Gender Equality Support in the Arab World Revisited

Gender Equality Support in the Arab WorldRevisited.

Veronica Kostenko, Eduard Ponarin, Musa Shteiwi, OlgaStrebkova

Laboratory for Comparative Social Research. Higher School of Economics, Russia;Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan

August, 24, 2016

Research Question

Do Arab countries follow the global trend ofliberalization in gender issues or do they becomemore conservative and traditional?

Veronica Kostenko, Eduard Ponarin, Musa Shteiwi, Olga Strebkova August, 24, 2016 2 / 25

100 years of beauty. Egypt 1950s


100 years of beauty. Egypt 1980s


Theoretical Framework

∙ Revised modernization theory (Inglehart, Baker, Welzel)∙ Impressionable years theory (Newcomb, Alwin)∙ Gender equality research (Norris, Jamal, Moghadam)∙ Studies of nationalism (Smith, Gellner, Greenfeld)


The main findings from applied researchon modernization theory regarding gender equality

∙ Age (young) and education (higher) have the strongest positive effectsfor gender egalitarianism. Females are more egalitarian than males(Inglehart & Norris, 2003).

∙ Urban dwellers are more likely to support egalitarian practices, while inrural settings people tend to remain more conservative.

∙ Degree of religiosity is a stronger predictor of gender inequality supportthan denomination (Van Tubergen, 2009).

∙ Islam has a moderate but robust anti-egalitarian effect on gender issues(Alexander &Welzel, 2011).

∙ Countries differ significantly in their support of gender equality.Within-country variation dwarves in comparison to cross-countrydifferences (Welzel, 2013).

∙ Cohort differences in gender equality attitudes are smaller in industrialand agrarian (including Muslim) countries than in post-industrialcountries, reflecting the pace of social change (Inglehart & Welzel, 2010).


Why Is GenderEgalitarianism Advancing Slower in the Arab World?

1. Institutional Explanation∙ Labor force participation (Spierings; Yaganeh & May)∙ "Oil curse"discourse (Ross)

2. Cultural explanation∙ There are patriarchal cultures, such as Muslim, that are not

likely to change towards the Western way of life (Huntington),or are in clash with modernity (Lewis).

∙ The Muslim cultural heritage is one of the strongest barriersfor the rising tide of gender equality (Inglehart & Norris).

∙ Higher religiosity of Muslims is the reason of patriarchaldominance (Kandiyoti, Hassan).


Feminist critique

∙ Orientalist approach lumps together very different societies asthe "East"as opposed to a mythic "West"(Said, Ahmed).

∙ Ignores Arab women as actors who actually change the socialand political agenda, receive higher education, and getpositions in business and government (Moghadam).

∙ Paternalist attitude to Muslim women, discourse of"saving"them from their own culture, norms, and men(Abu-Lughod).

∙ Little attention to the role of women and the Arab feminism inthe Arab Spring events (Bellin, Al-Ali).


Our explanation of the "Conservative turn"

∙ Official discourse on gender issues is influenced by largerprocesses of identification in post-colonial world.

∙ Nationalism (in some countries backed by the Soviet Union)was popular in the 1950s-1960s and promoted female rights.

∙ By 1970s-1980s Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies haveaccumulated oil revenues and promoted an alternative way ofdevelopment, a return to the "pure Islam".

∙ Disappointment in the nationalist version of modernizationstrengthened the acceptance of religious identification by manyyoung people, which affected women’s rights.


Hypotheses

1. We expect more gender egalitarianism in older cohorts(compared to their younger compatriots) for the countries thatpromoted nationalism back in 1950-s - 1960-s.

2. For countries that buttress and sponsor religioustraditionalism, we anticipate lower levels and almost nointer-generational shift in gender equality support.

3. Education and religiosity level are supposed to affect genderattitudes as predicted by the modernization theory (morereligious and less educated people are more patriarchal).


Data and Methods I

∙ 3 waves of the Arab Barometer project∙ Sample: 5 repeating countries (Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon,

Palestine, Yemen) + Saudi Arabia (from wave 2).∙ Generalized Additive Modeling (GAM) framework to estimate

cohort effect on gender equality index (Hastie, 1990). GAMdescribes non-linear relations between variables that are poorlyapproximated by the parametric functions (uses smoothers andsplines instead).

