Georgian Anti-Corruption Legislation: Implementation in ... · • The activities of the...
Transcript of Georgian Anti-Corruption Legislation: Implementation in ... · • The activities of the...
GeorgianAnti-CorruptionLegislation:ImplementationinPractice
TransparencyInternationalGeorgia
2015
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ThePublicationhasbeenpreparedwiththefinancialsupportoftheSwedishInternationalDevelopmentCooperationAgency(Sida).TheviewsexpressedinthereportdonotnecessarilyrepresentthoseofSida.TransparencyInternationalGeorgiaissolelyresponsibleforthereport’s
content.
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ContentsI.Introduction........................................................................................................................................4
II.ExecutiveSummary............................................................................................................................4
III.OverviewofAnti-CorruptionLegislation...........................................................................................5
TheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService......................................................5
TheLawonCivilService.....................................................................................................................7
TheCriminalCode..............................................................................................................................8
LawonLobbyingActivities.................................................................................................................9
LawonNationalRegulatoryAuthorities............................................................................................9
IV.ImplementationofAnti-CorruptionLegislationinPractice............................................................10
LawonCivilService..........................................................................................................................10
ThelawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService.....................................................15
CivilServiceBureau..........................................................................................................................21
GeorgianNationalEnergyandWaterSupplyRegulatoryCommission............................................22
GeorgianNationalCommunicationsCommission............................................................................23
LobbyingActivities...........................................................................................................................24
ParliamentaryCommitteeonProceduralIssuesandRules.............................................................25
MinistryofInternalAffairsandChiefProsecutor’sOffice...............................................................26
V.Conclusion........................................................................................................................................27
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I.Introduction Anti-corruptionprovisionshavelongexistedintheGeorgianlegislationandhavebeenconstantlyundergoingchangeandimprovement.Forexample,theLawonCivilService1andtheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService2haveexistedsince1997.Theformerhasundergone104differentamendmentssinceitsadoption,andthelatter-50.In1998,GeorgiaadoptedtheLawonLobbyingActivities3.Thecountry’sCriminalCode4providesforcriminalliabilityforcorruptionandmalfeasance.Finally,conflictofinterestandprinciplesofintegrityofvariousregulatorybodiesandtheirmembersareregulatedbyanumberofotherlaws.
However,ofequalimportancetoimprovingthelegalframeworkisitseffectiveenforcement.Thelatteristhesubjectofthisresearch.
TransparencyInternationalGeorgiarequestedstatisticsfrompublicagencies(ministries)onviolationsandresponsestotheviolationsoftheLawsonCivilService,LobbyingActivities,andConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService.WealsorequestedstatisticsoninvestigationslaunchedandcriminalprosecutionscarriedoutunderrelevantarticlesoftheCriminalCode.
Thereportalsopresentsseveralcasestudies(identifiedthoughdeskresearch)thatillustrateshortcomingsintheimplementationofanti-corruptionlegislation.
II.ExecutiveSummaryEffectiveimplementationoftheanti-corruptionlegislation,includingcrimedetectionandprevention,intheGeorgianpublicsectorishinderedbyanumberofproblems.Theseproblemsaremultifacetedandcomplexinnature.Oneofthemainobstaclesforthisresearchwasincompleteinformationprovidedbypublicagencies.Severalagenciesdidnotprovideanyanswer,while,insomecases,wehadtheimpressionthatapublicagencydeliberatelyavoidedansweringcertainquestions.
KeyFindings:
• Mostministrieshaveadepartment(usuallytheInternalAuditDepartment)thatisresponsibleforidentifying,investigatingandrespondingtoviolationsofnormsestablishedbytheLawonCivilServiceandtheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService.
• Thesedepartmentsaremostlyineffective.Thisisevidencedbythefactthattheyhavefailedtodetectviolationsrelatedtoconflictofinterestandcorruption,whichhavebeenidentifiedbymediaandnon-governmentalorganizations.
• Independentregulatorycommissionsdonothavedepartmentstaskedwithinvestigatingcasesofpossibleconflictofinterest.
• Themajorityofpublicagenciesdonothaveaclearinternalwhistleblowingmechanism.Theexistenceofsuchamechanismisnotrequiredbylaw,whichisasignificantobstacleforthe
1LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,see:https://goo.gl/kKXQHv2LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,see:https://goo.gl/jB09YT3LawofGeorgiaonLobbyingActivities,see:https://goo.gl/fn1NJ54TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,see:https://goo.gl/fCL02E
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implementationoftheexistinglegislationonwhistleblowerprotectionandfailstomeetbestpracticerequirements.
• TheMinistryofInternalAffairs,theMinistryofDefenseandtheStateSecurityServicehaveyettofulfilltheirobligationtodevelopaspeciallegislationonwhistleblowerprotection.
• TheactivitiesoftheAnti-CorruptionDepartmentoftheStateSecurityServicearenottransparent.
• AnumberofinaccuracieshavebeenidentifiedinassetdeclarationssubmittedbyMPsinrecentyears.
• The‘revolvingdoor’provision(Article65-restrictionofemployment)oftheLawonCivilServiceisthemostproblematicofanti-corruptionprovisions.Thelawdoesnotapplytolocalgovernmentofficials,anddoesnotspecifywhichgovernmentbodyisresponsibleforitsenforcement.
Basedonthesekeyfindings,TransparencyInternationalGeorgiahasdevelopedthefollowingrecommendations:
• ThedepartmentswithinpublicagenciesresponsibleforenforcingtheLawonCivilServiceandtheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServicemustintensifytheireffortstodetectandpreventviolations.Thecapacityofthesedepartmentsmustalsobestrengthened,includingthroughtrainingofemployees.
• Independentregulatorycommissionsmustbeobligatedbylawtosetupinternaldepartmentschargedwithinvestigatingpossiblecasesofconflictofinterest.
• Publicagenciesmustbeobligatedbylawtodevelopclearandsimpleinternalproceduresforwhistleblowingthatwillbeproactivelyintroducedtotheiremployees.
• Aneffectivelegislationonwhistleblowerprotectionmustbeadoptedforlawenforcementagencies.Alternatively,theexistinglegislationmustbeextendedtotheemployeesoftheseagencies.
• Article65(restrictionofemployment)oftheLawonCivilServicethatcontainsregulationson‘revolvingdoor’mustbeextendedtolocalgovernmentemployees.Othershortcomingsofthisprovision(e.g.,thelackofaresponsibleagency)mustalsobeaddressed.
• TheactivitiesoftheAnti-CorruptionDepartmentoftheStateSecurityServicemustbecomemoretransparent.
• TheProceduralIssuesandRulesCommitteeofParliamentmustpaygreaterattentiontoexaminingtheassetdeclarationsfiledbyMPs.
• Inordertoeffectivelyimplementanti-corruptionlegislation,anindependentanti-corruptionagencymustbecreatedthatwillhavewithproperauthority,resourcesandpoliticalindependence.
III.OverviewofAnti-CorruptionLegislation
TheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServiceTheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServicedeterminesthebasicprinciplesofprevention,discoveryandeliminationofconflictofinterestandcorruptioninpublicagencies,and
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basicprinciplesofresponsibilityofperpetratorsofcorruption.5Thislawalsoregulateswhistleblowerprotectionandassetdeclarationsfiledbypublicofficials.
Thelawdefinescorruptioninpublicserviceas“theabuseofthepositionortheopportunitiesrelatedtothepositionbyapublicservantinordertoobtainpropertyorotherassetsprohibitedbylaw,andthetransferoftheseassetstohim/her,orsupportinobtainingandlegalizingthem.”6Accordingtothelaw,acorruptionoffensemayinvolvedisciplinary,administrativeandcriminalliability.Thelawdefines“conflictofinterestinpublicservice”astheconflictofpropertyorotherprivateinterestsofapublicservantwiththeinterestsofstateservice.7Thelawalsoregulatesgiftsreceivedbypublicservantsandtheirfamilymembersandthesubstantiationoftheoriginoftheirproperty.8Ifapublicservantorhis/herfamilymemberreceivesagiftthatisprohibitedbylaw,theyareobligatedtotransferittotheLEPLServiceAgencyoftheMinistryofFinancewithinthreeworkingdays.9
TheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServicesetsrestrictionsandbanspublicofficialsfrommakingpropertytransactionswithapublicinstitutioninwhichtheyholdaposition.Publicofficialsarealsoprohibitedfrommakingpropertytransactionsaspublicservantswiththeircloserelativesortheirrepresentatives.10Incaseapublicservant’spersonalorpropertyinterestispresentduringadecision-makingprocess,he/sheisobligatedtodeclareself-recusal.11Thislawalsoregulatestheincompatibilityofdutiesinpublicservice.Accordingtothelaw,anofficialorhis/herfamilymembermaynotholdaposition,performanykindofworkin,holdanystocksorashareintheauthorizedcapitalofanenterpriseregisteredinGeorgia,ifthecontrolofitsentrepreneurialactivitiesfallswithinthepowersofthisofficialorhis/heroffice.Officialsarealsoprohibitedfromholdingapositioninanyenterprise.12
Accordingtothelaw,publicofficialsshallbedismissedfromtheirpositionif:
• TheyortheirfamilymembershaveviolatedtheincompatibilityprovisionsunderthisLaw.• Itisconfirmedbyacourtdecisionthattheofficialownsillegaland/orunsubstantiated
property.13
Thelawobligatespublicofficialsandtheirfamilymemberstoannuallyfileassetdeclarationsandimposessanctionsincaseofnoncompliance.14
Thelawalsodeterminesthemechanismsofwhistleblowerprotection,disclosureprocedureandotherrelatedissues.15Accordingtothelaw,disclosuremaybemadeinwriting,orally,electronically,bytelephone,fax,throughthewebsiteadministeredbytheCivilServiceBureauorothermeans.At
5LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,Article16LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,Article37LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,Article38LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,Article59LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,Article5210LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,Article1011LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,Article1112LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,Article1313LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,Article1314LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,ChapterIV15LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,ChapterV
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thesametime,disclosurecanbeanonymous.Ifawhistleblowerdoesnotexpressinwritinghis/herconsenttoreleasehis/heridentity,thebodyinchargeofthereviewofwhistleblower'sapplicationsshallnotdisclosethewhistleblower'sidentity.16Article204ofthelawdeterminestheguaranteesofwhistleblowerprotection.Forexample,itprohibitstheintimidationofawhistleblowerorhis/herrelatives.
