Generosity and social distance in dictator game field ... · Experimental design, 1 Experiment took...
Transcript of Generosity and social distance in dictator game field ... · Experimental design, 1 Experiment took...
Generosity and social distance in dictator game field experiments with
and without a face By
Sosina Bezu and Stein Holden
School of Economics and Business
Norwegian University of Life Sciences
www.steinholden.com
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Introduction The dictator game may be the simplest tool for
investigating generosity (Dufwenberg and Muren 2006)
There are mixed evidences on the gender differences and
effects of social distance on generosity (Eckel and
Grossman 1998; Dufwenberg and Muren 2006)
– Could be due to variations in methods and framing
effects
Do findings in lab experiments in the West generalize to
poor people in developing countries?
– Contexts where women have a much weaker social
position
– Family networks may be more important in such contexts
and affect the extent of generosity and interdependence
of preferences
Genero
sity a
nd so
cial d
istance
in d
ictato
r gam
e fie
ld
experim
ents w
ith a
nd w
ithout a
face
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Theoretical model
Genero
sity a
nd so
cial d
istance
in d
ictato
r gam
e fie
ld
experim
ents w
ith a
nd w
ithout a
face
,i i
j j ig g
i
v X xU U x
d
Building on Fehr and Schmidt (2005): Taking into
account social preferences and interdependent
preferences:
Individual and interpersonal characteristics of the
person ( )
Marginal utility effect on the other party,
Social distance (d )
Gender-specific preferences (g )
j
j iv X x
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Hypotheses (1) a) Family members are more likely to receive positive
amounts/receive larger amounts in dictator games than
anonymous villagers from the same village (effect of social
distance)
b) Generous family members (spouses) are more likely to get
positive amounts (and receive larger amounts) than less
generous family members (spouses) (interdependent
preferences)
c) Persons who are more generous towards anonymous
villagers are also likely to be more generous towards their own
family members and vice versa (social preferences)
d) Exposure to generous family members contributes to
generous behavior towards anonymous persons (responsive
social preferences)
4
Genero
sity a
nd so
cial d
istance
in d
ictato
r gam
e fie
ld
experim
ents w
ith a
nd w
ithout a
face
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Hypotheses (2)
e) Women are more generous to their husbands and
anonymous villagers (have stronger social preferences)
than men are.
f) Spouses that themselves selected each other through
voluntary marriage contracts (love marriage) are more
generous towards each other in dictator games than
spouses that were married through involuntary or
enforced marriages
5
Genero
sity a
nd so
cial d
istance
in d
ictato
r gam
e fie
ld
experim
ents w
ith a
nd w
ithout a
face
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Sampling and data
A sample of 600 households in 17 villages in Southern
Ethiopia surveyed in 2007 and 2012 to investigate
impacts of a land tenure reform aiming to strengthen
household tenure security and women’s land rights
through joint land certification of husbands and wives
Social experiments: Dictator games in 2012
– With husbands and wives in monogamous households:
385 households
– With husbands and wives in polygamous households: 90
households
– With one other family member in remaining households
Genero
sity a
nd so
cial d
istance
in d
ictato
r gam
e fie
ld
experim
ents w
ith a
nd w
ithout a
face
6
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Experimental design, 1
Experiment took 1 day in each village
Designed to prevent communication between households
and household members during the experiment
– Separate play room and two waiting rooms/places
– Household couples were called one at the time
– Coin toss (1) to identify a “winner” to play first, the loser
had to wait in the other waiting room till all “winners”
had played
– The winner was given 40 EB and two stated preference
questions for willingness to share with the waiting family
member/spouse and with an anonymous person in the
sample of households in the village
– Coin toss (2) to determine whom to share with of the two
7
Genero
sity a
nd so
cial d
istance
in d
ictato
r gam
e fie
ld
experim
ents w
ith a
nd w
ithout a
face
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Experimental design, 2
First player receives her/his money and amount given to
family/anonymous person is put in an envelope
Player is asked to hide the money, go home an not talk to
anybody about the game or what was won
Same procedure for all pairs
Losers are called one by one in the same order
Are asked the same “what if” stated preference (hypothetical)
questions about what they would allocate to spouse/family
member and anonymous person
