Georges Canguilhem author, François Delaporte editor A Vital Rationalist Selected Writings from...

7/22/2019 Georges Canguilhem author, Franois Delaporte editor A Vital Rationalist Selected Writings from Georges Canguilh

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A V i t a l R a t i o n a l i s t

S e l e c t e d W r i t i n g s f r o mG e o r g e s C A n g u i1h e m

E d i t e d b y F r a n c o i s D e l a p o r t eT r a n s l a t e d b y A r t h u r G o l d h a m m e r

w i t h an i n t r o d u c t i o n bv Paul Rabinow a n da c r i t i c a l b i b l i o g r a p h y b y C a m i l l e L i m o g e s

Z O N F B O O K S N E W Y O R K

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1994 Urzone, Inc.ZONE B O O K S611 Broadway, Suite 608New York, NY 10012All rights reserved.No part of this book may be reproduced , stored in aretrieval system , or tran smitted in any form or by anymeans, including electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording, or otherwise (exceptfor that copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 ofthe U.S. Copyright Law and except by reviewers forthe public press) without written permission fromthe Publisher.Sources for the excerpts are listed on pp. 480-81 .Printed in the United States of America.Distributed by The MIT Press,Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, EnglandLibrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataCanguilhem, Georges, 1904-

A vital rationalist : selected writings from GeorgesCanguilhem / edited by Francois Delaporte; translatedby Arthur Goldhammer with an introd uction by PaulRabinow and a critical bibliography by Camille Limoges.

p. cm .Includes bibliographical references.ISBN 0-942299-72-81. Science-History. 2- Science-Phi losophy.

] . Delaporte, Francois, 1941- . 11. Title.Q125.C34 1993Soo-dc2o 93-8613

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Editor's Note by Francois Delaporte 9I n t r o d u c t i o n : A Vi ta l R a t ion a l i s t

by Paul Rabinow 11P A R T O N F M E T H O D O L O G Y

I The Hi s t o ry of S c i e n c e 2511 The Var ious Mode l s 41

III The H i s t o r y of t h e H i s t o ry of S c i e n c e 49

P A R T TWO E P I S T L M O I O G Y

I V E p i s t e mo l o g y of Biology 67V E p i s t e m o l o g y of Phys io logy

A Baroque Physiology 91An Experimental Science 103The Major Problems of Nineteenth-Century

Physiology 115VI Epistemology of Medicine

The Li mi ts of Healing 12 9The New Situation of Medicine 133A Medical Revolution 145


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P A R T T H R E E H I S T O R YVII C e l l Theory iei

VII I The Concept of Reflex 179IX Bio logica l O b je c ts 203

P A R T F O U R I N T E R P R E T A T I O N SX R e n e Descartes 219

XI Au g u s t e Comte 237XII C lau de Berna rd 261

P A R T F I V E P R OR I I-.MSXIII Kn o wl e d g e a n d t h e L i v i n g

Science and Life 287The Concept of life 303

XIV T h e N orm al and th e Pa tho log ica l 321Introduction to the Problem 321The Identity of the Two States 327Implications and Counterpositions 337

XV N o rm a l i t y a n d N o rm a t i v i t v 351

C r i t i c a l Bibliography by Camille Limoaes 385N o t e s 455


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Translator's NoteThe t ex t s co l l ec t ed he re a re t rans l a t ed f rom the F rench fo r thef i r s t t i me , b u t fo r t wo e x ce p t i o n s : 1 have in cl ud ed passages f rommy t r a n s l a t i o n o f Ge o rg e s Canguilhem's Ideology and Rationality(C a m b r i d g e , M A : M I T P re s s , 1 9 8 8 ) a n d f ro m C a ro l y n Fawcett'stranslation o f The Normal and the Pathological (New York: ZoneBooks , 1989) .


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E d i t o r ' s N o t eF r a n c o i s D c l a p o r t e

The texts collected in this volume introduce English-languagereaders to an especially difficult and complex dimension of GeorgeCanguilhenVs work, namely his philosophy of biology and medic ine . Its primary purpose, then, is to chart the main themes oiCanguilhem's tho ug ht , w hich is dis tinguished by m inu te a t tention to developments in biology and medicine over the past fiftyyears. To achieve this end, importance was given to questions ofmethodology in the history of science. This in itself was necessary because the object of historical discourse is not scientific discourse as such but the historicity of scientific discourse insofaras i t represents the implementation of an epistemological project (projet de savoir). If the history of science is the history of adiscourse subject to the norm of critical rectification, then it isclearly a branch of epistemology. C anguilhem recognizes that thedisciplines whose history he writes give the appearance of a genesis, that is, a process opposed to the diversity of the various formsof pseudo-science. This, in fact, is the source of his interest inepistemological breaks. Studying the history of an activity itselfdefined by its reference to truth as an epistemological value forcesone to focus attention on both the failures and successes of thatactivity. Taking a macroscopic view of the history of science,


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Canguilhem u n d e r t o o k t o s t u d y t h e e m e r g e n c e o f t h r e e d i s c ip l ines : b io logy* phys io logy and m ed ic in e . D ep en d in g on the subj e c t o f s t u d y , C a n g u i l h e m wi l l s o m e t i m e s p r o v i d e a h i s t o ry oft h e o ry , s o m e t i m e s a h i s t o ry o f co n c e p t s a n d s o m e t i m e s a h i s t o ryo f b io lo g ica l o b j ec t s . Bu t the ob je c t iv e is a lways th e sam e: tod e s c r i b e h o w i d e o l o g y a n d s c i e n ce a r e a t o n ce i n t e r t w i n e d a n ds e p a r a t e . Further, h i s s t u d i e s o f R e n e De s ca r t e s , Au g u s t e Comteand Claude Bernard c lear ly revea l w h y , as Louis Althusser o n c epu t i t , C ang ui lhe m is con side red o ne of the bes t "teachers of howt o read works o f ph i lo sophy and sc i ence . " The reade r , we assume,wi l l no t be su rp r i sed tha t t he p re se n t w ork end s w i th a se r i e s ofg e n e ra l q u e s t i o n s co n c e rn i n g t h e r e l a t i o n o f k n o w l e d g e t o lif ea n d o f t h e n o rma l t o t h e p a t h o l o g i ca l . C a n g u i l h e m b e g a n wi t he r ro r and on tha t basi s posed th e ph i lo so ph ica l p ro b l em o f t ru thand l i fe . F o r M i ch e l Foucault, t h i s a p p r o a c h c o n s t i t u t e d "one o fthe c ruc ia l even t s in the h i s to ry o f modern p h i l o s o p h y . "


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I n t r o d u c t i o n : A V i t a l R a t i o n a l i s tP a u l R a b i n o w

Georges Cangui lhem was born in Castelnaudary in southwest-ern France on June 4 , 1904 . Although h is fa ther was a ta i lor ,Ca ngu i lhem l i kes to re fe r to h im se l f , no t w i t h o u t a ce r ta intwinkle in his eye, as being of peasant s tock , rooted in the harm on iou s, c yc l ical l i fe o f the soi l and the seasons, his sen sibi l i t iesformed by the yearly round of the fruit trees. The story o f his sent im en tal edu cation is a classic one . H igh marks on national examination s sent h im on a jou rne y to Paris to study; once th er e, hewas a great success. A fte r c om p le tin g his studies at the pres tigiousLycee Henri IV, he entered the most el i te educational insti tut ionin France, the Ecole Normale Super ieure, in 1924. Among h ispromotion , his cohor t , were Jean-Paul Sartre, Raymond Aron andPaul Nizan; Maurice Merleau-Ponty entered the Fcole a year later.Already at this t ime, Canguilhem was interested in themes thathe would re turn to and develop throughout h is in te l lectua l l i fe :in p ar t icu lar, a paper on Auguste Comte's theory of order andprogress, w hi ch Can gui lhem su bm it ted for a d ip lo m a, d isp laysthe beginnings of this persistent interest in the relation of reason and society an in terest he shared wi th h is o ther d is t inguished classmates but w h ic h C ang uilhem developed in a high lyoriginal manner. The philosopher Alain's judgment of Cangui lhem


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A V r A I. RATIONALISTin 1924 as " l i ve ly , resolute and content" st i l l captures the man'sspir i t a lmost three-quarters of a century later.1

Once he became agre'gc i n ph i l osophy in 1927, the youngCangui lhem began his teaching tour of provincial iycees, as wasrequ ired o f al l Ecole Normale graduates in repayment to the statefor their educat ion. His in i t ia l peregrinat ions ended in 1936 inTou louse, where he taught a t the l ycee , wh i l e beg i nn i ng h i smedica l t r a i n i ng . In 1940, he resigned f rom his teaching post ,because, as he wrote the Rector of the Academie de Toulouse,he hadn' t become an ogrege in phi losophy in order to preach thedoct r ine o f the V ichy reg ime.2 He took advantage of his newlyfound f ree t ime to complete h is medical s tudies. Prophet ica l ly ,in bo th a ph i losop hic and po l i t ica l sense, Ca ngu i lhem replacedJean Cavai l lcs, the phi loso ph er of ma them at ics - he had beencal led to the Sorbonne - at the Universi ty of Strasbourg, w h i c hre located to C lerm on t -Fer ra nd in 1941, w he n Strasbourg wasannexed by the R e ich . He par t i c ip a te d in the fo rm at io n o f animportant resistance group to which he made avai lable his ski l ls.Al l in al l , a l i fe in the century, as the French say: l ike so manyof his compatriots, CanguiihenVs l i fe was shaped by the conjuncture of France's endur ing inst i tu t ions and the cont ingent eventso f h is t im e .In 1943, Cangui lhem defended his medical thesis, "Essais surquelques problemes concernant le normal e t le pa tho log ique . "The cont inued t imel iness and except ional durabi l i ty of th is workis attes ted to by the fact that he up da ted i t tw e n ty years laterwith signi f icant new ref lect ions, and that i t was translated intoEnglish decades later as The Normal and the Pathological.* Af te rthe war, he resumed his post at the Universi ty of Strasbourg ( inStrasbourg), where he remained unt i l 1948. Af ter f i rst refusingthe important administrat ive post of inspecteur general de ph i losoph ic at the L ib e ra t io n, he f ina l ly accepted i t in 1948, and

