Gift Exchange and Income Redistribution between Yombe Rural Wage-Earners and Their Kinsfolk in...

International African Institute

Gift Exchange and Income Redistribution between Yombe Rural Wage-Earners and TheirKinsfolk in Western ZaïreAuthor(s): André LuxSource: Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Jul., 1972), pp.173-191Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the International African InstituteStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1159158 .

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AFRICA JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL AFRICAN INSTITUTE

VOLUME XLII JULY 1972 NUMBER 3

GIFT EXCHANGE AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION BETWEEN YOMBE RURAL WAGE-EARNERS AND

THEIR KINSFOLK IN WESTERN ZAIRE

ANDRE LUX

I. INTRODUCTION

A PREVIOUS article (Lux, I97I) dealing with the network of visits between 1 rural wage-earners and their kinsfolk in Western Congo, presented a first set

of findings collected during field-work conducted in July 1966 among a stratified random sample of 268 workers in the territory of Lukula in central Mayombe. One-third of them are employed in the plantations, and two-thirds in the industrial, mainly wood-processing, sector of seven generally big enterprises.' Some of these workers live in Lukula, a small town of io,ooo people, others in rural company camps. They are thus to a large extent rural industrial wage-earners. Many of them are fully committed to the modern wage economy, so that I have been forced in the previous article to question Southall's assertion that rural wage-earners are 'still firmly embedded in the fuller kinship system of rural tribal communities' (196I: 34). The degree of their commitment has been measured by their various occupational profiles, to which I shall turn later. Suffice it here to say that half of them are already second- or even third-generation workers.

All of them originate from surrounding Yombe matrilineal and patrilocal village communities. They share a common Yombe feature of disliking long-distance migration. Thus while living outside their villages they remain geographically close to them. Therefore, it seems clear that, although localization and occupation separate these industrial and plantation workers from their surrounding village kinsmen, no closed and self-contained extra-tribal social system, be it in a rural township or a company compound, can provide an adequate theoretical framework to scrutinize the process of change and modernization experienced by them (Lux, 1971: i I).

' The total number of employees of these seven enterprises amounts to about 4,200. The sample represents 6-5 per cent of the total.

'Africa', the Journal of the International African Institute, is published by the Institute, but except where otherwise stated the writers of the articles are responsiblefor the opinions expressed. Issued quarterly. ? International African Institute, 1972. All rights reserved.



I74 GIFT EXCHANGE AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION BETWEEN YOMBE Hence the insistence on the dialectics of interchange between tradition and modernity, and of exchange of visits and gifts between rural workers and their village kinsmen.

The previous study analysed the frequency and structure of visit relationships between these two groups. It pointed to the coexistence among Yombe rural workers of a modern-oriented occupational option and a range of involvements in the spheres of activities, social relations, and mental representations of their village communities. As opposed to a unilinear evolution towards modernity, factors like higher occupational skill, better education, being a second-generation worker, or the modern- oriented kinship environment, do not automatically detach the worker from traditional values nor lessen his ties with his fellow villagers: they may work in the opposite sense, supporting Philip Mayer's insistence on the role of individual auto-determination as a major factor in acculturation (i962: 59I-2).

Though being rural, these Yombe workers are not merely half-way towards modernity, as opposed to supposedly more modern urban workers. They are, on the contrary, keenly aware of the difference separating them from surrounding villagers, but since they live not far away from them, they are forced to reconcile their aspira- tions to modernity, as they conceive it, with a set of constraints imposed on them by their more traditional social environment. This makes for their necessarily ambivalent behaviour.

The present study is logically linked with the previous one, since the economics of gift giving and redistribution is built within the network of social relationships; the flow of goods and money is directly related to the flow of visits between wage- earners and village kinsfolk. Besides providing the reader with some detailed data on the economics of solidarity between village and extra-village communities-not a frequent occurrence2-these data will be related to those presented on the visit relationships, in order to find confirmations and extensions of the previous findings and conclusions. The latter cannot all be summarized here.

II. GIFT EXCHANGE AND LINEAGE RELATIONSHIPS I. Visits and gifts

Table I shows to what extent gift giving is related to visits. The wives' relatives are not included in the table, because they are very seldom visited by the husbands. Out of 3 59 persons visiting and/or visited by the workers, 21 or 59 per cent received or offered some present. Among the remaining 148, 80 had their visit relation associated with a gift relation with another relative, while 68 were accompanied by no gift. On the other hand, the workers had gift relations with 90 kinsmen without

2 Literature on urbanization provides surprisingly I83). Baeck (I96I: I66), Bettison and Rigby (196I: little factual information on urban-rural exchanges 47, 50, 76, 94, 97), Goddard (I965: 26-7), Gutkind of visitors and gifts. As Gutkind puts it, 'more (I965: 53, 58), Harris (1944: 329-33), Kay (I960: i, studies on the urban African family are needed... 16-17, 46-7), Reader (I96I: 56). As an exception so that reciprocal relations and interdependence of to the rule, more detailed data on financial support town and country be more clearly understood' received by Ghanaian university students and on (1963: 206). The lack of information is even more their opinions about their extended family obliga- complete as far as exchanges between rural wage- tions in the future, are provided by Caldwell (I965), earners and villagers or within the village communi- in the context of his study of a particular aspect of ties are concerned. Some limited data can be grasped the demographic transition. e.g. in Ardener and Warmington (1960: I56-60,



RURAL WAGE-EARNERS AND THEIR KINSFOLK IN WESTERN ZAIRE 175

any accompanying visit. This means that not more than 32 out of 268 workers

engaged in no visit and/or gift relation for the six months preceding the survey. If we exclude those having contacts with their wives' relatives, the percentage of abstainers

drops well below io per cent. The geographical proximity of village kinsfolk is

evidently being felt here. The connection between visits and gifts, summarized in the 59 per cent just

mentioned, varies widely according to kinship rank: 89 per cent for mothers, 71 per

TABLE I

Gift relations as percentage of visit relations between workers and their matrilineal and patrilateral village relatives

Gift relation with Visit relation with

Mother Matril. uncle Siblings Nephews Other matril.

Same person(s) No. 43 30 69 II 20 % 89-6* 4 '7* 66'3 39-3t 5z26

Other person(s) No. I 23 13 I3 9 % 2'I* 3I-8 I2-6 46'4* 23'7

Nobody No. 4 19 22 4 9 % 8-3t 26'5 2I.I 14'3 23'7

Total No. 48 72 104 28 38 % I00 I00 I00 100 I00

Gift relation with Visit relation with All persons with Persons without visit relation visit relation

Father Other patril.

