Gaullism without de Gaulle

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University of Utah

Western Political Science Association

Gaullism without de GaulleAuthor(s): Frank L. WilsonSource: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Sep., 1973), pp. 485-506Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/446435

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GAULLISM WITHOUT DE GAULLEFRANK L. WILSONPurdue UniversityINHIS exposition on charismatic authority, Max Weber describes how suchextraordinaryauthority relationshipsbecome routinized.l In fact, the processis not so much the routinization of charisma- which Weber definesas inher-

ently antiroutine- as its transformationinto some other form of authority whichis more readily transferredto successors.2While the legitimacy of the charismaticauthority might erode without the leader'sawareness,its transformationto a moredurable authority does not take place automatically or unconsciously. It occursonly when leaders perceive the need to build new bases of authority and have thepolitical styleand skillnecessary o do so.ContemporaryFrance offers an example of a mature democratic state whichhas recently confronted the problems of transformingthe charismatic authority ofan extraordinarypolitical leader into forms more readily employable by less extra-ordinarymen. The sudden resignationof President Charlesde Gaulle in April 1969and his subsequent total withdrawal from politics had the potential of creating amajor successioncrisis. From the very moment that Charles de Gaulle returnedtopower in May 1958 and established the Fifth French Republic, a major questionin the minds of French and foreign observerswas what would happen after deGaulle left power. Very few expected the political institutionsof the Fifth Republic,which were so clearlyfashioned to fit de Gaulle'spolitical talents and style,to persistwithout immediate and radical changes once de Gaulle was removed from thecenter stage of French politics. Even fewer thought that the Gaullistpolitical move-ment would long survivethe disappearanceof its namesake.This article focuses on developments within the Gaullist movement whichmade possible its survival after de Gaulle. It attempts to explain the survival of apolitical movement totally devoted to a single man after that leader disappearsfrom politics. It is not a complete explanationof the transformation rom de Gaulle'scharismatic type of authority to the more prosaic rule of his successor. The reasonfor the public's acceptance of the new leader and his new forms of authority is abroader question beyond the scope of this article. However, the successfuladapta-tions within the governing Gaullist coalition no doubt contributed to the public'sacceptanceof the new leader.The period after the retirementor death of a strongleaderis often a tryingonefor political parties. In addition to the immediate problem of finding a successor,the party may find additional problems stemming from the lasting imprint of theNOTE: The author expresses appreciationto the Purdue Research Foundationfor a summer"XL" grant and an international travel grant which made possible work on this project.

Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, edited by Talcott Parsons(New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 363-92 and From Max Weber: Essays in So-ciology, edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1968), pp. 245-52.2 Robert C. Tucker, "The Theory of Charismatic Leadership," Daedalus, 97 (Summer 1968),731-56.485


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THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYformerleader'spersonalityon the party'sorganization,image, and style. The leaderhas often shaped the party to fit his talents and preferences. For example, even thevenerable British Conservativeparty faced a difficult time adjusting to the retire-ment of Winston Churchill and finding an effective successor.3The adjustment tothe loss of the strong leader is even more acute when the party lacks deep historicalroots and the departed leader was the party's founder. A case in point is WestGermany'sChristianDemocratic Union (CDU). Under the leadershipof KonradAdenauer, the CDU had developed as his personal political machine.4 In hisabsence, the CDU experienced major difficulties in adjusting to politics withoutAdenauer.5 Many of the older party stalwarts regarded the immediate successor,Ludwig Erhard, as a usurper. Furthermore,both Erhard and his successor,KurtKiesinger, were weak leaders who proved unable to establishcontrol over the partyor to cope with a changing political context. In short, even under the best circum-stances, the transition from a strong and popular leader is difficult for politicalparties.In the case of the Gaullist movement in France the prospects of surviving deGaulle ought to have been even more problematic. For one thing, rather thanstarting with a single cohesive party, the Gaullist movement was a coalition ofpolitical parties and mini-parties. The movement was dominated by the Union desDemocrates pour la Ve Republique (UDR), but the much smaller R6publicainsInddependants RI) and still smaller groups jealously guarded their autonomy.?None of these partieshad been in existence for more than a dozen yearsand so theirdurabilityhad not been tested. Each of the elements in the coalition had politicianswith varied political backgrounds: former communists and socialistsas well as menwhose previous political experiencehad been with partiesof the far right. While theGaullist coalition was basically stable, its cohesion could not be taken for granted;de Gaulle's presence was a major part of the cement that held together the coali-tion. Secondly, most of the groups and individuals making up the Gaullist move-ment came from the right and center of the political spectrum. Traditionally,French parties of the right and center have been highly vulnerable to division andindiscipline and have had only fleeting existences. It might readilybe expected thatwithout the unifying force of de Gaulle's presence, there would be a revolt againstthe strict discipline of the Gaullist movement and a return to the small parties of8See R. T. McKenzie, British Political Parties (2nd ed.; New York: Praeger, 1964), pp.579-94b, 631-34. McKenzie describesAnthonyEden'scareer as party leader as "prob-ably the most disastrous n the modern history of the party." Harold MacMillan andSir Alec Douglas-Home ared little better.4See ArnoldJ. Heidenheimer,Adenauerand the CDU: The Rise of the Leader and the Inte-grationof the Party (The Hague: MartinusNijhoff, 1960).s After his retirementas Chancellorin 1963, Adenauerremainedchairmanof the CDU forthree more years. His continuedinterference n partyaffairs,and especiallyhis effortstoundermine the position of Ludwig Erhard, complicated the adjustment to the post-

Adenauer era.' The Gaullist party was known successivelyas the Union la Nouvelle RJpublique,UnionDemocratiquepour la CinquiemeRdpublique,Union pour la Deflnse de la Republique,and finally Union des Dimocrates pour la Ve RJpublique. For simplicity,the initialsofthe last, UDR, will be usedthroughoutthis text.'One source lists a total of 29 Gaullist organizations. Jean Charlot, Le Phenomenegaulliste(Paris: Fayard, 1969), p. 188.