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served until 1955, when he accepted the Chair of History andPhilosophy of Sciences at the Sorbonne and succeeded GastonBachelard as director of the Institut dTiistoire des sciences et destechniques. His reputation as a ferocious examiner l ives on inParis today, as does a de ep well of affection for the inte llec tua land institutional support he provided over the decades.4

History and Philosophy of ScienceLouis Althusser paid Canguilhem a com plim ent w hen he compared him (as well as Cavailles,"Bachelard, Jules Vuillemin andMichel Foucault) to an anthropologist who goes into the fieldarmed with "a scrupulous respect for the reality of real science.11 5Th e com pariso n is revealing if no t qu ite an accurate des crip tionof Canguilhem's method. More strictly ethnographic studies oflaboratory life, like those of Bruno Latour, would come laterand would aim not merely at correcting a positivist and idealistunderstanding of science as a single unified activity achieving acumulative understanding of nature, but also at dismantling thevery idea of science a position as far from CanguilhenVs as onecould imagine. Nonetheless, Althusser's statement captures themove, first initiated by Bachelard, away from the static univer-salism that the French university system had enshrined in i tsrationalist And idealist approaches to science. For Bachelard, philosophy's new role was to analyze the historical development oftruth-producing pra ct ices . Th e philosophy of scienc e be cam ethe study of regional epistemologies, the historical reflection onthe elaboration of theories and concepts by practicing scientists,physicists, chemists, pathologists, anatomists and so on. The aimwas not to attack science but to show it in action in its specificity and plurality.

Canguilhem is clear and adamant that even though philosophyhad lost its sovereignty and its autonomy, it still had important

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wo rk t o a cco mp l i s h . Un l i k e t h e t a s k o f t h e scientist, t h e cp i s t e -mologisfs problem is to es tab l i sh "the o rd e r o f co n ce p t u a l p ro g ress that is vis ible only af te r th e fac t and of w h ic h the pr es en tn o t i o n of scien t i f ic t ru th is the prov isional po in t of c u l m i n a t i o n . "6T r u t h s are found in the p ra c t i c es o f sc i en ce ; ph i lo so ph y ana lyzest h e p l u ra l i t y o f t h e s e t ru t h s , t h e i r h i s t o r i c i t y , a n d co n s e q u e n t l yt h e i r p rov i s iona l i ty , while aflirming - no t leg is la t ing , as th e o l de rF re n ch p h i l o s o p h y o f s c i e n ce s o u g h t t o d o - t h e i r n o rm a t i v i t y .Epistemology is a r igo rous de sc r ip t io n o f the p r oce ss by w h ic ht ru th is e l ab o ra t e d , n o t a l is t o f f ina l re s u l t s . AIthusser\s e n c o mium takes fo r g ran ted tha t sc i ence ex i s t s and ho lds a p r iv i l egeds ta tus , bu t Cangu i lhem, l i ke Foucau l t and P ie r re Bourd ieu , neve rd o u b t e d t h i s : "To t a k e as o n e ' s o b j e c t o f i n q u i ry n o t h i n g o t h e rthan sou rces , i nven t ions , i n f luences , p r io r i t i e s , s imu l t ane i t i e s , andsucc ess ion s is a t b o t t o m to fail t o d i s t ing u i sh b e tw e e n sc i en cea n d o t h e r a s p e c t s o f c u l t u r e / 1 7 T h i s a s s u m p t i o n L a t o u r h a sca l led i t the key symbol of French phi losophy and h is tory of sc i e n c e - is t h e c o r n e r s t o n e o f t h e w h o l e a r c h i t e c t u r e o f t h e h o u s eo f reason inh ab i t ed by C a n g u i l h e m . * Sc i e n c e , fo r C a n g u i l h e m , is"a di sc ou rse ve r if ied in a de l im i t e d se c to r o f experience " 9 Scien ce i s an exp lo ra t ion o f the no rm o f ra t iona l i ty a t w or k . Bu t ju s tas f i rm as the be l ie f in sc ience i s the be l ie f in i t s h i s tor ic i ty andi t s p lu ra l i t y . There a re on ly d ive rse sc i ences a t work a t pa r t i cu la r h i s to r i ca l m om en t s : phys ics is no t b io logy ; e igh teen th -c en tu ryn a t u ra l h is t o r y is n o t t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y g e n e t i c s .

T h u s , f o r C a n g u i l h e m , l lthe h i s to ry o f science is the history ofan ob jec t - d i sco urse - t ha t is a history and has a h is tory , w her eassc i en ce is t h e sc i e nc e o f an ob jec t t ha t i s not a history, that hasno h i s to ry . " 1 0 Sc i e n ce , t h ro u g h i t s u s e o f m e t h o d , d i v i d e s n a t u rei n t o o b j e c t s . T h e s e o b j e c t s a r e s e c o n d a r y , in a s e n s e , b u t n o tde r iva t ive ; one cou ld say tha t t hey a re bo th cons t ruc ted and d i s cov ere d . Th e h i s to ry o f sc i e nc e pe r fo rm s a s im i l a r se t o f ope ra -

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t i o n s o n s c i e n t i f i c o b j e c t s . The ob jec t o f h i s to r i ca l d i s co urs e is" t h e h i s t o r i c i t y o f s c i e n t i f i c d i s co u r s e , in s o m u c h a s t h a t h i s to ry e f fec tua te s a p r o je c t gu ide d by i t s ow n in t e rna l no rm s b u tt r a v e r s e d b y a c c i d e n t s i n t e r r u p t e d by c r i s e s , t h a t is t o sa y b ym o m e n t s of j u d g m e n t a nd t ru t h . " 1 1 T h e s e t ru t h s a r e a l wa y s co n tes tab le and in process , as i t were , bu t no less " r e a r o n a c c o u n to f t h e i r co n t i n g e n cy . T h e h i s t o r y o f s c i e n c e is n o t n a t u ra l h i s to ry : i t does no t iden t i fy the sc i ence wi th the sc i en t i s t , t he sc i e n t i s t s w i t h t h e i r b i o g ra p h i e s , o r s c i e n ce s w i t h t h e i r r e s u l t s , n o rt h e r e s u l t s w i t h t h e i r cu r r e n t p e d a g o g i ca l u s e . T h e e p i s t e m o l o g -ical and h i s to r i ca l c l a im s assum ed by th i s no t ion o f th e h i s to r yo f s c i e n ce a r e ma g i s te r i a l a n d ru n co u n t e r t o m u c h of c o n t e m p o ra ry doxa i n the soc ia l s tud ies o f sc i ence . The t ex t s ga the redin th i s vo lume p rov ide the ev idence fo r CanguilhervTs p o s i t i o n .F ra n co i s D e l a p o r t e h a s a r r a n g e d t h e m in a co n c e p t u a l a n d p e d a gog ica l fa sh ion with such c lar i ty tha t i t would be f ru i t less andi n a p p r o p r i a t e t o b u r d e n t h e m w i t h e x t e n d e d c o m m e n t a r y . In d e e d , th e y p r o v i d e a k i n d o f c o h e r e n t "book," w h i c h , e x c e p tfo r h i s second doc to ra l d i s s e r t a t i o n ,1 2 C a n g u i l h e m h i m s e l f n e v e rw ro te ; he p r e fe r re d , a f t e r 194 3 , t h e e ssay form cr am m ed w i thp r e c i s e , a l m o s t a p h o r i s t i c , s e n t e n c e s , m a n y w i t h th e d e n s i t yo f k r y p t o n i t e .The Norm al and the PathologicalA l t h o u g h C a n g u i l h e m p u b l i s h e d in t h e la t e 1 9 30 s a p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r e a t i s e o n e t h i c s a n d e p i s t e r n o l o g y , Traite de logique et dcmorale, intended as an unconventional t ex tbook fo r advanced lycees t u d e n t s , t h e w o rk fo r w h i c h h e is b e s t k n o w n s t a r t s w i t h h i sme d i ca l t h e s i s , wh e re h e investigates the very def in i t ion of theno rm al and the pa th o lo g ic a l . T h i s w ork s igna led a m a jo r reve rsa lin th ink ing abou t hea l th . Prev ious ly , med ica l t ra in ing in F ranceh a d p r i v i l e g e d t h e n o r m a l ; d i s e a s e o r malfunction w as under-

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stood as the deviation from a fixed norm, which was taken to bea constant. Medical practice was directed toward establishing scientifically these norms and, practice following theory, towardreturning the patient to health, reestablishing the norm fromwhich the patient had strayed.