Same person(s) No. 30 8 2II 90 % 7'14 29-6* 58-8 72-2

Other person(s) No. 9 12 80 % 2I'4 44 5* 22-3

Nobody No. 3 7 68 32 % 7-2 25-9 18'9 27-8

Total No. 42 27 359 122

% I00 I00 I00 I00

Pb: * < 0002; t 0'07.

cent for fathers, 66 per cent for siblings, 5 3 per cent for 'other members' of matri-

lineages, 42 per cent for maternal uncles, 39 per cent for nephews and nieces,3 30 per cent for 'other paternal relatives'. Members of the nuclear family have the lead, whereas maternal uncles and nephews are far behind.

This last point is of great importance, in so far as it means that the traditionally valued ties between the maternal uncle and his nephews are fading. Let us recall here that early studies made by Philippart (1920: 240, 505-6), Mertens (I935: 54-5,

3 Unless otherwise stated, nephews and nieces are those from the matrilineage.



176 GIFT EXCHANGE AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION BETWEEN YOMBE

io8), de Beaucorps (I94I: 28, 75-6) on the traditional social organization of the Kongo, and more specifically the study by Van Reeth (I935) on the role of the maternal uncle among the Yombe, were unanimous in stressing the predominant position of the maternal uncle. He was the legal representative of his lineage, was

responsible within the wider community for anything done by his dependants, whom he really possessed, and he bore the burden of their unpaid taxes, debts, and fines. In return, however, he was obeyed blindly, and no decision could be made without his approval; for instance, no youngster could safely be hired by a white employer if he did not agree, and such approval meant that the nephew was expected to hand him a large portion of his earnings. The maternal uncle was then supposed to redistribute goods and money according to the best interests of the lineage, with

special attention to the needs of his nephews. Clearly, this pattern of circulation of

goods and incomes conformed to the model of centricity-redistribution formalized

by Polanyi ( 944: chapter 4). With such a background, there is little doubt that the uncle-nephew relationship

has undergone a serious change in recent times. Of course, the maternal uncle still accounts for 21 per cent of his nephew's visits on the average, but such visits often lack the complementary gift relations and thus do not seem to conform any more to the traditional pattern of uncle-nephew primacy. Let us none the less be cautious, since no comparable data are available on the present evolution of uncle-nephew ties within the village communities; the latter, indeed, are not static and have

already been permeated by imported cultural patterns which are likely to sharpen the

traditionally ambivalent interaction between these persons (Doutreloux, 967: 92, 96). The low degree of gift-visit convergence in the uncle-nephew relations is evidently

linked with the lack of gift reciprocity between these persons. If we compare sub- columns (i) and (2) of Table II, we see a significantly higher reciprocity of gifts made during visits, as compared to gifts in general; now, maternal uncles are an

exception to the rule, the proportion of givers falling from 2I*7 (i7-4+4-3) to I6.7 per cent, whereas those receiving without reciprocating increase from 78-3 to 83-3 per cent. The rule, however, holds true for the workers' nephews, but these are only eleven cases. After Mauss and Polanyi, and taking account of many more recent contributions in the field of economic anthropology, one may assert that within traditional communities exchange used to conform to the model of symmetry or

centricity, according to whether partners were either of equal status or vertically related in the social pyramid. In the latter case, reciprocity really existed, though indirectly: prestations by junior members were balanced partly by redistribution made on their behalf by senior members, partly by their subsequent promotion to a senior status and its concomitant privileges. Now, Table II clearly displays, for

specific kin ranks, a very uneven distribution of gifts, according to whether they are made or received by workers without being reciprocated, or whether they are

reciprocated (within the time-span of six months). This means that among the Yombe, the norm of indirect reciprocity in the uncle-nephew relation is weakening, at least when the nephew has become a full-time wage-earner. Prestations were the price paid by junior tribesmen for being granted security through communal redistribution. Why should actual wage-earners go on paying this price, since they draw their livelihood and security mainly from a stable commitment to the modern



RURAL WAGE-EARNERS AND THEIR KINSFOLK IN WESTERN ZAIRE 177

wage economy,4 whereas their participation in the kinship redistributive channel is more and more limited and even questioned by village elders?

The transition to wage labour, indeed, tends to unilateralize the demands, to the

disadvantage of the wage-earners, and to distort the economics of interpersonal relations. The case of the maternal uncle seems clear: normally, the initiative of gift giving rests on the visiting rather than on the visited person; now, the maternal uncle is much more often being visited than visiting his nephew worker, and in the

TABLE II

Circulation of (I) allgifts, and (2) those made during visits, in percentages according to kinship rank

Mother Father Siblings Matril. uncle

From... to (I) (2) (I) (2) (I) (2) (I) (2)

Worker - kinship 5 50 32'7t 66.8 56-7 55'3 43'5 78'3t 83.3* Kinship -worker 3-ot 39t 7'9 I0o0 1I'4 II.6 I7'4t 0Io0 Worker - kinship 42z0* 63'4* 25'3 33'3 33'3 44'9 4'3* 6'7*

(n) = ioo% (Ioo) (43) (51) (30) (96) (69) (46) (30)

From... to Nephews Other matril. Other patril. Total

(I) (2) (I) (2) (I) (2) (I) (2)

Worker -- kinship 78-8 41' 66-7 50-0 38-5t 37'5 62-3 49'3 Kinship -worker 9'1 27-2 9'5 I5'o 23-0 I2'5 9'4 io09 Worker - kinship I2'It 27.2 23-8 35'0 38-5 50o0 28'3 39'8

(n) = oo% (33) (II) (42) (20) (13) (8) (381) (211)

Pb: * < 0-002; t < 0-05. Italics < o-oi between sub-columns.

latter case only one out of twenty such uncles offers a present which is not reciprocated (Table I). The worker is thus on the losing side with his uncle, without receiving due compensation from his own nephews; contacts with the latter are infrequent, except for those who are sheltered and fed for lengthy periods, and though the

nephews are mostly visiting rather than visited, gifts circulate predominantly unilaterally from the workers to them, as shown in Table II.

The lack of reciprocity in the relationship between maternal uncle and nephew worker is responsible for its decreasing appeal to the latter, who does not adhere to it spontaneously any longer. One might therefore wonder why the maternal uncles continue to represent as much as 32 per cent of the workers' visit partners.5 The

4 On the average, these workers are thirty-five years old, spent fourteen years in employment, divided in two and a half jobs, with the present job lasting for eight years. Forty per cent of them have never worked as cultivators, and 25 per cent left their initial village agriculture to turn definitely to wage labour.

