China Looks to Thailand: Exporting Arms, Exporting InfluenceAuthor(s): R. Bates GillSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 6 (Jun., 1991), pp. 526-539Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645081Accessed: 22/07/2010 00:38

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CHINA LOOKS TO THAILAND Exporting Arms, Exporting Influence

- R. Bates Gill

During his November 1978 trip to Thailand, Deng Xiaoping, referring to the Soviet Union and Vietnam, told his hosts in Bangkok that "the hegemonists have stepped up their expansionist activi- ties in Asia, particularly in Southeast Asia. It is only natural that some Asian and Southeast Asian statesmen and men of vision should have per- ceived ... the attempts of the hegemonists to reach out towards Southeast Asia and taken positive measures to counter them."' A month later after signing a friendship treaty with Moscow, Vietnam invaded Cambodia and quickly established a puppet regime in Phnom Penh. It was time for Deng's "statesmen and men of vision" to come forward to counter Soviet- backed Vietnamese expansion in Southeast Asia.

Relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Thailand rapidly evolved from contention to cooperation, even developing to the unofficial status of a Beijing-Bangkok axis in Southeast Asia. These devel- opments came about largely due to the Cambodian conflict, wherein both Bangkok and Beijing recognized their mutual interest in resisting ex- panding Vietnamese influence in Indochina. Within this framework of anti-Vietnamese cooperation, Chinese arms exports through Thailand to Cambodian resistance forces (primarily the Khmer Rouge) and to Thai- land's armed forces greatly enhanced Beijing's security and political inter- ests in the region, and today raise important questions as to future PRC influence and aims in Southeast Asia.

R. Bates Gill is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, Lynchburg College, Virginia. The author was a recent recipient of the Albert Galla- tin Fellowship in International Affairs; for support during this study, the author is grateful to the Pacific Cultural Foundation, the Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies and the Modern Asia Research Centre both in Geneva, Switzerland, and the Stock- holm International Peace Research Institute.

? 1991 by The Regents of the University of California

1. "Vice-Premier Teng Visits Thailand," Peking Review, November 10, 1978, pp. 3-4.

526

R. BATES GILL 527 This article traces the development of Sino-Thai relations since the early

1980s, especially within the framework of burgeoning military cooperation between the two countries and particularly Chinese weapons transfers to Thailand. With an understanding of this crucial aspect of PRC-Thailand ties, we can proceed to analyze more closely the practice, patterns, and prospects of Chinese arms exports and Beijing's intentions and influence in Thailand, in Southeast Asia, and along China's strategic periphery. In the process, we can gain greater insight into the important PRC foreign policy tool of arms transfers and into the broader picture of PRC security policy.

A Budding Relationship, 1978-84 Before the December 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, Thailand's most pressing threat to stability and security came from communist insur- gencies. From Bangkok, these movements were not seen as indigenous but rather as exports, mainly by Beijing. In the 1950s the PRC had actively participated in the creation and support of the Communist parties of Thai- land and Malaysia, both of which carried out insurgency campaigns in the Thai hinterlands, typically under ethnic Chinese leadership. While Bang- kok withstood the communist-led challenge, it was nevertheless a nagging provocation that severely strained relations between China and Thailand. Even after the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1975, Beijing con- tinued openly to encourage "revolutionary struggle" by communist insur- gents fighting in Thailand. But in 1978 the threatening situation along the Cambodia-Vietnamese border, capped by the Vietnamese invasion, led to a great turnabout in the Sino-Thai relationship. The exposure of China's southern flank to Hanoi's expansionist designs was not seen in Beijing as an isolated incident, but a keystone in the larger "arc of encirclement" constructed by Moscow around China. In February 1979 the PRC launched its short-lived "lesson" against Vietnam, which proved to be a costly blow to PRC lives, materiel, and prestige. This setback forced Bei- jing to seek alternative avenues to achieve its strategic and political goals against Hanoi and in Southeast Asia overall. One avenue led directly to Bangkok.