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Naziism. His war memoirs are filled with criticism of the French parties and theirpoliticians.While leader of the Resistance, de Gaulle opposed the renewal of party lifeand rejected suggestionsthat he create a new political party of the Resistance. Heviewed parties as unable to provide strong and effective government; he thoughtthat they would inevitably supportnarrow interestsratherthan the national interestas a whole. Typical of his attitude was this analysisof the place partiesshould havein postwar France:I was no less convinced that the nation required a regime whose power would be strongand continuous. The parties were evidently unqualified to provide such power.... Althoughsome among them could obtain the votes of an important fraction of the citizens, not a singleone was thought of as representing public interest as a whole.... no organization commandedeither the power or the credit which would permit it to lay claim to national authority.To the parties' factional character, which infected them with weakness, was added theirown decadence. ... No longer inspired by principles, no longer ambitious to proselytize sincethey found no audiences on these grounds, they were inevitably tending to degradation,shrinking until each became nothing more than the representation of a category of interests.If the government fell into their hands again, it was certain that their leaders, their delegatesand their militant members would turn into professionals making a career out of politics.14During the war, some had thought that de Gaulle's contempt for the existingpartieswould lead him to capitalize on his popularityin order to createa new politi-cal party. However, de Gaulle'spopularitygave him a broad base of support fromall sections of French society and he was unwilling to sacrifice his position asnational leader and spokesmanfor all Frenchmen by becoming involved in partypolitics. Furthermore,his political philosophy kept him from trying to create a new

political movement. He conceived his role in politics as aloof from the divisions anddisputes of the parties. He saw himself as the embodiment of the French nationalinterest as opposed to the particular and partisan interests represented by the par-ties. By remaining above the petty conflicts and divisions of the parties, de Gaullefelt he could avoid the problems of party fractionalization that had plagued earlierFrench democratic regimes. He saw no need for a political party to support him-self since he felt he could appeal directly to the people. He preferred such directappeals to seeking support through intermediaries such as parties.

When the parties regained control of politics after the war, de Gaulle resignedas premier. Then, in 1947, de Gaulle attempted for the first and last time in his life-time to create a political movement - the Rassemblement du Peuple Franfais(RPF) .5 For the first and only time de Gaulle formally belonged to and presidedover a political party. In spite of the protestations by de Gaulle and other leadersthat the RPF was not another party but a massive patriotic rally of Frenchmen, theRPF was clearly a political party. The RPF enjoyed spectacular successes in thenationwide municipal elections held only a few months after its organization (about35 percent of votes cast more than for any other party) and in the national legis-13Charles de Gaulle, La Discorde chez l'ennemi (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1924).14 Charles de Gaulle, The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle: Salvation. 1944-1946 (NewYork: Simon and Schuster, 1960), pp. 271-72.5On the RPF, see Roy Pierce, "De Gaulle and the RPF - A Post-Mortem," Journal of Poli-tics, 16 (February 1954), 96-118; and Christian Purtschat, Le Rassemblement du PeupleFranqais 1947-1953 (Paris: Editions Cujas, 1965).

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THE WESTERNPOLITICALQUARTERLYlative electionsof 1951 (21.6 percent- second only to the communists). However,these victories were deceptive. The RPF permitted its adherents to retain theirmemberships n other parties.As a resultmany politiciansaccepted the RPF label inorder to join the bandwagon but did not make a genuine commitment to Gaullistprinciples or discipline.l6 Although the RPF gains were impressive, they were notsufficient to bring de Gaulle back to power. As it became clear that de Gaulle'sreturn to power was not imminent, many RPF members returnedto their old partyloyaltiesand were absorbed nto the parliamentarypracticesof the Fourth Republicwhich de Gaulle found so repugnant. The result was that in May 1953 de Gaulleformally withdrew the right for anyone to use the RPF label in parliamentaryorelectoral activities.l7 The RPF was not formally disbanded,but in fact it ceased tooperate.The disappointing experience with the RPF reinforced de Gaulle's disdainfor parties. Even his own followers, organized into a political formation which hehimself headed, appeared vulnerable to the vices that he decried in other parties:pusuit of narrowand selfishinterests,disunity,indiscipline, and willing participantsin the making and breakingof cabinets. In his memoirs, de Gaulle makes clear hisscorn for those who "left the organization to which they owed their allegiance."And he placeson them the responsibility or the end of the RPF.18In 1958, de Gaulle was returned to power by the old parties in an attempt tounravel the Algerian imbrogliowhich had brought France to the verge of civil war.Once in power, de Gaulle's reluctanceto become involved in anotherpolitical move-ment - the memories of the failure of the RPF no doubt were still fresh- wasreinforced by his concept of the president'srole as an arbiter who should be alooffrom partisan politics and special interests. He made no effort to solidify his holdon power by creating a party; instead, he intended to seek direct public supportwithout the intermediaryof a political party.In the fall of 1958, as the first legislative elections of the Fifth Republicapproached, some Gaullist leaders created a new party so that voters desiring tosupportde Gaulle could do so.'9The new party, the Union pour la Nouvelle Repub-lique (later, the Union des Democrates pour la Ve Republique--UDR) wasofficially organized in October 1958 with Roger Frey as its secretary-general. DeGaulle had opposed the formation of this party. In addition to his fearsof a recur-renceof the RPF betrayals,he feared that the new party might be used by thosewhowere committed to keeping Algeriaas an integral part of France to exert pressureonhim. Consequently, in its first few months, de Gaulle did little to promote the" For many politicians of the right and center whose own parties had tarnishedreputationsas a resultof wartime collaborationwith Vichy, the RPF served as a patrioticvehicle fortheir political reentries.See de Gaulle'sstatementof May 6, 1953 in Charlesde Gaulle,Discours et messages(Paris:Plon, 1970), II, 580-82."Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor (New York: Simon andSchuster, 1971), p. 16.'On the founding of the UDR see Chariot, L'UNR, pp. 39-41; and Jacques Soustelle,L'Espirancerahi(Paris:Editions e l'Alma,1962),pp.71-73.

