Part11. LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ,petitioners,vs.THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT and JESUS YANES, ESTELITA YANES, ANTONIO YANES, ROSARIO YANES, and ILUMINADO YANES,respondents.G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990FERNAN,C.J.:Facts:This is a petition for review oncertiorariseeking the reversal of: (a) the decision of the Fourth Civil Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 31, 1983 in AC-G.R. CV No. 56626 entitled "Jesus Yanes et al. v. Dr. Rodolfo Siason et al."affirmingthe decision dated July 8, 1974 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental insofar as it ordered the petitioners to pay jointly and severally the private respondents the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental andreversingthe subject decision insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively and (b) the resolution of said appellate court dated May 30, 1984, denying the motion for reconsideration of its decision.The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B which were originally known as Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental. Lot 773, with an area of 156,549 square meters, was registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes under Original Certificate of Title No. RO-4858 (8804) issued on October 9, 1917 by the Register of Deeds of Occidental Negros (Exh. A).Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib.1It is not clear why the latter is not included as a party in this case.Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three hectares of Lot 823 as she could not attend to the other portions of the two lots which had a total area of around twenty-four hectares. The record does not show whether the children of Felipe also cultivated some portions of the lots but it is established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773.2It is on record that on May 19, 1938, Fortunato D. Santiago was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. RF 2694 (29797) covering Lot 773-A with an area of 37,818 square meters.3TCT No. RF 2694 describes Lot 773-A as a portion of Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia and as originally registered under OCT No. 8804.The bigger portion of Lot 773 with an area of 118,831 square meters was also registered in the name of Fortunato D. Santiago on September 6, 1938 Under TCT No. RT-2695 (28192 ).4Said transfer certificate of title also contains a certification to the effect that Lot 773-B was originally registered under OCT No. 8804.On May 30, 1955, Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. in consideration of the sum of P7,000.00.5Consequently, on February 20, 1956, TCT Nos. T-19291 and T-19292 were issued in Fuentebella's name.6After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the administratrix thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) filed in Special Proceedings No. 4373 in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, a motion requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A and 773-B.7By virtue of a court order granting said motion,8on March 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez.9Hence, on April 1, 1958 TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 covering Lots 773-A and 773-B were respectively issued to Rosendo Alvarez.10Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also prayed that an accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint be made by the defendants, that after court approval of said accounting, the share or money equivalent due the plaintiffs be delivered to them, and that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in the form of attorney's fees.11During the pendency in court of said case or on November 13, 1961, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B and another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason.12Accordingly, TCT Nos. 30919 and 30920 were issued to Siason,13who thereafter, declared the two lots in his name for assessment purposes.14Meanwhile, on November 6, 1962, Jesus Yanes, in his own behalf and in behalf of the other plaintiffs, and assisted by their counsel, filed a manifestation in Civil Case No. 5022 stating that the therein plaintiffs "renounce, forfeit and quitclaims (sic) any claim, monetary or otherwise, against the defendant Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella in connection with the above-entitled case."15On October 11, 1963, a decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 5022, which ordered Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey the land. the dispositive portion of which reads:It will be noted that the above-mentioned manifestation of Jesus Yanes was not mentioned in the aforesaid decision.However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to Lot 773. In his return of service dated October 20, 1965, the sheriff stated that he discovered that Lot 773 had been subdivided into Lots 773-A and 773-B; that they were "in the name" of Rodolfo Siason who had purchased them from Alvarez, and that Lot 773 could not be delivered to the plaintiffs as Siason was "not a party per writ of execution."17The execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 having met a hindrance, herein private respondents (the Yaneses) filed on July 31, 1965, in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title and for a declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 issued to Rosendo Alvarez.18Thereafter, the court required Rodolfo Siason to produce the certificates of title covering Lots 773 and 823.Expectedly, Siason filed a manifestation stating that he purchased Lots 773-A, 773-B and 658, not Lots 773 and 823, "in good faith and for a valuable consideration without any knowledge of any lien or encumbrances against said properties"; that the decision in the cadastral proceeding19could not be enforced against him as he was not a party thereto; and that the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 could neither be enforced against him not only because he was not a party-litigant therein but also because it had long become final and executory.20Finding said manifestation to be well-founded, the cadastral court, in its order of September 4, 1965, nullified its previous order requiring Siason to surrender the certificates of title mentioned therein.21In 1968, the Yaneses filed anex-partemotion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution in Civil Case No. 5022. Siason opposed it.22In its order of September 28, 1968 in Civil Case No. 5022, the lower court, noting that the Yaneses had instituted another action for the recovery of the land in question, ruled that at the judgment therein could not be enforced against Siason as he was not a party in the case.23The action filed by the Yaneses on February 21, 1968 was for recovery of real property with damages.24Named defendants therein were Dr. Rodolfo Siason, Laura Alvarez, Flora Alvarez, Raymundo Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. The Yaneses prayed for the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-19291 and 19292 issued to Siason (sic) for being null and void; the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the Yaneses "in accordance with the sheriffs return of service dated October 20, 1965;" Siason's delivery of possession of Lot 773 to the Yaneses; and if, delivery thereof could not be effected, or, if the issuance of a new title could not be made, that the Alvarez and Siason jointly and severally pay the Yaneses the sum of P45,000.00. They also prayed that Siason render an accounting of the fruits of Lot 773 from November 13, 1961 until the filing of the complaint; and that the defendants jointly and severally pay the Yaneses moral damages of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00 plus attorney's fees of P4, 000.00.25In his answer to the complaint, Siason alleged that the validity of his titles to Lots 773-A and 773-B, having been passed upon by the court in its order of September 4, 1965, had becomeres judicataand the Yaneses were estopped from questioning said order.26On their part, the Alvarez stated in their answer that the Yaneses' cause of action had been "barred byres judicata, statute of limitation and estoppel."27In its decision of July 8, 1974, the lower court found that Rodolfo Siason, who purchased the properties in question thru an agent as he was then in Mexico pursuing further medical studies, was a buyer in good faith for a valuable consideration. Although the Yaneses were negligent in their failure to place a notice oflis pendens"before the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental in order to protect their rights over the property in question" in Civil Case No. 5022, equity demanded that they recover the actual value of the land because the sale thereof executed between Alvarez and Siason was without court approval.The case against Siason was dismissed but it ordered the heirs of Rosendo Alvarez to pay jointly and severally the Yanese party.The petitioners appealed to the IAC(court of Appeals) which in turn affirmed the judgment in the lower court and decided in favor of the Yaneses.Petitioners then appealed their case to the Supreme Court where they asked the court whether they as heirs can inherit their fathers debt and in turn be liable to the Yaneses.Issue: Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre to Dr. Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is any, could be legally passed or transmitted by operations (sic) of law to the petitioners without violation of law and due processHeld:The court in the affirmative. The debt of Rosendo can be legally transferred to his heir but only up to the amount of the inheritance. Judgment of the lower court if upheld.The petition is devoid of merit.Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death.Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property received from the decedent.As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case ofEstate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc.41The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the state is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors.The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco has characterized the history of these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal,i.e., is contractedintuitu personae, in consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other.xxx xxx xxxPetitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate.42It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance. With this clarification and considering petitioners' admission that there are other properties left by the deceased which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in favor of private respondents, we see no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