Strategically, Beijing wished to see the eclipse of Soviet and Soviet- backed Vietnamese strength in the region; politically, it sought to establish a more influential regional presence by developing closer ties with South- east Asian countries. Opening up a cooperative relationship with Thailand served Beijing in both of these objectives. Through Thailand, the PRC could: (1) militarily support Cambodian resistance groups, principally the Khmer Rouge, in their struggle "to bleed Vietnam white" and overthrow the Hanoi-backed government in Phnom Penh; and (2) see to it that a favorable political atmosphere-a neutral or even pro-Beijing leadership in

528 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXI, NO. 6, JUNE 1991

Phnom Penh-was established in Cambodia. By offering support directly to Thailand, Beijing strengthened the front line against further Vietnamese military expansion while politically enhancing Chinese influence on Cambodian issues in Thailand and, by extension, in the other countries of Southeast Asia. The supply of arms, both through and to Thailand, be- came the principal means by which these several strategic and political goals would be met.

In the immediate aftermath of the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia, Deng requested Thai cooperation in supplying Cambodian resistance forces with "material aid." Deng hoped that "the Government of Thailand will permit China to send material aid to Cambodia via Thai- land.... The relationship between Cambodia and Thailand or between Cambodia and Southeast Asia is one of mutual dependence. If one falls, the other will be in danger. Therefore, it is impossible for Thailand to stay aloof."2 A year later the first visit ever to China by a Thai parliamentary delegation arrived in Beijing along with the Thai air marshal. During these meetings, Deng made clear Beijing's willingness to stand on the side of Thailand if Vietnam attacked it. People's Liberation Army Chief-of- Staff Yang Dezhi warned, during his January 1983 visit to Thailand, that "if Vietnam dares to make an armed incursion into Thailand, the Chinese army will not stay idle. We will give support to the Thai people to defend their country."3 The question of direct or indirect military intervention by the PLA was never ruled out and was left for the authorities in Hanoi to ponder. But in the early 1980s, Beiing provided little more than moral support to the Thais and the vague promise of "siding with Thailand" in case of an attack from Vietnam. The first hints of more direct and con- crete military cooperation between Beijing and Bangkok did not surface until the middle of the decade.

Transfers of Major Weapons, 1985-87 From 1985, China offered a wide range of military exports to Bangkok, including artillery, munitions, armored personal carriers, aircraft, tanks, missiles, and naval vessels. The first transfer of major weapons4 was a

2. Sukhumbhand Paribatra, From Enmity to Alignment: Thailand's Evolving Relations with China (Bangkok: Institute of Security and International Studies, 1987), p. 56, quoting R. K. Jain, ed., China and Thailand, 1949-1983 (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1984), p. 234.

3. From Enmity to Alignment, p. 25, quoting Bangkok World, February 5, 1983. 4. "Major conventional weapons" typically refers to the four prevalent weapon types on

the global arms market: military aircraft, artillery and armor, missiles, and naval craft. (See Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, eds., Arms Production in the Third World [London: Taylor and Francis, 1986], p. 7.) Other weapons systems, such as guidance and radar sys-

R. BATES GILL 529 grant-in-aid package in late 1985, which included heavy artillery guns, antiaircraft guns, antitank guns, and 24 T-59 main battle tanks (MBT). This procurement beefed up Thailand's eastern border defenses and counterattack strength against incursions from Vietnamese and Vietnamese-backed forces in Cambodia, and it opened the door to much wider PRC-Thailand military cooperation, especially in the form of arms transfers. In a press interview in March 1987, Thai Army Deputy Chief- of-Staff Lieutenant General Suchinda Khraprayun declared Bangkok's in- tention to conclude a large arms deal with China.5 This was confirmed two months later when General Chawalit Yongchaiyut, the supreme com- mander of the Thai military, returned from Beijing with an agreement to acquire 30 T-69s (with an option to purchase an additional 70), 10 antiair- craft gun batteries, 3,000 rocket-propelled grenades, and ammunition.