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GAULLISM WITHOUT DE GAULLEUDR's success.20He chose an electoral system- the single member district, twoballot system- which was favored by the leaders of the older parties and opposedby the Gaullistsbecause it was thought least likely to result in a landslide for a newparty. He urged that candidatesnot use his name "even in the form of an adjective"during the 1958 election campaign. He took no part in the 1958 electionsclaimingthat "the mission that the country has given me makes it impossiblefor me to takepart in the election."21 Finally, it is not clear that de Gaulle was entirely pleasedby the impressivesuccessof the new party in the elections. In his memoirs,he notesthat the electoral results had surpassedhis hopes. And one source quotes him assayingat the time of the elections: "Obviously,I would have liked a few moresocial-ists to balance the legislature."22Although de Gaulle did refrainfrom publicly endorsingthe new Gaullist partyand did nothing to help it win public acceptance, he was ready to interfere in theinternal politics of the UDR in order to shape the party according to his desires.Most importantly, de Gaulle did not want his supporterslocked into a party com-mitted to an unconditional insistence on retaining Algeria as part of France. Hewanted his supportersto remain as uncommitted as possiblein order to enhance hisflexibility n dealing with the criticalproblemof Algeria. As the new partyemerged,de Gaulle exerted influence on key individuals in the UDR to prevent the partyfrom becoming the political voice of those who advocated the continuation of theAlgerian war, to block the creation of a party presidency (which would likely havegone to Jacques Soustelle- a determined advocate of Algerie Franfaise), and toprevent the alliance of the party with the traditional conservativeforces.23Nearlyall of this was accomplished indirectly by close associates of de Gaulle. It wasgenerallysufficientfor one of them to suggest that the General'sdesireswere this orthat for his desires to be fulfilled.Even after the UDR had successfullyproved its loyalty to de Gaulle during theresolution of the Algerian War and had demonstratedits discipline and cohesive-ness in parliament, de Gaulle still maintained his distance from the party. He ex-plained his reticencetowardinvolvementin a party in thisway: "To governthrougha party,Napoleon once said, is to become dependent on it sooneror later. I will notbe caught in that."24 As a result,he left the duties of organizingand managing theparty to his prime minister and party officials. In the division of responsibilitiesbe-tween the president and the prime minister, it was the task of the prime ministerto maintain day to day contact with the party.25He himself avoided all public con-tacts with UDR officials.26He even insisted that those called to serve as ministers20On de Gaulle'sactivities o hinder he UDR, see Philip Williams,FrenchPoliticians ndElections1951-1969(Cambridge:Cambridge niversityPress,1970),pp. 101-3. SeealsoSoustelle, p.cit.,pp.67-68.21De Gaulle,Discours t messages,II, 52. Seealsode Gaulle,Memoirs f Hope,pp.34-35.2PierreViansson-Ponte,istoiredela ripublique aullienneParis:Fayard, 970),I, 80-81.3On de Gaulle'snvolvement,eeChariot,L'UNR,pp. 29-57; Soustelle, p. cit.; and LouisTerrenoire, e Gaulle t l'Alglrie Paris:Fayard, 964)."Charlot,Le Ph6nomeneaulliste, . 139.Seede Gaulle's ressconferencen September 968 for a clearstatement f this division fresponsibility. e Monde,September, 1968.

X De Gaulleregularlyespondedn writing o expressionsf best wishesandsupport entbytheUDR on hisbirthdays,t NewYears. tc. SeeCharlot,L'UNR,pp. 263,268.

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THE WESTERNPOLITICALQUARTERLYwho were also members of the UDR secretariat resign from their party posts toemphasize de Gaulle's and the government'sindependence from the party.27

Similarly,de Gaulle avoided the management of relations between the variousparties making up the government coalition. Here again, it was the task of theprime minister to maintain good relations among members of the coalition. Attimes, this was a very difficult responsibilityas the smaller Independent Republi-cans, led by the ambitious minister of Finance, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, wereattempting to develop their own party structuresand enlarge their position in thecoalition.28 Occasionally, one of the coalition partners would appeal to de Gaullefor help in disputes over the political action of the majority. However, de Gaullerarely intervened, leaving such matters to be resolved by the prime minister andparty leaders.Never during the Fifth Republic did de Gaulle attend a Gaullist party func-tion of any kind.29 Although he made election eve appeals in 1962, 1967, and 1968to vote for candidates who would support his actions and the institutions of theFifth Republic,30he refrainedfrom specifically endorsingthe UDR or other major-ity parties. In fact, even when there were no electoral considerations, de Gaulledid not mention the party by name in public. His most explicit public referencetothe UDR came in a press conference in 1967 when he noted the ardent and solemncommitment to the institutions of the Fifth Republic that was demonstrated by"thosemeeting at Lille" - where the UDR had recentlyheld a national congress.31In at least one instance, de Gaulle'saloofness from his own party almost endedin a major political defeat. During the 1965 presidential election all candidatesavoided tying their campaigns to any single party.32 A wise course for candidateswhose parties had only narrow electoral base, the separation of the party fromde Gaulle's campaign deprived him of needed electoral assistance. His campaignwas managed by the Association national pour le soutein de Faction de general de

Gaulle, a committee with only indirect links with the UDR. The UDR did notformally endorse de Gaulle, although its support of his candidacy was obvious. DeGaulle largely ignored the contest, busying himself with the job of being president.2 However,he did not compel Valery Giscardd'Estaingto resignfrom the presidencyof theIndependent Republicans when he returned to the cabinet as Minister of Finance in1967.28On the RIs, see Jean-Claude Colliard, Lis Republicains Ind6pendants; Valry Giscardd'Estaing(Paris: PressesUniversitairesde France, 1971).2 De Gaulle did send membersof his staff to UDR meetings. However, it is indicativeof thedistance that he insisted on maintainingbetweenhimselfand the partythat the presenceof these observerswas not publicly announced. Only in the last few months of his rulewere the representatives f the presidentformally acknowledgedat UDR meetings."0n 1962, de Gaulle called for supportfor those who voted yes in the prior referendumonthe popular election of the president. De Gaulle, Discours et messages, IV, 42-44. In1967 he urgedvotes for those who will supportthe Fifth Republicand his action. Ibid.,

V, 147-49. In 1968, he called for an "assemblycapableof backingthe necessarypolicywith a strong,constant and coherentmajority."31 bid., V, 247.'2See Roger-GerardSchwartzenberg,La Campagne prisidentielle de 1965 (Paris: PressesUniversitairesde France, 1967), passim.; and Centre d'Etude de la Vie PolitiqueFran-caise,L'Electionpresidentielledes 5 et 19 dicembre 1965 (Paris: ArmandColin, 1970),pp. 41-45, 107-9, 139-40, 188-92.

