern leftwing newsmedia and academics seek to ienore.Yet it was a saga whieh helped savefreedom in the Western World,This proposition's corollary is that aresponse to transnational tyranrylarge enough to be successful will beas big, as complex, and as controver-sial as the rise of the containment inthe Truman-Marshall-Vandenbergeffort.My second special order will ouflinea proposed transnational strategy forfreedorn and the institutional and doc-trinal changes it will require. The cen-tral difficulties in proposition two areessentially intellectual, managerial,and political. Thai is, once we acceptthe reality in proposition 1 of theSoviet empire, the Communist Cubancolonial army, and a transnationalstrategy for tyranny, our problems indealing with that, in responding to itare essentially problems of iltellect,problems of management, and prob-lems of Dolicies.Proposition 3, tneasured against thescale and momentum of the Soviet em-pire's chaUenge the Reagan adminis-tration has failed, is failing, and with-out a dramatic fundamental change instrategy will continue to fail.Let me be clear: f have the ereatestrespect for President Reagan. I thinkhe personally understands the threatof communism. He personally under-stands the history of Lenin's adapta-tion of czarist secret police oppressionto the new purposes of a Soviet gov-erning dictatorship.President Reagan personally knowsthere is a Soviet empire and it is aglobal transnational threat to Americaand to freedom. President Reagan per-sonally appreciates the threat to Israelin a more powerful Soviet empire, thethreat to civilization in a more power-ful Soviet-encouraged network of ter-rorism, the threat to AJrican freedomin fhe Soviet use of the Cuban colonialarmy to impose Communist dictator-ships, the threat to freedom in the'Western lfemisphere ttrrough theSoviet empire's Cuban and Nicaraguancolonies, and finally that the long-term persistenee, the massive dedica-tion of resources, and the serious pro-fessionalism of the Soviet empire com-bined with its development of a trans-national strategy makes it a mortalthreat to the survival of America.Fresident Reagan knows all this. Iferanks with Presidents Truman, Eisen-

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March 21, 1986hower, Kerrnedy, and Nixon in tryingto focus attention on the Sovietempire and in trying to protect free-dom. Yet President Reagan is clearlyfailinc.Whatever tactical successes he iswinning in El Salvador, in Grenada, orin rebuilding our defenses, are success-es built on the quicksand of his per-sonal popularity. As he himself saidlast Sunday, he tras less than 3 yearsleff to serve. Yet there are not the in-stitutional frameworks, the politicalmovemenLs, the massive public educa-tion that are the necessary permanentbase for a true America.n response tothe rising Soviet imperial challenge inthe form of a transnational strategy oftyranny using Cuban colonial forces,The fact is that George Will,Charles Krauthammer, Irving Krisbol,and Jeane Kirkpatrick are right inpointing out the enorrnous gap be-tween President Reagan's strong rhet-oric, which is adequate, and his admin-istration's weak policies, which are in-adequate and will ultimately fail.Sincere, decent, committed anii-Communlst Members of the Ifouseand Senate who quesi,ion $100 millionin aid to the NicaraEnran freedomfighters and ask in vain for a strategyare fundamentally rieht. The Reaganadministration has a huge gap be-tween its President's correct visionarywarnings of the transnational Sovietempire and the rest of the executivebranch's incorrect, ineffective fuan-blings and inadequaeies.The burden of this failure franklYmust be placed first on PresidentReagan; he is the President.In addition, to making good speechesit is his job to ensure that othersdesign good policies, that they imple-ment them effectively, and that theyreshape existing institutions andinvent new ones as necessary. He ismore than just the greatest communi-cator of our time. he is the Fresidentand therefore the head of the execu-tive branch a.s well a^s the head of hispolitical party.Second, the burden must be on hisWhite House staff, which has system-atically failed aeain and again for 5years now to understand that the realproblems of developing a transna-tional strategy for freedom of con-fronting the Soviet empire and theCuban colonial arlny are Problensmuch more fundamental than aReagan speech, much more difficultthan a Pat Buchanan editorial, muchmore difficult than once again usingthe CIA to ineffec0ively manage to dothe best it can when the best it can issimply not good enough. I say this notas in any way a com::cent on any Per-sonality but on an institutional crisisof the first order about American Gov-emment and the American Govern-ment's inability as an institution tomeet the challenge of the Sovietempire.

CONGRISSIONAT RECORD-HOUSEThird, the failure must be borne bythe senior executives in the Cabinet,the Department of State, Defense, andthe Cenfral Intelligence Agency; notas individuals, not because they do notmean well, I believe they do, not be-cause they are not serious, I thinkthey are, not because they do not workhard, they work terribly hard; it is rea-sonable for these three fine gentlemanto wonder whaf it is that is beingasked of fhem. But the answer issimple: They are the heads of great in-

stitutions. Those institutioru currentlydo not have an understanding of thetransnational Soviet empire, do noteven use the language that describesthat empire, have no strategies todefeat the empire in countries thePresident ha.s identified.The gap between Ronald Fl,eagzr,n'sUnited Nations speech in srhich hecourageously called for support forfreedom fighters in Afghanistan, Cam-bodia, Ethiopia, Angola, and Nicara-gua, the gap between that speech andthe reality of our pathetically incom-petent efforls is a gap that should be ascandal if oniy we took it seriously.Fourth, the burden be borne byHouse and Senate Rept'rblicans whoagree with President Reagan's visionand have not fought hard enough toforce the changes in the executivebranch. We can hardly expect ourfriends on the left who do not aEreewith this policy or our friends on theIefb who do not aree with this polieyor our friends who are pressured be-cause as Democrats they believeReagan is right, they exist in a caucuswhose majority clearly does not be"lieve Reagan is right, to lead the wayin forcing the executive branch tobecome competent or to lead the wayin articulatinc the ca.se to the Ameri-can people.

D 1240Tlre burden must be borne by llouseand Senate Republicans who agreewith the President's vision, who areafraid of the transnational Sovietempire, who understand the Commu-nist Cuban colonial army, and who un-derstand that what we are doing todaysimply is not good enough,Fifth, the burden of responsibilitymust be borne by our own politicalsupporters who have not held our feetto the fire and who have not focusedon results rather than intentions.It is au too easy in this complex na-tional capital to be so exhausted bydaily crisis that we forget that good in-tentions are not good results, thatmeaning to do well is not the same asdoing well, that thinkinc that doingtoday's speech is somelrow achievingtomorrow's success. It is not necessari-ly true.Our supporters across this Nation,the people who were aroused by Gor.n-wATER in the sixties, the people who,for generations, have believed in

588?Reagan, the people vlho trnderstandthe terrible fhreat of the Sovietempire, those supporters should betougher, firmer, harder on us, in in-sisting that we do a better job, thatthe measure is whether or not we arecapable of defeating the Soviet empirein Angola, not whei;her we mean wellfor Savimbi. The challenge should bewhether or not we can achieve a demo-cratis pro-Western Governmeut inNicaragua, not whether we like theContras.

