Gender, Poverty and Indicateurs sur le genre ... · Gender, Poverty and Environmental Indicators on...

African Development Bank/Banque africaine de dveloppementStatistics Department -Dpartement de la statistiqueChief Economist Complex - Complexe de lconomiste en chef

Immeuble du Centre de commerce International dAbidjan CCIAAvenue Jean-Paul II01 BP 1387Abidjan 01, Cte d'IvoireTel: (225) 20 26 33 25Email: [email protected] - Internet : http://www.afdb.org

African Development Bank Banque africaine de dveloppement

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Special Feature Article on:Poverty, Climate Change, and Sustainability in Africas Development

Article spcial sur le thme : Le dveloppement de lAfrique face aux dfis de la pauvret, du changement climatique et de la durabilit

Indicateurs sur le genre, la pauvret

et lenvironnementsur les pays africains

Gender, Poverty and Environmental Indicators

on African Countries

2015

Burkina Faso

Burundi

Central African Rep.

Congo Democratic Rep.

Eritrea

Ethiopia

Gambia

Guinea

Guinea Bissau

Liberia

Madagascar

Malawi

Mali

Mozambique

Niger

Rwanda

Sierra Leone

Somalia

Tanzania

Togo

Uganda

AfDB REGIONAL MEMBER COUNTRIES BYGROSS NATIONAL INCOME PER CAPITA IN 2013

A) Low Income; $785 or less

Algeria

Angola

Botswana

Cabo Verde

Egypt

Equatorial Guinea

Gabon

Libya

Mauritius

Namibia

Seychelles

South Africa

Tunisia

C) Upper Middle Income; $3,116-$9,636

B) Lower Middle Income; $786-$3,115

Benin

Cameroon

Chad

Comoros

Congo

Cte dIvoire

Djibouti

Ghana

Kenya

Lesotho

Mauritania

Morocco

Nigeria

So Tom and Principe

Senegal

South Sudan

Sudan

Swaziland

Zambia

Zimbabwe

Burkina Faso

Burundi

Congo, Rp. Dm.

Erythre

Ethiopie

Gambie

Guine

Guine-Bissau

Libria

Madagascar

Malawi

Mali

Mozambique

Niger

Ouganda

Rp. Centrafricaine

Rwanda

Sierra Leone

Somalie

Tanzanie

Togo

PAYS MEMBRES REGIONAUX DE LA BAD SELONLE REVENU NATIONAL BRUT PAR HABITANT EN 2013

A) Faible revenu; (moins de 785$)

Bnin

Cameroun

Comores

Congo

Cte dIvoire

Djibouti

Ghana

Kenya

Lesotho

Maroc

Mauritanie

Nigria

So Tom et Princ.

Sngal

Soudan

Soudan du Sud

Swaziland

Tchad

Zambie

Zimbabwe

B) Revenu intermdiaire, tranche infrieure (Entre 786$ et 3 115$)

Afrique du Sud

Algrie

Angola

Botswana

Cabo Verde

Egypte

Guine Equatoriale

Gabon

Libye

Maurice

Namibie

Seychelles

Tunisie

C) Revenu intermdiaire, tranche suprieure; (Entre 3 116$ et 9 636$)



African Development BankBanque africaine de dveloppement

Indicateurs sur le genre,

la pauvret et lenvironnementsur les pays africains

2015Volume XVI

iiiiii

2015Volume XVI

Division des statistiques conomiques et sociales

Dpartement de la statistique

Economic and Social Statistics Division

Statistics Department



Indicateurs sur le genre,

la pauvret et lenvironnementsur les pays africains

This document was prepared by the Economic and Social Statistics Division of the Statistics

Department at the African Development Bank. Designations employed in this publication do not

imply the expression of any opinion on the part of the African Development Bank concerning

the legal status of any country or territory, or the delimitation of its frontiers. While every effort

has been made to present reliable information, the African Development Bank accepts no

responsibility whatsoever for any consequences of its use.

Published by:

Economic and Social Statistics Division

Statistics Department

African Development Bank

Immeuble du Centre de commerce International dAbidjan CCIA

Avenue Jean-Paul II

01 BP 1387

Abidjan 01, Cte dIvoire

Tl. (Standard) : +225 20 26 10 20

Ce document a t prpar par la Division des statistiques economiques et sociales du

Dpartement de la statistique de la Banque africaine de dveloppement. Les dnominations

employes dans cette publication nimpliquent, de la part de la Banque africaine de

dveloppement, aucune prise de position quant au statut juridique ou au trac des frontires des

pays. Aprs tant defforts raliss pour prsenter des informations aussi fiables que possible, la

Banque africaine de dveloppement se dgage de toute responsabilit de lutilisation qui pourra

tre faite de ces donnes.

Publi par:

Division des statistiques conomiques et sociales

Dpartement de la Statistique

Banque africaine de dveloppement

Immeuble du Centre de commerce International dAbidjan CCIA

Avenue Jean-Paul II

01 BP 1387

Abidjan 01, Cte dIvoire

Tl. (Standard) : +225 20 26 10 20

E-mail: [email protected]

Web site: http://www.afdb.org/statistics

Copyright 2015 African Development Bank

ISSN 1563-437X

vv

The Staff Team

The staff team was led by Beejaye Kokil and comprised Maurice Mubila, A. Hilaire Kadisha Mbiya, George Kararach and Stephane Hauhouot.The publication was prepared under the general direction of Charles Leyeka Lufumpa

quipe de Production

Lquipe dirige par M. Beejaye Kokil comprenait MM. Maurice Mubila,

A. Hilaire Kadisha Mbiya, George Kararach et Stephane Hauhouot. La publication a t ralise sous la

direction de M. Charles Leyeka Lufumpa

PRODUCTION TEAM QUIPE DE PRODUCTION

PrefaceThis is the sixteenth volume of Gender, Poverty, and Environmental Indicators on African Countries published by the Statistics Department of the African Development Bank Group. The publication also provides some information on the broad development trends relating to gender, poverty and environmental issues in the 54 African countries.

Gender, Poverty and Environmental Indicators on African Countries 2015 is divided in three main parts: Part One presents a special feature article on Poverty, Climate Change, and Sustainability in Africas Development. Part Two presents comparative cross-country data on Millennium Development Goals, Gender, Poverty and the Environment. Part Three provides detailed data for each of the 54 countries.

Cest le seizime volume dIndicateurs sur le genre, la pauvret et lenvironnement sur les pays africains publi par le Dpartement des statistiques du Groupe de la Banque afri-caine de dveloppement. La publication fournit aussi des informations de faon gnrale sur les tendances de dveloppement relatives aux problmatiques sur le genre, la pauvret et lenvironnement dans les 54 pays africains.