5 This 32 per cent relates to 0oo per cent of visit partners, and therefore does not contradict the 21 per cent of Table I, which relates to Ioo per cent of visits. The difference illustrates the fact that the average frequency of visits of a worker to his maternal uncle is lower than the frequency of visits to other relatives



I78 GIFT EXCHANGE AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION BETWEEN YOMBE

answer lies in the magical constraint referred to in section IIc of my previous article: the eldest maternal uncle is visited by his uterine nephew in a stereotyped way, mainly on value-charged customary events; in these potentially conflictive situations, the workers display attitudes of formal, though substantially ambiguous, allegiance. It is to be remarked, however, that three maternal uncles out of four were visited without being offered a gift, a fact which shows the divergence of actual behaviour from the traditional norm. If combined with the high percentage of workers abstaining from any contact with their maternal uncle, this suggests that the Yombe workers' behaviour is increasingly responsive to the logic of ambivalence. Such a logic, according to Mauss's Essay on the Gift (1966: 267-73) already influenced traditional relationships in the pre-colonial period, but the more recent economic context gives it a new significance as a major lever of social change.

Contrasting with the position of maternal uncles (and to a lesser degree, maternal nephews), the link between visits and gift exchanges is prominent in the workers' relationship with members of their nuclear families. Together with this link, exchanges are more often reciprocal, because of the spontaneous nature of visits within the nuclear family (mother and siblings in particular).

The degree of convergence between visits and gifts varies not only according to kin rank, but also according to whether the worker is visiting, being visited, or both. The proportion of visits with gifts increases accordingly from 46 to 60 and 89 per cent. This increase combines with a smaller proportion of unilateral gifts provided by the workers: 62, 49, 33 per cent. Reciprocated visits increase the likelihood of reciprocated gifts to 55 per cent of the workers concerned, as compared to only 24 per cent of all workers with some (unilateral or bilateral) visit relationship. The combined reciprocity of visits and gifts is much less frequent with maternal uncles and nephews (30 per cent of those with reciprocal visits) than with other members of the matrilineages (70 per cent). Something analogous to a free-trade area exists, which may be called the area of spontaneous intercourse between the workers and those relatives who are not hierarchically connected to them. Maternal uncles and nephews, and, to a lesser extent, fathers, are thus excluded.

2. Nature of gifts exchanged Three kinds of gifts are exchanged between workers and villagers: first, consumer

goods, both foodstuffs and durables like clothes and household utilities; second, money; and third, the service of hospitality to visitors. The survey made among the Yombe workers has been able to measure how much they spent on these three categories, and thus to evaluate the total cost of solidarity borne by them over a period of six months. The total value of what they received in counterpart, however, could not be evaluated satisfactorily, though we know the amount of cash granted to them. No accurate balance can thus be drawn to compare the values which were given and received, but the workers are undoubtedly on the losing side.

Hospitality is given both to short-term visitors and to long-term dwellers (mothers, sisters, nephews, etc.). The nature of gifts varies according to whether they are received or offered. Money flows mostly towards the village, since 76 per cent of the workers contributed as against only 7 per cent who received; among the latter, only four did not reciprocate with a, generally larger, money gift. The flow



RURAL WAGE-EARNERS AND THEIR KINSFOLK IN WESTERN ZAIRE 179 to the village amounts to 364,687 CF6 as compared to only 22,900 CF from the village. Consumer goods circulate less unilaterally, with 76 per cent of the workers contributing and 56 per cent receiving something. Hospitality costs the workers much more than it yields; the combined number of visits paid by them and their wives to the village is 50 per cent larger than the number of visits received from villagers, but the total duration of the latter far exceeds the former; moreover, many relatives have been living with the workers' families for months and even years.

The contents of gifts flowing towards the village differ from those flowing from the village; specialization is threefold: first, as already mentioned, money is village- directed; second, the workers receive relatively more food and provide more durable consumer goods; third, they generally receive local foodstuffs and offer imported (from abroad and from town manufactures) victuals. Eighty-two workers gave some non-edible goods and 19 some food, whereas not more than 17 received such goods and I 37 received some food. The specialization as to the imported or local origin of food is based on the partners' comparative ease of access to these two different categories of foodstuffs, but, by the same token, it expresses a comparative advantage of the gift partners, which enhances the value of their respective gifts: each one tends to give the sort of goods he is able to buy or produce cheaper than would his partner, and so too, he tends to receive what he himself could only obtain at a higher price. Locally produced food, indeed, is passed through one or two intermediaries before being bought by the workers' wives at a cost which bears heavily on their tiny budget. Reciprocally, and because of a deficient commercial network, prices are excessively high at the village level for semi-luxury food such as sugar or tinned meat, and for all other consumer goods which, therefore, are not easily sold out, even when in very small supply. Such items are enjoyed the more when offered as gifts.

Table III shows how 232 workers distributed for the last six months their expenditures by categories of goods and beneficiaries. These expenditures totalled 738,I6I CF on behalf of 3 5 individuals or groups of individuals. Each worker thus spent an average 3,182 CF for 2z3 persons or groups, viz. 1,380 CF per unit. When groups instead of individuals are the beneficiaries, sisters or nephews for instance, each member of such groups receives of course less than the average amount spent by worker for the group.

Money gifts constitute 49-4 per cent, foodstuffs and other consumer goods 26-2 per cent, and hospitality outlays 24-4 per cent of the solidarity expenditures. Hospi- tality outlays include food provided for visitors, evaluated as a lump sum per day, as well as the cost of feeding and sheltering relatives, mainly' little brothers ', nephews, and sisters-in-law, residing for longer periods. The total expenditure of 738,I61 CF is very unevenly distributed according to beneficiaries: mothers, siblings, and wives' relatives receive 20 per cent each, nephews and nieces 14 per cent, fathers 9 per cent, maternal uncles 8 per cent, other matrilineal relatives 7 per cent, and other paternal relatives only 2 per cent. On the other hand, the number of workers contributing varies according to the category of relatives; therefore, wives' relatives as a group rank first in the average expenditure per contributing worker, the latter being only 86 as compared to 13 entertaining their siblings and Ioz entertaining their mother;

6 In 1966, the monetary unit was still the Congolese Franc, with an official exchange rate of o50 CF for U.S. $i. In 1967, the CF was replaced by the Zaire, which is exchanged for U.S. $2.




the various members of this in-law group receive much less, of course. As individual beneficiaries the o02 mothers are on top with an average of 1,472 CF each.

