German-Ottoman Relations

Introduction to Historical Study Final Paper

German-Ottoman Relations in World War 1:

An Alliance of Opportunity

Henry Smith

Towson University

Spring 2015

0522169

HIST 300.003 Henry Smith

Introduction

Germany and the Ottoman Empire allied in 1914, making up two thirds of the Central

Powers in the First World War. Studies related to these countries during World War 1 often

focus on their individual efforts and military battles. For Germany, much of attention has been

placed on their efforts in the heartland of Europe. The studies of the Ottoman Empire in this time

period either disregard the Turks as a weak minor player or as only relevant to the periphery of

the war. However the two empires were significant, not only to the development and legacy of

the War, but also to each other.

German and Ottoman relations during the beginning of the First World War, specifically

from August 1914 to January 1916, is a topic that deserves more analysis. This time period

constitutes the beginning of the alliance to the end of the Gallipoli Campaign. While research on

this or similar topics is not nonexistent, a comprehensive view on German-Ottoman relations is

lacking, and many of the sources that successfully tackled this subject are aging.1 The relations

1 For the scholarly research on Germany and the Ottoman Empire in World War One, refer to: Aksakal, Mustafa, “ ‘Holy War Made in Germany?’ Ottoman Origins of the 1914 Jihad,” War in History 18:2 (April 2011); Atun, Ata & Aya, Şükrü Server, “Different Opinions on Ottoman and German Political Military and Economic Relations,” International Journal of Academic Research 5:6 (November 2013); Beşikçi, Mehmet, The Ottoman mobilization of manpower in the First World War: between voluntarism and resistance (Boston: Brill, 2012); Köroğlu, Erol, Ottoman propaganda and Turkish identity: literature in Turkey during World War 1 (New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007); Krobb, Florian, “ ‘Welch’ unbebautes and riesengroßes Feld’: Turkey as Colonial Space in German World War 1 Writings,” German Studies Review 37:1 (February 2014); McMeekin, Sean, The Berlin-Baghdad: the Ottoman Empire and Germany’s bid for world power (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010); Stremmel, Fabian, “An Imperial German Battle to win over Mesopotamia: The Baghdad Propagandaschule (1909-17).” Middle Eastern Studies 51:1 (August 2014); Trumpener, Ulrich, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968); “Liman von Sanders and the German-Ottoman Alliance.” Journal of Contemporary History 1:4 (October 1966); “Turkey’s Entry into World War 1: An Assessment of Responsibilities,” The Journal of Modern History. 34:4 (December 1962)

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between Germany and the Ottoman Empire are extensive and make up a timeline much larger

then this paper’s scope. In analyzing the political, military, and economic relations between the

two empires, their affect on each other can become evident, allowing for a better understanding

of this part of history in Germany, Turkey, and all that is involved between them.

Key research questions include: How did Germany and the Ottoman Empire interact with

each other in the political, military, and economic realms? How did these interactions influence

their affect on the war? What were the motivations of Germany and the Ottoman Empire in

making this alliance? Would any of these motivations come at the expense of the other ally?

The main standard secondary source used in this paper is Ulrich Trumpener’s Germany

and the Ottoman Empire 1914-1918. This monograph details the historical interactions made

between Germany and the Ottoman Empire using at the time new sources and reports from the

German National Archives. These address key issues in the alliance building and maintaining.

Trumpener’s book provides a definitive account of the German-Ottoman Alliance and is useful

for understanding the narrative that makes up the relations. There are several flaws to this source

material however, as it is an older book, meaning it may be outdated in its interpretation and

research. Additionally, the book tends to lean towards a German perspective on the proceedings

between the two empires, which lead to questions on bias and objectivity. Partially to meet these

needs, additional scholarly articles from more recent times were crucial to creating a more

comprehensive academic analysis on the subject. While these are not as comprehensive, they are

more detailed and varied, giving a balanced historical analysis on the major connections between

the two Empires. The New York Times provides a balance to these secondary sources by

including primary accounts of the Great War as it happened. Articles related to either Germany,

the Ottoman Empire, or both printed during this time period give more specific and trivial

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actions or events that built up the relations. The secondary sources use academic and scholarly

interpretations of events, programs, and decisions to create an analysis on the various subjects

that exist within the topic of German and Ottoman cooperation. They help to shape the direction

that this paper structure by providing an academic basis to guide my arguments and research.

Additionally, the primary sources serve not only as interesting facts that give flavor to the

narrative, but also as the backbone that the arguments lie on, both my own and the authors of the

secondary sources. Comparing the two can show how they work together and sometimes at odds.

