Vol. 3, No. 2 (February 2015)

IN THIS ISSUE

01 Does Australia Energy Export Future Lie with the Asian

Supergrid?

Samantha Mella (Freelancer)

10 Southeast Asia’s nuclear push: the need for better

regional communication and nuclear accident

response capabilities

Denia Djokic (University of California, Berkeley)

15 Ammonia as a Fuel for Passenger Vehicles: Possible

Implications for Greenhouse Gas Reduction in Korea

David von Hippel and Doo Won Kang (Nautilus Institute)

22 Open-source Seed System and Intellectual Property on

Global Food Security

Eun Chang Choi (GP3 Korea)

Global Energy Monitor Vol.3, No.2, 2015-2

1

Does Australia Energy Export Future Lie with the Asian Supergrid?

Samantha Mella

A dominant narrative in Australia has been that Australian, Asian and global prosperity is

inextricably linked to the production and consumption of coal. In 2014, Australia’s

conservative Prime Minister, Tony Abbott made his position clear:

“Coal is good for humanity, coal is good for prosperity, coal is an essential part of our

economic future, here in Australia, and right around the world ... Energy is what

sustains our prosperity, and coal is the world's principal energy source and it will be

for many decades to come.”1

Abbott’s position continues the trajectory of his conservative predecessor, John

Howard. Howard’s vision was of an Australian energy super power – a global leader in the

export of coal, gas, petroleum and uranium.2 The Rudd-Gillard Labour government that

served between the administrations of Howard and Abbott controversially introduced

carbon pricing as a measure to reduce domestic greenhouse gas emissions. This

administration, however, also shared the vision of an Australian economy dominated by

fossil fuel exports. In 2011, when the price of Australian thermal coal reached its post-

recession peak at $US136.30 per ton, 3 the Gillard government’s position was:

“Australian coal production is expected to continue its strong growth over the course of

the decade and beyond. This will largely be to meet export opportunities in our region.”4

1Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) (2014) Coal good for humanity, Prime Minister Tony Abbott says

at $3.9b Queensland Mine opening” ABC, 13 October 2014. available at : http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-

10-13/coal-is-good-for-humanity-pm-tony-abbott-says/5810244 2 Wendy Frew (2006), “We'll be an energy superpower: PM”. Sydney Morning Herald, July 18, 2006, available

as http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/well-be-an-energy-superpower-

pm/2006/07/17/1152988475628.html 3 Edited by Ed Davies, (2014) “Australia’s coal sector defies all comers to keep on mining,” Sydney Morning

Hearald, October 13, 2014 available at: http://www.smh.com.au/business/mining-and-resources/australias-coal-

sector-defies-all-comers-to-keep-on-mining-20141013-1154av.html 4 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism (2011), Strengthening the Foundation for Australia’s Energy

Future, Draft Energy White Paper 2011. Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism Australian Government.

Global Energy Monitor Vol.3, No.2, 2015-2

2

Australia began exporting coal to Asia during Japan’s post-war reconstruction in the late

1940s. Export markets grew to include South Korea, Taiwan and China. Abbott’s vision

sees past and future coal export as a cornerstone to Asian economic growth.5 Asian

“energy poverty”—the relative paucity of domestic energy sources in many of the major

economies in Asia—is frequently cited as a reason for the expansion of coal production

and use. 6 The impact of Australian coal’s “downstream” emissions—that is, the

emissions of greenhouse gases when Australia’s exported coal is consumed—is not

acknowledged as Australia’s problem. This is despite the costly domestic impacts of

extreme weather events in Australia that appear to be consistent with the climate

predictions made by agencies such as the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change), and the Australian Bureau of Meteorology and the CSIRO (Commonwealth

Scientific and Industry Research Organization). Some of these climatic events affect the

coal industry itself. Flooding has lead to mine closures, infrastructure damage, and

billions in lost production in Queensland in 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2013.7 8 9 In

addition, bushfires have set alight the brown coal seam at Hazelwood in Victoria in 2006

Available as http://www.afr.com/rw/2009-2014/AFR/2011/12/12/Photos/70eee99a-250a-11e1-a799-

d611028b2128_Draft-EWP.pdf. 5 Tristan Edis (2014), “Abbott's kinda right – coal was ‘good for humanity’”, Business Spectator,

14 Oct 2014, available as http://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2014/10/14/renewable-

energy/abbotts-kinda-right-%E2%80%93-coal-was-good-humanity. 6 Brendan Pearson (2014), “Coal the answer to energy poverty”, The Drum, 7 April, 2014, available as

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-08/pearson-coal-the-answer-to-energy-poverty/5371462. 7 Sarah Jane Tasker (2011) “Queensland floods cause another mine closure”, The Australian, 11 January,

2011

Available as: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/mining-energy/queensland-floods-force-another-coal-

mine-closure/story-e6frg9df-1225985677568. 8 Reserve Bank of Australia (2011) The Impact of the Recent Floods on the Australian Economy, Statement on Monetary

Policy, February 2011. Accessed online: http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/smp/boxes/2011/feb/a.pdf 9 Matt Chambers (2013) “BHP’s Bowen Basin Coal Mines hit by floods”, The Australian, 29 January 2013

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/mining-energy/miners-spared-but-queensland-storm-closes-rail-and-

ports/story-e6frg9df-1226563790140.

Global Energy Monitor Vol.3, No.2, 2015-2

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and 2014.10 The 2014 fire burned for 45 days, cost $100 million, and was subject to a

state government inquiry due to local residents’ exposure to toxic fumes.11

The Climate Council’s 2014 report, Counting the Costs, Climate Change and Coastal

Flooding, stated that $226 billion worth of Australian infrastructure was at risk with a

1.1m sea level rise.12 This is includes ports, domestic and international airports, rail and

light rail infrastructure, hospitals, schools, and housing. The flood maps for a 1.1m sea

level rise are available on the Australian government’s own Department of Environment

website 13 . The fossil fuel super power goal pursued by successive Australian

governments can be viewed as highly damaging to Australia’s future. From the

perspective of climate movement, the downstream emissions from Australian coal export

are, “a menace to the planet and would have to be left in the ground if the world had any

hope of avoiding catastrophic global warming.”14

In 2013-14 Australia exported 375 million tons of coal, valued at almost $A40

billion.15 Meat, wheat, and wool combined yielded $A18 billion in export revenue. Only

iron ore exports exceeded the value of exported coal. Given the importance of coal to

Australia’s economy, the challenges posed by climate change and the need for

greenhouse gas emissions reductions, both domestically and internationally, have been

10

AAP (2006), “Massive coal mine blaze still burning”, The Age, 13 October 2006. Available at

http://www.theage.com.au/news/National/Massive-coal-mine-blaze-still-

burning/2006/10/13/1160246290407.html. 11

James Fetts (2014), “Hazelwood mine fire inquiry: Authorities too late in warning Morwell residents of

health risks”, Australian Broadcasting Commission, 2 September, 2014. Available at:

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-02/authorities-too-late-with-hazelwood-fire-health-warnings-

report/5713790 12

Will Steffen, John Hunter and Lesley Hughes (2014), available as

http://www.climatecouncil.org.au/uploads/56812f1261b168e02032126342619dad.pdf. 13

The Australian Government, Department of Environment Available at :

http://www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/adaptation/australias-coasts/mapping-sea-level-rise 14

Bill McKibbon (2013) “How Australian Coal is causing global damage,” The Monthly, June 2013. Available

at: http://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2013/june/1370181600/bill-mckibben/how-australian-coal-causing-

global-damage 15

Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade statistics, available from

http://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/trade-investment/australias-trade-in-goods-

services/Pages/australias-trade-in-goods-and-services.aspx#imports.