2. BIENVENIDO, ESTELITA, MACARIO, LUIS, ADELAIDE, ENRIQUITA and CLAUDIO, all surnamed, GEVERO,petitioners,vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DEL MONTE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,respondents.G.R. No. 77029 August 30, 1990PARAS,J.:Facts:This is a petition for review oncertiorariof the March 20, 1988 decision1of the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in AC-GR CV No. 69264, entitled Del Monte Development Corporation vs. Enrique Ababa, et al., etc. affirming the decision2of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Misamis Oriental declaring the plaintiff corporation as the true and absolute owner of that portion of Lot 476 of the Cagayan Cadastre, particularly Lot No. 2476-D of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450, containing an area of Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy Eight (7,878) square meters more or less.The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 of the Subdivision Plan Psd-37365 containing an area of 20,119 square meters and situated at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. Said lot was acquired by purchase from the late Luis Lancero on September 15, 1964 as per Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of plaintiff and by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4320 was issued to plaintiff (DELCOR for brevity). Luis Lancero, in turn acquired the same parcel from Ricardo Gevero on February 5, 1952 per deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero which was duly annotated as entry No. 1128 at the back of Original Certificate of Title No. 7610 covering the mother lot identified as Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica Babangha 1/2 share and her children: Maria; Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquio and Ursula, all surnamed surnamed Gevero, 1/2 undivided share of the whole area containing 48,122 square meters.Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II and was survived by her six children aforementioned. The heirs of Teodorica Babangha on October 17,1966 executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Partition of the estate of Teodorica Babangha, consisting of two lots, among them was lot 2476. By virtue of the extra-judicial settlement and partition executed by the said heirs of Teodorica Babangha, Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I, inclusive, under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450 duly approved by the Land Registration Commission, Lot 2476-D, among others, was adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero who was then alive at the time of extra-judicial settlement and partition in 1966. Plaintiff (private respondent herein) filed an action with the CFI (now RTC) of Misamis Oriental to quiet title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same prejudices the land which it acquired a portion of lot 2476.Plaintiff now seeks to quiet title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same prejudices the land which it acquired, a portion of Lot 2476. Plaintiff proved that before purchasing Lot 2476-A it first investigated and checked the title of Luis Lancero and found the same to be intact in the office of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City. The same with the subdivision plan (Exh. "B"), the corresponding technical description (Exh. "P") and the Deed of Sale executed by Ricardo Gevero all of which were found to be unquestionable. By reason of all these, plaintiff claims to have bought the land in good faith and for value, occupying the land since the sale and taking over from Lancero's possession until May 1969, when the defendants Abadas forcibly entered the property. (Rollo, p. 23)The case for the quieting of title made by DELCOR was won by DELCOR(respondents herein) and the IAC(Court of Appeals) affirmed the decision of the trial court in the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners.Issue:Was the share of Ricardo in the inheritance from Teodorica included in the sale made by Ricardo to Luis Lancero, even if the sale happened before the partition of the property but after the death of their mother Teodorica??Held:The Court held in the affirmative. The Court held that the share was included in the sale.Petition is devoid of merit.The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of the "causante" or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777), and there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate (De Borja v. Vda. de Borja, 46 SCRA 577 [1972]).Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the rights to the succession were transmitted from the moment of her death. It is therefore incorrect to state that it was only in 1966, the date of extrajudicial partition, when Ricardo received his share in the lot as inheritance from his mother Teodorica. Thus, when Ricardo sold his share over lot 2476 that share which he inherited from Teodorica was also included unless expressly excluded in the deed of sale.PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