By year's end, reports surfaced of actual sales or potential sales in a number of other weapons categories. Bangkok purchased 800 armored personnel carriers (APC) and approved the future purchase of ammunition and explosives from the PRC. The Thais expressed an interest in buying Chinese HY-5 portable heat-seeking antiaircraft missiles and long-range artillery guns. In addition, Beijing made low-priced offers to Bangkok for the transfer of antiaircraft missiles, Romeo-class submarines, and F-7 fighter jets. These initial arms trade activities proceeded logically from China's increased desire to arm Thailand against Vietnamese expansion and its interest in expanding PRC influence in Bangkok and Southeast Asia. PRC-Thai arms transfers complemented the growing Sino-Thai re- lationship marked by broad consensus on Cambodian issues, concern for Thai security, and frequent high-level official exchanges over the period 1985-87.

Beijing's political and strategic intentions are all the more clearly under- stood when we consider the financial terms of the arms deals. The first known transfers, in late 1985, were gifts to Bangkok, while the following transactions in 1987 were said to border on "give-aways," with the weap- ons being sold at very low "friendship prices." Exact details of the deals are not known, but General Chawalit said the PRC sold arms to Bangkok at only four to five percent of their actual value, and terms of repayment were said to be similarly generous.6 For the Chinese then, economic gain

tems, which are not yet fully developed and exported by the PRC, are also considered as "major conventional weapons" by some observers.

5. Bangkok Post, 7 March 1987. 6. Bangkok was given a ten-year grace period before repayment, in installments, and it

could be made in agricultural products. See "'Friendship' Arms Sales," Far Eastern Eco- nomic Review [FEER] (March 19, 1987), pp. 15-16; "Thais to Pay 5% of Cost of China Arms," International Herald Tribune, May 12, 1987.

530 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXI, NO. 6, JUNE 1991

took a back seat to more important considerations of potential political leverage and strategic maneuvering.

Expanding Exports and Cooperation, 1988-91

In March 1988 a second major purchasing wave by Thai defense forces began. General Chawalit reportedly approved the purchase of 23 T-69 MBT, 360 APC, an antiaircraft radar guidance system, and 130mm am- munition. Later in the year, the Royal Thai Navy announced its intention to acquire Jianghu-class frigates from the PRC.7 In addition, Thailand sought to buy a number of missiles from China, including the HY-5 porta- ble surface-to-air missile, the HQ-2J mobile surface-to-air missile, a truck mobile multiple rocket system, tactical surface-to-surface missiles, a ship- to-air missile system, and air-to-air missiles. At the beginning of 1989, a third wave of purchases was in the works involving larger and more so- phisticated weapons. After an extremely important Sino-Thai military consultation in late November 1988, the Thai military expressed an inter- est in acquiring a squadron of F-7 fighter jets (an upgraded PRC version of the Soviet MiG-21), three submarines, missiles, additional MBTs, and more APCs. By the end of 1989, however, after considerable testing, the F-7 purchase was put off and has not been renewed seriously. In August 1990, Bangkok approved the purchase of at least 50 C-801 ship-to-ship missiles, one of China's latest weapons developments. Capable of sinking a destroyer-sized vessel, these missiles are expected to arm the Jianghu-class frigates being delivered to Thailand.

In addition to increased contacts through arms transfers, Beijing- Bangkok relations strengthened through other military-related exchanges. High-ranking military officials of both countries met on a consistent basis to arrange the arms transfers to Thailand while deliberating on the strate- gic and political situation they faced in Southeast Asia. In 1988 major exchanges occurred in which perhaps as many as 200 students and faculty members of Thailand's Air War College and Army War College made two separate observation visits to China in April and October. Several ongoing training programs for the use and maintenance of Chinese military equip- ment strengthened PRC influence in Thailand as well. Another important indication of growing military cooperation was the development of joint

7. China delivered the first of these frigates in April 1991, to be followed by another sev- eral months later. Two more are to be delivered each year for a total of six by 1993. (Report from the Beijing-based China Daily, April 4, 1991, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, China [hereafter FBIS, DRICHJ], April 8, 1991, p. 16; see also "First Thai 'Jianghu' Launched," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 21, 1990, p. 81.)