As Francois Dagognet, the philosopher of biology, has crisplyobserved, Canguilhem launched a frontal attack on "that edificeof normalization" so essential to the procedures of a positivist science and medic ine . l i He did so by re-posing the question of theorganism as a living being that is in no prcestablished harmonywith its environment. It is suffering, not normative measurementsand standard deviations, that establishes the state of disease, Nor-mativity begins with the living being, and with that being comesdiversity. Each patient whom a doctor treats presents a differentcase; each case displays its own particularity. One of Canguilhem'sfamous aphorisms drives this point home: "An anomaly is not anabnormality. Diversity does not signify sickness.1' With livingbeings, normality is an activity, not a steady state. The result, ifone follows Canguilhem's reasoning, is that "a number, even aconstant num ber, translates a sty le, habits, a civilization, even theunderlying vitality of life."14 The recent discovery that humanbody temperature has a much wider range of normality than waspreviously assumed demonstrates this point. Normality - and thisis one of Canguilhem's constant them es - means the ability toadapt to changing circumstances, to variable and varying environments. Illness is a reduction to constants, the very norms bvwhich we measure ourselves as normal. Normality equals activity and flexibility. Hence there is no purely objective pathology;rather, the basic unit is a living being that exists in shifting relations with a changing environment. Arguing for a dramatic reversal, Canguilhem maintained that illness ultimately is defined bythe very terms that had defined health, namelv stable norms,

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unchanging values.15 Life is not stasis, a fixed set of natural laws,set in advance and the same for all, to which one must adhere inord er to survive. Ra ther, life is ac tion , m ob ility and p atho s, th econstant but only partially successful effort to resist death, to useBichat's famous definition: "Life is the collection of functionsthat resist death."

Canguilhem's work has been a consistent and disciplined historical demonstration, a laying-out of the consequences, of theseprinciples. Life has its specificity: "Life, whatever form it maytake, involves self-preservation by means of self-regulation.1*16 Thisspecificity can - in fact, must be elaborated perpetually, but itcan never be evaded. Canguilhem's punctuate, his torical essaysare not a philosophy of life, like those of Hans Jonas or MauriceMerleau-Ponty, which seek to fix an understanding of life witha single set of concepts. Rather, Canguilhem's t ightly writtendidactic forays display how the life sciences, including the therapeutic ones, have simultaneously elaborated concepts of life andthe ways these concepts must be seen as an integrated part of thephenomenon under study: l ife and its norms. '*

Although he has been careful not to turn these explorationsinto a panegyric of vitalism, Canguilhem demonstrates the constant presence of evaluative notions like "preservation," "regulatio n ," "ad ap tation" and "no rm ality," in both everyday and scientificapproaches to life. "It is life itself, and not medical judgment,that makes the b iological no rmal a co nc ep t of value and no t a concept of statistical reality."17 Humanity's specificity lies not in thefact that it is separate from the rest of nature but, rather, in thefact that it has created systematic knowledge and tools to help itcope . This testing, parrying with pathology, this active relationto the environment, this normative mobili ty and projective ability, humanity's conceptual career, is central to its health. "Beinghealthy means being no t only normal in a given situation bu t also

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n o rma t i v e i n t h i s a n d o t h e r e v e n t u a l s i t u a t i o n s . Wh a t ch a ra c t e r iz e s h e a l t h is t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t r a n s c e n d i n g t h e n o r m , w h i c hd e f i n e s t h e mo m e n t a r y n o r m a l , t h e p o s s i b i l i ty o f t o l e r a t i n g in f rac t ions o f t h e hab i tua l no r m and in s t i t u t in g new n o rms i n n e ws i t u a t i o n s /1 ' 8 Life is an ac t ivi t y th at fol low s a n o r m . But hea l th isn o t b e i n g n o rm a l ; h e a l t h is b e i n g n o rm a t i v e .

In g e n e ra l , r e f l e c ti o n s o n t h e r e l a t io n s h i p s b e t w e e n co n c e p t sand li fe req ui re c la r i f ica t ion of th e fac t tha t a t l eas t tw o d is t in ctor de rs a re be in g inv es t ig a ted . F i rs t , th er e is l ife as form , l ife ast h e " u n i v e r s a l o r g a n i z a t i o n o f matter1' (le vivant)> a n d s e c o n d ,th er e i s l ife as th e ex p er ie n ce of a s ing ular l iv ing be ing w h o isconscious of h i s o r her l i fe (le vc'cu). By " l i f e " - i n F r enc h - on eco u l d me a n e i t h e r le vivant, t he p re sen t pa r t i c ip l e o f t h e ve rb " t ol ive" (v-jvrc), or the past participle le vecu. Canguilhem i s unequ iv oca l on th is po in t : the f i rs t l eve l o f l i fe , fo rm, cont ro ls the secon d, ex pe r i en ce . A l tho ug h i t is on ly the f irs t l eve l , th e po w er andform-giv ing d imensions of l i fe , which const i tu tes the expl ic i t subj ec t m a t t e r o f h i s w ork , t he p re se nc e o f the sec on d is f re quen t lyfe l t n o n e t h e l e s s . 1 9 For a l l i t s declara t ive c la r i ty , the c la im of pr i ori ty only thinly masks the keen awareness of suffering and searching - in a w or d , pa th os - w h ic h is t h e ex pe r i en t i a l do u b le , t hec o n s t a n t c o m p a n i o n , of C a n g u il h e nV s i n s i s te n t c o n c e p t u a l i s m .T h e pa t ho s of ex is te nc e is a lways c lo se at han d for th i s physic ianc u m p h i l o s o p h e r c u m p e d a g o g u e .

In fac t , a no t - so - l a t en t ex i s t en t i a l i sm, a lbe i t o f a d i s t inc t ivea n d i d i o s y n c ra t i c s o r t , s h a d o ws C a n g u i l h e n Vs co n ce p t i o n o f me d ic ine . One eas i ly hears echoes of Sar t re and Merleau-Ponty's earlyth em es , t ran spo sed to a d i f fe ren t reg i s t e r and p layed wi th a d i s t inct ive f la i r . Cangui lhenVs var ian ts of "to f r e e d o m c o n d e m n e d "and "the s t r u c t u r e o f c o m p o r t m e n t " a re c o m p o s e d in a differentkey . Hi s ind iv idua l is co nd em ne d to ada p t t o an en v i ro nm en t andto ac t u s ing con ce p t s and too l s tha t have no p re es t a b l i s he d a ff in -

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ities w i t h hi s s u r r o u n d i n g w o r l d . "Life b e co m e s a w i ly , s u p p l ein t e l l i gence o f the wor ld , wh i l e reason , fo r i t s pa r t , emerges a sso m eth in g m or e v i ta l : i t f ina lly dev elop s a log ic tha t is m o re thana m e r e l o g i c o f i d e n t i t y " 2 0 Reason and l i fe are intertwined, n o to p p o s e d , b u t n e i t h e r l e g i s l a t e s t h e o t h e r .

A New Understanding of Life: ErrorIt h as b e c o m e a c o m m o n p l a c e t o say t h a t CanguilhenVs r e c o g n i t ion by an Eng l i sh -speak ing p ub l i c , bey ond a few spec ia l i s t s i nthe h is tory of the l i fe sc iences , fo l lows in the wake of the success o f on e o f h i s favor i te s tu de n t s and f r iends , M iche l Foucault.W hi l e no t exac t ly fa lse, such an ap pre c ia t ion rem ains in su f f i c ien tunless we also ask what i t was in Canguilhem's w o r k w h i c h s oi n t e r e s t e d F o u c a u l t . A n d , e v e n f u r t h e r, a r e t h e s e p r o b l e m s t h emo s t p e r t i n e n t for a n Am e r i ca n a u d i e n ce ? panguilhenVs work , i ti s worth under l in ing , i s re levant for d iverse reaso jas* The ques t ionto be asked th en i s , W hy read h im today ? T h e an sw er lies part i a l l y i n a n o t h e r f r e q u e n t co mmo n p l a ce . C a n g u i l h e n Vs p re d e ce s so r , Ba che la rd , i nv en te d a m e t ho d for a new h i s to ry o f the "hards c i e n c e s " o f c h e m i s t r y , ph y s ic s a n d m a t h e m a t i c s ; h is s t u d e n t ,Foucau l t , worked on the "dubious s c i e n c e s " o f M a n ; C a n g u i l h e mhimse l f has spen t h i s l i fe t rac ing the l i n imen t s o f a h i s to ry o f theconcepts of the sc iences of l i fe . Le t us sugges t tha t today i t i s theb i o s c i e n c e s - w i t h a r e n e w e d e l a b o r a t i o n o f s u c h c o n c e p t s ofno rms and l i fe , dea th and in fo rmat ion t ha t ho ld cen te r s t agein the sc i en t i f i c and soc ia l a rena ; hence the renewed r e l e v a n ceo f G e o r g e s C a n g u i l h e m .

