GARY WATERS

PUBLISHED BY

OBOE - AIR OPERATIONS OVER BORNEO, 1945

Gary Waters

Published by Air Power Studies Centre

RAAF Base Fairbairn Canberra

1995

ii

(C) Commonwealth of Australia, 1995

The views are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect

the official policy or position of the Department of Defence, the

Royal Australian Air Force or the Government of Australia. This

document is approved for public release.

This book is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the

purposes of private study, research, criticism, or review as

permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may be reproduced by

any process without written permission. Inquiries should be made

to the publisher.

National Library of Australia

Waters, Gary, 1951-.

Oboe.

Bibliography.

Includes index.

ISBN 0 642 22590 7.

1. World War, 1939-1945 - Aerial operations, Australian. 2. World War, 1939-1945 - Campaigns - Borneo. I. Australia. Royal Australian Air Force. Air Power Studies

Centre. 11. Title.

Designed by Defence Publications

Published and distributed by:

Air Power Studies Centre

RAAF Base FAIRBAIRN

Canberra, ACT, 2600

AUSTRALIA

Telephone (06) 267 6458

Facsimile (06) 267 6382.

iii

ABSTRACT

This book analyses the air operations conducted over Borneo in

1945 as part of the series of joint operations known as Oboe.

The lead-up to the Oboe operations is discussed as an essential

precursor, describing the situation at the time. Each of the

three operations - Tarakan Island, Labuan Island-Brunei Bay, and

Balikpapan - is discussed in turn, with a focus on the phases of the operations, the air support and fighter control

organisations, and administration (including logistics, medical

and personnel issues).

Armed with this holistic view of the air operations themselves

and the supporting operations, the book draws together the

principal observations. The final chapter analyses the doctrine

of the time and assesses the degree to which the observations

accord with the doctrine.

iv

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Gary Waters joined the W in January 1969. He qualified as an

accountant and economist, was employed as a Supply officer, and

later qualified as a computer programmer. His more recent

postings have included RAF Bracknell, United Kingdom, where he

attended the RAF Advanced Staff Course in 1985, and RAAF Staff

College, Fairbairn Canberra from 1986 to June 1989, where he

served as an instructor, as Director of Air Operations Studies,

and finally in 1989 as Director of Studies during the review of

the W ' s Command and Staff Course. In June 1989 he was posted

to the newly formed Air Power Studies Centre, where he

contributed to the writing of the RAAF's inaugural doctrine - AAP

1000.

From January 1990 he was the RAAF visiting fellow to the

Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National

University, where he produced two books - RAAF Air Power

Doctrine: A Collection of Contemporary Essays, ( 1990), and The

Architect of Victory: Air Campaigns for Australia, (1991). In

May 1991 he was posted back to the Air Power Studies Centre,

where he produced a book entitled Gulf Lesson One - The Value of Air Power: Doctrinal Lessons for Australia, (1992).

He then served in the Directorate of Logistics Development and

Planning during 1992, during which time he edited a book called

Line Honours: Logistics Lessons of the Gulf War (1992). In

January 1993, he was promoted to group captain and posted as the

Director of the Air Power Studies Centre. During that time he

has co-edited another two books - one with John Mordike entitled

Regional Air Power Workshop Darwin 24-26 August 1993, and the

other with Mark Kelton entitled Air Power Presentations 1993.

v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

An enormous amount of time has gone into researching this book,

and to my family I owe an apology for begrudging them so much of

my time, but also a large vote of thanks for assisting with

typing, formatting and so forth. So to Carolyn, Scott, Brett and

Emma, many thanks for all your help and patience.

To my colleagues at the Air Power Studies Centre, I am indeed

grateful for their assistance and encouragement over the two

years that this book was in the making - so thank you to Doctors

Alan Stephens and John Mordike and Wing Commanders Mark Lax and

Ric Casagrande. The maps were drawn by Sandra Seignarack, and

absorbed quite a deal of her time - my vote of thanks seems hardly just compensation.

Throughout the entire project, my good friend and mentor

Professor John McCarthy has been there when I needed him. Thank

you John. So too has Group Captain Phi1 Morrall provided

sterling support and continued encouragement.

Finally, to those many good friends who show up each year at the

RRAF history conference, thank you for indulging me and assisting

me with my research. You are too numerous to name, but please

take care and I hope to see you at our future conferences.

vii

CONTENTS

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

MAPS

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE: THE LEAD-UP

CHAPTER TWO: OBOE ONE - TARAKAN

CHAPTER THREE: OBOE SIX - LABUAN ISLAND-BRUNEI BAY

CHAPTER FOUR: OBOE TWO - BALIKPAPAN

CHAPTER FIVE: OBSERVATIONS

CHAPTER SIX: DOCTRINE

CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INDEX

ix

xii

viii

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AA ACM

ACS

AF AFDS

AIF

ALO

ALP

A0

AOC

AOC-in-C

AOP

ASP

ASR

ASS

ASV

ASW

AVM

C-in-C

CAIRS

CAP

CAS

CO

CP

CSA

D/F

DDT

E/A

F-Day

FEAF

Frag

GC I

W C

HE

HF

Anti-Aircraft

Air Chief Marshal

Airfield Construction Squadron

Air Force

Airfield Defence Squadron

Australian Imperial Forces

Air Liaison Officer

Air Liaison Party

Area of Operations

Air Officer Commanding

Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief

Air Observation Post

Air Support Party

Air Sea Rescue

Air Support Section

Anti-Surface Vessel

Anti-Submarine Warfare

Air Vice-Marshal

Commander-in-Chief

Close Air Support

Combat Air Patrol

Chief of the Air Staff

Commanding Officer

Command Post

Commander Support Aircraft

Direction Finding

Dichloro-Diphenyl-Trichloroethane

Enemy Aircraft

1 ~ u l y 1945

Far Eastern Air Forces

Fragmentary Message (from Air Tasking Schedule)

Ground Control Intercept

General Officer Commanding

High Explosive

High Frequency

HQ IFF

km

LASU

lb

LOCS

LST

LW/GCI

LW/AW

M/T

MCRU

MC S

MFCU

MTB

MTU

NCO

NE

NE I

NGS

NWA

0 A

OBU

P- ay

POL

POW

PRO

PT

R/T

RAAF

RAN

RDF

RIMU

RNZAF

RSU

SA0

SAR

Headquarters

Identification Friend or Foe

Kilometre

Local Air Supply Unit

Pound

Lines of Communication

Landing Ship Tank

Light Weight/Ground Control Intercept

Light Weight/Air Warning

Motor Transport

Mobile Control and Reporting Unit

Medical Clearing Station

Mobile Fighter Control Unit

Motor Torpedo Boat

Mobile Telecommunications Unit

Non-Commissioned Officer

North East

Netherlands East Indies

Naval Gunfire Support

North Western Area

Objective Area

Operational Base Unit

1 May 1945

Petrol, Oil and Lubricants

Prisoner of War

Public Records Office

Patrol Torpedo

Radio/Telephony

Royal Australian Air Force

Royal Australian Navy

Radio Direction Finding

Radio Installation and Maintenance Unit

Royal New Zealand Air Force

Repair and Salvage Unit .

(Renamed Repair and Servicing Unit on 1 January 1945)

Support Air Observer

Search and Rescue

SW

SWPA

TAF

TMO

US

USAAC

USAAF

USAF

uss VHF

VIP

WA

WOP

Z- ay

South West

South West Pacific Area

Tactical Air Force

Transportation and Movements Office

United States

United States Army Air Corps

United States Army Air Force

United States Air Force

United States Ship

Very High Frequency

very Important Person

Western Area

Wireless Observer Post

10 June 1945

MAP 2

China (Taiwan

i i C

"d Hong Kong

i

$ J ii \ 4 Manila

I

Celebes Sea Jolo" Archipelago

6'Tawi Tawi " Sanga Sanga v Morotai

I ,'

,", >A ('~uching

Java Sea

Semarang ,,Surabaya --, .--- c-p * Kangeag. ,[LJ- --4 ,? T i m r Sea Java ,?j--Bali

i --. P A/*..& i . . " 4 L CL_ c* Malang Den Pasar

0 1,OO ZOO 491 Miles

MAP 3 BORNEO

D,? Kudat / J '

S,

f ,~ana"\, Sandakan Jesselton J. i NORTH,

*h.-.