Indicateurs sur le genre, la pauvret et lenvironnement sur les pays africains 2014 comprend trois principales parties. La premire prsente larticle spcial sur La pauvret, les chan-gements climatiques et la durabilit dans le dveloppement de lAfrique. La deuxime partie prsente des donnes comparatives croises par pays sur les Objectifs du millnaire pour le dveloppement, le genre, la pauvret et lenvironnement. La troisime partie fournit des donnes dtailles pour chacun des 54 pays africains.

vivi

Tableof Contents

des matires

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vPrface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vAbbreviations and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ixAbrviations et Acronymes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ixCountry Classification by Region/Grouping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xClassification des pays par rgion/groupe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

PART I PARTIE I

SPECIAL ARTICLE : Poverty, Climate Change, and Sustainability in Africas Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3ARTICLE SPECIAL : Le dveloppement de lAfrique face aux dfis de la pauvret, du changement climatique et de la durabilit . . 19

PART II PARTIE II

COMPARATIVE CROSS-COUNTRY TABLES TABLEAUX COMPARATIFS CROISS PAR PAYSTHE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS LES OBJECTIFS DU MILLENAIR POUR LE DVELOPPEMENTProgress Towards Realizing the Millennium Development Goals Progrs vers la ralisation des objectifs du millnaire pour le dveloppement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

1 . Eradication of Extreme Poverty and Hunger Eradiquer la pauvret extrme et la faim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 2 . Achieve universal primary education Assurer lducation primaire pour tous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 3 . Promote gender equality and empower women Promouvoir lgalit des sexes et lautonomisation des femmes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4 . Reduce children under 5 years mortality Rduire la mortalit des enfants de moins de 5 ans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5 . Improve maternal health Amliorer la sant maternelle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 6 . Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases Combattre le VIH/sida, le paludisme et dautres maladies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 7 . Ensure environmental sustainability Assurer un environnement durable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 8 . Develop a global partnership for development Mettre en place un partenariat mondial pour le dveloppement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Section 1. GENDER GENRE

1 .1 Mid-Year Population Estimates Population estime en milieu anne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 1 .2 Fertility Rates Taux de fcondit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 1 .3 Reproductive Health Sant de la reproduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 1 .4 Contraceptive Use by Method Usage des contraceptifs par mthode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

viivii

1 .5 Contraception Use by Age Group Usages des contraceptifs par groupe dges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 1 .6 Life Expectancy Esprance de vie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 1 .7 Infant Mortality Rates Taux de mortalit infantile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 1 .8 Access to Schooling Accs au systme scolaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 1 .9 Internal Efficiency and Illiteracy Efficacit interne et analphabtisme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 1 .10 Gross School Enrolment Ratios Taux bruts de scolarisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 1 .11 Teaching Staff Personnel enseignant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 1 .12 Participation of Women Participation des femmes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 1 .13 Gender Empowerment Gender Empowerment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

Section 2. POVERTY PAUVRET

2 .1 Human Development Index Indice de dveloppement humain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 2 .2 Population in Poverty (%) Population en pauvret (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 2 .3 Income Distribution Rpartition du revenu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 2 .4 Nutrition Status Statut de la nutrition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 2 .5 Health Status Statut de la sant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 2 .6 Access to Health Services Accs aux services de sant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 2 .7 Mortality Trends Tendance de la mortalit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 2 .8 Health Services Personnel Personnel des services de sant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Section 3. ENVIRONMENT ENVIRONNEMENT

3 .1 Urbanization Profile Profil de lurbanisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 3 .2 Forest Cover and Structure Etendue et structure des forts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 3 .3 Land Use (000 ha) Surperficies utilises (000 ha) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 3 .4 Water Resources and Withdrawals Ressources en eau et retraits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 3 .5 Industrial Emissions Emissions industrielles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 3 .6 Energy Use Utilisation de lnrgie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 3 .7 Population and Forest Resources Population et ressources en fort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

viiiviii

PART III PARTIE III

COUNTRY TABLES TABLEAUX PAR PAYS 1 . Algeria - Algrie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 2 . Angola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 3 . Benin - Bnin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 4 . Botswana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 5 . Burkina Faso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 6 . Burundi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 7 . Cabo Verde - Cabo Verde . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 8 . Cameroon - Cameroun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 9 . Central African Rep . - Rp . Centrafricaine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 10 . Chad - Tchad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 11 . Comoros - Comores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 12 . Congo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 13 . Congo, Dem . Rep . - Congo, Rp . Dm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 14 . Cte dIvoire - Cte dIvoire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 15 . Djibouti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 16 . Egypt - gypte . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 17 . Equatorial Guinea - Guine Equatoriale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 18 . Eritrea - rythre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 19 . Ethiopia - thiopie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 20 . Gabon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160 21 . Gambia - Gambie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 22 . Ghana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 23 . Guinea - Guine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 24 . Guinea-Bissau - Guine Bissau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 25 . Kenya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 26 . Lesotho - Lsotho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 27 . Liberia - Libria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188 28 . Libya - Libye . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 29 . Madagascar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196 30 . Malawi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 31 . Mali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204 32 . Mauritania - Mauritanie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 33 . Mauritius - Maurice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212 34 . Morocco - Maroc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216 35 . Mozambique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 36 . Namibia - Namibie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 37 . Niger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228 38 . Nigeria - Nigria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232 39 . Rwanda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236 40 . So Tom & Principe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240 41 . Senegal - Sngal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244 42 . Seychelles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248 43 . Sierra Leone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252 44 . Somalia - Somalie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256 45 . South Africa - Afrique du Sud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260 46 . South Sudan - Soudan du Sud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264 47 . Sudan - Soudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268 48 . Swaziland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272 49 . Tanzania - Tanzanie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276 50 . Togo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280 51 . Tunisia - Tunisie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284 52 . Uganda - Ouganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288 53 . Zambia - Zambie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292 54 . Zimbabwe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296

ixix

Definition of Statistical Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303Dfinition des termes statistiques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311Data sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322Sources des donnes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323

AAU Assigned Amount UnitsAfDB African Development BankAIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency SyndromeAMU Arab Maghreb UnionBAD Banque africaine de dveloppementCCNUCC Conventioncadre des Nations Unies sur

les changements climatiquesCDM Clean Development Mechanism CEA Commission conomique pour lAfrique CEDEAO Communaut conomique des tats de

lAfrique de lOuestCEMAC Communaut conomique et Montaire

de lAfrique CentraleCEN-SAD The Community of Sahel-Saharan StatesCOMESA Common Market of Eastern and

Southern AfricaCSA Climate-Smart AgricultureECA Economic Commission for AfricaECOWAS Economic Community of West African

StatesEPMR valuation participative en milieu ruralERU Emission Reduction UnitFAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the

United NationsFCPF Forest Carbon Partnership FacilityFNUAP Fonds des Nations Unies pour la

populationFONERWA Rwanda Fund for Environment and

Climate ChangeFPCF Le Fonds de partenariat pour le carbone

forestierGGI Green Growth IndexGIEC Le Groupe dexperts

intergouvernemental sur lvolution du climat

IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

MDP Mcanisme de dveloppement propreOCDE/CAD Organisation de coopration et de

dveloppement conomiques/Comit dAssistance au Dveloppement

ODA Official Development AssistanceOECD/DAC Organisation for Economic Co-operation

and Development/ Development Assistance Committee

ONUSIDA Programme commun des Nations Unies sur le VIH/SIDA

PIB Produit intrieur brutPMR Pays membres rgionaux de la BAD

PNUE Programme des Nations Unies pour lenvironnement

PRA Participatory Rural AppraisalREC Regional Economic CommunityREDD+ Reducing Emissions from Deforestation

and Forest Degradation plus Rduction des missions issues de la dforestation et de la dgradation des forts