The challenge should be whether ornot we help the Afgharu regain theircountry, whether we wistr them well asthey are butchered by the SovietArmy.Sixth, the burden must be borne bythe intellectual and cultural communi-ty in America, which has been unwill-ing to deal honestly wiih the Sovietempire.It said a gteat deal about the Ameri-can cultural intellectual communitythat the "I(illing Fields" is a movieabout Cambodia in which, accordingto one critic, the word "Corn:rrunist"was never used- It was not easy towrite an emotional, powerful screenplay, to film a powerful movie aboutthe Commurrist genocide of one-thirdof the population of Cambodia andIranage to avoid the word "Cornnu-nist."Yet it is essential to understand whythe "Killinc Fields" had rave revlewsfrom leftwing intellectuals, while"Rambo" was laughed at. The"Rambo" was overtly anti-Conmunist,while the "Kilinc Fields" managed tosomehov/ pin the blame on Americafor what was clearly a Communist gen-ocidal action in Cambodia.The Arnerican intellectual and cul-tural corununilies are all too blind tothe threat of communism, are all toowilling, just as their predecessors werein the twenties and thirties, to apolo-gize and excuse Ccmmunist atrocities,to somehow never quite understand ordeal directly with the threat of theSovieI empire.Just as H.G. Wells was taken in byStalin, all too many American intellec-tuals and American academics aretaken in by Gorbachev. Just as intel-lectuals in the twenties and thirtiesalways found one more reason toapologize for the Soviet police shte, sotoday all too many intellectuals andal] too many academics find one moreexcuse to apologize for Castro's policestate, for Nicaraguan Comnunistatrocities or for the Soviet empire'satrocities in A-fghanistan,Seventh, and finally, the responsibil-ity must be borne by a news mediawl,lch is critical if a dictatorship isprc.American, but tends to iEnore adictatorship which is anti-American,whlch uses Soviet language to explainSoviet behavior, which pretends thatJaruzelski is an independent leader of

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5888Poland, when clearly Jaruzelski is thedictalor imposed by the Soviet army,which ignores if possible the 35,000pounds of Communist documents cap-tured in Grenada when we liberatedthat island, and which ignores when itcan the real nature of Ortega's Com-munisI dicbatorship.All ioo often the news rnedia itselJ isgro'uesquely uncritical and grotesquelywiUine to use Soviet lancuage to ex-plain Soviet behavior, Possibly itreached its epitome when ABC Newspub on a paid Soviet propagandist fol-lowing the President of the UnitedStates.The American news media stands, Ibelieve, guilty all too often of failingto learn the lessons of 40 years of com-petition between freedom and theSovieb empire.In bhe context of all of this, if theReagan administration is to succeed, itwill have to launch a fundamentallynew effort of enormous proportionsaimed, I thin-k, at five sfeps: First, toestablish right laneuage; second, to es-tablish right policies; third, to estab-lish right institutions and strategies;fourth, to establish right public under-standing; and fifth, to establish theright Iegislation. And I believe thesteps come in that order.If bhe State Department has no realknowledge of Leninism, it can hardlyunder;tand ihe Soviet empire. If as re-cently as last Friday, the Central In-telligence Agency was not aware thatin its own files it had records about aCuban general who had served inSyria agairxt Israel and who thenwent to selve in Ango]a against thefreedom fighters, and was now beingassigned to Nicaragua-not, mirrd you,that the CIA did not know who he wasand what he was doing-but it had noboccurred to the Central IntelligenceAgency that the fact that the Cubanshad served against Israel was of ratherconsiderable importance in explainingboth the Soviet empire and in explain-ing to our friends who believe and areconcerned deeply about fsrael why theSoviet empire and its CommunistCuban colonial army is ir, threat forthe very survival of fsrael,If the State Departme.nt, the De-fense Department and the Central In-telligence Agency cannilt think ofusing rieht laneuage, then as GeorgeOrwell put it in his Essay on Politicsand the English Language, it is impos-sible to thini- ;learly about it. The fail-ure of right lrords jeads to failure ofright policy.Yet, I catr ':1'1j Ilatly on this floor,after 4 y&rc ,if arfuing and talkingwith three diJferent Nationai SecurityAdvisers, after ';alkine with the Secre-tary of State, of talking with the As-sistant Secretary f.or Latin America, oftalking with the Presidential speech-writers, that after 4 long years, it isvirtually impossible to get the word"Sandinista," which js a propaganda

CONG RESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSEword stolen by the Comrnunists inNicaragua to deliberately mlslead na-tionalists, it is virtually impossible toget thaL word out of the current gov-ernmenl language. So last Sundaynighl, Ronald R.eagan, who under-stands better than anyone bhat he isdealing with a Communist dictator-ship, used the word "Sandinista" 15times.Now, if the most anti-Conrmunist ar-ticulator in this administration uses aComm'rnist propaganda term, itshould not surprise him ihat the bu-reaucracies of defense and diplomacyuse old language and fail to thinkclearly. If the President of the UnitedStates cannot discipline himself to usethe correct language, he can hardlyexpect those who unde::stand less thanhe does lo rinderstand what is at stake.Yet Sandino was a nationalist. Hewas repudiated by the CommunistParty of Ivlexico in 1934 becarxe hestood for Nicaragua and against theSoviet empire.The true Sandinisfas are preciselythe freedom fighters wlro are national-isbs who were in the countryside whowere fighting against the Communistdictatorship.So, first, before this administrationcan do anything else, it has to use thecorrecf language, or else it has nohope of either articulating for the

American people, for our allies or forour bureaucracies what it is we intendto do.Second, we have to develop rightpolicies. Right policies, I think, haveto be fundamental. ff you do not haveright policies, you can hardly expectto develop the right solution. AJter all,policv is to solution what a cookbookrecipe is to dinner. With a bad recipeyou get a bad dinner; with a bad policyyou are bad to get a bad solution.The best case is Afghanistan. If onewere to examine seriously the West'sefforts to help the Afghan freedomfighters, the freedom fighters who arethe most universally supported on thisplanet, the freedom fighters who havethe best case for their activities, theIreedom fighters wtro are most coura-geously sbanding up against the directovert Soviet invasion of their country,if we were to look seriously at theWest's efforts to help those freedomfighters, we cannot help but cry at theimpotence, the incompetence and theelfectiveness of the West.