My preliminary assumption on the nature of the relations between the Germans and the

Turks was that the Empires were two almost independent forces that had all of their own goals

and reasons for fighting, and aside from a few minor military collaborations, there was little

interaction. An early, erroneous, hypothesis of German-Ottoman relations was that the alliance

was simply in name, and was a matter of two separate forces operating under the same name, but

not the same ambitions. Like many things in history, the truth is much more complicated, and

shows that the German and Ottoman Empires were more than simply two armies helping each

other, but nations and governments intertwined.

German-Ottoman relations were a product of opportunity with both sides seeing

advantages in the alliance. Neither had intentions for sustained friendship, but each looked

instead to advance their own goals. Their ally in war could provide the means to achieve these

goals.

Political Relations: Interests and Motivations

The alliance to bring the two empires together was never definite, and took the strenuous

work of several politicians often working against their own peers. Chief among these were

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German ambassador Hans Freiherr von Wangenheim and Ottoman military commander Enver

Pasha. The negotiations were sparked by geography as Turkey commanded the Bosphorus Strait,

a strategic waterway connecting the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea. German Real Admiral

Wilhelm Souchon intended to move his Mediterranean Squadron into the Black Sea to begin an

offensive against Russia.2 Turkey was hesitant in agreeing to this, as a show of solidarity with

Germany would jeopardize unsure loyalties in Bulgaria and Rumania. Undeterred, Souchon took

the initiative despite orders from Berlin, and sailed into the Marmara through the Dardanelles

Strait on August 6, 1914.3 This impressed the Ottoman command, known as Sublime Porte, and

they agreed to allow passage for Germany and Austria-Hungary as long as the fighting did not

include Turkish forces.4 Souchon knew an offensive against Russia’s Black Sea would be crucial

in defending Germany’s Eastern front and also give the Ottomans a reason to enter the war

militarily.

This was accepted along with a list of obligations that Germany would owe to Turkey,

including protection of Ottoman land and territorial claims to Greek islands in the Aegean Sea.

This is significant as it shows progress and continued interest by both parties in the continuation

of the alliance. The two Empires came together on August 2, 1914 in a signed Treaty created by

Wangenheim and Said Halim, the Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire.5 The Treaty mentioned

that should Russian military become active, Germany would have reason to enter the war in

alliance with Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire would have the same justification. This

explains the Porte’s reluctance to let Germany proceed with placing troops near Russia’s ports.

Admiral Souchon utilized this diplomatic commitment in his movement into the Black Sea,

2 Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 26.3 Ibid, 27.4 Ibid, 28.5 Baron v. Wangenhiem & Said Halim“Treaty of Alliance Between Germany and Turkey 2 August, 1914,” The Avalon Project http://avalon.yale.edu/20th_century/turkgerm.asp

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pressuring Turkey to uphold their casus belli. Russia could use this as provocation to wage war,

compelling the Ottomans to join. Turkey was not yet mobilized, and feared entering the war now

would lead to failure.6

Also outlined in the Treaty was that the agreement and negotiations would be kept secret.

Unwilling to be marked down as enemy by any one nation, Enver Pasha was in correspondence

with Russia discussing an Ottoman’s effort against Austria, and two Ottoman battleships were

being constructed and held in an English shipyard.7 Turkey had no interest yet in a complete

declaration of alliance with either the Triple Entente or the Central Powers. There may have been

plans to join with Germany in the future of the war, but in early August of 1914 foreign political

interests and relations were too important to end in a declaration of war. Germany and Turkey’s

ability to keep the secret agreement quiet was successful as seen as late as September, 1914

when an alliance between Rumania, Greece, and Bulgaria was formed in preparation for a

possible German allied-Ottoman Empire.8 An alliance was already made, but its secrecy was

upheld to the neighbors of Turkey. These additional political pressures from Turkey’s neighbors

expedited their official involvement in the war and strengthened their commitment to a German

alliance.

Germany’s political motivations in creating an alliance came from the geographic

advantages the Ottoman Empire possessed. Aside from their control of the Dardanelles and

Bosphorus Straits, they were also in close proximity to Russia and British Egypt. Turkey had a

clear line of attack over the Black Sea to Russia’s holdings on the coast, an advantage Berlin

wished to exploit. Rear Admiral Souchon’s excursions against Russia needed Ottoman support,

6 Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 23. 7 Ibid, 24.8 Correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, “Combine Against Turkey,” The New York Times, September 12, 1914, 4.