They are given the envelope that either comes from their
spouse or anonymous person with an amount topped up with
10 EB
They are asked to hide the envelope, and go home without
talking to anybody
DETTE E
R T
ITTELEN
PÅ P
RESEN
TASJO
NEN
8
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Example of location for field experiments
9
Genero
sity a
nd so
cial d
istance
in d
ictato
r gam
e fie
ld
experim
ents w
ith a
nd w
ithout a
face
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Example of game environment
10
Genero
sity a
nd so
cial d
istance
in d
ictato
r gam
e fie
ld
experim
ents w
ith a
nd w
ithout a
face
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Another “field lab” location
11
Genero
sity a
nd so
cial d
istance
in d
ictato
r gam
e fie
ld
experim
ents w
ith a
nd w
ithout a
face
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
DETTE E
R T
ITTELEN
PÅ P
RESEN
TASJO
NEN
12
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Allocation to spouse by husbands and wives
020
40
60
0 10 20 30 40 0 10 20 30 40
Husbands Wives
Pe
rce
nt
How much money allocated, EB
Graphs by Gender of player
Genero
sity a
nd so
cial d
istance
in d
ictato
r gam
e fie
ld
experim
ents w
ith a
nd w
ithout a
face
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Allocation to anonymous villager
020
40
60
80
0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30
Husbands Wives
Pe
rce
nt
How much money allocated, EB
Graphs by Gender of player
Genero
sity a
nd so
cial d
istance
in d
ictato
r gam
e fie
ld
experim
ents w
ith a
nd w
ithout a
face
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Mean allocations by gender and receiver
15
Allocation to spouse Allocation to
anonymous villager
Probability of
non-zero
allocation
Average
amount
allocated
Probability
of non-zero
allocation
Average
amount
allocated
Husbands Mean 0.850 16.816 0.291 2.940
St. error 0.018 0.462 0.023 0.283
N 380 380 385 385
Wives Mean 0.766 14.408 0.255 2.455
St. error 0.022 0.448 0.022 0.251
N 380 380 385 385
Genero
sity a
nd so
cial d
istance
in d
ictato
r gam
e fie
ld
experim
ents w
ith a
nd w
ithout a
face
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Validity of within-household experiments?
A unitary household model would
invalidate the experiments as households
would share the cash after the game
anyway
We assessed the extent of sharing of cash
through separate questions to the spouses
about their ability to mobilize cash for an
urgent need and the extent to which they
could obtain this cash from their spouse
The results follow:
16
Genero
sity a
nd so
cial d
istance
in d
ictato
r gam
e fie
ld
experim
ents w
ith a
nd w
ithout a
face
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Ability to mobilize cash and extent of help from spouse
17
Wives’
cash
mobili-
zation
Get
cash
from
hus-
band
If cash
from
husband,
how
much
Husbands’
cash
mobili-
zation
Get
cash
from
wife
If cash
from
wife,
how
much
Mean, EB 491.64 0.20 145.93 1219.85 0.02 325.00
Median,
EB
200 0 100 500 0 150
St. error 118.00 0.02 17.49 185.60 0.01 150.42
N 366 367 75 352 359 6
Genero
sity a
nd so
cial d
istance
in d
ictato
r gam
e fie
ld
experim
ents w
ith a
nd w
ithout a
face
Indicates clearly limited pooling of cash among
spouses
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Generosity and interdependent preferences, linear probability models with village fixed effects
18
Wife
gives to
husband,
dummy
Husband
gives to
wife,
dummy
Wife gives to
anonymous,
dummy
Husband
gives to
anonymous,
dummy
Real game dummy 0.031 0.076** -0.024 -0.042
(0.040) (0.030) (0.040) (0.050)
Received positive amount 0.312**** 0.018
from husband, dummy (0.060) (0.060)
Received positive amount 0.207**** 0.083
from wife, dummy (0.040) (0.060)
Giver to anonymous, 0.219**** 0.162****
dummy (0.050) (0.040)
Giver to spouse, dummy 0.257**** 0.311****
(0.050) (0.070)
Constant 0.425**** 0.609**** 0.058 -0.016
(0.060) (0.040) (0.070) (0.070)
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.128 0.137 0.068 0.075
Number of observations 380 380 385 385
Genero
sity a
nd so
cial d
istance
in d
ictato
r gam
e fie
ld
experim
ents w
ith a
nd w
ithout a
face
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Wives’ allocation to anonymous villager vs. zero or non-zero allocation to spouse
19
050
10
0
0 5 10 15 20 0 5 10 15 20
0 1
Perc
ent
How much money allocated by wife to anonymous
Graphs by dummy:player gave nonzero amount to spouse
Genero
sity a
nd so
cial d
istance
in d
ictato
r gam
e fie
ld
experim
ents w
ith a
nd w
ithout a
face
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Husbands’ allocation to anonymous villager by zero or non-zero allocation to spouse
20
050
10
0
0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30
0 1
Perc
ent
How much money allocated by husband to anonymous
Graphs by dummy:player gave nonzero amount to spouse
Genero
sity a
nd so
cial d
istance
in d
ictato
r gam
e fie
ld
experim
ents w
ith a
nd w
ithout a
face