3. Locsin vs CA G.R. No. 89783, 206 SCRA 383, Feb 19,1992 Ponente: Narvasa, C.J

FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a reversal of the decision of the CA affirming with modification the ruling of the RTC of Albay in favor of Jose Jaucian and petitioners seek an action for recovery of real property with damages

Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina, as the sole and universal heir of all his properties including those inherited from his father. The spouses being childless, had agreed that their properties, after both of them shall have died should revert to their respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties would go to his "Locsin relatives", and those of Catalina to her "Jaucian relatives", and this was drawn up by Catalinas nephew and trusted legal adviser Atty. Salvador Lorayes.

Don Mariano died of lung cancer and his will was probated. Doa Catalina carried out the terms of their compact, hence, 9 years after his death, Doa Catalina began transferring, by sale, donation or assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her own, properties to their respective nephews and nieces. She made the sales and donation of properties which she had received from her husband's estate, to his Locsin nephews and nieces. Before her death she made a will affirming and ratifying the transfers she had made.

6 years after Doa Catalina's demise, some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces who had already received their legacies and hereditary shares from her estate, filed action in the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime, alleging that the conveyances were inofficious, without consideration, and intended solely to circumvent the laws on succession. Those who were closest to Doa Catalina did not join the action.

RTC rendered judgement in favor of the Jaucians declaring as null and void ab-initiothe deeds of sale, donations, reconveyance and exchange of any part of the estate of Catalina. C.A. affirmed.

ISSUE: WON the nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, are entitled to inherit the properties which she had already disposed of more than 10 years before her death.

HELD:No, Petition has merit and should be granted.

They are not entitled since those properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's) death and those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession."

The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such time.Property which Doa Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay claim.Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; Even if those transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, theright arising under certain circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs.

Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that she had any such, hence there were no legitime that could conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her property during her lifetime.All that the respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents may not invoke:

Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor or part thereof,provided he reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation, the donation shall be reduced on petition of any person affected. (634a)

There is not the slightest suggestion in record that Catalina was mentally incompetent when she made the disposition as she was transferring properties to both Jaucians and Locsins. The desistance of her closest Jaucian relatives persuasively demonstrates that Catalina acted as a free agent. (Note* The SC also held respondents action from RTC level should have prescribed 4 years from registration as registration is constructive notice as to the world)4. Opulencia vs. C.A.G.R. No. 125835, 293 SCRA 385, July 30,1998Ponente: Panganiban, J

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari, assailing the decision of the C.A. declaring the Contract to Sell executed by Opulencia in favor of Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven, valid and binding.

Petitioner Natalia Carpena Opulencia executed a "CONTRACT TO SELL" Lot 2125 of the Sta. Rosa Estate, consisting of 23,766 square meters located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna at P150.00 per square meter which she recently inherited from her dead father; that plaintiffs paid a downpayment of P300,000.00 but defendant, despite demands, failed to comply with her obligations under the contract. Private respondents therefore prayed that petitioner be ordered to perform her contractual obligations and to further pay damages, attorney's fee and litigation expenses.

Petitioner admitted the execution of the contract in favor of plaintiffs and receipt of P300,000.00 as downpayment. However, she put forward the following affirmative defenses: that the property subject of the contract formed part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena (petitioner's father), in respect of which a petition for probate was filed with the RTC; that at the time the contract was executed, the parties were aware of the pendency of the probate proceeding; that the contract to sell was not approved by the probate court.

RTC dismissed the complaint and held a decedent's representative (administrator) is not estopped from questioning the validity of his own void deed (for lack of approval of the probate court) purporting to convey land and the action to declare the inexistence of contracts do not prescribe.

CA reversed and ruled that contract to sell in question is not covered by Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court since it was made by appellee in her capacity as an heir, of a property that was devised to her under the will sought to be probated. Thus, while the document inadvertently stated that appellee executed the contract in her capacity as "executrix and administratrix" of the estate, a cursory reading of the entire text of the contract would unerringly show that what she undertook to sell to appellants was one of the "other properties given to her by her late father," and more importantly, it was not made for the benefit of the estate but for her own needs (Upon reading the PREAMBLE of the doc. The sale was made for the reasons of "difficulties in her living" conditions and consequent "need of cash.")

ISSUE: WON the Contract to Sell an inherited estate without the requisite probate court approval is valid

HELD:YES, The petition has no merit

Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, because petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress. Hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedent's death.Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father.

InJakosalem vs. Rafols,the Court resolved an identical issue under the old Civil Code and held:Art. 440 of the Civil Code provides that "the possession of hereditary property is deemed to be transmitted to the heir without interruption from the instant of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance be accepted." And Manresa with reason states that upon the death of a person, each of his heirs "becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate while it remains undivided."

Under article 399 of the Civil Code, every part owner may assign or mortgage his part in the common property, and the effect of such assignment or mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted him in the partition upon the dissolution of the community. Hence, where some of the heirs, without the concurrence of the others, sold a property left by their deceased father, this Court, speaking thru its then Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, said that the sale was valid, but that the effect thereof was limited to the share which may be allotted to the vendors upon the partition of the estate.

There is no basis for petitioner's apprehension that the Contract to Sell may result in a premature partition and distribution of the properties of the estate. Indeed, it is settled that "the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such administration."(Note: SC held that Petitioner is also estopped from backing out of her representations)

5. EMNACE v. COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 126334.November 23, 2001; 370scra431]YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:FACTS: Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a business concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry.Sometime in January of 1986, they decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership properties among them, consequent to Jacinto Divinagracias withdrawal from the partnership.Among the assets to be distributed were five (5) fishing boats, six (6) vehicles, two (2) parcels of land located at Sto. Nio and Talisay, Negros Occidental, and cash deposits in the local branches of the Bank of the Philippine Islands and Prudential Bank.Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente Tabanaos untimely demise in 1994, petitioner failed to submit to Tabanaos heirs any statement of assets and liabilities of the partnership, and to render an accounting of the partnerships finances.Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanaos heirs the deceaseds 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership, amounting to P30,000,000.00, or the sum of P10,000,000.00, despite formal demand for payment thereof.Private respondents demands were not availed and so they filed a complaint against herein petitioner. On the other hand, petitioner contends that the case should be dismissed because the estate of Tabanao cannot sue and the private respondents were not in the capacity to do so because they werent assigned as the administrator of the Tabanaos estate. The trial court held that the heirs of Tabanao had a right to sue in their own names, in view of the provision of Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.Petitionerthen filed apetition forcertiorari before the Court of Appeals which wasdismissedISSUE:Whether or not the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao has the legal capacity to sue even if she was never appointed as administratrix or executrix of his estate.