In his 1966 essay "Le C o n ce p t e t la v i e , " C a n g u i l h e m a n a ly z e dt h e c o n t e m p o r a r y r e v o l u t i o n u n d e r w ay in g e n e t i c s a nd m o l e c u la r b io lo gy . T h e essay , a h i s tor ic a l t o u r de forc e , t race s the c on cept of l i fe as form (and exper ience) as wel l as knowledge of tha tfo rm, f rom Ar i s to t l e to the p resen t . Cangu i lhem demons t ra t e s the

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continui ty of problematization and the discontinuity of answersin the history of the concept of life. This historical reconstruction provides the groundwork for an analysis of our contemporaryconceptualization of life. Canguilhem frames James D. Watsonand Francis Crick's discovery of the structure of the double helixas an information system, one in which the code and the (cellular) milieu are in constant interaction. There is no simple, unidirectional causal relation between genetic information and itseffects. The new understanding of life lies not in the structuringof matter and the regulation of functions, but in a shift of scaleand location from mechanics to information and communication theory.21 In an important sense, the new understanding of lifeas information rejoins Aristotle insofar as it posits life as a logos"inscribed, converted and transmit ted" within l iving matter .2 2However, we have come a long way since Aristotle. The telos oflife mo st com m only proposed today is m ore an ethological on e,see ing behavior as de termined and humans more as animals ,than a contemplative one that assigns a special place to reflection and uncertainty. From sociobiologists to many advocates ofthe Human Genome Project, the code is the central dogma.

Canguilhem rejects this telos. If homo sapiens is as tightly programmed as the ethologists (or many molecular biologists) think,then how, Canguilhem asks, can we explain error, the history oferrors and the history of our victories over error? Genetic errorsare now understood as informational errors. Among such errors,however, a large number arise from a maladaption to a milieu.Once again he reintroduces the theme of normality as situatedact io n, n ot as a pregiven co n dit io n . Mankind makes m istakeswhen it places itself in the wrong place, in the wrong relationship with the environment, in the wrong place to receive theinformation needed to survive, to act, to flourish. We must move,err, adapt to survive. This condition of "erring or drifting" is not

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merely acc iden tal or external to life bu t its fundam ental form .Knowledge, following this understanding of life, is "an anxiousq u e s t " (une recherche inquiete) for the r ight information. Thatinformation is only partially to be found in the genes. Why andhow th e ge ne tic co de is activated and functions, and wh at theresults are, are questions that can be adequately posed or answeredonly in the context of life, le vivonU and experience, le vecu.ConclusionMichel Foucault, in an essay dedicated to Canguilhem, "La Vie,Inexperience et la scie nc e," cha racterized a division in Frenchthought between subject-oriented approaches, which emphasizemeaning and experience, and those philosophies which take astheir object knowledge, rationality and concepts. 2 3 The rhetorical effect was marvelous. While everyone had heard of Sartre andMerleau-Ponty, few people beyond a small circle of specialists hadactually read the work of Cavailles on the philosophy of set theory in mathematics or Canguilhem on the history of the reflexarc.2 4 The irony was made more tantalizing by allusions to theunflinching and high-stakes activities in the resistance of one sideof the pair (Cavailles was killed by the Nazis after forming theresis tance network that Canguilhem joined), while the otherslived in Paris, writing pamphlets, Foucault was revealing to usa hidden relat ionship of t ruth and poli t ics , indicat ing anothertype of intellectual, one for whom totality and authenticity boredifferent forms and norms. However, there is a certain insider'shumor involved; twenty years earlier, Canguilhem had employedthe same distinctions, applying them to Cavailles during the 1930swhile mocking those who deduced that a phi losophy without asubject must lead to passivity and inaction. Cavailles, who hadmade the philosophic journey to Germany during the 1930s andwarned early on of the dangers brewing the re, did n ot, Canguilhem

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tells us, hesitate when the war finally came. 2 3 Rather than writing a moral treatise to ground his actions, he joined the resistance while finishing his work on logic as best he could. Truthand politics were distinct domains for these thinkers of the conce pt ; on e was ethically ob liged ro act in bo th do m ains w hilenever losing sight of the specificity of each. Cavailles's exampleof rigorous thought and principled action, while still compellingtoday (especially given the misunderstanding and moralizing aboutFrench thought rampant across the Rhine, the Channel and theAtlan tic), would seem to dem and a renewed co nc ep tua lizatio n.The rise and ephemeral glory of structuralism and Althusserianismhave shown that removing the humanist subject in the social sciences by itself guarantees neither an epistemological jump fromideology to science nor more effective political action (any morethan rein serting a qua si-transcend ental su bject will prov ide suchguarantees) . While Canguilhem's work enables one to think andrethink such problems, i t obviously does not offer any ready-made answers for the future. Deploying readymade solutions fromthe past, when history has moved on, concepts changed, milieusal tered, would, Canguilhem has taught us , const i tute a majorerror an error matched in its gravity only by those seeking toannul history, blur concepts and homogenize environments. Living beings are capable of correc ting their errors, and CanguilhenVswork oiicrs us tools to begin, once againA the process of doin g so.


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C H A P T E R O N E

T h e H i s t o r y o f S c i e n c e

The Object of Historical Discourse[ 1 ] W h e n o n e s p e a k s o f t h e "science o f c r y s t a l s , " t h e r e l a t i o nbe tw ee n s c i en ce and c rys ta l s is no t a gen i t ive , a s w he n on e speakso f t h e " m o t h e r o f a k i t t e n / 1 T h e sc i en ce o f c rys t a ls is a d i sc ou rseon the na tu re o f c rys t a l , t he na tu re o f c rys t a l be ing no th ing o the rthan i t s i d en t i ty : a m ine ra l a s op po se d to an an im a l o r veg e tab le ,a n d i n d e p e n d e n t o f a ny u s e t o w h i c h o n e ma y p u t i t. W h e n c ry sta l lography , crys ta l op t ics and inorganic chemis t ry a re const i tu teda s s c i e n ce s , t h e "nature of c r y s t a l " ju s t is t h e c o n te n t o f t h e sc i en ce of crys ta l s, by w hic h I m ean an obje ct ive d isco urse con sis t ingof ce r t a in p ropos i t ions tha t a r i se ou t o f a p a r t i cu l a r k i n d o f wo rk .T h a t w o r k , t h e w o r k o f s c i e n c e , i n c l u d e s t h e f o r m u l a t i o n a n dt e s t i n g of h y p o t h e s e s , w h i c h , o n c e t e s t e d , ar e fo rg o t t e n i n f av oro f t h e i r r e s u l t s .

W h e n Helene Metzger w r o t e La Genese de la science des crista ux,s h e co m p o s e d a d i s co u r s e a b o u t d i s co u r s e s o n t h e n a t u re o f crysta l .1 But these d i scourses were no t o r ig ina l ly the same as wha t wenow take to be the co r rec t d i scourse abou t c rys t a l s , t he d i scourset h a t d e f i n e s w h a t " c r y s t a l s " a r e a s an o b j e c t o f s c i e n c e . T h u s ,th e h i s to ry o f sc i e nc e is t h e h i s to ry o f an ob je c t - d i s co ur se -t h a t is a h is tory and has a h i s to ry , wh er ea s sc i en ce i s t h e sc i en ce

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M E T H O O O L O G V

of an o b je c t chat is not


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paid to a significant f ac t a b o u t t h e e m e r g e n c e o f t h i s g e n re : itrequ i red no fewer than two scientific a n d t wo philosophical revo l u t i o n s as i ts p r e c o n d i t i o n s . O n e s c i e n t if i c r e v o l u t i o n o c c u r r e di n m a t h e m a t i c s , i n w h i c h Descartes's ana ly t i c geometry was foll o we d b y t h e i n f i n i t e s i ma l c a l cu l u s o f L e i b n i z a n d N e wt o n ; t h esecon d re vo lu t io n , in m ec ha n ic s and cosm ology , is sym bo l i zed byDescartes's Principles of Philosophy and Newton's Principia. In p h i l o s o p h y , a n d , m o re p re c i s e l y , i n t h e t h e o ry o f k n o w l e d g e , t h a tis , t h e fo u n d a t i o n s o f s c i e n c e , C a r t e s i a n i n n a t i s m wa s o n e r e v o l u t i o n a n d L o c k e i a n s e n s u a l i s m t h e o t h e r . W i t h o u t D e s c a r t e s ,w i t h o u t a r e n d i n g o f t r a d i t i o n , t h e re w o u l d b e n o h i s t o ry o f s c ie n c e . [Etudes, p p . 1 6 -1 7 ]

[2 ] Wa s B e rn a rd Le Bouvier Fontenelle m i s t a k e n w h e n hel ook ed to D esc a r t e s for j u s t i f i c a t ion o f a ce r t a in ph i lo so ph y o fthe h i s to ry o f sc i en ce? F ro m th e den ia l t ha t au tho r i ty ho lds anyva l id i ty in sc i ence , Fon tene l l e reasoned , i t fo l lows tha t t he cond i t i on s o f t ru th a re su b je c t t o h i s to r i ca l ch an ge . But do es it t h enm a k e sense t o propose a h i s t o r i c i s t r e a d i n g o f a fu n d a m e n t a l l yan t ih i s to r i c i s t ph i lo s oph y? If we ho ld tha t t ru th com es on ly f romt h e e v i d e n ce a n d t h e l ig h t o f n a t u r e , t h e n t ru t h , i t wo u l d s e e m ,has no h i s to r i ca l d imens ion , and sc i ence ex i s t s sub specie actcrnt-tatis (h e n ce t h e C a r t e s i a n p h i l o s o p h y is a n t i h i s t o r i c i s t ) . B ut p e r h a p s F o n t e n e l l e d e s e r v e s c r e d i t f o r n o t i c i n g a n i m p o r t a n t b u tn e g l e c t e d a s p e c t o f t h e C a r t e s ia n r e v o l u t i o n : C a r t e s ia n d o u b tr ef us ed t o c o m m e n t o n p r io r c l a i m s t o k n o w l e d g e . It no t on lyre j ec t ed th e l egacy o f an c i en t and m edieva l phys ics bu t e r ec t edn e w n o rm s of t r u t h in p l a ce o f t h e o l d . H e n ce , it r e n d e r e d a llp r e v i o u s s c i e n ce o b s o l e t e a n d co n s i g n e d i t t o t h e s u rp a s s e d p a s t[lepasse depasse], Fon tene l l e thus rea l i zed tha t when Car t e s i an ph i l o s o p h y k i l l e d t r a d i t i o n - t h a t is , t h e u n re f l e c t i v e co n t i n u i t y o fpas t and p resen t i t p ro v id ed a t t h e same t im e a ra t iona l founda t io n fo r a po ss ib l e h i s to ry , fo r an em er ge n t c on sc io usn ess th a t