March 21, 1986major Soviet advantage? Where are allthe kinds of high-tech equipmentwhich could be there if we had takenseriously in 1980 the job of inventingthe computerlzed, light, high technol-ogy, the inexpensive user-friendly sys-tems that would have driven theSoviet Army out of Afghanistan ormade its stay there a thousand timesmore expensive? Where is the freeworld training academy to take youngAfghan leaders and train them in lightinfantry tacbics and train them in thehabits and doctrine of the SovietArmy?Oh, we have people in camps inPakistan, we have irregulars, we haveadvisers; but the simple fact is thatour response, just as in the SpanishCivil War in the thirties and the de-mocracies were .ineffective, our re-sponse in Afghanistan has been piti-ful, and we should all be ashamed.But then our policy has never beento be militarily good enough with reg-ular light infantry that we coulddefeat the Soviet Army or drive up bhecost dramatically.Where is the diplomatic strategy,the public diplomacy, that knits to-gether throughout the Islamic world aleague for the protection of Islamfreedom against the Soviet empire?Where are the public policy efforts

that should be ongoing every day thatfocus peopir across the world on thefact that even as we speak, there areSoviet troops butchering Afghan. Evenas we rest this evening, there will beSoviet helicopters butchering Af-ghans. Even as we have a nice week-end. there will be Soviet columnsbutchering Afghans.We have simply been incompetent inAfghanistan, in Angola, in Ethiopia, inCambodia and Nicaraflra and we mustconfess it.Third, we lack the right institutionsand the right slrategies, There is noinstitution in America today chargedwith developing irregular Iight in-fan-try weapons. There is no institution inAmerica today charged with desieningthe tactics and the strategy and thedoctrine that will defeat Soviet forcesor Communist Cuban colonial forcesin the field. We do not have those in-stitutions, we have not invented them.and without those institutions, we canhardly invent the strategies that willmake them successful.Where is the Sony hand-held anti- Fourth, how can you possibly havehelicopter missile that is cheap, user right public understanding of what wefriendly and can be trained so that are doing if ycu do not have the rightanyone can use it while carrying it in a language, you do not have the rightbackpack? Where are the inexpensive policies, if you don't have the right in-radios that are easy to use that allow stitutions and strategies?light infantry, which is all the guerril- When people listen to the Presi-las are, to communieate and stay out dent's strong language and look at theof the reach of the soviets? where is pitiful request for 9100 million, canthe light hand-carried radar that they be surprised that there is noallows them to know when the heli- sense of, "Oh, yes, this is urgent"?copters are coming to set up the anti- "This is like Ftanklin Roosevelt inhelicopter missiles to knock down the World War II"?

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March 91, 1986When we look at our strong lan-guage about Afghanistan and our io-tally ineffeci,ive response, can we besurprised that there is no public un-derstanding?When we look at how litUe filmcomes out of Communist tyrannies,can we be surprised? Every night onAmerican television, every night onEuropean television, every night onLatin American television thereshould be footage of the barbarism ofbhe Soviet empire, and we should pay

higher prices to those courageousenough to go into the Soviet empire toget that footage, and it should becomecommonplace to develop documenta-ries and films about just how horribleihe Soviet empire is.Yet, American television does not doit. American commerical televisiondoes not do it. The U-S. InfoqnationService does not do it. And :;hen wewonder why our allies and ourselvesare so ignorant of the truth about theSoviet empire and the Cuban Commu-nist colonial forces.Finally, only within the frameworkoI right language, right policies, rightinstitutions and strategies, right publicunderstanding, can we exPect to getright legislation.For 6 long years now, the Reaganadministration, day in and day out,has followed a fundamentally flawedstrategy of dealing with the Congxess,largely because the senior leadershipof the R,eagan administration remerrr-bered the Rayburn yeers. It has dealttactically behind closed doors withpeople who either cannot deliver votesor will not deliver votes.The fact is that the U.S. Congress isshifting from a Rayburn model, closeddoor, handful of leaders model to aerassroots Congress led by the Nationat large; whereas in Rayburn's daY, adozen nren meeting in what theYcalled the board of education, couldmake major decisions. Today it is mil-liorrs of Americans across this countrywriting, telephoning, wiring, and visit-ing their Congxessman to help makedecisions. This is a much healthierbody now that it has television, nowthat it is open, now that the citEenscan participate by mail, by iet air-plane, by telephone and bY town hallmeetings.Yet there has been no adequateReagan administration vision in strat-egy to develop the gtassroots Con-gress. fn the long rlul, we have to havelong throughout, deliberate strategiesin operation, foctrsinB on educatingthe country at large, rather than fo-cusing on just'ihis Congress.Thts morning at a press conference,we had an iliustration of the gap be-tween what I am describing and whatthis city is used to. One reporter askedme, "How could you want a more aEi-gressive administration than Pat Bu-chanan's article in the Post the otherweek?" Yet, her question was exactly