Global Energy Monitor Vol.3, No.2, 2015-2

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extremely difficult for Australia to assimilate into its energy policy. Serious incorporation

of climate considerations would curtail Australia’s current fossil fuel exports-based

superpower path.

As a consequence of this climate considerations/fossil-fuel export dependence mismatch,

“business as usual” has prevailed. Australia continues to operate on the assumption

that other nations won’t act to meet their emissions reduction targets, and as a result

Australia’s coal exports will not be threatened by climate considerations. In China, the

2014 energy transition created a 3 % drop in thermal coal consumption, even with an

overall 3.8% increase in electricity output. This has taken Australia and the coal industry

by surprise, even though China’s transition was forecast in Australia by the well-known

economist Professor Ross Garnaut.16

As Australia continues to invest in coal export infrastructure, Australian coal is in

trouble. The global coal glut has caused a marked decline in prices, down to $US57.10

per ton as of mid-January, 2015.17 The industry has responded by increasing production

volumes to make up for the low price, and by shedding workers to cut costs.

Climate change concerns and the impacts of the coal fuel cycle on health,

environment, agriculture and tourism are driving local resistance to the coal industry and

legal challenges to new coal mining and transport projects. A global divestment

campaign, aimed at restricting the fossil fuel industry’s access to capital, is starting to

gain traction. Pressure from activists led four European banks to rule out involvement in

16

Ben Potter (2015), “China cuts thermal coal use by 3pc”, Financial Review, 27 January, 2015, available as

http://www.afr.com/Page/Uuid/6a490ad8-a5ce-11e4-9dae-b62d8445140 17

Greg McKenna (2015), “CHART OF THE DAY: Newcastle Coal Is Quietly Crashing”, Business Insider

Australia, January 14, 2015, available as http://www.businessinsider.com.au/chart-of-the-day-newcastle-coal-is-

quietly-crashing-2015-1

Global Energy Monitor Vol.3, No.2, 2015-2

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financing the expansion of the Abbott Point Coal Terminal in Queensland, based on

concerns about the Great Barrier Reef.18 19

Goldman Sachs has warned investors to pull out of stocks in thermal coal production

companies.20 Citibank, HBSC, and the Deutsche Bank acknowledge that the carbon in

the world’s fossil fuel reserves, if extracted, burned, and emitted as carbon dioxide,

exceed any safe limit for atmospheric carbon stabilisation, and warn investors about

investing in projects that cannot be realized.21 Carbon pricing—placing taxes on fossil

fuels to reflect the potential costs of greenhouse gas emissions in fuel prices—is

gradually gaining momentum. According to the World Bank, 40 countries and 20 cities

and provinces are currently using or implementing some kind of carbon pricing

mechanism.22 This is a major global structural reform that will have a further impact on

coal production and sales worldwide.

Australia may benefit from reconsidering what it means to be an energy superpower

in 2015. In the era of an altered climate and carbon constraints, the need to “think

different” has never been greater. Australia has vast reservoirs of solar energy within

reach of South East Asia (SEA), where energy demand is forecast to increase by 80% by

2035.23 The Asian Development Bank (ABD) has stated that “business as usual” in the

18

Julien Vincent (2014), “What I did on my ‘holiday’: European banks won’t fund Abbot Point”, Market

Forces, May 27, 2014, available as http://www.marketforces.org.au/what-i-did-on-my-holiday-european-banks-

wont-fund-abbot-point/.

19 Coal wire (2014), “Congratulate the Royal Bank of Scotland for dumping Abbott Point”,

enewsletter, dated June 19 June 2014. 20

See, for example, Goldman Sachs (2013), “The window for thermal coal investment is closing”, dated July

24, 2013, and available as http://d35brb9zkkbdsd.cloudfront.net/wp-

content/uploads/2013/08/GS_Rocks__Ores_-_Thermal_Coal_July_2013.pdf.

21 Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (2014), Briefing Note Fossil Fuels, Energy

Transition and Risk, dated April 18, 2014, and available as http://ieefa.org/briefing-note-fossil-fuels-energy-

transition-risk/. 22

World Bank (2014), “What Does It Mean to Put a Price on Carbon?”, June 11, 2014, available as

http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/06/11/what-does-it-mean-to-put-a-price-on-carbon.

23 International Energy Agency (2013), Southeast Asia Energy Outlook, Executive Summary: World

Energy Outlook Special Report, available as

Global Energy Monitor Vol.3, No.2, 2015-2

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energy sector is not sustainable for SEA, and calls for greater efficiency and increased

rollout of renewable energy.24

A regional energy agreement between Australia and the ASEAN states to mobilise

Australia’s desert solar resources to SEA via a subsea High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC)

interconnector has the potential to address the key regional challenges of energy security

and emissions reduction. In addition, ASEAN nations have committed to interconnect

their electricity grids by 2020 to enhance energy security and sustainability. Realistically,

fully realizing the ASEAN interconnection within that timeframe seems optimistic,

however the goal of a regional grid exists.

A subsea HVDC interconnector between Australia and the ASEAN grid is an ambitious

proposal with significant challenges, but does have historical precedents. In 1871, an

1100-mile subsea telegraph cable was laid by sailing ships from Jakarta to Darwin.25

The subsea telegraph cable revolutionized Australian communications by connecting it to

the global Morse code network.

Around the world, nations are connecting their electricity grids to create multi-lateral

electricity markets.

Grid integration is most advanced in Europe where interconnection stretches from

Finland to Portugal. At 580 km, the “NorNed” powerline is currently the longest subsea

HVDC Interconnector in the world. NorNed delivers Norwegian hydroelectricity to the

Netherlands, where the power is sold by auction on the European market.26

http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO_Special_Report_2013_Southeast_Asia_Ener

gy_Outlook_Executive_Summary.pdf. 24

Asian Development Bank (2013), “Power Swaps Can Help Asia-Pacific Manage Daunting Future Energy

Needs – Report”, dated 14 October 2013, and available as http://www.adb.org/news/power-swaps-can-help-

asia-pacific-manage-daunting-future-energy-needs-report 25

Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory, “History of Parliament House Site”, available as

http://www.nt.gov.au/lant/about-parliament/history-of%20parliament-house-

site.shtml#PortDarwinPostandTelegraphOffice.