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THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYPOMPIDOU AND THE UDR

In the first few months of the UDR's existence, there was a major debatewithin the party over its relationship to the government.36The issue was whetherthe UDR should develop policiesand positionswhich would differentiateit from thegovernment or should pledge itself to the unconditional defense of the government.The debate centered on the choice between the traditional French model of aparty/government separationor the Britishmodel of party government. Under theFourth Republic, the French model was a virtual necessity since the multiplicityof small parties led to coalition governmentsthat were clearlybased on compromise.Under such circumstances,each party needed to assert its own policies which mightdiffer from the compromise choice of a coalition government in which it partici-pated. The electoral success of the Gaullists in the Fifth Republic made possiblegovernmentdominated by a single party. Some Gaullistsstill insisted that the partyshould be free to develop positionswhich might differfrom the government. Othersargued unconditional support of de Gaulle and his governmentwas necessarybothout of loyalty to de Gaulle and out of the need to make the new institutions of theFifth Republic work smoothly. At the party's first national congress, held inNovember 1959, the party opted for the notion of unconditional support of thegovernment. Although this decision has been contested from time to time, it stillreflectsthe party'sattitude towardgovernmentswhich it dominates.This decision made the UDR the government party so long as de Gaulle ora Gaullist successor was president and so long as the party had the necessarystrength in the National Assembly to lead the government coalition. Since deGaulle insisted on maintaining his distance from the party, the way was open forthe prime minister to become the effective leader of the UDR. With the partycommitted to the unconditionalsupportof the government,the leader of the govern-ment or the prime minister naturally could be regarded as the party leader. Thefirst prime minister of the Fifth Republic, Michel Debre, did not take advantageof this opportunity.This was partly due to the tremendousupheavals that the partywas experiencingas a consequenceof division over the Algerianquestionand partlybecause Debre shared de Gaulle's desire to keep the state above party politics.Georges Pompidou, however, took full advantage of the situation and used it tobuild a political base that brought him into the Elysees Palace as de Gaulle's suc-cessor.

At first glance, Pompidou's background seemed an unlikely one for a manhoping to become a powerful influence in Gaullist politics.37 He had few of thecredentials believed to be important among Gaullists. Although his official biogra-phy claims that he served as a liaison with the Resistance while teaching highschool, he was not a Resistance hero.38 He was not closely linked to the RomanCatholic Church; a main bastion of Gaullist electoral support. Indeed, he was sus-8 Charlot, L'UNR, pp. 85-111.For biographies of Pompidou, see Merry Bromberger, Le Destin secret de Georges Pompidou(Paris: Fayard, 1965); and PierreRouanet, Pompidou (Paris: Grasset,1969).8 Rouanet, op. cit., pp. 43-47.

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GAULLISM WITHOUT DE GAULLEpect in the eyesof many convinced Catholics since he was a product of public ratherthan parochial schoolsand had been a teacherin a public high school.

Pompidou was more a bureaucratthan a politician. Since 1944, he had servedon several occasions as head of de Gaulle's personal staff. This gave him directdaily contact with de Gaulle, but little actual political involvement. He served asde Gaulle's aide on the General'srequest and returned to private life as rapidly aspossible. He spurned opportunities to become more deeply involved in politics.For example, during the early years of the RPF Pompidou was head of de Gaulle'sstaff but he did not join the RPF and declined an offer to run for parliament in1951.In 1958, de Gaulle returned to power and once again Pompidou, by then adirector of the Rothschild banks, was called to again head de Gaulle's personal

cabinet. During the few months that he was assisting de Gaulle, he still did notexhibit any political ambitions. He was not involved in the founding of the UDRand did not join once it was organized. Twice, in 1959 and 1962, he declined deGaulle's offers of ministerialposts. When he left de Gaulle's service to return onceagain to his private career,he did accept appointment to the advisoryconstitutionalcouncil, a body with little political visibility or importance. Back in the businessworld, Pompidou maintained regularpersonal contacts with de Gaulle. From timeto time he carried out delicate assignmentsfor de Gaulle, including a series of secretnegotiationswith Algerianrebel leaders.As the Algerian conflict finally ended de Gaulle called on Pompidou to beprime minister in April 1962. Charged with the duties of heading the day to dayconduct of government and of defending the government's policies before parlia-ment, Pompidou had little political experience to help him. He was not a memberof parliament; in fact, he had never even run for public office. He had had noprevious ministerial experience. He was not a member of the UDR or any otherpolitical party. His disinterest in politics may have enhanced his image in the eyesof de Gaulle but it left him with little public exposure. At the time of his appoint-ment, he was virtually unknown to the general public as well as to many of theGaullists.39

The UDR had suffered severe internal divisions over the Algerian problemand continuing tensions produced by Debre's style of leadership. Pompidou'sappointment as prime minister, however, was not welcomed by the rank and fileGaullists since they regarded him as a technocrat rather than as a dedicated andloyal party man. During the first few years as prime minister, Pompidou gradu-ally became more and more deeply involved in partisanpolitics. At firsthis involve-ment was with the ministers and members of parliament, not with the parties.Then, in order to repair the strained relations between the government and itssupporters n the National Assembly, Pompidou increasedhis contacts with Gaullistdeputies. Through dinners, cocktail parties, and attendance at caucuses of the9Pompidou'sackof politicalexperiencewasinterpretedy someto be partof theevidenceof a generaldepoliticizationf Frenchpolitical ife. On the problemof depoliticiza-tion in France, see Georges Vedel, ed., La Dipolitisation, mythe ou realiti? (Paris:ArmandColin, 1962).

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THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYGaullistdeputies,he began to build greatersupportfor himself and the government.However, he still kept party activities at a minimum. He did not join theUDR, nor did he meddle in its affairs. In the referendumand legislative electionsheld during the fall of 1962, Pompidou took part in devising the UDR campaignstrategy. But he did not have a prominent role in the actual public campaigns.More familiar and seasoned Gaullist politicians played the leading parts: Debre,Jacques Chaban-Delmas,Andre Malraux, etc. Pompidou was not even a candidatein these legislative elections. He remained sufficientlyaloof from the UDR thatthe only television and radio speech he made was not from the UDR's portion offree broadcast time.40

By 1965, Pompidou'spolitical ambitions had begun to develop and he saw thepossibilityof a run at the presidency n the elections to be held at the end of that yearshould de Gaulle choose not to run. However, Pompidou was in a difficultpositionsince de Gaulle had decided not to declare publicly or even to his closest associateswhether or not he would run for reelection until a month before the polling day.In the meantime, he gave contradictory ndications about his intentions both in pub-lic and to his associates. If Pompidou were to campaign actively he would antag-onize loyal Gaullists and face embarrassmentshould de Gaulle decide to seek re-election. On the other hand, if he did not campaign and de Gaulle later opted forretirement, he would lack a well developed public image and would have only amonth to catch up with candidates who had been campaigning hard for severalmonths.41 Pompidou's solution was to avoid open campaigning but to increase hispublic exposure through involvement in the municipal elections (when for the firsttime he ran successfully or elected office) and throughstate visits to variousregionsof the country.Once de Gaulle announced his candidacy, Pompidou willingly gave his fullsupport. In line with de Gaulle's decision to conduct a low profile, nonpartisancampaign, Pompidou played only a minor part in the first ballot campaign. How-ever, for the run-off election, Pompidou took the lead in a vigorous effort of thegovernment ministers and the UDR to assure de Gaulle's reelection. Pompidoushaped strategy, arranged financing, coordinated propaganda, and supervised therapid mobilizationof the party for the two weeks of campaigning before the secondballot. He could justifiablysharecreditwith de Gaulle for the victory.From this point on, Pompidou was deeply involved in Gaullist politics. Hequickly emerged as the acknowledgedleader of the UDR and of the Gaullist coali-tion. No longer aloof from partisan matters, Pompidou began attending and pre-siding over meetings of the UDR executive committees. He increased his appear-ances on television and made well publicized tours of the provinces. With deGaulle still aloof from partisan matters, Pompidou became the dominant and con-trolling figure in the party and the Gaullist coalition. In a year, from the springof40On the 1962 elections, see Fran?ois Goguel et al., La R6f6rendum d'octobre et les ilectionsde novembre 1962 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1965), pp. 51-167.41Polls taken in 1964 indicated that if de Gaulle did not run, Pompidou would not do wellagainst a leftwing candidate. One poll (May 1964) showed Gaston Defferre - then adeclared candidate - drawing 29 percent of the vote and Pompidou 21 percent with11 percent to others and 39 percent uncertain. Sondages, 1964, No. 3, pp. 24-25.