CONG RESSIONAL RECORD_trIOUSEmy point. With a long-term well-thought-out, strategy, this administra-tion woi.rld have had 30 to 50 peopleoutside the administration writincthat ariicle. There would have beenpeople across America writing ^r,hat ar-ticle. lt would not have been tacticalwork to be done by the Director ofCommunications.Because there is no strategy for thegrassroots, there can be no effectivestrategy for the Congress. Congressesshould follow the will of the people. Ifthe administration carrnot educate theNation into understanding why itneeds over time to develop a transna-tional strategy for freedom to counterthe transnational strategy for tyrannyof the Soviet empire and its Commu-nist Cuban colonial forces, it shouldhardly expect the Congress month inand monlh out to be able to do that.This is not to say that Congressshouid be cowardly or that Congressshould have no role. ft is simply to sayflatly that if the Central IntelligenceAgency will not declassify documents,if the State Department will not usethe right language, if the Defense De-partment will not develop the rightdocirines, if the White lfouse will no0develop the right legislative strategies,it can hardly then turn in a crunchand complain because Fiepresentativesand Senators cannot quite figure outhow to do all tha0 which the executivebranch has failed to do.As I said, I want tc :rt these ordersoutline three propositions. First, therealiby of the Soviet empire, theCuban col.onial Communist army andthe t,ransnal,ional strateglr of tyranny.n 1250Secono, the need ior a free worldstralegy cf a transnational campaignfor freedom to mafch and then defeatthe transnational campaign for tyran-ny.And, third, the specific steps neces-sary for the Reagan administration tocommunicate the firsb and implemerttthe second.To undelstand the intellectual prin-ciples of sl;rategic thinking and whywe lrave been losing the struggle withthe Soviet empire, the CommunistCuban coionial army and their trans-national slrategy of tyranny, it is nec-essary to focus for a moment on thebasic system of thinking of our con-flict.I would sugges0 that the first placewe los-re is intellectually in the issue ofthinking about the ari of survival.Sun T'zu, in "The Art of War," writ-ten 500 years before Christ, said,"Know the enemy and you have wonhalf the battle; know yourself and thebattle is yours."He said that the process of survivalis vital to the state and should be thefirst duty of study of every statesman.The key to survival and thinkingabout survival is recognizing that com-

5889petilion occurs at four levels, and theyare a hierarchy; that the top level isvision, the second level is strategy, thethird ievel i:s operations or projects,and the bottom level !s tastics. Andthey are a hierarchy in the sense thatvision dominates everything else.Strategy, how you are going to imple-ment your vision, dominates the othertwo, operations or projects. \ilhat arethe definable tasks you can assign wiUdominate tactics, and tactics is at thebase.

This is particularly important be-carxe in this country we think almosbalways at the tactical level. We askabout Nica,iaiBua, not the Sovietempire; we ask about General Lopezonly in Nicara8ua, not about GeneralLopez in Syria fighting the fsraelis, inthe Soviet Union being trained, or inAngola dominating the freedom fight-ers fo form another Soviet colony.Let me give you an example of whatI mean by hierarchy and use acommon, everyday nonmilitary exam-ple. If you have the vision that youare going to cook a Thanksgivingdinner, you have a very differen!vision than if you have a vision thatyou are going to fix a picnic in July.That vision changes what kind ofstrategy you will have, in terms e1what you will buy at the grocery store,how long it will take to fix it, whetheror not you rreed to use the stove, howmany people you are going to inviteover, a whole range of issues, evenwhal kind of si-lverware you may use.If you think you are going to fix aThanksgiving dinner but in fact youadopt the strategy of a picnic lunch, soyou buy watermelon, you buy slicedham, you buy lots of potato chips, youmay confuse all of your friends whoshow up for what they thought was aThanksgiving dinner.On the other hand, if you think thatyou are going to go out on a picnic oryour strategy is to set the table withthe family's best China and best silver,you. may confuse those who show upin their shorts and their bathing suitsprepared to go to the locai park.Therefore, the strategy, operations,end tactics have to fit the vision. Thisis particularly important, because his-torically we need to study the vlsion,the strategy, operations and tacticalframework of evcnts to unr-lerstandwhaf is happening.For example, the German Wehr-macht, the German Army in WorldWar II, was brilliant at operatioru andtactics, probably the best aimy inWorld War II. But at the visron andstrategy level, Germany lost the war.And because vision and strategy domi-nate operations and tactics, in the endthe German Army was defeated eventhough. it was a better operationalarmy than any of its compeLitors.The British Army in the AmericanFlevolution was clearly the superior

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5890operational and tactical army. GeorgeItr/ashineton could never have built anAmerican Revolutionary Arny capa-ble of defeating the British Army. Infact, it is the arrival of French reeu-lars that made it possible, finally, forthe British to be trapped at Yorktown.The British lost one arrny at Saratogabecause of a massive strategical mis-take, not because on airy single daYthe Americans could tactically defeatGeneral Burgoyne at Saratoga but be-cause strategically the British Al.my atSit'atoga had gotten tcc far out oftouch with the rest of the army and,therefore, was defeated by the strate.gic mistakes, not by its operational ortactieal skills. Yet clearly the Britishlost the war, they lost the tvar becauseat the vision-and-strategy level, theAmerican Revolutionary A:'my was su-perior to the British Army.Similarly, the table was turned on usin Vietnam, While the American Armyirr Vietnam was clearly operationallyand tacticaUy.superior to tire Commu-n-ist ltlorth Vietnamese Army, we neverh,ad a vision or strategy of that warwhich would have enabled us to win it;so although we defeated the North Vi-etnamese Army every single time wemet them in battle, in the end we didnot succeed. Indeed, in flarry Sum-ners' brilliant study of the Vietnamwar, he begins his book with a person-al story as an Army colonel of havinggone to llanoi at the end of the war,and he said to a North Vietnamese of-ficer, "You never defeated us on thebattiefield." And the Norbh Vietnam-ese officer said to him, "That is irrele-vant." And in that one quote, Ithought Sumners caught the centrallesson of vision, strategy, operations,and taetics.If you have the most brilliant tacticin the world but your opponent candefeat you operationally, you will lose.If you have the greatest operationaland tactical skills Lr the world butyour opponent beats you at the visionand strategy level, you will lose.It is precisely at the vision and strat-egy levels that tbe Soviet empiretoday is superior to the free world inour concept of the competition we areengaged in.In the l:r.te 1940's Harry Truman,George Marshall, Arthur Vandenberg,and others invented the contaiilnentstrategy to contain Joseph Stalin andthe Soviet empire. It was for its time abrilliant vision-and-strategy response.It required tremendous arguments inAmerica, impassioned pleas by Flepub-licans and Democrats alike, fiercefiehts over the future of this country,the definiCion of conununism, thenature of spying, the threat to surviv-al.fn the end, it created an answerwhich lasted I believe for about 20years.In the mid-1960's, the Soviet empirebegan to develop a new transnational

