Germany 1813 1849

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    German liberalism and the militarisation of civil society, 18131848/49

    Doron Avraham*

    Department of General History, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel

    (Received 19 November 2009; final version received 12 February 2010)

    From the beginning of nineteenth century German liberals endeavoured to reform thearmies of different German states, subject them to constitutional authorities, open theirranks to members of civil society and turn military service into a civic obligation. After

    the Wars of Liberation and during the Vormarz years, the liberals struggle fordemocratically oriented armed forces was combined with their opposition to restorativeregime and their hopes for the national unification of Germany and the formation ofcivil society. The liberals campaign, however, turned military service and military

    values into authentic manifestations of the ideal civil society. Military service wasadmired for the qualities it bestowed on those who bore arms and the values guiding itsmembers as citizens. Paradoxically, military service became the founding institution of

    civil society. This process found further expression upon the renewed establishment ofthe civil militias (Burgerwehren) during theVormarzand the central role they played inthe 1848 revolution. They were intended to introduce alternative forces into the army,but they ended up performing popular military and policing activities. Through this

    process, theBildungideal in the formation of civil society declined considerably, andthe liberals actually contributed to the militarisation of society.

    Keywords: militarism; liberalism; civilian; Germany

    For decades it has been widely considered that militarism was a dominant characteristic of

    German history until 1945. The Prussian heritage and the leading role that Prussia played

    during the unification process of Germany and afterwards were among the factors that

    helped foster this historical image of Germany. This militaristic nature is frequently

    attributed to the traditional ruling elites of the Prussian monarchy. Together with the

    agrarian aristocracy and the bureaucracy, the officers corps constituted the central pillar

    of the old regime. From the early nineteenth century, members of those elites became the

    social backbone of the emerging conservative ideology.1 The close correlation between

    conservatism and militarism that developed during this century was a serious obstacle tothe liberals aspiration to change the division of power and reform the political system.

    The liberals attempts to restructure German society and its political system still form

    the basis of the investigation of German liberalism, since its beginning in the late

    eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth. Many studies have tried to explain the

    hesitant course taken by liberals towards fulfilling their ideological aims, and their

    ultimate capitulation to Bismarck upon national unification in 1871. The latter won the

    liberals support with his realpolitik and the formation of a nation state, which they longed

    to establish for decades. They were willing, though, to compromise about civic and

    ISSN 1350 7486 i /ISSN 1469 8293 li

    *Email: [email protected]

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    political liberties instead of posing a real liberal and democratic challenge to the new

    state.2 Alongside their limited political achievements, the liberals inability to thoroughly

    address social problems has been attributed to the movements failure to engage with the

    lower strata of society and its prime focus on its own interests as members of the

    Burgertum. In their adherence to laissez-faire economy these liberals discard the peasantsand the artisans who especially in 1848 needed their political leadership and left them

    to the conservatives manipulation. The unsuccessful handling of the liberals with social

    problems drove them into cooperation with the conservative aristocracy during the Empire

    period at the cost of civic democracy.3 Indeed, in comparison with the development of

    liberalism in France or England, the relatively conservative nature of the German liberals

    and their limited ability to act as a political opposition are striking. Nonetheless, the

    constellation in those two nation-states differed from that in the loose German Reich and

    later the Confederation. The latter, that is, the Confederation, was also confronted with

    other kinds of challenges and problems that stemmed from the political fragmentation of

    Germany.4 In this article I focus on one of the objectives that German liberals sought to

    realise an objective whose meaning and consequences have not been sufficiently

    appreciated by historians that of a thorough reform in the structure, composition, and

    tasks of the armed forces. I argue that after the defeat by Napoleons army and until the

    1848 revolution and beyond, liberals from different German states supported the

    democratisation and liberalisation of the military but at the same time incorporated

    militaristic values into their vision of ideal civil society. It was this admiration for the

    formative and educational values perceived in military service, and their transfer from the

    military to the civil sphere, that contributed to the militarisation of German society well

    before the foundation of the German national state. This process, however, was different

    from the militarism that emerged in the Empire period. From the last third of the

    nineteenth century militarism was a result of the popular respect and approbation the armywon as a result of a series of military victories that brought about national unification.5 But

    German liberals in the years discussed here did not admire the armed forces only for their

    specific achievements, if any. Rather, they conceived the military itself and military

    service as the founding agents of ideal citizenship.

    The two main concepts around which this article revolves liberalism and militarism

    have a variety of definitions. Here, I will employ two theories that seem to be most suited

    to the context of this discussion.

    Since political parties in the modern sense did not exist in Germany until the early

    1860s, liberalism and liberals cannot be defined according to a single coherent platform.

    They belonged to a framework of the kind described by Ludwig Wittgenstein as a familyof ideas and behaviour patterns. This so-called family of ideas includes complicated

    network of similarities, overlapping and crisscrossing: sometimes overall similarities,

    sometimes similarities of detail.6 Quite often republicans and democrats were also

    counted among the liberals, although their worldviews and actions went beyond those of

    the mainstream liberals and were combined with a revolutionary agenda.

    These divisions imply the multifaceted nature of liberalism, but do not suffice to

    understand its essence as a political ideology, nor its particularly German features. It might

    be useful therefore to turn to the theory of liberalism elaborated by the Bavarian jurist

    Johann Christoph von Aretin in 1816, which also considers the specific German political

    context of the first half of the century. In an article published under the title What is

    liberal? (Was heit liberal?), Aretin tried to forge a synthesis between the main

    principles of liberalism and the political reality of Germany, while basing his definition on

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    focuses first on its more universal appeal: the essence of the concept does not derive from

    its French or English version, but rather from the Latin expressionliber(free or liberated).

    Hence it can be applied to everything that is free first and foremost the freedom of

    human beings.7 In a more concrete manner, Aretin believed that liberal political ideas

    should manifest themselves in a constitutional system whose ultimate embodiment is theState of Law (Rechtsstaat). It is to be governed by the rational general will and strive for

    the welfare of the people and the freedom and security of civil societys members. This

    definition does not seem to deviate from the classical principles of liberalism. However,

    later in his argument he reveals the more particular German aspects of this ideology. In

    England, he claims, the liberal element emerges in a gentlemanly appearance or in the

    person of the gentleman. But Aretin fails to find any appropriate German equivalent to

    these concepts.8 And there is also a difference as regards the French version of liberalism.

    While the French essay that Aretin draws on speaks of the institutionalisation of criticism

    against the government in the form of a parliamentary opposition, the German jurist is

    satisfied with the mere articulation of criticism.9 Accordingly, his political vision seeks a

    limited popular sovereignty. He thinks that monarchism should continue to prevail as the

    main form of political government, one that will secure civil liberties resolutely.10

    Though Aretins perception of liberalism reflects some of its main German

    characteristics, it cannot be considered as a paradigmatic definition. Among German

    liberals there were those who sought a reform from above without being confined to a

    popular constitutional system, while others believed that the power of the monarch should

    be considerably limited and that the peoples representatives should be allowed to make

    decisions on crucial issues such as war and peace. Nevertheless, if one follows Thomas

    Nipperdeys judgment of the liberals in the aftermath of the 1848 revolution, it might be

    more appropriate to treat German liberalism as a movement of the political centre, not of

    the left,11

    and therefore view Aretins definition as corresponding with this judgment.Militarism, a word that acquired common usage in the 1860s,12 also has a variety of

    definitions, and in many of them a clear contrast is evident between what are considered

    militaristic values and liberal principles. An early conceptual contrast of this kind, one that

    designates the modern division, was made as early as the eighteenth century by Immanuel

    Kant. Following practical and moral reason, claims the philosopher in a somewhat utopian

    belief, war should not take place, neither between individuals nor between states, as this is

    not the appropriate way to seek the individuals rights. In his essay on Eternal Peace Kant

    considers the republican political structure as the ideal one for guaranteeing peaceful

    relations between states and securing the interests of the citizen. He predicts that standing

    armies will eventually disappear since they generate a constant arms race and pose tooheavy a burden on states. Improving citizens welfare, based on a private property

    economy, will ultimately necessitate pacifism. Moreover, for Kant the mere idea of

    soldiering, of sending people to die in a war, violates fundamental human rights because it

    treats the soldiers as machines, not as human beings. At the same time Kant does not

    ignore the need for armed defence, but he maintains that it should be performed only

    according to republican principles, i.e. following the citizens decision and through their

    voluntary recruitment for a limited period of service.13

    The core of Kants concept forms the basis for the various modern theories of

    militarism. One of these definitions, which also reflects the argument presented here, is

    found in Alfred Vagts discussion of militarism. Vagts differentiates between the military

    way and militarism. An action conducted according to the military way is directed

    towards accomplishing specific missions with the minimum cost to life and other

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    constitutes a diversity of customs, interests, symbols and practices, which, though

    connected directly to the army, are transferred to politics, economy and culture. It denotes

    the prevalence of the military spirit, ideals, and scales of values in the life of a state.