Labuan l s g c BORNEO &'-L

J

v''* Pensingan "./' !,/@runeil , . ?.. .. . , ~alabakan L,"_. ?; '" "16

/ Miri -3'' Tawao * "1

i' Mensalung-; sj* Bintulu -:c Tarakan Is

!~ >>

Sibu \, i

Sarawak -' ' _ _ . '"\

.l W

Balikpapan $f Manggar Sepinggan

2

i L,

Kotawaringin \

f'

"--.-.-% R

~andjermasln? +

d )P J-'%=

/' L; G t f b a n i o

0 100 200 300

U miles

MAP 4 TARAKAN ISLAND

*A+' Sadau Is

",W . C A~ri 4

--'\ \ . \ - ",

Anzacwwy .Tarakan i \.

'\ 'Tnwn 6 ;-

'<, I\

\~

Karis Is \\ a

\.>v

' . -.... % . . p

c,,

,.') I .P ,l Pamoesian ;

Cape i,

Pasir 'Q I i

5 L-",-/

Miles

MAP 5 LABUAN ISLAND - BRUNEI BAY

,' I I I I .- 40 60

Miles

fd ))

,," !'

s'

i / timbalai ~abuah,, Strip\

( Labuan i

@own, I j p---> C~LJ,

Brown Bea:h 1' {Avictoria Hbr i l l I

I I I I 0 1 5 Miles

.- .,.,,

:L ., , -:

Jesselton j, i

+" C-? : Vapar

,G , . \.-*'

Labuan Is I Kitau .

,l-Padas..R. L a b u a n ~~4 Beaufort

O 5 3%- '\ Keningau Brunei ~aj;;' ' Westow

Brooketon ! . Tenom 2- ,..<)Q Muara Is ;-' " Lawas

I .,- .i. Limbung prGnej ,, --..S

o I Miles 5 ,/.iown <:G,, f North ~ f i ! Limbang '

Borneo Kuala Belait

'w=-.-': Seria . CL- Lutong ). \.,. . : L ~ - ~ .. .~runei

'7 F ~. , L . Miri : ',. Brunei ,:

L, ' ,

/ -" .: : ' Sarawak , . s \ ~

. . Borneo i . .. . . .

MAP 6 BALIKPAPAN

Red

I I I I

0 2 4 6 Miles

I

xviii

INTRODUCTION

xix

The retaking of Borneo by the Allies in 1945 (known as the Oboe

operations) was achieved mainly by Australian forces conducting

joint operations. Borneo was important for strategic reasons (in

particular its location near Singapore and its oil resources),

and as this study will show, for operational reasons as well -

principally because Australian forces acted at the operational

level of war. At a time when the Australian Defence Force is

attempting to define the operational level of war and the

philosophy and requirements of joint operations, it is timely to

analyse the events in Borneo in 1945, more so since 1995 marks

the fiftieth anniversary of the Oboe operations.

This is not a study of the joint operations themselves, but

rather an analysis of air power's role in those joint operations

on Borneo in 1945. While clear and unambiguous air power

doctrine was not articulated at the time, many of the theoretical

and operational concepts had been tested and refined. That is

the purpose of this book - to identify those concepts and examine

their relevance to the conduct of air operations during Oboe.

For the reader to appreciate the context in which the operations

were conducted, Chapter One is devoted to discussion on the

Japanese invasion of Borneo, Japanese force strength in 1945, the

Allies' Montclair plan (Victor and Oboe phases), the role of Air

Vice-Marshal Bostock, the conditions at Morotai, and the

importance of doctrine to operations.

Chapters Two, Three and Four then analyse the particular air

operations related to each of the Oboe operations - Tarakan,

Labuan Island-Brunei Bay, and Balikpapan. Each of these chapters

identifies the overall objective, the intelligence available, the

planning and command and control, before the air operations

themselves are analysed. Each operation can be broken down into

phases, which helps provide an understanding of the implicit

doctrine at the time - air attacks on Japanese airfields and principal infrastructure that could support the Japanese,

followed by air attacks on the landing beaches (since the three

Oboe operations began with amphibious landings), and then the

close air support operations conducted in concert with the

Australian soldiers as they captured the respective objective

areas. In addition, there are several types of air operations

which warrant discussion, as well as the air support and fighter

control organisations and the supporting administration, all of

which help to clarify the doctrine under which the RAAF operated.

Description of the air aspects of the three Oboe operations is

necessary in some detail to identify the observations that can

be made which are of relevance to doctrine. In Chapter Five,

these observations are brought together in an operational sense,

and then discussed in Chapter Six in a doctrinal context. Most

of the doctrinal issues to arise are associated with direct air

support. Air support in the Middle East and European theatres

was developed and refined by the time of the Oboe operations and

several important doctrinal issues emerge from these other

theatres of which the RAAF in the South West Pacific Area would

have been aware. Additionally, the RAAF had developed some

expertise at direct support during the Allied victory at Milne

Bay and afterwards. Accordingly, these issues are discussed in

Chapter Six.

Fundamental to any doctrinal analysis of air support must be an

examination of Tedder's principles. After all it was probably

Tedder more so than any other airman who turned the spotlight on

air support doctrine. The views of Lord Tedder, Air Vice-Marshal

Wrigley (the Australian) and General 'Hap' Arnold are examined

in brief for comparative purposes. Then, using Tedder's

principles, the conduct of air support of the Oboe operations is

assessed, and comment made about the correlation between these

principles and the actual conduct of operations. Finally, some

comment on the immediate post-war doctrine to emerge is

warranted, so that the Oboe operations may be viewed

xxi

retrospectively, in terms of what was said about how air

operations should have been conducted.

That the Oboe operations were a tremendous tactical success goes

without saying. Irrespective of their perceived contribution to

the Allied strategy in forcing Japan to surrender, the simple

fact that the operations were conducted warrants detailed

analysis - more so since the Australian forces did function at

the operational as well as tactical level. While certain aspects

of Oboe have been addressed by historians, no one has drawn

together the important observations from the way in which the

RAAF conducted operations and set them in a doctrinal context.

This book does that.

CHAPTER ONE

TEE LEAD-UP

Substantial studies have been undertaken of the part played by

the RAAF in the European theatre during World War 11, and in

recent years, there has been an increasing focus on the Pacific

theatre. While much of that recent attention has focused on the

South West Pacific Area (SWPA), RAAF operations in Borneo have

tended to be ignored.

This is surprising as the First Tactical Air Force (1st TAF)

played a major role in the Montclair plan for operations in

Borneo, Netherlands East Indies (NEI) and the Philippines, in

1945. Montclair formed part of the Allied plans to clear

Japanese-occupied territories in the SWPA, south of Luzon, once

Luzon had been seized. Montclair involved the re-occupation of

thewesternvisayan-Mindanao-Borneo-NE1 area, with the plan being

prepared by General Headquarters on 25 February 1945.'

Borneo had been ruled by a group of sultans, with the Sultan of

Brunei being the most powerful. Dutch interest then appeared in

the Seventeenth Century, and British interest in the Nineteenth

Century, when trade routes to China and trade from British Penang

and Singapore came under threat. Sarawak, and later Labuan

Island (in Brunei Bay) were ceded to the British. Formal

treaties were signed in 1888, separating British Borneo,' Brunei

and Sarawak (British protectorates) and Dutch Borneo.