RMCs Regional Member Countries (AfDB)SADC Southern African Development

CommunitySEA Strategic Environment AssessmentsUDEAC Union Douanire des Etats de lAfrique

CentraleUEMOA Union conomique et montaire ouest

africaineUMA Union du Maghreb ArabeUNAIDS Joint United Nations Program on HIV/

AIDSUNEP United Nations Environmental ProgramUNFCC United Nations Framework Convention

on Climate ChangeUNFPA United Nations Population Fund UNICEF United Nations Childrens FundUQA Units de quantits attribuesURE Units de rduction des missionsUNESCO United Nations Educational and

Scientific OrganizationWAEMU West African Economic & Monetary

UnionWHO World Health Organization

Units - Units

m3 Cubic metre / mtre cube

DR Donnes les plus rcentes

ha Hectare

Km2 Square Kilometre / Kilomtre carr

Key Symbols - Principaux symboles

Data not available

Donne non disponible

- Magnitude zeros / Grandeur nulle

0 or 0.0 Magnitude less than half of the unit

Grandeur infrieure la moiti de lunit

Abbreviations and Acronyms Abrviations et acronymes

xx

Central Africa - Afrique centraleCameroon - CamerounCent. Afr. Rep. - Rp. Centraf.Chad - TchadCongoCongo, DRC - Congo, RDCEquat. Guinea - Guine quat.GabonSo Tom & Principe

East Africa - Afrique de lEstBurundiComoros - ComoresDjiboutiEritrea - rythreEthiopia - thiopieKenyaRwandaSeychellesSomalia - SomalieSudan - SoudanTanzania - TanzanieUganda - Ouganda

Southern Africa - Afrique australeAngolaBotswanaLesothoMadagascarMalawiMauritiusMozambiqueNamibia - NamibieSouth Africa - Afrique du SudSwazilandZambia - ZambieZimbabwe

West Africa - Afrique de lOuestBenin - BninBurkina FasoCabo VerdeCte dIvoireGambia - GambieGhanaGuinea - GuineGuinea-Bissau - Guine-BissauLiberia - LibriaMaliNigerNigeria - NigriaSenegal - SngalSierra LeoneTogo

North Africa - Afrique du NordAlgeria - AlgrieEgypt - EgypteLibya - LibyeMauritania - MauritanieMorocco - MarocTunisia - Tunisie

Cen-SADBenin - BninBurkina FasoCent. Afr. Rep - Rp. Centrafr.Chad - TchadComoros - ComoresCte dIvoireDjiboutiEgypt - gypteEritrea - rythreGambia - GambieGhanaGuinea - GuineGuinea-Bissau - Guine-BissauKenyaLiberia - LibriaLibya - LibyeMaliMauritania - MauritanieMorocco - MarocNigerNigeria - NigriaSo Tom & PrincipeSenegal - SngalSierra LeoneSomalia - SomalieSudan - SoudanTogoTunisia

COMESABurundiComoros - ComoresCongo, DRC - Congo, RDCDjiboutiEgypt - EgypteEritrea - rythreEthiopia - thiopieKenyaLibya - LibyeMadagascarMalawiMauritius - MauriceRwandaSeychellesSudan - SoudanSwazilandUganda - OugandaZambia - ZambieZimbabwe

AMU - UMAAlgeria - AlgrieLibya - LibyeMauritania MauritanieMorocco - MarocTunisia - Tunisie

ECOWAS - CEDEAOBenin - BninBurkina FasoCabo VerdeCte dIvoireGambia - GambieGhanaGuinea - GuineGuinea-Bissau - Guine-BissauLiberia - LibriaMaliNigerNigeria - NigriaSenegal - SngalSierra LeoneTogo

SADCAngolaBotswanaCongo, DRC - Congo, RDCLesothoMadagascarMalawiMauritius - MauriceMozambiqueNamibia - NamibieSeychellesSouth Africa - Afrique du SudSwazilandTanzania - TanzanieZambia - ZambieZimbabwe

UDEAC/CEMACCameroon - CamerounCent. Afr. Rep. - Rp. Centraf.Chad - TchadCongoEquat. Guinea - Guine quat.Gabon

WAEMU/ UEMOABenin - BninBurkina FasoCte dIvoireGuinea-Bissau - Guine-BissauMaliNigerSenegal - SngalTogo

Country Classification by Region/GroupingClassification des pays par rgion/groupe

11

Special Feature Article

Article dintrt spcial

Part/Partie 1

2

POVERTY, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND SUSTAINABILITY IN AFRICAS DEVELOPMENT

3

There needs to be a clear understanding of the linkages between development and climate change. Some of the public policy discourses posit an inherent conflict between the dual objectives of robust socioeconomic development and environmental sustainabil-ity. Indeed, this is what underpins the fallacy that development must come before environ-mental/climate concerns.

A number of crucial questions need to be answered within the framework of the climate changedevelopment discourse. For exam-ple: Who should pay to manage a chang-ing climate in the context of Africa? What practical actions need to be undertaken by African countries and regional entities/com-munities taking into account that most of the interventions would fall into the category of regional public goods?

Climate change and development in Africa which comes first? We have to recognize that this is a spurious question to raise, as the linkage between de-velopment and climate change is circular and cumulative. There is no first in an unbroken circle. Left unmanaged, climate change and environmental degradation reverse develop-ment progress and compromise the well being of current and future generations. Granted, the impacts of climate change will be felt worldwide, however, most of the damage will occur in developing countries (Harrington and Walton, 2008; IWM and CEGIS, 2007). Greater rainfall variability and more severe droughts in Africa will hinder efforts to enhance food se-curity and combat malnourishment (Schmid-huber and Tubiello, 2007; Mller et al., 2014). The disappearance through deforestation of water catchment areas, which regulate river

IntroductionClimate change is a major impediment to sustainable growth and development in Af-rica. The continent is particularly vulnerable to climate change because of its overdepen-dence on rain-fed agriculture, compounded by factors such as widespread poverty and weak capacity for climate- smart agriculture (CSA). The principal longer-term impacts of climate change include: changing rainfall patterns affecting agriculture and reducing food security; worsening water security; de-creasing fish resources in large lakes due to rising temperatures; a greater number of vector-borne diseases; rising sea levels affecting low-lying coastal areas with large populations; and water stress. The analysis is couched within the energy, water, and food security nexus and calls for an understanding of the linkages between poverty and climate change and how these impact Africas eco-nomic development.

This article draws a number of its inspirations from Van Zyl and Nhamo (2011) and Kar-arach (2014), focusing on how, within the UN Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCC), the continent should respond as it approaches the COP21 Paris Summit of 2015 and beyond. Africas response needs to take into account not only its acute vul-nerability but also its legitimate development needs, and the broader principles of equity and fairness. Africa faces massive challenges in adapting to the impact of climate change and in managing the increased levels of cli-mate risk. Increased support and financing for this are essential, which need to come not only from global funds and international organizations, but also national governments and the private sector, as will be discussed later in this article.