26 Tennent (2008), “NorNed turnover exceeds EUR 100 million”, dated 1 December, 2008, and avail

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Grid integration is also occurring in Asia. Bilateral electricity trade is occurring via

single interconnectors in SEA, for example between Thailand and Malaysia, and between

Russia and China in North Asia (NA). Many other interconnectors are planned or in across

Asia.

The Asia Super Grid (ASG) is the concept of multilateral electricity trade in an

integrated grid between Japan, Russia, China, Korea, Mongolia and beyond. 27 28

Mongolia has major ambitions to mobilise its wind and solar resources to become NA’s

energy hub, and to export 100 GW of renewable energy into the ASG by 2030. It is

interesting to note that despite Mongolia’s huge coal reserves, and recent large

increases in its coal exports to China, it aspires to become a renewable energy

superpower.

Is dependence on the fossil fuel economy a wise path for Australia in 2015 and

beyond? Will the coal narrative lead to a 1.1m sea level rise and $226 billion in lost

infrastructure, including the ports and railways that export coal? Does Australia’s political

leadership have the courage to have a discussion about climate change,coal exports, and

downstream emissions?

Will the ASG evolve to become an integrated electricity market as in Europe?

WillAustralia be isolated from Asia’s future electricity market if it continues to focus on

coal exports? Is an HVDC interconnector with Asia more appropriate energy infrastructure

than more coal loaders?

Transitions in energy supply and demand in SEA, and globally, are bound to continue.

The need for electricity in the countries of SEA seems certain to persist, and likely expand.

able as http://www.tennet.eu/nl/news/article/norned-turnover-exceeds-eur-100-million.html.

27 Mano S, Ovgor B, Samadov Z et al (2014) Gobitec and Asian Super Grid for Renewable Energies in

North East Asia, Energy Charter Secretariat, Available at

http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/Gobitec_and_the_Asian_Supergrid_2014_ENG.p

df.

Global Energy Monitor Vol.3, No.2, 2015-2

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The rate of expansion will depend on the balance between energy efficiency improvement

and expanding electricity service needs in SEA nations, but a large and persistent market

for Australian renewable electricity exports seems highly likely.

Challenges to renewable energy exports—ranging from the technical challenges of

configuring HVDC interconnections, to the environmental challenges of generation sites

and powerlines, to the political and economic challenges of settling management and

pricing arrangements with trading partners—should not be underestimated. If an

effective and substantial Asian Super Grid results from overcoming these challenges,

however, access to that grid may help to pave the way for Australia’s transition to being

an exporter of clean energy.

Global Energy Monitor Vol.3, No.2, 2015-2

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Possible Australia-Asia Electricity Interconnector (graphic prepared by Kellie O'Hare, 2015)

Global Energy Monitor Vol.3, No.2, 2015-2

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Southeast Asia’s nuclear push: the need for better regional

communication and nuclear accident response capabilities

Denia Djokic

Last month, in January 2015, the Nuclear Power Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur brought

representatives of the global nuclear industry and Asian nations together for a

conversation on the status of nuclear energy growth in Asia. Although many Asian

countries reconsidered their nuclear ambitions in the aftermath of the tragic Fukushima

Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident of March 2011, plans to introduce nuclear energy

into their long-term energy mix have not been permanently deterred. Although most of

the additions to Asia’s nuclear power plants fleet are being planned and built in China,

India, and South Korea, the level of interest in nuclear power in an increasing number of

members of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) remains high. OECD

projections of economic growth in the Southeast Asian region predict an annual average

5.6% increase in gross domestic product (GDP) between 2015 and 2019.29 This growth,

accompanied by expected rapidly increasing energy (and particularly electricity) needs,

coupled with energy security issues and concerns about greenhouse gas emissions, has

led many Southeast Asian countries to take a renewed interest in nuclear energy

development.

On the forefront of this regional nuclear energy push are Vietnam, Indonesia, and

Malaysia, according to a recent report on the sustainability of nuclear energy in

Southeast Asia, published last October by the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies

29

OECD (2015), Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2015: Strengthening Institutional

Capacity, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/saeo-2015-en

Global Energy Monitor Vol.3, No.2, 2015-2

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(NTS) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS).30 All of these nations

have plans to acquire nuclear energy capability in the next decade. After some delays,

Vietnam is determined to commission its first nuclear power plant, two Russian-built

1000 MWe reactors, at Phuoc Dinh (Ninh Thuan Province) after 2020. Indonesia’s

National Nuclear Energy Agency, BATAN, and the Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency,

BAPETEN, have conducted feasibility studies and undergone extensive preparations to

ready the country for a possible nuclear energy expansion. BATAN has also performed a

number of site selection processes, focusing on Muria (Central Java Province), Banten

(West Java Province), and Bangka Island (east of Sumatra Island), identifying these areas

as those with lowest risk of natural disasters. Last September, Russia’s state nuclear

energy corporation Rosatom expressed interest in constructing two nuclear power plants

on Batam Island. Malaysia announced last July that it plans to conduct a feasibility study

aimed at the possibility of building a nuclear power plant in the next ten years. Other

ASEAN countries have also been part of the nuclear discussion, historically as well as

currently. Thailand has drafted proposals to implement nuclear energy, including it in its

Power Development Plan starting in 202631. The Philippines constructed a 621 MW

(megawatt) nuclear power plant at Bataan, about 75 km west of Manila. Though the

Bataan plant was essentially complete and had undergone non-nuclear testing by 1984,

it never went into operation due to public and political opposition. Cambodia and

Myanmar have also identified themselves as “aspirants” to nuclear energy. Some of the

smaller countries in the region, however, such as Brunei, Singapore, and East Timor, have

30

Caballero-Anthony, Mely, Alistair DB Cook, Julius Cesar I. Trajano, and Margareth Sembiring (2014). The

Sustainability of Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia: Opportunities and Challenges. NTS Report No. 1, Centre

for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. October 2014.

Available as http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/NTS-Report-October-2014.pdf. 31

Summary of Thailand Development Plan, 2012-2030. Energy Policy and Planning Office, Ministry of Energy,

Thailand. Available as http://www.egat.co.th/en/images/about-egat/PDP2010-Rev3-Eng.pdf

Global Energy Monitor Vol.3, No.2, 2015-2

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said they will abstain from pursuing a commercial nuclear energy option.32

There are many responsibilities that these nuclear aspirants must fulfill in order to be

able to utilize nuclear energy responsibly. These include technical capacity-building for

the nuclear workforce and the strengthening of programs of nuclear engineering

education, as well as enhancing the rigor and robustness of their regulatory

infrastructure. Independence of the nuclear energy regulators from the government

bodies and/or private industries that promote nuclear energy must be ensured, so as to

not repeat the conflicts of interest that arose from the pre-Fukushima Japanese nuclear

regulatory structure. 33 Emerging nuclear energy countries also must improve

cooperation with international oversight bodies, most notably the International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA), in light of proliferation and nuclear accident risks. For a region that

is prone to natural disasters, including typhoons, tsunamis, and earthquakes, assurance

of preparedness to respond to a nuclear incident is indispensable. According to the NTS

report from October 2014, “It is imperative for ASEAN member states to work together to

ensure effective governance of nuclear facilities, materials, and wastes and to adopt a

regional disaster preparedness mechanism. ASEAN can facilitate regional cooperation on

capacity-building, information dissemination, and emergency preparedness and

response frameworks.”34

Even though the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in 2011 was geographically

distant enough to not prompt a large-scale immediate crisis response (for example,

related to the health impacts of radiological emissions from the accident) in Southeast

Asian nations, the events at Fukushima spawned effects that transcended national

32

Parameswaran, Prashanth (2009). “Southeast Asia’s Nuclear Energy Future: Promises and Perils.” Project

2049 Institute, Futuregrams 09 6 (2009): 23. Available as

http://project2049.net/documents/southeast_asia_nuclear_energy_future.pdf. 33

Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (2012). The Official Report of the

Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission: Executive Summary. National Diet of

Japan, 2012. Available as https://www.nirs.org/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf. 34

Caballero-Anthony, Mely et al (2014), ibid.