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the evolution of humankind has meaning. If the past was no longerjudge of the present, it was, in the full sense of the word, witness to a movement that transcended it , that dethroned the pastin favor of the present. As Fontenelle was well aware, before theModerns could speak about the Ancients, even to praise them,they had to take their distance. [Etudes, p. 55]

[3] According to Descartes, however, knowledge has no history. It took Newton, and the refutation of Cartesian cosmology,for history - that is, the ing ratitude in he ren t in the claim to beginanew in rep ud iation of all origins - to appear as a dim ensio n ofscience.'The history of science is the explicit, theoretical recognition of the fact that the sciences are critical, progressive discourses for determining what aspects of experience must be takenas real- The object of the history of science is therefore a non-given, an object whose incompleteness is essential. In no way canthe history of science be the natural history of a cultural object.All too often, however, it is practiced as though it were a formof natural history, conflating science with scientists and scientistswith their civil and academic biographies, or else conflating science with its results and results with the form in which they happen to be expressed for pedagogical purposes at a particular pointin t ime. [Etudes, pp . 17-18]The Constitution of Historical Discourse[4] The his torian of science has no choice but to define hisobject. It is his decision alone that determines the interest andimportance of his subject matter. This is essentially always thecase, even when the historian's decision reflects nothing morethan an uncritical respect for tradition.

Take, for example, the applicat ion of probabil i ty to nineteenth-century biology and social science. 4 The subject doesnot fall within the boundaries of any of the nineteenth century's

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mature sciences; i t corresponds to no natural object, hence itsstudy cannot fall back on mere description or reproduction. Thehistorian himself must create his subject matter, starting from thecurrent state of the biological and social sciences at a given pointin t ime, a state that is neither the logical consequence nor thehistorical culmination of any prior state of a developed science -not of the mathematics of Pierre-Simon Laplace or the biologyof Charles Darwin, the psychophysics of Gustav Fechner, the ethnology of Frederick Taylor or the sociology of Fmile Durkhe im.Note, moreover, that Adolphe Quetelet, Sir Francis Galton, JamesMcKeon Catell and Alfred Binet could develop biometrics andpsychometrics only after various nonscientific practices had provided raw material suitable for mathematical treatment. Quetelet,for example, studied data about human size; the collection of suchdata presupp oses a certain type of ins titu tio n, namely, a nationalarmy whose ranks are to be Hlled by conscr ipt ion, hence aninterest in the standards for selecting recruits. Binet's study ofintel lectual apt i tudes presupposes another type ot inst i tut ion,com pulsory p r imary edu cat ion , and a co nc om itant in terest inmeasuring backwardness. Thus,'in order to study the particularaspect of the history of science defined above, one must look notonly at a number of different sciences bearing no intrinsic relation to one another but also at "nonscience," that is , at ideologyand political and social praxisJOur subject, then, has no naturaltheo retical locus in one or anoth er of the sciences, any m ore thanit has a natural locus in politics or pedagogy. Its theoretical locusmust be sought in the history of science itself and nowhere else,for it is this history and only this history that constitutes the specific domain in which the theoretical issues posed by the develop m en t of scientific p ractice find the ir reso lutio n. 5 Que te l e t ,Gregor Mendel, Binet and Theodore Simon established new andunforeseen relat ions between mathematics and pract ices that

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were originally nonscientific, such as selection, hybridization andorientat ion. Their discoveries were answers to quest ions theyasked themselves in a language they had to forge for themselves.Critical study of those questions and those answers is the properobject of the history of science. Should anyone wish to suggestthat the concept of history proposed here is "externalist," theforegoing discussion should suffice to dispose of the objection.

The history of science can of course accommodate variouskinds of objects within the specific theoretical domain that i tconstitutes: there are always documents to be classified, instruments and techniques to be described, methods and questions tobe interpreted, and concepts to be analyzed and criticized. Onlythe last of these tasks confers the dignity of history of scienceupon the others . It is easy to be i ronic abo ut th e im po rtan ceat tached to concepts , but more d i f f icul t to unders tand why,without concepts, there is no science. The history of science is'interested in, say, the history of instruments or oi academies onlyinsofar as they are related, in both their uses and their intent ions, to theories. Descartes needed David Ferrier to grind optical glass, but it was he who provided the theory of the curves tobe obtained by grinding.

A history of results can never be anything more than a chronicle. The history of science concerns an axiological activity, thesearch for truth. This axiological activity appears only at the levelof quest ions, methods and concepts , but nowhere else. Hence,time in the history of science is not the time of everyday life.A ch ron icle of inventions or discoveries can be periodized in thesame way as ordinary history. The dates of birth and death listedin scientific biographies are dates from the ordinary calendar, butthe advent of tru th follows a different tim etable in each d iscipline;the chronology of verification has its own viscosity, incompatible with ordinary history. Dmitry Mendeleyev's periodic table of

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t h e e l e me n t s a cce l e r a t e d t h e p a ce o f p ro g re s s i n ch e mi s t ry , a n deven tua l ly led to an upheaval in a t o mi c p h y s i c s , while o t h e r s c i e n c e s m a i n t a i n e d a m o r e m e a s u r e d p a c e . T h u s , th e h i s t o r y ofsc i en ce , a h i s to ry o f t h e re l a t ion of in t e l l i ge nc e to t ru th , ge ne r a t e s i t s own sense o f t ime . Jus t how i t does th i s depends on howt h e p ro g re s s o f s c i e n c e p e r m i t s t h i s h i s t o ry t o r e co n s t i t u t e t h etheoretical di scourse o f t he past. A new d i scovery may m ak e irp o s s ib l e t o u n d e r s t a n d a d i s co u r s e t h a t was n o t u n d e r s t o o d w h e ni t was f i r s t enunc ia t ed , such a s Mendel's t h e o r y of h e re d i t y , o ri t m a y d e m o l i s h t h e o r i e s o n c e c o n s i d e r e d a u t h o r i t a t i v e . O n l yco n t ac t w i th r ec en t s c i e nc e can g ive the h i s to r i an a sense o f h i s t o r i c a l r u p t u r e a n d c o n t i n u i t y . S u c h c o n t a c t i s established, asG a s t o n B a c h e l a r d t a u g h t , t h r o u g h c p i s t e m o l o g y , so long as i tr e ma i n s v i g i l a n t .

T h e h is tory of sc ien ce is the re fo re a lways in f lux . It mu s t co r r e c t i ts e lf co n s t a n t l y . T h e r e l a t io n b e t w e e n A rch i m e d e s ' m e t h o do f e x h a u s t i o n a n d m o d e r n ca l cu l u s is n o t t h e s a me lor today'smathematician as i t was for Jean Etienne M o n t u c l a , the f i rs t greath i s t o r i a n of m a t h e m a t i c s . T h i s is b e ca u s e n o d e f i n i t i o n o f m a t h emat i cs was poss ib l e be fo re the re was ma themat i cs , t ha t i s , be fo rem ath em at i c s had be en co ns t i tu t ed th ro ug h a se r ie s o f d i scover i e sand dec i s ions . "Mathematics is a dev e lop m en ta l p roce ss [un cleve-nir]" sa id Jean Cava i l l e s . The h i s to r i an o f ma themat i cs mus t t akeh is p rov is iona l de f in i t i on o f w ha t m a th em at i c s is f rom co n t em po r ary m a t h e m a t i c i a n s . M a n y w o r k s o n c e r e le v a n t t o m a t h e m a t i c sin an ear l ie r per iod may therefore cease to be re levant in historicalp e r s p e c t i v e ; fro m a n e wl y r i g o ro u s s t a n d p o i n t , previously import an t works may become t r i v i a l app l i ca t ions . [Ftuties, p p . 18-20]Recursion and Ruptures[ 5 ] In e s t a b l is h i n g s u c h a c l o s e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n e p i s t e m o l -ogy and the h i s to ry o f sc i en ce I am , o f co ur se , d r aw ing on th e


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inspirational teachings of Gaston Bachelard.6 The fundamentalconcepts of Bachelard's epistcmology are by now well known, sowell known, perhaps, that they have been disseminated and discussed, especially outside France, in a vulgarized, not to say sanitized, form, devoid of the polemical force of the original. Amongthem are the not ions of new scient if ic spir i t , epistemologica)obstacle , epistemologica! break [rupture], and obsolete or "official" science