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and not just militarily. Naval bases and supply routes would have been difficult to impossible

had Germany only had the Austrian Navy to support them. Creating an alliance with the

Ottomans was crucial to establishing naval superiority against Russia in the Black Sea. In order

to keep appearances of neutrality, the Ottomans staged a fake purchase of two German cruisers,

Goeben and Breslau. The ships were renamed and the German crews were dressed up in

Ottoman fashion.9 When the war reached Turkey, a German military presence were already

there.

With Russia’s southern coast accounted for, Berlin needed to have a strategy for Great

Britain. An invasion of the British islands would be difficult against the superior British. Failed

attempts against setting mines on the River Thames and submarine excursions in the North Sea

would prove to the Germans that a direct assault on Britain was not yet possible.10 Germany

would only be successful at performing raids against England’s Northeast coast.11 If Britain

could not be attacked, then the colonies could provide a different target. One colony that would

have strategic importance was the Ottoman Empire’s former territory of Egypt. Germany’s plan

for Egypt was done less to expand the political boundaries of the Ottoman Empire but to disrupt

Britain, who controlled Egypt at the onset of the war. The Ottoman Empire annexed Egypt in

November of 1914, effectively ending all correspondence and alliance with Great Britain.12 The

German government backed this move, as it would take away not only the bountiful land of the

Pharaohs, but also cut off Britain from the trade routes into the Indian Ocean. It would also allow

access to the German colony of Zanzibar in East Africa

9 Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 31-32.10 Girard Lindsley McEntee, A Military History of the World War: A Complete Account of the Campaigns on all Fronts (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1937), 162.11 Dispatch, “East Coast Scene of Raid,” The New York Times, December 17, 1914, 1.12 Unknown, “Britain Admits Turkish Break,” The New York Times, November 1, 1914, 1.

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These decisions in the Black Sea and Egypt would lead to the Palestine and Dardanelles

Campaigns. These actions were not supported by the German embassy due to Ottoman military

strategy and success, but to better their situation back in Germany. Introducing the Ottomans to

the war would force the British and Russians to divert forces elsewhere, keeping Germany from

being overwhelmed. Their motivations lied in having the Ottomans as allies came from the Turks

creating a new front of the war, which provided the largest advantage to the Germans.

For the Ottoman Sultan and government, their political interests into forging an alliance

with Germany stemmed from the fact that Germany was doing the most to appease them. Aside

from Germany and the Central Powers, the other likely option would be Great Britain and the

Triple Entente. One large reason the Ottomans would join Germany is that part of Triple Entente

was Russia, who were at odds with Turkey for dominance over the Black Sea area. Additionally,

Enver Pasha believed “that the ‘Triple Alliance was stronger militarily than the Entente, and

would prove the victor in case of a world war.’”13 The Ottomans needed to choose a side, and

Germany proved to be the most viable candidate.

One aspect of World War One that is often neglected is the role of religion. Even more

rare is the role of Islam, as the majority of the soldiers in the war were Christian Europeans. The

Ottoman Empire held the responsibility and heritage of the Islamic Empires dating back to the

Prophet Muhammad. Likewise, the Turkish soldiers fighting for the Ottoman banner would have

been Muslim. This would have been a unique sight on the World War One battlegrounds, and the

Ottomans religious practices often surprised Western observers.14 Kaiser Wilhelm II did not

forget the power God could have, be it the Christian or Islamic God. The Kaiser played a

significant role in solidifying and maintaining the political relationship between the Germans and

13 Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 20.14 Alfred Ruhl, Antwerp to Gallipoli: A Year of War on many Fronts- and behind them (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1916), 196

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the Turks. He was in charge of reforming the Turkish Army into the Prussian model in 1913,

introducing and establishing General Liman von Sanders, who would command Ottoman forces

in World War One.15 Kaiser Wilhelm II also made a personal visit to Constantinople and

Gallipoli on October 15th and 16th, 1917 to meet with several of the Turkish high command,

including Enver Pasha, to survey the city, meet with his allies, and award soldiers who fought in

the Dardanelles Campaign.16 He was committed to creating a formidable ally in Turkey.