    Moreover, militarism values military institutions and ways above those of civil life and

    carries the military mentality and modes of acting and decision into the civilian sphere.Therefore, Vagts concludes that the opposite of militarism is civilianism.14 One

    implication of this definition is that military service bears qualities that are essential for the

    appropriate conduct of civil society. A similar perception of militarism can be seen in the

    definitions made by other scholars who contrasted militaristic conduct with modes of

    thought and actions that are closely connected to paradigms and ideologies such as

    modernism and liberalism.15 Otto Hintze, for example, recognised a growing tension

    between military command, militaristic behaviour, and monarchical regime on the one

    hand, and the aspirations to establish a republican constitutional system on the other. 16

    Militarism was also contrasted with pacifism, since the first concept, according to Gerhard

    Ritter, reflects a preference for using force and military techniques, instead of applying

    peaceful solutions in cases of conflict between states.17 In her study about the military

    service and civil society Ute Frevert interprets militarism as effects of military

    socialisation on civil societys mentality, rituals and conduct in peacetime.18

    The dichotomy created between militarism on the one hand and civilianism and

    liberalism on the other hand might be reduced if the developments in the military forces and

    armies in Europe since the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries are taken into

    account. General conscription marked the emancipation of the individual from the old

    compulsory service system, and the transformation from absolutist states and armies into

    modern ones. In principle, the duty of military service did not distinguish between

    aristocrats and common people. It put an end, even if only theoretically, to the social and

    political arrogance that was part of military service in the old armies and blurred theseparation between civilians and soldiers. The soldier did not cease being a civilian during

    his military service. As shown by Max Weber, the state retained the sole authority to order

    the use of force, but from then on civil society also possessed military, violent strength, as

    wars were conducted not merely between rulers but also between peoples. In this regard, the

    obligation of military service might appear similar to general voting rights, since the two

    systems are evidence of a democratisation process that awards rights in return for duties.19

    This democratic transformation, however, should not necessarily dull the difference

    between military service and the liberalisation of civil society. The citizen who served in

    the army and the free citizen had a different status, with significant variations. A citizen

    who functioned as a soldier had to obey his superiors orders and to act according to rigidrules, using the devastating force at his disposal in a war situation. As a soldier, that citizen

    was subordinated to one ethical system that determined his personal patterns of behaviour

    and the values he was obliged to comply with. On the other hand, the civilian, when

    released from service, was a private person who put his trust in the law and the judicial

    system, and their authority in the life of state and society. Unlike the unified military ethic,

    there were diverse civil ethics and concepts, suited to the specific political ideologies

    within which they had developed.20 The independent citizen had the freedom to choose

    among different modes of conduct, politically as well as socially.

    Attempts at military liberalisation

    Early attempts to influence changes in the armed forces could be discerned within the

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    rationalisation of political authority and the legal system, the abolition of social privileges,

    the creation of parliaments and reform in the armies. A constitution should secure the civic

    status of the individual as an equal citizen and annul the correlation between the estate-

    structure and its legal manifestations in the army, as well as the special military

    jurisdiction. Such changes were intended to considerably limit the dominance of thearistocracy in the army, especially in the officer corps, and consequently dismantle it as a

    bastion of the old regime. The creation of alternative armed forces of this kind meant that

    citizens would be entrusted with arms and the conduct of war; the political rights they were

    to enjoy also entailed the obligation to defend them by force of arms.21

    In this period, however, liberals were unable to bring about any transformation in the

    army, and the first challenge posed by liberal conceptions to the militarys dominance

    within the state occurred in the wake of the defeats by Napoleons armies in the battles of

    Austerlitz (1805) and Jena (1806), which brought about the collapse of the German Reich.

    Though many German states underwent a reform process as a result of Napoleons

    occupation, some of the most comprehensive reforms regarding the military forces, as well

    as in other areas, took place in Prussia. The reorganisation of state and army also coincided

    with the German national awakening and German liberals hopes to create a new, modern

    framework for the conduct of national political life. And it is at this point that liberal

    tendencies could also have gained practical expression in the formation of new, modern

    armed forces, modelled on the French version of the peoples army. Attempts to create a

    modern nation-state, as reflected in the French Revolution, necessitated the construction of

    a popular-based army whose soldiers would perform their duties on the basis of civic

    consciousness and national solidarity. Such an army would guarantee the existence of the

    national state, or, in other words, the national state would serve as the rationale of the army

    whose members were citizens of the state. All aristocratic privileges within the army

    should be abolished. However, the process by which the peoples army in France cameinto being the army that had been formed through mass conscription (levee en masse) in

    order to defend the nation and the achievements of the revolution was not repeated in the

    German lands. In the French case, mass conscription and the wars were the completion of

    the revolutionary act aimed at emancipation from an absolutist regime and the application

    of liberal civic principles. In France, therefore, revolution and war were interlinked.22 On

    the right bank of the Rhine, events took a different course. There was no liberal revolution

    in which an emancipated society and a nation were forged together with the army. Rather,

    change was the result of a limited and controlled process conducted from above.

    The new direction could already be perceived in 1807, with the personal changes in the

    armys command. The Prussian Armys new generals not always of Prussian origin,some not even of aristocratic descent were entrusted with the task of rehabilitation.

    Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, joined by Grolmann, Boyen and Clausewitz, conducted the

    military reform process. Under their command the Prussian Army underwent thorough

    changes. More than 200 officers of aristocratic descent were coerced to resign, and the

    officers ranks were opened to other classes. New structures and tactics were applied, and

    for the first time a Ministry of War and the position of Chief of the Prussian General Staff

    were established. One of the most important changes took place in February 1813, when

    all exemptions from military service were terminated and the road toward universal

    conscription was paved. In March a royal decree announced the creation of the Landwehr

    militia. It was to comprise men aged 17 to 40 who did not serve in the regular army, the

    Heer. Subsequently theLandsturmwas established as a guerrilla unit, to be joined by men

    who had not taken part in other armed forces. In September 1814 the Wehrgesetz was

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    The organisation of these two institutions, the Landwehrmilitia and the regular army, and

    service within their ranks, were considerably different. Unlike the rigid, hierarchical

    structure of the army, its professional command and stiff discipline, the militia had less

    tightened regulations, and was conceived as a volunteer force. It had its own commanders,

    and an independent middle class officers corps. Its members did not wear uniform on aregular basis; they were legally committed to exercise in their home area, and only twice a

    year in a more distant location. Unlike in the army, in which training and various activities

    were preformed also in times of peace, service in the Landwehrwas only during wars.

    Moreover, members of the militia were subject to civil jurisdiction and not to military law,

    as were the soldiers. As to the duration of the service itself, when joining the Heerevery

    recruit had to serve three years, and another two years in the army reserves. Then he would

    join the first reserves of theLandwehrfor six years, and serve an additional seven years in

    the second reserves. Service in the volunteer corps was only one year.23

    Unlike reforms in other fields, the armys reorganisation seemed to prove its efficiency

    in a relatively short period of time, as Prussia, together with its allies, finally defeated

    Napoleon in 1814. This victory was not a result of the military reforms alone. Yet for many

    at that time, especially liberals with national aspirations, the new course taken by the armed

    forces, together with the recently created Landwehrmilitias, was of crucial importance.

