Getting the CapEx right in the infrastructure sectors Phil Caffyn, Utility Consultants Ltd Please...

Getting the CapEx right in the infrastructure

sectors

Phil Caffyn,Utility Consultants Ltd

www.utilityconsultants.co.nz

Please read disclaimer on second page

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Disclaimer• This presentation has been prepared for the sole

purpose of the NZIGE Spring Technical Seminar 2007 and is not to be relied upon by event participants or any other person as professional advice.

• This presentation has been compiled by Utility Consultants Ltd at the invitation of the NZIGE. Neither the NZIGE, its officers or their employers take any responsibility for the factual accuracy of this presentation or for any views, opinions or biases in the content of this presentation.

• Utility Consultants Ltd as the author of this presentation shall not be liable in any way whatsoever for any action or failure to act based on the content of this presentation.


Context for this presentation• This presentation has been prepared for an audience of

gas engineers in New Zealand however the general principles discussed in this presentation will be applicable to other network infrastructure.

• The context for this preparation includes four converging issues…

• A significant shift in the New Zealand government’s thinking on the need to encourage investment in network infrastructure following a blackout at Otahuhu grid exit substation in June 2006.

• The review of Part 4A of the Commerce Act (which sets out the regulatory framework for electricity lines price control).

• The on-set of the bow-wave of renewals of much of New Zealand’s infrastructure.

• A seeming increasing number of asset failures which always seems to spook government agencies.


Presentation topics• What is CapEx ??

• Different types of CapEx.

• How can we get the CapEx wrong ??

• And what’s so wrong about getting the CapEx wrong ??

• How can we get the CapEx right ??

• Getting the right amount of CapEx at the right time.

• Regulatory incentives for CapEx.

• Valuation & optimisation risks.

• Bringing together some practical approaches to getting

the CapEx right.

• Contact me for more info.


What is CapEx ??


What is CapEx ??• Short definition of CapEx is funds that are spent on

stuff that outlives the current financial year.

• In contrast OpEx is funds that are spent on stuff that is fully consumed within the current financial year.

• Stuff that CapEx is spent on is called “capital assets”.

• CapEx has two key characteristics…

• Must be depreciated in the Statement Of Financial Performance (can’t be fully expensed, which reflects its life beyond the current financial year).

• Must be added to the Statement Of Financial Position in accordance with specified rules.


Different types of CapEx


Different types of CapEx• I’ve found it useful to define three types of CapEx…

Type Description Reason

Renewal Replacing existing assets with assets of similar capacity or functionality.

Existing asset condition is insufficient to perform as required (often manifests as declining reliability or leakage).

Up-sizing Replacing existing assets with assets of greater capacity or functionality.

Existing assets lack capacity or functionality to perform as required (often manifests as excessive pressure drop or flow restriction).

Extension Extending the network at large by adding new assets (excludes new service mains).

Existing assets cannot physically reach new customers (usually manifests as a physical gap)


Different types of CapEx• These three different types of CapEx tend to occur in

the following circumstances…

Prevailing load growth

Location of demand growth

Lo Hi

Within existing network footprint

Outside of existing network

footprint

Quadrant 4

· CapEx will be an even mix of both extensions to reach new customers and then up-sizing to supply that demand through existing upstream assets .

Quadrant 3

· CapEx will be dominated by extensions because load growth is occurring beyond the reach of existing assets, and then maybe some up-sizing to supply this additional demand through existing upstream assets.

Quadrant 1

· CapEx will be dominated by renewals because assets will wear out before they get “too small”.

Quadrant 2

· CapEx will be dominated by up-sizing because assets become “too small” before they wear out.


Different types of CapEx• The three different types of CapEx tend to have the

following characteristics…

Characteristic Renewal Up-sizing Extension

Location Within the existing network foot-print by definition.

Within the existing network foot-print by definition.

Outside of existing network foot-print by definition.

Nature of load increase

Isn’t any – driven by asset condition, not capacity.

Supplying either new load or increasing load at an existing connection within existing foot-print.

New supply to a new customer outside of network footprint.

Upstream reinforcement

Isn’t any – by definition renewal replaces assets with assets of similar capacity of functionality.

Forms the focus of up-sizing.

Will only be needed if demand from new customers cannot be supplied by existing upstream assets.


Different types of CapExCharacteristic Renewal Up-sizing Extension

Visibility (context was originally lines)

Generally invisible (might look new and shiny).