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GAULLISM WITHOUT DE GAULLE1965 to early 1966, Pompidou had developed from a largely non-political primeminister who was de Gaulle's agent into a powerful political leader with demon-stratedelectoral skillsand public appeal.It should be emphasized that this transformationof Pompidou was approvedby de Gaulle. He had encouraged Pompidou to get greater public exposure andwas sufficientlydisinterested in party affairs to let Pompidou extend his activitiesin the UDR. There is evidence to suggest that de Gaulle had himself begun tothink of Pompidou as his most likely successor.42 It is also likely that Pompidoureceived a mandate from de Gaulle at this time to groom himself for the presi-dency.43De Gaulle's followers,ministers,deputies, and party members,were muchmore concerned with what would happen after de Gaulle than was de Gaulle andfor the most part they welcomed Pompidou's emeregence as heir apparent. Theiranxieties about the future of Gaullism and their search for a successorto de Gaullefacilitated Pompidou'srapid consolidation of power in a party to which he still didnot formally belong.With Pompidou's assumption of control, the UDR found itself for the firsttime with a genuine party leader. De Gaulle, of course, was still the paramountleader to whom the party owed unconditional loyalty. But de Gaulle abstainedfrom most party affairs. There was no party president and the secretarygeneralwas usually not a top-level political personality. The consolidation of the powersof the prime minister with the powers derived from leadershipof the largest partybrought the UDR close to the British model of party leadership where the partyleaderis that party'sprime ministerdesignate.The extent of the change in Pompidou's new role as majority leader can beillustratedby contrastinghis activities in the legislativeelectionsof 1962 and 1967.44In 1962, he assistedin drafting the general electoral strategybut his most importantactivity was gathering campaign funds from his connections in the financial andbusiness world. In 1967, the whole campaign was under his immediate direction.He devised the broad strategy and successfully fought for its acceptance by theUDR and other elements of the majority. On his insistence, each district had onlyone official Gaullist candidate agreed upon by all the elements of the majority(UDR, RI, and others). In 1962, candidates were designated by the UDR secre-tariat; five years later they were endorsed by a committee headed by Pompidou.In 1962, Pompidou made only a single campaign addresson television and generallyremained in the background. In 1967, he made three major addresses on nationaltelevision, participated in numerous radio interviews,and twice confronted leadersof the opposition in widely publicizedface-to-face debates. His impact on the cam-paign was such that he was clearly the most prominent single personality,outstrip-ping not only his rivals in the attention he received from the media but also de

4 See Viansson-Ponte,Histoirede la R6publiquegaullienne,II, 235.4 This was suggestedto the authorin an interview with a prominentGaullistvery close to deGaulleand somewhathostileto Pompidou,May 1973." For the 1967 UDR campaignsee Centred'Etude de la Vie Politique Francaise,Les Electionslegislativesde mars1967 (Paris: ArmandColin, 1970), pp. 19-44, 151-79, and passim.See also Alain Lancelot, "Les Elections egislativesdes 5 et 12 mars 1967," Projet, No.28 (May 1967).

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THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYGaulle.45 It became a highly personalized campaign pitting Pompidou as representative of the Gaullists versus the leading personalitiesof the opposition: Fran-cois Mitterrand,PierreMendes-France, Jean Lecanuet.The 1967 elections gave furtherevidence of Pompidou'sskills as a campaigner.The Gaullists obtained 1.8 million more votes than in 1962 pushing their shareof the vote from 36.3 percent in 1962 to 38.1 percent in 1967. On the other hand,the Gaullists lost seats in the National Assembly because of the unity of the left-wing opposition in the run-off elections. The result was that the UDR and the RIfell slightly short of an absolute majorityin the new National Assembly. The Gaul-lists' hold on power was not threatened since they could count on the votes of sev-eral centristsand independents. But it did alert the Gaulliststo the need for furtherpenetration of the electorate.

In the aftermath of the elections, Pompidou used the near defeat as a prod forfurther party development. He strengthened his hold on the UDR by having theparty replace its secretarygeneral with a collegial secretariatof five men, none ofwhom could claim overall direction of the party. A few months later, Pompidouwas forced to abandon this format when the party congress, moved by a spirit ofdemocratizationas well as by some Gaullists who resented Pompidou's ascendancy,insisted that there be a secretarygeneral elected by the party's central committee.But this was not a major set-backfor Pompidou. When the central committee metto elect the party secretary general, it obligingly elected Pomidou's man, RobertPoujade.Under Pompidou'sguidance the party began to preparefor de Gaulle's depar-ture. He pushed for reforms that would change the party from a periodic assem-blage of deputies and ministers into a broad-basedelectoral machine.4 Pompidoupressedfor greater party activity at all levels and increasedrecruitmentof members.UDR federations were organized in all departments and local units were formedin most cities. In some cases the new organizationssimply formalized the ad hocgroups of Resistance workerswho had informally championed the Gaullist causein the past. In other cases, new Gaullists with no Resistance ties were recruited toorganize the local party units. Under Pompidou's direction, attempts were alsomade to win over local elected officialsand other notables. The fruits of this policywere evident in 1968 when many previouslyuncommitted local notables rallied tothe Gaullistsin the aftermathof the "events"of May and June.