R. BATES GILL 531 industrial ventures for the production of Chinese military hardware and spare parts in Thailand, a logical outcome of Thailand's increasing reliance on the PRC for weaponry. To meet the maintenance and resupply needs of its forces equipped with Chinese armaments, an agreement between Bei- jing and Bangkok was signed in January 1989 for the creation of a joint repair and assembly facility for APCs supplied by China. It was possible that the facility would expand into maintaining and producing Chinese tanks as well.8 One particularly controversial area of military cooperation involved developing a Thailand-based stockpile of Chinese weapons. The stockpile, said to be a Thai initiative, would be the first such cache of Chi- nese weapons outside the PRC; it could provide the PRC with an overt military presence in the region, would identify Vietnam as Thailand's number one security threat, and according to one observer, "would also symbolize acceptance of China as a benevolent power" in Southeast Asia.9 Whether or not the PRC would have access to the stockpile remains unde- termined, with some Thai officials wishing to downplay the image of a "Chinese stockpile," preferring instead to view the plan as a Thailand spare parts depot. However, probably owing to the improving security situation along Thailand's border with Laos and Cambodia, the stockpile is yet to materialize. - Strategic and political exchanges at the highest levels also increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The most significant visits to Bangkok during this period were those of PRC Premier Li Peng in November 1988 (his first trip overseas as China's premier) and in August 1990; Defense Minister Qin Jiwei went to Thailand in January 1989, General Chawalit visited Beijing in November 1988 and Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Chunhawan traveled to China in November 1988, October 1989, and again in November 1990. Throughout these high-level exchanges, subjects dis- cussed included arms transfers as well as the mutual security interests of the two countries. During the Li visit in 1988, several agreements were concluded to provide for continued military cooperation between the two countries, including arms transfers from China. In January 1990, Deng Xiaoping's son-in-law He Ping, a high-ranking official dealing in weapons transfers, made an important trip to Bangkok in order to maintain the Sino-Thai arms trade relationship.10 Since mid-1990, instability in the Chatichai government leading to the February 1991 bloodless coup in Bangkok has apparently contributed to a slowdown in PRC-Thailand ma-

8. " . . . and Sino-Thai APCs," International Defense Review, March 1989, p. 395; "Thai- land," Pacific Defence Reporter, June 1989, p. 34.

9. "Chinese Stockpile for Thailand Causes Concern," Pacific Defence Reporter, March 1989, p. 34.

10. "Firming Up Sales," FEER, February 15, 1990, p. 9.

532 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXI, NO. 6, JUNE 1991

jor arms transactions relative to their weapons trade activities in the late 1980s.

Patterns in PRC Arms Transfers The political and strategic incentives behind PRC arms transfers to Thai- land, as well as the weapons' quality, quantity, and low cost, are represen- tative of an emerging pattern in Chinese arms transfer policy over the past decade, and are indicative of a shift toward "regional priorities" in PRC foreign policy overall. PRC arms transfers have shifted geographically over time but now focus on regions much closer to home, a shift that ap- pears designed (1) to counter a hostile "arc of encirclement" around China, perceived in Beijing to be the work of Soviet strategists in the 1970s and early 1980s; (2) to counter potential threats from smaller, regional powers (Vietnam, India); and (3) to assert through arms exports PRC in- fluence regionally where the superpowers once held sway.

When the Soviet-Vietnamese threat to China in Southeast Asia intensi- fied at the end of the 1970s and into the early 1980s, the PRC moved to include Thailand as one of its arms clients, which it firmly accomplished by 1986. Thus, Thailand represented a continuation of similar policy in the late 1970s and 1980s-in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Paki- stan, Bangladesh, North Korea-in which Beijing sought through arms transfers to counter, challenge, or directly confront Soviet influence. The transfer of weapons to Thailand is also consistent with PRC security pol- icy meant to counter the threats posed by smaller, regional powers along the PRC periphery. Arming Thailand to deter Vietnam resembles PRC arms transfers to Pakistan to deter China's other nemesis to the south, India. Finally, transfers of PRC weaponry to Thailand came about in the context of diminishing military interest in, and support on the part of the United States for Bangkok's security needs. 1 1 In the past, PRC arms have breached similar gaps left open by the superpowers for Pakistan, Bangla- desh, and Egypt. The quality, quantity, and cost of PRC arms transfers to Thailand also follows and strengthens emerging patterns in Chinese arms diplomacy. The pattern of the Sino-Thai arms trade relationship most closely resembles PRC ties with Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, with North Korea, both long-time arms clients of China. Along with Thailand, only three other countries-Pakistan, North Korea, and Bangladesh-are

11. Security assistance from the United States to Thailand dropped from $92.2 million in FY1986 to $28.2 million in FY1989 (Leszek Buszynski, "New Aspirations and Old Con- straints in Thailand's Foreign Policy," Asian Survey, November 1989, p. 1,069. In the wake of the February 1991 coup, the U.S. immediately announced a cut in economic and military assistance to Thailand. See report from Bangkok-based Naeo Na, March 8, 1991, in FBIS, DR/EA, March 8, 1991, p. 59.