Generally invisible (might look new, but hard to tell that the wires are bigger)

Generally very visible – new asset where previously there wasn’t any.

Quadrant in the investment model

Tends to be restricted to Quadrant 1 because assets wear out before they become too small.

Usually restricted to Quadrants 2 and 4 because it requires assets to get too small rather than wear out.

Restricted to Quadrants 3 or 4 by definition. Precise quadrant will depend on rate of load growth and will define degree of associated up-sizing.

Necessity Possible to avoid by deferring renewal – carries increased risk of condition related failure.

Possible to avoid by over loading – carries increased risk of capacity related failure.

Can’t avoid – a new physical connection is required between the network at large and the new load.



Impact on revenue

Generally doesn’t result in any increased revenue.

Hard to attribute revenue from increased demand or connections to up-sized assets.

Generally results in increased revenue directly attributable to new connections.

Impact on costs Can range from modest to large, no revenue impact to be phased to.

Can range from modest to large, generally better matched to revenue growth than extensions.

Likely to be large and over a short period, generally always occurs ahead of revenue, precise phasing depends on nature of new load.

Impact on asset valuation

Can range from modest to large.


Generally large depending on length of extension and degree of up-sizing required.



Impact on profit



Can be large, but often mitigated through customer contributions.

Means of cost recovery

Generally spread over all customers as part of on-going line charges.

Generally spread over all customers as part of on-going line charges.

Generally through capital contribution, possibly up to 100% depending on policy.

Nature of work carried out

Replacement of worn out assets with new assets of similar capacity or functionality.

Replacement of assets that are “too small” by new assets of greater capacity or functionality.

Construction of new assets to connect new customers to existing assets, may also require up-sizing depending on surplus of up-stream capacity.


How can we get theCapEx wrong ??


How can we getthe CapEx wrong??

• Quite simple really – in fact the chances of getting it wrong on either or both of two critical dimensions are probably higher than the chances of getting it right !!!

• We can get the scope of work wrong…• Too much.• Too little.

• We can get the timing wrong…• Too soon.• Too late.

• The following 3x3 matrix depicts the possible choices along these two dimensions…



Too much

Cell #7Massive over investment

Cell #8Over

investment

Cell #9Under

investment

Scope Just right

Cell #4Over investment

Cell #5Ideal situation

Cell #6Under

investment

Too little

Cell #1Under

investment

Cell #2Under investment

Cell #3Massive under

investment

Too soon Just right Too late

Timing



• The coloring of each cell in the matrix probably merits some explanation…

• Firstly the fact that only cell #5 is green, and not cells #2, #4, #5, #6 and #8 suggests that both the scope and timing must be right – not simply one or the other.

• Secondly the fact that cells #1 and #9 are not green suggests that scope cannot be traded off with timing.

• Thirdly the fact that cells #4, #7 and #8 are not green suggests that over-investment is not good.

• Fourthly the fact that cells #4, #7 and #8 are a different color to cells #1, #2, #3, #6 and #9 suggests some sort of asymmetry between under and over-investment.



• So here’s how we can get the CapEx wrong…

• By failing to understand that both the scope and timing of the work must be right.

• By assuming that scope and timing can always be traded off (and the reality is that some small trade-offs are possible, but these tend to be small).

• By failing to understand the different nature and consequences of the risks of under and over-investment.


And what’s so wrong aboutgetting the CapEx wrong ??



• Actually … there’s heaps wrong with getting the CapEx wrong !!!

• If the CapEx is too late, an asset may cross the threshold of minimum acceptable service (and may also fail catastrophically).

• If CapEx is too soon, the company incurs a cost of capital sooner than it needs to and may also be discarding unconsumed component life.

• If CapEx is too much, there is the risk that it cannot be fully rolled into the Regulatory Asset Value.

• If the CapEx is too much the regulator may also conclude that CapEx is “inefficient” or “unjustified” – kind of relates to the above but on a wider scale.



• If you’re a UK distributor and your estimated CapEx is more than OFGEM’s estimate you miss out on the reward for being close to OFGEM’s estimates under the Information Quality Incentive (which was included in EDPCR4 and is being included in the current GDPCR).

• It should be clear by now that the nature of the risks of getting the CapEx wrong are asymmetrical – the consequences of too little and/or too late are very different from the consequences of too much and/or too soon.