    Armed forces of that kind expressed the republican idea of the armed people (Das Volk in

    Waffen). They were not manned by aristocratic officers but by the people who supposedly

    embodied the idea of civilian life. These German liberals associated the arming of the people

    with the republican sense of freedom: the emancipated citizen who is supposed to enjoy

    equal rights also has a duty to protect his nation-state, the very state that guarantees his

    freedom. Yet the liberals ideal of republicanism did not correlate with that of democracy or

    popular sovereignty. Rather, it was based on the free will and active participation of the

    citizen for the bonum commune (common good).24

    In this regard one can find a basicresemblance with the argument of the Scottish philosopher Adam Ferguson about the need

    to create a militia of citizens, and who, like the German liberals, had national orientation but

    not a national state. Arguing against his compatriot Adam Smith who believed that in

    order to avoid damage to the economy, and to ensure effective military operation, only a

    professional army should be employed Ferguson maintained that republican patriotism

    should manifest itself in the active participation of the citizen in war. Since the individual

    was not an end of the society but part of its specific historical development, he should act in

    accordance with it. War, thus, is one of the last integrative bonds left to hold society together

    and save the national spirit in a period of economic individualism.25 For Kant (mentioned

    above), Ferguson, and German liberals, membership in civil militias had then reasserted therights of the citizen who acted for the common good, and established a republican ideal. For

    the German liberals, however, a joint action of citizens for the benefit of all did not entail a

    classical republican or democratic constitutional structure. Their constitutional ideal was an

    amalgamation of monarchical and parliamentarian principles an ideal that combined

    absolutism and democracy. Republicanism of this kind was a result of classical political

    theories adapted to specific historical circumstances.

    The address of the Prussian king before the outbreak of the war in the words An mein

    Volk was perceived by the liberals in the same republican manner: the people were called

    upon to fight the French armies and perform their civic and political rights and duty. The

    creation of volunteers regiments as well as the hasty recruitment of theLandwehrmilitias

    were seen as steps in this direction. The growing number of recruits also encouraged an

    unprecedented number of women to actively join the war. Following the French example,

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    disguised women and some undisguised others participated in the Prussian anti-Napoleonic

    wars between 180615. This experience in itself might serve as an indication of the

    gendering process of the nation, and of the interdependence between the military service and

    the civic status and rights of the individual. The duty to fight for state and nation brought

    with it the demand for civil rights. It is this correlation, as some historians argue, that wasamong the reasons that drove also women to join the armed forces, although their zeal and

    patriotism did not change the way in which those female warriors were accepted by men.

    The latter saw the carrying of arms by women as a threat to the natural, social and gender

    order. Therefore, those who have to fight and consequently win their rights as members of

    the nation and the state, those who actually embody them, are male alone. 26

    The reforms in the army improved Prussias military abilities, and its armed forces

    became better organised.27 However, universal conscription met with some opposition.

    Members of the propertied bourgeoisie lamented the damages that absence from

    productive activities would create in the wake of military service; others expressed their

    concern over the spiritual and cultural emptiness that accompanies soldiers lives.

    Desertion was not a rare phenomenon. Some of those who participated in the Wars of

    Liberation were more concerned about protecting their own particular Heimatthan about

    the national German cause. But these discrepancies could not obscure the achievements of

    the reforms and the victory of the German states over Napoleon, which in itself was

    regarded as a clear popular demonstration of German nationalism. These wars became the

    founding myth of German nationalism and were followed by increasing activities at this

    early stage, mostly intellectual aimed at creating a German national state.28

    Some liberal-minded nationalists maintained that the popular, national and

    democratic-like aspects of the military reforms and the wars of 1813 15 also had

    educational significance.29 A few years before the wars, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, the

    founder of the gymnastics movements, the Turnerschaft, and later the Burschenschaftwrote in hisDeutsches Volkstum(1810) about the importance of masculine training. In the

    chapter dedicated to peoples education, he maintained that the physical instruction of

    young men was indispensable for the future defence of the fatherland.30 It was a

    precondition for the establishment of a national militia, constituted by the Volk. Through

    gymnastic exercises theVolkwould become manly and patriotic; according to democratic

    principles, social differences among members of the Turnerschaften and Burschenschaf-

    tenwould disappear. Such training and activities, as Matthew Levinger argues, reflected a

    new kind of popular politics.31 This is the background to Jahns assertion that he who

    abandons the flag (while fighting) without being injured should be denied his civil rights.32

    Similar ideas were expressed in 1813 by the poet and writer Ernst Moritz Arndt, whosought to awaken German men and mobilise them for a Volkskrieg against Napoleon.

    Liberation from the French yoke was possible, according to Arndt, only if the whole

    nation, represented by its masculine part, bore arms. The peasant and the Burgershould

    aim to follow the old German model, that of the Niebelungen. True Germans should

    re-acquire the warriors qualities that characterised their forefathers. Therefore, in war

    men would regain the proper education that had been lost. Only when theBurgeracted like

    a man, like a warrior, would he be able to protect his state. It was essential, he argued, to

    educate citizens in the art of war.33 In his essay on theWehrmannschaft, Arndt added that

    the first and most important aim of the Defence Troops was to return every citizen to the

    framework of his natural right and natural duty.34 Jahn and Arndt, like liberals in Europe

    and America during the revolutionary age, believed that arming the people is the best

    guarantee for its political freedom. Yet the importance ascribed to the armed citizen by

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    elsewhere by the people through revolutionary process. For these Germans, the ultimate

    framework for civic qualification was to be found within the armed forces and through war

    itself, not necessarily by civil, political actions.

    The Congress of Vienna and the subsequent age of Restoration did not follow the

    course of political development that the liberals had envisioned. A German national statewas not formed, and the conservatives reasserted their dominant positions. They viewed

    theLandwehras a politically unreliable organisation that ought to be subjected to the loyal

    Heer. From 1819, and under the pressure generated by the higher command of the regular

    army and the conservative aristocracy, the Landwehr was considerably restricted. The

    number of its training days was reduced, 34 regiments were dismantled, 16 divisions were

    appended to the standing army, its separate supervision was abolished, and officers of the

    Heer were appointed to various commanding positions within its ranks. The armys

    officers had occasionally behaved in an insulting and arrogant manner towards their

    counterparts in theLandwehrwhom they treated with disdain as unqualified soldiers. Such

    a conduct on behalf of the army was intended to bring the Landwehr in line,35 thus

    reasserting the dominance of the traditional forces. And it is here that a difference can be

    discerned between the German and the British model. Though the civil dimension in the

    British case was manifested mainly in the formation of volunteer corps since 1794, and not

    merely in militias like the Landwher (which in Britain were very similar to that of the

    regular army), it acquired other status. Similar to the Landwehr, these corps of armed

    British civilians was committed to full time military service in case of invasion or local

    insurrections, and had their own command and administration. But unlike the Prussian

    armed civilian organisation, they won various benefits on behalf of the authorities, and in

    the next decades grew in numbers and activities. Unlike the suspicious attitude of the

    Prussian army and government towards the Landwehr, the British civilian corps turned

    into the largest of the auxiliary military forces, and became the reliable force of theestablished authority. Most of the British volunteer corps was disbanded in 1814 and many

    of their members joined local militia. However, this act was not a result of a political

    distrust, as in the Prussian case, but stemmed from the governments decision to establish

    more systematic organisation and administration of the armed forces.36 In Prussia, on the

    contrary, keeping the strength and the special supervision of the militias had clear political

    aspect. For the liberals, therefore, the struggle against the dominance of the Heerand in

    support of the Landwehr became closely connected with their efforts to transform the

    political and constitutional structure of the German nation.

    Liberal reaction to restoration: accommodating militaristic values

    The beginning of Restoration and the consequent decreasing autonomy of theLandwehrin

    Prussia marked the end of what many German liberals regarded as signs heralding

    liberalisation. At the same time, however, it was obvious that recent developments had left

    their mark on the statesocietymilitary relationship, and a renewed definition of the

    division of power was necessary. The position of the standing army as a social elite and the

    main tool of the monarchical executive was challenged by the idea of Volksbewaffnung.