It was not until 24 September 1941 that Sarawak released its own

constitution. Just as the people of Borneo had every right to

believe that oppressive and colonist rule was at an end, Japanese

forces arrived on the scene. Oppression, torture and massacre

would be of proportions not previously witnessed. And so it was

that Japan invaded Borneo on 16 December 1941, only nine days

' George Odgers, A i r War A g a i n s t Japan 2943-1945, Australian War Memorial, 1957, p.433.

British North Borneo is now known as Sabah

2 Oboe

after the attack on Pearl arbor.^

The alarm bells for an impending attack by the Japanese had been

ringing for some years. As Ernest Hemingway had observed in

Manila earlier in 1941, 'Japan must have oil. If the Netherlands

East Indies and America do not agree to deal with her in

quantities sufficient to keep her reserves intact, she will act.

She will drive to the Netherlands East Indies. And she will take

them'.4

Even earlier, the US Ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew said (on

12 September 1940), 'The German victories have inspired Japan's

militarists as a golden opportunity to carry their dreams of

expansion into effe~t'.~ On 27 January 1941, Grew became even

more alarmed and sent a telegram to US Secretary of State Cordell

Hull, in which he advised of a plan for a surprise mass attack

on Pearl Harbor if trouble loomed between Japan and the US. He

advised further 'that the attack would involve the use of all the

Japanese military fa~ilities'.~

As if that had not been sufficient warning, Brigadier 'Billy'

Mitchell sounded his concerns as early as 1934, when he said 'The

Japanese will not politely declare war. They are treacherous and

will stop at nothing. Hawaii, for instance, is vulnerable from

the sky. .... And Hawaii is swarming with Japanese spies. As I

have said before, that's where the blow will be struck - on a

fine, quiet Sunday morning'.'

' Athol Moffitt, Project Kingfisher, Angus & Robertson, NSW, Australia, 1989, p.xi.

See Sky Phillips, Secret Mission to Melbourne, November 1941, Sunflower university Press, Kansas, 1992, p.1.

ibid, p.23.

ibid, p.87.

' ibid, p.74.

l T h e Lead-Up 3

Borneo was strategically important due to its location near

Singapore, the Philippines and Netherlands East Indies all of

which had yet to be invaded by Japan. Borneo's oil reserves - accessible and in quantity - were attractive to Japan. The first invasion force landed at Miri, which brought the oilfields at Miri and Seria and the refinery at Lutong under Japanese control.

The retaking of these areas, as well as Labuan Island, has

special significance therefore, and is described in detail in

Chapter Three. Lack of defences meant that within days of the

16 December invasion, the whole of Borneo, including several

other rich oilfields, were under Japanese control.

By early 1942, the Japanese air forces exercised control of the

air throughout the entire NE1 area. The Tainan Air Corps, flying

from Tainan Base had taken Bali Island, Jolo Island, Tarakan,

Balikpapan and Bandjermasin.8 The naval air force distribution

at the beginning of the Philippines campaign (8 December 1941)

included: The Tainan Air Corps (the 1st Air Corps) ; The Takao Air

Corps (3rdAir Corps), which operated from Kaohsung (Takao Base);

The Kanoya Air Corps, which operated from Taichung (Taichu Base);

The lOOlst Air Corps operating from Chiai (Kagi Base); and The

Toko Air Corps operating from Tungkan (Toko Base)."

In the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese had air forces

that were 'highly mobile and capable of most effective offensive

operations against an unprepared enemy. They had only a limited

concept of strategic bombing and a relatively small aircraft

production; and they were unprepared for a long war of attrition

against the air forces of a much stronger industrial nation'."

Masatake Okumiya and Jiro Horikoshi, with Martin Caidin, Zero! T h e S t o r y o f the J a p a n e s e Navy A i r Force 1937-1945, Cassell and Company Limited, London, 1957, p.60.

i b i d . p.56.

' O PRO, Air 40/2201 - Report of Japanese Air Order of Battle Conference 5-23 February 1945, Washington DC, p.1.

4 Oboe

After defeats at Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal the Japanese

air forces of 1943 had to adopt essentially a strategic defensive

role. They embarked on a fighter production program (at the

expense of bombers) and sought to conserve strength as they built

up their fighter capability. Their tactics were to strike at

night and where forced to concentrate numbers of aircraft, they

tended to do so for relatively short periods.

By 1944, the Japanese were making concerted efforts in all

theatres to avoid combat losses," and they relied now on land-

based air power almost exclusively (as they attempted to rebuild

their carrier forces). In late 1944, they were forced to operate

in strength to try to stop the Allied advance. The

'hopelessness' of the situation probably gave rise to the notion

of suicide attacks.

The assessment in early 1945 was that 'at each stage of the

Allied advance the Japanese have been caught making belated

efforts to develop adequate air installations and facilities'."

The assessment was also that continued and heavy pressure by the

Allies would see the Japanese qualitative and quantitative

inferiority exacerbated. The Japanese simply could not mount

operations exceeding 30 aircraft, and were virtually restricted

to night operations only.

The February 1945 assessment went on: 'the Japanese are not

likely to risk aircraft losses in the defense [sic] of any areas

outside of the main islands of Japanf.13 Furthermore, in an

assessment on enemy intentions in South-east Asia and the East

Indies, the Washington conference concluded: 'Japanese air forces

deployed south of Formosa may be expected to suffer progressive

deterioration. The increasing difficulties of supply and

replacement, plus the more urgent need for all available aircraft

'l i b i d , p.2.

" i b i d , p.3.

l3 i b i d , p.4.

The Lead-L@ 5

in Japan Proper, and adjacent areas, will cause the Japanese to

rely increasingly upon local ground forces without substantial

air support for the defense [sic] of these outlying positions.

The tendency will be to deploy the air strength remaining in the

southern areas for the defense [sic] of the Malaya Peninsula,

Palembang and the French Indo-China coast'.14

In relation to air bases the Japanese had constructed a close

network to afford the necessary flexibility, but had failed to

provide sufficient development of service facilities. By 1945

only a handful of major bases had adequate mechanical facilities,

disabled aircraft on minor airfields would remain unserviceable,

there was by now a shortage of skilled service personnel

especially in the outlying areas, and inadequate radio

navigational aids had been provided at many of the minor

air£ ields . l5

Another problem for the Japanese were the aircraft losses that

were starting to mount up. For example, by April 1945 losses

were so bad that training units were receiving tactical

commitments. One particular example should suffice - on 22 April

1945, one training unit in China received 25 fighters and began

conducting tactical operations.16

The Allies were certainly aware of the parlous state of the

Japanese Air Forces which was reflected in the observation that:

'In all combat areas of the Pacific, Japanese air activity is

purely defensive and has resolved itself down to a series of

uncoordinated local reactions to Allied Naval and Army Air Forces

ibid, p.5.

l5 ibid, pp.10-11.

'"PRO, Air 40/2208 - Japanese Air Forces Order of Battle Report No 77 of 22nd April 1945. Also see Report No 76 of 15th April 1945 which mentions a number of training units of the 10th Air Fleet providing aircraft and crews for operations with the First Mobile Base Air Force.

attacks'." Nevertheless, those local reactions could be

characterised by tactics that: involved suicide attacks,

implemented radar-evasion measures, reflected improved bombing

and fighter methods (including improved defensive tactics), and

showed increased proficiency in night operations."

The Allies' Montclair plan had emerged on 15 February 1945" with

assumptions that the strength and disposition of hostile ground

forces would remain unchanged in the MoluCCaS, Borneo and

southern Philippines. In addition, hostile air opposition was

expected to be limited to suicide and harassing operations by

small forces, and sufficient enemy air strength in the Borneo-NE1

area would necessitate moderate air cover over friendly naval

assault forces and supply convoys.

Two different series of operations were envisioned. The Victor

phase (or series) aimed to reoccupy enemy-held areas in the

Visayas, Palawan, Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. The Oboe

phase (or series) aimed to reoccupy Java and subsequently to

consolidate the taking of enemy-held parts of British Borneo and

NEI. The effect of Montclair would be to isolate Japanese forces

from Japan, rendering the rich resources throughout the area

virtually useless. Enemy naval and air components in NE1 would

be rendered impotent and ground troops would be immobilised, in

that they would be unable to obtain reinforcements and resupply.