Pompidou had another opportunity to demonstrate his electoral skills in thelegislative elections brought on by the student riots and general strikeof May-June1968. It was Pompidou who had urged a very reluctant de Gaulle to dissolve theNational Assembly and call for new elections as a means of resolving the crisis.47This approach quicklysucceeded in breakingthe general strikeand restoringorder.u Ibid., pp. 253-75.4 See Jean Chariot, "L'Apris-gaullisme,"Revue Franfaise de Science Politique, 18 (1968),68-76, Chariot, Le Phlnomene gaulliste, and Alain Lancelot, "Electionscantonalesetimplantationdu gaullisme,"Projet,No. 45 (May 1970), 593-96.,7For reliableaccountsof de Gaulle's reluctance and Pompidou's nsistenceon dissolution,seeViansson-Ponte,Histoire de la Republiquegaullienne, II, 520-42.

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GAULLISM WITHOUT DE GAULLEFurthermore, t set the stage for the Gaullists'- and Pompidou's- most spectacu-lar electoral success. Again, Pompidou organizedand directed the Gaullist electioncampaign and was the most prominent Gaullist campaigner. Again, the Gaullistsincreased their share of the vote this time to 43.6 percent or 5.5 percent above the1967 figure. This time the Gaullistssucceeded in getting an overwhelming majorityin the National Assembly: the UDR alone won 296 of the 487 total seats; the RIadded 64 more to the majoritycoalition.48It was at this point that de Gaulle chose to place Pompidou "in the reserveof the Republic" to await destiny. Maurice Couve de Murville, another essentiallyapolitical Gaullist,was named the new prime minister. By this time, however, Pom-pidou was firmlyentrenchedas de Gaulle'sheir apparent and as leader of the Gaul-list movement. He was a proven campaigner,a capable political and governmentalleader. While Pompidou withdrew from party affairsfor the next few months, theparty was still his to control if and when he so desired. He had gained control ofthe UDR and directed it in making the transformationsnecessaryfor its survivalafter de Gaulle. He had brought new people into politics who owed their careersin the UDR and in parliament to him. He had won the allegiance of most of the"barons" of Gaullism, including Debre, Chaban-Delmas, Olivier Guichard, andRoger Frey. He simply had to bide his time until de Gaulle departed from thepolitical scene.There was the danger that Pompidou's hold over the party and his favorablepublic image might weaken if he had to wait too long. There was also the dangerthat de Gaulle might publicly name another man as his preferred successor. Ifthe new prime minister, Couve de Murville, had had sufficient time to build hisown political base or if de Gaulle had designated someone else as his successor,Pompidou's presidential aspirationsprobablywould have been destroyed. However,neither dangermaterialized. Less than a yearlater, de Gaulle quietly resignedwhenthe voters rejected his referendumreformingthe Senate and decentralizing govern-ment. His retirement was complete; he refused to make any comment whatsoeveron politics.

Without meeting opposition from within the Gaullist movement, Pompidoudeclared his candidacy for the office of President. His only real Gaullist rival, RIpresident Valery Giscard d'Estaing, had destroyedhis own hopes of succeeding deGaulle by campaigning against the referendum. After a brief flirtation with thepossibilityof running himself or presenting some other alternative candidate, Gis-card found little supporteven among his own followers. Within a few days,Giscardand his RI followers came out for Pompidou.49Unlike de Gaulle in 1965, Pompi-dou was formallyendorsedby the UDR, the RI, and other elements of the majority.8On the 1968 elections, see Francois Goguel, "Les Elections lgislatives des 23 et 30 juin1968," Revue Franfaise de Science Politique, 18 (1968), 837-58; and Alain Lancelot,"Les /lections des 23 et 30 juin 1968." Projet, No. 28 (September-October 1968), 935-52.4 See Colliard, Les Rdpublicains Indlpendants, pp. 175-85; and Roger-G6rard Schwartzen-berg, La Guerre de succession (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969), pp.37-42.

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Early polls showed him trailing his chief opponent, Alain Poher, the interim presi-dent, but Pompidouralliedand won an easysecond ballot victory.50As president, Pompidou attempted to follow de Gaulle's model by assuminga position above partisan conflict. In his first press conference as president, heseeminglyabandoned his party ties and said that it was the prime minister'srespon-sibility to organize the majority.51In practice, it was difficult for Pompidou, who,after all, had spent over four years building the UDR into a well-organized andelectorally successful party, to remain aloof from party affairs. Pompidou lackedde Gaulle's special aura of authority among Gaullists, but he did command theallegiance and support of large numbersof younger deputies and party leaderswhoowed their parliamentaryand party positions to him. It is not surprising hat Pom-pidou was unwilling to risk the loss of this important source of political power bysevering his ties with the party. The result was the shifting of partisan politicalleadershipfrom the prime minister to the president,or more preciselythe retentionof that leadership by Pompidou as he shifted from the one political post to theother.52In contrast to de Gaulle, Pompidou was very deeply interested and involvedin party matters. This involvement continued while he was president. He metperiodically in joint sessionswith heads of the various parties making up the gov-ernment coalition. These meetings, held at the presidential palace, included lead-ing ministers,parliamentaryleaders, and party secretaries from the UDR, the RI,and the Center for Progress and Democracy (CDP), which had rallied to themajority at the time of Pompidou's election. Such meetings were conducted bythe prime minister when de Gaulle was president. Representativesfrom the presi-dential staff attended UDR party meetings, were formally recognized, and sat inhonored positionson the podium. During de Gaulle'spresidency,presidentialaidesperiodically attended UDR meetings only as unofficial observers who remainedformallyunrecognized n the background.The selection of the UDR party secretary general offers another example ofthe shift of party leadership from the prime minister to the president. Under deGaulle, the selection of party officials within certain broad limits was left to theparty and ultimately came under the prime minister's control. When Pompidouassumed the presidency, the naming of top-level UDR officialsincluding the secre-tary general remained under his control. Pompidou's appointee as UDR secretarygeneral in 1967 (Robert Poujade) was held over in spite of the fact that he wasnot an enthusiastic supporterof the new prime minister, Jacques Chaban-Delmas.s0On the presidentialcampaign,see Schwartzenberg, p. cit.; Jean and Monica Chariot,"LesCampagnesde Georges Pompidouet Alain Poher,"RevueFranfaisede SciencePolitique,20 (April 1970), 224-48; and Elijah Ben-Zion Kaminsky, "The Selection of FrenchPresidents,"paper deliveredto the American Political Science Associationannual meet-ing, September1971.51Le Monde, July 12, 1969.s2This shift of partisan political power paralleled a shift in political power away from theprime minister as well. Pompidouhas been a more activist president and has kept abroader range of policy issues under his immediatecontrol than de Gaulle. That thisshift was not perceived by the public is indicated in a 1971 poll. Of those polled, 56percent thought that the prime minister then had more freedom of action than underde Gaulle; only 8 percentthoughthe had less. Sondages,1971, No. 1 and 2, pp. 42-43.