Poverty, Climate Change, and Sustainability in Africas Development

Africas response needs to take into account not only its acute vulnera-bility but also its legitimate devel-opment needs, and the broader principles of eq-uity and fairness. Africa faces mas-sive challenges in adapting to the impact of climate change and in managing the increased levels of climate risk. Increased support and financing for this are essential, which need to come not only from global funds and international organizations, but also national gov-ernments and the private sector.


4

flow, generate hydropower, and supply clean water for over a billion people on farms and in cities, will threaten rural livelihoods and important food markets (Bates et al., 2008).

Hitherto, the direct benefits of carbon-inten-sive development have been concentrated largely in high-income countries. There is enormous inequity between the global dis-tribution of emissions and the consequent damage. Moreover, the window of opportu-nity to choose the right policies to deal with climate change and promote development is closing. This is the greatest challenge facing the world, as a severe financial and economic crisis continues to wreak havoc in some countries such as Greece and Spain. Stabilizing the Euro as well as wider financial markets and protecting the real economy, labor markets, and vulnerable groups are the immediate priority.

Three conceptual issues are involved here: adaptation, mitigation and green growth/de-velopment. Adaptation takes place through adjustments that reduce vulnerability or enhance resilience to changes in climate, and involves modifications to processes, perceptions, practices, and functions (Parry et al., 2007; IPCC, 2014a). Adaptation may be initiated on a variety of levels, from in-stitutionally driven policies and programs at international, national or subnational levels to adjustments and risk management deci-sions within individual households (McLeman and Smit, 2006). Mitigation is any anthro-pogenic intervention that can either reduce sources of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (abatement) or enhance their carbon sinks (sequestration) (GTZ, 2008: 8; IPCC, 2014b). According to the IPCC definition, mitigation is a human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of GHGs.

According to the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP, 2010), the green economy recognizes a number of key aspects. Cardinal among them is the need to invest in natural capital, which is central to poverty alleviation. This creates jobs and enhances social equity;

substitutes renewable energy and low-car-bon technologies for fossil fuels; promotes enhanced resource and energy efficiency; delivers more sustainable urban living and low-carbon mobility; and grows faster than a brown economy over time, while maintain-ing and restoring natural capital (Van Zyl and Nhamo, 2011).

Conditions for the attainment of a green (Af-rican) economy include the following: the es-tablishment of a sound regulatory framework; prioritization of government investment and spending in areas that stimulate the green-ing of economic sectors; limiting government spending in areas that deplete natural capital; use of taxes and market-based instruments that enhance green investment and innova-tion; investment in capacity building, training and education; as well as strengthening in-ternational governance frameworks, among them, the United Nations Framework Con-vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol.

Neglecting the natural environment in the pursuit of economic growth has rendered communities more vulnerable to natural dis-asters. The hardest hit are the poorest, who often rely more directly on natural resources for their livelihoods. About 70 percent of the worlds extremely poor people live in rural areas and rely on agriculture for their income (World Bank, 2010).

The world population is projected to reach around 9.5 billion by 2050. These bigger populations will put more pressure on eco-systems and natural resources, heighten the competition for land and water, and increase the demand for energy. The population in-crease will be largely in cities, which could help limit resource degradation and individual energy consumption. However, both could increase, along with human vulnerability, if urbanization is poorly managed.

Over 95 percent of Africas agriculture is rain-fed. Agricultural production and food security in many African countries and subregions

Over 95 percent of Africas agri-culture is rain-

fed. Agricultural production and food security in

many African countries and

subregions are projected to be

severely compro-mised by climate

variability and change (Kararach,

2014). In some countries, yields

from rain-fed agriculture could

be reduced by up to 50 percent

by 2020 (World Bank, 2013).


5

are projected to be severely compromised by climate variability and change (Kararach, 2014). In some countries, yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by up to 50 percent by 2020 (World Bank, 2013).

Many African countries are in zones where a small reduction in rainfall could cause large declines in the river water. Climate models show that 600,000 square kilometers clas-sified as moderately water-constrained will experience severe water limitations. By 2020, between 75 and 250 million people are pro-jected to be exposed to an increase in water stress due to climate change. Water scarcity is even more acute in North Africa, due to very high population growth rates and the already high rates of water resource use (World Bank, 2013).

The health effects of climate change are likely to be overwhelmingly negative. Africa is al-ready vulnerable to a number of climate-sen-sitive diseases such as Rift Valley fever, which afflicts both people and livestock; cholera, associated with both floods and droughts; and malaria, where rising temperatures have spread the disease to the highlands of Ken-ya, Rwanda and Tanzania (Caminade et al., 2011; 2014). These factors are superimposed on existing weak health systems and poor access to health centers and other facilities.

There is another potential impact of climate change which we have not yet broached, yet which could bring wide social disruption, even civil strife, as well as economic rami-fications. The risks to coastal areas could drive major population movements and so-cial disintegration. Sea-level rise threatens the coasts, lagoons and mangrove forests of both eastern and western Africa. Local food supplies are projected to be negatively affected by decreasing fishery resources due to rising water temperatures, which may be exacerbated by continued over-fishing (Che-ung et al., 2010; Cinner et al., 2011; Lam et al., 2012). Moreover, significant population migrations both internally and across borders will have severe humanitarian impacts which

could undermine peace and stability (Kara-rach, 2014; Gemenne et al., 2014).

While the likely immediate impacts of climate change are known, more efforts are need-ed to assess and estimate their long-term socio-economic implications, and to cost the development characteristics of climate change. All this analysis will need to engage environmentalists, economists, and devel-opment planners. Because most climate ad-aptation efforts take place at the local and subnational levels, there is a need to provide local audiences with more information so that they can make informed decisions.

Beyond the climate change versus development debate1 Bryan et al. (2013) conducted a study based on farm household and Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) data collected from districts in various agro-ecological zones in Kenya. The study examined farmers perceptions of climate change, ongoing adaptation mea-sures, and factors influencing their decisions to adapt. The results show that households face considerable challenges. While many households have made small adjustments to their farming practices in response to cli-mate change (in particular, changing planting decisions), few are able to make more costly investments, for example in agro forestry or irrigation, although there is a desire to invest in such measures. This highlights the need for greater investments in rural and agricultural development to scale up households capaci-ty to make strategic, long-term decisions that will affect their future well-being.

The international climate change debate should inform and support developing coun-tries national decision-making on investment, and in particular how to fund technological and institutional change. Leaders and the public at large must be prepared to integrate climate change into developmental decision

1 See Dubash (2009) for a detailed discussion of these linkages.

The risks to coastal are-as could drive major population movements and social disintegra-tion. Sea-level rise threatens the coasts, lagoons and mangrove forests of both eastern and west-ern Africa.


6

making. This involves addressing the multi-ple yet sometimes competing goals involv-ing equity, climate, and social and economic development. Indeed, the very perception of trade-offs can prove a potent political barrier to achieving optimal outcomes. Experience has shown that differences in perceptions and conceptual frameworks between high- income and developing countries may impair and obfuscate a meaningful discussion on how climate action can be integrated with development objectives.

We identify four foci of tension between the climate and the development perspectives, namely: environment and equity; burden sharing and opportunistic early action; a pre-dictable climate outcome and an unpredict-able development process; and conditionality in financing and ownership.

Environment and Equity: The worlds common is not being used in ways that allow for equity. Most of the poor live in developing countries, yet there is now real pressure to cap the way environmental assets are being used in the search for de-velopment.