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD_HOUSE March 21, 1986strategy. Contained at the top by nu- colony gives them additional trainersclear vreapons, contained in Europe by in the Cuban Communisb secret policethe North Atlantic Tleaty Organlza- who work closely, as Claire Sterlingtion, the Soviet empire begirn to hunt and ottrers have proven, with the ter-lor new battlefields, for a new way of rorist networks of the Paiestine Lib-dealing at the vision-and-strategy level eration Organization and with Qadha-with Western freedom. fi in Libya.Begirurins with what l{hrushchevcalled wars of national libeiation; thatis, deliberately establish Communistefforts to tmin guerrillas, magnified inthe 19?0's by a deliberate networkingof terrorisb Eiroups, many of themtrained and supplied by the Sovietempire, the Soviets developed a newapproach, a new threai.With the death of John F. KennedY,the Demoeratic Party lost its greatestarticulator of the threat ol commu-nism. Throughout the 1960's and early1970's, compounded by the chaos ofWatergate, the American Nation lostits way, the free world failed to zna-lyze what was happening, and a new,powerful Soviet trarsnational strategyemerged. ft is the Soviets who have in-vented this transnational strategywhile we cling to the l9th-century Eu-ropean models of sovereicrrty, clear-cut choices of war and peace, recogni-tion or nonrecognition. It is the Sovi-ets who have studied our system. Theyhave invented disinformation systemsof massive scale and remarkable so-phistication. We have no defensivemeasures to protect us from $300,000 ayear WashinBton law firms who takeCommunist money to repeat Commu-nist lies to help Communisi foreignpolicy.We have no techniques to explaina.nd deal with domestic front groupsguided by Communist fot'eien govern-menfs. We are faced with a disinfor-mation campaign of enormous sophis-tication, of g:'eat power, which theGrenada documents indicate clearlyha-s impact on the U.S. Congress, onour own sbaffs, on the national newsmedia and on our intellectua,I corrrmu-nity.It is the Soviets who have created aComrnunist Cuban colonial army ofenormous power. Remember, Cuba isdangerous for many reasons. Cuba isdangerous as a Communlsl colony be-cause it makes Casiro a greab puppetfigurehead presumably independent ofthe Soviets, while his very survival de-pends every day on the Soviet empire'smoney, the Soviet empire's secretpolice, the Soviet empire's permission;yet Castro can posLure as though hewere independent.The Soviet transnational system inCuba gives them their largesL spy baseoutside the Soviet empire. At Lourdesin Cuba they have more electroniceguipment to spy on the United Statesthan anywhere else outside of theSoviei Union. The Soviet colonial oc-cupation of Cuba gives them 11 air-fields, a set of aircraft carriers thatare permanent and stationed in Cubaitself. The Soviet use of Cuba as a

o 1305The Grenada documents docurrentclearly and systemrnatically foranyone willing to read them thedegree to which the Grenadian Com-munists and the Cuban Communistswere intimately tied to terrorists inLibya and elsewhere.The Cuban colonial system the Sovi-ets have established in their transna-bional method gives them a greattraining ground, for example, for theNicaraguan Comrnunists, most ofwhose leaders were training inIfavana, most of whom met withCastro, most of whom who had workedwith the Libyan terrorists, and most ofwhom wtro have a direct relationshipin our allies to the Soviei empire'smost anti-Israeli and anti-Americanactivities.Finally, it is the Soviet transnationalsystem creating a Communist Cubancolonial army which has given themremarkable a^ssets. Thirty-five thou-sand Cuban soliders occupying Angolain what is now a Cuban Communist,Soviet Communist imperial colony re-placine the Portuguese colony. Thou-sands of Cuban soldiers occupyingEthiopia in what is now in effect aSoviet colony. Thousands of Cubansoldiers now in Nicaragua in what is aCommunist Cuban colony. Again andagain, the Soviets have developed apretty inexpensive investment in aCuban colonial army which helpsthem immensely.Mr. WEAVER. Mr. Speaker, will thegentleman yield?Mr. GINGRICH. I wiil yield just fora rnoment.Mr. WEAVER. I was just wonderingif you would oppose our own Govern-ment doing the same thing. I mean, dowe not have the right to put bases inTurkey? Do we not have the riglrt tosend our warships on the high seas?Do we not have the right to use orwould you oppose our using troops?Mercenary troops?Mr. GINGRICII. I am glad youraised that; f was going to comment onthat a ]ittle bit later. But I am gladyou raised that issue, and I am onlygoing to yield briefly because f want tofinish this, then I wiil yield longer if Ihave time.I had a gentleman the other day,when I was talking about Gen. NestorLopez who the Cubans have now sentto NicaraEnra. General Lopez was sentto Syria to fight on the side of theSyrians against fsrael in charge of aCuban tank regiment. He was sent toAngola in charge of a division to

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March 21, 1986impose communism in Angola, and acolleague of mine on the left said tome, "But isn't that exactly like ourgenerals?"My answer wa.s simPle: If You do notbelieve there is slavery and freedom,there is no functional difference be-tween those who uss guns to imposeslavery and those who txe grrns to pro-tect freedom. Just as there is no differ-ence between the criminal who uses agrrn to rob a store and the policemanwho uses a gun to Protect a stcre.If you are witling to saY tbat aCuban colonial arrny imposinc aSoviet dictatorship on Angola is mor-ally acceptable, then there is no differ-ence. But in fact my dad was stationedin Ftance and we moved out of FYancein 1959, and when Charles de Gaulleand the Ftench said to us, "Take all ofyour troops and leave," we ieft'When, on the other hand, the Polishpeople said in 1956-57, "Russiansieave," the Russian ArmY came inharder. When the Hungarians rose inrebellion, the Russian tanlrs crushedHungarian freedom f i ghters.When the East Germans in 1953 rosein rebellion, Flussian tanks crushedEast Germans. When the Czechoslova'kians tried to become free in 1968'R,ussian tanks crushed the Czechoslo-vakians.I think that mY good friend fromOregon raised exacUy the differencebetween those of us who think there isa transnational strategy for tyrannyon the part of the Soviet empire andwho see the Cuban colonial arrny as acolonial army, and ttr.ose on the leftwho in fact do not think it is anempire, do not see it as colonialism,and do not seem to understand the dif-ference, the fundamental differencebetween tyranny and freedom.Remember, recently when we talkedabout our bases in the Philippines, noone suggested, "Let rl's send an Ameri-can army of occupation to ki]l Filipi-nos so we can keeP Clark Field and wecan keep Subic BaY." What we saidwas, "It a Philippine Governmentcomes into power and asks us to leave,we will leave." Because, after all' webelieve in freedom and in a free peoplebeing our allies, not our PuPPets.Let the people of Poland tomorrowmorning ask the Russians to leave'and the-v will be met by machineeuns.I,et the Cuban people tonight ask theR'Bsians to leave, and they will be metby tlind helicopters with gacling guns.My good friend from Oregon ex'plained precisely the difference be-tween those of us who fear tyrannyand those of our friends on the leftvrho do not seem to be able to under-stand the difference between JohnBrown who was trYinB to free theslaves and those who used rifles tokeep the slaves in slaverY.F urthermore, it is the Soviets whohave eneouraged a worldwide networkof terrorists who attack Israel, under'