However,thislawdoesnotapplytotheMinistryofDefense,MinistryofInternalAffairsandtheStateSecurityService.Whistleblowerprotectionissupposedtoberegulatedthroughaspeciallegislationinthesepublicagencies.17
TheLawonCivilServiceTheLawonCivilServiceestablishesthelegalbasisfortheorganizationofcivilserviceinGeorgia,regulatesrelationsrelatedtotheperformanceofcivilserviceanddeterminesthelegalstatusofpublicemployees.Thelawdistinguishesbetweenthefollowingcivilservanttypes:astate-politicalofficial,anofficial,amemberofthesupportstaff,apart-timeemployee.
TheLawonCivilServiceestablishesthecriteriaunderwhichapersonwillnotbeacceptedintocivilservice.18Thelawalsodistinguishesbetweenpoliticalpartyactivitiesandpublicservice,andprohibitscivilservantsfromusingtheirofficialpositionforpoliticalpartyactivities.19Thelawsetsrestrictionsonofficialsupervision.Forexample,acivilservantisnotallowedtosuperviseanorganizationwherehis/herfamilymembersholdmanagerialpositions.20Civilservantsarealsonotallowedtoparticipateinentrepreneurialactivities,andonlyhavetherighttoholdsharesorownershipstakes.21Inaddition,civilservantsmaynotreceiveprofitfromorganizationswhosesupervisionispartoftheirofficialduties.
Thelawintroducestheconceptofincompatibilityofofficeandplacescertainrestrictionsforcivilservantsonconcurrentlyperformingotherpaidwork.22
Adismissedcivilservantmaynotstartworkingforapublicinstitutionthathe/shesupervisedduringthepastthreeyears.Inaddition,forthreeyearshe/shealsomaynotreceiveincomefromsuchinstitutionorenterprise.23
Stateemployeesarenotallowedtomaketransactionswithpoliticalparties,theirbusinessentities,aswellaswithfamilymembersandrelatives.24
16LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,Article20417LawofGeorgiaonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,Article201118LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article1719LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article6120LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article6221LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article6322LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article6423LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article6524LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article66
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Article73oftheLawonCivilServicedefinesthegeneralrulesofconduct,theirpurposeandscope,andimposescertainrestrictionsandobligationsoncivilservants.25Thisarticlealsoestablishesgeneralrulesofconductforpreventingconflictofinterestandcorruptionincivilservice.26
Article734,Paragraph4ofthelawdefinestheconceptof‘apersonrelated’toacivilservant,whichmayinclude‘afamilymember’and‘acloserelative’undertheLawonConflictsofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,aswellasanyotherpersonwithwhomthepublicemployeemaintainsacommonhousehold,i.e.aspecialrelationshipthatmayaffectconditionsoreconomicoutcomesoftheiractivity.Paragraph3ofthesamearticleobligatesapublicservanttoprovideinformationtorelevantauthoritiesabout‘relatedpersons’employedatthesamepublicagencywithinonemonthafterjoiningcivilservice,andlaterbyFebruary1ofeachsubsequentcalendaryear.27
Inordertopreventcorruptionoffenses,Article735,Paragraph2ofthelawobligatescivilservantstoinformtherelevantdepartmentofthepublicagencyaboutreceivingagift.28Ifapublicservantisofferedanunduebenefit,he/shemustnotifyhis/herimmediatesuperiorinwritingoftheattemptedofferwithinthreeworkingdays.29
Articles78and79ofthelawregulatedisciplinaryviolationsandrelatedsanctions.Thelatterinclude:30
• Reproval• Warning• Deductionofnomorethantenworkingdays'salary• Suspensionfromworkwithoutpay–fornomorethantenworkingdays• Transfertoalowersalarygrade–fornomorethanoneyear• DismissalonthebasisofthisLaw.31
TheCriminalCodeTheCriminalCodeofGeorgiaprovidesforresponsibilityofdifferentseverityforcorruptionorcorruption-relatedcrimes.Accordingtothislaw,thefollowingoffensesarecriminallypunishable:votebuying32;unlawfulappropriationorembezzlementofanotherperson'spropertyorpropertyrightsthroughuseofone’sofficialposition33;crimesagainsttheinterestsofserviceinentrepreneurialorotherorganizations,suchasabuseofpower34andcommercialbribery35;officialmisconduct,specifically,abuseofofficialpowers36,exceedingofofficialpowers37,illegal
25LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article731,Article73226LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article734,Article73527LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article734,Paragraph428LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article735,Paragraph229LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article735,Paragraph3,Subparagraphf)30LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article7931LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article7932TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,Article164133TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,Article18234TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,Article22035TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,Article22136TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,Article33237TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,Article333
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participationinentrepreneurialactivities38,bribe-taking39,bribe-giving40,tradeininfluence41,acceptinggiftsprohibitedbylaw42,andforgerybyanofficial43.
LawonLobbyingActivitiesGeorgianlawdefineslobbyingasanyinfluencenotprohibitedbylawofapersonregisteredasalobbyistonarepresentativeoranexecutivebodyforthepurposeofachievinglegislativechange.44AnycapablecitizenofGeorgiamayregisterasalobbyist,withsomeexceptions,includingwhenthecitizen’sworkpositionisincompatiblewithconductinglobbyingactivitiesorwhenacitizenhasbeenconvictedforacrimeagainstthestateorofficialmisconduct.45
Afterregistration,lobbyistsaregrantedtherighttoenterandfreelymoveinsidethebuildingsofadministrativebodies,totakepartindiscussionsofdraftnormativeacts,topresenttheircommentsinwriting,torequestinformationfromapublicagencyforthepurposeofcarryingouttheiractivities,andtomeetwithamemberoftherepresentativebody.46Atthesametime,lobbyistsareobligatedtofileactivityreportsbetweenthefirstandtenthdaysofeachmonthaftertheirregistration,andnolaterthan10daysafterterminationoftheirlobbyiststatus.47
LawonNationalRegulatoryAuthoritiesTheLawonNationalRegulatoryAuthoritiesensurestheindependenceofnationalregulatorycommissionsfrompoliticalpressure,fromimproperinfluenceandillegalinterferenceofStateAuthoritiesorotherpersons,andfromanyactsthatmayinfringeontheirindependenceandactivities.
Thelawalsoregulatesthenormsofethicsandconflictofinterestissuesofthemembersofthenationalregulatorycommissions.48Accordingtothelaw,commissionmembersmustsuspendtheirpoliticalpartymembershipforthewholeperiodoftheiractivityascommissionmembers.Inaddition,commissionmembers,membersoftheirfamilyandemployeesofregulatorybodyadministrationdonothavetherighttohaveanydirectorindirecteconomicinterestsinrespecttoalicenseholder,ortoholdanyofficeinalicenseholdingenterprise.Finally,commissionmembersandmembersoftheadministrativestaffarenotallowedtoreceivegiftsfrompersonsororganizationsthataresubjecttothesphereofauthorityoftherelevantregulatoryauthority.
38TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,Article33739TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,Article33840TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,Article33941TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,Article339142TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,Article34043TheCriminalCodeofGeorgia,Article34144LawofGeorgiaonLobbyingActivities,Article245LawofGeorgiaonLobbyingActivities,Article646LawofGeorgiaonLobbyingActivities,Articles10and1147LawofGeorgiaonLobbyingActivities,Article1348LawofGeorgiaonNationalRegulatoryAuthorities,Article15;see:http://goo.gl/64WgKT
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IV.ImplementationofAnti-CorruptionLegislationinPractice
LawonCivilServiceOfthe19publicagencies(ministries)reviewedwithinthescopeofthisresearch,15haveaninternalstructuralunit(department)thatisresponsiblefordetecting,investigatingandsanctioningtheviolationsoftheLawonCublicService.(twooftheremainingfouragenciesdidnotrespondtoourrequesttoprovidetheinformation,whiletheothertwoarenotrequiredbylawtohavesuchaunit).
Inmostcases,thisstructuralunitisthepublicagency'sInternalAuditDepartment;however,inrarecases,theresponsibilityisentrustedtotheGeneralInspectorateorisdistributedamongseveraldepartments.