R. BATES GILL 533

TABLE 1 PRC Arms Transfers to Thailand, 1985-90, by Year of Order

Year Armor/Artillery Missiles Naval Vessels Aircraft

1985 24 T-59 tanks 18 130mm towed guns 37mm antiaircraft guns 85mm antitank guns

1986 3 Romeo-class submarines

1987 55 antiaircraft guns 3,000 rocket-propelled grenades 30 T-69 tanks 800 armored personnel carriers

1988 360 armored personnel carriers 12 HQ-2B 4 Jianghu- surface-to-air class frigates missiles

60(?) multiple rocket launchers 18 HY-5 23 T-69 tanks portable surface-

to-air missiles 1989 2 Jianghu- 3 F-7 for

class frigates inspection 1990 50 C-801

antiship missiles

SOURCES: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armament and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986-1990); Jane's Defence Weekly (several issues).

recipients of arms from the four major categories of Beijing weapons pro- duction: military aircraft, artillery/armor, missiles, and naval vessels (see Table 1).

Furthermore, China is willing to transfer to Thailand weapons that, by PRC standards, are of a technically sophisticated nature. Typically, such weapons have been made available only to China's closest clients and al- lies. For example, the T-69 sent to Thailand is Beijing's top-of-the-line MBT, designed after the Soviet T-55. This tank is being integrated into the Pakistani army, but has not been transferred to some of Beijing's clos- est allies, including North Korea.12 The F-7 fighter aircraft, modified with the addition of Western avionics, has been offered to the Thais; currently more than 100 F-7s are in service in the Pakistani air force. China's export of six guided-missile Jianghu-class frigates to Thailand is unprecedented; Bangladesh and Egypt have received only one and two such vessels, re-

12. On Sino-Pakistan cooperation involving the transfer and indigenous development of the Chinese T-69II MBT, see "Pakistan's Procurement Chief on New Programs," Interna- tional Defense Review, June 1989, p. 764, and "Pakistan Reaches MBT 'Milestone'," Jane's Defence Weekly, August 11, 1990, p. 187.

534 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXI, NO. 6, JUNE 1991

spectively. The three Romeo-class submarines ordered by Bangkok in 1986 are the same type Beijing has delivered to North Korea, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Egypt. The transfer from the PRC to Thailand of 18 Hong Ying portable surface-to-air missiles (copies of the U.S.-made Stinger) puts Thailand on a short list with others now possessing this weapon: Pakistan, Iran, the mujahedin in Afghanistan, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and possibly North Korea. Only Thailand and Iran are re- cipients of a recent Chinese weapons development, the C-801 antiship mis- sile.

An agreement signed in January 1989 between China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) and the Thai firm, Suco Engineering, created a joint venture involving the repair and possibly the licensed production of Beijing-supplied APCs, and places Thailand even further within the ranks of China's closest weapons clients. The facility may also expand into re- pair and maintenance work on the PRC T-69s now in the Thai arsenal, and is expected to influence favorably Beijing's attempts to enter the Southeast Asian arms market. Joint production, licensing arrangements, or plant transfer agreements are a relatively undeveloped aspect of PRC arms exports. There have been some joint arrangements, including the agreement by Beijing to construct a munitions factory in eastern Pakistan in the late 1960s which was not carried out, and China has helped develop through licensing agreements the indigenous weapons production capacity of Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan. The PRC reportedly provided assist- ance and technology to develop Pakistan's nuclear capability as well. To- day's Sino-Thai maintenance and co-production agreement resembles these past arrangements extended by the PRC to close arms clients.