" PRO, Air 40/2217 - Headquarters Allied Air Forces Intelligence Report 'Japanese Fighter Tactics', January 1945, p.4.

l8 PRO, Air 40/1761 - RAAF Command Intelligence Summary No 9 of 31 March 45, p.17.

'' Ten days before it was formally prepared.

T h e Lead-Up 7

~acArthur's~%perations throughout the entire South West Pacific

Area were characterised by 'the movement forward of air power by

successive bounds in order to gain local air superiority, provide

adequate cover for the advance of surface elements, and isolate

each successive enemy position prior to the final assault of all

arms ' .21

As part of the Victor phase, landings were made on Panay, Cebu

and Negros, and on 3 April, Tawi Tawi Island was captured by US

forces.22 Tawi Tawiwas to feature in the subsequent Oboe phase.

Landings followed at Jolo, Basilan and Cotabato (on Mindanao),

which essentially brought the Victor phase to a close by 17

April. The stage was now set for the Oboe phase, the objectives

of which were to seize Java, destroy enemy forces in NEI, re-

establish the NE1 government in its capital, and establish a base

for subsequent operations against Japanese forces throughout the

area.

Although the original intention was to conduct six distinct

operations as part of the Oboe phase, only three were carried

out. The original six were: Oboe One - Tarakan Island, Oboe Two - Balikpapan, Oboe Three - Bandjermasin, Oboe Four - Surabaya (or

MacArthur was appointed as Commander-in-Chief, which in today's parlance could be equated with a joint force commander. He exercised command through three principal subordinates - Commander Allied Naval Forces, Commander Allied Air Forces and a task force commander who had responsibility for ground forces. The task force commander for the Borneo operations was General Morshead, Commander 1st Australian Corps. The American, General Kenney, was Commander Allied Air Forces, although he effectively delegated operational control to Air Vice-Marshal Bostock.

'l See T. Dodson Stamps and Vincent J. Esposito, eds., Combat A i r F o r c e s o f W o r l d War 11, v o 1 . 2 , O p e r a t i o n s i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n and P a c i f i c T h e a t e r s , US Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., 1956, p.297 as cited in Timothy D. Gann, Lt Col, USAF, F i f t h A i r F o r c e L i g h t and Medium Bomher O p e r a t i o n s d u r i n g 1 9 4 2 and 1 9 4 3 : B u i l d i n g t h e D o c t r i n e and F o r c e t h a t T r iumphed i n the B a t t l e o f the B i s m a r c k Sea and the Wewak R a i d , Air University Press, Alabama, November 1993, p.2.

2 Z Odgers, p.432.

8 Oboe

~atavia"), Oboe Five - East Netherlands East Indies, and Oboe Six - British Borneo. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (in the US)

decided that the Oboe sequence would be altered, and advised

General MacArthur on 4 April that Oboe Six would follow Oboe One.

Four days later, Oboes Three, Four and Five were suspended and

the precise area of attack in Oboe Six was given as the Labuan

Island-Brunei Bay area.%-s the official historian George

Odgers observed 'It was significant that three operations of the

Oboe series . . . . would take the Allies into the oil-producing centresr ."

There has been considerable controversy over Australia's role in

being assigned essentially to 'mopping up operations',

particularly in relation to the 'mandate campaigns' and the

Borneo operations, and not being employed on attacks on Japan

itself. The controversy associated with the 'mandate campaigns'

- in New Guinea, New Britain and the Solomon Islands - and with the Borneo operations is dealt with by John Robertson and

Professor John McCarthy in some detail.26 It is not the purpose

of this study to fuel the debate or discuss it any further, but

it is necessary to make the observation in the first instance,

that the Oboe operations were undertaken, and to observe that

little in-depth analysis of these operations has been

forthcoming. This, in itself, provides sufficient impetus for

this study.

Batavia is now known as Jakarta.

Odgers, pp.433-434.

See John Robertson and John McCarthy, Australian War Strategy 1939-1945, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia Queensland, 1985. The mandate campaigns are discussed at pp.401- 416, and the Borneo operations at pp.417-427.

The Lead-Up 9

Importantly, once Air Vice-Marshal ~ostock~' realised the

opportunity for a joint Australian operation, he proposed to

General KenneyZ8 that RAAF Command should exercise operational

control over 1st TAF, as 1st TAF provided air support for 1

Australian Corps. 1 Australian Corps had responsibility for the

conduct of the Oboe operations. While it is tempting to suggest

that Bostock was driven by altruistic motives to ensure a good

Australian showing, he must surely have been concerned at the

continuing use of the 1st TAF in purely defensive operations.

He was keen to see 1st TAF used as a 'forward offensive formation

rather than in a garrison r~le'.~"

Bostock was also given operational control of RNZAF elements

(under AVM Isitt), and the 13th Air Force (under General

Wurtsmith) was to support Bostock when needed. Bostock was given

the responsibility 'to designate the targets and coordinate the

timing of the American and Australian mission^'.'^ Accordingly,

Bostock established an Advanced Headquarters of RRAF Command at

Morotai on 15 March, close to 13th AF Bomber Command's

headquarters. Headquarters 1st TAF was also at Morotai, under

the command of Air Commodore Cobby. Morotai had been captured

by the Allies in September 1944."

Just as the issue of Australian forces being assigned to the

Borneo operations rather than to more 'strategic' operations was

seen as a distraction to the compilation of this book, so too was

'' Bostock was in command of RAAF Command, headquartered in Brisbane.

Kenney was, in essence, MacArthurrs air component commander, having taken over from General Brett.

2 9 Quoted in Odgers, p.435.

30 ibid.

" Liberators operated from Pitoe strip, while fighters operated from Wama. See Michael V. Nelmes, Tocumwal to Tarakan: Australians and the Consolidated B-24 Liberator, Banner Books, Canberra, 1994, p.110.

10 Oboe

the Jones-Bostock situation. The division of responsibility and

the continual disputes between these two have been covered

else~here,~' and will not be discussed further. As Dr Alan

Stephens has argued, both Bostock and Jones had 'legitimate

grievances' - Bostock because he could not exercise control over

the support services he needed, and Jones because he could not

exercise control over how the RAAF was employed in operation^.^^ Perhaps the answer to the whole sorry affair would have been, as

Dr Chris Coulthard-Clark has suggested, to have made Jones an air

marshal on his appointment as CAS.~'

As RAAF and Australian Army personnel arrived at Morotai, they

found the conditions crowded and unhygienic. As noted in a

recent book on Liberator operations, 'It should [have been]

renamed Mudatai, the mud sticks closer than Adelaide

As well, many units experienced 'great difficulty' in their

movement to ~orotai . Apart from these appalling conditions, '' 1st TAE units found it difficult to obtain replacementpersonnel.

So bad did this become that tours of duty had to be extended,

AVM Jones was Chief of the Air Staff and had administrative responsibility for the RAAF, while Bostock had operational responsibility. For further discussion on the 'RAAF command scandal' see Odgers, pp.436-439, Alan Stephens, Power Plus Attitude, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1992, pp.64-67, and John Robertson and John McCarthy, Australian War Strategy 1939-2945, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia Queensland, 1985, pp.337-356.

33 See Alan Stephens, 'The Office of the Chief of the Air Staff', in Australia's Air Chiefs: RAAF History Conference 1992, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1992, p.8.

" See C.D. Coulthard-Clark, 'An Extraordinary Group of People: Personalities from the 1920s to the 1970s', in Australia's Air Chiefs: RAAF History Conference 1992, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1992, p.29.

35 Nelmes, p.115.

36 Odgers, p.440.

" Although George Odgers paints a grim picture of the conditions, he still suggests that 'conditions at Morotai were not unpleasantr. See Odgers, p.440.