Accordingtotheinformationreceived,casesofviolationoftheLawonCivilServicein2010-2015weredetectedinonlythreeministries:25casesintheMinistryofForeignAffairs,36casesintheMinistryofHealth,andfourcasesintheMinistryofEnvironmentProtection.
ViolationsdetectedbythedepartmentsoftheaboveministrieswereassociatedwiththefollowingarticlesoftheLawonCivilService:Article52(obligationtoperformofficialdutiesandtoobservelegalacts)–35cases;Article66(restrictiononconclusionofdeals)–1case;andArticle732(generalrulesofconduct)–5cases.
16outof19examinedministriesprovideduswithinformationaboutthenumberofstatementssubmittedbypublicservantsabouttheir‘relatedpersons’.14ofthese16ministrieseitherreportedhavingreceivednostatementsrelatedtoArticle734,Paragraph3oftheLawonCivilService,ordidnotincludethisinformationintheirresponseletters.Statementsonrelatedpersonsweresubmittedinonlytwoministries:422statementsintheMinistryofForeignAffairsand2intheMinistryofRegionalDevelopmentandInfrastructure.
15ministriesprovideduswithinformationaboutthestatementssubmittedbycivilservantsongiftsandservicesofferedtothem(Article735,Paragraph2oftheLawonCivilService).Oneministryreportedthatithadnotconductedsuchaninvestigation.Theinternalauditdepartmentofanotherministrydoesnothaveinformationonthematter.Meanwhile,12ministriesreportedreceivingnostatementsunderthisarticle.OnlytheMinistryofEducationreportedhavingreceivedonesuchstatementin2010-2015.
Also,14ministriesprovideduswithinformationaboutthestatementssubmittedbypublicservantsregardingunduebenefitsofferedtothem(Article735,Paragraph3,Subparagraphf)oftheLawonCivilService),while11ministriesreportedhavingreceivednosuchstatements.TheMinistryofPrisonshadnotconductedsuchaninvestigation,whiletheinternalauditdepartmentoftheMinistryofEnvironmentProtectiondoesnothaveinformationonthematter.OnlytheMinistryofEconomyreportedhavingreceivedonesuchstatementin2010-2015.
AsfordisciplinarysanctionsoutlinedinArticle79oftheLawonCivilService,onlyoneoutof19ministries(OfficeoftheStateMinisteronEuropeanandEuro-AtlanticIntegration)hadnotusedonlyin2010-2015.
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StatisticsrelatedtotheLawonCivilService
Responsibledepartment Statisticsonviolationsofthe
law
Numberofsubmittedstatementson‘relatedpersons’
(Article734,Paragraph3)
Numberofsubmittedstatementsongiftsorbenefits
(Article735,Paragraph2)
Numberofsubmittedstatementsonthe
attemptstooffergifts(Article735,Paragraph3,Subparagraph
f))
Statisticsontheuse
ofdisciplinarysanctionsin2010-2015
(Article79)
MinistryofForeignAffairs
InternalAuditDepartment
25 422 0 0 46
MinistryofEnergy
InternalAuditDepartment
0 0 0 0 6
MinistryofEconomy
HumanResourcesDivisionoftheHumanResourcesManagementandAdministrationDepartment
0 0 0 1 28
MinistryofHealth
InternalAuditDepartment
1caseofviolationofArticles66and732in2015.AllotherviolationswereofArticle52,Paragraph1.
0 - - 36
MinistryofRefugees
InternalAuditDepartment;DepartmentofHumanResourcesManagementandDevelopment
0 0 0 0 105
MinistryofEducation
InternalAuditDepartment;andtheDepartmentofHumanResourcesManagement
- - 1 - 7
MinistryofAgriculture
InternalAuditDepartment
0 0 0 0 19
MinistryofRegionalDevelopmentandInfrastructure
AdministrativeDepartment(atthecompetitionstage).InternalAuditDepartment(detectionandresponse)
- 2 0 0 16
MinistryofFinance
InternalAuditDepartment
0 0 - - 6
MinistryofCulture
InternalAuditandMonitoringDepartment
0 - 0 0 51
MinistryofSport
Sharedbyseveraldepartmnets
0 0 0 0 16
MinistryofDefense
GeneralInspectorate 0 0 0 0 42
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MinistryofJustice
- - - - - -
MinistryofInternalAffairs
- - - - - -
MinistryofPrisons
GeneralInspection 0 0 0 0 532
MinistryofEnvironmentProtection
InspectionDivisionoftheInternalAuditDepartment
4 0 0 0 61
OfficeoftheStateMinisterofEuropeanandEuro-AtlanticIntegration
AdministrativeDepartment
0 0 0 0 0
OfficeoftheStateMinisterofReconciliationandCivicEquality
AdministrativeDepartment
0 0 0 0 1
OfficeoftheStateMinisterofDiaspora
Notobligatedbylawtohavesuchadepartment
0
0 0 0 9
ApartfromreceivingstatisticsfromministriesonviolationsoftheLawonCivilService,wealsoidentifiedseveralcasesthroughdeskresearchthathelpillustratetheproblemsofpracticalimplementationoftheabovelaw.Thesecasessuggestthatthe‘revolvingdoor’regulationsandtheirenforcementarestillveryweakand,inmanycases,ineffectiveintermsofpreventingcorruptionrisks.
The‘revolvingdoor’phenomenon,orthekindofmovementofofficialsbetweenthepublicandtheprivatesectorsorbetweensupervisorandsupervisedagenciesthatgivesrisetotherisksofconflictsofinterestorcorruption,isregulatedbyArticle65(restrictiononentryonduty)oftheLawonCivilService.
“Article65-RestrictionofEmployment:
Foraperiodofthreeyearsafterleavingpublicservice,acivilservantmaynotstartworkingataninstitutionorenterprisewhichwasunderhis/hersystematicofficialsupervisionduringtheprecedingthreeyears.Inaddition,he/shemaynotreceiveincomefromsuchinstitutionorenterpriseduringthisperiod.”
OurresearchrevealedsignificantproblemswiththeLawonCivilService.Firstly,thelawdoesnotspecifythepublicagencyresponsiblefordeterminingwhichcaseofmovementofpublicservantsbetweenthepublicandprivatesectorsconstitutesaviolation.Itisalsounclearwhattheresponsemechanismisforcaseswhenaperson’srelocationfromthepublictotheprivatesectorhasbeenidentifiedasaviolationofArticle65.
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Inrecentyears,non-governmentalorganizationsandmediarepresentativeshaveidentifiedanumberofpossibleviolationsofthisarticle.Forexample:
• MiningcompanyRMGwasandperhapsisstillheadedbypersons,whowerepreviouslyemployedinpublicserviceandwereresponsibleforgrantinglicensestothiscompanyandoverseeingitscompliancewithlicenseconditions.ThesepersonsareZurabKutelia(formerheadoftheMineralResourceProtectionandMiningDepartmentoftheMinistryofEnvironmentProtection,andchairmanoftheMinistry’sInteragencyCouncilofExpertsonMineralResourceLicensesuntil2004)andSolomonTsabadze(headoftheDepartmentofEnvironmentalPermitsandStateEnvironmentalAssessmentattheMinistryofEnvironmentProtectionuntil2003).49
• DarialiEnergyLtdDirectorZurabAlavidzeheldthepositionofdeputyministerofeconomyin2009-2010.TheMinistryofEconomyissuespermitsfortheconstructionofmediumandlargehydropowerplantsandisresponsibleforoverseeingtheircompliancewithpermitconditions.50
• Thefollowingpersonsheldhigh-rankinggovernmentpositionsbeforebecomingaffiliatedwithacompanysetuptoallowhuntingofanimalsincludedintheRedListofEndangeredSpecies:SabaKiknadze(formerchairmanoftheTourismandResortsDepartmentoftheMinistryofEconomy)andDatunaRakviashvili(formerdeputystateministerofreintegration,laterdeputyambassadorofGeorgiatotheUnitedStates).51
• “ThemostnoteworthyexampleisZviadCheishvili’s“movement”betweenthelargestcompanyinvolvedintimberbusinessandtoppositionsregulatingthisveryfield(headoftheDepartmentofLicensesandPermits;headoftheForestryDepartment;deputyministerofenvironmentprotection;deputyministerofeconomyandsustainabledevelopment.)”52
Themechanismforrespondingtoviolationsidentifiedduringthemovementofcivilservantsbetweensupervisorandsupervisedpublicagenciesisalsoproblematic.Ifacivilservantappliestoworkatapublicagencythattheyhadsupervisedduringtheirserviceinthepublicsectorovertheprecedingthreeyears,therecipientpublicagencymustrefusethememploymentonthebasisofArticle65.However,itisunclearwhattheresponsemechanismiswhentherecipientpublicagencyviolatesthisnorm,asitwaslikelythecasewiththeGeorgianPublicBroadcaster(GPB),whenKakhaberSonishviliwasappointedasitsDeputyFinancialDirector.