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boundaries. The nuclear accident created far-reaching confusion about radiological

fallout, shifted public opinion of nuclear energy, and complicated many national nuclear

energy policies globally in the midst of what had been considered a “nuclear

renaissance”, including a reconsideration of nuclear energy in Southeast Asian countries

previously enthusiastic about adopting developing or acquiring reactors. 35 In the

aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear accident, the need for a coordinated and coherent

approach to responding to natural disasters in an effective and timely manner was

immediately acknowledged in ASEAN. Notably, on April 9, 2011, almost a month after the

Great East Japan Earthquake, a Special Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting was held in

Jakarta, at which ASEAN countries expressed solidarity with Japan in the context of

natural disasters, and which stressed the importance of international cooperation in

disaster management. In his opening speech, President Yudhoyono of the Republic of

Indonesia emphasized “the need to further enhance capacity for disaster preparedness

and management by building upon the existing mechanisms and frameworks.”36

The two devastating natural disasters in Southeast Asia in the last decade, the 2004

Indian Ocean Tsunami and the 2008 Cyclone Nargis, presented lessons in and

demonstrated the indispensability of disaster response readiness. If Southeast Asia is to

gain significant nuclear capacity in the near future, nuclear-specific disaster preparation

is a pressing need. To address “the peculiar nature of a radiation-related disaster,” the

NTS report recommends the establishment of “a special coordinating body, such as a

nuclear crisis centre, which is expected to be conversant in the appropriate responses to

35

Melissa Low (2011), “Nuclear Power, Tectonic Collision Zones and Climate Targets: ASEAN’s Risky

Convergence?” ESI Bulletin on Energy Trends and Development, Volume 4, Issue 1, April 2011. Available as

http://esi.nus.edu.sg/docs/default-source/esi-bulletins/volume-4-issue-1-april-2011. 36

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2011), “Japan and ASEAN Vow Closer Cooperation in Disaster

Management: Special Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Held in Jakarta. April 15, 2011”. Available as

http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/jfpu/2011/4/0415.html.

Global Energy Monitor Vol.3, No.2, 2015-2

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this type of disaster affecting people in the region.”37 An existing example of such a

crisis center, though it does not target nuclear-related issues, is the ASEAN Coordinating

Centre for Humanitarian Assistance located in Jakarta. Furthermore, this type of center

could be established to respond to not only nuclear reactor accidents, but also nuclear

security and terrorism incidents. Currently, the two ASEAN sub-organizations that

promote regional cooperation on nuclear energy are the ASEAN Network of Regulatory

Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM) and the Nuclear Energy Cooperation Sub-sector

Network (NEC-SSN). This existing infrastructure could be built upon to enhance regional

coordination, communication, and training on nuclear disaster-related issues.

In light of Southeast Asia’s near-term nuclear ambitions, it is imperative to cultivate a

regional culture of response readiness, cohesion and communication, as well as policies

to facilitate this goal. To prepare for nuclear safety and security-related incidents, all

ASEAN and neighboring nations, independent of whether they have plans to utilize

nuclear energy, need to develop an early warning system for nuclear accidents and a

thorough regional emergency preparedness and response plan. This could be achieved

by more regional preparedness exercises, specifically radiological disaster training,

coupled with training and assistance from the IAEA and countries with greater technical

experience in nuclear power, such as the US, Russia, France, Japan, and South Korea.

This preparation must start sooner rather than later; the earlier that gaps and limitations

in response readiness to a nuclear incident are identified, the sooner and more

thoroughly they can be addressed.

37

Caballero-Anthony, Mely et al (2014), ibid.

Global Energy Monitor Vol.3, No.2, 2015-2

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Ammonia as a Fuel for Passenger Vehicles: Possible Implications for

Greenhouse Gas Reduction in Korea

David von Hippel and Doo Won Kang

Among the goals of “green growth” in the Republic of Korea (ROK) are shifting to use of

renewable fuels in place of fossil fuels. Renewable options—including solar space heating,

biomass-fueled heating and power, and solar and wind displace coal and gas used in

electricity generation (along with, possibly, more nuclear power) are available for many

sectors, but fossil fuels are hardest to displace in the transportation sector. Fossil fuels

offer a difficult-to-match combination of energy density and availability for vehicle use.

Given Koreans’ increasing appetite for ownership of road vehicles, there is an important

role for a fuel that is carbon-free, portable, energy-dense, and compatible with existing

cars and fueling systems. Ammonia (NH3) fulfills many of these requirements, as it

produces no carbon dioxide when it is burned, is usable in existing vehicles with only

modest engine modifications, is familiar to producers as an industrial and agricultural

chemical traded worldwide, and requires only low-pressure tanks for storage, similar to

liquefied petroleum gas (LPG, or “propane”). The degree to which shifting to ammonia as

a fuel fulfills green growth objectives, relative to other ways of reducing carbon emissions

from road transport, depends in large part, however, on how ammonia is produced.38

A key goal of green growth policies in the ROK, as elsewhere, is to reduce emissions

of the pollutants that lead to climate change. Climate change, and specifically, global

warming, is caused by increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the

atmosphere, especially carbon dioxide (CO2). The atmospheric build-up of GHGs is

38

This article is based in part on Doo Won Kang (2014), “Combating climate change with ammonia-fueled

vehicles”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 17 February 2014, available at http://thebulletin.org/combating-

climate-change-ammonia-fueled-vehicles.

Global Energy Monitor Vol.3, No.2, 2015-2

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largely the result of combustion of fossil fuels and other human activities, as reaffirmed

by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in September of 2013.39

A significant portion of CO2 emissions come from the tailpipes of cars and trucks.