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There were some rumors that during the summer of 1970 he had participated in awhisper campaign among hardline Gaullists directed against the prime minister.When he resignedin 1971 to accept a ministerialpost, the new party secretarygen-eral, Rene Tomasini, was clearly Pompidou'schoice and not the choice of his primeminister. Tomasini had been publicly critical of Chaban-Delmas'leadership53andwas one of those rumored to be a part of the whisper campaign against the primeminister. Further evidence of Pompidou'sinvolvement in Tomasini's selection canbe seen in the fact that just prior to his designation as the "official"candidate,Tomasini was summoned to the presidential palace.4 Similarly, when Tomasiniresigned in 1972, the new UDR secretarygeneral, Alain Peyrefitte,was also desig-nated by Pompidou.

Pompidou has tried to remain publicly aloof from the party. On several occa-sions he has insisted that the prime ministeris responsible or partisanmatters. Thereason for this reluctance openly to admit his partisan intervention is to be foundin the constitutional description of the French president as an arbiter. Since he isto "ensureby his arbitration,the regular functioning of the governmental authori-ties" (Article 5), the president needs to be free of partisan attachments. Further-more, overt partisan commitment could be interpreted as an unacceptable breakwith de Gaulle'sprinciplesof leadershipand government.In an attempt to maintain the guiseof partisanaloofness,Pompidouhas arguedthat there is more than one kind of electoral majority. There is a "presidentialmajority" which brought him to the presidency and which he naturally heads.There are also local majorities and legislative majorities which may or may notparallel the presidential majority.55 The presidential majority is supposedly verybroad including all political forces and individuals who supported his electionand/or accepted his presidential leadership. The legislative majority is narrowerencompassingthose elements in the parliament which support the government. Itsleader is the prime minister. In fact, the distinction between the presidential andparliamentarymajorities is largely a myth. The two are identical in compositionas the Chaban-Delmasand Messmergovernmentsincluded leadersfrom all signifi-cant political groups which had supported Pompidou's election. This distinctionhas been used as a convenient way of perpetuating the impressionof an aloof presi-dent with a basisof supportbroaderthan any narrowpartisanloyalties.56The dual executive of the Fifth Republic worked well with de Gaulle as presi-dent because his charismatic authority was not threatened by the action of hisprime minister and because his political style permitted a division of labor with theprime minister taking care of partisanmatters. With other personalities,the consti-tutional provisions for a dual executive portend rivalry and conflict between the3See his polite but firm criticism in the UDR National Council. Le Monde, June 26, 1970.

5 Paris Match, February 27, 1971.6For Pompidou's explanation of the different majorities, see his press conference. Le Monde,September 25, 1971.56Another purpose served by this division was to defuse potential discontent on the part ofparty purists who were opposed to opening up the UDR to elements of questionableloyalty to de Gaulle. The party could remain pure and the president could still gathersufficient forces to win a nation-wide election.

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GAULLISM WITHOUT DE GAULLEof by Pompidou, and the desire for new leadership to prepare the 1973 legislativeelections.58 In any case it was clear that the change was not designed to alter poli-cies since most other cabinet officers were held over into the new Messmergovern-ment. The timing of the change, the manner of the change, and the personalityofthe new prime minister all indicate that this was a maneuver to assure Pompidou'scontrol of the majority.The new prime minister was a less imposing rival than Chaban-Delmas. Asde Gaulle's former defense minister and a hard-line Gaullist, Messmer could helprestore the confidence in the government among those orthodox Gaullistswho de-fected during the referendum. Unlike Chaban-Delmas, Messmer did not have anational reputationand was thus not likely to rival Pompidou'snational popularity.Furthermore, he did not have much experience in parliament or Gaullist partypolitics and would be unlikely to threaten Pompidou's dominance of the move-ment. By necessityand also by inclination - evidenced by his enjoyment of parti-san politics - Pompidou has been unwilling to follow de Gaulle's example ofabstaining from party politics. He has remained an active and powerful voice inthe politicsof the Gaullistpartyand coalition.

CONCLUSIONS

If, as Samuel P. Huntington persuasively argues, "the institutional strengthof a political party is measured in the first instance, by its ability to survive itsfounder or the charismatic leader who first brings it to power,"59then the UDRand its allies have passed successfullytheir first test. Pompidou's easy successiontode Gaulle's presidential post evidences this institutionalization of the UDR. Somehave argued that the cult of an original charismatic leader may well survive hisdeath and militate against the transmissionof his charismato his successor.6?Whilethe cult of de Gaulle continues, it has not affected Pompidou's efforts to establishmastery over the movement. Pompidou wisely avoided seeking to replace deGaulle's charisma with his own. Instead, he projected the public image of being"a Frenchman like other Frenchmen." To compensate for his lack of charismaticauthority,he concentratedon building a powerful political base in a well-organizedand effective party.In many ways, the UDR at the time of its founding resembled the social move-ments associated with charismatic leadership.61If de Gaulle's followers lacked themilitancy and proclivity to violence of the followers of Lenin, Hitler, or Mussolini,they demonstratedthe acceptance of de Gaulle'smystic sense of mission, they weretotally devoted to his cause, and they were unconditional in their support for their58 See Pompidou'sexplanationof the shift in his press conference,Le Monde, September23,1972.53Samuel P. Huntington,Political Orderin ChangingSocieties (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1968), p. 409.60 Robert C. Tucker,"The Theoryof CharismaticLeadership,"Daedalus,97 (Summer 1968),754.61See ibid., pp. 737-40; and Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization,pp.360-61.