AccordingtoinformationreceivedfromtheStateAuditOffice(SAO),fromMay6,2010toSeptember20,2012,KakhaberSonishviliworkedasthesupervisingauditorattheEconomicActivitiesAuditDepartmentoftheSAO.AccordingtotheSAO,Sonishviliwasinvolvedincompliance
49NaturalResourceManagementandFactorsConducivetoEliteCorruption,GreenAlternative,2015(revisededition),see:http://goo.gl/xNB9mt50NaturalResourceManagementandFactorsConducivetoEliteCorruption,GreenAlternative,2015(revisededition),see:http://goo.gl/xNB9mt51NaturalResourceManagementandFactorsConducivetoEliteCorruption,GreenAlternative,2015(revisededition),see:http://goo.gl/xNB9mt52NaturalResourceManagementandFactorsConducivetoEliteCorruption,GreenAlternative,2015(revisededition),see:http://goo.gl/xNB9mt
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auditsofthemeasuresagainstpollutionoftheBlackSeaandtheactivitiesoftheLEPLGeorgianPublicBroadcaster.
AccordingtotheLawonStateAuditOffice,complianceauditinvolvesexamination,evaluationandreportingonthereasonabilityandlegalityoftheauditee'sactivities.Article24ofthesamelawstatesthattheSAOisentitledtodeveloprecommendationsbasedonauditfindingsandsubmittheauditreportandrecommendationstotheauditee.TheSAOmustbenotifiedonthemeasuresundertakeninfollowuponitsrecommendationswithintheperiodof1month,unlessanothertimeframehasbeensetbytheSAO.Inotherwords,bytakingpartinthecomplianceauditofLEPLGeorgianPublicBroadcasterKakhaberSonishvilihadconductedofficialsupervisionoverit.Therefore,hisrelocationtotheGPBasitsDeputyFinancialDirectorinMarch2013isaclearexampleofa‘revolvingdoor’andconstitutesaviolationofArticle65oftheLawonCivilService.
TheGPBhasnotrespondedinanywaytothediscoveryofthispossiblelegalviolationbyTransparencyInternationalGeorgia,whichservesasanillustrationoftheabove-mentionedlegalshortcoming.
Finally,thecurrentwordingoftheLawonCivilServicesuggeststhattherestrictionssetbyArticle65donotapplytolocalgovernmentemployees,whichisalsoaproblem.Accordingtothelaw,Article65appliestostateemployees,whichisdefinedbyArticle4,Paragraph2ofthesamelawas“anemployeewhohasworkingrelationswiththestate”,“whileapersonwhohaslaborrelationswithalocalgovernmentunitisalocalgovernmentemployee”.
ThefollowingcasediscoveredbyTransparencyInternationalGeorgiaillustratestheneedtoextendthelawtolocalgovernmentemployees:
• “AnothercaseofnoticeinvolvesLashaPurtskhvanidze,formerdeputymayorofTbilisiandheadoftheOldTbilisiDistrictAdministration.AfterresigningfromtheCityHallin2009,PurtskhvanidzeandhisformerdeputyKobaKharshiladzeeachacquireda50percentshareinGreenserviceLtd.atatokenpriceofGEL200inNovember2010.Bythen,GreenservicewasalreadyamajorrecipientofpublicfundsthroughprocurementandhadbeencontractedbytheCityHalltoimplementanumberofprojectsinthecity(includingthoseimplementedduringPurtskhvanidze’sandKharshiladze’stimeintheoffice).AllegationsweremadethatPurtskhvanidzewasthebeneficialownerofthecompanywhileholdingofficeintheCityHall.AftertheformalacquisitionbythesetwoformerCityHallofficials,GreenservicecontinuedtowinpublictendersandreceivedatleastGEL4millioningovernmentcontractsin2010-2012.InApril2012,TIGeorgiareportedthattheCityHallhadpurchasedtreesfromGreenserviceatasuspiciouslyhighprice.Whenthestorywaspickedupbythemedia,thecitymayorcalledapressconference,accusedGreenserviceofcheating,andannouncedthattheCityHallwouldcancelallofitscontractswiththecompany.Whilethecityauthoritiesdid,indeed,stopworkingwithGreenservice,theycontinuedtocontractGreenservicePlus,acompanywhichisalsoownedbyPurtskhvanidze
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andKharshiladze,andhasthesamelegaladdressasGreenservice.ThecompanyreceivedoverGEL0.5millionfromtheCityHallinthefirstthreemonthsof2013alone.”53
Theaboveproblemspointtotheneedtoimproveandbetterenforcetheanti-corruptionregulationssetbytheLawonCivilService.
ThelawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServiceOfthe19ministriesexaminedwithinthescopeofthisresearch,15haveadepartmentwhichisresponsiblefordetecting,investigatingandsanctioningviolationsoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService.SimilartotheLawonCivilService,thisfunctionismostoftenperformedbytheministries’InternalAuditDepartments;however,insomecases,theresponsibilityisassignedtotheGeneralInspectorateorisdistributedamongseveraldepartments.Forexample,theMinistryofSportdoesnothaveadepartmentsolelyresponsiblefordetecting,investigatingandsanctioningthecasesofconflictofinterestandcorruption.However,theMinistryrespondedthat,whennecessary,otherdepartments,suchastheInternalAuditandMonitoringDepartmentandtheResourceManagementDivisionoftheAdministrativeDepartment,mayperformpartofthisresponsibilitywithinthelimitsoftheirmandate.
TheOfficesofStateMinistersrespondedthattheydonothavethelegalobligationtosetupdepartmentsresponsibleforinvestigatingcasesofconflictofinterestandcorruption.However,incaseoftheOfficeoftheStateMinisterofEuro-AtlanticIntegrationandtheOfficeoftheStateMinisterofReconciliationthisfunctionisperformedbytheAdministrativeDepartments.TheOfficeoftheStateMinisterofDiasporadoesnothaveadepartmentwiththisresponsibility.
Accordingtoinformationreceivedfromthese19ministries,noviolationsoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServicehavebeendetectedin2010-2015,withtheexceptionoftheMinistryofRegionalDevelopmentandInfrastructure,wherepublicservantsdidreportconflictofinterest;howeverthiswasdoneinaccordancewiththelawand,therefore,didnotconstituteaviolation.Forexample,in2013,acouncilmemberattheMinistryreportedhavingapersonalinterestinthedecisionofthecollegialbody,andrefusedtoparticipateinthedecision-making.In2015,amemberoftheStaffSelectionCommissionattheMinistrydeclaredself-recusalonthebasisofhavingapersonalinterestandrefusedtotakepartinevaluatingajobcandidate.
MinistriesthatdonothavedepartmentsresponsiblefordetectingviolationsoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServiceareunawareofpossibleviolations.Theseministriesrespondedtoourrequestsbysayingthattheydidnothaveanycasesofconflictofinterest.Forexample,aresponsefromtheMinistryofSportread:“thereisnoseparatedepartmentofthiskindandtheMinistryhasnostatisticsontheviolationsoftheaforementionedArticlesoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServicein2010-2015.”
AsimilarresponsewasprovidedbytheOfficeoftheStateMinisterofDiaspora:“theOfficeoftheStateMinisterdoesnothaveadepartmentresponsibleforinvestigatingthecompliancewithandrespondingtoviolationsoftheprovisionsoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublic
53BusinessmeninPoliticsandPoliticiansinBusiness:ProblemofRevolvingDoorinGeorgia,TransparencyInternationalGeorgia,2013,http://goo.gl/6xlO5z
16
Service.Therefore,noviolationsoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServicehavebeenidentifiedintheOfficeoftheStateMinisterin2010-2015.”
Responsesofthiskindsuggestthatthelawisnoteffectivelyenforcedinthesepublicagencies.
TheremainingministriesrespondedthatthedepartmentsresponsibleformonitoringthecompliancewiththelegalprovisionsoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptionhaveeitherfoundnoviolationsofthelaworthisinformationisavailableelsewhere.
StatisticsontheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService
Existenceofaresponsibledepartment
Statisticsontheviolationofthelaw
Numberofsubmittedself-
recusalstatements(Article11,Paragraph2)
Numberofcasesof
incompatibilityofduties(Article13)detected
Numberofcorruptionoffensesdetected
Numberofemployeesdismissedonthebasisofcorruptionoffenses
MinistryofForeignAffairs
InternalAuditDepartment
0 - - 0 0
MinistryofEnergy
InternalAuditDepartment
0 0 0 0 0
MinistryofEconomy
InternalAuditDepartment
0 - 0 0 0
MinistryofHealth
InternalAuditDepartment
0 0 0 0 0
MinistryofRefugees
InternalAuditDepartment;DivisionofHumanResourcesManagementandDevelopment
0 0 0 0 0
MinistryofEducation
InternalAuditDepartment
0 0 - - -
MinistryofAgriculture
InternalAuditDepartment
0 0 0 0 0
MinistryofRegionalDevelopmentandInfrastructure
InternalAuditDepartment
0 2 0 0 0
MinistryofFinance
InternalAuditDepartment
0 - - 0 0
MinistryofCulture
InternalAuditandMonitoringDepartment
0 0 0 0 0
MinistryofSport
Nodesignateddepartment,however,ifneeded,severaldepartmentscanconductmonitoring.