This extended to the beginning of the War, when the Kaiser supported the Ottoman

proclamation if jihad, holy war or struggle, on November 11, 1914 by the Custodian of the

Fetva, Ali Haydar Efendi.17 Jihad has two meanings in Islam: greater jihad, the struggle within

the self, and lesser jihad, a military struggle. They were proclaimed by Islamic leaders as a call to

protect the religion and its people. It is interesting to note that the Ottoman leaders called for a

greater jihad to mobilize the army.18 The argument for why this was done is that the 1914 jihad

claimed that this jihad would unite imperial and personal struggles, unifying the Empire.19 This

also unified religious and government affairs, as personal religious values were now the concern

of the Sultan and the Young Turks leaders.20 These decisions would be crucial to the Islamization

of the Ottoman Empire up until the civil war, or War of Turkish Independence, in 1923.

Wilhelm believed his support of this call to arms would strengthen their relations.

However, the Kaiser’s support had little real affect. His support of a Muslim practice caused jests

15 Ata Atun & Şükrü Server Aya, “Different Opinions,” International Journal of Academic Research 5:6 (November 2013), 228-229. 16 Generalstab, der Kaiser bei unseren Türkischen Verbündeten (the Kaiser with our Turkish Allies), Imperial War Musuem. http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/1060023280?bt=europeanaapi 17 Mustafa Aksakal, “ ‘Holy War Made in Germany’? Ottoman Origins of the 1914 Jihad,” War in History 18:2 (2011), 186. 18 Ibid, 188.19 Ibid.20 Ibid.

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in Europe to label him as “Kaiser Hajji Muhammad Wilhelm II” by enemy propagandists.21 And

in between Germany and Turkey, the support was more symbolic than actual religious

cooperation. Jihads had been called many times in the Ottoman’s previous recent wars as a

method of uniting the Muslim forces in the Empire.22 Enver Pasha even advised Wilhelm against

declaring a jihad, due to Germany being a Christian nation.23 A declaration of jihad might create

tensions between the Christian Germans and Muslim Turks. Kaiser Wilhelm believed that such a

call could motivate the Turkish people to mobilize and play their part in Germany’s larger plans

for this theater of the war, but this ignored the Muslim-Christian divide in the Ottoman Empire

that would be so crucial in its collapse.24 Enver Pasha remarked that a jihad is more than a call to

arms of the citizens of the Empire, despite Wilhelm’s understanding. It is a hoy war, where the

enemies of Islam would be defeated.25 The Kaiser’s understanding of jihad was not complete,

and could cause a religious divide between the Central Power allies. Additionally, the Ottoman

command was not committed to military interference on October 22, 1914, when these talks

between Enver and Wilhelm were being held.26 Eventually though, it was clear to both leaders

that Ottoman mobilization must be enacted, and a declaration of jihad would be the most

effective way to produce this.27

The Kaiser was genuinely interested in having Turkey as an ally and making sure the

Ottomans stayed strong and on their side. While his overall contributions may have been less

than groundbreaking, he was directly involved in the political relations. These relations were

diplomatic, and in most cases had advantages to each. However, these political missions and

21 Ibid, 184.22 Ibid, 190-191.23 Ibid, 195-196.24 Ibid, 199.25 Ibid, 196.26 Ibid, 195.27 Ibid, 196.

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documents were all done with the one side’s own interests in mind. Germany agreed to the

alliance because it allowed them access to the Black Sea, and the Ottoman’s allowed it for

military and political support. The alliance was done not as an ideological unity or common

cause against a like enemy. Opportunity was presented for both Empires, and they both seized

the chance. Their motivations were their own, and even if they announced they had shared

motives, it was in name only. The political relations of Germany and the Ottoman Empire were

based on interest in what the ally could provide, and motivations the ally could improve.

Military Relations: Command and Strategy

Many battles fought in the Great War are still discussed today in detail. They have shaped

our understanding of the war, the time period, the culture, and war in general. While the majority

of this study tends to focus on the battles and trench warfare in Central Europe, the Allied

Campaign to take Constantinople is also widely studied. The so-called Dardanelles Campaign is

relevant and important as it showcases the largest German-Ottoman joint military operation of

the war. The German Admiral von Tirpitz noted the strategic importance of holding the Strait in

1915 that, “Should the Dardanelles fall, then the World War has been decided against us.”28

Should the Turks lose this position, the Ottoman capital of Constantinople would be exposed to

the Triple Entente, proving a major threat to Germany’s ally and war plans.