    But while this idea was widely acknowledged, there were uncertainties regarding its real

    meaning. The conservatives insisted on the subordination of the Landwehrto the standing

    army and declined any attempt to subject the military to any constitutional framework. The

    only authority they were willing to recognise was that of the monarch. Those who served

    in the army, especially officers, were expected to avoid any criticism against the

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    approval of any political worldview that guided any of the governments measures. Such

    an attitude was also manifested in public activities: the period 181548 witnessed the

    formation of conservative veterans associations (Kriegervereine), which disseminated

    militaristic values throughout society, mainly via their newspapers, and took issue with the

    liberal persuasion of civic rights.

    37

    The conservative organisations, however, were not theonly ones whose actions acquired public attention. During the Vormarz the Landwehr

    militias participated in festivals arranged by local population in different districts. These

    events turned into a kind of a militaristic folklore that included feasts, demonstration of

    patriotism through donation of ornaments to the soldiers uniforms, and other kind of

    equipment. The presence of civil servants was also part of these events. 38 Such folklore

    became part of the militaristic cult developed during the Empire years, though in the later

    period it lost its spontaneous atmosphere, and were carefully arranged by the state as part

    of the calendar of national events and celebrations.39

    Beyond these popular aspects, the liberals approach differed from that of the

    conservatives in other respects, though not radically. While taking steps to organise a

    national liberal movement, they expressed criticism against the restorative regime and the

    conservatives concept of army and Volksbewaffnung. And though it is difficult to clearly

    assess their practical conduct regarding actual recruitment since some of the educated and

    propertied bourgeoisie tried to avoid conscription, while others acknowledged its advantages

    for their status both parts of the Burgertum advocated the steady democratisation of the

    armed forces, which they saw as a crucial step towards modernising the political system and

    creating a national state. One of the leading voices in this campaign was that of Carl von

    Rotteck, the historian and liberal politician from Baden. In 1816 he published his first essay

    on the ideal form of the military in a state that has undergone transformation from an

    absolutist into a more modernised organisation. As a liberal who comprehended the lasting

    changes created in the wake of the French Revolution, Rotteck believed that one of the mainfeatures of the post-revolutionary epoch was the inclusion of the people in a decision-

    making process regarding issues that concerned its very existence, such as the conduct of

    war, through constitutional political institutions. In this regard, he thought that the whole

    nation, every citizen, should take part in the defence of the fatherland. Such military service

    reflected the organic relationship between state and nation, and therefore every citizen is

    obliged to perform it.40 Rottecks perception integrated the ancient ideal whereby active

    civic participation in public life requires readiness to defend the fatherland in time of danger.

    However, he did not support the complete dismantling of the standing army, but called for its

    reform. He envisaged a regular army consisting only of volunteers, which would thus reduce

    its size considerably. Alongside this army, local militias should be founded that would electtheir officers in an independent manner. This reorganisation of the military forces would

    eliminate both the aristocratic character of the Heerand the officers corps privileges.41

    Civil values were to replace the harsh orders and discipline.

    The advantages brought about by democratisation of the armed forces were also

    acknowledged by those liberals who, unlike Rotteck, supported mass conscription. Wilhelm

    Schulz, a former officer from Hessen and a publicist who belonged to democratic circles,

    saw, like Rotteck, the importance ofVolksbewaffnungas lying not only in its constitutional

    significance but also in its moral and educational values. In 1825 he wrote that when people

    belonging to different estates (Stande) serve together in the army, they are introduced to

    progress. For example, peasants who serve with other Stande become acquainted with

    innovations they could not have learned had they remained within the traditional confines

    of land cultivation. When everyone performs military duties, then a blending of spirits of42

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    The constitutional and civic-formative aspects of democratised military service

    continued to occupy the attention of German liberals during the Vormarz. They acquired a

    certain formal expression during the 1830s with the publication of the Staats-Lexikon,

    edited by Rotteck and his close associate Carl Welcker. Under the entry Heerwesen:

    Landwehrsystem, Welcker himself wrote that parents should aspire for their sons to fulfilmilitary duty, as it educates and enriches them. A warlike education (kriegeriche

    Erziehung) is beneficial to their bodies and health, for acquiring a capable and free

    personality and physical dexterity. It provides a serious education in civic sense, courage

    and patriotism. It is the most excellent educational tool (das trefflichste Erziehungsmittel).

    The army, according to Welcker, enhances the concern for the fatherlands and its own

    honour; it should not be regarded as brutal and immoral training, but rather as a blessing and

    a noble educational framework.43

    More explicit appreciation of these educational and formative qualities for citizens-

    in-arms was expressed by Wilhelm Assmann, a liberal historian and politician from

    Braunschweig. In an essay written in 1831, entitled Die Bedeutung deutscher

    Burgerbewaffnung, he identifies what he defines as the noble nature of man as a citizen

    not only in his participation in the conduct of church and state, but also in the bearing of arms

    and the defence against any obstacle to progress. Since the power of reason wins dominance

    on earth, it is essential that everyone who fights for rights and truth should utilise not merely

    the sword of the word (das Schwert des Wortes) but also the iron sword of violent action

    (das eiserne Schwert der Gewaltthat) wherever violence hinders right. It is unlikely,

    according to Assmann, that someone would give up what he cherishes as sacred without

    violently fighting for it.44

    The idea that military practices reflect the true essence of the people as citizens also

    appears in the discussion on the conduct of German liberalism during the Napoleonic

    Wars. Under the entry Liberal, Liberalismusin theStaats-Lexikonof 1840, written by theliberal jurist from Wurttemberg, Paul Achatius Pfizer, liberalism in Germany is compared

    with the revolutionary practices of the French. The latter pursued radical ideas of freedom

    by brutally violent methods, where every kind of weapon was legitimate. In contrast,

    German liberalism, as it emerged and evolved through its early years (die erste

    Jugendzeit), during the Wars of Liberation, demonstrated a different sort of conduct.

    It displayed patriotism, responsibility and loyalty. In this period liberals proved their

    devotion to their princes, while presenting modest and just requests. Had the German

    rulers acted in the spirit of 181315, writes Pfizer, German citizens would not have had to

    resist the states authority by force later on.45

    It appears that, on the one hand, Rotteck, Welcker and other German liberals envisagedthe formation of a popular, democratic and highly motivated army. One can argue in this

    regard that the ideal military service conceived by these liberals reflected the great

    importance they attached to the concept of citizenship. The soldier, accordingly, is a

    citizen who performs a civic obligation, not a person whose military service sets him apart

    from the rest of civil society. On the other hand, this concept of military obligation also

    implies a deeper militarisation of society: instead of treating the army as a special

    institution with exclusive functions and an organisational structure that differs from that of

    civil society, though constituted from its members and obliged to protect it, these liberals

    gradually narrowed the gap between mere citizenship and the military. They thus blurred

    the demarcation lines between soldier and citizen as individuals, between army and

    society as organisations guided by diverse values and objectives. For them, soldiering and

    citizenship were two closely interconnected existential situations, which in fact defined

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    liberals, is forged during military service, where the recruits are trained to be worthy citizens.

    The formative function of the military paves the way to the ultimate proper civilian life.

    These perceptions also mark the change in the liberals ethos of the individuals

    genuine personality. The enlightened and progressive concept ofBildung humanistic

    and aesthetic education and self-formation as part of an organic unity was partly discardedin favour of a more militant view of the individual as a worthy citizen, as explicitly

    articulated by Assmann. In a similar manner, the warlike education envisioned by Welcker

    was gradually perceived to be no less adequate for training a national liberal citizenry than

    the humanistic and universal ideal of Bildung. The gradual detachment of liberals from

    humanism might also correspond with what Nancy Rosenblum defined as romantic

    militarism, embraced by a liberal such as Wilhelm von Humboldt. It does not oppose

    liberalism but introduces another variation of it by imagining war as the ultimate occasion

    for self-expression. Self-assertion and heroic individualism employed through militaristic

    conduct thus replaced classical liberal principles of conventional civil society.46

    German liberals during the Restoration and the Vormarz conceived the popular

    foundations of military service as being essential to the development and sustenance of

    civil society. Enlisting in the armed forces was in itself the fulfilment of a civic duty. At this

    point, the difference between the liberals and the leaders of the armys reforms was clear:

    the latter generals such as Scharnhorst and Boyen sought to soldier the citizens (turn

    citizens into soldiers), while liberals strove to civilianize the soldiers (turn soldiers into

    citizens). The soldiers would be inspired by a civic consciousness that would prevent them

    from being totally subjected to individual rulers.47 However, the importance that the

    liberals attached to the peoples army as a substitute for the old standing army points to an

    opposite, perhaps unconscious, course of development inherent in this liberal vision. Their

    new conception of military service as embodying civic qualities introduced militaristic

    elements into liberal concepts of civil society.The historical circumstances reinforce this impression. During the Restoration and the

    Vormarz, unlike during the French Revolution, there was no real and immediate need for

    mass, universal conscription or for the maintenance of a large army, since there was no

    concrete danger that threatened German lands or any major political development

    resembling the French situation in 1793. On the contrary, the military ethic in German civil

    society was adopted in times of peace, which explains how in 1843 Arnold Ruge, who was

    one of the radical liberals in that period and belonged to the young Hegelians, was able to

    write about the arming of the people in a purely civil context. The peoples education and

    peoples armament (Volksbildung und Volksbewaffnung), the school and the army, he

    claimed, should merge.