0 0 0 0 0
17
MinistryofDefense
GeneralInspection 0 0 0 0 0
MinistryofJustice
- - - - - -
MinistryofInternalAffairs
- - - - - -
MinistryofPrisons
GeneralInspection 0 0 0 0 0
MinistryofEnvironmentProtection
InspectionDivisionoftheInternalAuditDepartment
0 0 0 0 0
OfficeoftheStateMinisterofEuropeanandEuro-AtlanticIntegration
AdministrativeDepartment
0 0 0 0 0
OfficeoftheStateMinisterofReconciliationandCivicEquality
AdministrativeDepartment
0 0 0 0 0
OfficeoftheStateMinisterofDiaspora
Doesnotexist 0 0 0 0
0
EventhoughtheexaminedministriesreportedhavingdetectednoviolationsoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,violationsofvariousprovisionsofthislawhavebeenidentifiedbynon-governmentalorganizationsandthemediaatalllevelsofgovernment,aswellasintheexecutiveandthelegislativebranchesandinthelocalgovernmentbodies.Forexample:
• AsofMay5,2015,theGovernorofImeretiregionwasalsoadirectorofacompanyheheldsharesin,whichisaclearviolationoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService.54
• Forseveralyears,MariamValishvili,DeputyMinisterofEnergysince2008,wasalsothedirectorofTOTEnergy(oneofthecompanieswhereEnergyMinisterKakhaKaladzehadastake),inviolationofArticle13,Paragraph4oftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,accordingtowhich,“apublicservantmaynotholdapositioninanyenterprise”.55
54Georgia'sGovernors:BiographiesandAssets,TransparencyInternationalGeorgia,2015,http://goo.gl/sgr0eG55BusinessmeninPoliticsandPoliticiansinBusiness:ProblemofRevolvingDoorinGeorgia,TransparencyInternationalGeorgia,2013,http://goo.gl/6xlO5z
18
• ChairmanofPotiCityCouncilAleksandreTopuriafiledhisassetdeclarationonDecember2,2014,withoutfullyincludingthebusinesssharesheldbyhisfamilymembersinthedocument.Specifically,asofJune2015,hiswifeEteriTopuriaheld100%sharesintwocompaniesand50%inonecompany.56
• AsofApril2015,DeputyMayorofBatumialsoheld100%sharesofElit-FloraLtd.Inaddition,theDeputyMayordidnotdeclarehissharesintwocompanies.Therefore,hisassetdeclarationdoesnotincludeinformationabouttheincomereceivedfromthesecompanies.57SimilarviolationswereidentifiedinrelationtotheChairpersonandseveralMembersofBatumiCityCouncil.58
TheseexamplesillustratethattheviolationsoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServicearenotuncommon,whilethedetectionandpreventionmechanismsareweak.
Theresponsetoviolationsisalsolargelyineffective.Forexample,afterTransparencyInternationalGeorgiainformedtheAnti-CorruptionAgencyoftheMinistryofInternalAffairsaboutanincompleteassetdeclarationfiledbyagovernor,thelawenforcementagencyrespondedbysayingthatArticle355oftheCriminalCode(entryofincompleteorincorrectinformationinanassetdeclaration)hadnotbeenviolated.Itisunclearhowlawenforcementagenciesdeterminewhetherinaccurateorincompleteinformationwasincludedinanassetdeclarationintentionally.ThefactthattheAnti-CorruptionAgencyoftheMinistryofInternalAffairsdidnotlaunchaninvestigationunderArticle355oftheCriminalCodepointstotheweaknessofresponsemechanismsandalackofpoliticalwill.59
Thefactthattheresponsemechanismsareeitherweakornon-existent,eventhoughviolationsofthelawarecommon,isundoubtedlyoneofthemainproblemsofanti-corruptionpolicy.
Thestudyalsorevealedthatalargemajorityofministrieshavenotdevelopedinternalmechanismsofdisclosure(forwhistleblowers)andinsteadfollowthegeneralrulesestablishedbytheLawonConflictofInterestsandCorruptioninPublicService.Onlyafewministrieshaveissuedclarificationsonthemechanismsandproceduresofdisclosure.Forexample,provisionsrelatedtodisclosureareincludedintheEmployeeHandbookthatwasapprovedbytheMinisterofEconomy(OrderN1-1/130,April28,2014);AccordingtoMinistryofFinance,itsInternalAuditDepartmentrunsanelectronicmailbox([email protected])andahotline(226-22-22)thatcanbeusedtodiscloseofficialmisconduct.TheinformationgatheredthiswayisthenpublishedontheMinistrywebsiteandinsideitsadministrativebuilding.TheMinistryalsostatedthatnootherinternalmechanismofdisclosurehadbeendevelopedandnoseparatelegalactshadbeenapproved.TheMinistryofFinanceexplainedthattheadministrativewebsiteoftheLEPLCivilServiceBureauwouldserveasa
56CommercialActivitiesofPublicOfficialsinSamegreloMunicipalitiesandtheirFamilyMembers,TransparencyInternationalGeorgia,2015,http://goo.gl/m9zqC657CommercialActivitiesofBatumiCityHallOfficials,TransparencyInternationalGeorgia,2015,http://goo.gl/mT9W1k58CommercialActivitiesofBatumiCityCouncilMembers,TransparencyInternationalGeorgia,2015,http://goo.gl/E1PHAh59TheAnti-CorruptionAgencyoftheMIAdoesnotrespondeffectivelytoallegedviolationsinassetdeclarationsofpublicofficials,TransparencyInternationalGeorgia,2015,http://goo.gl/thMC8A
19
technicalmechanismofdisclosurebyallowingwhistleblowerstodisclosemisconductandbymakingthisinformationelectronicallyavailabletotheappropriateauthorities.
TheMinistryofEnvironmentProtectionreliesonthestatuteofitsInternalAuditDepartmentwhendealingwithwhistleblowing.AccordingtotheMinistry,theInspectionDivisionoftheInternalAuditDepartmentinvestigatescasesofofficialmisconductbytheMinistrystaffonthebasisofreceivedstatements,complaints,notifications,orotherinformation.AwhistleblowerapplicationmaybereceivedbyanemployeeoftheMinistry,aswellasaformeremployeeorathirdperson.ThefactthatpublicagenciesarenotrequiredbylawtodevelopclearinternalmechanismsofdisclosureisamajorshortcomingofthecurrentGeorgianlegislationonwhistleblowerprotection.Theexistenceofclearandsimpleinternaldisclosureproceduresthatpublicagencyemployeesarefamiliarwithisanimportantcomponentofbestpracticeonwhistleblowerprotection.60
Only3ofthe19examinedministriesreportedhavinghadcasesofdisclosurein2010-2015.TheMinistryofForeignAffairsreported1suchcase.TheMinistryofRegionalDevelopmentandInfrastructurereportedhaving1disclosurecasein2011,2in2012,1in2013and2in2015.AccordingtotheMinistryofEnvironmentProtection,317ofthereportsproducedbyitsInternalAuditDepartmentresultedfromtheinquirieslaunchedonthebasisofstatementsfiledbycurrentandformeremployees:151fromMay4,2013toDecember31,2013;154in2014,and12in2015(todate).TheMinistryexplainedthatitsInternalAuditDepartmentdidnothavetheneedtousethewhistleblowerprotectionlegislationforanyofthereceivedwhistleblowerapplications.Accordingtothereceivedinformation,noneoftheministrieshadusedthewhistleblowerprotectionlegislationsinceitsadoptionin2009.
StatisticsontheWhistleblowerProtectionportionoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService
Existenceofaninternaldisclosuremechanism
Numberofwhistleblowingcases
Numberoftimesthelegislationonwhistleblower
protectionwasused
Numberoftrainings/informationmeetingson
whistleblowerprotection
Numberofviolationsof
Articles203,204and205detected
MinistryofForeignAffairs
- 1 - 2 -
MinistryofEnergy
- 0 0 0 0
MinistryofEconomy
EmployeeHandbook(Minister’sOrder)
0 0 2 0
MinistryofHealth - 0 0 1 0
MinistryofRefugees
- 0 0 2 0
MinistryofEducation
- - 0 1 -
MinistryofAgriculture
- - - 2 -
60http://www.transparency.ge/sites/default/files/post_attachments/whistleblower_protection_and_georgia_-_policy_brief_july_2015.pdf
20
MinistryofRegionalDevelopmentandInfrastructure
- 6 0 3 3
MinistryofFinance
E-mailboxandhotline 0 0 - -
MinistryofCulture
- - - 1 -
MinistryofSport - 0 0 1 -
MinistryofDefense
- 0 0 0 0
MinistryofJustice
- - - - -
MinistryofInternalAffairs
- - - - -
MinistryofPrisons
- 0 0 0 0
MinistryofEnvironmentProtection
TheInspectionDivisionoftheInternalAuditDepartmentinvestigatescasesofofficialmisconductbytheMinistrystaffonthebasisofreceivedstatements,complaints,notifications,orotherinformation.ThestatementmaybereceivedbyanemployeeoftheMinistry,aswellasaformeremployeeorathirdperson.