Practically all of current Korean vehicles run on gasoline and diesel, and as those fuels

are burned, CO2 is released. The transportation sector contributed 12% of total ROK

greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions in 2011. Within the transportation sector, road-

transportation, including passenger cars, trucks and buses, contributed 95% of those

emissions.40

A projection of the composition of the future passenger vehicle fleet in Korea

prepared in late 2012 by the Korea Energy Economics Institute (KEEI) suggests that

without aggressive application of measures to reduce road transport GHG emissions,

those emissions will continue to increase, probably significantly faster than population.41

KEEI’s projections show that although the ROK’s population will stabilize at about 52

million people in 2030, and begin to fall thereafter, the number of passenger transport

vehicles will continue to increase, from about 13 million in 2010 to over 21 million by

2035, implying an increase in the number of cars per person from about 0.27 in 2010 to

about 0.40 by 2035. Moreover, KEEI’s projections show very limited penetration of high-

efficiency or alternative-fueled vehicles, with only about 1.7 percent of vehicles being

hybrid (driven by both fossil-fueled and electric motors) by 2035, and with a scant 3,500

electric-only vehicles in the fleet by that year.

Reducing road vehicle GHG emissions can involve a number of potential “fixes”.

39

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 27 September 2013. IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (WGI

AR5). 40

“2013 National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report of Korea,” Greenhouse Gas Inventory & Research Center

of Korea, Feb, 2014 (Korean). Available as

http://www.gir.go.kr/home/board/read.do;jsessionid=9Y0S23c1aQqsFwoLR1oxYgiIfTaLz1jsVXTJbE1FsVNz

CFcYS7z09PnC78u7cAX3.og_was_servlet_engine1?pagerOffset=0&maxPageItems=10&maxIndexPages=10&

searchKey=&searchValue=&menuId=36&boardId=22&boardMasterId=2&boardCategoryId=. 41

“Analysis of the influence of dissemination of electric vehicles on Korea’s energy supply and demand,”

KEEI, Dec. 2012 (in Korean).

Global Energy Monitor Vol.3, No.2, 2015-2

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Moving more transit from private vehicles to mass transit in other, more efficient forms of

transportation including rail, subway, and buses, is one approach, and is to some extent

underway in the ROK, though based on the appetite for personal transport in Korea

projected by KEEI, there will be limits to the effectiveness of this “mode shifting”. How,

then, can Korea achieve deep reductions in CO2 emissions from the transportation sector?

Other approaches to reducing GHG emissions by private vehicles require modifications to

the makeup of the private passenger fleet itself, either through improvements in vehicle

efficiency (including the dissemination of vehicles with hybrid powertrains), and the use

of vehicles that use alternative fuels. One alternative fuel and powertrain combination is

electric vehicles (EVs). The battery technologies required by EVs, however, though

improving rapidly in storage capacity and falling in cost, still do not match the range and

cost-effectiveness (from the standpoint of vehicle purchase costs) of gasoline and diesel-

fueled vehicles. Other fuels that have received significant attention are compressed

natural gas (CNG), which burns cleanly and can be used in most internal combustion

engines, with some modifications, but requires high-pressure tanks for on-board gas

storage, and hydrogen, which can be made using electricity and water (or from fossil fuels

or biomass), and can be used in either internal combustion engines or in fuel cells that

convert the hydrogen to electricity without combustion, and therefore work more like a

battery than an a typical gasoline or diesel motor, and at an efficiency typically much

higher than that of a typical auto engine. When hydrogen burns (or is converted to

electricity in a fuel cell) water vapor is the main product. LPG is widely used in lightly-

modified vehicles, including much of Korea’s taxi fleet, and produces slightly lower

emissions than gasoline or diesel. A fifth alternative fuel is ammonia, which, like

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hydrogen, produces practically no GHGs when burned.42

Although ammonia-fueled vehicles have a number of enthusiastic proponents

around the globe, most notably in the farm belt of the United States, NH3 vehicles have

received generally less attention than CNG or hydrogen-fueled vehicles.43 NH3-fueled

vehicles have the potential to reduce CO2 emissions to levels far below those achieved by

some alternative-fueled cars, such as those fueled with natural gas or ethanol derived

from corn. The mode of operation of NH3-fueled vehicles is similar to conventional

gasoline-fueled internal combustion-engine vehicles: Liquid ammonia is burned with

oxygen in order to move an engine’s pistons, producing power that is harnessed to drive

the vehicle’s wheels. This familiar technology means NH3-fueled vehicles can generally

be built and maintained in the same way as the current vehicle fleet. NH3-fueled vehicles,

however, unlike conventionally-fueled vehicles (and like hydrogen and electric vehicles),

do not directly release any carbon dioxide. 44 Ammonia can be used in internal

combustion engine (ICE) vehicles with minor modifications, and is environmentally

friendly, as it produces only molecular nitrogen (N2) and water (H2O) at the tailpipe, even

when only low-cost emissions controls are used. Any unburned ammonia and NOx in the

engine’s exhaust are removed by a selective catalyst reduction (SCR) system in NH3-

fueled vehicles.45

Recent research suggests that ammonia could also be used as a high-density, low-

pressure means of storing hydrogen, with a compact on-board conversion device

42

A small amount of nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions are produced when ammonia or hydrogen are burned.

NOx has an indirect impact on GHG concentrations in the atmosphere, but the impact is much smaller than

direct emissions of CO2 from fossil fuels. 43

See, for example, the presentations prepared for the 11th Annual NH3 Fuel Conference, “NH3, the Renewable

Carbon Free Fuel”, held September 21 – 24, 2014 in Des Moines, Iowa, USA, and available as

http://nh3fuelassociation.org/events-conferences/2014-nh3-fuel-conference/. 44

N. Olson and J. Holbrook, Iowa Energy Center (2012), NH3 – “The Other Hydrogen”, available from:

http://www.iowaenergycenter.org/grant-and-research-library/nh3-the-other-hydrogen-report. 45

William Jacobson, Gasoline/Ethanol/Ammonia Mixture as a Transition Fuel “Solution”, SY-Will

Engineering, Available from: http://www.sy-will.spyang.com/.

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producing hydrogen for fuel cell vehicles with low, or possibly no, nitrogen oxide (NOx)

emissions.46

Compared to gasoline vehicles, NH3-fueled vehicles do not produce CO2 during

operation. When GHG emissions from vehicles are considered, however, it is important to

look at not just the direct emissions associated with vehicle operation, but at the full

energy-cycle emissions associated with fueling the vehicles. A full consideration of

emissions of electric vehicles, for example, must include the emissions associated with

producing and delivering the electricity stored in vehicle batteries. Similarly, a full

accounting of GHG emissions from CNG vehicles must include emissions from gas

production, processing, transportation, distribution, and compression. GHGs from

hydrogen-fueled vehicles should include emissions associated with hydrogen production,

and an accounting of GHG emissions from gasoline, diesel, and LPG vehicles should

include not only emission from the tailpipe, but from oil refining and product distribution.