The L e a d - 4 11

simply because transportation could not be found to bring the

replacements to Morotai." Complaints were common of deficiencies

in essential equipment, misallocation of technical staff (for

loading parties for instance), insufficient environmental

training, and shortages of personnel. This is an important point

as similar complaints arose during the Oboe operations

themselves.

Continuing irritation at the type of operations being conducted

by the RAW reached crisis point on 14 April. Eight identically-

worded resignations (including two from group captains) brought

the command of 1st TAF under scrutiny by Bostock. He

recommended, on 22 April, that Air Commodore Cobby and two of his

principal staff officers (Group Captains Simms and Gibson) should

be transferred. The timing of these changes was most unusual,

as will be seen from the Tarakan operation. Cobby was actually

on Tarakan, just after the landing and before the island had been

recaptured, when he was replaced.

Problems at Morotai may have been a reflection of even wider

discontent, especially in relation to lack of flying. For

example, when No 25 Squadron was equipped with Liberators at

Cunderdin, Western Australia, aircrew complained about lack of

flying time. Operational policy limited each squadron's flying

to 516 hours per month, for maintenance reasons (timing for

scheduled maintenance). The crews argued that this meant too

much idle time and insufficient training time. Subsequently, the

figure was increased to 900 hours. But all this occurred in the

first few months of 1945,39 which may also have contributed to

discontent and lower morale at Morotai.

Air Vice-Marshal Jones agreed with Bostock's recommendations as

to replacement of the three key senior officers at Morotai, and

ibid, p.441.

Nelmes, p.126.

12 Oboe

also suggested to the Minister for Air that a commissioner or

judge should conduct an enquiry. Commissioner Barry was

appointed to conduct the enquiry and found that the operational

activities had to be called into question and that the 1st TAF

commander had 'failed to maintain proper control'." Cobby

denied that he had failed in his duty as a commander when he

appeared before the Barry commission, but his protestations

appear not to have persuaded Barry.

With this background of poor living conditions, a divided control

of the RAAF (Jones and Bostock) and a conviction by many airmen

that their operations were not 'militarily justifiable'," one

may indeed pause to wonder how the Oboe operations could have

been conducted at all. After all, the controversy about

Australian operations was not confined to the RAAF - similar

questions had been raised by the Army and by Australian

politicians.

Despite this poor setting, Oboe One commenced on 1 May 1945 and

Tarakan Island was taken. However, the airfield on the island

could not be used for extensive air operations. Use of Tarakan

airfield was a fundamental assumption in planning for Oboe Six

which centred on Labuan Island/Brunei Bay and Oboe Two -

Balikpapan (which was to provide an advance operating base).

Oboe One had been scheduled for 23 April, but finally occurred

on 1 May. Oboe Six occurred on 10 June (having been brought

forward to protect oil and rubber resources within the Brunei Bay

area), and Oboe Two was deferred from 18 May to 1 July.

The individual operations provided the RAAF with considerable

operational experience, in situations where the RAAF had full

planning responsibility. While there were certain similarities,

and this is only to be expected because the operations occurred

'O Odgers, p.446.

4 ' ibid, p.450.

The Lead-Up 13

so close in time, there were unique lessons that can be derived

1 from each of the operations. The importance of examining the

Oboe operations in detail goes without saying, but the value of

this study is that it also analyses the conduct of operations in

light of doctrine prevailing at the time.

While doctrine adopts many guises and is used in many different

ways, it offers several broad but positive benefits, in

particular: a conceptual framework; general guidance in specific

situations; a foundation for the air force (including force

structure, strategy, tactics, training and procedures); guidance

for establishing employment priorities; a sounding board for

testing, evaluating and employing new technologies and new

policies; and a rationale for the organisation and employment of

air forces.

Doctrine is a set of principles only: organisational and

employment means still have to be established. Directives help

establish the organisational means and tactical procedures help

establish the employment means. These directives and procedures

however lack the time-enduring hallmark of doctrine. They most

certainly are guided by doctrinal principles, but are also

affected by political and technological issues which can be quite

transitory.

Doctrine is sourced from three areas - theory, technology and historical experience. Theory, in the guise of far-reaching

conceptual thinking is most necessary, but is nevertheless

hypothetical, emanating from the vision of theorists. Vision

alone is not enough - it does not provide sufficient substance.

The second area - technology - has at times taken its cue from

doctrine (that is, doctrine has lead technology), but there have

'' See Gary Waters, 'Air Power Doctrine', in Waters and Dr John Mordike, Regional Air Power Workshop 1993, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1993, pp.43-44.

14 Oboe

been many technological breakthroughs that occurred for reasons

other than doctrine, and doctrine must be flexible enough to

accept such changes. That said, existing doctrine should not be

discarded out of hand with each technological change.

Experience provides the real substance about what has and has not

worked in the past, and the circumstances of the time.

Experience moves the air force of today beyond hypotheses or

educated guesses and into the realm of providing 'proof'. It

adds a practical dimension to the theoretical one. It also

carries with it a requirement to retain objectivity and a sense

of awareness about the conditions of the past and the changes of

the present. Critical analysis of what happened and why is

necessary so that institutional shibboleths which cannot be

proved, can be treated with care.

Thus, the static theoretical and practical dimensions come

together with the dynamic one of innovation (through

technological and procedural change) to form doctrine.

This study analyses the planning and conduct of air operations

in the three Oboe operations - devoting one chapter to each - and then brings together the operational issues within a doctrinal

framework. The framework has had to be constructed as there is

no record of the precise doctrine of the time.

One final point that needs to be made in this opening chapter,

which adds to the context of the Borneo operations and which is

referred to in subsequent chapters, is the Japanese brutality

visited upon local inhabitants and Prisoners of War (POWs). No

more telling comment can be made than that by Athol Moffitt as

the investigating officer into Japanese atrocities in 1945. He

was moved to note ' - his spirit was such that he refused to die. He was thin and his legs looked paralysed. The Japs beat him

over the head to kill him, but still he lived - I saw his face,

which hardly looked like a face anymore - his head was battered

and his cheeks were swollen up into his eyes - a bluish mass of

The Lead-Up 15

pulp. I can understand now what is said about the brutality of

the Japs to our people when this is what they do to their own

people'

Perhaps the most infamous circumstances occurred at Sandakan.

A total of some 2000 Australians and 750 British POWs were

transported to Sandakan, Borneo in 1942 and 1943, to build a

military airfield. Between late 1943 and July 1945 - the completion of the Oboe operations - three 'death marches' and other brutality at Sandakan had resulted in less than 50 of those

2750 left alive." Not only were Australian and British POWs to

suffer, but so too were thousands of Javanese labourers and

Chinese and Indian locals.

Athol Moffitt argues that the Japanese behaviour would, at times,

be contradictory, with moments of kindness to POWs, yet moments

of 'utter brutality or inhuman disregard of the life or limb of

pris~ners'.'~ He goes on to suggest that the token incident of

kindness was seen by the Japanese as more indicative of their

nature, and the periods of brutality and inhumanity were seen as

irrelevant because they occurred in the line of duty.

" Athol Moffitt, Project Kingfisher, p.45.

" Even more distressing evidence of wanton brutality is presented in Chapter 4.

Moffitt, p. 106.

CHAPTER TWO

OBOE ONE - TARAKAN

OVERVIEW

General MacArthur issued his Operation Instruction (No 99)

directing 9th Australian Division of 1st Australian Corps

(using 26 Brigade Group) to seize Tarakan' capturing the

Island; to destroy enemy forces there; to provide facilities

for air and naval units to support subsequent operations

against Balikpapan; to protect and conserve petroleum

producing and processing facilities; and to re-establish the

Netherlands East Indies (NEI) civil government.' Naval support

was provided by Task Group No 78.1, Allied Naval Forces, South

West Pacific Area (SWPA).

RAAF Command, Allied Air Forces, was allotted a five-fold task

of:

* Neutralising all enemy resources that could interfere

with the success of the operation.