The plan for the defense of the Dardanelles Strait and the Gallipoli Peninsula was to

centralize all weaponry and forces to the narrowest part of the Strait and the forts on either side

of the mouth of the Dardanelles.29 The defensive forces, which were modernized by Germany

two years prior, consisted of mine fields and artillery, as well as the garrisoned forces and

28 McEntee, A Military History of the World War, 224.29 Ibid, 228.

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artillery already in place at the forts.30 The Turkish High Command and the German Admiral

Usedom, who presided as general supervisor of Gallipoli’s defense, established these defensive

strategies.31 The defenses would hold, and Constantinople would not be captured by conventional

military means.

The German presence in the Ottoman military was mostly administrative. Admirals

Souchon and Usedom were incorporated into the Ottoman Naval command, and they were given

the same power, at least in name, as the Turkish commanders, creating a joint military command.

In total, about forty German military commanders were placed in Turkey either before or at the

onset of the alliance.32 Perhaps most notable was General Otto Liman von Sanders. Relocated

south to the Ottoman Empire in 1913, the role of von Sanders supports the idea that the German

military commanders had little influence on the relations between Germany and Turkey. During

the political negotiations between Wangenheim and Enver, von Sanders was often not consulted,

or was not informed of developments in the alliance.33 Von Sanders often felt neglected and was

frustrated by the politicians’ elusiveness, and was openly combative against his Ottoman and

German peers. This escalated to when von Sanders, ignored by the Kaiser and Wangenheim,

threatened to duel Enver Pasha and Cemal Pasha for the control of the Ottoman forces.34 Liman

von Sander’s place in the Ottoman military hierarchy was tense, and he felt he deserved a more

influential in the army. These frustrations took their toll on von Sanders, and he even requested

to be recalled on August 19, 1914.35

30 Ibid.31 Ibid.32 Trumpener, Liman von Sanders, 179.33 Ibid, 181-184.34 Ibid, 184.35 Ibid.

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Despite these difficulties in command, von Sanders did play a significant role in the

Ottoman army, and therefore German-Ottoman relations. He was responsible for the programs

that modernized and improved the Turkish Military, as well as convincing Berlin that the

Ottoman Empire had the capabilities for being a good ally. He and Enver Pasha made the reports

and arguments of the size and effectiveness of the Ottoman military, which was able to convince

Wangenheim and Berlin that Turkey could be useful.36 This was never an assurance, but von

Sanders was successful in swaying the German and Ottoman High Command to forge the

alliance. While several of von Sanders and Enver Pasha’s promises did not pan out, including the

military support of Bulgaria, they shared a goal in bringing the Ottoman Empire into an active

role in the war. Their motivations were von Sanders was frustrated with Ottoman inductiveness

in aiding Germany, and Enver Pasha was a member of the Ittihad ve Terakki (Union and

Progress) faction, who supported an alliance with Germany to improve Turkey’s global status.37

While von Sanders and the other German commanders may have had the title of military

leaders, few possessed real practical power. Many of the high roles occupied by Germans were

mostly ceremonial, or offered little in military strategy and tactics. Alfred Ruhl, an American

journalist touring war-torn Europe in 1915, was present at Gallipoli and witnessed an

unidentified German officer appear distinctly separate from the Ottoman soldiers he was

commanding.38 The officer could not speak Turkish and was without his interpreter, leaving him

“at best a civilian among soldiers.”39 Some of the Ottoman officers, like Essad Pasha, could

speak German and understood the German mentality, but there is no evidence that the common

soldier could say the same.40 In fact the direct opposite is more likely. In July of 1915, German

36 Ibid, 182.37 Ibid.38 Ruhl, Antwerp to Gallipoli, 202-203.39 Ibid, 203.40 Ibid, 209-210.

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officers were killed by Turkish troops for the discipline and motivation tactics used by the

Germans, specifically shooting at the Turkish soldiers’ feet to make them march forward.41 The

Turkish soldiers, described by Alfred Ruhl as stoic and unflinching, broke out in an extreme

measure against their commanding officers. This supports the notion that the German military

officers did not have a strong relationship with the soldiers they were commanding, and perhaps

their powers extended only as far as the battle tents. The joint German and Turkish command

structure of the Ottoman forces had to not only battle the forces of Great Britain and the Triple

Entente but also deal with cultural and power differences within their own ranks.