3. Gifts and kin rank

It is worth noting, moreover, that the distribution by category of gifts varies

significantly according to the kin rank of beneficiaries, mainly as far as maternal

TABLE III

Distribution of solidarity expenditures by category of items and beneficiaries

Mother Maternal uncle

Goods Money Hospit. Total Goods Money Hospit. Total

Total expend. CF 58,702 76,330 I5,195 150,315 9,900 47,030 2,260 59,I9o % 39'I 50-8 io-i 100 I6'7 79'5* 3'8* o00

No. workers 59 7I 31 I02t 13 37 23 53 Aver. exp./worker 996 I,075 490 I,474t 762 1,271 98 1,II7

Siblings Nephews and nieces

Total expend. CF 25,290 92,451 26,635 144,376 9,420 30,256 60,480 100,156 % I7'5 64'0* I8.5 100 9'4 30-2 60.4* 100

No. workers 36 78 69 113 II 22 35 53 Aver. exp./worker 703 1,185 386 1,278 856 I,375 1,728 1,889

Other matril. relatives Father

Total expend. CF 17,020 24,610 10,425 52,055 25,810 41,190 1,250 68,250 % 32'7 47'3 20o0 o00 37-8 60'3 1.9* IOO

No. workers II 3I 26 54 26 46 I3 54 Aver. exp./worker I,547 794 401 964 993 893 96 1,264

Other patril. relatives Wives' relatives

Total expend. CF 6,720 7,750 715 15,185 40,634 45,070 62,930 I48,634

% 44'3 51'O 4'7 Ioo 27-3 30'3* 424* oo00 No. workers 5 IO I3 20 40 48 6i 86 Aver. exp./worker 1,344 775 55 759 i,oi6 939 1,032 I,728

Total, contributing workers Total, beneficiaries

Total expend. CF 193,584 364,687 179,890 738,161 I93,584 364,687 179,890 738,I6I

% 26'2 49'4 24'4 IOO 26-2 49'4 244 Ioo No. workers 142 I96 162 232t No. beneficiaries 202 343 271 535 Aver. exp./worker 1,363 1,86I 1,110 3,I82t 958 I,063 666 I,380

* Pb < 0-02.

t The number of workers and the average expenditure appearing in the columns 'total' are evidently not equal to the sum of the corresponding figures of the preceding three columns, because many workers are represented in more than one of these three columns, whereas average expenditures in the various columns do not concern all the workers.

uncles, siblings, and nephews are concerned. This is to be explained by the uneven

frequency of visits received from these relatives, as has been noted elsewhere (Lux, 1971: 122-4). First of all, maternal uncles and fathers are not often visitors and cannot bear much on hospitality costs, as opposed to nephews who, though infrequent visitors, then often live with the workers' family. Let us therefore deduct hospitality costs, to consider the relative shares of goods and money gifts, which amount

roughly to two-thirds and one-third respectively. Significant deviations (at the o'o3 level) are observed among maternal uncles and siblings, who receive about 80 per



RURAL WAGE-EARNERS AND THEIR KINSFOLK IN WESTERN ZAIRE I8I

cent in money, as opposed to only 56 per cent for mothers and 54 per cent for wives' relatives.

Among the workers' ascendants, the maternal uncles are the only ones who receive such a large share of gifts in money form, this share being about five times more than the 'real' goods (79 5 per cent v. I 6-7 per cent) and provided by three times as many workers (37 v. 13). Once again, they deserve special attention. We know from the previous article (Lux, I97I) that the maternal uncles, especially the eldest, are traditionally invested with the lineal authority, so that contacts with their nephews working outside occur on rather formal occasions and do not result from spontaneous motivations.7 The significance of gift exchange with them has become increasingly ambiguous, since they are not eager at all to reciprocate, as Table II shows us. In short, the breakdown of the traditional prestation-redistribution pattern, making for the 'economic' link between maternal uncles and nephews, is here being confirmed by the sharply increasing share of money gifts. The maternal uncles require, they even exact, money for money's sake, as being intrinsically a power of choice upon goods and persons; this contrasts with the predominantly symbolic value of traditional gift exchange. It is quite understandable, then, that the workers react defensively against such a distortion, not only by reducing the frequency of contact, as explained in the previous article (Lux, I97I: II3, II7-19), but also by abstaining from giving money: not more than 37 workers made money gifts to their maternal uncle, as compared with 7I to their mother and 78 to their siblings.

Tables II and III display a striking contrast in the structure of exchanges with mothers and siblings on the one hand, maternal uncles and nephews on the other. The second circuit, in which the workers play both roles, either as nephews or as uncles, is traditionally more important than the first. We already know that the workers are not, as uncles, compensated for what they give away as nephews, and that in both cases gifts are but loosely connected with visits. Again, the customary pattern of exchange between these persons has been distorted, and this is confirmed by looking at the surprisingly small number of workers offering money, goods, or hospitality to their maternal uncles or nephews: 53 only in both cases, instead of as many as o02 and II3 to their mother and siblings respectively. The difference increases even when hospitality costs are excluded. As for the latter, I would go further by suggesting that the 3 5 workers who spent on hospitality one-third of the total hospitality outlays (60,480/I79, 890) to feed and shelter nephews of theirs, did not intend to play their role of maternal uncles along traditional lines and for traditional purposes, but in order to remove their nephews from tribal elders and thus free them from village constraints. This interpretation would suggest that a tradition-imposed role, dictated by tradition-rooted values, is being performed against the traditional structure, contributing to its obsolescence.

It is worth looking at the wives' relatives, because they account for no less than 20 per cent of the workers' solidarity expenditures, with as many as 86 out of 202

contributing married workers spending money on their behalf. This does not mean

7 From Doutreloux (1967: 96): 'Lorsque les ques de respect habituelles, genuflexions, battement neveux grandissent, l'oncle maternel commence a des mains, sont prises pour empecher les actes de voir en eux des rivaux possibles. Lors de leurs sorcellerie ou, plus positivement, les tentatives rencontres des precautions rituelles, outre les mar- d'empoisonnement.'



I82 GIFT EXCHANGE AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION BETWEEN YOMBE that marriage and women are the channel conveying the persisting influence of traditional social structure and norms to the company workers at the periphery of the tribal world. The previous article (pp. I20-i) showed that the workers' wives have adopted the restrictive behaviour of their husbands by paying still fewer visits to the village, especially when the latter display a more modern-oriented occupational career. Moreover, half of the few visits by these women within their lineage are made to their mother. It therefore appears that these wives, partly at their husbands' instigation, manage successfully to resist their lineages' efforts to retain control over them; in addition, they keep practically no contact with their maternal uncles, are visited mainly by sisters and nephews, who must content themselves with shelter and food without being often granted money or other gifts. All these facts suggest that the workers are able to control on their own behalf the relations with their wives' relatives. We may then perhaps extend to the latter the interpretation just given for the hospitality provided by 3 5 workers to their nephews. If so, the workers are linked with some relatives of their own as well as of their wives' lineages by a sort of complicity; this develops a new patron-client relationship, in favour of the workers, which tends to replace the older lineal hierarchy.