* Providing air protection of the assault, follow-up and

re-supply shipping convoys.

* Supporting 26th Brigade Group AIF during the assault and

consolidation phases.

Tarakan is about 25 kilometres long and 18 kilometres wide at its widest point. The island is near the Sesajap River in North East Borneo. Tarakan township has as its port, Lingkas, on the south-west coast, offering docking facilities and a harbour. The island is over 2,000 kilometres from Darwin by air, 1,400 from Singapore and 450 from Balikpapan.

Japanese attacks on Tarakan had begun on 11 January 1942 (at 0300 local time) and by 14 January the Dutch garrisons had been defeated. Thus, the Japanese had occupied Tarakan for more than three years when Oboe One was launched.

18 Oboe

* Establishing air forces at Tarakan airfield to provide

air support for 26th Brigade Group during 'mopping up'

operations.

* Carrying out air operations in support of future

operations in the Borneo area.

1st TAF (RAAF)' and the 13th AF (USAAF)' provided the air

forces, with responsibility for planning and conducting air

operations being vested in the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief

(AOC-in-C) RAAF Command.' They were also supported by heavy

bomber Liberator squadrons of the North west6 and western'

areas of RAAF Command. No 24 Squadron was the first RAAF

Liberator squadron to form, followed by 21, 23 and 25

Squadrons.

Air Commodore Cobby (Officer Commanding 1st TAF - based in

Morotai) appointed Group Captain Arthur who was Commanding

Officer No 78 Wing, to be Task Force Commander, Tarakan. No

"st Tactical Air Force (Royal Australian Air Force).

13th Air Force (United States Army Air Forces). At this stage, the United States of America did not have a separate air force. The USAF was not formed until 1947. The USAAF had, in turn, originated only in June 1941, when it was renamed from the US Army Air Corps (USAAC).

While the use of the title AOC-in-C caused controversy and was never settled, this study uses it to clearly differentiate between Bostock and the AOCs subordinate to him. The controversy is discussed in George Odgers, Air War Against Japan 1943-1945, Australian War Memorial, 1957, p.439.

No 23 Squadron from Darwin, Northern Territory.

' No 25 Squadron from Cunderdin, Western Australia. No 25 Squadron flew via Corunna Downs or Truscott airfields in support of the Tarakan operation. In April, they attacked Den Pasar (on Bali), and Malang (on Java). One of the aircraft on the Malang attack (26 April) ditched into the sea. The crew was captured, imprisoned at Batavia (Jakarta) and beaten and tortured, but still managed to survive the war. See Michael V. Nelmes, Tocumwal to Tarakan: Australians and the Consolidated 8-24 Liberator, Banner Books, Canberra, 1994, p.127.

Tarakan 19

78 Wing had only 10 days to prepares as No 81 Wing which was

planned to be used and appeared in the Operations Instruction

(No 78/1945) could not move all its units forward from

Noemfoor and Townsville in time.

The assault on Tarakan occurred on P-Day (1 May 1945) .' Air

forces were supposed to be established on Tarakan by 7 May,

but due to problems in preparing the airstrip, Tarakan

airfield was not available for air operations until 30 June

(almost eight weeks late). Because air support for ground

operations over that period could not be provided by aircraft

from Tarakan, distant bases had to be used, with all the

attendant difficulties that carried. Bases such as Tawi-Tawi,

Sanga Sanga, Zamboanga, Samar, Palawan and Morotai were used.

The strategic importance of Palawan was that it allowed

further expansion of Allied air power. Apart from the main

strip at Puerta Princessa, there were two emergency landing

grounds - Iwahig and ~aytay."

While Air Vice-Marshal Bostock believed the conduct of air

operations was generally satisfactory, he was concerned that

incorrect action had been taken on certain occasions,

particularly in relation to fighter protection of the assault

shipping convoy and the employment of RAAF heavy bomber

squadrons of the 1st TAF (RAAF). There were also instances of

breaches of Close Air Support (CAIRS) control procedures.

Two bomber squadrons based at Morotai did not meet their

commitments on 1 May because the aircraft were withdrawn from

service for scheduled maintenance (as the allotted number of

flying hours had been reached). The aircraft were

a George Odgers, A i r War A g a i n s t Japan 1943-1995, p.453.

P-Day was postponed from 29 April to 1 May to take advantage of a higher tide which would lift the LSTs further onshore.

ID See Air Ministry Intelligence Summary No 290 of 24 March 1945, p.19; copy held Hendon Archives.

2 0 Oboe

serviceable, which led Air Vice-Marshal Bostock to write later

in May 1945:

'it is inexcusable to allow consideration of routine

maintenance procedure of this nature to preclude the

employment of aeroplanes in operations in support of an

assault on a beach head'."

OBJECTIVE OF OBOE ONE

The overall objective of Oboe One was to seize the airfield at

Tarakan, destroy enemy forces on Tarakan Island, and re-

establish the NE1 civil go~ernment.~~ The Allies had

established a pattern for such assaults - to isolate the site from re-supply and re-inforcements, to neutralise enemy air

and sea support, to destroy enemy troop concentrations and

then to provide air cover to the assault team. Minehunting

and Motor Torpedo Boat (MTB) operations were fundamental to

the plan and 13th AF aircraft were used to provide air cover

for these operations.

The plan called for a landing by 26th Brigade Group (under

Brigadier D.A. Whitehead), two RAAF Airfield Construction

Squadron (ACS) teams, a boat company, US Army engineer

elements and a company of the NE1 infantry battalion. The

plan was to land at Lingkas Beach, with a field battery being

landed at Sadau Island first (some 5,500 metres to the north-

west of Lingkas). The decision was taken to land on Lingkas

Beach because it was the only one of the possible landing

points connected to the airfield by a road of reasonable

quality. The soft mud of Lingkas and the other Tarakan

beaches would not support the artillery battery, hence its

positioning on Sadau Island on 30 April, the day before the

l' RAAF Command AAF, SWPA, Report of OBOE ONE Operations, May 1945, p.2.

T a r a k a n 2 1

assault.

The 13th AF lay smoke screens along the beach of Tarakan and

bombed obstacles on the beach immediately prior to the

assault. Naval units provided Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) and

the artillery battery on Sadau Island also contributed to the

clearing of obstacles. These obstacles consisted of double

apron barbed wire fences and rows of vertical posts, rails and

pipes. l3

INTELLIGENCE

The main areas of intelligence of relevance to air operations

were: estimates of enemy strengths, likely effects of weather,

and specific information on the airfield at Tarakan. Enemy

airfields which could influence the Tarakan operation, in

order of their priority of probable employment were: Manggar

and Sepinggan; Api, Sandakan, Tawao and Labuan; and Miri,

Kudat and Bintulu. Staging airfields were at Kuching and

Oelin. Intelligence reports contained estimates of enemy

strengths as discussed below.14

Japanese anti-aircraft (AA) strengths were:

* 12 heavy AA positions (with eight occupied, and effective

ranges of 12,000 feet for 75mm to 24,000 feet for 127mm).

* 39 medium AA positions (with 15 occupied, and effective

range of 5,000 feet).

* 9 light AA positions (with one occupied, and a range of

. 2,000 feet).

E.G. Keogh, T h e South West P a c i f i c 1941-45, Grayflower Productions, Melbourne, 1965, p.436.

l-hese estimates are contained in 1 Australian Corps Intelligence Review No 2, 10 April 1945.

2 2 Oboe

* Possibility of two searchlights, and two radar or RDF

stations.

Japanese operational air strength was Miri (3), Labuan (21).

Bandjermasin (17), Balikpapan (12); constituting a total of 53

combat aircraft which encompassed 28 fighters, six dive

bombers, eight medium bombers, eight float planes and three

reconnaissance aircraft. There were an additional 97 aircraft

at Celebes (14), Java and Lesser Sundas (71), and Mindanao

(12). Additionally, there were 343 enemy aircraft in other

areas which had the potential to provide support. These

encompassed Sumatra (74), Malaya (85), French-Indochina (143),

and Thailand (41).