The military operations of the joint German and Ottoman forces in the beginning of the

war were defensive in nature, and the higher command was a delicate balancing act of

incorporating German officers into Ottoman ranks. The Ottomans benefited from the advanced

weaponry from Germany and the military mastery their commanders possessed. However, this

military alliance was not smooth and brought difficulties to all parties involved. The German

commanders, of which few spoke Turkish, were in a far off land fighting for an Empire other

than their own, an Empire that was reluctant to enter the fight at all. And for the Ottomans,

foreigners were leading them to a fight that wasn’t theirs. These grudges were not exclusive to

the soldiers. The Ottoman President of Parliament, Halil Bey, stated in November of 1915 that

the German presence in Turkey is starting to feel more like a conquest than collaboration.42 The

military relations between the Central Powers was successful in holding a defense of the Turkish

capital, but issues and conflict in the hierarchy in command between German and Ottoman

officers threatened the alliance during their defense of the Gallipoli Peninsula

41 Special Cable, “Says Turks Kill German Officers,” The New York Times, July 9, 1915, 3.42 German Reports, “Turkey is Uneasy over German Army,” The New York Times, November 23, 1915, 1.

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Economic Relations: Resources and Infrastructure

The alliance between Germany and the Ottoman Empire was as much a trade agreement

as it was a military partnership. Germany was blocked by the sea blockade and by war to trade

routes and food production. The Ottoman Empire was, economically and technologically, rapidly

decaying as an empire. The alliance provided a solution to these issues, and was integral to

maintaining relations between Germany and Turkey.

Germany and the German people were on the brink of a food crisis. Rationing was in

effect and the will of the people was strong, but could only last so long with the French, British,

and Russian forces surrounding the German heartland.43 The Ottomans provided a solution to

this problem. Anatolia, the Turkish heartland, was a large regional power in agricultural export,

and Germany wished to use this capacity to help feed its citizens.44 However, this was not so

simple. The grain production in the fields was diminished compared to previous seasons, and

Turkey did not have the manpower or the equipment to produce enough food to feed not just

themselves but Germans as well. Germany did have the agricultural technology to increase the

harvests, but for the time being were content in taking granaries on the Bosphorus. This includes

food packages marked for foreign destinations, like New York in the neutral United States.45

While neither the sale to nor acquisition by the Germans is confirmed, their reliance on Turkey

for food is evidenced by soldier’s rations including dates from Anatolia. Turkey’s food

production would be a vital asset to Germany’s maintenance of its population and proves to be

one of the most important advantages the Ottomans offered to Germany.

43 Ruhl, Antwerp to Gallipoli, 98, 100.44 Private Advices, “Germany Reaching for Food in Turkey,” The New York Times, November 10, 1915, 3.45 Ibid.

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This is not to suggest that the relationship is one-sided. In fact, the Supreme Porte agreed

to the alliance since it knew all the opportunities Germany could offer. The Ottoman Empire was

decaying, losing money and control over its territories. Its emergence as a gunpowder empire

was now in the past, and was fast being eclipsed by the industrial powers of Europe. One of the

largest and most significant effects Germany had was the continuation and construction of the

Berlin-Baghdad Railroad. Germany was the driving force behind connecting Constantinople to

Baghdad, once the proclaimed greatest city in the world, but now a ghost of empires past.46 The

construction efforts were lead by the German engineer Wilhelm von Pressel in 1878, but

bankruptcy of the weary Ottomans and a lack of investors by German banks delayed

construction.47 Von Pressel was invigorated by the Turkish culture and Anatolia, and his own

personal motivations for restoring the Ottoman Empire to its former glory.48 The Germans were

able to get the Sultan’s support by agreeing to build the railroad towards the east. This appeased

the Sultan over the British and French propositions, which were also attempting to access the

region, because it allowed the Ottomans to mobilize in case of Armenian or Russian threats.49

Germany secured the rights in 1899 to build by the Sultan for 200,000 lira, which is the modern

equivalent of 100 million dollars.50 Included in these rights was prospecting, and the German

mining companies were able to secure copper and coal deposits.51

Construction of the railroad began in 1903 with the plan to connect the Turkish city of

Konya to Basra in modern day Iraq. The Reichstag and the Supreme Porte both believed that

Mesopotamia held potential, if for different reasons. Germany saw it as one of the last

46 McMeekin, The Berlin-Baghdad Express, 33-34.47 Ibid, 37-39.48 Ibid, 37-38.49 Ibid, 40.50 Ibid, 42.51 Ibid, 43.

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conquerable and colonizable places left on the world, and also gave better access to the Persian

Gulf and Indian Ocean by means of Basra.52 Connecting Constantinople to the Arabian Peninsula

by means of rail would spread German colonial and economic influence to this region.

Expanding the German Empire was a long-term goal for Kaiser Wilhelm II, and also one of the

causes for the buildup to the First World War. Had the Central Powers proved victorious, the

economic investments made in creating this rail would have improved their global standing as

well as relations to the Ottomans.