• What may not be clear is that the magnitudes of these risks are also hugely different because some form of catastrophic failure often occurs – an explosion, a crash, a derailment etc.



• To labor the point a bit more consider the price paid for a kWh of gas (10 … maybe 15 cents), and then consider the losses if that kWh is not supplied...

• Patrons walking out of a café because their meals weren’t served.

• Guests bailing out of a hotel because there is no hot water.

• Molten product such as aluminium, steel or chocolate freezing in a mould.

• Delicate processes such as glass blowing, spray painting or annealing being interrupted.

• To further labor this asymmetry consider the different consequences of over and under-investing in the rail network !!!



• Just to close this section it would be worth noting the recent shift in New Zealand regulatory thinking on this asymmetry.

• My view is that some (and certainly not all) regulators have been slow to recognise this asymmetry – will stand corrected on this point if need be !!!

• That was until June 12th 2006 when a shackle broke at Otahuhu Substation and Auckland was in the dark for a whole morning.

• Within 2 months the Ministers of Commerce and Energy had both released statements recognising the asymmetry of under and over-investing, and of correctly incentivising investment in regulated infrastructure.


How can we getthe CapEx right


• Correct implementation of CapEx can be broken into six reasonably distinct activities, as follows...

• #1 - identifying and understanding why and when CapEx (or any other sort of work) needs to be done to an asset – these are the trigger points for each asset or class of asset.

• #2 - continually monitoring each asset for breaches of the trigger levels.

• #3 - identifying and understanding the options available to restore asset performance to below the trigger levels.

• #4 - identify the option that best meets the business’ priorities.



• #5 - implement the chosen option.

• #6 - confirm that the benefits are actually occurring, and capture the learning from each project to feed back into the organisations accumulated experience.

• We now need to examine each of these six activities in detail, but most importantly we need to understand that getting the CapEx right actually starts a long way before considering the merits of individual CapEx projects.



• Step #1 is to identify and understand the trigger points associated with each asset or class of assets.

• All assets exist to create some sort of outcome – capacity, reliability, security, pressure drop, safety etc.

• The assets create outcomes through their physical characteristics eg. a 6” pipe creates a different pressure drop outcome than a 4” pipe for the same flow.

• We can then define an acceptable pressure drop trigger for all 6” pipes, and for all 4” pipes and so on.

• We can then define similar trigger points for all the other service levels.




• This leads to a table like the following (example drawn from an electricity distribution context).

Asset category

Extension Up-sizing Renewal

Location trigger

Capacity trigger

Security trigger

Reliability trigger

Voltage trigger

Condition trigger

LV lines & cables

Existing lines don’t reach the customers point of connection

Tends to manifest as a voltage problem

Not considered at LV level

Not considered at LV level

Voltage at consumers switchboard drops below 0.94 per unit

Falls below safety criteria or requires increased mtce effort

Zone substation

Existing network can’t reach new customers

Max demand regularly exceeds 100% of nameplate rating

Security declines to less than (n-1) for 100 hours per year.

Causes more than 100,000 lost customer minutes per year

HV volts regularly drop below 10.2kV

Falls below safety criteria or requires increased mtce effort


• Step #2 is to monitor the actual performance of each asset against the established trigger levels.

• This monitoring and comparison can range from on-line real-time SCADA to off-line testing and inspection of components.

• When trigger levels are exceeded the organisation needs to make a decision – in some cases these may be a simple operational decision, but in some cases an asset characteristic or configuration decision will need to be made.



• Step #3 is to firstly understand and then secondly identify what options are available to bring the assets performance back under the trigger levels.

• Those options include a range of non-CapEx solutions such as (again drawn from an electrical context)…

• Do-nothing eg. let the voltage on a long rural feeder drop below 0.94pu for a few days per year (would only only do this is if the risk profile was contained).

• Operational activities eg. switching load to a lightly loaded supply point.

• Demand side measures eg. encouraging off-peak usage.



• Lift an assets’ trigger point eg. forced cooling on a transformer.

• Re-think an assets’ trigger point eg. using fancy software to re-rate transmission lines closer to the trigger point (making the most of the generous design margins of a by-gone era).

• Adopt a CapEx solution – up-size, renew or extend the asset.

• Important to understand that each of these options will affect the business’ performance in different ways – service delivery, cashflow, profitability, depreciation, tax, asset valuation etc.