Similarly, an accounting of GHG emissions from NH3-fueled vehicles must include the

GHGs associated with NH3 manufacture. Current industrial ammonia production plants

run principally on fossil fuels, most commonly natural gas and emit approximately 1.2 –

1.8 metric tons of CO2 per ton of ammonia produced.47 Ammonia can be and is also,

however, produced using electricity through the catalytic reaction of nitrogen from air

(which is 78 percent N2) and hydrogen from water. Current industrial electricity-to-NH3

production is somewhat over 50 percent efficient, but once advanced ammonia

production methods (such as solid state ammonia synthesis) that are now working at the

lab scale are commercialized, with the use of electricity from non-fossil sources

46

Autoblog (2014), “Is ammonia the secret to better hydrogen cars?”, dated June 30th , 2014 , and available

as http://www.autoblog.com/2014/06/30/ammonia-secret-to-better-hydrogen-cars/. 47

Jason C. Ganley, John H. Holbrook, Doug E. McKinley, "Solid State Ammonia Synthesis," 2007 Annual

NH3 Fuel Conference, San Francisco, CA, Oct. 15-16, 2007, available as http://www.claverton-

energy.com/wordpress/wp-content/files/NHThree_SSAS_Oct2007_Final.pdf.; Sam Wood and Annette Cowie,

"A Review of Greenhouse Gas Emission Factors for Fertiliser Production," June 2004, available as

http://task38.org/publications/GHG_Emission_Fertilizer_Production_July2004.pdf.

Global Energy Monitor Vol.3, No.2, 2015-2

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(renewable energy sources or nuclear power), virtually no CO2 emissions will be emitted

during ammonia production process, with only modest emissions even including, for

example, GHGs associated with power plant construction and operation. The same, of

course, applies to fuel sources for electric or hydrogen-fueled vehicles.

The graph below presents the authors’ estimates of the total GHG emissions per

kilometer, estimated over the full energy cycle, including fuel extraction, transmission,

distribution, refining, electricity generation, fuel consumption, and, for generation

facilities, emissions related to fuel production and power plant construction/operations.

The vehicles shown are illustrative example chosen to be generally comparable—most are

commercially-available compact and, in one case, medium-sized sedans. For vehicles

using electricity (“All-electric”) or fuels derived from electricity (“Hydrogen”, “NH3 (H2

electrolysis)”, and “NH3 (solid state)”), emissions were estimated in two ways, first using

emission factors related to the average generation fleet in the ROK as of 2012 (blue

bars),48 and second, assuming renewable generation in a 50/50 wind/solar PV mix (red

bars). Several conclusions are clear from this graph. First, electric vehicles offer the

lowest emissions per km. Second, NH3 and H2 vehicles in which electricity is used to

produce the fuel have higher energy-cycle emissions because of the conversion losses in

electricity generation (coupled with the lower efficiency of internal combustion, relative to

electric drive, in ammonia-fueled vehicles).49 Third, in order for H2 and NH3 vehicles to

be competitive with other vehicles on an overall GHGs-per-km basis, their fuels must be

made using fossil-free electricity.

48

Data from KEEI (2013) 2013 Yearbook of Energy Statistics, pages 172 through 177. Available as

http://www.keei.re.kr/keei/download/YES2013.pdf. 49

Note that using NH3 in a hybrid vehicle, in this comparison, would reduce emissions by roughly a third from

those shown.

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That said, other considerations, including cost of vehicles, costs of fuel production,

vehicle range, fuel safety, 50 51 and adaptability of fuels to existing vehicles, will also

play roles as the ROK and global vehicle fleets evolve. The advantages of ammonia as a

motor fuel—including its portability, compatibility with familiar fueling systems, existing

industrial infrastructure, and the ability of conventional cars to easily be modified to run

on a mixture of up to 85 percent ammonia,52—make the concept of NH3-fueled vehicles

and companion NH3-from-renewable-energy production technologies well worth pursuing.

50

Nijs Jan Duijm, Frank Markert, Jette Lundtang Paulsen, “Safety assessment of ammonia as a transportation

fuel,” Riso National Laboratory, Denmark, February 2005; “Comparative Quantitative Risk Assessment of

Motor Gasoline, LPG and Anhydrous Ammonia as an Automotive Fuel,” Quest Consultants Inc., June 2009.

Available as http://www.iowaenergycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/NH3_RiskAnalysis_final.pdf. 51

George Thomas and George Parks (2006), Potential Roles of Ammonia in a Hydrogen Economy: A Study of

Issues Related to the Use Ammonia for On-Board Vehicular Hydrogen Storage, US DOE, February 2006.

Available as http://www.hydrogen.energy.gov/pdfs/nh3_paper.pdf. 52

Helen Knight, “Portable ammonia factories could fuel clean cars,” NewScientist, 01 September 2011.

Available as http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21128285.100-portable-ammonia-factories-could-fuel-

clean-cars.html#.VLrGKC7ruPU.

-

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1,000G

HG

Em

issi

on

s, g

m C

O2

e p

er

km

Fuel, Drivetrain, and Fuel Origin

Total GHGs, Average ROKGeneration

Total GHGs, RenewableElectricity

Global Energy Monitor Vol.3, No.2, 2015-2

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Open-source Seed System and Intellectual Property on Global Food

Security

Eun Chang Choi

It is well-known that food security and nutrition is an unquestionable prerequisite for

hunger eradication. In essense, the future of food secuity lies with seeds, and food

insecurity is directly connected to seed insecurity. The Food and Agriculture Organization

noted that global hunger reduction continues in 2012-14, but 805 million people are

estimated to be chronically undernourished. With the growing demand of an expected 9

billion of world population by 2050, the world is supposed to face tremendous challenges

in securing adequate food. As world agriculture industrialises, the irreversible destruction

of biological resources raises critical policy issues regarding food security.

Today, the proprietary seed market accounts for a staggering share of the world’s

commercial seed supply. The global proprietary seed market is highly concentrated

because the top ten multinational enterprises —including Monsanto, Syngenta, Bayer,

DuPont, Dow Agrosciences and BASF— own staggering shares of two-thirds (67%) of the

world market. This proprietary seed, almost the genetically modified (GM) seeds, is

meant to serve mono-cultural, industrial farming systems. Small farmers notice that big

seed companies steadily carry out the agricultural practice with modern varieties, which

are always cultivated as monocultures over a wide area. The growing market power of

multinational food corporations threaten the capacity of small producers to ask for

sustainable prices. What is more, seed security has been hampered by constrained seed

supply chain. The situation suggests that control over seed is nothing but the first link in

the food chain.

Conversely, there is also non-proprietary seed supply system, which allows farmers

to sow plants without charge. While the proprietary seed market concerns seeds

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produced by private companies, the non-proprietary seed market is made up of

harvested seeds that re-sown by small farmers. It is widely believed that small farms are

key to global food security who practice conventional ways of farming with non-proprietary

seeds. The United Nations’ sustainable development project found that 500 million small

farms provide up to 80 % of food consumed in a large part of the developing world. These

figures explain that small farmers are contributing significantly to poverty reduction and

food security. In the same light, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)

suggests that Africa’s small farmers key to reducing poverty, increasing food security.