Furthermore, it was anticipated that during the first five

days the following additional forces may be committed: fifteen

fighters, five night fighters, sixteen light and medium

bombers, eight float planes and three reconnaissance aircraft.

After the first five days there was potential for even more

forces to be deployed, including forty-two fighters, six night

fighters, twelve light and medium bombers, eight float planes

and three reconnaissance aircraft. These figures are at

slight variance with those contained in RAAF Operations

Instruction No 78/45, but the important point is that on

paper, the Japanese had sufficient forces to impede the

Allies' ability to take Tarakan Island.

Despite the numbers of Japanese aircraft in the vicinity, the

intelligence assessment was that Borneo was no longer afforded

the priority it once had, and the enemy's aircraft were

unlikely to be risked as they would be required to defend

higher-priority areas nearer to Japan. Hence, the target

priorities of the Japanese Air Force were expected to be

shipping, beach-heads, air base, dumps, installations and

troop concentrations. Suicide attacks were also considered a

possibility.

Tarakan 23

Weather

Implications of climatic conditions on air operations were

assessed by the RAAF as follows:15

a. Poor to fair mission success for high-level bombing due

to the presence of broken cloud.

b. Poor mission success for incendiary bombing due to the

humid climate.

c. Fair mission success for observation and photography due

to the light cloud cover in the mornings.

d. Fair to good mission success for air-to-ground support,

although visibility was assessed as questionable.

e. Good mission success for parachute operations, with low

winds and good flying conditions.

The Airfield

Tarakan airfieldT6 measured 4,900 feet by 105 feet, and had a

NE/SW bearing of approximately 58 degrees. The surface was

all-weather, tarred or oiled coral, with 10,000 feet (3,000

metres) of dispersal lanes, 21 dispersed points (including

five bomber and 10 fighter revetments), and hardstanding

capacity for 300 aircraft.

An additional runway could be constructed, aligned NW/SE and

crossing the existing runway at right angles at its centre. A

runway of 4,000-5,000 feet (1,200-1,500 metres) could be

l5 RAAF Operations Instruction No 78/45.

l6 Precised from No 1 Australian Corps Intelligence Review No 2, 10 April 1945.

2 4 Oboe

achieved (up to 8,000 feet with extensive filling of a swamp).

However, the runway would be at variance with prevailing

winds. There was no other suitable site on the island for an

airfield; however, a seaplane base could be established at

Lingkas port.

The Works organisation was tasked with providing a runway

(5,000 feet X 100 feet), two alert aprons, undispersed parking

areas (four squadrons of fighters and one Air Observation Post

(AOP) flight), a Mobile Fighter Control Unit (MFCU)

headquarters, and a base operations building and control

tower.

Later, the Works organisation was required to provide

increased undispersed parking for three squadrons of attack

aircraft and one squadron of Air Sea Rescue (ASR) aircraft,

followed by additional parking for the staging of two fighter

and two attack squadrons. In addition, various receiver and

transmitter buildings, wing and squadron headquarters

buildings, air stores parks, alert huts, fuel storage, bomb

storage, access roads, a dry off-loading area, service aprons,

a bore-sighting range and an air evacuation building were to

be provided.

RAAF PLANNING

In anticipation of Oboe One, Operations Instruction No 63/45

promulgated the roles for Nos 77 and 78 Wings and No 452

Squadron.

No 78 Wing

No 78 Wing was allocated Nos 75, 76 and 80 Squadrons (P.40

Kittyhawks), as well as No 452 Squadron (Spitfires) for Oboe

One. Initial planning indicated that No 81 Wing (replaced by

Tarakan 2 5

No 78 Wing) was to conduct air alert patrols with one squadron

and bombing and strafing with the other two. From the 17th

to 30th April, the Wing was to maintain continuous daylight

air alert over Tarakan, with six aircraft on constant air

alert.

The Wing's three squadrons were to carry out the following

tasks:

* One squadron was to provide day and night defence of

Tarakan (six aircraft on constant ground alert during

daylight; one aircraft on air alert and one aircraft on

ground alert during the moonlight period). On 11 April,

this squadron was to be relieved by No 452 Squadron and

was then to carry out bombing and strafing sweeps against

specified targets.

* One squadron was to be used for direct support operations

in support of 26th Brigade.

* One squadron was to act as a reserve, carrying out

restricted operations until 15 April. From 27 March

until 15 April, that would involve providing convoy

protection on the Morotai-Brunei Bay run. The squadron

was to operate from Sanga Sanga and four aircraft were to

be constantly over convoys during daylight hours.

No 77 Wing

No 77 Wing Beaufighters were to conduct bombing, strafing,

rocket and sweep missions. Prior to 17 April, the Wing was to

provide convoy protection against enemy submarines and

aircraft, with four aircraft constantly over the convoy during

daylight hours.

2 6 Oboe

No 452 Squadron

No 452 Squadron was to take over full day and night air

defence of Tarakan. Six aircraft were to be on constant

ground alert during daylight hours. During moonlight hours,

one aircraft was to be on air alert and one on ground alert.

Other Forces

As well as the Spitfire squadron and the Kittyhawk and

Beaufighter wings, other RAAF forces were involved. No 82

Wing aircraft (comprising Beaufighters of Nos 22, 30 and 31

Squadrons) were to maintain 12 sorties per day carrying 6000

lbs of bombs per sortie. No 16 AOP Flight (Austers) was to

carry out four sorties per day, each of one hour duration. No

113 Air Sea Rescue (ASR) Flight was to conduct one four-hour

sortie per day.

Additionally, on the ground were No 114 Mobile Fighter Control

Unit (MFCU), No 38 Operational Base Unit and seven radar

stations - Nos 167, 168, 308, 309, 312, 354, 355.

Division of Responsibility

Operations Instruction No 78/45 promulgated the following

division of responsibility for 1st TAF and 13th AF.

With effect from 4 April 1945, 1st TAF (RAAF) ceased to

operate under operational control of the Commanding General

13th Air Force USAAF with control being transferred to

AOC-in-C RAAF Command. In this, the RAAF was responsible to:

* Continue destruction of enemy forces, air bases and

installations.

Tarakan 2 7

Continue destruction of enemy sources of war materials,

lines of communications and troop concentrations.

Provide air protection for convoys into and out of

Morotai as requested.

* Provide tactical reconnaissance and aerial photography as

requested.

* Conduct long-range attacks against selected targets in

NE1 . * Provide Air Support Sections and Air Support Parties.

Prior to 1 May, assist in destruction of hostile ground

forces on Tarakan Island, oil storage and other enemy

installations that posed a threat to Allied amphibious

operations.

* On l May, establish Advanced Headquarters 1st TAF on

Tarakan.

* On 7 May, establish one fighter wing (wing headquarters,

three squadrons of Kittyhawks, one squadron of Spitfires

and one AOP flight of Austers).

* On 16 May, establish one attack wing (wing headquarters,

three squadrons of Beaufighters and a detachment of

Catalinas for ASR).

* On 21 May, establish staging facilities for two squadrons

of P.38~ (13th Air Force). (note - these were originally

to be Kittyhawks, Beaufighters and Mosquitoes).

* Take over responsibility for fighter protection (day and

night) of the Objective Area (OA) and maintain air

defence of Morotai (also day and night). Provide Close

2 8 Oboe

Air Support (CAIRS) to No 26 Infantry Brigade Group on

request.

* Begin preparation to support Oboe Six.

* Provide safe-hand air courier services as necessary.

* Provide courier service (daily) from Manila to Tarakan

and return.

* Support 31st American Division on Morotai as requested.

Responsibility of 13th Air Force was to:

- Continue long-range bombing attacks against Japanese

airfields and installations within staging range of

Tarakan.

- Prosecute diversionary attacks against Tawao.

- Conduct aerial photography to support RAAF Command.