317 0 1 0
OfficeoftheStateMinisterofEuropeanandEuro-AtlanticIntegration
- 0 0 0 0
OfficeoftheStateMinisterofReconciliationandCivicEquality
0 0 0 1 0
OfficeoftheStateMinisterofDiaspora
0 0
0 0 0
AccordingtoArticle2011oftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,issuesofdisclosurearetoberegulatedbyspeciallegislationfortheMinistryDefense,theMinistryofInternalAffairsandtheStateSecurityService.Inordertochecktheexistenceofthislegislation,TransparencyInternationalGeorgiarequestedpublicinformationfromtheParliamentaryCommitteeonDefenseandSecurity,theMinistryofDefense,theMinistryofInternalAffairsandtheStateSecurityService.
21
TheParliamentaryCommitteeonDefenseandSecuritystatedthatthequestionfelloutsideitsmandateandredirectedittotheMinistriesofDefenseandInternalAffairsandtheStateSecurityService.
TheStateSecurityServicedidnotrespondtothisrequest,asitdidwithallotherrequestswesentaspartofthisresearch.BothMinistries(DefenseandInternalAffairs)statedthattheyareworkingondevelopingthespeciallegislation,butdidnotprovideanyinformationonspecificdeadlines.
SeveralrecentwhistleblowingcasesdemonstratedthenecessityfortheMinistriesofDefenseandInternalAffairsandtheStateSecurityServicetodeveloptheirspeciallegislationonwhistleblowerprotection.Forexample,onSeptember27,2015,themediareportedonavideowhichGiorgiBabunashvili,aformerseniorlieutenantofthepolice,hadobtainedfromtheMinistryofInternalAffairs.ThevideorevealedpossibleviolationsinsidetheMinistry.Accordingtomediareports,theformerpoliceofficeriscurrentlyinEuropeandisseekingpoliticalasylum.Also,inMarch2015,theMinistryofInternalAffairsdismissedapoliceofficerRuslanBaziashvili,whohadprovidedinformationaboutpossibleviolationsintheMinistrytoaMemberofParliamentfromtheUnitedNationalMovement,GiviTargamadze.Moreover,theChiefProsecutor’sOfficelaunchedaninvestigationoverpossibleabuseofpoweragainstnineemployeesoftheMinistryofInternalAffairs.BothGiorgiBabunashviliandRuslanBaziashviliareformerpoliceofficerswhodisclosedinformationthatrevealedpossibleviolationsthatharmedpublicinterest.61Despitethis,andbecauseoftheabovementionedlegalshortcomings,thesepeoplecannotcurrentlyenjoyprotectionaswhistleblowers,whichobstructssuccessfulpreventioncorruptionandotheroffenses.
CivilServiceBureau TransparencyInternationalGeorgiarequestedinformationfromtheCivilServiceBureauoncasesofconflictofinterestidentifiedin2010-2015.AccordingtotheCivilServiceBureau,itdoesnothaveinformationonanyviolationsrelatedtoconflictbetweenapublicservant’spropertyorotherpersonalinterestandtheinterestofpublicservice,illegalpropertyandincompatibilityofduties.TheBureaualsodoesnothaveanyinformationoncasesofpublicservantsortheirfamilymembersreceivinggifts,thevalueofwhichexceedsthelimitsetbylaw.TheCivilServiceBureauprovidedTIGeorgiawithinformationontheviolationbypublicofficialsofdeadlinesforfilingassetdeclarationandinformationmeetingsonwhistleblowerprotectionorganizedin2009-2015.In2010-2015theBureauidentified39casesofpublicofficialsfailingtofiletheirassetdeclarationswithintwomonthsofappointment(Article14,Paragraph1),fivecasesofofficialsfailingtofileannualdeclarationsduringtheirservice(Article14,Paragraph2),and12casesofthemfailingtosubmitdeclarationswithintwomonthsofleavingtheirposition.
61GovernmentMustEnsureProtectionofWhistleblowersinInteriorandDefenseMinistries,TransparencyInternationalGeorgia,2015,http://goo.gl/h9M8UO
22
TheCivilServiceBureaureportedthatforeachoftheaboveviolations,theofficialswerefinedforGEL1,000throughindividualadministrative-legalacts.15oftheseactswerechallengedincourt,ofwhich:
A) 7claimswerefullygranted;B) 1claimwasnotgranted;C) 1claimwasleftunexamined;D) 1claimwasrecalledbytheplaintiff.E) 4claimsarecurrentlybeingconsideredbythecourt.
TheCivilServiceBureaualsoreportedthattherehasnotbeenasinglecaseofcriminalliabilityhavingbeenimposedonanofficialforafailuretofileanassetdeclarationaftertheinitialfine(Article20,Paragraph4).In2015,theCivilServiceBureauconductedthreetrainingsfortheemployeesofall19ministriesandtheirInternalAuditDepartmentsonthestrengtheningofwhistleblowerprotection.However,thesetrainingswerenotmentionedintheresponsesfromtheMinistriesofEnergy,Prisons,FinanceandDiaspora.Inaddition,theNationalAnti-CorruptionStrategyinvolvestrainingtworepresentativesofeachlocalgovernmentbodyontheissuesofethicsandwhistleblowerprotectionin2015.Inmanycases,attendancetothewhistleblowerprotectiontrainingswaslow,whichsuggeststhatthesetrainingswereprobablynotveryeffectiveinsupportingtheimplementationofthelegislationonwhistleblowerprotectioninthepublicsector.Therefore,inthefuture,itisnecessarytoincreasethenumberofparticipantsinthesemeetings.
GeorgianNationalEnergyandWaterSupplyRegulatoryCommission TransparencyInternationalGeorgiadecidedtodeterminewhethertheGeorgianNationalEnergyandWaterSupplyRegulatoryCommission(GNERC)hasadepartmentresponsibleforinvestigatingconflictofinterestofitsemployees.WealsoinquiredabouttheattemptsatimproperinfluenceorillegalinterferenceasdefinedbytheLawonNationalRegulatoryAuthorities,andrequestedinformationonviolationsofnormsofethicsdeterminedbyArticle15ofthislawin2010-2015.TheCommissionrespondedthatthelawdoesnotrequireittosetupadepartmentresponsibleforinvestigatingconflictofinterestsamongitsemployees.OnApril8,2003,GNERCapprovedResolutionN2ontheRulesofEthicalBehaviorofCommissionMembersandEmployees,Article4,Paragraph6ofwhichrequirescommissionmembersandemployeestodeclareself-recusalwhendealingwithcircumstancesdescribedinArticle92oftheGeneralAdministrativeCode(ineligibilitytoparticipateinadministrativeproceedings)orothercircumstancesthatmayaffecttheimpartialityoftheirwork.TheCommissionreportedthat,in2010-2015,therewerenocasesorattemptsofimproperinfluenceorillegalinterference,andnoviolationsofethicsnorms.Therefore,duringthesameperiod,noneofthedecisionsmadebytheGNERCwerebeenoverturnedduetoimproperinfluenceandillegalinterference.