African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP) recognized that small-

scale farmers constitute the bedrock of the agricultural farming population. But they are

being squeezed out as mega-farm, and are being literally enforced to purchase

proprietary seeds. It enforeces monoculture farming with GM seeds provided by global

scale of agricultural biotechnology industry. This type of farming practice currently causes

many problems : rise of excessive costs, failure to yield crops, and vulnerability to local

diseases. When crop species lacks diversity in the field, conditions favor the spread of

plant diseases. These are simply because GM seeds failed to meet the different settings

of the soil-forming factors, rainfall types, and temperature fluctuations in all parts of the

world. Large biotech firms are looking for innovations with the greatest profit-generating

potential, so they tend not to invest in solving small-scale, local problems. For example,

the most economically devastating crop epidemic was caused by the intentional use of

cytoplasmic male sterility genes, which also unknowingly created susceptibility to a

disease. Nonetheless but, the widespread use of commercial, proprietary seeds made

small farmers highly dependent on gigantic multinational corporations to supply inputs.

The argicultural strategies based on proprietary seeds largly ignored the value of seed

diversity.

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Seeds are deeply related to a controversial question: whether food insecurity in

developing countries has been exacerbated because of dominant proprietary seed supply

chain across the world? Or do scientific improvements of GM seeds basically enhance

crop productivity to feed the world? Regardless of standpoint,one point seems very clear.

GM seeds cannot fight hunger as effectively as traditional farming, at least, in poor

countries. In 2005 the World Bank and United Nations funded 900 scientists in 110

countries to examine the complex issue of world hunger for three-year of collaborative

effort. The final report in 2008 clearly stated that the use of GM crops is an ineffective

solution to the situation of world hunger. Its conclusion suggested that GM seeds bassed

industrial farming models were outperformed by traditional agro-ecological methods that

provided the most viable means to enhance food security. Industrial large-scale

agriculture is unsustainable because such farming is highly dependent on cheap oil and

subsequently causes inevitable negative impacts on ecosystems.

As seed regulations are being introduced across the world that requires registration

procedure of seeds, many countries passed legislations on seeds with regards to

intellectual property protection. But small farmers do not know how to register their own

traditional seed diversity, thus they become easily dependent on global seed

corporations. As such it eventually became impossible for small farmers or breeders to

save their own seed or develop their own new varieties without paying fees to a private

company. Novel biotechnologies have been used to gain corporate control over the first

link in the food chain - the seed. These biotechnologies are being developed and

controlled by gigantic seed corporations. It would be science-based solutions for global

sustainability focusing on food security, but at the same time it undermines biodiversity

conservation which is also critical part of food security. Agriculture and biodiversity have

often been regarded as separate concerns. Many policymakers, however, still consider

Global Energy Monitor Vol.3, No.2, 2015-2

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agricultural biodiversity very important in food and agriculture. Throughout agricultural

history, seed diversity, has been essential for food security and nutrity. Farmers’ intimate

knowledge has made possible the evolution of seed diversit. For this, the Convention on

Biological Diversity (CBD), signed by 150 world government leaders at the 1992 Rio

Earth Summit, represents a meaningful step forward in the conservation of biological

diversity, the sustainable use of genetic resources. Despite the purport of CBD, it does

not seem to work well in terms of securing seed diversity. As matters stand at present s,

it seems that CBD implementation had failed to achieve that target. To protect seed

diversity, CBD member governments decided to give themselves another 5 years to adopt

the Aichi Biodiversity targets for 2020.

A broad variety of ideas need to be taken into policy consideration in order to

determine the best approach for food security, in particular, in the least developed

countries and developing countries. Ensuring food security, adequate nutrition can be

maintained by seed biodiversity. Should we allow seed diversity to be a subject of

proprietary rights in order to guarantee key resource of the global biotech industry

excluding general non- proprietary use of seeds? Otherwise, can seed be used by small

farmers without any concern over patent license permission and patent royalty? To

determine this question, we must understand the following: what sort of long-term risks

are associated with GM crops, and can GM seeds help to alleviate the causes of food

insecurity in direct and indirect ways? Amidst one of the worst threats from famine in

2002, the Zambian Government has rejected a huge American donation of maize?

Uganda, Bolivia, Columbia, and Ecuador also rejected US food aid containing GM food;

and in 2002 India halted the import of 23,000 tons of corn-soy blend (CSB) originating

from the USA. Chronic poverty and its hunger crisis, followed by the governments’

rejection of food aid, brought the GM food aid debate into the spotlight. Before calling it

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“irrational fears” and “despicable” treatment, we need to see it was not a matter of the

ungrounded myths over potential hazards of eating GM crops as the US Food and Drug

Administration said that GM corn had been consumed worldwide without side-effects. It

was because that these crops were from genetically modified seed. These poor countries

in Sub-Saharan Africa are concerned that letting in food aid containing genetically

modified material will lead to the planting of seeds and the contamination of domestic

crops.

Southern African nations resisted the donation crops precisely because they were

concerned that donation crops from GM seeds will have transported across their territory

contaminating its original seeds. Many African nations have noticed that GM food aid can

be used to grow new crops then could encroach on their local food chain. If so, ultimately,

even poor countries inevitably buy patent-protected seed along with nonselective

herbicide supplied by multinational seed companies. Then, seed companies that

dominate the seed business will be utterly delighted with it: selling their own proprietary

varieties or hybrids. To avoid this problem, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe later

accepted food aid only after crops has been milled, so that crops would only be good for

consumption and not cultivation.

Accordingly, even small farmers gradually become dependent on proprietary seeds,

which they cannot freely sow and save for the next growing season. In the very first step

to purchase GM seeds, all farmers must sign a boilerplate legal agreement that limits

what can be done with them. The legal terms in a licensing agreement are considered

necessary to protect proprietary companies’ patents, and justifiably preclude the

replication of the genetic enhancements that make the seeds unique.

To put it simply, these days, seeds are intellectual property, and the private sector

sets the rules of the global food system. Therefore farmers must get permission from the

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patent holders to use them, and they are not supposed to harvest seeds for replanting.

Some proprietary vegetable seeds are hybrids come with a built-in security lock; if

farmers replant proprietary seed from a hybrid, they will not get exactly the same plant.

Initially proprietary seeds gave earlier promise of delivering yield growth to farmers

since its herbicide-tolerant crop technologies enabled farmers greatly simplified weed

management. But, for instance Monsanto’s soybeans Roundup Ready, brought farmers

in less revenue because the average cost of planting an acre of soybeans had risen 325%

between 1995 and 2011. Furthermore, in 2013, the US Supreme Court came down on

the side of the agricultural giant Monsanto, ruling that a farmer could not use patented

genetically modified soybeans Roundup Ready to replicate seeds without paying a seed

patent holder ( Bowman v. Monsanto Co.). Vernon Bowman, an American farmer, bought

Monsanto’s Roundup seeds from a local grain elevator and planted them for a second,

late-season crop. He took the soybeans he purchased home; planted them in his field.

But the patent license attached to the soybeans stipulated a term that farmers who plant

Monsanto soybeans have to sign an agreement which prohibits farmers from saving the

“second-generation” seeds and using them for the next harvest. Monsanto filed a lawsuit

arguing that Bowman had signed a contract when he initially bought the Roundup Ready

soybeans in the spring, agreeing not to save any of the harvest for replanting. Mr.