This brings us back to the core of the analysis of the network of visits, as it appeared in the previous article. The workers, on the one hand, keep increasingly at a distance from their authority-invested lineal elders, except for tactical considerations induced by a magical fear which still permeates their conscience. On the other hand, by main- taining solidarity ties with less dangerous members of the lineage, they conform to a traditional cultural value, but with an ambivalent perspective; this explains why gifts are offered to these members out of spontaneously generous feelings, which, however, combine with a more or less consciously calculated strategy aiming both at with- drawing these young relatives from the tribal elders' grip and, paradoxically, at gaining influence and authority over them (mainly over nephews) according to the traditional standards of hierarchical subordination and to the 'economics of prestation '.8

Here we enter into the dialectics of tradition-modernity relationships. We need here to link our analysis of the quantitative importance of gift exchanges to the previous analysis of the network of visits. The same independent variable, viz. the workers' occupational profiles, and the attendant control variables will be used in order to look for confirmations and new aspects of the problem relating the movement from traditional solidarity to the modernizing process of wage labour as it has been experienced by our sample workers.

III. COMMITMENT TO WAGE LABOUR AND VALUE OF EXPENDITURES FOR THE KINDRED

My previous study started with the hypothesis of an inverse relationship between the frequency of visits and the choice of visit partners on the one hand, and the degree

8 The workers' calculated strategy of gift-giving wealth in this way, he has, through a capital invest- is very similar to the strategy of the wealthy man of ment, gained continuing control over future services. traditional societies, as it is interpreted by anthro- His command over wealth has been secured and has

pologists, such as Cyril Belshaw (I965: 48-9): ' The expanded. And he is known to have such power. man who holds the vaygu'a and the man who holds This is the true wealth in a prestation system, and it the scrip has power; he commands resources, he can is the mainspring of entrepreneurial activity.' call them forth at will... Having dispersed material



RURAL WAGE-EARNERS AND THEIR KINSFOLK IN WESTERN ZAIRE I83 to which the workers were committed to the modern wage economy on the other hand. This degree was evaluated by means of their occupational profile. This hypothesis, however, was not supported by the fact findings; indeed, the process of integrating oneself into the money economy, instead of setting the worker at an increasing distance from his village, developed more intricate interactions. An adapted version of the previous hypothesis to the main topic of the present study reads as follows: the more committed a worker is to the wage economy-in other terms, the higher he ranks on the scale of occupational profiles, the lower is the amount of solidarity expenditures on behalf of his village kinsfolk. Because visits and gifts are bound together, this hypothesis is likely to be refuted by the forth- coming analysis of facts, the latter probably supporting the main findings of the study on the visit network.

The profiles, which are used as an independent variable, must be recalled. 'Profile no. I refers to the people who started their active life as cultivators, went over to wage labour, but withdrew from it one or more times to resume temporary village activities; this first profile is labelled C-W(C). Profile no. 2 features people who began as wage-earners, but withdrew temporarily just like those of profile no. I; they are labelled W(C). The people with profile no. 3 began their adult life as cultivators, but then entered the labour market without ever returning to the village economy; their label is C-W. Profile no. 4, labelled W, is composed of men who have persevered from the start as wage-earners. Profile no. 5 is only a special case of the preceding, in so far as some of these workers took one or more chances in trade or modern handicraft activities, but returned to the labour market; their label is W(t/h). Sixteen workers could not be included in any of these five profiles, and make up a sixth, sundry (S) one. The sample distribution by occupational profile is as follows:

I = C-W(C) 2 =W(C) 3 = C-W 4 = W 5 =W(tlh) 6 = S No. 30 50 63 8i 23 i6 Per cent I2-7 I8.7 23*6 30'3 8'7 6-o

'Profile no. i workers are not " migrant workers " since they have spent an average of thirteen years divided into only 2-9 jobs with their present job lasting for an average of six years. The same is true of profile no. 2 workers; both are composed of men who have been less committed to the wage economy than the others, but more than are real migrant workers' (Lux, 197I: I1-I2).

The present section deals exclusively with the value of gifts made by the workers to their village relatives. The values received from them, in connection with the question of reciprocity, have already been evaluated in the preceding section.

i. Occupational profile and solidarity expenditures Table IV provides for the last six months the distribution of solidarity expenditures

by category-money, consumer goods, hospitality-according to the workers' occupational profiles. Once divided by six, the average monthly expenditures are measured in proportion to the monthly wages.

Table I of my previous study showed that an increasing commitment to wage labour, as measured on the scale from profile no. i to profile no. 5, was related to a decreasing frequency of visits to the village, but to an increasing number of visitors

p




from there, so that the total number of contacts was kept fairly constant. We have

seen, earlier in the present study, that gifts circulate mostly during visits. Therefore, it looks normal, at first glance, that expenditures on solidarity do not decrease when

passing from profiles no. i to no. 5. Since this passing, however, means an increasing commitment to a modern way of life and thus a widening gap from the village milieu, one would expect workers of a higher profile to spend less, at equal wages,

TABLE IV

Amounts of solidarity expenditures, according to their nature and the workers'

occupationalprofiles, in Congolesefrancs

Nature of Occupational profiles expenditures

I 2 3 4 5 6 Total C-W(C) W(C) C-W W W(t/h) sundry

a. Money CF 909 1,242 1,578 i,6i8 887 1,944 I,403 % 54-8* 45'8 48-I 50-5 47'2 55-6 49'5 Index Ioo 137 I74 178 98 214 I54

b. Consumer CF 550 702 825 637 722 722 715 goods % 33.I 25.9 25-1 I9-9 38'4 20'7 25'3

Index ioo 128 50o ii6 13I 131 130 c. a+b CF 1,459 1,944 2,403 2,255 I,609 2,666 2,118

% 87'9* 7I'7 73'2 76.4 85.6 76.3 74'8 Index Ioo I33 I65 I55 IIo I83 145

d. Hospital CF 201 768 879 946 259 828 714 % I2-I* 28.3 26-8 23'6 14.4 23'7 25-2 Index 0oo* 382 437 471 I29* 412 355

e. Total CF 1,660 2,712 3,282 3,201 1,878 3,494 2,832t % 100 I00 I00 I00 I00 100 100

Index o00* 163 198 193 131 211 171 f. Monthly wage 2,910 3,169 3,028 3,509 3,525 3,553 3,260 g. Exp./wage (%) 9'5 14'3 i8-i 14-5 8-7 I4'4 13'9

* Pb < 0-075. t This amount is lower than the 3,182 CF of Table III, because it represents the average expenditure of

all the 267 workers of the sample, instead of only the 232 who effectively contributed to the aggregate expenditures.

for their village kinsmen than do workers of a lower profile. Facts do not conform to this expectation, except for profile no. 5, ranging one-third under the average. For the remaining profiles, the opposite tendency holds true, in so far as profile no. i workers, who are undoubtedly the least integrated in the wage economy and the most involved in village affairs, also display the lowest solidarity outlays (59 per cent of the average). Such a difference can be explained only to a slight extent by their wage level, which is 8 per cent below the average.