To my mind, the best summary of Bachelard's research andteaching can be found in the concluding pages of his last epistemologica! work, Le Materialisme rationneL 1 Here the not ion ofepistemologica] discontinuity in scientific progress is supportedby arguments based on the history and teaching of science inthe twentieth century. Bachelard concludes with this statement:^Contemporary science is based on the search for true [veritable]facts and the synthesis of truthful [vehdique] laws." By " t ruthful" Bachelard does not mean that scientific laws simply tell atruth permanently inscribed in objects or intellect. Truth is simply what science speaks. How, then, do we recognize that a statem en t is scientific? By the fact tha t scientific tru th never springsfully blow n from the head of its cre ato r. A science is a disc ou rsegoverned by cr i t ica l correct ion. If this discourse has a historyw ho se course th e historian believes he can rec on stru ct, it is be cause it is a history whose meaning the cpistemologist must reactivate. "Every historian of science is necessarily a historiographerof truth. The events of science are linked together in a steadilygrowing truth At various moments in the history of thought,the past of thought and experience can be seen in a new light"

8Guided by this new light, the historian should not make the errorof thinking that persistent use of a particular term indicates aninvariant underlying concept, or that persistent allusion to similar experimental observat ions connotes affinities of method or

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ap pr oa ch . By obs e rv in g the se ru l e s he wi l l avo id th e e r ro r of, forin s t an ce , see ing P ie r re Lou i s M oreau d e Mau per tu i s as a p re m atu ret r a n s form ist o r g e n e t i c i s t . 4 [Ideology and Rationality, p p . 10-12]

[ 6 ] W h e n Bachelard speaks of a norm or value, i t i s because int h i n k i n g o f h i s f a v or it e s c i e n c e , ma t h e m a t i c a l p h y s i cs , h e i d e n t i f i e s t h e o ry wi t h ma t h e ma t i c s . His ra t ion al i sm is bu i l t on a f ramew o r k o f m a t h e m a t i s m . In m a t h e m a t i c s o n e s p e a k s n o t o f t h e" n o r m a l " b u t of t h e "normed " In co n t r a s t to o r t h o d o x l o gi calp o s i t i v i s t s , B a ch e l a rd h o l d s t h a t ma t h e ma t i c s h a s e p i s t e mo l o g i -cal c o n t e n t , w h e t h e r a c t ua l o r p o t e n t i a l , and t h a t p ro g re s s i nma t h e ma t i c s a d d s t o t h a t co n t e n t . O n t h i s p o i n t h e a g re e s w i t hJean Cavai l les , whose cr i t ique of log ica l pos i t iv i sm has los t no thing of i ts vigor or rigor. Cavai l les re fu tes Rudolph Catnap by showing tha t "mathematical reason ing i s i n t e rna l ly coheren t i n a waytha t ca nn o t be ru sh ed . I t is by na tu re progressive/' i ! ) As to then a t u re o f t h i s p ro g re s s , h e co n c l u d e s ,

One of the fundamental problems with the doctrine ol science isprecisely that progress is in no way comparable to increasing a givenvolume bv adding a small additional amount to what is already there,the old subsisting with the new. Rather, it is perpetual revision, inwhich some things are eliminated and others elaborated. What comesafter is gre ater than what went before, not because the present contains or supersedes the past but because the one necessarily emergesfrom the other and in its content carries the mark of its superiority,which is in each case unique. 1 1

N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e u s e o f epistemological recu rs ion a s a h i s to r i ca lm e th o d is no t un iversa l ly va l id . I t bes t f it s th e d is c ip l ine s for t h es t u d y o f w h i c h i t wa s o r i g in a l ly d e v e l o p e d : m a t h e m a t i ca l p h ys i cs and nuc le a r ch em is t ry . O f co ur se , t h e r e is no reason why o neca nn o t s tudy a pa r t i cu la r ly adv anc ed spe c ia l ty dnd t h e n a b s t r a c t

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rules for the production of knowledge which may, with caution,be extrapolated to other disciplines. In this sense, the methodcannot be generalized so much as it can be broadened. Yet it cannot be extended to other areas of the history of science withouta good deal of reflection ab ou t th e specific natu re of the area tobe s tudied. Consider, for example, e ighteenth-century naturalhistory. Before applying Bachelardian norms and procedures tothe study of this subject, one must ask when a conceptual cleavage12 occurred whose effects were as revolutionary as were thoseof the introduction of relat ivi ty and quantum mechanics intophysics. Such a cleavage is barely p erc ep tib le in th e early Darwinian years,13 and, to the extent that it is visible at all, it is onlyas a resul t of subsequent cataclysms: the r ise of genet ics andmolecular biology.

Hence, the recurrence method must be used judiciously, andwe must learn more about the nature of epistemological breaks.Often, the historian in search of a major watershed is temptedto follow Kant in assuming that science begins with a flash ofinsight, a work of genius. Frequently the effects of that flash aresaid to be all-embracing, affecting the whole of a scientist's wrork.But the reality is diffe ren t. Even within one man's work we oftenfind a series of fundamental or partial insights rather than a singledram atic break. A theory is woven of many strands, some of whichmay be quite new while others are borrowed from older fabrics.The Copernican and Galilean revolutions did not sweep away tradition in one fell swoop. Alexandre Koyre has located what heconsiders to be the decis ive "mutat ion" in Galileo's work, thedecis ive change in thinking that made him unable to acceptmedieval mechanics and astronomy.14 For Koyre, the elevationof math em atics - arith m etic and geo m etry - to the status of keyto inte lligibility in physics indicated a rejec tion of A ristotle infavor of Plato. Koyrc's argument is sufficiently well known that I

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need n ot discuss it in de tail. But in pain ting a qu ite accura te picture of Galileo as an Archimedean as much as a Platonist, is notKoyre abusing the freedom of the recurrence method? 1 5 And ishe not somewhat overstating the case in saying that the changein Galileo's thinking marked a total repudiation of Aristotelian-ism? Is not Ludovico Geymonat right to point out that Koyre'sinterpretation neglects all that Galileo preserved from Aristotelian tradition even as he was proposing that mathematics be usedto bolster logic?16 Thus, Koyre is himself challenged on the verypoint on which he chal lenged Pierre Duhem when he wro t e ,uThe apparent continuity in the development of physics from theMiddle Ages to the present [a continuity that Jean-Paul Caverniand Pierre Maurice Duhem have so assiduously stressed] is illusory, . . . No matter how well the groundwork has been laid, a revolution is still a revolution."17 [Ideology and Rationality, pp. 1315]Science and Scientific IdeologiesWhat is scientific ideology?[7] Scien tific ideology , un like a po litical class ideolog y, is no tfalse consciousness. Nor is it false science. The essence of falsescience is that it never encounters falsehood, never renounces anything, and never has to change its language. For a false scienceth e re is no p rescien tif ic state . Th e assertions of a false sciencecan never be falsified. Hence, false science has no history. Bycontra st, a scientific ideology does have a history. A scientific ideology comes to an end when the place that it occupied in theencyclopedia of knowledge is taken over by a discipline that operationally demonstrates the validity of its own claim to scientificstatus, i ts own "norms of scientificity." At that point, a certainform of non scienc e is excluded from the dom ain of scien ce. I say"nonscience 11 rather than use Bogdan Suchodolski's term "anti

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sc i ence" s imp ly in o rde r to t ake no te o f t he fac t t ha t , i n a sc i en t i f ic i d e o l o g y , t h e r e is a n e x p l i c i t a m b i t i o n t o b e s c i e n c e , ini m i t a t i o n o f s o m e a lr e a dy c o n s t i t u t e d m o d e l o f w h a t s c i e n c e is.[T h i s is a c r u c i a l p o i n t . T h e e x i s t e n c e ol s c i e n t i f i c i d e o l o g i e sim pl i e s th e pa ra ll e l and p r io r ex i s t e nc e o f sc i en t i f i c d i s co urs es .H e n c e , i t also p re s u p p o s e s t h a t a d i s t i n c t i o n h a s a l r e a d y b e e nm a d e b e t w e e n science a n d r e l i g i o n .

C o n s i d e r t h e c a s e o f a t o m i s m . D e m o c r i t u s , E p i c u r u s an dLucre t iu s c l a imed sc i en t i f i c s t a tu s fo r t he i r phys ics and psycho l ogy . To th e an t i sc ie nc e of re l ig ion they oppo sed th e an t i re l ig ion ofs c i e n c e . Sc i e n t if i c i d e o lo g y n e g l e c t s t h e m e t h o d o l o g i ca l r e q u i r e m e n t s an d o p e ra t i o n a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f s c i e n ce in t h a t re a l m o fex pe r i en ce i t cho oses to ex p lo re ; bu t i t is no t the r eby ign ora nc e ,and i t doe s no t scorn or rep ud ia te the funct ion of sc ien ce . H en ce ,scientific i deo logy i s by no means the same th ing a s supe rs t i t i on ,for ideology has i ts place, possibly usurped, in t he rea lm o f knowl e d g e , not in the rea lm of re l ig ious belief. N or is i t sup e r s t i t i o nin the s t r i c t e tym olo g ic a l sen se . A su pe rs t i t i on is a be l i e f f roman o ld re l ig ion th a t pe rs i s t s de sp i t e i t s p r oh ib i t io n by a new re l ig i o n . Sc ien t i f i c ideo logy docs indeed s t and ove r [superstore] a si tetha t wi l l even tua l ly be oc cu p i ed by sc i e nc e . Bu t sc i en ce is no tmerely overlain; i t i s pushed aside [deportare] by ideo logy . There -t o r e , w he n sc i en ce even tua l ly sup p la n t s ideo logy , i t is no t in th es it e e x p e c t e d . [Ideology and Rationality, p p . 32-34]How scientific ideologies disappear and appear[8 ] Fo r an o th e r , I ho pe conv inc ing , ex am ple o f t he way in w h ic hscien t i f ic ideologies a re supplan ted by sc ience , consider the Men-de l i an theo ry o f he r ed i ty . Mos t h i s to r i an s o f b io log y be l i eve tha tMaupertuis was the fo re runner o f modern gene t i cs because in h i sVenus physique h e c o n s i d e r e d t h e m e c h a n i s m s by w h i c h n o r m a land abnormal t ra i t s a re t ransmi t t ed . He a l so used the ca lcu lus o f