HELD: YES. Petitioners objection in this regard is misplaced.The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix of the estatebeforeshe can file the action.She and her children are complainantsin their ownright assuccessors of Vicente Tabanao.From the very moment of Vicente Tabanaos death, his rights in so far as the partnership was concerned were transmitted to his heirs becauserightstothe succession are transmitted from the moment of death ofthe decedent. Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitionerwere transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted. WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED.

6. Tanedo v Ca[G.R. No. 104482.January 22, 1996]

FactsThis is a Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside and reverse the Decision1of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court.October 1862Lazardo Taedo executed a notarized deed of absolute sale in favor of his eldest brother, Ricardo Taedo, and the latters wife, Teresita Barera, private respondents herein, whereby he conveyed to the latter in consideration of P1,500.00, one hectare of whatever share I shall have over Lot No. 191, said property being his future inheritance from his parents. Later upon the death of his father Lazaro executed an Affidavit of Conformity datedFebruary 28, 1980(Exh. 3) to re-affirm, respect. acknowledge and validate the sale I madein 1962. On 1981 Lozardo again executed another notarized deed of sale in favor of private respondents involving the same parcel of land Lot no. 191After sometime Ricardo learned that Lazaro sold the same property to his children, petitioners herein, through a deed of sale datedDecember 29, 1980. On June 7, 1982, private respondents recorded the Deed of Sale in their favor in the Registry of Deeds and the corresponding entry was made in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 166451.Petitioners onJuly 16, 1982filed a complaint for rescission (plus damages) of the deeds of sale executed by Lazaro in favor of private respondents covering the property inherited by Lazaro from his father.Petitioner presented in evidence: (1) a private writing purportedly prepared and signed by Matias dated December 28, 1978, stating that it was his desire that whatever inheritance Lazaro would receive from him should be given to his (Lazaros) children (2) a typewritten document dated March 10, 1979 signed by Lazaro in the presence of two witnesses, wherein he confirmed that he would voluntarily abide by the wishes of his father, Matias, to give to his (Lazaros) children all the property he would inherit from the latter and (3) a letter dated January 1, 1980 of Lazaro to his daughter, Carmela, stating that his share in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of his father was intended for his children, petitioners herein.The trial court decided in favor of private respondents, holding that petitioners failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to support (their) claim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, ruling that the Deed of Sale datedJanuary 13, 1981(Exh. 9) was valid and that its registration in good faith vested title in said respondents.

Issue1.Is the sale of a future inheritance valid?2.Was the subsequent execution onJanuary 13, 1981(and registration with the Registry of Property) of a deed of sale covering the same property to the same buyers valid?

Ruling

1.No. pursuant to Article 1347 of the Civil Code, (n)o contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law.Consequently, said contract made in 1962 is not valid and cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation between the parties.Hence, the affidavit of conformity datedFebruary 28, 1980, insofar as it sought to validate or ratify the 1962 sale, is also useless and, in the words of the respondent Court, suffers from the same infirmity. Even private respondents in their memorandum concede this.

2. Yes. The deed of sale of January 13, 1981 in favor of private respondents covering Lazaros undividedinheritance of one-twelfth (1/12) share in Lot No. 191, which was subsequently registered on June 7, 1982; and (b) the deed of sale dated December 29, 1980 in favor of petitioners covering the same property. These two documents were executed after the death of Matias (and his spouse) and after a deed of extrajudicial settlement of his (Matias) estate was executed, thus vesting in Lazaro actual title over said property. In other words, these dispositions, though conflicting, were no longer infected with the infirmities of the 1962 sale.The question now is which of these two should be diven effectArt. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.The property in question is land, an immovable, and following the above-quoted law, ownership shall belong to the buyer who in good faith registers it first in the registry of property. Thus, although the deed of sale in favor of private respondents was later than the one in favor of petitioners, ownership would vest in the former because of the undisputed fact of registration. On the other hand, petitioners have not registered the sale to them at all.