Burden sharing and opportunistic early action: A second focus of tension is sharing the bur-den of the absolute reduction targets (EU, 2009). Based on the recommendations of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), some countries have advocated for a global goal of restricting global temperature rise to no more than 2C by 2050 from their 2010 levels. This would necessitate reducing global emissions by at least 70 percent. In re-sponse, several high-income countries have submitted proposed national reduction tar-gets for 2050. However, many African coun-tries support a 1.5C target at the UNFCCC, which means emissions would need to be reduced by between 70 and 95 percent from 2010 levels by 2050 (Rogelj et al., 2015).

An unpredictable development process: The climate challenge is quite different when

viewed from a development perspective. Here, a recent strand of thought focuses on institutions and institutional inertia, where-by formal rules of the game and informal norms, including those embedded in culture, are important determinants of economic in-centives, institutional transformation, tech-nological innovation, and social change. The political economy dynamic is central to this process. Three key ideas are relevant here: a) development is a process of change, largely driven from below; b) history and the past patterns of institutions matter a great deal, so common templates are of only limited useone size does not fit all; and c) this characterization of change applies equally to high-income countries, even though the challenge of imperfect and incomplete insti-tutions appears less daunting, and top-down policy and price signals are considered to be the main drivers of change.

Policy ownership and financing: Climate-change related policies will not suc-ceed if they compromise living standardsrather, they should aggressively explore the co-benefits of development for climate. Nested within this longer-term objective, African countries could agree to short-term best-practice measuresnotably for en-ergy efficiencythat will bring about both developmental and climate benefits.

Who pays the bill? Capacity for climate change financing in AfricaCivil society and other actors in Africa have come to see conditionality, which imposed unpopular reforms such as the structural adjustments of the 1980s and 1990s, as the enemy of democracy. Because these conditions were not very effective in helping states undertake politically difficult reforms, conditionality has given way to the opposite concept of borrower ownership of a reform agenda as a precondition for policy reform loans (Dollar and Pritchett, 1998).

Financing must support both low-carbon development and well-specified mitigation

Four foci of tension between the climate and

the development perspectives,

namely: environ-ment and equity;

burden sharing and opportunis-tic early action;

a predictable climate outcome

and an unpre-dictable devel-

opment process; and conditionality

in financing and ownership.


7

actions in African countries. These should be mutually agreed upon by donors and recipients as serving the dual functions of climate mitigation and development gains. Flows of climate finance to Africa represent the principal means to reconcile equity with effectiveness and efficiency. Financial flows can help countries reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the effects of climate change by developing and diffus-ing new technologies. Mitigation, adapta-tion, and the deployment of technologies need to happen in a way that allows African countries to continue their generally positive growth trajectories and reduce poverty. This is why additional financial flows to Africa are so crucial.

The funding required for mitigation, adap-tation, and technology is massive. Exist-ing financing instruments have clear limits and inefficiencies. Contributions from high- income governments are affected by frag-mentation and the vagaries of political and fiscal cycles. Unfortunately, the Clean Devel-opment Mechanism (CDM), which is the main source of mitigation finance available today, has design shortcomings and operational and administrative limits as it is vulnerable to changes in fiscal space and mitigation ambition. The scope for raising adaptation funding through the CDM is also limited.

New sources of finance have to be tapped, including the private sector, which has a key role in financing mitigation efforts through carbon markets and related instruments. Official flows or other international funding can build capacity, correct market imper-fections, and target areas overlooked by the market. Support for measures taken by the private sector in developing countries can be important for adaptation, because private agentsboth households and firmscarry much of the adaptation burden. But those most in need of adaptation assistance are the poor and disadvantaged, and this means that public finance has a key role to play (World Bank, 2010).

Using available resources more effectively is crucial, including exploiting synergies with existing financial flows and development assistance, as well as coordinating imple-mentation. The scale of the financing gaps, the diversity of needs, and different national circumstances call for the deployment of a broad range of instruments (Schaeffer et al., 2013).

Any delay in the implementation of emis-sion reductions, whether in developed and big carbon-emitter countries or in less de-veloped countries, considerably ramps up the cost of limiting global warming. Costs can be substantially reduced if high-income countries provide enough financial incentives for African countries to switch to lower car-bon paths. However, finance alonecrucial though this isis not enough: it needs to be combined with access to technology and capacity building.

The financing gap is huge. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the cost of cutting global greenhouse gas emissions by 50 percent by 2050 could be in the range of 13 percent of GDP (Barker et al., 2007; IPCC, 2014b). Mitigation costs are sensitive to policy choices. Global miti-gation costs will rise with any deviation from the least-cost emission reduction path. In-deed, excluding developing countries in the initial mitigation effort would increase global costs significantly (a consideration that led to the establishment of the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol).

One has to distinguish between mitigation costs (the incremental costs of a low- carbon project over its lifetime) and incremental investment needs (the additional financ-ing requirement created as a result of the project). As many clean investments have high upfront capital costs, followed later by savings in operating costs, the incremental financing requirements tend to be higher than the lifetime costs by as much as a factor of three. For fiscally constrained developing countries, these high upfront capital costs

Flows of climate finance to Africa represent the principal means to reconcile equi-ty with effective-ness and effi-ciency. Financial flows can help countries reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the effects of climate change by devel-oping and diffus-ing new technol-ogies.

New sources of fi-nance have to be tapped, including the private sector, which has a key role in financing mitigation efforts through carbon markets and re-lated instruments. Official flows or other international funding can build capacity, correct market imperfec-tions, and target areas overlooked by the market.


8

can act as a significant disincentive to invest in low-carbon technologies. With regard to adaptation, the most comparable estimates are the medium-term figures produced by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the World Bank. Their estimates range from US$ 30100 billion (World Bank, 2010). More recently, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) estimated the cost of adaptation needs in developing countries to range between US$ 350500 billion by 2050 (UNEP, 2014).

The costing of adaptation mainly relates to climate-proofing future infrastructure. How-ever, this underestimates the diversity of likely responses and ignores changes in behavior, innovation, operational practices, or loca-tions of economic activity required. It also discounts the need to adapt to non-market impacts, such as those impinging on human health and natural ecosystems. Some of the omitted options could reduce the adaptation bill (for example, by obviating the need for costly structural investments); others would increase it (see Agarwala and Fankhauser (2008); and Klein and Persson (2008) for a discussion on the link between adaptation and development).

There are various ways to encourage private investment in mitigation. The Clean Develop-ment Mechanism2 has triggered more than 4,000 recognized emission reduction projects to date. Others, such as Joint Implementa-tion (the equivalent mechanism for industrial countries) and voluntary carbon markets, are important for some regions (transition coun-tries) and sectors (forestry), but are much smaller. Under the CDM, emission reduction activities in African countries can generate carbon creditsmeasured against an agreed baseline and verified by an indepen-dent entity under the aegis of the UNFCCC

2 In contrast to the secondary CDM market, the prima-ry CDM market declined in value for the first time, to US$ 7.2 billion (down 12 percent from 2007 levels), as a result of the economic downturn and lingering uncertainty about market continuity after 2012 (see Capoor and Ambrosi, 2009).

which can be traded on the carbon market. The financial revenues the CDM generates constitute the largest source of mitigation finance for developing countries to date. Be-tween 2001 (the first year for CDM projects registration) and 2012 (the end of the Kyoto commitment), the CDM was expected to pro-duce some 1.5 billion tons of carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e) in emission reductions, much through renewable energy, energy ef-ficiency, and fuel switching. This raised US$ 18 billion in direct carbon revenues for devel-oping countries (World Bank, 2010).