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Allocation by wives to husbands by zero or non-zero amount given to anonymous villager
21
020
40
60
80
0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30
0 1
Perc
ent
How much money allocated by wives to husbandGraphs by dummy: player gave nonzero amount to anonymous
Genero
sity a
nd so
cial d
istance
in d
ictato
r gam
e fie
ld
experim
ents w
ith a
nd w
ithout a
face
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Allocation by husbands to wives by zero or non-zero amount given to anonymous villager
22
020
40
60
80
0 10 20 30 40 0 10 20 30 40
0 1
Perc
ent
How much money allocated by husband to wife
Graphs by dummy: player gave nonzero amount to anonymous
Genero
sity a
nd so
cial d
istance
in d
ictato
r gam
e fie
ld
experim
ents w
ith a
nd w
ithout a
face
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Allocation by wives to husbands by zero or non-zero amounts received from husbands
23
020
40
60
80
0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30
0 1
Perc
ent
How much money allocated by wife to husband
Graphs by Dummy:Non-zero amount received from husband
Genero
sity a
nd so
cial d
istance
in d
ictato
r gam
e fie
ld
experim
ents w
ith a
nd w
ithout a
face
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Allocation by husbands to wives by zero or non-zero amount received from wife
24
020
40
60
80
0 10 20 30 40 0 10 20 30 40
0 1
Perc
ent
How much money allocated by hysband to wife
Graphs by Dummy:Non-zero amount received from wife
Genero
sity a
nd so
cial d
istance
in d
ictato
r gam
e fie
ld
experim
ents w
ith a
nd w
ithout a
face
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Correspondence of stated marriage type by spouses
25
Marriage type: females’
responses
Marriage type:
males’ responses Parental
arrange
ment
Parental
and bride
agree-
ment
Love
marri-
age
Wife
ex-
change
Kidnap-
ping
marri-
age
Total
Parental arrangement
60 7 11 1 4 83
Parental and bride
agreement 14 81 7 1 3 106
Love marriage 11 12 132 0 11 166
Wife exchange 0 1 2 5 0 8
Kidnapping marriage 1 1 2 0 18 22
Total 86 102 154 7 36 385
Genero
sity a
nd so
cial d
istance
in d
ictato
r gam
e fie
ld
experim
ents w
ith a
nd w
ithout a
face
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Models with wider sample, incl. polygamous hhs and other hh members than the spouse
26
Prob. of non-zero allocation Non-zero amounts
allocated
Linear probability models Truncated tobit models
Wives Husbands Wives Husbands
Dummy for real game, -0.018 0.023 -1.541*** -0.573
Allocation for whom: Baseline=Allocation for spouse
Son or daughter 0.115 -0.009 -2.478 0.888
Mother or father 0.153 . -1.104 .
Other relative 0.322**** 0.432 -2.442 0.211
Wife 2-4 (polygamous hhs) -0.215**** -0.020 -7.125**** -2.521****
Anonymous person -0.492**** -0.558**** -9.251**** -9.290****
Type of marriage: Baseline=Parental arrangement
Parental and bride agreement -0.053 -0.013 -1.678** -1.904**
Love marriage -0.041 0.020 -1.522** -1.449*
Wife exchange -0.003 -0.105 -0.337 1.883
Kidnapping marriage -0.083 -0.148* -3.911**** -1.540
Genero
sity a
nd so
cial d
istance
in d
ictato
r gam
e fie
ld
experim
ents w
ith a
nd w
ithout a
face
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Summing up: Hypothesis testing/Conclusions 1
Hypothesis a) that family members are more likely to receive
positive amounts/receive larger amounts in dictator games than
anonymous villagers from the same village (effect of social
distance); cannot be rejected;
Hypothesis b) that generous family members (spouses) are
more likely to get positive amounts than less generous family
members (spouses) (interdependent preferences), cannot be
rejected;
Hypothesis c) that persons who are more generous towards
anonymous villagers are also likely to be more generous
towards their own family members and vice versa (social
preferences); cannot be rejected;
Hypothesis d) that exposure to generous family members
contributes to generous behavior towards anonymous persons
(responsive social preferences), was rejected;
27
Genero
sity a
nd so
cial d
istance
in d
ictato
r gam
e fie
ld
experim
ents w
ith a
nd w
ithout a
face
NO
RW
EG
IAN
UN
IVERSIT
Y O
F L
IFE S
CIE
NCES
www.umb.no
Summing up: Hypothesis testing/Conclusions 2
Hypothesis e) that women are more generous to their
husbands and anonymous villagers (have stronger social
preferences) than men are; was rejected;
Hypothesis f) that spouses that themselves selected each other
through voluntary marriage contracts (love marriage) are more
generous towards each other in dictator games than spouses
that were married through involuntary or enforced marriages;
was partly rejected.
Wives married through love marriages and through parental
and bride agreement were less generous than wives married
through parental arranged marriages.
Wives married through kidnapping marriages were less
generous towards their husbands, in line with the hypothesis.
28
Genero
sity a
nd so
cial d
istance
in d
ictato
r gam
e fie
ld
experim
ents w
ith a
nd w
ithout a
face