The amount of weaponry transferred by Beijing to Thailand also ranks highly in some cases (see Table 2). Most prominent is the agreement by Beijing to ship more than 1,000 APCs to Thailand, which will constitute the largest assemblage of Chinese-made APCs outside of the PRC. These large unit sales of armor resemble the major sales of MBTs and APCs to Iran and Iraq in the 1980s and the massive transfer of 1,000 MBTs to Pakistan from 1978 to 1989. In terms of dollar value of arms transfers, we also find Thailand ranking among China's major clients. Over the five- year period 1985 to 1989, Thailand ranked sixth overall, with US$283 mil- lion dollars in sales, following West Asian countries and Pakistan (see Ta- ble 2). However, these figures are for major weapons, and they also do not reflect the value of arms transferred via Thailand to the Cambodian resist- ance. Thus, the actual value of PRC weapons trasferred to Thailand is possibly much higher.

A final point on the nature of Beijing's arms exports to Thailand relates to their cost. These exports are distinguished by their low price tags and

R. BATES GILL 535

TABLE 2 Values of Exports of Major Weapons by China, 1985-89, by Highest- Ranking Countries (in US$ millions, constant 1985 prices)

Country Amount Country Amount

Iran 1,704 Thailand 283 Pakistan 1,205 North Korea 272 Saudi Arabia 1,200 Zimbabwe 252 Iraq 1,067 Bangladesh 107 Egypt 323 Sri Landa 88

SOURCE: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute database, 1990.

the favorable repayment terms that accompany the agreements. These ar- rangements are similar to arms-transfer accords Beijing has made in the past with its most favored clients. Beginning in the 1970s, for example, Beijing "took responsibility for rehabilitating Pakistan's army and equip- ping it with the most modem weapons systems it had available-all at no cost to Pakistan" or "under the most convenient terms."13 As we have noted, Thailand too has received weaponry "at no cost," with the bulk of Beijing's arms exports to Bangkok being made "under the most convenient terms." When asked about the low-cost arrangements, some Beijing offi- cials implied that these exports are similar to arms transfers with other "friends." According to this view, Beijing expects payment at cost, or well below cost from "friends" and a profit in its arms dealings from other clients.14 In the past these "friendly" arrangements have been extended to North Korea, Egypt, and Bangladesh, and certainly to Pakistan, among others. Today, Thailand enjoys similar treatment in importing weaponry from China.

Incentives and Arms Sales In analyzing PRC arms exports, the question frequently arises: Why does Beijing engage in this trade? The PRC is often understood to be a "rogue elephant, supplying arms virtually without consideration for political or security considerations," that "arms sales are essentially a business deci-

13. Yaacov Vertzberger, "The Political Economy of Sino-Pakistani Relations," Asian Sur- vey, May 1983, p. 647.

14. These views emerged from discussions held with members of the Chinese diplomatic community in Geneva, including those attached to the United Nations Conference on Dis- armament. They do not wish to have their opinions regarded as "official" and requested that their identities not be revealed.

536 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXI, NO. 6, JUNE 1991

sion" for Beijing, and it is suggested that PRC "arms sales of the 1980s ... were designed purely for economic profit."15 This viewpoint emphasizes the generation of foreign exchange earnings as the number-one motivation driving Beijing to sell its weapons abroad. In these assessments, the other two important incentives to export arms-political and strategic consider- ations-are typically played down. How well do such analyses apply in the case of PRC arms transfers to Thailand?

From a strategic standpoint, Beijing began arms exports to Thailand in earnest during the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and upon deciding that the number-one difficulty between China and the Soviet Union rested in the Cambodian question. PRC arms exports to Thailand should be seen as directly related to PRC concerns with the Soviet and Vietnamese promi- nence along China's southern periphery. The PRC wished to weaken this threat to its security and to neutralize hostility toward Beijing in the re- gion; it used arms transfers to further these aims with Chinese military support to Thailand and through Thailand to anti-Vietnamese resistance forces in Cambodia (particularly the Khmer Rouge).