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probabil i t ies to decide whether the frequency of a part icularabnormality within a particular family was or was not fortuitous,and explained hybridization bv assuming the existence of seminal atoms, heredi tary elements that combined during copulation. But it is enough to compare the writings of Maupertuis andMendel to see the magnitude of the gap between a science andthe ideology that it replaces. The facts that Mendel studies arenot those gleaned by a casual observer; they are obtained throughsystematic research research dictated by the nature of Mendel'sproblem, for which there is no precedent in the pre-Mendelianliterature. Mendel invented the idea of a character, by which hemeant not the elementary agent of hereditary transmission butthe element of heredity itself. A M endel ian character could en terinto combinat ion with n other characters, and one could measure the frequency of its appearance in successive generations.Mendel was not interested in structure, fertilization or development. For him, hybridization was not a way of establishing theconstancy or inconstancy of a global type; it was a way of decomposing a tvpe, an instrument of analysis, a tool for separating characters that made it necessary to work with large samples. Hence,Mendel was interested in hybrids despite his repudiation of an age-old tradition of hybrid research. He was not interested in sexuality or in the controversy over innate versus acquired traits or overpreformation versus epigenesis. He was interested only in verifying his hypothesis via the calculation of combinat ions.1* Mendelneglected everything that interested those who in reality were nothis predecessors at all. The seven tee nth-century ideology of hereditary transmission is replete with observations of animal and planthybrids and monsters. Such curiosity served several purposes. Itsupported one side or the other in the debates between prefor-mationists and epigenesists, ovists and antmalculists. As a result,it was useful in resolving legal questions concerning the subor-

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clination of the sexes, paternity, the purity of bloodlines and thelegitimacy of the aristocracy* These concerns were not unrelatedto the controversy between innatism and sensualism. The technology of hybridization was perfected by agronomists in searchof advantageous varieties, as well as by botanists interested in therelations between species. Only by isolating Maupertuis's Venusphysique from its context can that work be compared with theVersuche uber Pflanzenhybriden. Mendel 's science is not the endpoint of a trail that can be traced back to the ideology it replaced,for the simple reason that that ideology followed not one but several trails, and none was a course set by science itself. All were,rather, legacies of various traditions, some old, others more recent . Ovism and animalculism were not of the same age as theem pirical and mytholo gical arg um en ts advanced in favor of aristocracy. The ideology of heredity 1 9 was excessively and naivelyambitious. It sought to resolve a number of important theoretical and practical legal problems without having examined theirfoundations. Mere the ideology simply withered away by attrit ion. But the elimination of i ts scientific underpinnings broughtit into focus as an ideology. The characterization of a certain setof observations and deductions as an ideology came after the disqualification of its claim to be a science. This was accomplishedby the development of a new discourse , which ci rcumscr ibedits field of validity and proved itself through the consistency ofits results.

[9] Instructive as it is to study the way in which scientific ide ologies disappear, it is even more instructive to study how theyappear. Consider briefly the genesis of a nineteenth-century scient if ic ideology, evolut ionism. The work of Herbert Spencermakes an interesting case study. Spencer believed that he couldstate a universally valid law of progress in te rm s of evolu tion fromthe simple to the complex through successive differentiations.

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Everything, in other words, evolves from more to less homogeneity and from lesser to greater individuation: the solar system,the animal organism, l iving species, man, society, and the products of human thought and act iv i ty , inc luding language. Spencerexplicit ly states that he derived this law of evolution by generalizing the principles of embryology contained in Karl-Ernst vonBaer's Uber Entwickelungsgeschichtc der Thiere (1828) . The publ ication of the Origin of Species in 1859 confirmed Spencer ' s conv ic tion that his generalized theory of evolution shared the sc ient i f icvalidity of Darwin's biology. But he also claimed for his law ofev olu t ion the supp ort of a sc ie nc e m ore f irmly establ i shed thanthe new bio logy: he c la imed to have deduced the phenomenonof evolut ion from the law of conservation of energy, which hemaintained could be used to prove that homogeneous states areunstab le . If on e fo l lows the de velo pm en t of Spencer's work, i tseems clear that he used von Baer's and, later, Darwin's biologyto lend scientif ic support to his views on social engineering innin ete en th -ce nt ur y Engl i sh industr ia l soc iety , in part icular , hisadvocacy of free enterprise , pol i t ica l indiv idual i sm and competi t i on . From the law ol differentiat ion, he deduced that the indi v idua l must be supported aga ins t the s ta te . But perhaps th i s" d e d u c t i o n " was contained in the principles of the Spenceriansystem from the very beginning.

T h e l a w s o f m e c h a n i c s , e m b r y o l o g y an d e v o l u t i o n c a n n o tval idly be extended beyond the domain proper to each of thesesciences. To what end are specific theoretical conclusions severedfrom their prem ises and appl ied ou t of co nt ex t to human experi ence in general , part icularly soc ia l experience? To a pract ica len d. Evolu tionist id eo log y was used to justify industrial so cie tyas against traditional so ciety, o n th e on e hand, and th e de m an dsof workers, on the other. It was in part antitheological , in partantiso c ia l i s t . Th us, evo lut ion ist ide olo gy was an ide olog y in the

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Marxist sense: a representation of nature or society whose truthlav not in what it said but in what it hid. Of course, evolutionismwas far broader than Spencer's ideology. But Spencer's views hada lasting influence on linguists and anthropologists . His ideologygave meaning to the word primitive and salved the conscience ofcolonialists . A remnant of i ts legacy can sti l l be found in thebehavior of advanced societies toward so-called underdevelopedcountries, even though anthropology has long since recognizedthe plurality of cu ltur es, presumab ly m aking it illegitim ate forany one culture to set itself up as the yardstick by which all others are measured. In freeing themselves from their evolutionistorigins, contemporary linguistics, ethnology and sociology haveshown that an ideology disappears when his torical condit ionscease to be compatible with i ts existence. The theory of evolution has changed since Darw in, bu t D arwinism is an integral partof the history of the science of evolution. By contrast, evolutionist ideology is merely an inoperative residue in the history of thehuman sciences. [Ideology and Rationality, pp. 34-37]

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C H A P T E R T W O

T h e V a r i o u s M o d e l s

The Positivist Tradition[10] Events co m ple tely e xtrinsic to science and logic, portrayedconventionally if at all in standard histories of scientific research,yield an account that claims, if only in ritual fashion, to trace thelogical develo pm en t of a scien tific idea. Th is wo uld be surprising only if there were no distinction between science and the history of science. In that case, a biologist could write a history ofhis work in exactly the same way as he would write a scientificpaper, relying on exactly the same criteria he would use in evaluating the truth of a hypothesis or the potential of a particular lineof research. But to proceed in this way is to treat hypotheses andresearch programs not as projects but as objects. When a scientific pr op os itio n is judged to be tru e, it takes on a retro activ evalidity. It ceases to be part of the endless stream of forgottendreams, discarded projects, failed procedures and erroneous conclusions - things, in short, for which someone must shoulder theresponsibility. The elimination of the false by the true that is,the verified - appe ars, on ce it is acc om plish ed, to be the quasi-mechanical effect of ineluctable, impersonal necessity. Importingsuch n orms of judg m ent into the historical domain is, therefore,an inevitable source of misunderstanding. The retroactive effect

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of the truth influences even one's assessment of the respectivecontributions of various investigators to a scientific discovery (anassessment that only a specialist is competent to make), becausethe tendency is to see the history of the subject in the light oftoday's truth, which is easily confused with eternal truth. But iftruth is eternal, if it never changes, then there is no history: thehistorical content of science is reduced to zero. It should comeas no surprise that it was positivism, a philosophy of history basedon a generalization of the n otion that theory ineluctably succeedstheory as the true supplants the false, that led to science's contempt for history. Over time, a research laboratory's library tendsto divide into two parts: a museum and a working reference library.Th e m useum section co ntains books w hose pages one turns as onemight examine a flint ax, whereas the reference section containsbooks that one explores in minute detail , as with a microtome.[Formation du reflexe, p p . 155-56][II] Eduard Jan Dijksterhuis, the author of Die Mechanisier-ung des Weltbildes, thinks that the history of science is not onlyscience's memory but also epistemology's laboratory. This phrasehas been quoted frequently. The idea, which has been acceptedby num erou s specialists, has a less well know n a nte ce de nt. PierreFlourens, referring in his eulogy of Georges Cuvier to the Histoiredes sciences naturelies published by Magdelaine de Saint-Agy, statesthat the history of science "subjects the human mind to experimen t .. .makes an experimental theory of the human spirit." Sucha co nce ption is tantamo unt to mo deling the relation betw een thehistory of science and the science of which it is the history onthe relation between the sciences and the objects of which theyare sciences. But exp erim en tation is only on e of the ways in whichscience relates to objects, and it is not self-evident that this isthe relevant analogy for understanding history's relation to its object. Furthermore, in the hands of its recent champion, the meth-