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD_FIOUSEmine the West, and threaten our secu-rity as individuals and our very srrrviv-al as a civilization. Yet we do noL evento this day have an adequaie doclrilalstrategy for transnational lerrorismdeveloped by states. Otherwise, howcould Qadhafi recently have threat-ened us when he has a binY dictator-ship and we are lhe most Powerfulfree country in the world.It is the Soviets who have developednegotiations as a screen behind whichto consolidate dictatorship, train thenext cycle of guerrillas and terrorists,and it is the Soviets who have devel-oped gradualism as a siralegy. First,Castro took power in Cuba. Then heimposed a CommunisL dictatorship.Then he developed Communist secretpolice. Tlten he accep'ued a few Soviettrainers. Then a few helicopters. Thena few Mig fighters. Then a couPle ofsubmarines. Now he has an army infour different countries occupyingcolonies for the Soviet Empire'Inch-by-inch, step-by-step we weretold let us negotiate. What happened?The Comrnunisk grew stronger inCuba, Thetl we were told let us drawthe line, and what happened? A Yearla,ter, 2 years later when we were notpaying attention, the Communistscrossed the line. What are we seeing inNicaragua today? It is Cuba all over-First comes ihe dictatorship, but leius negotiate. Then come the secretpolice, but let us negotiate. Thencomes training guerrillas, but iet usnegotiate. Then come the Cuban ad-visers, but let us negotiate' T}-en comethe Soviet advisers, but let us negoti-ate.Then come the Hind helicopbers, butlet us negotiate. Then eome theCzechoslovakian light fighter-bomb-ers, but let us negotiate. Finally comethe Mig-23's, but let us negotiate.Then comes the training brigade ofSoviet troops, the heavY tanks, [hencome the missiles.Not a single thing I have just de-scribed failed to happen in Cuba andtwo-thirds of it has happened in Nica-ragua. What is the answer of ourfriends on the left? It is to not noticeit, to explain it away; but frankly whatis the elfect of our executive branch?It is f,o fail to develop a diplomatic re-sponse, a political response or a mili'tary response tbaL is effective.Finally, it is the Soviets who havedeveloped language into a war ofvrords of great power. Lenin probablymost brilIiantly personified this whenhe and his faction los| a fight for con-trol of the International arounci 1903,and immediately adopted the Russianword "Bolshevik" which means major-ity.As Lenin said, "If we who are the mi'nority, they had lost the vote, butthey said if we call ourselves "Boishe-vik" meaning majority, and we call ouropponents "Menshevik" meaning mi-nority, then after a year or two, every-

5891body will believe that we are the tna-jority arrd they are the minority.So they were Bolsheviks ever since.It is Lenin who called the Sovlef news-paper Pravda, which mearls trutit. Be-cause he said, "I will own truth." Hemeant by that not merely a pun, butthe literal ability of a totalilarianstate, as George Orwell told us in"1984," to redefine reality over andover again,The Soviets believe very deeply in awar of words and in the power of lan-guage to shape reality. Thev under-stand George Orwell's essay on politicsand the Engtish language. They sys-temmatically use words which is whythey call their armies "peoples'armies" even if they are dictatorshipsand thugs and terrorists. Which i,s whythey told their Communists in Nicara-gua to use "Sandinista" because theyknew that if they were called Commu-nists we would have undersiood it,.Yet, we do not even realize that Lenin-ism as a doctrine for the use of lan-guage exisk.All too ofien we use their words. OurGovernment uses their words. Wesent, for example, last year congtatu-lations on the coup de etat on the an-niversary of the Soviet takeover ofpower illegally in the Soviet Union, Anonseruical concept intellec[ually ifthere is a Soviet Empire.Again and again we forgei thatwords in the long run define realityand that if you carur!,i. think it, youcannot say it; and if you cannot say it,conversely you cannot think it. If wethink of the Soviets as "Gorbachov isbasically a nice guy," and I can findyou quotes, the best of them bYGeorge McGovern, on AndroPov as areasonable man.Now, Andropov was the head of theSoviet Secret Police. He helped inventusing mcntal hospitals as a tortureground for people who dissented. Hehelped develop the Gulag Archepe-Iago. I{e was the Ambassador whobrought in Soviet tanks to crush theHungarians. There are no adequatewords in the West to describe whatthe horrible thug Andropov was func-tionally even if he drank scotch andpretended to be nice personally.Because we lack the words, we alltoo often deceive ourselves. We are alittle bit like the story of the "ThreeLitLle Pigs" in which, if the Little Pigshad said, "Oh, that is not a wolf, thatis essentially a well-meaning mammalwith a strange appetite for protein,"they would, over a time, have decidedthat we would have, if the wolf haddescribed lrirnself in Leninist ter-ms asa "hairy pig," and said, "Yes, I havenutrition problenx, but do not thinkof me a wol-f, wolves are those peopleover there. I am essentially a hairypig, and yes, I eat protein, but I wiilnot eat you today." You would under-stand then far better the nature of

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5892Gorbachov, AndroPov, Chernenko,and the Soviet Empire.Vision must lead to words' Ourvision cannot exist if we ca.nnot say it.Strategy must lead to policies, to strat'egies, and they must lead to structureslor implementation. Operations mustbe definable tasks for which we canholci people accountable.a 1315The tacties on a daily basis must bea doctrine that fik our vision of strat-egy.It was totally appropriate for thisCongxess to impose human rights limi-tations on the Government of Ei Sal'vador if we were going to support it. Inmy judgment, it is totally appropriatefor us to impose human rights limita-tiorx on the freedom fighters in Nica-ragua if we are going to support them.That is making a doctrine of freedomfit at a taetical level our vision of free-dom, but I think you then have to beable to supply the trainers to makesure they are well trained. Yori mustbe willing to supply the kind of de-tailed help that is necessary if theforces of freedom are going to win.That is why, frankly, I think weshould declassify a lot more. If we infaet have, as the Central IntelligenceAgency keeps claiming and the WiriteHouse keeps claiming, if we have mas-sive documentary proof of the exist-ence of the So'viet disinformation net-work, then our vision of freedomshould reguire our Gove.:nmenb to de-classify those argn-rmenk and let ustalk it out here in public and let uslook at them and let us learn whichones are important and which onesshould worry us and which ones arerelevant.Let me within this framework ofvision, strategy operations and tactics,go back to the first proposition. Isthere a Soviet empire? Does it use aCommunist Cuban army to extend itspower, and has it developed a transna-tional strategy for imposing tyrannyon people?I think it is clear, the Soviet empireis real. It has developed a transna-tional strategy for tyranny. It does usethe Communist Cuban colonial armyas a colonial arrny around the worldand it is helping terrorisk so that theywill undermine the free world.Why if those are true, and I thinl< itis almost irnpossible for a reasonableperson to deny that at least at a fun-damental level they are true, whythen do so many people reiect this re-ality so totally?I would suggest that to an Americanin the late 20th century the centralchallenge of the reality of the Sovj.etempire is inteUectual and psychologi-cal. Irrtellectually, many Americanssimply do not want to believe in theweird and frightening reality of theSoviet empire. They refuse tc readRussian ldstory. They refuse to study