    48

    This ideal integration of values and institutions actuallyepitomises the essence of the new citizenship conceived by German liberals. Nonetheless,

    the liberal conceptions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, imbued with the

    universal and pacifist elements of the Enlightenment and the notion ofBildungas defining

    free, modern citizenship, gave way, during the Vormarz,to more national and militaristic

    standards in prescribing appropriate German citizenship. In the wake of the Wars of

    Liberation, liberals perceived the war fought by the people, and the mere bearing of arms, as

    formative factors of national and civic consciousness.49 Military force was now seen not just

    as a means of liberating the nation from the yoke of foreign occupation and defending it

    against enemies from outside, but as a precondition for securing basic civic freedom.

    The cry for Volksbewaffnungor the arming of citizens, however, did not remain on a

    declarative level, and the monopoly of force held by the conservative-oriented standing

    armies was once again challenged. Political and social unrest encouraged actual deeds in

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    the governments, especially the Prussian, used the army to crush them. Apart from the

    1830 events, there were riots in Posen (1832), Cologne (1838), Schildesche (1845) and

    Berlin (1847). In these and other cases, the government employed the citadel practice,

    i.e. sending in the army, sometimes hundreds of soldiers, to violently suppress the rebels,

    as the state was conceived as a citadel under siege.

    50

    These acts reinforced the militarysreactionary image and encouraged the formation of alternative armed organisations that

    would embody the ideal of citizens-in-arms.

    From the Vormarz, therefore, liberals advocated the establishment of civil militias,

    Burgerwehren, in order first and foremost to protect citizens and their property against the

    violent attacks by the lower classes, and thus prevent also the armys deeper intervention

    in the civic sphere. These militias were not a new pattern of armed organisation. Initial

    formations of this kind had been already created under the old regime, and after

    Napoleons occupation of Germany Burgergarde based on the model of the French

    Garde Nationale created in 1789 were established in Berlin and Brandenburg. Their

    main task was to keep order. In the wake of the 1830 revolution and in light of the armys

    use of force discussed above, the civil militias were re-established. Yet from the early

    phase of their renewed activity, and especially during the 1848/49 revolution, as will be

    discussed below, some crucial questions regarding the exact aims of the Burgerwehren

    and their social composition hindered their coherent function. This simultaneous

    development the reassertion of the armys dominant traditional status and the creation of

    the civic militias as an alternative force seems paradoxical: the same liberals who

    criticised the increasing interference of the military in civil life simultaneously advocated

    arming civilians and military service as the best ways of teaching proper civil conduct.

    This paradox was the outcome of the liberal postulate to create a modernised state and

    emancipate society from absolutist patterns of rule while seeking to construct controlled

    citizenship that would restrain that emancipated society through militaristic values. Thisparadox and its results were clearly reflected in the 1848 revolution.

    Militarising the revolution

    For many German liberals, the revolution was a means of solving a variety of national,

    political and social problems. Divided by specific orientations, most liberals hoped to

    reintroduce some of the changes that had been accomplished in the Reform period but

    reversed during the Restoration, and to realise their demands, already raised during the

    Vormarz. Among the overwhelming majority of the liberals, however, there was a

    relatively wide consensus that a new army should be formed an army whose structure,composition, status and subordination to political authority should be redefined.

    Building a new army, therefore, was one of the major revolutionary demands in the

    upheavals of 1848. Liberals from German states hoped for the establishment of a peoples

    army in which national solidarity between the soldiers, not class orientation and rigid

    discipline, would dominate. Such trends were also manifested in a series of civic petitions

    to the German governments, in the Frankfurt Parliament debates, and in efforts to

    strengthen theBurgerwehrenthat were supposed to perform some of the armys functions,

    on the one hand, and confront its oppressive acts, on the other.

    Even before the outbreak of tumult, the Saxon liberal Robert Blum gave a speech on 6

    March in which he lamented the division of the German people into those who bore arms

    and those who did not. The former, acting like machines, turned against their brothers

    when commanded to do so. The hope lay in the arming of all German citizens: that alone

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    was created, there would be no need for armed force (bewaffente Macht).51 At a

    revolutionary gathering held in Berlin in April 1848, speakers called forBurgerbewaffnung in

    a form that could serve as a counter-model to all the deficiencies of the standing army. In such

    organisations, values like brotherhood, freedom and the safeguarding of civil life would

    replace the supremacy of uniform and arrogance that had characterised the old army.

    52

    In theNational Assembly of Frankfurt, liberal delegates reasserted the civic merits of carrying arms.

    The Prussian representative from Trier, Ludwig Simon, advocated the idea of general

    armament as a means of protecting constitutional liberties and confronting any attempt to

    violently breach constitutional rights. The military should be subordinated to the

    Reichsverfassung. For Simon, the creation of a peoples army (Volkswehr) could be an

    effective instrument against Prussian despotism.53 The democrat from Dresden, Franz

    Wigard, presented a more radical approach. He held that every German was entitled to have

    his own weapon, including those who because of old age or physical disability could not serve

    in the military. This is an original, real, German right that no one would never be able to deny

    a German.54 In the parliament of Karlsruhe, a lawyer from Mannheim, Friedrich Hecker,

    expressed a similar view. Every citizen, he claimed, should have his own weapon, buy it with

    his own money, look after it and eventually bequeath it to his son. For Hecker, owning a

    weapon was both a manifestation of patriotism and a precaution against unjust conduct by the

    authorities, expressing the ideal of an armed people defending its freedom and rights.55

    Efforts to bring about an immediate change in the nature and structure of the armed

    forces could be discerned as soon as the revolution broke out. German liberals campaigned

    for increasing the activities of the civil militias which, as mentioned, had already been

    founded during the Vormarz. In 1848, however, the civil militias faced new challenges.

    In the first months, different German governments opposed these organised forces and

    tried to hinder the establishment of independent military groups not subject to the states

    authority. In numerous German cities, the revolutionaries demand for a transformation ofthe armies occupied pride of place in their protests. In cities like Offenburg, Freiburg,

    Heidelberg and Munster,56 citizens petitioned their governments for the integration of civil

    militias with the army in order to create a new, popular defence force ( Volkswehr). For the

    more radical liberals and the revolutionary democrats, the merging of the citizen and the

    soldier, the civil militias and the regiments of the standing army, was a precondition for

    establishing a new democratised army which was perceived as a guarantee of the freedom

    and welfare of the people. Such an army would not be deployed against the people as were

    the traditional monarchical armies.