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odological statement has an epistemological corollary, namely,that there exists an eternal scientific method. In some periodsthis method remains dormant, while in others it is vigorous andactive. Gerd Buchdahl has characterized this corollary as naive,20and one would be inclined to agree if he were willing to applythe same description to the empiricism or positivism underlyinghis own view. It is no accident that I attack positivism at this pointin the argument: for after Flourens but before Dijksterhuis, PierreLafitte, a confirmed discip le o f Auguste Comte, compared thehistory of science to a "mental microscope" 2 1 The use of suchan instrument, Lafitte suggests, reveals hidden truths: the understanding of science is deepened through discussion of the difficulties sc ientists faced in making their discoveries and propagatingtheir results. The image of the microscope defines the contextas the laboratory, and there is, I think, a positivist bias in the ideathat history is simply an injection of duration into the expositionof scientific results. A microscope merely magnifies otherw iseinvisible objects; the objects exist whether or not one uses theinstrument to look for them. The implicit assumption is that thehistorian's object is lying there waiting for him. Ail he has to dois look for it, just as a scientist might look for something with amicroscope. [Etudes, pp. 12-13]Historical Epistemology[12] To understand the function and meaning of the history ofscience, one can contrast the image of the laboratory with thatof a school or tribunal, that is, an institution where judgment ispassed on either the past of knowledge or knowledge of the past.But if judgment is to be passed, a judge is essential. Epistemol- 'ogy provides a principle on which judgment can be based: it jteaches the historian the language spoken at some point in theevolution of a particular scientific discipline, say, chemistry. The

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historian then takes that knowledge and searches backward intime until the later vocabulary ceases to be intelligible, or untilit can no longer be translated into the less rigorous lexicon of anearl ier period, Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier, for example, introduced a new n om enclature into chemistry. I Ience, the languagespoken by chemists after Lavoisier points up semantic: gaps inthe language of earlier practitioners. It has not been suflicientlynoticed or admired that Lavoisier, in the "Discours pre l imina^e"to his Traite elemental re dc chimie, assumed full responsibility tortwo decisions that left him open to criticism: "revising the language spoken by our teachers'1 and failing to provide "any his tori-.cal account of the opinions of my predecessors/ ' It was as thoughhe understood the lesson of Descartes, that to insti tute a newbranch of knowledge is in effect to sever one's ties to whateverhad presumptively usurped its place.

There are in fact two versions of the history of science: the history of obsolete knowledge and the history of sanctioned knowledge, by which I mean knowledge that plays an active [agissant]role in its own time. Without epistemology it is impossible todistinguish between the two. Gaston Bachelard was the first tomake this distinction.22 His decision to recount the history of scientific experiments and concepts in the light of the latest scientific principles has long since demonstrated its worth.

Alexandre Koyre's idea of the history of science was basicallysimilar to Bachelarcrs. True, Koyre's epistemology was closer toEmile Meyerson's than to Bachelard's, and more keenly attunedto the continuity of the rational function than to the dialecticsof rationalist activity. Yet it was because he recognized the roleof epistemology in doing history of science that he cast his Etudesgalile'ennes and The Astronomical Revolution in the form that he did.

Is the dating o^an "epis temological break" a cont ingent orsubjective judgment? To see that the answer is no, one need onlv

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no te tha t Kovre and Bachelard we re interested in different periodsin t h e h is t o ry o f t h e e x a c t s c i e n ce s . F u r t h e rm o r e , t h e s e p e r i o d swe re n o r equally e q u i p p e d t o d e a l m a t h e m a t i ca l l y w i t h t h e p ro b l ems o f phys ics . Kovre b e g a n w i t h C o p e r n i c u s a n d e n d e d w i t hN e w t o n , w h e r e B a c h e l a r d b e g a n . Key re's e pi stemo l og ica l obse r v a t i o n s t e n d t o co n f i rm Bachelard's v iew tha t a "continuist" history of sc ience i s the h is tory of a vounu s c i e n ce . Ko v re believed,for i n s t an ce , t ha t sc i enc e is t he o ry and tha t t heo ry is fund am ental ly m a t h e m a t i z a t i o n . ( G a l i l e o , fo r e x a m p l e , is m o r e A r c h i m ed ean than P l a to n i s t . ) He a l so he ld tha t e r ro r is i nev i t ab le inth e pu rsu i t o f sc i en t i f i c t ru th . To s tudy t he h i s to ry o f a t heo ry i sto s tudy the h is tory of the theorist's d o u b t s . " C o p e r n i c u s . . . w asno t a Copernican "

T h e h i s t o ry o f s c i e n ce t h u s c l a i m s t h e r i g h t t o m a k e j u d g ments of sc ien t i f ic va lue . By "judgment," h o we v e r , I d o n o t me a npur ge or ex ec ut io n . H is tory is no t an inver ted im age of sc ien t i f icp r o g r e s s . It is n o t a p o r t r a i t in p e r s p e c t i v e , w i t h t r a n s c e n d e ddoctrines in th e fore gro un d and toda y ' s t ru t h w ay off a t th e "van i s h i n g p o i n t . " It i s , ra ther , an e ffor t to d iscover and expla in tow h a t e x t e n t d i s c r e d i t e d n o t i o n s , a t t i t u d e s o r m e t h o d s w e r e , i nt h e i r d ay , u s e d t o d i s c r e d i t o t h e r n o t i o n s , a t t i t u d e s o r m e t h o d s -and therefore an effort to discover in what respects the discreditedpast remains the past of an act ivi ty that s t i l l deserves to be cal leds c i e n t i f i c . It is as i m p o r t a n t t o u n d e r s t a n d w h a t t h e pa s t t a u g h tas It is to find ou t why we no longer believe in i ts lessons. [Etudes,p p . 13-14]

Empiricist Logicism[13] It is easy to d i s t ing u i sh b e t w ee n w ha t Bache la rd ca l ls "n o r m a l i t y " 2 * a nd w h a t T h o m a s K u h n ca l ls " n o rm a l s c i en ce ." -1 4 T h et w o epistemologies d o s h a re ce r t a i n p o i n t s i n co mmo n : i n p a r t i cu l a r , t h e o b s e rv a t i o n t h a t s c i e n t i f i c t e x t b o o k s o v e re mp h a s i z e

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the continuity of scientific research. Both stress the discontinuous nature of progress. Nevertheless, while the fundamental concepts share a family resemblance, they do not really belong tothe same branch. This has been noted by Father Francois Russo,who, despite reservations about the claims of superiority to whichepistemological historians are sometimes prone, argues that Kuhnis mistaken about the nature of scientific rationality ^ such .2 5Though ostensibly concerned to preserve Karl Popper's emphasis on the necessity of theory and its priority over experiment,Kuhn is unable to shake off the legacy oflogical positivism andjoin the rationalist camp, where his key concepts of "parad igm"and "normal science" would seem to place him. These conceptspresuppose intentionality and regulation, and as such they implythe possibility of a break with established rules and procedures.Kuhn would have them play this role without granting them themeans to do so, for he regards them as simple cultural facts. Forhim, a paradigm is the result of a choice by its users. Normal science is defined by the practice in a given period of a group ofspecialists in a university research setting. Instead of concepts ofphilosophical critique, we are dealing with mere social psychology. This accounts for the embarrassment evident in the appendix to the second edition of the Structure of Scientific Revolutionswhen it comes to answering the que stion of how th e truth of atheory is to be understood. [Ideology and Rationality, pp. 12-13]Internalism and Externalism[14] How does one do the history of science, and how shouldone do it? Th is question raises an oth er: what is the history of scienc e a history of? Many authors apparently take the answer to thissecond question for granted, to judge by the fact that they neverexplicit ly ask it . Take, for example, the debates between whatEnglish-speaking writers call internalists and externalists.26 Exter-

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nalism is a way of writing the history of science by describing aset of events, which are called "scientific" for reasons having moreto do with tradition than with critical analysis, in terms of theirrelation to economic and social interests, technological needs andpractices, and religious or political ideologies. In short, this isan attenuated or, rather, impoverished version of Marxism, onerather common today in the world's more prosperous societies*-17Internalism (which externalists characterize as "idealism") is theview that there is no history of science unless one places oneselfwithin the scientific endeavor itself in order to analyze the procedures by which it seeks to satisfy the specific norms that allowit to be defined as science rather than as technology or ideology.In this perspective, the historian of science is supposed to adopta theoret ical attitude toward his specimen theories; he there forehas as much right to formulate models and hypotheses as scientists themselves.Clearly, both the internalist and externalist positions conflatethe object of the history of science with the object of a science.The externalist sees the history of science as a m atte r of explainingcultural phenomena in terms of the cultural milieu; he thereforeconfuses the history of science with the naturalist sociology ofinstitutions and fails to interpret the truth claims intrinsic to scientific discourse. The internalist sees the facts of the history ofscience, such as instances of simultaneous discovery (of moderncalculus, for example, or the law of conservation of energy), asfacts wh ose historv cannot be w ritten w itho ut a theorv. Th us,a fact in the history of science is treated as a fact of science, aprocedure perfect ly compatible with an epistemology accordingto which theory rightfully takes priority over empirical data.[Etudes, pp . 14-1S]

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7/22/2019 Georges Ca

Georges Canguilhem author, François Delaporte editor A Vital Rationalist Selected Writings from...

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