Donors and international financial institutions established new financing vehicles to scale up their support for low-carbon investment in the run-up to 2012, amounting to US$ 19 bil-lion (ibid.), although this figure combines both mitigation and adaptation finance. In 2013, annual global climate finance flows totaled approximately US$ 331 billion, which was US$ 28 billion below 2012 levels (Buchner et al., 2014).

Combining donor funds (and counting them as if committed solely to mitigation) with the projected CDM finance to 2012 produced mitigation finance of roughly US$ 37 billion, which equates to less than US$ 8 billion per year. This falls far short of the estimated mit-igation costs in developing countries of US$ 140175 billion per year by 2030, and even farther short of the associated financing re-quirements (US$ 265565 billion).

The main source of adaptation funding re-mains international donors. The establish-ment of the Adaptation Fund in December 2007, with its own independent source of finance, was an important development. Its main income source is the 2 percent levy on the CDM, which could raise between US$ 300600 million over the medium term, depending on the carbon price. Excluding private finance, US$ 2.22.5 billion was pro-jected to be raised for adaptation up to 2012, with the Global Climate Fund raising US$ 10 billion by the end of 2014, depending on the amount the Adaptation Fund raised. The


9

potential adaptation finance now available is less than US$ 1 billion per year, against funding requirements of US$ 30100 billion per year over the medium term. So there is an obvious case for ensuring that climate finance is generated and spent efficiently.

Fragmentation through the proliferation of special purpose funds threatens to reduce the overall effectiveness of climate finance. This is because as transaction costs increase, recipient country ownership lags behind, and alignment with country development objec-tives becomes more difficult. Some of the les-sons from the aid-effectiveness literature are highly relevant to climate finance. Concern about the negative effects of aid fragmenta-tion was one of the key drivers of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, which was reaffirmed in the Accra Agenda for Action in 2008 and at Busan in 2011.

The Paris Declaration raises important issues for financing climate investments in Africa:

Ownership must be built into country de-velopment strategies;

Alignment: Stop-start climate-action pro-grams, driven by financial volatility, will reduce overall effectiveness;

Harmonization: Synergies between ad-aptation, mitigation, and development finance need to be exploited;

Results: Designing and implementing meaningful outcome indicators will be key to maintaining public support for climate finance and building country ownership; and

Mutual accountability: High-income coun-tries must be accountable for moving to-ward their own emission targets, and for providing climate finance, as established in the Bali Action Plan.

While some climate investments will fund in-dividual projectslow-carbon power plants, for exampleothers may be more efficient-ly employed in moving to the sectoral or program level. Finance at the country lev-el should in most cases be combined with

overall development finance, and not used for specific adaptation projects.

Public institutions are among the key drivers of climate-smart development. So far they have relied almost exclusively on government revenues to finance their activities. But it is unlikely that climate-change costs rising into the tens or hundreds of billions of dollars a year could be predominantly covered through government contributions. Other sources of finance will have to be identified and tapped.

Proposals of alternative funding include: an internationally coordinated carbon tax; a tax on emissions from international transport; auctioning assigned carbon amount units; and domestic auction revenues. Globally, well over US$ 2 trillion has been committed in various fiscal packages, chief among them the US$ 800 billion US package and the US$ 600 billion Chinese plan. Some 18 percent of this, or about US$ 400 billion, is green in-vestment in energy efficiency and renewable energy, and, in the Chinese plan, adaptation (Robins et al., 2009).

With more national or regional initiatives ex-ploring emissions trading, the carbon mar-ket could help to catalyze and financially support the transformation of investment patterns and lifestyles. Through purchas-ing offsets, cap-and-trade systems could finance lower- carbon investments in devel-oping countries.

Looking forward, carbon will have a price worldwide and will be traded, taxed, or reg-ulated in all countries. Once this is in place, market forces will direct most consumption and investment decisions toward low-carbon options. With global coverage, many of the complications affecting the current carbon marketadditionality, leakage, competi-tiveness, scalewill fall away. However, some activities, such as risky research and development or energy-efficiency improve-ments, are hindered by market or regulatory failures; others, such as urban planning, are not directly price-sensitive. The forest and


10

agriculture sectors present significant addi-tional potential for emission reduction and sequestration in developing countries but are too complex to depend exclusively on market incentives.

Considerable uncertainties surround the very existence of a global carbon market, with questions about the ambition of mitigation targets, the resulting demand for carbon credits, the degree of linkage between dif-ferent trading schemes, and the role for off-sets across various existing and upcoming regimes. Defining a global mitigation goal for 2050, supported by intermediate targets (to be determined through the UNFCCC pro-cess), would provide long-term carbon price signals and greater certainty to the private sector.

Set up either inside or outside the current CDM, a market mechanism would support the enactment of policy changes that will place Africa on a low-carbon path. Propos-als to support a sectoral shift fall into two broad groups: regional and national. Variants pertain to policy and country commitments under an international agreement (manda-tory or flexible), the geographical (regional or national), or sectoral scope (sectoral or cross-sectoral).

Among these options, sectoral no-lose tar-getswhereby a country could sell carbon credits for emission reductions below an agreed target (which would lie below busi-ness-as-usual levels), while not being penal-ized for not achieving this have attracted a great deal of interest.

Another issue of particular concern is the lack of financial incentives for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD). And this despite the fact that in 2005, nearly one-fourth of emissions in developing countries came from this source (WRI, 2008; Houghton, 2009). Land use, land-use change, and forestry have always been contentious in climate negotiations. As a result, only af-forestation and reforestation were allowed

within the CDM, but the European Union Emission Trading Scheme excludes them.

Initial attention to REDD+ was focused on countries such as Cameroon, where defor-estation is occurring on a large scale. But some heavily forested countries have little deforestation, and they seek support to man-age and conserve their forests sustainably, especially if REDD+ activities shift logging and agricultural expansion across national bor-ders (leakage). Uganda already has policies and measures to bring forests under sustain-able management, and is seeking recognition of its efforts through market-based solutions akin to payments for environmental services.

REDD+ could provide a new source of in-come for indigenous peoples, but they are rightly concerned that its mechanisms may be used to threaten their rights of access and use of traditional lands. REDD may pro-vide resources to bring areas of high biodi-versity value under better protection, but it could also displace logging and land clearing across international borders.