    The military forces, as conceived by many liberals during the revolution, seem, ironically,

    to embody the main features of their ideal of civil society. The new forces were to constitutethe authentic representatives of the national German citizenry. The social diversity and/or

    solidarity of civil society were to be reflected in the most appropriate manner within their

    ranks. Some of the moderate Prussian liberals, for example, requested that service in the

    militias be limited to middle-class property owners, white-collar employees and educated

    people. These were members of the Besitz- and Beamtenburgertum who represented the

    respectable and conforming elements of society. In the Berlin Burgerwehr, most members

    belonged to the bourgeoisie, while workers and members of democratic revolutionary groups

    were denied admission. Radical liberals, on the other hand, maintained that membership

    should also be opened to workers and other parts of the Pobel, to those among the people who

    could not afford to purchase the required personal military equipment.57

    In different strongholds of radicalism the cities of the Prussian Rhine such as

    Dusseldorf, Krefeld, Cologne, and in Mainz, at the Grand Duchy of Hessen parts of

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    during the summer of 1849. In these cities the militias included members of the bourgeoisie

    as well as peasants and railway-workers. These were seen as representing civil society. In

    Mannheim too, in the Grand Duchy of Baden, where bourgeois citizens had been alarmed by

    the armed insurrection of the lower classes in April 1848, all eventually joined together in

    the local Burgerwehr. Closer cooperation between the different social strata was alsomanifest in Lower Franconia. In this part of Bavaria, craftsmen, peasants, workers,

    merchants, clerks and higher officials all came together in the regional Burgerwehr.58

    The social heterogeneity of the militias also had political implications: the mere fact of

    serving in these forces, which in principle was available to everyone, gave many people

    their first-ever chance to actively participate in the political sphere regardless of the

    individuals social origin, status, or wealth. People were entitled to join these forces

    because they were citizens performing civic duties. In other words, the militias were the

    founding institutions for civic political practices. The Burgerwehrwas an affirmation of

    the individuals status as a citizen.

    The newly opened ranks of the militias and their activities are evidence of the popular,

    democratically oriented alternative to the traditional armed forces, as envisioned by the

    liberals. Unlike the army, which had to carry out oppressive acts, the militias seemed to act

    on behalf of the people, with the people. They were also different from other violent forces,

    such as those evident in 1848 as in other revolutions. In contrast to the spontaneous and

    uncontrolled revolutionary acts of aggression, activities within the militias during most of

    this period were organised, supervised and focused, despite their origin in rebellion. Violent

    confrontations between the Burgerwehren and the regular army were not very frequent,

    though they did occur. After the completion of the imperial constitution by the Frankfurt

    National Assembly in May 1849, bloody clashes broke out in different cities, especially in

    Prussia, while units of the Landwehrand the Burgerwehrasserted their determination to

    protect the new constitution against the reactionary policy of the governments. In Karlsruheand Heidelberg the civil militia declared a defensive war (Verteidigungskrieg) against the

    governmental forces, while forming (in Karlsruhe) aGeneralkommando der Volkswehr. In

    front of the regular armies, though, these militias had little chance of prevailing.59

    However, the socially integrative potential of the militias, their patriotic commitment

    and the rule of order apparent among their soldiers deepened the sense of national

    integration. And though they acted independently in every city and usually were not under

    joint command, their popular basis, as well as their cause and goals, and the understanding

    that they were operating as part of the more general tendency of the Volksbewaffnung, lent

    them an apparent national character. Furthermore, the mere armament of the city dwellers

    introduced the traditional Stadrepublikanismus ideal: by forming the local militia thesecitizens tried to affirm their protesting stance against monarchical authorities (or even

    absolutism) and the regular army at their disposal.60 But it is precisely here that an

    important aspect of the militarisation of society is revealed: a civic consciousness was

    created not only by civil actions such as demonstrations, strikes, barricades, festivals and

    so on, but also, and maybe mainly, by bearing arms and performing policing and military

    functions in other words through disciplining the citizens.

    The change in the nature of recruits to the militias was also determined by the

    fluctuating mood during the revolution. At first, as the revolution advanced, it seemed that

    the German princes had decided to meet the demonstrators demands. However, the fact

    that the radical and violent wave of the revolution was stalled after several months, as well

    as the constant fear that its renewal would lead to anarchy, testified to the fact that most

    liberals were reluctant to exploit the potential of revolutionary action. The threat of

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    authorities in Wurttemberg and Saxony issued decrees ordering the reinforcement of the

    militias, while entrusting them with the task of keeping order and security within the state.

    It seems that the evolution of these armed organisations into a genuine military

    organisation as opposed to the policing force that they had previously been was a result of

    the revolutionary pressure. The fostering of hostile feelings against external enemiesprovided many with an additional motivation to enlist.61 Public debates and discussions in

    the Frankfurt National Assembly portrayed conflicts between Germans and French as

    frictions between the Teutonic and the Romance peoples;62 the war against Denmark was

    a matter of national honour that overshadowed the European balance of power; and

    arguments about possible restoration of Poland were justified by the notion that such a

    state in the east could serve as a bulwark against Russian despotism.63 Moreover, the

    decision by the Prussian government, as well as by the authorities in other German states,

    to legalise the Burgerwehren and not to repress them might serve as additional

    confirmation to the premise that their activities did not seriously threaten the political

    order. In the autumn of 1848, after the Burgerwehrgesetz was issued in Prussia, most

    members of the militias felt that they had not only lost their revolutionary dimension, but

    had also become a force that imposed order on behalf of the government.

    This development, however, is not surprising. Many spokesmen for the liberals, in

    Heidelberg, Munster, Freiburg and other places in Germany, actually wanted to see the

    popular militias as an integral part of the standing army, but not necessarily as a

    revolutionary alternative.64 Finally, with the suppression of the revolution, the militias

    were outlawed, in Prussia in October 1849 and subsequently in other German states in

    Baden and Saxony in 1850 and in Wurttemberg in 1851.

    In light of these historical developments, the question arises whether the 1848

    revolution in Germany had a clear militaristic character. The political conflict between the

    revolutionaries and the forces of order between liberals and democrats on the one hand,and conservatives and reactionaries on the other was not limited to parliamentary

    debates, articles in the press or activities by various organisations. The militarisation of the

    political discourse was also expressed in the initial inclination of both sides, the militias

    and the regular army, to confront each other.65 Yet confrontations of this kind, between

    those striving for change and those seeking to defend the existing regime, were not

    substantially different in Germany from other armed clashes that occurred at the same time

    elsewhere in Europe. They characterised all the revolutions in the eighteenth and

    nineteenth centuries, and cannot be regarded as an exclusive feature of the 1848

    revolutions. What distinguishes the German case is the central place that military issues

    occupied within the revolutionary discourse: the social composition of the army, its size,structure, subordination, functions and the significance of military service. This discourse

    expressed the militarisation of the revolution far more than the violent clashes between the

    revolutionaries, the militias and the standing army. Although these issues did not

    overshadow the acute national, political and social problems that emerged in the wake of

    the revolution, they nonetheless seem to have been reflected in the debate about the

    military: service in the standing army, especially in the officer corps or the militias,

    reflected the social divisions within German society and the civic status derived from

    them; the importance of the constitutional system and its consequent civil rights directly

    affected the nature of the obligation to military service and the ruling authorities of the

    army; the participation of larger sections of society in the armed forces helped forge

    German national identity and foster awareness of civil rights.

    These circumstances suggest that themilitarisation of the Germanliberal discourse didnot66

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    evident in the revolution itself the very revolution that symbolised a struggle for the

    liberalisation and democratisation of the political and social systems. This militarisation was

    a reflection of the militaristic tendencies that had been developing among German liberals

    from the beginning of the century and found practical expression in the course of revolution.

    The failures of 1848/49 and the decade of reaction that followed rendered irrelevant everyattempt by liberals to influence and change the army.

    Conclusions

    In his comprehensive book about the army as the Erziehungsschule der Nation, Reinhold

    Hohn claims that the armys educational function was not given to it by the people. It was the

    army itself that embraced this role, as a result of the confrontation with civil society.