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSELenin. They refuse to study 40 yearsexperience of Soviet colonialism inEastern Europe. They refuse to study26 years of Castro's communism inCuba. They refuse to examine theemerging new historiography aboutthe Vietnam war arrd the success of aVietnamese colonial imperialism alliedwith the Soviet empire. They refuse tostudy the Grenada documents andtheir clear lessons about the nature ofthe Soviet empire. They refuse tostudy the true meaning of Marxism-Ireninism as an instrument of tyrannyand the deliberate ways in which theGrenadian Communisbs with Cubaaand Soviet training and guidance werelying to the American Gcvernmentand the A:nerican people and were mil-nipulating our sincerity to mask theirtyranny.These Americans who intellectuallyhide from reaiity deny the over 16-year pattern of Nicaraguan Commu-nist ties to Cuba and to Middle East-ern terrorism.They also reject the clearly colonialnature of the Cuban occupation ofAngola. They ignore or refuse to con-front the grue-(ome terrible daily reali-ty of a thousar:d people a day dying inCommunist Ethiopia from deliberateactions by the Communist dictatorshipdesigned to strengthen its g,rip on 0hecountry. They iemore or refuse tostudy the realities of military powerand so they never read "Sun T'zu, theArt of War," Clauswitz on war, MaoTse Tung on "Guerrilla Warfare," orLenin on "Totalitarian Powet."This first weakness is the intellectu-aI weakness of i$rorance, a weaknesswhich was described by James Madi-son, who said:Knowledge shall forever govern igroranceand a people who mean to be their own gov-ernors must forever arm themselves withthe power which only knowledge can give.But this first wealrness of iatellectu-al weakness is compounded by asecond weakness, the psychologicalblock on learning, which psychologisLscall cognitive dissonance, which isdriven by an isolationism and a paci-fism, the will to avoid knowledgewhich mieht be frightening.Starting with the horrors of WorldWar f, there has been a erowing west-ern world tendency toward pacifismand isolationism. Henry Wallace inAmerica in World War II, Gec,rgeMcGovern who campaigned for HenryWallace, Jimmy Carter who in manyways accepted McGovernism, WalterMondale who defended McGovernism:today there is a generation of politi-cians, intellectuals, and religious lead-ers on the left who I think in manyways find it very, very difficult to dealwith the weird frightening reality ofthe Soviet Union and find iC easier tobe reassured by a fantasy that is pleas-ant, but simply does not conform tothe real world.

March 21. 1986The fact is that there ls a Sovietempire of tyran"ny and there is a ra-tional historica.l basis for its existence.The key to understanding the Sovietempire is to recogf,rize how djJferentfrom us it is.The key lesson of Charles Itraut-hamrner's essay on "Mirror Images" inhis new book "Cutting Edges" is thatmanv of us on the left simply refuse toaccept that Khomeini is differentfrom us, Gorbachev ir; different iromus, the l(rerr-lin is different from us,

the Soviet tyranny is different fromlls.The key lesson of Theodore White'sbook "America in Search of Itself" inwhich he talks about how hard it wasfor the Carter adrniuistration to recog-nize that Khomeini was by Westernstandards a barbarian, that is, a manoutside our culture, which is what theword means, is equally difficult for therest of us in dealinet with the SovietUnion.Western civilization is a set ofvalues, the importance of the individ-ual, that no one is above the law, theright to private properly, the right toa free press, the right to free elections,to give pos/er to those in governmentand to take back that power, the righbto freedom of religion and freedom ofspeech.Note that in Western civilizationfhese are rishts and they limit andcontrol the power of government overthe individual citizen, as even RichardNixon found when we proved onceagain that no one person is above thelaw.A student at the Universit.y of Vir-ginia Law School the other nightasked me, "Aren't we and the Russiansreally sharing Lhe same civjlizaiion?Don't \te and the Russians really haveChe same heritage?"The questlon was based on my dis-cussion of Japan, and he said, "Butisn't Russia more like us than Japan?"lvly answer in a word is "No."In fact, there is a form of shallowhistory and a kind of racism whichsuggests that because Russians arewhite and we are white and mostAmericans are white, that we rnusl bemore like the Russians; yet the fact isthat Oriental Japanese, Asiatie Indi-ans, Caucasians who happen to beAmericans, have far more in corrrmonin political and legal values than anyof us have with Caucasian Russians.The fact is that in political valuesand government systems, India andJapan are more western than theSoviet Union. The fact is that whilewe have a deep cultural and societaldifference with Hindu-Muslim andBuddhist Indians, we share with thepeople of India a deep reverence forthe law, for the rights of the individ-ual, for a free press, for elections.The fact is that while we have deepdiffslsngss in culture, history and ge-

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March 21. 1986osraphy with Japan, we share a simi-lar process of lavr and govemment andsociety.It is the Soviet Union which is astrange and barbaric country, a throw-back to the Middle East, a medievalszardom with a computerized modernsecret police.The weird frightening uniqueness ofthe Soviet empire in the late 20th cen-tury is captured brilliantly in PaulJohnson's "Modern Times, a Historyof the 20th Century."