• Important to also recognise that unless demand growth is very low many of these options will only defer CapEx, they will not avoid it.

• In that context it probably merits noting that high global prices for key inputs such as plastic, steel, cement, copper and man-power mean that it will probably be cheaper to do CapEx sooner rather than later.

• Traditional reasoning of avoiding capital charge of about 10% per year breaks down when input costs are escalating in some cases at 30% per year !!



• Step #4 is to identify which option (CapEx or otherwise) will best fulfil the business’ objectives.

• Projects (CapEx or otherwise) must compete in two senses…

• Firstly they must compete in an absolute sense against pre-defined criteria such as Discount Rate or Payback Period to see whether it will add or destroy value.

• Secondly they must compete in a relative sense against other projects on the basis of how much they contribute to the business’ overall priorities.

• First step tends to be simple – classical NPV analysis using a defined Discount Rate.



• Accept or reject the project based on the NPV of its discounted cashflows – might also reject the project if its payback period is too long.

• Second step arises from CapEx rationing, and may involve rejecting projects that could create value for the business.

• This requires the business to not only know what its objectives are but to also have a clear sense of priority amongst competing and potentially conflicting goals.

• Important that both costs and benefits are realistic and don’t include people’s bias either for or against the project.



• Step #5 is to implement the chosen option.

• This option must obviously firstly create value for the business and secondly contribute more to the business’ priorities than other projects.



• Step #6 is to capture the learning experience from the project and modify the business’ processes, thinking and behavior.

• Important to confirm that projected benefits are actually occurring, especially if they are based on subjective parameters such as the probability of a supply interruption occurring, the value of energy not served, or the likely extent of a catastrophic failure.

• Key issue is knowing whether an event didn’t happen because the project was done, or whether it wouldn’t have happened anyway.



• Also important to capture the little quirky, qualitative things that can make or break a project…

• Who the best people to deal with in various agencies are (and who are the ones to avoid).

• Which suppliers provide good service.

• Which model or type of product has the cheapest installed costs.

• Which products require extensive IT upgrade or support to make them work.



Getting the right amount ofCapEx at the right time


• The colored 3x3 matrix indicated that there are two dimensions to getting the CapEx right – scope and timing.

• Until we perfect the art of telling the future with absolute certainty getting both of these dimensions right will be very difficult.

• I would go as far as to say that erring on a slight over-investment slightly ahead of time would be the best approach – aiming for cells #4 or #8, or even cell #7 if the consequences of getting it wrong are severe.

• So this section presents a couple of rules of thumb for getting the CapEx right…



• Amount of CapEx (scope)…

• First rule of thumb – is the total annual depreciation for the whole asset base being off-set by renewal CapEx ??

• Second rule of thumb – if it is not, does including the up-sizing CapEx off-set the total annual depreciation ??

• Third rule of thumb – is the total annual depreciation for each class of asset being off-set by renewal CapEx ??

• Fourth rule of thumb – if it does not, does including the up-sizing CapEx off-set the total annual depreciation for each asset class ??



• Timing of CapEx…

• First rule of thumb – what are the risks if renewal (or up-sizing) occurs too late – is it catastrophic (eg. a ruptured steam pipe in down-town Manhattan) or is it inconsequential (eg. a 5kVA transformer in a remote rural area cooks itself) ??

• Second rule of thumb – what are the risks if renewal or up-sizing occurs too soon – could that CapEx be disallowed from inclusion in the RAV ??



• The previous page suggests that the disciplines of CapEx scope and timing are both strongly risk driven.

• Timing the CapEx right involves the following…

• Knowing the shape of an assets “decline in service capability” curve.

• Knowing what mix of parameters drive that curve.

• Knowing exactly how far along that curve we are.

• Practical reality is that while we can statistically predict the likely failure rate for a large population of assets, we can’t predict the failure of any single asset.

• Pick here to discuss this issue further with me.


mailto:[email protected]?subject=Discuss%20CapEx%20risks%20(NZIGE%20slide%20show)


Regulatory incentives for CapEx


• Most infrastructural assets are subject to tariff regulation to safeguard “customer interests” in the face of supposed monopoly suppliers.

• Over the period 1990 to about 2003 most regulators seemed to have interpreted the phrase “customer interests” as driving down tariffs.

• So when regulators have used a building block approach to compiling or assessing allowable tariffs it’s not surprising that CapEx gets a lot of scrutiny (usually second after WACC and efficiency carry overs).