∙ Multiple imputation using Amelia II package in R (we impute2718 missings of 17096 sample)


Data and Methods II:Countries sampled in the three waves

Wave I Wave II Wave IIILebanon Lebanon LebanonJordan Jordan JordanAlgeria Algeria Algeria

Palestine Palestine PalestineYemen Yemen Yemen

Morocco MoroccoKuwait Kuwait

Tunisia TunisiaIraq Iraq

Saudi ArabiaEgypt EgyptSudan Sudan

LibyaVeronica Kostenko, Eduard Ponarin, Musa Shteiwi, Olga Strebkova August, 24, 2016 12 / 25

Countries covered by Arab Barometer

ALGERIAMO

ROCCO

BAHRAIN


Dependent Variable - Gender Equality Index

Wave I Wave II Wave IIIA married woman can workoutside the home if she wishes

A married woman can workoutside the home

A married woman can workoutside the home

On the whole, men make betterpolitical leaders than womendo (reverse)

In general, men are betterat political leadership thanwomen (reverse)

In general, men are betterat political leadership thanwomen (reverse)

A university education is moreimportant for a boy than a girl(reverse)

University education formales is more importantthan university education forfemales (reverse)

University education formales is more importantthan university education forfemales (reverse)

A woman can be a presidentor prime minister of a Muslimcountry

A woman can be a presidentor prime minister of a Muslimcountry

A woman can travel abroad byherself if she wishes

It is permissible for a woman totravel abroad by herself

Men and women should haveequal job opportunities

Men and women should haveequal work opportunities

Men and women should receiveequal wages and salaries


Changes in genderattitudes across 3 waves by country (3-item index)


Findings from descriptive statistics

∙ Gender egalitarianism is growing steadily in all the countriessampled.

∙ Egypt used to be the most conservative gender-wise by the2nd wave, but now it’s Yemen.

∙ Lebanon remains the most supportive of gender equality.∙ Algeria and Egypt show the greatest (positive) change in

gender egalitarianism in the recent years, the slowest growth isin Iraq and Morocco.


Changes in gender attitudes ofpeople belonging to the same cohorts in 5 countries


GAM models.DV - Gender egalitarianism. 5 countries, waves 1-3

1930 1950 1970 1990

−0

.40

.00

.40

.8

Year Born

Yemen

Year Born

s(G

E I

nd

ex,

DF

=4

)

1st wave

2nd wave

3rd wave

1930 1950 1970 1990

−0

.40

.00

.40

.8

Year Born

Palestine

Year Born

s(G

E I

nd

ex,

DF

=4

)

1st wave

2nd wave

3rd wave

1930 1950 1970 1990

−0

.40

.00

.40

.8

Year Born

Algeria

Year Born

s(G

E I

nd

ex,

DF

=4

)

1st wave

2nd wave

3rd wave

1930 1950 1970 1990

−0

.40

.00

.40

.8

Year Born

Lebanon

Year Born

s(G

E I

nd

ex,

DF

=4

)

1st wave

2nd wave

3rd wave

1930 1950 1970 1990

−0

.40

.00

.40

.8

Year Born

Jordan

Year Born

s(G

E I

nd

ex,

DF

=4

)

1st wave

2nd wave

3rd wave


Parametriceffects of GAM (5 countries across 5 waves)

Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3

Jordan −0.066 (0.046) 0.012 (0.017) 0.061*** (0.010)Palestine −0.059 (0.046) 0.056*** (0.017) 0.081*** (0.013)Algeria −0.021 (0.046) 0.065*** (0.017) 0.127*** (0.012)Lebanon 0.087* (0.046) 0.187*** (0.016) 0.220*** (0.011)Yemen baselineGender (male) −0.104***(0.005) −0.110*** (0.005) −0.109*** (0.005)EducationIlliterate baselineElementary 0.032** (0.014) 0.027** (0.013) 0.003 (0.011)Primary 0.055*** (0.014) 0.047*** (0.013) 0.016 (0.010)Secondary 0.084*** (0.014) 0.062*** (0.013) 0.033*** (0.011)2-year college 0.110*** (0.015) 0.075*** (0.014) 0.038*** (0.012)BA+MA 0.137*** (0.014) 0.093*** (0.013) 0.082*** (0.011)Reading QuranEvery day baselineSometimes 0.009 (0.006) 0.022*** (0.007) 0.007 (0.006)Rare/Never 0.040*** (0.007) 0.028*** (0.006) 0.001 (0.008)

Observations 5,088 5,788 6,220Adjusted R2 0.228 0.199 0.210Log Likelihood 1,398.366 1,204.356 1,189.175UBRE 0.034 0.039 0.040

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01


GAM models. DV - Gender egalitarianism. Wave 3

1940 1960 1980

−0.