The tragedy of the Russian peopleand the even gxeater tragedy of thedozens of other nationalist national!ties, oppressed, colonized and exploit-ed by this weird mutation of a grealRussian medieval empire, the Duchyof Muscovy, into a 20th-centuryempire, shaped by Leninism and heldtotJether by terror, is something wehave to conJront directly,Solzhenitsyn has explained brilliant-Iy in fiction and nonJiction the grimruthless savage reality of the Sovietempire. ft is there in his books for ailwiro will simply look: "One DaY in theLife of fvan Denisovich," the "GulagArchipeligo," the "Cancer Ward," andothers.Can anyone read them withouttears. think of them rvithout deep sad-ness, ponder the nature of that evilempire without fear for freedom andhumanity?An American writer, Harrison Salis-bury, caught the essence of Soviet tyr-anny, the savagery of the police state,the brutality of bhe system that, Gor-bachev heads in his novel "The Gatesof He]l." It is a novel about two char-acters who resemble Solzhenitsyn andAndropov. Anyone who reads it willunderstand why President Reagancalled the Soviet Union an evil empire.The Soviet Union is not only terriblefor human freedom and human decen-cy, it is the last ereat colonial empire.Eid Luttvak's book, "The GrandStrategy of the Soviet Union," makesclear how obvous the Soviet empire isif you simply ask straightforwardquestions. What is the Soviet domina-tion of Poland but an empire?What is the Soviet domination ofEast Germany, Hungary, Czechoslova-kia, Romania, Bulgaria, if not anempire?Our less sophisticated friends on theleft will say, what is t'he difference be-tween NATO and the Soviet empire inEastern Europe? The difference is ex-actly the difference between slaveryand freedom.When De Gaulle left us to leaveFbance, we pulled out.When the East Germans rose in1953, they were crushed,When the Ilungarians rose in 1956,they were crushed.'When the Czechs moved towa.rdfreedom in 1968, the:r were crushed.When the Poles rose in Solidarity in1980, the Soviet sent a simple message

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSEto Jaruzelski, "Either you crush theeffort for freedom or Soviet troopswill crush it."Note lhe American confusion in theGerald Ford-Jimmy Car[er debate in1976, because it illustrates the failureof vision and strategy in America.Technically, under the old rules ofsovereignty, Poland is sovereign andGerald Ford tried to say that, but helost ground politically because Ameri-caru understood that it is dumb tothink of Poland as a free country.While Poland may be technically sov-ereign by the mosi gruesome rules oflaw, ib is clearly a colony of the trans-national Soviet empire. So JimmyCarter, who in fact favored GeorgeMcGovern's policy, sounded tougherthan Gerald Ford because the StateDeparf,ment had coached Ford to saythat which was technically correct at atechnical level, but ab the vision levelwas clearly dumb and wrong.Poland is not sovereign in any senseexcept in the most grotesque. Polandis a colony of the Soviet empire,Similarly, the Ukraine today as wetalk has a vote in the United Nationsbecause it is theoretically free. Thereis a simple test. The United States, theReagan administration, should ask theSoviet Union to allow us to open anembassy in lfiev, recognizing theUkreinians. We should recognize theUkraine as a separate country, or weshould irrsist that the Soviet Unionwithdraw its phony puppeC colonyvote from bhe United Nations.But note today how the Sovietempire wins both ways. ft uses a tran-scendental strategy of lies and West-ern gullibility to get both. They setthe vote in the United Nations fortheir colony and they get to keep thecolony.The weird frightening reality of theSoviet empire and the degree to whichit is very different from Westernvalues, the rule of law, ftee elections,freedom of religion and free press, canbest be seen in the context of Russianhistory, LenirdsL ideology and therecent acbivities of the Soviet policestate and the Soviet imperial effortthrough its Cuban colonial army.Paul Johnson's brief description ofczarist Russia and Lenin's adaptationsof the 19th-century czarist secretpolice into a 2Oth-century totalitariansystem is brief, concise and conclusive.The Grenada papers, the 35,000pounds of documents captured fromthe Communist dictatorship whenAmericans liberated Grenada and the800 pages ol documents published bythe State Department proved conclu-sively that modern Leninist govern-menLs are systematictlly trained inLenin's methods.Since Gorbachev's wife is a professorof Marxism-Leninism, it should be ob-vious just how central Lenin'sthoughts on power and tyranny are tothe operations of the Soviet empire.

5893To try to undersband the Sovieternpire withouL studying Lenin is liketrying to understand the U.S, Govern-ment with no knowledge of the Ameri-can Constitution or American politicalparties; yet Lenin's writings are soruthless, so savage, so antihuman, soalien to Wesbern values, that mostAmericans shrug them off and refweto take them seriously.There is a real parallel betvleen thepsychological will to av.rld reality andhide in the fantasy of pacifism and iso-lationism in the 1930's and the samedetermined psychological avoidance ofreality on the religious left, the aca-demic left, and the political left overthe last 50 years.No reasonable person can read thepublished open docurnents, Lenin'swritings, the speeches of Brezhnev,Andropov, and Gorbachev, Castro'sspeeches, the "Sevenby-lwo Hour Doc-ument of the Nicaraguan CommunistDictatorship," and thet public state-menk, the published writings of theVietnamese Communists since theirvictory, as cited by Fox Butterfield inhis brilliant New York Times article,"The New Vietnam Historiography,"the thousands of pages of documentsfrom Grenada.Given the consistent straightforwardpattern of Soviet imperialism and itsopen published record of telling uswhat it will do, doing it, and then tell-ing us it has done it, why is it so hardfor the Ieftwing of American life tolearn?Eric l{ofer's "The Tlue Beiiever,"John Francois Revel's, "How Democ-racies Perish," and Walter LeQuer's"The Terrible Secret" give us some ofthat understanding and perhaps of thethree of them, I{/alter LeQuer's is themosi powerful and the rnost frighten-ing for LeQuer went back and lookedat the annihilation of the Jewishpeople ar AuschwiLz, at L}:.e terribleholocausb of Nazi Germany, and heasked in his book, "How could west-erners fail to have believed? Howcould they fail to have learned? Howcould they fail to have noticed?"He cites perhaps most tellingly FeJixFrankfurter, the great Justice of theSupreme Court, who when briefed bya European Jew on what was happen-ing, said to the young man, "I cannotbelieve you."And the young rnan started to objectand he said, "Please, understand me. Ibelieve tbe facts you say are true. It issimply impossible for me to beiieve ibis possible for the world to be so horri-ble. I cannot in my soul, in my heart,believe the world could be so evil."And yet as our troops walkedthrough those concentration camps, itwas clear the world was that evil.