Where should we look for an explanation? Not to the ambivalent behaviour of these profile no. I people, on which I insisted in the previous study of visit network

(pp. I I4, i 19). Indeed, the distribution by category of outlays supports the view that they keep, more than other workers, tradition-patterned relations with their village



RURAL WAGE-EARNERS AND THEIR KINSFOLK IN WESTERN ZAIRE I85

kinsfolk, as is borne out by the following two points. First, though these profile no. i workers receive practically as many visitors as the others, they spent relatively little on hospitality, z2 per cent instead of an average 2 5 per cent, and in effect even less, 201 CF as against 714 CF; this proves that they seldom have nephews and other relatives staying at home for long periods and cannot, therefore, be willing to play the role of estranging these young relatives from tribal elders' influence, as suggested above for some 35 workers (p. 18 ); nor are they perceived as a refuge by these younger relatives who may intend to escape from the village's constraints, precisely because they remain quite involved in the village affairs.

Secondly, gifts in kind remain relatively more important among profile no. i workers. Now these gifts, as opposed to modern money, used to circulate as symbols of traditional inter-group or inter-individual solidarity, and they were exchanged as such without reference to intrinsic value. In this perspective it is less surprising to record that, by distributing these workers in two groups below and above the 3,000 CF wage level, the upper group with an average wage 50 per cent higher than the lower group, does not offer more money gifts, does not even bear any hospitality costs, but increases gifts in kind by one-third; as a result, the aggregate outlays are reduced by 8 per cent as compared to the lower wage group (see Table VI). Increased gifts in kind are also observed in the (higher wage) group of profile no. 2 workers whereas the contrary holds among workers with profile nos. 3 and 4, who spend 38 per cent less on gifts in kind, but 50 per cent more on money gifts. I shall refer later on to the monetization of gifts in relation to increased wages, but it suffices here to stress that this phenomenon does not apply to the profile no. x workers, whose tighter bonds with the village community are already known.

These cultural bonds may explain why the total amount of their solidarity expenditures remains both unimportant and unrelated to their ability to pay. The inflationary process of gift-giving typifies the distortion brought to its significance by the impact of money and has been studied among others by Stuart Piddocke ( 965: 262). Among the workers who have moved only a short distance from the traditional world, such a process is absent precisely because they are still considered by their kindred as members of the village community. On the contrary, the more modern- oriented workers tend to be perceived as 'different' people, as outsiders; village kinsmen, therefore, appeal to their solidarity feelings in an ambiguous way, with tradition-inspired norms and sanctions hiding the greed-motivated extortion of valuables, which are desired for their own sake and material utility, without any reference to the logic of traditional gift exchange.

The occupational profile has been used as the main measuring rod of the degree of integration of the workers in the modern money economy. It leads to the conclusion that a higher degree involves more solidarity expenditures, and it thus refutes the general hypothesis and by the same fact confirms the main findings of the study on visit relationships. This conclusion must now be tested, by introducing various control variables. These variables are linked with the occupational profile, as has been demonstrated in my former article (I971: II2-I5) and will be related to the amount of solidarity expenditures. They are (i) the cultivation by the worker of a plot of land as secondary activity; (2) the level of wages; (3) the level of professional skill; (4) the level of education; (5) the ascendants' occupational profiles.



I86 GIFT EXCHANGE AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION BETWEEN YOMBE

2. Side-line agriculture and solidarity expenditures When a worker has a small plot of land or a few banana- or palm-oil trees within

the tribal boundaries, he will have more contacts with his village relatives; this explains why these workers have quite often a profile no. i. No special relation is to be found between side-line agriculture and solidarity expenditures, except that a higher proportion of the workers concerned offered gifts in kind, 53 per cent compared to 40 per cent of those without agriculture (pu = 0-o67). This confirms the role of this sort of gift among workers of lower profiles.

3. Level of wages and solidarity expenditures The level of wages is positively but indirectly connected with the occupational

profile. It depends, indeed, on the level of skill and the number of years spent in the present job. Now, the higher the occupational profile, the higher the workers' rank on skill and seniority. The following figures show clearly that higher monthly wages command increased solidarity expenditures:

Wages: -3,000 3,000-3,999 4,000 and + Expenditures (6 months) 2,375 2,987 3,673 (n) (I I I) (105) (5 )

These higher wages, however, induce the workers to make fewer visits to the village. It has been demonstrated in the second section that gifts are generally made during visits, but, on the other hand, the wage level is not linked to the frequency of received visits. It follows that the visits made to the village are the real occasion for gift giving. We may, therefore, interpret the combined infrequent visits to the village and seeming generosity as a defensive reaction of the better paid workers. Two factors are responsible for this reaction. First, above a given threshold, the wage offers opportunities for improved standard of living to the workers' nuclear families; this can be easily inferred from inventories of the durable consumer goods of the respective households. As a consequence, the ratio between marginal solidarity expenses and marginal wage is frequently inferior to the ratio between the corresponding average figures. In other words, the modern aspiration to a better standard of living competes increasingly against the traditional norm of lineage solidarity. Secondly, higher wages provoke more pressures from kinsmen for redistribution on their behalf. These pressures are the main reason invoked by the largest group of workers-two-thirds of them-who consider it a drawback to work in the vicinity of their village kinsfolk. As can be seen from Table V, all these workers, but especially those with better wages, have been spending on behalf of their kinsmen much more money than the remaining one-third who seem happy to live in the proximity of their own village relatives.

The interpretation just made here, interestingly enough, holds true even for the workers with a profile no. i, those known to be less detribalized. The subgroup earning less than 2,750 CF per month has an average of 2z7 visits to the village, in sharp contrast with the subgroup earning more, whose visit frequency drops to o08. The wage level has been used so far to control the validity of the relation between occupational profile and solidarity expenditures. It has, moreover, its own impact on these expenditures, as can be inferred from Table VI.