Politically, the Chinese leadership expected a close Sino-Thai relation- ship to develop into one of quasi-alliance or alignment, thereby putting China in the strongest position it has yet enjoyed in the postwar era to exert its centuries-old claims to influence in Southeast Asia. In the process of weakening Vietnamese, and by extension, Soviet influence in the region, Beijing hoped to improve its diplomatic standing in Southeast Asia, partic- ularly in Bangkok. A close relationship with Thailand, a leading member of ASEAN and the front-line state against Vietnamese expansion in the region, would allow the PRC a measure of political clout that could be earned almost entirely through military aid to Bangkok and to the insur- gent Khmer Rouge and other anti-Vietnamese guerrilla groups in Cambo- dia. Beijing's stand in Southeast Asia and its close ties to Thailand contributed to the reestablishment in August 1990 of official relations be- tween China and Indonesia, after a bitter rupture of 25 years. Negotia- tions regarding the purchase of Chinese naval vessels by Jakarta immediately preceded and followed the establishment of formal ties be- tween the two countries.16 Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, China's image as

15. These three assessments are offered, respectively, in Strategic Survey, 1988-1989 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989), p. 23; Wei-chin Lee, "The Birth of a Salesman: China as an Arms Supplier," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Winder, 1987-88, p. 36; Anne Gilks and Gerald Segal, China and the Arms Trade (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), p. 196.

16. "Indonesia, China Frigate Talks," Jane's Defence Weekly, September 15, 1990, p. 459. Interestingly, a Chinese-language newspaper in Bangkok even reported that it was through the good graces and mediation of Thailand, particularly the foreign minister, Air Marshal

R. BATE-S GILL 537 an arms patron to Thailand influenced Burma to purchase as much as US$1 billion in Chinese military hardware, even though in the past Beijing and Rangoon experienced less than cordial relations.17

A clear case for economic motivations in PRC arms exports to Thailand is difficult to establish, as the most striking aspect of the exports is their delivery at drastically reduced prices and with generous repayment terms. In assessing China's incentives, it becomes clear that the main motivation is not the money that arms transfers might earn, but the strategic and political goals they might help Beijing to achieve. In sum, Chinese arms exports-to Thailand, as well as to some others-form part of China's overall strategic and political relationships with its arms clients and with the regions in which they are situated.

Influence Through Arms Sales: Tenuous or Tenacious?

The question of how much influence one country can project through the vehicle of arms transfers is often answered in two words: "not much." But, in meeting the goals that motivated arms transfers to Thailand, the PRC has had some success. Due in part to the weapons exported to Thai armed forces, and through Thailand to the Cambodia resistance, Vietnam expansionist policy is in retreat. Furthermore, China has strengthened the position of Thailand while improving Sino-Thai relations, developments that would suggest a greater Chinese presence in Southeast Asia in the years ahead. Chinese arms transfers also help to project a favorable polit- ical outcome for Beijing in the region. Any settlement on the future of Cambodia, an agreement that will have far-reaching consequences for the future of all of Southeast Asia, cannot now be concluded without the par- ticipation, cooperation, and agreement of Beijing. Chinese leaders must recognize the success they have met with their arms exports to the region, both from a strategic and a political point of view. It would be unrealistic to assume the PRC will soon forego the gains made in the region through arms transfers.

Of course, "influence" is a two-way street, and requires cooperation from the partner in any relationship. From Thailand's point of view, it is likely a continued Beijing presence through arms transfers will be en- couraged. The acquisition of arms from China improves Thai defenses, and if it can continue to be done at relatively low cost, would meet General

Sitthi Sawetsila, that led to the restoration of official Sino-Indonesian relations (Xing Xian Ribao, July 5, 1990, in FBIS, DR/EA, July 10, 1990, p. 51).

17. "Allies in Isolation: Burma and China Move Closer," Jane's Defence Weekly, Septem- ber 15, 1990, p. 475.