23
DespitethisresponsefromtheCommission,non-governmentalorganizationshaveraisedquestionsaboutconflictofinterestwithinGNERC,specificallyinrelationtoitsformerchairmanGuramChalagashvili.Accordingtohisassetdeclaration,Chalagashvili’swifeworksatGeorgianWaterandPower,thecompanyoperatingTbilisi’swatersupplysystem,wheresheearnedatotalofGEL25,024in2012.Thisappearstobeaviolationofthelegalprovisionwhichprohibitsfamilymembersofindependentregulatorsfrominvolvementinprivatecompaniesoperatinginrespectivesectorsand,onceagain,pointstothepoormonitoringandenforcementofexistingrestrictions.62
GeorgianNationalCommunicationsCommissionTheGeorgianNationalCommunicationsCommission(GNCC)respondedthatitdoesnothaveadepartmenttaskedwithreviewingconflictofinterestamongitsemployees.ThisisbecauseGNCCmembers(5intotal)alreadyhavethestatusofpublicofficials,meaningthattheirconflictofinterestisexaminedbythePresident,theGovernmentandParliamentpriortotheirappointment,whileotheremployeesdonothavethesamestatus.Therefore,theCommissionhasneithertheneednortheobligationtoinvestigateconflictofinterestofitsemployees.Inaddition,accordingtotheCommission,ithasnotidentifiedanyviolationsoftheLawonNationalRegulatoryAuthorities.Consideringthiscontext,thecaseofformerGNCCchairmanIrakliChikovaniisworthmentioning.63Accordingtotheinformationobtainedbythemediaandnon-governmentalorganizations,aswellasareportpreparedbytheTemporaryParliamentaryInvestigativeCommission,IrakliChikovanihadaconflictofinterestduringhisserviceasmemberandchairmanofGNCC.Specifically,Chikovaniheld35%sharesintheMagiStiliMediacompany,whichwasmainlyinvolvedintelevisionadvertising.TheParliamentaryInvestigativeCommissionconcludedthat,whileperforminghisofficialduties,Chikovaniwasguidedbyhisbusinessinterestsratherthanthelaw.TheTemporaryParliamentaryInvestigativeCommissionalsoestablishedthatanotherformerGNCCChairmanKarloKvitaishvilihadaconflictofinterestaswell:Specifically,politicalincompatibility.FromAugust6,2005untilApril24,2013,KvitaishvilihadservedasarepresentativeoftheUnitedNationalMovementpoliticalpartyintheCentralElectionCommission.ThiswasconfirmedbytheUnitedNationalMovement.Basedonthisinformation,theInvestigativeCommissionconcludedthatduringhisserviceasamemberoftheGNCCKvitaishviliconcurrentlyrepresentedapoliticalpartyinanotherpublicagency.64TheInstituteforDevelopmentofFreedomofInformation(IDFI)alsoidentifiedsignsofnepotismintheGNCC.Accordingtotheorganization,GNCCveryrarelyannouncedvacanciespublicly.IDFI
62BusinessmeninPoliticsandPoliticiansinBusiness:ProblemofRevolvingDoorinGeorgia,TransparencyInternationalGeorgia,2013,http://goo.gl/6xlO5z63BusinessmeninPoliticsandPoliticiansinBusiness:ProblemofRevolvingDoorinGeorgia,TransparencyInternationalGeorgia,2013,http://goo.gl/6xlO5z64ReportoftheTemporaryParliamentaryInvestigativeCommissionontheActivitiesoftheGeorgianNationalCommunicationsCommission,ParliamentofGeorgia,reportingperiod:May1,2013-November1,2013,http://goo.gl/WUvvWU
24
believesthatthelegalamendmentsthatrecentlyintroducedarequirementforpublicagenciestoconductrecruitmentonlythroughpubliccompetitionhaveresultedintheGNCCalmostexclusivelyhiringsupernumeraryspecialists.TheproblemisthattheGNCCdoesnothavealimitonitssupernumerarystaff,meaningthat,theoretically,itcanhireunlimitednumberofemployeesthroughanontransparentprocess.IDFIfoundthat,in2012-2015,theGNCChadhired51newemployees,someofthembeingtherelativesofMPs.Forexample,brother-in-lawofMPAnaMirotadzeandson-in-lawofMPIrakliTripolskihadstartedworkingattheGNCCassupernumeraryspecialistsaftertheelections.TheappointmentofTamtaTepnadze,formeremployeeoftheParliamentaryCommitteeonEconomics,astheGNCCPublicDefenderalsoraisedquestions.ThecommissiontaskedwiththeselectingofthePublicDefenderwasheadedbyMPZurabTkemaladze,chairmanoftheParliamentaryCommitteeonEconomics,whosegrandchildTamtaTepnadzelaterhiredinherdepartmentattheGNCC,togetherwithherbridesmaidandthesonofMPDimitriKhundadze,chairmanoftheHealthandSocialIssuesCommittee.65SuchstaffingpolicygivestheimpressionthatGNCCisnotimmunetoexternalinfluenceandraisesquestionsaboutitsindependence.Thefactthat,inrecentyears,Parliament,mediaandnon-governmentalorganizationshaveidentifiedpossiblecasesofconflictofinterestandnepotismintheGeorgianNationalCommunicationsCommissionillustratesthattheexistingmechanismsandlegalframeworkcannoteffectivelypreventofconflictofinterest,corruptionandnepotism.
LobbyingActivitiesTransparencyInternationalGeorgiarequestedpublicinformationonregisteredlobbyistssince1999fromtheGovernmentAdministration,Parliament,andlocalgovernmentbodiesofKutaisi,BatumiandTbilisiAccordingtotheinformationreceivedfromParliament,therewereatotalof27casesoflobbyistregistrationin2003-2015,while7personsweredeniedregistration.Duringthisperiod,atotalof19personshaveexercisedtheirrighttoregisteraslobbyistsinParliament.TbilisiCityCouncilreportedthatonlyonepersonhadregisteredasalobbyistin2014,andthatnonehadbeenrefusedregistrationin2003-2015.TbilisiCityHallreportedthatitsdatabasedoesnotholdinformationaboutregisteredlobbyists.ThelocalgovernmentbodiesofBatumiandKutaisireportedhavinghadnocasesoflobbyistregistrationeither.TheaboveinformationshowsthatlobbyinginGeorgiaisnotawidespreadpractice.However,thisissuestillrequiresattentionsince,withoutappropriateregulationsandenforcement,itmaygiverisetoseriouscorruptionrisks,specificallyinrelationtotheso-called‘revolvingdoor’phenomenon.Forthepurposeofpreventingcorruptionrisks,theLawonLobbyingActivitiesdetermines‘workposition’asoneofthebasesfordenyinglobbyistregistration.Article6,Paragraph1,Subparagrapha)ofthelawstatesthat“alobbyistregistrationshallbedeniedif:a)acitizen’sworkpositionis
65SignsofNepotismintheGeorgianNationalCommunicationsCommission(GNCC),InstituteforDevelopmentofFreedomofInformation(IDFI),2015,https://goo.gl/f4PTny
25
incompatiblewithconductinglobbyingactivities”.66AccordingtoArticle65(restrictiononemployment)oftheLawonCivilService,“foraperiodofthreeyearsafterleavingcivilservice,acivilservantmaynotstartworkingataninstitutionorenterprisewhichwasunderhis/hersystematicofficialsupervisionfortheprecedingthreeyears.Inaddition,he/shemaynotreceiveincomefromsuchinstitutionorenterpriseduringthisperiod.67Duringlobbyistregistering,properattentionmustbegiventotheaboveregulationsandincasesof‘revolvingdoor’,thepersonmustbedeniedregistrationasalobbyist.
ParliamentaryCommitteeonProceduralIssuesandRules
TheProceduralIssuesandRulesCommitteeofParliamentisresponsibleforexaminingthecompatibilityofofficialandentrepreneurialactivitiesofMPswiththestatusofaMemberofParliamentandrespondingaccordingly.In2012-2015,theCommitteehadexaminedatotalof19casesofMPstakingincompatiblepositionsandineachcasehadrequestedtheParliamentBureautoterminatetheirmandatebeforetheendoftheirterm,towhichParliamenthadcomplied.TheCommitteestatedthatitsystematicallycontrolstheMPs'participationinentrepreneurialactivities,althoughitleftourquestionsonspecificproceduresandfrequencyofinspectionunanswered.TheCommitteereportedthat,in2012-2015,therewere69casesofMPsgivinguptheircompanysharesand10casesofthemleavingthepositionofcompanydirector.AccordingtotheCommittee,itrequeststheinformationabouttheMPs'assetdeclarationsperiodicallyandwherevernecessary,andanalyzesitonthebasisoftheParliamentaryRulesofProcedureandtheStatuteoftheCommittee.Nosuchrequestshavebeensentduringthereportingperiod.However,theCommitteedoesretrievetheMPs'assetdeclarationsfromtheCivilServiceBureauandexaminesthemforlimitedpurposes,suchasprovisionofaccommodationfortheMPsoranalysisoftheincompatibilityofentrepreneurialactivitieswiththeMPs'status.Forthispurpose,theCommitteehasexaminedtheassetdeclarationsofalmostallMPs.TheCommitteealsooverseesMPcompliancewiththeobligationssetbytheParliamentaryRulesofProcedure.However,itdoesnotkeeprecordofitsresponsestotheseviolations,becauseitismainlyinvolvedinpreventingsuchviolationsandoftenrespondstotheminwaysotherthaninwriting.DespitethefactthattheProceduralIssuesandRulesCommitteeofParliamentmonitorstheMPs'assetdeclarations,TIGeorgiaidentifiedseveralcaseswhereMPshadprovidedinaccurateand/orincompleteinformationintheirdeclarations.Forexample,asofJanuary27,2014,anumberofMPshadincludedincompleteinformationabouttheircurrentandpastbusinessactivitiesintheirassetdeclarations.68Also,asofDecember2014,anumberofSamegrelo-ZemoSvanetimajoritarianMPs
66LawofGeorgiaonLobbyingActivities,Article667LawofGeorgiaonCivilService,Article6568UndisclosedBusinessActivitiesofMembersofGeorgianParliament,TransparencyInternationalGeorgia,2014,http://goo.gl/ZqlL99
26
hadnotfullydeclaredtheirpropertyandbusinessactivities.69Casessuchastheseillustratethatcertainnormsoftheanti-corruptionlegislationarenotbeingimplementedeffectively.Inaddition,violationsthatarebeingdetectedareoftenleftunaddressedbytherelevantauthorities.
MinistryofInternalAffairsandChiefProsecutor’sOfficeTheMinistryofInternalAffairsreportedthat,since2010,ithaslaunchedinvestigationsonjustasinglecaseofacceptingagiftprohibitedbylaw(Article340oftheCriminalCode)andasinglecaseofillegalparticipationinentrepreneurialactivities(Article337).TheChiefProsecutor'sOffice,however,haslaunchedinvestigationsonsevencasesbasedonArticle340andninecasesbasedonArticle337inthesameperiod.ItshouldbenotedthattheinformationprovidedbytheMinistryofInternalAffairsandtheChiefProsecutor'sOfficeincludesviolationsdetectedinallpublicagenciesoperatinginGeorgiaandnotjusttheministriesexaminedaspartofthisresearch.TheMinistryofInternalAffairsalsoreportedthatitsAnti-CorruptionAgencyhadnotlaunchedanyinvestigationsonArticle355oftheCriminalCode,whichinvolvesfailuretosubmitanassetdeclarationorentryofincompleteorincorrectinformationtherein.