RURAL WAGE-EARNERS AND THEIR KINSFOLK IN WESTERN ZAIRE 187 Within each of the six occupational profiles, indeed, wages of 3,000 CF and more

entail either increased total expenditures or for at least one category of gifts. The increase amounts to an average of one-third. It is particularly worth comparing the 34 profile no. i workers, who are less detribalized, with the 80 profile no. 4 workers, who (together with the 23 profile no. 5) are the most integrated in the modern

TABLE V

Aggregate solidarity expenditures by categories of wages, according to the workers' favourable or unfavourable opinion regarding the proximity of their villages

Opinion Monthly wages

<3,000 3,000-3,999 4,000-4,999 5,000 and + Total

a. Favourable 2,021 2,745 2,715 2,350 2,654 (I00) (I35-9) (I34'4) (II6-3)

b. Unfavourable 2,430 3,134 4,397 6,025 3,444 (i00) (I28.8) (I8o09) (247-9)

c. (bla)ioo 120 114 I62 256 130

TABLE VI

Index of solidarity expenditures by occupationalprofile and category of gifts for wages superior to 3,ooo CF, on the base of ioo for wages lower than 3,ooo CF

Category of gifts Occupational profile

C-W(C) W(C) C-W W W(tlh) Sundry Total

Money 103 159 I65 132 683 127 I50 Consumer goods 133 193 55 67 127 127 96 Both 14 172 io8 I09 256 127 128 Hospitality o 211 283 6i 571 I50 128

All gifts 82 184 130 I03 288 131 i28 (n) (34) (50) (63) (8i) (23) (i6) (267)

economy. Neither of them conforms to the rule of higher aggregate expenditures, but they differ from each other: among the former, money gifts decrease while gifts in kind increase, whereas the opposite tendency obtains for the latter: when wages are above 3,000 CF, money gifts increase by 50 per cent. This reveals once again that with a deeper commitment to the wage economy, gifts become increasingly monetized. Moreover, either below or above this level, the workers with the three more committed profiles nos. 3 to 5 spend on money gifts at least 50 per cent more than those with the less committed profiles nos. i and 2: I,210o . 809 CF when earning less than 3,000 CF, and 1,737 v. I,III CF when earning more.

4. Occupational skill, education, and solidarity expenditures The category of occupational skill, which the level of wages partly depends on,

is another control variable, introduced to test the way solidarity expenditures are



i88 GIFT EXCHANGE AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION BETWEEN YOMBE related to the workers' degree of insertion in the money economy. The less committed profiles nos. i and 2, indeed, are to be found among 37 per cent of unskilled, 29 per cent of semi-skilled, but only 20 per cent of skilled workers. This variable confirms the main findings, by being positively related to the amount of solidarity outlays; the connection is even accentuated for money gifts, thus supporting the phenomenon of increased monetization of gifts:

Unskilled Semi-skilled Skilled

Money gifts 1,187 (1oo) 1,785 (150) 2,227 (I88) Total solidarity expenditures 2,492 (Ioo) 3,250 (130) 4,075 (I64)

The same trend can be observed with the level of education, expressed in number of school years:

o to 2 years 3 to 5 years 6 to 9 years Money gifts 1,322 (ioo) 1,527 (II6) 3,179 (240) Total solidarity expenditures 2,759 (ioo) 3,154 (II4) 3,890 (I4I)

Education reacts positively on solidarity expenditures, in the same way as it does on the frequency of visits to the village (Lux, 197: I I4-1 5). The interpretation in terms of a defensive reaction, used so far to take account of simultaneously decreasing visits but increasing outlays, evidently does not explain the role of a longer education, as one among various indexes of modernization, upon the workers' behaviour towards the norm of traditional solidarity. The interpretation given to the education- visit relation seems to be reinforced here: the workers with more schooling, especially those with at least six years, ' may convert their higher educational standard into prestige as a lever for promotion within the tribal hierarchy, provided they retain favourable contacts with the tribal elders ' (Lux, 197: I I4-15) and display generous attitudes on their behalf. So, we may observe among the elite of the Yombe rural workers an eventual intricate relationship between modernity and tradition, something analogous to the ambivalent behaviour of the less modern-oriented profile no. i workers. Let us mention for instance that the workers with at least six years of school attendance not only spend much more on solidarity expenditures, but make money gifts up to 82 per cent of the total amount given, as compared to only 48 per cent among the less educated workers. One may wonder whether this combination of higher education and money-oriented gift-giving really expresses a reappreciation of or compromise with, the traditional village milieu and values, instead of merely resulting from tactical considerations in order to neutralize possible magical retalia- tion from envious tribal elders. The answer partly depends on how these elders and the workers feel about each other and on how these feelings are interpreted reciprocally. This introduces a last control variable.

5. Ascendants' wage-labour experience and solidarity expenditures These feelings, indeed, are seriously influenced by the extent to which the lineal

elders, mainly fathers and eldest maternal uncles, have become familiar with wage labour through personal experience. Tables III and IV of my previous article showed first that the workers have a more modern-oriented occupational profile when their ascendants themselves went through such an experience, and, second, that the



RURAL WAGE-EARNERS AND THEIR KINSFOLK IN WESTERN ZAIRE 189 workers were in this case much more disposed to visit the village frequently. Now, it can be demonstrated that the father's wage-labour experience has a direct impact on the latter's amount of solidarity expenses. For instance, when the father has worked exclusively as wage-earner and/or modern trader or artisan, his son's expenses are 60 per cent above the average, and even more if the latter is more committed to the wage economy (profiles 3 to 5). The professional career of the eldest maternal uncle does also, but to a lesser extent, impinge on the amount of solidarity expenses.

IV. CONCLUSION

The study of the Yombe rural workers who spend money on behalf of, and exchange gifts with, their village kinsfolk is in line with, and confirms the general interpretation of the previous analysis of visit networks. In other words, the basic hypothesis of an inverse relationship between the degree of the workers' commitment to the wage economy and the importance of ties they keep with their village relatives, has not as such been confirmed. This hypothesis oversimplifies the process of socio-economic change.