    Since the Wars of Liberation, civil society had imposed challenges on the standing army

    challenges that led to a conflict between army and society and reached a peak in the 1848

    revolution. The army could have curtailed these challenges through an educational

    process implemented during military service. This, he argues, is the only way of

    understanding why the army constantly prepared the nation for war, not peace.67 While this

    might be true, it does not provide sufficient explanation for the militarisation of Prussian and

    German society as a whole. In their struggle to liberalise the political system, liberals

    thought it essential to democratise the old army and turn it into a peoples army. But the

    reforms they proposed do not imply that liberals adopted a pacifist attitude or were prepared

    to fight only for a defensive cause. As shown in some recent studies of the post-1848 period,

    liberals were among the main advocates of war during the 1850s and urged Prussia to

    actively intervene in the Crimean War and the war between Austria and Italy.68 Yet the role

    that liberals played in the militarisation of German society must also be measured by what

    they considered as real citizenship. The victory over Napoleon, as they saw it, proved theimportance of modernising and democratisating the army. By fighting the predominantly

    aristocratic and conservative nature of the old army, liberals hoped that the armed forces

    would be built by members of an emancipated society. They popularised militaristic values

    and patterns of behaviour and tried to assimilate them within civil society, thus turning them

    into criteria of modern civil status. The liberals adoption of values such as discipline,

    willingness for self-sacrifice, national solidarity, respect for authority, patriotism and

    loyalty by citizens meant that they actually contributed to the creation of controlled

    citizenship. Such citizenship was not meant to merely serve the personal and political

    freedom of citizens, but to limit it by appropriate political and social conduct.

    Consequently, the power of the old traditional army to enforce the authority of the monarchyand to oppress political opposition was to be replaced by that of a popular, modernised

    and more liberal army that performed educational functions and hence ensured the

    cultivation of proper citizenship. German liberals, therefore, formulated a new model of

    citizenship in which military service and values were seen as preconditions for real

    citizenship. It was this emphasis on military ideals rather than modern, progressive civic

    values that thwarted their efforts to change the hegemony of the monarchy, the

    conservatives and the military and, in the long run, during the Empire period, it intensified

    the militarisation of society.

    Acknowledgements

    The author wishes to thank the Yad Hanadiv Trust and the Minerva Stiftung for their generous

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    Notes

    1. On the correlation between political and social elites and the army see: Willems, Derpreuisch-deutsche Militarismus, 60 and Trox, Militarischer Konservatismus, 357.

    2. The literature on German liberalism is most extensive. Here are some of the main criticaldiscussions about the political vacillation of German liberalism: Anderson, The Social and

    Political Conflict in Prussia, 1858 1864, 440; Krieger,The German Idea of Freedom, 275 7;Bumann, Zur Geschichte des deutschen Liberalismus im 19. Jahrhundert. On the particularcase of liberalism in Baden and its decline after German unification see: Gall,Der Liberalismusals regierende Partei, 47596. The criticism against German liberalism culminated in theSonderweg theory, most explicitly presented by Wehler, Das deutsche Kaiserreich 18711918. On the decline of German liberalism since the late 1870s see: Sheehan, German

    Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century, 181 271 and Langewiesche, Liberalismus inDeutschland, 911. Recent research has kept this critical tendency: Backes, Liberalismusund Demokratie Antinomie und Synthese, 498 9, 503 6; Levinger, Enlightened

    Nationalism,1912, 2279, 23940; Leonhard,Liberalismus, 54999.3. Examinations of such social tendencies among German liberals appear in many studies. The

    following are among the most important: Hamerow,Restoration, Revolution, Reaction, 58 64;

    Rohr,The Origins of Social Liberalism in Germany, 15866. One of the most interesting andchallenging interpretations of the social vision of German liberals is that of Lothar Gall. Gallanalyses the liberal vision of society in the first half of the nineteenth century regarding thecreation of klassenlose Burgergesellschaft. Yet this vision was too optimistic and could notsurvive beyond 1850, when liberals appeared more as Klassenpartei. See Gall, Liberalismusund burgerliche Gesellschaft, 99125 (especially pp. 1202). As to the close correlationbetween political liberalism and class interests see: James J. Sheehan, Liberalismus undGesellschaft in Deutschland 18151848. Recent research into German liberalism and thewelfare state argues that towards the end of the nineteenth century liberals eventually clung toindividual economic responsibility with a limited state interference in social matters. See: vonKieseritzky, Liberalismus und Sozialstaat, 4812.

    4. For a comparative analysis of German, British and French liberalism see: Muhs, Deutscherund britischer Liberalismus. Versuch einer Bilanz, 223 59. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt und

    Friedrich Lenger, Liberalismus und Handwerk in Frankreich und Deutschland, 30531.5. Regarding the militarisation process of the Empire years see: Clark,Iron Kingdom, 6003.

    About the birth of burgerliche[r] Militarismus during the Empire period see: Forster, Derdoppelte Militarismus, 65.

    6. See the discussion on this matter by Sheehan,German Liberalism, 5.7. Leonhard,Liberalismus, 1934.8. Backes,Liberalismus und Demokratie, 2512, 2967.9. Leonhard,Liberalismus, 1978.

    10. Backes,Liberalismus, 2512, 2967; Leonhard,Liberalismus, 1945.11. Nipperdey,Deutsche Geschichte 18001866, 664.12. Stargardt,The German Idea of Militarism, 19.13. Kant,Samtliche Werke in sechs Banden, 661. See also Kater, Burger-Krieger: Immanuel Kant,

    Adam Smith und Adam Ferguson uber Militar und Gesellschaft, 2746 (especially pp. 2834).14. Vagts,A History of Militarism, Civilian and Militarism, 134, 17. See also: Vogel,Nationen

    im Gleichschritt, 2756. Wette, Fur eine Belebung der Militarismusforschung, 13.15. For the various definitions of militarism see: Berghahn, Militarism, 11. For a detailed

    discussion, see pp. 7 30.16. Hintze, Staatsverfassung und Heerverfassung, 1334.17. Ritter, Staatkunst und Kriegshandwerk, 13.18. Frevert, Die Kasernierte Nation, 123.19. In his recent illuminating book about the centrality of wars and general conscription in the

    formation of twentieth-century Europe, James Sheehan demonstrates how military service wasconceived in many European countries as part of this democratic transformation. While referringto the observations of Hippolyte Taine and Friedrich Engels about the indispensable correlationbetween universal suffrage and universal conscription Sheehan reveals their insight: since therevolutionary wars of the 1790s, when the whole nation carried arms, universal military serviceturned into an aspect of the general political participation and civil rights. See Sheehan,WhereH ll th S ldi G ? 16 7 A d l K i K i G ll h ft d Milit 215

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    20. For differentiations of this kind see: Frevert,Die Kasernierte Nation, 1011. And see alsoHuntingtons discussion about the division between the military and civic spheres: Huntington,The Soldier and the State, 8990.

    21. Marwitz, Die Grundlagen deutscher militarischer Tradition im Zeitalter des Absolutismus,603. And see also: Wolfgang Kruse, Burger und Soldaten, 4767.

    22. On the correlation between revolution and wars as complementing processes of the nationsemancipation, see: Fehrenbach Die Ideologisierung des Krieges und die Radikalisierung derFranzosischen Revolution, 57 66; Kruse,Die Erfindung des Militarismus, 268 74, 300, 370 2;Ritter, Staatkunst, 602; Vagts, History of Militarism, 1169. It should be mentioned that thecharacteristics which Kruse attaches to militarism are similar to those described by Vagts, thoughhe thinks militarism, as it appeared in the French Revolution, was also an outcome of modernism.

    23. For a detailed discussion about the different structure and nature of service in theLandwehrmilitia and the standing army see: Frevert,Die Kasernierte Nation, 81 95; Craig,The Politicsof the Prussian Army 16401945, 59 61, 74 5.

    24. Nolte, Burgerideal, Gemeinde und Republik, 60956 (see especially pp. 61820). Prove,Stadtgemeindlicher Republikanismus und die Macht des Volkes,23 4. Regarding theconcept of the republican ideal in Hamburg during the Napoleonic rule see: Aaslestad, Payingfor War, 64175 (see especially 642, 662, 670). And see also the discussion by Hagemann,Mannlicher Muth und Teutsche Ehre, 289304.

    25. Kater, Burger-Krieger, 34 43; Fania Oz Salzberger,Translating the Enlightenment,11720,1478.

    26. On the participation of women in the Wars of Liberation see: Hagemann,Mannlicher Muth,813, 41627. Idem, Heroic Virgins and Bellicose Amazons, 50727 (see especiallypp. 509, 511).