One aspect that is of note and is so common in modern scholarly research of the Middle

East is the role of oil in the economies of Middle Eastern countries. This ties in to the topic of

German-Ottoman relations because the first discoveries of oil in the Middle East occur in 1908, a

few years before the start of the War.53 This discovery changed the potential of the Middle East

from being a land of desert and mountains to one of strategic importance. A pipeline was built

three years later near Basra to access the oil that was in high demand for the industrialized

European powers that used the resource to fuel their naval craft.54 This extended into World War

1 when German and Ottoman forces fought the British for control over the pipeline.55 The high

demand would cause the Ottomans to invade the prosperous Baku oilfields in Azerbaijan in

1918.56 This would constitute the Battle of Baku, and with the now Bolshevik Russians retreating

from the Caucasus and Armenian and Azerbaijani conflicts begging, the Ottomans saw an

opportunity to take the region and its valuable oil resource.57 Having control over large oilfields

52 Ibid, 34.53 E. Roger Owen, “One Hundred Years of Middle Eastern Oil,“ Middle East Brief 1:24 (January 2008), 1.54 Ibid.55 Ibid.56 Erik-Jan Zürcher, “The Ottoman Empire 1850-1922 – Unavoidable Failure?” Turkology Update Leiden Project (May, 2009): 5, http://edoc.bibliothek.uni-halle.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=6864 57 Bülent Gökay, “The Battle for Baku (May-September 1918): A Peculiar Episode in the History of the Cauasus,” Middle Eastern Studies 34:1 (January 1998), 37.

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would gives the Ottomans an economic advantage over virtually all modern empires in the

world, and could elevate them in global power. However, this was not to be, as the war ended in

a Central defeat, and Britain and France annexed much of the Ottoman territories, especially the

oil rich lands.58 But during the war, it did provide the Ottoman Empire with a valuable economic

tool that raised their importance, and Germany’s alliance with the Ottomans gave the European

power access to this resource. Oil was of high importance for the preservation of the naval war,

and the Ottoman Empire’s access to it would be important to both Turkish and German navies.

The construction of the Berlin-Baghdad Railroad provides a prelude to the economic

relations and negotiations between Germany and the Ottoman Empire during the First World

War. Germany had interests in the Ottoman Middle East in terms of empire building and

resource extraction. Germany also intended to protect their large and expensive investment in the

region, which would be threatened by British, French, and Russian takeover should the Ottomans

fall. Alternatively, the Ottoman Empire was becoming desperate for an ally that could support

them from utter collapse. They needed investors and strong economic relations, which could be

preserved in allying with the German Empire, who in turn saw possibilities in the Middle East

and Anatolia. The Ottoman Empire’s holdings in in the Middle East could prove to be an

economic boon, but they would need to be developed. Germany saw the mutual gain both

empires potentially could have, and made the investment into the development of the Ottoman

Empire. A strong Ottoman Empire could better assist Germany both during the conflict and in

times of peace. This was investment Germany expected to see a return on.

Cultural Influences: Colonies and Programs

58 Zürcher, “The Ottoman Empire,” 5.

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A final note should be made about the cultural influences that Germany instituted on the

Ottoman Empire. As mentioned before, Germany was looking to expand their empire, which is

one of the origins of the tensions leading up the beginning of the War. Germany had colonies in

East Africa, the East Indies, China, and the Pacific, but this was still small compared to the

extent of the British and French Empires. While direct colonizing of the Ottoman Empire by the

Germans seems unlikely, there is evidence that Berlin had plans for Turkey similar to colonial

processing.

This section was not included in the overall framework for understanding German-

Ottoman relation because it does not provide a direct relation between the two governmental

bodies. Additionally, the cultural influences spread were notably one sided, with Germany

influencing Turkish culture with little Ottoman influence on Germany. However, understanding

the cultural influences can be useful in analyzing the dynamics between the countries as a whole.