ArticleoftheCriminalCode Numberoflaunchedinvestigationsin2010-2015
Numberoflaunchedcriminalprosecutions2010-2015
1641(votebuying) - 11
182(unlawfulappropriationorembezzlementofanotherperson'spropertyorpropertyrightsthroughuseofone’sofficialposition)
1818 1533
192(illegalentrepreneurialactivities) 193 -
194(legalizationofillegalincome(moneylaundering))
216 7
194’(use,purchase,possessionorsaleofpropertyacquiredthroughthelegalisationofillegalincome)
1 -
205’(concealmentofpropertyusingfraudulentand/orshamtransactions)
8 -
220(abuseofpowers) 79 68
220’(Negligence) 1 -
221(commercialbribery) 98 81
69UndeclaredPropertyofMPsRepresentingSamegrelo-ZemoSvanetiMunicipalities,TransparencyInternationalGeorgia,2014,http://goo.gl/ArWMJL
27
332(abuseofofficialpowers) 825 356
333(exceedingofofficialpowers) - 205
337(illegalparticipationinentrepreneurialactivities)
1 9
338(bribe-taking) 520 456
339(bribe-giving) 136 159
339’(influencepeddling) 23 25
340(acceptinggiftsprohibitedbylaw) 1 7
341(forgerybyanofficial) 180 287
355(failuretosubmittheassetdeclarationorentryofincompleteorincorrectinformationtherein)
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Theabovestatisticsarenotenoughtodrawanydefinitiveconclusionsregardingtheeffectivenessofimplementationoftheanti-corruptionlegislation.However,theproblemsdescribedinthisreport,specifically,thoseconcerningassetdeclarationsandthe‘revolvingdoor’phenomenon,indicatethatgreaterattentionneedstobepaidtotheimplementationoftheexistinglegislationinpractice.Thiscanbeachievedbystrengtheningtheexistingcontrolmechanisms(e.g.,morefrequentandcomprehensiveinspectionsofcivilservantsbyresponsibleinternalstructuralunits)aswellasbycreatingnewmechanisms,suchasanindependentanti-corruptionagency.
V.ConclusionAnti-corruptionprovisionshavelongexistedintheGeorgianlegislationandhavebeenconstantlyundergoingchangeandimprovement.However,effectiveimplementationoftheanti-corruptionlegislationintheGeorgianpublicsector,includingcrimedetectionandprevention,remainsachallenge.Ourresearchrevealedanumberofproblemareas.Oneofthemainobstaclesforthisresearchwasincompleteinformationprovidedbypublicagencies.Insomecases,wehadtheimpressionthatpublicagenciesdeliberatelyavoidedansweringcertainquestions.Thefollowingarethekeyfindingsofourresearchandthecorrespondingrecommendations:
Findings:
• Mostministriesexaminedduringthisresearchhaveadepartment(usuallytheInternalAuditDepartment)responsibleforidentifying,investigatingandsanctioningtheviolationsofnormsestablishedbytheLawonCivilServiceandtheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService.However,inmanycases,thesedepartmentsareineffective,sincetherearenoclearregulationsonthefrequencyandscaleofrelevantinspections.
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• Thefactthatpublicagencydepartmentsresponsiblefordetectingviolationshavenotfoundanyreinforcesourdoubtsabouttheireffectiveness,especiallysincemanyindependentstudiesconductedbynon-governmentalorganizationsandthemediahaverepeatedlyshownthatviolationsoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServicearecommononalllevelsofgovernment,inthelegislative,theexecutiveandthelocalgovernmentbodies.
• SomepublicagenciesdonothavedepartmentsresponsiblefordetectingviolationsoftheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServiceand,therefore,areunawareofpossibleviolations.Thesepublicagenciesrespondedtoourrequestsbysayingthattherewerenocasesofconflictofinterest.
• Underthecurrentlaw,nopublicagencyisresponsibleforverifyingandreviewingtheassetdeclarationsfiledannuallybypublicofficials.Thefactspresentedinthisreportpointtotheneedforsystematicmonitoringofassetdeclarationsandverificationoffiledinformationinordertoeffectivelyenforcetheconflictofinterestandanti-corruptionregulation.WewelcometheamendmentstotheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,hereby,startingJanuary1,2017,theCivilServiceBureauwillmonitorthecomplianceofassetdeclarationswiththelawandverifyingtheaccuracyandcompletenessofthedeclaredinformation.However,theproblemwillremainunaddressedfortheremainingone-yearperioduntiltheamendmententersintoforce.
• Themajorityofpublicagenciesdonothaveaclearinternalwhistleblowingmechanism.Theexistenceofsuchamechanismisnotrequiredbythelaw,whichisasignificantobstaclefortheimplementationoftheexistinglegislationonwhistleblowerprotection.
• Publicagenciesthatareobligatedbylawtodevelopspeciallegislationonwhistleblowerprotection(theMinistryofInternalAffairs,theMinistryofDefenseandtheStateSecurityService)haveyettodoso.BothMinistrieshavestatedthattheyareworkingondevelopingthislegislation,buthavenotdisclosedanyinformationabouttheprocessoritsdeadlines.
• SeminarsandinformationmeetingsonwhistleblowerprotectionlegislationconductedbytheCivilServiceBureauarebeingattendedbyonlyahandfulofemployeesfrompublicagencies.Thisfailstomeetthegoalofhavingpublicservantsbethoroughlyinformedabouttheissue.
• The‘revolvingdoor’provision(Article65-restrictiononentryonduty)oftheLawonCivilServiceisthemostproblematicanti-corruptionprovision.Theregulationsincludedinthisprovisionarequiteweakandoftendonotaddresscorruptionrisks.Morespecifically:
o ThelawdoesnotspecifywhichpublicagencyisresponsiblefordeterminingwhetherArticle65hasbeenviolated.Itisalsounclearwhattheresponsemechanismisforthecaseswhereapublicservant’srelocationfrompublictotheprivatesectorhasbeenidentifiedasaviolationofArticle65.
o Themechanismforrespondingtoviolationsidentifiedduringthemovementofpublicofficialsbetweenthesupervisorandsupervisedpublicagenciesisproblematic.Ifacivilservantappliesforajobatapublicagencythattheyhadsupervisedduringthepast3years,therecipientpublicagencymustrefusethememploymentonthebasisofArticle65.However,itisunclearwhattheresponsemechanismiswhentherecipientpublicagencyviolatesthisnorm.
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o Finally,thecurrentwordingoftheLawonCivilServicesuggeststhattherestrictionssetbyArticle65donotapplytolocalgovernmentemployees,whichisalsoaproblem.
• TheStateSecurityServicedidnotreplytoanyofourfreedomofinformationrequests,whichpointstoitslackoftransparencyandaccountability.Thisisespeciallyalarming,consideringthefactthattheAnti-CorruptionAgencyispartoftheStateSecurityService.
BasedonthesekeyfindingsTransparencyInternationalGeorgiahasdevelopedthefollowingrecommendations:
• ThepublicagencydepartmentsresponsibleforenforcingtheLawonCivilServiceandtheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicServicemustintensifytheireffortstodetectandpreventviolations.Thelawmustclearlysetthisobligationandmustdeterminethefrequencyandthescopeoftherelevantinspections.Thecapacityofthesedepartmentsmustalsobestrengthened,includingthroughthetrainingoftheiremployees.
• AccordingtoanamendmenttotheLawonConflictofInterestandCorruptioninPublicService,onJanuary1,2017,theCivilServiceBureauwillstartmonitoringthecomplianceofassetdeclarationswiththelawandverifyingtheaccuracyandcompletenessofthedeclaredinformation.However,theproblemwillremainunaddressedfortheremainingone-yearperiod.WebelievethatthepartoftheamendmentthatgrantstheCivilServiceBureautherighttorespondtoviolationsofassetdeclarationmustenterintoforcebeforeJanuary1,2017,sothatthereisalegalmechanismofrespondingtoinaccuraciesestablishedbynon-governmentalorganizationsandthemedia.
• Publicagenciesmustdevelopclearandsimpleinternalproceduresforwhistleblowingandprovidedetailedinformationabouttheseprocedurestotheiremployees.
• TheMinistryofInternalAffairs,theMinistryofDefenseandtheStateSecurityServicemustadopteffectivelegislationonwhistleblowerprotectionthatwillbebasedontherelevantbestpractice.Alternatively,theexistinglegislationmustbeextendedtocovertheemployeesoftheseagencies.
• TheCivilServiceBureaumustcontinueitsinformationcampaignonwhistleblowerprotectionand,totheextentpossible,mustwidenthegroupofpublicservantsattendingitsinformationmeetingsandseminars.Theinformationcampaigncouldincludethepreparationanddistributionofinformationbooklets,videos,flyersandguidebooks.
• Article65(restrictionofemployment)oftheLawonCivilServicewhichregulatesthe‘revolvingdoor’mustbeextendedtolocalgovernmentemployees.Othershortcomingsofthisprovisionmustalsobeaddressed.
• TransparencyInternationalGeorgiabelievesthatanindependentanti-corruptionagencymustbecreatedinordertoeffectivelyenforceanti-corruptionlegislation.Thecreationofthisagencyispartofthebestpracticeincombatingcorruption.Amongotherthings,thisagencymustbetaskedwithimprovingthelegislationandmonitoringitsimplementation.Thiswouldsolvetheproblemsdiscussedinthisreportarisefromtheabsenceofabodyresponsibleforenforcinganti-corruptionlegislation.