Before forest countries can receive financial incentives for REDD, they need to establish building blocks in the policy, legal, institu-tional, and technical areasreferred to as REDD-readiness. These should be carried out at the national, rather than the project, level. The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) is designed to help forest countries prepare for REDD. In the FCPF, REDD-read-iness consists of a national strategy and im-plementation framework; a national reference scenario for emissions from deforestation and forest degradation; and a national monitoring, reporting, and verification system.3

Despite the emphasis on public finance, much of the adaptation burden will fall on individuals and firms. Insurance against climate hazards, for example, is provided

3 Also note that the UNFCCC decision 9/CP.19 of the Warsaw COP insists on support to REDD+ readiness (see paragraph 5 of the decision)


11

primarily by the private sector. Similarly, the task of climate-proofing the worlds capital stockprivate dwellings, factory buildings, and machinerywill fall predominantly on private owners, although the state will have to provide flood protection and disaster relief. Private companies also own or operate some of the public infrastructure that will have to be adapted to a warmer worldseaports, electric power plants, and water and sewage systems.

For governments, the challenge of involving the private sector in adaptation finance is threefold: getting private players to adapt; sharing the cost of adapting public infrastruc-ture; and leveraging private finance to fund dedicated adaptation investments (Estache and Fay, 2007).

Capacity for practical actions climate interventions as regional public goodsAfricas populations have for centuries demonstrated a tremendous and sophisti-cated ability to adapt to climate variability. Strategies currently employed include: diver-sification of livelihood sources (Crowley and Carter, 2000; Hesse and Cotula, 2006), by moving away from farming; adjustments in forms of governance; agricultural practices; development of new opportunities for income generation; and migration (Boko, 2007).

However, this adaptive capacity may not be sufficiently robust to respond to a rapid exacerbation of climatic variability shocks (ibid.). There is now a situation of chronic underdevelopment and poverty; regional economies centered on the economic rent of natural resources; and a generally poor natu-ral governance. Notwithstanding rapid urban growth, the livelihoods of a large percentage of Africas population are still closely tied to natural environmental conditions (Leichenko and OBrien, 2002).

There is also a need to link adaptive capac-ity, conflict, and peace-building. Adaptation

strategies can either create or resolve con-flicts, depending on how they are managed. Introducing alternative livelihood strategies may encourage dependence on an activity that proves to be unreliable, thus ultimately increasing vulnerability to climate stress and potential conflict (Eriksen and Lind, 2005). The establishment of conflict early warning systems and robust conflict resolution institu-tions may thus become an adaptation priority.Climate-related technical innovation is con-centrated in high-income countries, and in-ternational transfers of clean technologies to Africa remain modest, occurring in at best one-third of the projects funded through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (Haites et al., 2006). The Global Environment Facility supports technology needs assess-ments in some African countries, and about US$ 5 billion has recently been pledged un-der the new Clean Technology Fund to assist developing countries as a group by support-ing large, risky investments involving clean technologies. However, there are disputes over what constitutes clean technology.

Mainstreaming technology agreements into a global climate deal would boost technology innovation and ensure developing-country access. A climate deal can build on the les-sons of aid effectiveness and international agreements. While climate finance is not aid finance, the aid experience does offer critical lessons.

Cost-sharing agreements are needed for large-scale and high-risk technologies such as carbon capture and storage. Equally, inter-national agreements on standards will create markets for innovation. Domestic percep-tions about climate change will determine the success of any global deal, which must incorporate lessons from other international agreements.

Compounding the shortfalls in climate fi-nance are significant inefficiencies in how funds are utilized because of issues such as financial governance (Olsen, 2007; Sut-ter and Parreno, 2007; Olsen and Fenhann,

Climate-related technical innova-tion is concen-trated in high-in-come countries, and international transfers of clean technologies to Africa remain modest, occur-ring in at best one-third of the projects fund-ed through the Clean Develop-ment Mechanism (CDM) (Haites et al., 2006).


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2008; Nussbaumer, 2009; Michaelowa and Pallav, 2007; Schneider, 2007). If mitiga-tion finance is directed to where costs are lowest, efficiency may increase (see Vogt-Schilb et al., 2014 for a discussion of these issues). Furthermore, CDM transactions do not reduce global carbon emissions beyond agreed commitmentsthey simply change where they occur (in developing rather than developed countries) and lower the cost of mitigation (thereby increasing efficiency).

The Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Proto-col initially employed a novel financing instru-ment in the form of a 2 percent tax on certified emission reductions (units of carbon offset generated by the CDM). This rule has been slightly changed by decision 1/CMP18. It also applies to assigned amount units (AAUs) and emission reduction units (ERUs) such that for the second commitment period, the Adapta-tion Fund shall be further augmented through a 2 percent share of the proceeds levied on the first international transfers of AAUs and the issuance of ERUs for Article 6 projects immediately upon the conversion to ERUs of AAUs or removal units (RMUs) previously held by Parties (UNFCCC, 2013). However, the instrument is taxing a good (mitigation finance) rather than a bad (carbon emissions) and like any tax, there are inevitable inef-ficiencies (deadweight losses). Analysis of the CDM market suggests that most of the lost gains from trade as a result of the tax would fall on developing-country suppliers of carbon credits (Agarwala and Fankhausen, 2008).

It will be necessary to reform existing instru-ments and develop new sources. Reform of the CDM is particularly important in view of its role in generating carbon finance for projects in developing countries. Efforts to reduce emissions of soil carbon (through incentives to change tilling practices, for example) could also be a target of financial incentives. The role of the public sector in African countries will be critical in creating such incentives (through subsidies, taxes, caps, or regulations), by providing informa-

tion and education, and eliminating market failures. But much of the finance will come from the private sector. Generating additional finance for adaptation is a key priority, and innovative schemes such as auctioning AAUs (the binding caps that countries accept under the UNFCCC), taxing international transport emissions, and a global carbon tax have the potential to raise tens of billions of dollars of new finance each year.

Developing capacity for Climate-Smart AgricultureAgriculture has tended to be seen as a partial driver of climate change rather than an agent of mitigation. Climate-Smart Agriculture (CSA) seeks to reverse that pattern. CSA acknowl-edges that food production and consumption exert a considerable impact on the environ-ment (UNEP, 2010; FAO, 2012), yet agriculture is essential for a green economy (FAO, 2012). Climate change is putting pressure on how agriculture is undertaken, including changes in land tenure systems. Two tendencies im-mediately come to mind: a) with deteriorating soil quality, farmers have to adapt by either expanding land use or employing intensive farming techniques; and b) global attempts to reduce carbon fuels usage have spurred the growth of carbon-farming for biofuel production. At the core of the tendencies is the emergence of land grabs/acquisitions to combat the impacts of environmental change, water security, loss of biodiversity, renewable energy and energy security, food security, and sometimes speculative investment (Nhamo and Chekwoti, 2014). Makochekanwa (2014) documents six case studies where foreign land deals have adversely impacted on poverty reduction efforts in Rwanda, Uganda, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania.

Technologies such as inorganic fertilizers, pesticides, feeds, supplements, high-yield-ing crop varieties, and land management and irrigation techniques have considerably increased production in much of Africa. How-ever, they have also proven to be unsustain-able, resulting in lower yields, degrading or


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depleting natural resources, and encroaching upon important natural ecological areas such as forests.

Production systems can be enhanced by im-proving the various components such as soil and nutrient management, water harvesting and use, pest and disease control, managing genetic resources, and developing resilient ecosystems, as well as managing the agri-cultural value chain.