Germany’s first excursion into instilling German lifestyle was in the creation of the

Propaganda School in Baghdad. The Propagandaschule was in place from 1909 to 1917, and

was an extension of Reich Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg’s Schulreferat

programs. These were School and Education Units placed around the world that would serve

German migrants overseas.59 These would not only provide a German place of education for

German migrants, but also improve diplomatic relations with the countries the schools were

situated. Cultural exchange and political unity were the motivations for establishing these

schools, and would carry over for the decision to create one in Baghdad.60 These schools, while

designed for Germans, would accept any one into their classrooms, especially the local

populations, who would learn the German language and culture.61 Baghdad was home to one of

59 Fabian Stremmel, “The Baghdad Propagandaschule,” 49, 52.60 Ibid, 54.61 Ibid, 55.

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these schools due to its strategic location, naturally, on the Berlin-Baghdad Railroad.62 Securing

German interest in Baghdad would connect Germany to the Persian Gulf and all that laid in-

between. Germany wanted control and influence over this region, and introducing the German

culture into these Ottoman owned lands would allow them to do so without offending

Constantinople.

Turkey was not ignorant to German plans. Some within the Ottoman command were

uneasy with the alliance and negotiation with Germany, which was one of the reasons the official

alliance and intervention was stalled. President of Parliament Halil Bey was uneasy with the

proposition for German troops to enter Turkey fearing an eventual German takeover.63 Halil Bey

was one of the three most powerful leaders in the Ottoman Empire, and his reservations on

German involvement show that Germany’s advances into Turkish culture would not go

unopposed.

This section will focus on the German colonial pressures being placed upon the Ottomans

and the people within. The main focuses will be the German efforts to install German

establishments in the Ottoman Empire and the reactions from Turkish government and other

Turks being placed under the German pressures. The German efforts were the Propaganda

School set up in Baghdad to teach the German language and lifestyle. They also offered a

destination for German colonists. Additionally, the German perspective of the Turkey as not a

future ally but the possibility of a future colony is important to seeing the motivations of the

Reichstag in conducting affairs in Turkey.

Germany had colonial spaces in several different parts of the world, and although one

was never established in the Ottoman Empire, this time period provided the most effort in

62 Ibid, 58.63 German Reports, “Turkey is Uneasy over German Army,” The New York Times, November 23, 1915, 2.

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creating one. In Germany, the propaganda publication Der Deutsche Krieg, Germany at War,

circulated literature devoted to explaining and detailing the Ottomans’ homeland and military

and the work Germany has done in modernizing Turkey.64 The aim here was to create a sense of

Orientalism in the German people, making Turkey appear as an enticing destination for future

German migrants. They may not claim Anatolia and Mesopotamia in the name of the Kaiser, but

they could spread the German way of life in a manner similar to colonialism. The Ottoman

Empire was seen as a land of opportunity and potential, and the German hand could shape the

land and people to create a strong German ally in the same way they would create a German

colony.65

The lasting effects of German cultural influence into Turkey and the Ottoman Empire are

few, as the Propaganda Schools and Berlin-Baghdad Railroad were not in place long enough to

make any lasting impact. The end of the war saw the end of German foreign lands and Britain

and France carved up the Ottoman Empire after the armistice. Britain and France were sure to

remove any established German influence and institute their own. Despite the long-term failings,

this short time period did see the height of German interest into the Ottoman Empire as an ally,

potential power, and colonial space.

Conclusion

Germany and the Ottoman Empire forged an alliance of war, but their relations went

beyond the battlefield. Their political leaders, like Kaiser Wilhelm II and Enver Pasha, came

together to create diplomatic bonds. Military leaders like General von Sanders and Admiral

Souchon were integrated into the Ottoman military. Economic decisions like the creation of the

64 Florian Krobb, “Turkey as Colonial Space,” 2.65 Ibid, 5-6.

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Berlin-Baghdad railroad showed investment in a successful alliance. But this alliance was not

one of friendship.

The nature of the German-Ottoman relations was one of opportunity rather than

necessity. Germany already had a strong ally in Austria-Hungary, so it was not Germany looking

for anyone to join the alliance. Instead, the Ottomans offered certain opportunities like food

supplies to rationed Germany, as well as geographic importance, as the Ottomans had access to

Egypt, the Mediterranean, and southern Russia, alleviating the pressure on the German army.

They also offered a potential colonial presence. On the Turkish side, Germany was not their only

choice, as Constantinople had relations to other nations, notable England. Germany offered the

industrialization of the decaying Empire and a chance to return to global importance. The

Ottomans saw a way to escape their increasingly likely destruction.

German-Ottoman relations were products of two Empires with different cultures and

histories seeking an advantage. Germany saw the Ottoman Empire as a way to grow, and the

Ottoman Empire saw Germany as a way to survive. Together they contributed to a turning point

in European and Middle Eastern history, but their mutual relations were not of friendship, but of

opportunity.

Bibliography

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German-Ottoman Relations

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