4−

0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

Year Born

s(G

E In

dex,

df=

4)

Yemen

1940 1960 1980

−0.

4−

0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

Year Born

s(G

E In

dex,

df=

4)

Morocco

1940 1960 1980

−0.

4−

0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

Year Born

s(G

E In

dex,

df=

4)

Palestine

1940 1960 1980

−0.

4−

0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

Year Born

s(G

E In

dex,

df=

4)

Egypt

1940 1960 1980

−0.

4−

0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

Year Born

s(G

E In

dex,

df=

4)

Saudi Arabia

1940 1960 1980

−0.

4−

0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

Year Born

s(G

E In

dex,

df=

4)

Tunisia

1940 1960 1980

−0.

4−

0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

Year Born

s(G

E In

dex,

df=

4)

Jordan

1940 1960 1980

−0.

4−

0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

Year Born

s(G

E In

dex,

df=

4)

Lebanon

1940 1960 1980

−0.

4−

0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

Year Born

s(G

E In

dex,

df=

4)

Libya

1940 1960 1980

−0.

4−

0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

Year Born

s(G

E In

dex,

df=

4)

Sudan

1940 1960 1980

−0.

4−

0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

Year Born

s(G

E In

dex,

df=

4)

Kuwait

1940 1960 1980

−0.

4−

0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

Year Born

s(G

E In

dex,

df=

4)

Iraq

1940 1960 1980

−0.

4−

0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

Year Born

s(G

E In

dex,

df=

4)

Algeria


(Yemen united) (Yemen North and South)

Algeria 0.087*** (0.011) 0.104***(0.025)Egypt 0.036*** (0.013) 0.029 (0.026)Iraq −0.006(0.013) −0.023 (0.030)Jordan 0.020** (0.009) 0.017 (0.021)Lebanon 0.179*** (0.009) 0.162*** (0.022)Libya 0.011(0.011) 0.012(0.023)Morocco 0.047***(0.015) 0.094*** (0.029)Palestine 0.041***(0.012) 0.051** (0.022)Sudan −0.013(0.013) −0.027 (0.028)Tunisia 0.107*** (0.009) 0.092*** (0.022)Saudi Arabia 0.058*** (0.018) 0.146***(0.047)Yemen −0.034** (0.015)North Yemen −0.049 (0.036)South Yemen −0.036 (0.098)Kuwait baselineGender (Male) −0.114*** (0.003) −0.115*** (0.003)EducationIlliterate baselineElementary 0.006 (0.007) 0.008 (0.007)Primary 0.015** (0.007) 0.018*** (0.007)Secondary 0.041***(0.007) 0.044*** (0.007)2-year college 0.057*** (0.007) 0.059***(0.007)BA or MA 0.079*** (0.007) 0.081***(0.007)Reading QuranRare/No 0.015*** (0.006) 0.017*** (0.006)Sometimes 0.00004 (0.004) 0.0005(0.004)Every day baseline

Adjusted R2 0.154 0.159Log Likelihood 2,608.259 2,640.709UBRE 0.041 0.041

Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p < 0.01


GAM models. DV - Gender egalitarianism


Results1 - Modernization trends in gender egalitarianism

∙ There is evidence of growing support for gender equality in allthe Arab countries across all generations (without controls).

∙ When controlling for education, gender, urban or rural setting,and religiosity, the growth of gender egalitarianism becomessubtle, and in many cases vanishes.

∙ In some countries, like Yemen and Algeria, older people showmore egalitarian attitudes then their younger compatriots.


Results 2 - Yemen and Saudi Arabia

∙ South Yemeni (socialist) start from more egalitarian attitudesin generations born before 1950-s and end up with veryconservative mores among youth.

∙ North Yemeni born before 1950-s express very conservativegender attitudes, but generations born after 1970-s expressslightly more support for egalitarianism then their southerncounterparts.

∙ In Saudi Arabia there is a modest growth of support foregalitarianism in the youngest cohorts (resembling NorthYemen).


Thanks for your attention


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