• Its also not surprising that infrastructure owners have tried to boost profits by withholding approved CapEx.



• However, as discussed previously, regulatory thinking seems to have shifted over the last 2 or 3 years to recognise the asymmetry of under and over investing.

• Hence we might expect that regulators would be less inclined to disallow proposed CapEx.

• While that seems to be happening, there are also several other factors in play …

• Steep increases in renewal CapEx compared to previous control periods as the bow wave of renewals kicks in.

• Steep increases in up-sizing CapEx as demand grows and the need to both meet demand and restore security head-room is recognised.



• Steep increases in renewal CapEx to catch up where funds were diverted toward extensions.

• Steep increase in renewal CapEx to catch up where funds may have been diverted to profit.

• These other factors make it difficult to clearly say that regulators are less inclined to disallow CapEx, but it seems to be pointing in that direction.

• What is clear is that regulators are augmenting tariff control regimes with additional features to better incentivise infrastructure owners to get the CapEx right.



• These incentives generally allow an increased revenue take so the infrastructure owner can boost their profit through increased revenue rather than by cutting costs (which was generally renewal and up-sizing CapEx).

• Some of the features used to incentivise CapEx are...

• S-Factor (used in the Victorian electricity sector).

• Information Quality Incentive (used in the UK electricity and gas sectors).

• Ex-post CapEx review.

• Guaranteed Service Levels (used in the Victorian electricity sector).

• Promoting certification of processes and systems.



• S-Factor essentially augments the CPI-X tariff control by adding a Service Factor to reflect under-performance or out-performance of target reliability levels.

• If an infrastructure owner out-performs the reliability target for any given year set by the regulator at the start of the control period, they are rewarded by an increased tariff in the subsequent year.

• Conversely if they under-perform the reliability target, they are penalised with a decreased tariff in the subsequent year.

• Reliability performance is, of course, something that an infrastructure operator can influence through their CapEx spend.



• Information Quality Incentive is based on the premise that an infrastructure owner may seek to artificially inflate its CapEx requirements to obtain a higher tariff and then take the excess funds as profit.

• The core of this argument is that it is difficult for a regulator to discern between genuinely required CapEx and artificially inflated CapEx.

• Under an IQI approach, infrastructure owners are incentivised to make their requested CapEx as close as possible to that estimated by the regulator (OFGEM in this case), with the key parameter being the ratio of the owner’s forecast to OFGEM’s forecast.



• These IQI’s take the following forms...

• Retaining a higher percentage of any under-spent CapEx relative to the owner’s forecast (up to a maximum of 40% if the owner’s forecast matches OFGEM, and down to 20% for a ratio of 140%).

• Capturing (or foregoing) a specified percentage of the forecast CapEx as additional revenue (ranging from 2.5% if the owner’s forecast matches OFGEM, down to -3.5% for a ratio of 140%).

• Being allowed to spend a specified percentage of OFGEM’s forecast CapEx (up to a maximum of 110% for a ratio of 140%).



• Ex-post CapEx review simply compares the actual CapEx spent against what was forecast.

• More importantly it compares the physical work done to ensure that any cost variances are excluded – in today’s world of escalating prices it is easy to spend all the CapEx budget without doing all the work.

• Regulatory concern in this regard seems to have stemmed from infrastructure owners setting ambitious schedules for completing projects.

• The incentive here is to give the regulator confidence that the forecast CapEx is actually required in order to minimise the chances of dis-allowal in subsequent control periods.



• Guaranteed Service Levels require the infrastructure owner to pay each customer effected by a lapse in supply reliability.

• Important to note that GSL’s are “sticks”, not “carrots” (to use OFWAT’s terminology) because they punish the infrastructure owner for getting it wrong rather than rewarding them for getting it right. Hence they are often used in tandem with a reward incentive such as S-Factor.

• In the Victorian electricity sector these lapses in reliability include the total duration and number of unplanned interruptions and the total number of momentary interruptions.



• The GSL payments range from $25 for a customer that has more than 24 momentary interruptions per year up to $300 for a customer that has more than 30 sustained interruptions or more than 60 hours total interruption per year.

• It doesn’t take much to see that GSL payments could easily add up to some big $$$ per year, so its worth targeting CapEx into the worst performing feeders to avoid having to make these payments.

• An implicit part of the GSL is therefore to ensure that average reliability is not improved by simply focusing on the easy and dense parts of a network, but that the worst performing areas are also improved.