Bowman argued that Monsanto’s patent was exhausted when he had bought the seeds

from a grain elevator. He contended that “if patent rights in seeds sold in an authorized

sale are exhausted, patent rights in seeds grown by lawful planting must be exhausted as

well. Due to the self-replicating nature of the invention, subsequent generations of seeds

are embodied in previous generations.” His claim, however, ended up in an anticlimax.

The court clarified that patent exhaustion doctrine does not permit a farmer to reproduce

patented seeds through planting and harvesting without the patent holder’s permission.

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This case suggests that seeds are not self-replicating products anymore; farmers cannot

freely plant GM seeds for the next seeding season. That is, agriculture is not an open

process for small holders who are now at the teeth to firms who insist monoculture with

their own seed patents in this area. It is undeniable that Bowman’s story not just cast

shadows on seed diversity, but also poised a fundamental challenge to local small

farmers’ right to practice of sowing, harvesting and saving for the next season, especially

when patent based GM seeds increasingly dominate farm fields and seed industry. GM

seeds will probably put further pressure on developing countries by encouraging firms to

move deeper into agricultural business. Then, small family farmers will be more driven off

their lands.

A series of campaigns organized by non-profits and advocacy groups aiming to

emphasize the high importance of biodiversity are against corporate control of food and

seeds claiming that Africa is the battlegrounds for two very different positions to

agriculture: non-proprietary and proprietary seeds. These critical voices contend that

patenting seeds— mostly genetically-modified organisms —has led to food crisis and

enormous amount of profits for biotechnology corporations. Oxfam and Greenpeace

found that GM foods accepted as attractive agribusiness but, ignored the broader and

much more important problem of chronic and pervasive marginalization of, smallholder

agriculture by the private sector. That is, most of the transgenic crops on the market have

been designed to meet the needs of industrial farmers rather than small farmers. Based

on seed patents, many seed companies have been suing farmers whose fields are

inadvertently contaminated with GM seeds. Monsanto alone has filed 144 patent-

infringement cases over the past 13 years. Legal threats wielding patents are at forefront

in expanding proprietary seed market. In this light, many researchers admit the need to

protect the intellectual property rights that have spurred the investments into research

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and development t y, but also ask that agricultural technology companies should remove

the restrictions from the end-user agreements. That seems an oxymoron that doesn’t go

together.

On the flip-side, Open source seeds are regarded as a tool for food security because

it prevents seeds from being patented by big seed companies. Shared seeds turned out

to be the foundation of a more sustainable and more just food system around the world.

The Open Source Seed Initiative(OSSI)I nurtures growing plants without patent barriers

without concern over patents on seeds (Self-Replicating Technology). The OSSI aims to

keep seeds free from patents, it is an attempt to pass out patent-free seeds and a

counter-attack to the push by big agricultural companies who hold patents over nearly all

of seed market. It includes 14 different food crops with 29 total varieties, including

carrots, quinoa, kale, and broccoli. In this way, open source seeds create a parallel

system, a new space where breeders and farmers can share seeds. The OSSI has been

launched by a group of scientists and farmers at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in

2011, is one answer to the heated debate between small farmers and the world’s largest

seed companies which holds patents on plants and seeds. Irwin Goldman, a vegetable

breeder helped open source seeds campaign to restore the practice of open sharing.

Sociologist Jack Kloppenburg has been against seed patents for 30 years. The OSSI was

inspired by the open-source software movement, that codes can be freely used, changed,

and shared by anyone. Open source software is made by volunteer engineers, and

distributed under GPL (GNU General Public License), which prohibits proprietization of

the software, but allow redistribution and modification. The development of Linux is one

of the most prominent examples of free and open-source software collaboration. The

underlying source code may be used, modified, and distributed—commercially or non-

commercially. The outputs of collaboration are free to be used, altered, and shared by

Global Energy Monitor Vol.3, No.2, 2015-2

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anyone instead of restriction from property law and conditional terms of contracts. Unlike

the comprehensive open source software licenses the OSSI adopted a fairly concise

license term, called the Open Source Seed Pledge. Therefore, it is a parallel licensing

system designed to keep seeds in the hands of the public without patent.

Open-source seeds movement, simply called as “Linux for Lettuce”, is an alternative

counterattack given the smallholder continues to be a key player in developing countires

including the African continent. Public domain seeds substitute corporate appropriation

of plant genetic resources, and relieve the global imposition of intellectual property rights.

These serious constraints often justified as an scientific innovation for increased food

production, but prohibited the free exchange of seeds and the development of new

cultivars by ordinary farmers, and public breeders. A new initiative will help farmers

overcome the intellectual property laws. It has not widely spread yet, however, it will give

a meaningful impact on small farmers in the developing world. If newly enhanced

varieties, developed by national research institutions, are publicly available as open

source seeds, it will shift farming from increasingly industrialized seed market to a more

sustainable model of agriculture that gives more benefits to small farmers. In this context,

open-source seeds are related to restoring the traditional rights of farmers as well as

food security in a long-term perspective. It also gives policy option to recognize the false

promise of GM seeds and to support farming that meets the needs of local communities

and to help access to plant genetic resources that underpin food security.

Global Energy Monitor Vol.3, No.2, 2015-2

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References

Mulle, Emmanuel et al., (2010) “Exploring the Global Food Supply Chain

Markets,Companies”, Systems Companion Publication to Seeds of Hunger, Backgrounder

No. 2 in the THREAD series

Jasanoff, Sheila (2006) “Biotechnology and Empire: The Global Power of Seeds and

Science”, Osiris 21: 273-92

Final Report, The International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and

Technology for Development (IAASTD)(2008)

Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S.Ct. 1761 (U.S. 2013).

Sunderland, T.C.H (2011), “Food security: Why is biodiversity important?” International

Forestry Review 13(3): 265-274

Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and Amy Orr (2012), GM Crops for Food Security in Africa – The Path

Not Yet Taken, Working Paper 2012-018: UNDP

Lisa Hamilton (2014), Linux for Lettuce, Summer 2014, Virginia Quarterly Review

The Open Source Seed Initiative (OSSI) http://osseeds.org/

FAO,(2014), State of Food Insecurity in the World 2014 Report www.fao.org/3/a-

i4037e.pdf

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About the authors:

Samantha Mella is a freelance writer and research consultant based in Hunter Valley,

New South Wales, Australia. She has been following trends in international electricity grid

integration, HVDC interconnection and the emergence of the renewable energy trade.

Denia Djokic is a postdoctoral researcher in Nuclear Engineering at the University of

California, Berkeley. Her interests include advanced nuclear fuel cycles and radioactive

waste management, energy and sustainability, nuclear security, engineering ethics, and

nuclear engineering education.

David F. von Hippel is a Nautilus Institute Senior Associate working on energy and

environmental issues in Asia, as well as on analysis of the DPRK energy sector.

Eun Chang Choi is currently a Visiting Fellow at the Information Society Project at Yale

Law School. Choi has also held an appointment as a Visiting Scholar at the University of

Oxford in the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies (CSLS) and the Programme in Comparative

Media Law and Policy (PCMLP).