Geographies of Surveillance

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Geographies of Surveillance Stephen Graham Newcastle University

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Transcript of Geographies of Surveillance

Page 1: Geographies of Surveillance

Geographies of Surveillance

Stephen Graham Newcastle University

Page 2: Geographies of Surveillance

Surveillance: What is It? What might its geographies be?

•  Split into groups of 2 •  Spend 10 minutes coming up with a definition of

surveillance and brainstorming all the areas and activities in your life that you think are subject to some form of mediated or computerised surveillance

•  For each, note down the geographical dimensions of the surveillance process. Where, for example, are the surveillers and the surveilled? How are they related?

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The Ambivalence of Surveillance

•  A definition: The monitoring of social behaviour over various distances in attempts to minimize risks or attempt social control

•  All social relationships necessarily involve surveillance. Often very positive effects…

•  Paradox: city life, long attractive for its anonymity and the potential to escape often suffocating surveillance and social control in rural communities, increasingly saturated by tracking, monitoring, remembering, devices

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Foucault’s Disciplinary Societies •  Michel Foucault (top) Discipline and Punish.

Social control in modern, disciplinary societies, rests of extended array of enclosed, disciplinary, spaces: clinics, prisons, schools, factories, workhouses, barracks…

•  Panopticon design principles (after English philosopher/reformer, Jeremy Bentham 1748-1832, bottom)

•  The power of visibility and the gaze •  Social control based on the possibilities of being

constantly monitored, even if controller not actually present

•  Social control and docility become internalised within subjects so heavy-handed authoritarian power is not needed

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Bentham’s Panopticon

Prison

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Deleuze (1925-1995): Postscript on Societies of Control (1988)

•  Shift away from physical, panoptic, design, to embedded, technological sensors, spread through, and constituting, society

•  Continuous, interconnecting, machinic, desocialised, and increasingly automated surveillance operating simultaneously over many scales: body to globe

•  “In the disciplinary societies one was always starting again (from school to the barracks, from the barracks to the factory), while in societies of control one is never finished with anything”

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From Modern Bureaucracies to the Data Image •  Closely related to remediations and shifts

to ubiquitous computing: “sentient environments”

•  Globalization, automation, shift to biometric systems

•  Underpins new consumption, distribution and production practices: saturates popular culture and imaginative practices

•  Behaviours, tastes, movements, continuously project and refine one’s ‘data image’

•  Simulations and social profiles incraesingly shaped through surveillance of actual behaviour

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Case Study 1: Street CCTV •  3 million cameras in UK •  Average Londoner viewed 300 times per day! •  Linked to privatization and enclosure of public

space and normalisation of shopping-mall style controls: “malls without walls”

•  Moral panics e.g. Jamie Bulger murder, Liverpool •  Geographical diffusion towards near ubiquity •  “Surveillance creep” as extra functions added •  Militarisation of law enforcement: ‘Homeland

Security’

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CCTV on a Typical NYC Shopping Street

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“Normative Space-Time Ecologies” Norris and Armstrong

•  Ethnographic analysis of control rooms Norris and Armstrong’s book The Maximum Surveillance Society

•  Categorical judgment based on notions of ‘normality’

•  Visual stereotypes used to define ‘abnormal’ people and behaviours and so mobilise law enforcement or exclusion

•  Black men, in certain dress, and groups of teenagers, main ‘targets’; women largely ignored except as targets for voyeuristic, sexualised, gaze

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Towards Facial Recognition or “Algorithmic” CCTV

•  Trials in Newham, East London, late 1990s; US Superbowl, airport security

•  Also “gait recognition” (walking style) •  Huge investment and R and D but still very ineffective

on city streets •  ”Unlike other biometrics [it] can operate

anonymously in the background" (Koskela, 2003). •  In future, may allow CCTV to extend to be a ‘5th

Utility’? •  Potentially a social and spatial tracking system

monitoring named individuals and silently and continuously alerting security personnel of presence of know on potential offenders

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The Racial and Social Politics of Facial

Recognition

•  Various trials of facial recognition CCTV •  Introna 2003 "for the top systems identification rates for males were

6% to 9% points higher than for females. Recognition rates for older people were higher than for younger people" (2003, 20).

•  Quotes the official report evaluating a trial which confirms that "Asians are easier [to recognise] than whites, African-Americans are easier than whites, [and] other race members are easier than whites" (FRVT, 2002)

•  See Graham’s “Software-sorted geographies”, PIHG, 2005.