The Copenhagen Accord committed devel-oped countries to provide US$ 30 billion in fast-start financing from 2010 to 20124 (bal-anced between adaptation and mitigation). The Accord also set a goal to mobilize US$ 100 billion by 2020 in the context of miti-gation to address the needs of developing countries. Some of the crucial investments are land management schemes and infra-structure, such as local roads and irrigation systems, which are an important source of job creation in rural areas. The High-Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nu-trition (HLPE, 2012a) reviews some of these public works programs, and affirms their ef-ficiency in dealing with covariate shocks and their capacity to contribute to food security. The public works programs also include ma-jor investments in research (HLPE, 2012b; Beddington et al., 2012).

Increased investment in public research is particularly needed in areas where the return on investment cannot immediately benefit the private sector. Applied research should involve all stakeholders, including small-scale food producers (HLPE, 2012b). Technology transfer should include development of the human capacity to absorb the technology, as well as structured partnerships to ensure that it is adapted and established locally.

Services and inputs to smallholders, fisher-men, and pastoralists will be needed. These

4 There are differences in the format in which parties to the Accord have reported their contribution, thus the difficulty of establishing whether the commit-ment is actually being met.

changes will require major investments from both the public and private sectors, as they involve the introduction of new inputs, tech-niques, and services. This in turn will create opportunities for the development of small local enterprises that provide inputs and ser-vices to farmers. Changes in farming systems should thus be accompanied by changes all along the food chain, including consumption patterns (HLPE, 2012a).

Governance and institutional capacity for climate change managementWith the exception of the Kyoto Protocol, in-ternational agreements have been largely inef-fective in achieving legally binding emissions cuts (Andonova et al., 2009). Moreover there has been no legally binding global climate regime that covers all countries. This failure has generated a call for more flexible, cost- effective, and participatory approaches to address the multifarious problems of climate change (Bckstrand and Lvbrand, 2007).

In the absence of international climate gov-ernance, a string of transnational public and publicprivate actor networks have sought to implement its aims, for example the C40, the Global Cities Covenant on Climate (also known as the Mexico City Pact), and the Cit-ies for Climate Protection Program (CCPP). The ICLEI Local Governments for Sustaina-bility initiative adopted the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as part of its commitment to link local action to internationally agreed goals.

In accordance with the Bali Action Plan, de-veloping country parties, including African countries, agreed to [nationally] appropriate mitigation actions [NAMAs] (COP, 2008). In-novative climate governance methods have also been developed to reduce emissions using market-based mechanisms, for exam-ple cap and trade.

Another important focus is strengthening SouthSouth Cooperation to enhance cli-mate justice (Bulkeley and Newell, 2009). In

With the excep-tion of the Kyoto Protocol, interna-tional agreements have been largely ineffective in achieving legally binding emissions cuts (Andonova et al., 2009). More-over there has been no legally binding global climate regime that covers all countries.


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recent years, international trade, free capital flows, and the burgeoning development of some southern nations (for example China and India) have redefined global socioeco-nomic and political relations (Therien, 2009), requiring African countries to take proactive steps to gain from these global economic reconfigurations.

A number of transnational environmental or-ganizations, such as Climate Justice Now!, Greenpeace, and Friends of the Earth have local affiliates in the African continent, such as the Green Belt Movement in Kenya. Obi (2005) argued that environmental movements in Africa should connect with broader so-cial struggles for popular empowerment and democracy. He concluded that the climate/environmental movement has redefined the conflict between extractive forces and those of popular resistance. States have tried to repress environmental movements that in-terrogate the exclusion of the majority from effective participation in the management and control of environmental resources. As a consequence, the African environment is experiencing serious degradation due to its position as a site of struggle.

More importantly, there is as yet only limited horizontal networking among environmental movements in Africa, and it takes place in the face of hostility from the state, calling for greater capacity in coalition building and greater ideological clarity (Kararach, 2003). Obi (2005) maintains that the experiences of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People and Kenyas Green Belt Movement have achieved a measure of success, and a number of transnational environmental gov-ernance movements are now emerging in the form of peace parks (Kararach et al., 2012).Community engagement plays an important role in the implementation of climate gov-ernance policy. First, where climate gover-nance requires behavioral change, there is a need to educate the public. Second, effective community engagement ensures that climate governance policies are relevant to the com-munities where they are to be applied.

Concluding remarksEntrenched values, norms, and organization-al arrangements hamper policy change at the individual, organizational, and institution-al levels. Equally, political and geopolitical dynamics constrain policy choices. Most countries, including those in Africa, still fo-cus their policies and regulatory institutions on ensuring the supply of energy, rather than managing demand and the sustain-ability of supplies. Imposing pollution taxes in economies where this is not considered to be a problem will generate resistance from decision- makers and the public alike. Factional economic interests can hinder the deployment of energy- efficient technologies.

Institutional capacity inertia has three im-plications for climate-smart development policy. First, institutional reforms must be a priority. Second, addressing the institution-al determinants of climate policy enhances the effectiveness and sustainability of inter-ventions, maximizes the impact of finance and technology, and yields additional devel-opment benefits. Third, broader aims such as increasing social inclusion, recognizing womens and indigenous peoples rights, reforming property rights, and shaping indi-vidual incentives are in any case desirable. Many of the changes can be accomplished without technological innovation or additional finance in poorer countries. Finally, African governments need to be transparent on the use of this funding and put in place a legal and fiscal framework that contributes to the development of public and private mitigation and adaptation measures.

The capacity of African countries to negotiate carbon emission-reduction targets will play a role in how local leaders and polities calculate the cost / benefit of climate-change policy innovation. One can draw lessons from the speed with which the Kyoto Protocol was ratified, as well as the size of the emission- reduction target to which most countries have committed themselves. The same could be said of the commitment to the Copenhagen Accord on fast-start finance for climate-smart


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agriculture. In addition, the political weight of interest groups and lobbies remains an important determinant of climate change pol-icies and measures, and yet their influence is the most difficult to measure. In such circum-stances, widening the dialogue on climate change issues becomes critical, and this, in turn, depends on levels of education and climate issue literacy. Equally, the capacity to effectively produce and disseminate in-formation on climate change is crucial, and a free media is thus a key factor in shaping public understanding of the issues involved.

It has become clear that policy pronounce-ments on climate change are necessary but not sufficient to bring about change. Political

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Bates, B., Kundzewicz, Z. W., Wu, S. and Palutikof, J. (2008). Climate Change and Water. Technical Paper. Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

Beddington, J., Asaduzzaman, M., Fernandez, A., Clark, M., Guillou, M., Jahn, M., Erda, L., Mamo, T., Van Bo, N., Nobre, C.A., Scholes, R., Sharma, R. and Wakhungu, J. (2012). The Role for Scientists in Tackling Food Insecurity and Climate Change?, Agriculture and Food Security, 1: 10.

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leaders may announce a course of policy ac-tion, which may or may not be translated into action. Programmatic interventions depend, at least in part, on the administrative capacity of the bureaucracy to draft regulations and laws, and submit them for legislative and ex-ecutive approval. Successful outcomes also depend on the capacity to raise the requisite financial resources to fund such programs. Political economy and agency drivers are thus important in the achievement of climate change objectives. African countries need to strengthen their governance and democratic frameworks, and allow free media and civ-ic voice to build the capabilities to design and implement such policiesand then, and most importantly, to enforce them.

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