    27. The literature about the reforms in the Prussian army is extensive. Some of the important worksare: Meinecke, The Age of Prussian Liberation 1795 1815, 44 101; Wehler, DeutscheGesellschaftsgeschichte, 17001815, 46372; Craig, Prussian Army, 3753; Simon, TheFailure of the Prussian Reform Movement, 1808 1819, 145 93; Nipperdey, DeutscheGeschichte, 536; Sheehan, German History 17701866, 30710. Regarding the reformsin the codes of behaviour and penalty see: Voigt, Die Gesetzgebungsgeschichte der

    militarischen Ehrenstrafen und der Offizierehrengerichtsbarkeit im preuischen und deutschenHeer von 1806 bis 1918, 3041. Prove, Militar, Staat und Gesellschaft im 19. Jahrhundert,912.

    28. Some of the latest works that deal with the national significance of the Wars of Liberation are:Echternkamp, Der Aufstieg des deutschen Nationalismus (1770-1840), 21632; Levinger,Enlightened Nationalism, 8993; Carl, Der Mythos des Bfreiungskrieges, 6382. A moretheoretical discussion of the formation of war-mythology see Gladigow, Gewalt inGrundungsmythen, 2338.

    29. Earlier ideas about the noble features of war and warlike training, combined with liberalpolitical theories, were even expressed by Wilhelm von Humboldt in 1792. See von Humboldt,

    Ideen zu einem Versuch die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu Bestimmen, 76, 867.30. Jahn,Deutsches Volkstum, 534.31. Levinger,Enlightened Nationalism, 1067.32. Jahn,Deutsches Volkstum, 62.33. Frevert, Die Kasernierte Nation, 425.34. Arndt,Die deutsche Wehrmannschaft, 65.35. Craig,Prussian Army, 745; Frevert, Die Kasernierte Nation, p. 90; Hohn, Die Armee als

    Erziehungsschule der Nation, 1913.36. For the British case see: Gee, The British Volunteer Movement 17941814, 13, 99, 153;

    Cookson, The British Armed Nation, 17931815, 736, 934.37. Trox, Militarischer Konservatismus, 85, 939.38. Frevert, Die Kasernierte Nation, 846.39. Vogel,Nationen im Gleichschritt, 1117.40. von Rotteck, Ueber stehende Heere und Nationalmiliz, 234.41. See the discussion in Frevert, Die Kasernierte Nation, 154, 221 3, 235 6.

    42. Schulz, Irrthumer und Wahrheiten aus den ersten Jahren nach dem letzten Kriege, 767.43. von Rotteck and Welcker, Staats-Lexikon, 593. This entry is based on an essay written

    by Welcker as early as 1829. See Welcker, Das innere und auere System der praktischen

    D. Avraham622

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    naturlichen und romisch- christlich- germanischen Rechts-, Staats- und Gsetzgebungs- Lehre,5978.

    44. Assmann,Die Bedeutung deutscher Burgerbewaffnung geschichtlich enwickelt, 245.45. Pfizer, Liberal, Liberalismus inStaats-Lexikon, eds. Rotteck and Welcker, vol. 7, 718 9.46. Rosenblum,Another Liberalism, 933.

    47. Hohn, Armee als Erziehungsschule, 43.48. Prove, Politische Partizipation und soziale Ordnung, 113. In this regard see also the

    importance attached to the wearing of uniform and the correlation between army and civilsphere which it symbolised: Brandli, Von schneidigen Offizieren und Militarcrinolinen,205. On Ruge see also Wende, Arnold Ruge: Kavalleriegeneral der Hegelei, 2332.

    49. Becker,Bilder von Krieg und Nation, 956.50. See the discussion on the armys oppression of unrest during the Restoration and theVormarz,

    in Ludtke,Police and State in Prussia, 18151850, 1606, 18393.51. Bundesarchiv Berlin (BArchB), Nachla Robert Blum, Nr. 65, Die Stellung der Soldaten in

    Deutschland. Von Rob. Blum (Gesprochen im Redeubungsverein am 6. Marz 1848). And seealso: BlumVolksthumliches Handbuch der Staatswissenschaften und Politik. Ein Staatslexikon

    fur das Volk, 757. On Robert Blum see also Maentel, Robert Blum, 13445 (especiallypp. 1413).

    52. Gheimes Staatsarchiv- Preuischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin (GStaPK), Rep. 92, VI.HA. NachlassBenedikt Franz Leo Waldeck, Nr. 28: Die Burgerwehr besonders in Berlin. In der Sitzung desVereins fur Geschichte der Mark Brandenburg am 12. April [1848]. Vorgetragen von demGeheimen ArchiRathe und Professor der Staats- Wissenschaft Dr. Riedel, Burger undBurgerwehrmanne des 13. Stadt-Bezirkes, Berlin 1848. p. 16.

    53. Stenographischer Bericht uber den Verhandlungen der deutschen constituirenden National-versammlung zu Frankfurt am Main, vol. 9, 6866.

    54. Ibid. vol. 2, 1328.55. For Heckers argument, as well as that of Wigrad (mentioned above), see: Frevert,

    Die Kasernierte Nation,1589. And see also Freitag, Friedrich Hecker: Der republikanischeSouveran, 4562 (especially pp. 546).

    56. For petitions in Offenburg see: BArchB, Nachla Karl Mathy, Nr. 97, Die Volksversammlung

    zu Offenburg, am 19. Maerz 1848. For Freiburg see: BArchB, Nachla Friedrich Hammacher,Nr. 71, Die Volkversammlung in Freiburg, am 26 Maerz 1848. For Heidelberg see: idem.Die Volkversammlung in Heidelberg, am 26 Maerz 1848. For Munster see: idem. An dieBuergergarde der Stadt Muenster [12.11.1848].

    57. Regarding the Prussian case and militias in Berlin see Wolff, Darstellung der BerlinerBewegungen im Jahre 1848 nach politischen, socialen und literarischen Beziehungen, 336.And see also: Becker, Forderungen nach Volksbewaffnung 1848, 1353 4; Prove,Burgerwehren in den europaischen Revolutionen 1848, 9112.

    58. For these cases see: Sperber, Rhineland Radicals, 36670; Nolte, Gemeindeburgertum undLiberalismus in Baden 1800-1850,327 8; Harris, Arms and the People, 144 5, 160.

    59. Prove, Burgerwehren, 909 10. Muller, Soldaten, Burger, Barrikaden. Konflikte undAllianzen wahrend der Revolution von 1848/49, 48.

    60. For this idea see: Nolte, Burgerideal, 624 5. Prove, Stadtgemeindlicher Republikanismus, 183.61. The number of members inBurgewehrendiffered considerably from one place to another. In

    Prussia they reached about 30,000 people. In Hannover, a city which at that time had about30,000 inhabitants, about 3000 served in the militia; 12,000 people carried arms in Leipzig, andin a small city like Heilbronn they numbered 1200. See: Prove, Politische Partizipation, 128.Frevert, Die Kasernierte Nation, 1701.

    62. Vick,Defining Germany,195. And see also Jeismann,Das Vaterland der Feinde. Studien zumnationalen Feindbegriff und Selbstverstandnis in Deutschland und Frankreich 17921918,1623.

    63. Vick,Defining Germany, 1813.64. Nachla Friedrich Hammacher, op. cit.65. On the role of the standing army during the 1848 revolution see Muller, Soldaten in der

    deutschen Revolution von 1848/49, 4254. On the continental level see Langewiesche, Die

    Rolle des Militars in den europaischen Revolutionen von 1848, 91532.66. This argument is presented by Christian Jansen. See Einheit, Macht und Freiheit. Die

    Paulskirchenlinke und die deutsche Politik in der nachrevolutionaren Epoche 18491867, 28.

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    senschaft21, Heft 9 (1973): 1352 76.Frank Becker, Bilder von Krieg und Nation: Die Einigungskriege in der burgerlichen Offentlichkeit

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    Kater, Thomas. Burger-Krieger: Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith und Adam Ferguson uber


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1813 clark

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A Changing World: 1813-1900

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Wellington’s Victory Beethoven - 1813.

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GARDINER POLICE DEPARTMENT SERVING SINCE 1849 SERVING SINCE 1849 Chief James M. Toman.

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1813 Overture 4 A

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Gained in Translation: Jews, Germany, California circa 1849 Exhibition Labels (2011)

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December2011NNAsite 1849 1854

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Danmarks demokratiseringsproces i 1849

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