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2. “Smart Borders”: Passports and National ID Cards •  Shift to digital and biometric

passports and migration control •  Possible even RFIDs: “ubiquitous

borders” •  Global tracking systems •  Easier to identify and exclude

‘illegal’ migrants as they will not have parallel, biometric identifier moving with their bodies through the system

•  Uses agency of code to further separate acceptable/celebrated and demonised mobilities

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3. Software-Sorted Services and Neoliberal Restructuring

•  New surveillance capabilities used to differentiated consumers, “unbundle” services, reduce risks and improve profitability from point of view of service suppliers

•  Everything from road space, train fares, internet packets, to call centre waiting times prioritised and treated differentially through surveillance

•  Underpins a “splintering urbanism”(Graham and Marvin, 2001)

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Call Centre Queuing: The Politics of Invisible

Bypass •  E.g. “Automatic queue

prioritization. This allows [service providers] to identify “high value” members. Calls

from such members are automatically are bumped to the front of the phone queue

so they’re answered immediately.”

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The Post 9/11 “Surveillance Surge” •  Ubiquitous anti-terror discourse

undermines criticism and democratic debate: ‘chilling effect’

•  Surveillance ‘creep’ as anti-terrorism rationale added to others eg London Road Pricing

•  ‘Security’ mantra overwhelms civil, social and urban policy domains

•  Huge supply-push, as military industrial companies colonise civil markets with military technologies

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Surveillance, Voyeurism, Exhibitionism •  Surveillance increasingly celebrated,

even fetishised, within popular culture •  Deepening connection between CCTV

capture, ordinary TV camera feeds, and broadcast TV/multimedia

•  Proliferation of digital video cameras and web cams

•  Surveillance blurs with simulation •  Reality TV, crime and police chase

shows, also dystopian movies like The Matrix and The Truman Show

•  Surveillance intrinsic to deepening celebrity culture and ‘society of spectacle’ (Guy Debord)

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4. Jordan Crandall: Tracking, Militarization and ‘Armed Vision”

•  “While civilian images are embedded in processes of identification based on reflection, militarised perspectives collapse identification processes into “Id-ing” - a one-way channel of identification in which a conduit, a database, and a body are aligned and calibrated” (Crandall 1999)

•  “tracking is integral” to the emerging modes of governance and sovereign and military power based on anticipatory seeing. ” (Crandall 1999)

•  this widespread integration of computerised tracking with databases of ‘targets’ represent little but of “a gradual colonization of the now, a now always slightly ahead of itself” (Crandall 1999).

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Jordan Crandall stresses: •  Automated linkages of databases to sensors

and tracking systems (airports, e-commerce, borders, GPS, road charging, oyster cards, algorithmic surveillance etc.)

•  Way these provide anticipatory forms of surveillance based on risk-profiling of people as ‘safe’ or ‘dangerous’ and automatic, military-style identification and tracking of the latter

•  Ways in which these form a system of what he calls ‘armed vision’

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Conclusion: The Surveillant Assemblage (Kevin Haggerty)

•  Remediations of social control: Increasing interconnection, normalisation, automation, distanciation, globalisation, simulation

•  Closely related to application of neoliberal models of service and spatial restructuring: ‘premium’ services for targeted groups and increasingly problematic access for those deemed unprofitable or risky who are demonised, criminalised, or electronically pushed away

•  Might spaces without surveillance may become sources of fear? E.g. CCTV ‘5th utility’ idea

•  Digitisation of societal and social memory. Shift away from a politics or possibility of forgetting?

•  The ‘calculative background’ (Thrift) and politics of code increasingly shape social control, prioritisation, judgment, and geographies of power. But such code is hidden and very hard to excavate/research.

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•  But, not a simple shift to an all-seeing, ‘panoptic’ society! Multitude of overlapping and intersecting ‘Little Brothers’ rather than a single, panoptic, all-seeing Big Brother.

•  Not simple, authoritarian, centralisation. Often, extended surveillance is embraced, encouraged, constructed by subjects.

•  Multiple circuits, sites and geographies at play. Basis for service customisation, identity-self formation, popular culture etc.

•  As Koskella (2003) suggests, "urban space will always remain less knowable and, thus, less controllable than the restricted panoptic space".

•  Spaces which escape surveillance do and will remain. Amin and Thrift (2002, 128): ”the networks of control that snake their way through cities are necessarily oligoptic, not panoptic: they do not fit together. They will produce various spaces and times, but they cannot fill out the whole space of the city".

•  A politics of transgressing, resisting, and even dismantling inequitable surveillance is possible