• The final approach to incentivising an infrastructure operator to get the CapEx right is indirectly through encouraging certification of asset management processes and systems to accepted standards such as PAS 55-1:2004.

• Over the last 2 years or so OFGEM has been encouraging the UK electricity distributors to implement the requirements of PAS 55-1 and then have that implementation independently certified.

• In the specific case of PAS 55-1 in the UK gas and electricity sectors, OFGEM has indicated that it won’t audit a pipes & wires business’ Asset Risk Management survey if they have had their asset management processes and systems independently certified.



Valuation & optimisation risks


• CapEx is exposed to a number of risks that make it even more important to get the CapEx right.

• Not surprisingly many of these implications spring from the regulatory regime and associated asset valuation approaches, which under a CPI-X regime tends to expose CapEx to a greater level of scrutiny than OpEx.

• Big risks associated with CapEx are…

• The risk that only prescribed levels of CapEx can be rolled into the RAV (includes both scope and timing).

• The risk of eventual optimisation out of the RAV regardless of whether the CapEx was prudent at the time of implementation (lack of a safe harbor).



• The risk that once rolled into the RAV the allowable WACC will be insufficient to allow that CapEx to be recovered.



Bringing together some practical approaches to getting it right


• At first glance getting the CapEx right would seem to involve only two very distinct disciplines…

• Asset management / engineering.

• Project management.

• But actually there are a whole load more disciplines, and it would seem unlikely that any one person will really good at all of these disciplines !!!

• The following table details out the disciplines involved in each of the 6 steps we discussed previously…

Bringing together some practical approaches to getting it right


Bringing together some practical approaches to getting

it rightStep Step description Disciplines involved

#1 Identify and understand the trigger points associated with each asset or class of assets.

•Customer psychology.•Systems & machine theory.•Material properties.•Material behavior.

#2 Monitor the actual performance of each asset against the established trigger levels

•Measurement.•Transducer behavior.•Data processing and comparison.•System & machine theory.•Material behavior.•Risk analysis.•Probability theory.




#3 Firstly understand and then secondly identify what options are available to bring the assets performance back under the trigger levels.

•System & machine theory.•Business strategy & policy.•Government policy.•Sector law and regulation.•Material behavior.•Machine theory.

#4 Identify which option (CapEx or otherwise) will best fulfil the business’ objectives

•Business strategy.•Capital budgeting.•Financial analysis.•Regulatory strategy.•Government policy.•Sector law and regulation.•Machine theory.




#5 Implement the chosen option.

•Project definition & scoping.•Contract law.•Materials procurement.•Man power management•Logistics.•Budgeting & cost control.

#6 Capture the learning experience from the project and modify the business’ processes, thinking and behavior.

•Human behavior.•Organisational culture.•Employment law.•Industrial relations.•Business process re-design.•Incentivising behavior.


Contact me for more info.


• Phone (07) 854-6541

• Mobile (021) 606-670

• Email [email protected]

• Skype philcaffyn

• Web www.utilityconsultants.co.nz

• Subscribe to “Pipes & Wires” (email

me).

Contact me for more info.

mailto:[email protected]

http://www.utilityconsultants.co.nz/


Contact me for more info.• Request the following slide shows on similar topics…

• Implementing the UK asset management specification PAS 55-1:2004 in the infrastructure sector. Request

• Setting service levels for utility networks. Request

• Tariff control of pipes & wires utilities – where is it heading. Request

• Renewals – (half) the hidden side of CapEx (scheduled for November 2007). Request

mailto:[email protected]?subject=Request%20PAS%2055%20slide%20show

mailto:[email protected]?subject=Request%20%22Setting%20service%20levels%20for%20utility%20networks%22%20slide%20show

mailto:[email protected]?subject=Request%20%22Tariff%20control%20of%20pipes%20&%20wires%20utilities%22%20slide%20show

mailto:[email protected]?subject=Request%20renwals%20slide%20show


Contact me for more info.• Visit Utility Consultants library to request other slide

shows, monographs and research reports.

• Visit Utility Consultants specialist CapEx website for specific insights.

http://www.utilityconsultants.co.nz/library1.htm

http://www.utilityconsultants.co.nz/capex1.htm

Getting the CapEx right in the infrastructure sectors Phil Caffyn, Utility Consultants Ltd Please...

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