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THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYleader.62 The transformationof this charismatic movement into a modern politicalpartybegan, as we have seen, even before de Gaulle had left politics. Pompidouandother Gaullist leadersperceived the need to adapt the party structuresand style ifthe party were to survive de Gaulle. They successfully imposed the necessarychanges over the opposition of some "purists"who feared the dilution of the move-ment through the addition of individuals whose personal loyalty to de Gaulle wasuntested.63

Pompidou and the other architects of the UDR have fashioned a catchall partyalong the lines described by Otto Kirchheimer." A broad based electoral partycombining most of the elements of the once fragmentedright and center, the UDRgives every indication of being an enduring and possiblydominant political force.65It draws political and electoral support from a wide range of socioeconomic forces.It has penetratedand conqueredareaswhere in the past the right has been virtuallynon-existent in politics. It has developed an organizationalstructurewith regionaland local ties. In its successfuladaptation to life without de Gaulle and also to therequirementsof modem French democracy, the UDR contrastsmarkedly with allother French political forces. What remains of the center is torn between the desireto join the Gaullist coalition and a distaste for Gaullist policies and political style.The left is as fragmented as ever and has been unable to stem twenty-fiveyears ofnear constant decline in electoral support. The alliance of the Communists andSocialistshas produced a joint programwhich papersover important disagreementson foreign policy and economic reforms. The French Left has failed to find leaderswith the vision and ability to carryout the far-reachingparty reformsnecessarytoreverse its decline.66

While the UDR has passed its first and perhaps greatest trial in surviving deGaulle's departure, there are still severalproblemsto be resolvedbefore the processof leadership successionis institutionalized. For one thing, as it has developed, theprocess of choosing the UDR party leader is undemocratic. The prime minister isthe de facto party leader, yet the selection of the prime minister is largely at thewhim of the president. His choice is not formally or informally endorsed by anyparty organ. Nor, in fact, is it ratified by the National Assembly. Two of deGaulle's choices for prime minister and, hence, party leader (Pompidou and Couvede Murville) would probably not have even been in the running had the partychosen its leader in an open democratic fashion. Pompidou'sselection of Messmerwas acceptable to most of the UDR, but it is doubtful that he would have been theparty's selection in an open contest. With the president free to select the partya For an excellent discussionof de Gaulle'scharisma,see Stanley and Inge Hoffmann, "TheWill to Grandeur:de Gaulle as Political Artist,"Daedalus,97 (Summer1968), 829-87.63See, for example, the stinging attack of one purist: Louis Vallon, L'Anti de Gaulle (Paris:Editionsde Seuil, 1969).4Otto Kirchheimer,"TheTransformation f the WesternEuropeanPartySystem," n PoliticalPartiesand Political Development,ed. JosephLaPalombaraand MyronWeiner (Prince-ton: PrincetonUniversity Press,1966).'s See Charlot, Le Phlnomene gaulliste, passim.,on the institutionalizationof the UDR as afederatorof the right.' See Frank L. Wilson, The French DemocraticLeft, 1963-1969: Toward a Modern PartySystem (Stanford: StanfordUniversityPress,1971).

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GAULLISMWITHOUT DE GAULLEleader largelyon his own, the UDR processof choosing its leader resemblesthat ofthe British Conservative party before 1965. Prior to that date, the Conservativeparty leader was designated by the monarchupon the recommendationof a handfulof elder party statesmen. (In 1965, the British Conservativeschanged the proce-dure so that the leaderis now elected by a vote of the membersof the parliamentaryparty.) The nondemocratic means of selecting the party leader may be a source ofinternal conflict, especially since future presidentswill not have de Gaulle's specialauthoritywhich automaticallylegitimized his choices in the eyes of Gaullists.A second problemis that the processis dependent upon the presenceof a Gaul-list president and of a parliamentarymajority which would sustain a UDR primeminister. Obviously, the UDR leader could not be selected by a non-UDR presi-dent. And the present system might not work if a UDR president was forced toturn to a non-UDR leader for his prime minister. It is not surprising hat the UDRhas not yet devised a means of selecting leaders when out of power since it hasheld power since its formation in 1958. But, should the Gaullists lose power theywill have to dramaticallyalter the procedure of choosing a party leader. Anotherproblem stems from the dual nature of party and governmental leadership. Thereis a potential for competition and rivalry between the president and the primeminister. The use of the prime ministerialpost as a training ground for the presi-dency and as a base for developing political support is possible only so long as thepresident does not view such activities as undermining his own political power, andonly so long as he is willing to relinquish his control over the party thus per-mitting the prime minister to develop his own power in the party. It must berememberedthat the prime ministeris appointed and can be dismissedby the presi-dent. In the case of the de Gaulle/Pompidou tandem, de Gaulle'spersonalauthor-ity was such that nothing Pompidou could do would undermineit, and he willinglydelegated party control to Pompidou. In turn, Pompidou was always careful tostay within the limits of his responsibilitiesavoiding even the slightest suggestionofa challenge to de Gaulle. The Pompidou/Chaban-Delmas relationship was muchlesssuccessful.Pompidou compensatedfor his lack of "natural"authority comparedto de Gaulle by relyingon political power. He was thus not interestedin relinquish-ing the control over the party that he had won through years of effort. Chaban-Delmas was neverthelessexpected by Pompidou and others to keep the party andcoalition in line and to avoid encumberingthe presidentwith petty partisanmatters.His efforts to develop his influence and power within the party could be and wereinterpretedas challenges to Pompidou'sauthority. This produced tension and con-flict within the party and between Pompidou and Chaban-Delmas. In short, thissuccession process worked well for Pompidou's preparation to succeed de Gaulle.But it is not clear that it will work now that the president needs party support tosustain his rule and therefore cannot or will not cede party control to his primeminister. At best, this successionprocess would lend itself to potential conflict andtensionbetween the presidentand prime minister.A final problem to be resolved is that of distinguishing the party from thegovernment when the prime minister is both head of government and party leader.This has not posed a major problem up to this point because the UDR clearly

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THE WESTERNPOLITICALQUARTERLYdominates the government.67It is conceivable that the UDR might find itself in acoalition which it leads but in which other parties have powerful voices. In such asituation, the compounding of prime ministerand party leaderin one man may leadto a distortion of the party's position since the compromises emerging from thegovernment coalition may not accurately reflect the UDR position. It might thenbe necessaryto differentiateparty leadership from governmental leadership.In conclusion, this article has argued that the UDR succeeded in survivingde Gaulle because the complementary attitudes toward party affairs of de Gaulleand Pompidou permitted the latter to prepare himself and the party for governingwithout de Gaulle. It illustrates the importance of party leaders, of their percep-tions of the needs and nature of party adaptation, and of their abilities in deter-mining party change. However, the solution which workedso well in the transitionfrom de Gaulle to Pompidou may not work in the transition from Pompidou tohis successor. Thus, the UDR has survived its charismatic founder; it now mustdevise the means for assuringthe smooth replacementof less extraordinary igures.

" Some UDR leaders have already complainedthat the partyis too closelyidentified with thegovernment. They argue that since there are non-UDR elementsin the government,theUDR should have a party president and a separatepolicy statementto differentiateitfrom the coalitiongovernment. See for examplethe argumentsof AlexandreSanguinettiLe Monde, October 12, 1971 and October 22, 1971. The argumenthas been renewedin the monthssince the 1973 legislativeelections. Pompidoucontinues to resistefforts toname a presidentfor the UDR.

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