A larger commitment, of course, involves opposing trends with fewer visits paid to the villagers but more money spent for them. This opposition expresses the ambiguous position of the workers. They are striving to improve the standard of living of their nuclear family, but they remain more or less subservient to the traditional value and norms of solidarity, partly for the sake of their own security. They are quite aware, however, of their becoming progressively estranged from their lineal relatives whom they consider as unilaterally extorting material advantages in the name of a perverted solidarity rule. Although they are unable to escape fully from the pressures brought to bear on them with magical sanctions, and even though they may keep some ambitions of status promotion within the village community, they are practically always contriving a way out of trouble and avoiding too great an involvement, mainly by refraining from frequent visits to the village. The subtle strategy of balancing opposing tendencies depends on how the workers feel about the influential elders of their lineages, which feelings are themselves a function of the state of apartheid or convergence of the two,

' modern' and ' traditional', milieus. A peculiar aspect of the ambivalent relationships between workers and villagers

consists of the widening gap separating traditional models of behaviour-which are still enforced through socio-magical pressures-from their original socio- cultural background, the latter being increasingly eroded by a new socio-economic environment; in other words, there is a definite and irreversible divorce between the 'significant' and the 'signifii', a divorce which is most clearly evidenced by the relationship of the workers with their eldest maternal uncles. The foundation or logic of this relationship has been deeply distorted by the way gifts have been monetized and flowing mostly unilaterally at the workers' cost into their uncles' hands. The' economics of gift' has disappeared, so to speak, and been replaced by mercantile endeavours, on the part of the village kinsmen, to haggle for the value of traditional solidarity, thus destroying its symbols, in order to have the largest possible share of material wealth redistributed on their own behalf. Whereas tensions have always existed within segmentary, mainly matrilineal, communities, there can be little doubt about the recent emergence of a new sort of conflictive structure,




which opposes groups of interest within the imported framework of economic and social transition to modernity.

REFERENCES

ARDENER, E. and S., and WARIINGTON, W. 1960. Plantation and Village in the Cameroons. London: Oxford University Press.

BAECK, L. I96I. An Expenditure Study of the Congolese Evolues of Leopoldville. In SOUTHALL, A. (ed.), Social Change in Modern Africa. London: Oxford University Press, pp. I 59-8.

BELSHAWV, C. I965. Traditional Exchange and AIodern Markets. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. BETTISON, D. G., and RIGBY, P. J. 1961. Patterns of Income and Expenditures, Blanyre-Limbe, Nyasaland. Rhodes-

Livingstone Communication no. 20. CALDWELL, J. C. I965. 'Extended Family Obligations and Education: A Study of an Aspect of Demographic

Transition amongst Ghanaian University Students ', Population Studies, xix. 2, 183-99. DE BEAUCORPS, R. I941. Les Basongo de la Luniungu et de la Gobari. Bruxelles: Memoire I.R.C.B., 1o, 2. DOUTRELOUX, A. 967. L'ombre des fetiches: societe et culture Yombe. Louvain et Paris: Nauwelaerts. GODDARD, S. I965. Town-Farm Relationship in Yorubaland. Africa, xxxv. 2I-9. GUTKIND, P. I963. African Urban Family Life. The Hague: Mouton.

I965. African Urbanism, Mobility, and the Social Network, in PIDDINGTON R. (ed.), Kinship and Geographical Mobility, Leiden: Brill, pp. 48-60.

HARRIS, J. S. 1944. Some Aspects of the Economics of Sixteen Ibo Individuals. Africa, xiv. 302-35. KAY, G. 1960. A Social and Economic Study of Fort Roseberry. Rhodes-Livingstone Communication no. 21. Lux, A. I97I. The Network of Visits between Rural Wage-Earners and their Kinsfolk in Western Congo.

Africa, xli. I09-28. MAUSS, M. 1950. Sociologie et anthropologie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. MAYER, P. 1962. Migrancy and the Study of Africans in Town. American Anthropologist, Ixiv. 576-92. MERTENS, J. 1935. Les Ba Dzing de la Kamtsha. Bruxelles: Memoire I.R.C.B., 5. PHILIPPART, L. 1920. L'Organisation sociale dans le Bas-Congo. Congo, I920. PIDDOCKE, S. I965. The Potlatch System of the Southern Kwakiutl: A New Perspective. Southwestern Journal

of Anthropology, xxi. 244-64. POLANYI, K. I944. The Great Transformation. New York: Rhinehart & Co. READER, D. H. I96I. The Black Man's Portion. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. SOUTHALL, A. 196I. Kinship, Tribalism and Family Authority. In SOUTHALL, A. (ed.), Social Change in Modern

Africa. London: Oxford University Press, pp. 3I-45. VAN REETH, E. P. 1935. De rolvan den moederlijken oom in de inlandschefamilie. Bruxelles: Memoire I.R.C.B., 5, i.

ReJsume

ECHANGE DE DONS ET REDISTRIBUTION DE REVENUS ENTRE SALARIES RURAUX ET LEUR PARENTf VILLAGEOISE CHEZ LES

YOMBE DU ZAYRE OCCIDENTAL

CET article complete celui d'avril 1971 sur les reseaux de visites entre travailleurs ruraux et leur parente du village. Puisque les visites offrent l'occasion privilegiee d'echanger des dons, l'analyse de ces dons confirme-t-elle les conclusions anterieures? L'ambivalence des comportements est entierement confirmee. Le don n'apparait plus guere comme expression de la volonte de resserrer les liens sociaux au sein du lignage. Les travailleurs sont perdants en donnant beaucoup plus qu'ils ne resoivent, alors que, stabilises dans leur condition de salaries du secteur moderne, ils ont de moins en moins besoin des garanties traditionnelles d'entr'aide. Neanmoins, par crainte des represailles magiques, leurs dons augmentent avec le niveau de leur salaire et, du moins chez ceux dont le profil professionnel temoigne d'une insertion plus profonde dans le salariat, prennent la forme predominante de billets de banque plutot que de cadeaux en nature. Cette monetisation du don marque surtout les relations avec les oncles maternels; ces relations sont des plus tendues et ambigues, ponctuees de peu de visites et de visites souvent non accompagnees de dons. Chez les travailleurs de profil professionnel no I, lesquels restent les plus impliques dans les affaires du village, le don garde davantage sa signification de symbole de solidarite sociale, en restant moins monetis6 et



RURAL WAGE-EARNERS AND THEIR KINSFOLK IN WESTERN ZAIRE I9I moins eleve et en n'augmentant pas avec le niveau du salaire. Tout comme dans le cas des visites, l'analyse des depenses de solidarite en relation avec le niveau scolaire des travailleurs et le profil professionnel de leurs pere et oncle maternel decouvre un aspect particulier de l'ambivalence de leurs comportements: les travailleurs avec une scolarite de six annees et plus depensent plus en dons, surtout sous forme de dons en argent; cette tendance s'accentue encore lorsque leur pere ou leur oncle maternel a frequente le marche du travail. Ainsi s'esquisse une sorte de convergence entre l'elite des travailleurs et leur parente villageoise, comme s'ils cherchaient a valoriser leur reussite professionnelle sur le plan de la societe 'traditionnelle '. Dans l'ensemble cependant, prevaut la conclusion d'une distortion des rapports entre salaries et leur parente a l'interieur d'une ' economie du don' irremediable- ment compromise par la presence d'une monnaie moderne.

The author is grateful to the Canada Council for the financial aid which enabled him to carry out the field work for this paper.

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