538 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXI, NO. 6, JUNE 1991

Chawalit's requirement that "we need to make our armed forces strong with a limited budget."18 Developing closer ties with Beijing also provides Bangkok with certain assurances and confidence in the face of Hanoi's powerful military. As Thai power is advanced in both military and polit- ical aspects, so too is Bangkok's standing within ASEAN and within the region as a whole. As a practical point, reliance on PRC weaponry, espe- cially "big-ticket" items such as the frigate and the APCs and tanks, will lead to further dependence as indicated by the plans for repair and co- production facilities. China's political clout in Thailand was certainly strengthened when Beijing acted quickly to be the first to recognize the new Thai government installed after the February 1991 coup. With the Thai military in control under the leadership of General Suchinda and with the political fortunes of General Chawalit appearing ever more favorable, the interests of Sino-Thai military cooperation, including arms exports, may be given an even further boost. Both Suchinda and Chawalit have been instrumental in developing Thailand's arms export ties and close military alignment with the PRC.

Future Prospects A number of factors can weigh against gains in influence sought by China through arms transfers, both in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Overall, Chinese arms transfers will no doubt be affected by events leading up to and during the 1991 Gulf War: major arms exporters may be wary about providing without question large amounts of weapons to potentially expan- sionist regional powers for fear of causing negative international repercus- sions. Also, at a worldwide level, as the Sino-Soviet normalization process progresses, China's use of arms transfers to combat Soviet-led "socialist hegemony" may lose its legitimacy. Regionally, diminished Soviet interest in Southeast Asia overall, and in supporting Vietnam particularly, could reduce Beijing's urge to arm Thailand and the Cambodian resistance. Per- haps most importantly, as the common anti-Vietnamese front loses its urgency-either through genuine Vietnamese concessions or the establish- ment of a more "friendly" government in Phnom Penh or Hanoi-this principal raison d'etre of close Beijing-Bangkok relations could also dimin- ish and with it the foundation for expanded PRC influence in Thailand and the region.

In 1990 a divergence of views emerged between Thailand and China concerning the future role of the Khmer Rouge and Bangkok's opening to Hanoi. Thailand wished to see more flexibility in China's Southeast Asia policy, thereby allowing a more substantive peace process to move for-

18. "New Aspirations and Old Constraints," p. 1,068, quoting Straits Times, January 13, 1988.

R. BATES GILL 539 ward. Yet, Sino-Thai support for the Khmer Rouge continues. In sum- mer 1990 a shipment via Thailand of 24 PRC T-59 tanks was reportedly made to the Khmer Rouge resistance forces, the first heavy armor trans- ferred to any of the Cambodian guerrilla factions. And following the Feb- ruary 1991 coup, Thai Foreign Ministry officials stated that the conciliatory policies within the deposed Chatichai government of "turning battlefields into marketplaces" were over, perhaps signifying a harder line toward Hanoi under the new military leadership in Bangkok.19 Yet, the several states in the region, including Thailand, are not necessarily in favor of an overly dominant presence for the PRC, which potentially poses a considerable threat to the smaller countries of Southeast Asia. Beijing has demonstrated its willingness to use force for its irredentist claims in the area, as signaled in the China-Vietnam clashes over the Paracel Islands. Farther south, the Spratly Islands are claimed by China, Vietnam, Malay- sia, and the Philippines, and stand as a source of potential regional conflict between Beijing and its neighbors. Questions of internal subversion di- rected by Beijing-a legacy of China's former revolutionary outlook-also remain in the minds of regional leaders.

But in sum, PRC arms sales to Thailand have been initially successful and have made significant strides toward broadening Chinese influence in the region, particularly with regard to settlement of issues in Cambodia and regional policies toward Vietnam. Furthermore, in the context of forming common cause against expansionist designs in the region, Beijing through its arms transfers has strengthened its portfolio as a patron of Thailand and the Cambodian resistance, leaving the door open for possibly even greater influence following a Cambodian settlement. The gains achieved through arms transfers to Thailand, while indicating a rapid rise in the regional fortunes of Beijing, will ultimately be measured over time, and the many obstacles noted as well as others yet unforeseen remain to be overcome. But an acceptance in Bangkok of a strong PRC presence, espe- cially within the traditionally influential Thai military, coupled with Bei- jing's readiness to extend its influence in the region, bodes well for sustained arms exports and increased influence for the PRC in Southeast Asia. Time-honored Chinese wisdom has it that even an extremely long journey must begin with one step. In China's never-ending quest for secur- ity and regional influence, arms transfers are significant strides toward this elusive goal.

19. Bangkok Post, March 15, 1991.