- Attack Lingkas and Pamoesian tank areas, heavy gun

positions and barracks.

- Provide convoy protection.

- Provide Combat Air Patrol (CAP), night fighters, and

strike forces as required by RAAF Command.

AOC North Western Area (NWA) similarly was to continue

destruction of Japanese targets, but also to establish an air

blockade over Arafura, Timor and Banda Seas and Flores Sea

(between Timor and Sulawesi), and to conduct aerial minelaying

operations.

Tarakan 29

AOC 1st TAF and AOC NWA jointly were to assure air defence of

forward bases, and provide ASR, air transportation and medical

evacuation.

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AIR OPERATIONS

Advanced Headquarters, which was still part of Headquarters

RAW Command (located in Brisbane), was established at

Morotai, adjacent to Headquarters 1st Australian Corps. RAAF

Command (under AVM Bostock) was on the same relative command

level as 1st Australian Corps (under General Morshead) and 1st

TAF (under Air Commodore Cobby) was on the same relative level

as 9th Australian Division (under General Wootten). As

mentioned earlier, Air Commodore Cobby appointed Group Captain

Arthur who was Commanding Officer No 78 Wing, to be Task Force

Commander, Tarakan.

AOC-in-C IUlAF Command was responsible for the higher direction

of the air forces involved. AOC 1st TAF was responsible for

the immediate direction of operations. Operational control of

13th Air Force aircraft in the area appears to have been

retained by 13th AF, USAAF, although General Kenney's order of

5 September 1942 clearly allocates operational control to AVM Bostock over all units assigned or attached.='

To complicate W command issues, just as Air Commodore Cobby

joined the Command Ship USS Rocky Mount, the Brunei Bay

operation (Oboe Six) was brought forward to precede the

Balikpapan operation (Oboe Two) and 1st TAF was given the

responsibility for Oboe Six. As well, Cobby learned that AVM

Bostock wanted to replace him (Cobby) and two of his most

senior officers.

l' See John Robertson and John McCarthy, Australian War Strategy 1939-1945, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia Queensland, 1985, p.340. Several 13th AF tasking documents imply that 13th AF aircraft were to remain under operational control of Americans at all times.

3 0 Oboe

Immediately after Air Commodore Cobby established his

headquarters ashore on Tarakan Island on 5 May, he left for

Morotai and was replaced by Air Commodore Scherger who arrived

on 10 May. Additionally, Cobby's Senior Air Staff Officer

(Group Captain Gibson) and Senior Administrative Officer

(Group Captain Simms) were replaced respectively by Group

Captains Murdoch and ~uncan."

CONDUCT OF AIR OPERATIONS

The air plan was divided into three phases. Prior to 2 6

April, enemy airfields that could be used for staging

operations were attacked, enemy sea lanes blockaded, and

targets of military importance in the O~~qestroyed. From 26

April to 1 May, air operations were intensified against

targets of military importance in the OA, in support of land

operations (pre-assault phase) and in protection of the

convoys and surface vessels. From 1 May, direct air support

operations, convoy protection, fighter defence of the OA, and

air observation were all carried out.

Phase One (Prior to 26 April)

Enemy-held airfields in Borneo, Celebes (now Sulawesi) and

Java were attacked from the 11th to the 25th April. These

successful attacks led to the absence of enemy land-based

aircraft in the OA just prior to and during the amphibious

Is The replacements occurred due to the 'Morotai Mutiny' of 19 April 1945 when eight senior RAAF fighter pilots submitted identically-worded letters of resignation. This was discussed briefly in Chapter 1. Dr Alan Stephens refers to this 'Mutiny' as 'another consequence of poor leadership' in Alan Stephens, Power Plus Attitude, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1992, p.71.

19 Contemporary terminology refers to an Area of Operations or AO. However, in 1945, it was referred to as an Objective Area (OA), which will be used henceforth.

Tarakan 3 1

assault. The air superiority achieved by allied air forces

meant that the common practice of suffering heavy casualties

during amphibious assaults could be avoided.

These attacks were prosecuted by the 13th AF operating from

Samar and Morotai and RAAF Nos 21 and 24 Squadrons operating

Liberators from Morotai (where they had re-located on 8-10

April). In addition, targets in the Tarakan area were

attacked heavily by medium bombers (B.24 Liberators and B.25

Mitchells) and fighters (P.38 Lightnings) of the 13th AF prior

to 26 April. Bulk storage oil tanks at Lingkas and Pamoesian

(the principal oilfield)" were destroyed and attacks were

launched against barracks, warehouses, supply and personnel

areas, radio and radar stations and gun positions.

Additionally, Liberators from No 23 Squadron (Darwin, Northern

Territory) and No 25 Squadron (Cunderdin, Western Australia)

bombed targets in Java and NEI, including airfields at Malang,

Den Pasar, Bingkalepa, Kendari and Ambesia. Others flew

shipping searches and blockade missions over Macassar Strait,

and Celebes, Arafura, Timor, Banda and Flores Seas.

As Len Gairns, a B.24 pilot with No 25 Squadron, recalled (in

1993) of his attack mission - 'Our orders were to stay over

the target at night for four hours. It was a nuisance raid to

keep the whole of Java quiet or noisy, whichever way you look

at it. We had 30 X 100 pound bombs and we would fly over

three separate cities . . . . . . . drop one bomb and clear off and go and do the other two cities, and then keep repeating the

job. Each of these places was very heavily defended ...... We did that for three nights running'.21

20 Tarakan oil was obtained from two major fields at Pamoesian and Djoeata, and from two minor fields at Sesanip and Tjangkol.

See Group Captain Gary Waters, 'The Tarakan Operation - Air Power Lessons', in The RAAF in the SWPA 1942-1945: RAAF History Conference 1993, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1993, p.137.

3 2 oboe

Bombing was to avoid excess damage to the following:

* docks, bridges, waterworks, navigation aids;

* lighthouses ;

* the provincial capital;

* Lingkas beach area;

* Pamoesian-Lingkas road and oil pipeline;

* Tarakan airstrip and road to Lingkas;

* Karoengen sawmill and jetties;

* Lingkas powerhouse;

* Pamoesian River barge landing stage;

* all oilfields (except tanks at Lingkas and Pamoesian);

and

* all hospitals.

On 12 April, 13th AF Lightnings attacked a gun position at

Tarakan. On 13 and 15 April, six B.24~ of Nos 21 and 24

Squadrons attacked a personnel area in Tawao (during the

first attack, 67% of bombs fell in the target area; during the

second attack, 75% fell in the target area). On 16 April,

nine B.24~ from Nos 21 and 24 Squadrons bombed Tarakan, with

the primary target being the Pamoesian tank farm (three tanks

were damaged or destroyed)." The secondary target was the

Lingkas tank farm (two tanks were destroyed and two were

damaged).

2 2 This was the first attack by Liberators against Tarakan.

Tarakan 3 3

On the next day (17 April), six B.24~ attacked the barracks

area of Tarakan. Similar attacks occurred on 19 April, this

time conducted by nine B.24~ from Nos 21 and 24 Squadrons.

Also on 19 April, nine B.24~ hit the dump area of Tawao.

On 20 April, Manggar airfield at Balikpapan was bombed, and on

the 21st, the Sepinggan storage area at Balikpapan was bombed.

Also, on 20 April six Beaufighters of No 31 Squadron conducted

strafing runs along the waterfront, protecting US B.25

Mitchells that were conducting low-level photography. Anti-

Aircraft (AA) positions were strafed until the guns stopped

firing. One oil tank and a warehouse were hit. AA fire was

meagre, light to heavy and ina~curate.'~

Phase Two (26 April to 1 May)

Attacks were continued against AA positions, supply dumps,

barracks and other military buildings, warehouses, coastal

defence gun positions, and other oil storage installations.

Smokescreens were laid to cover engineers engaged in breaching

the remaining obstacles on the beach. In addition to the

obstacles mentioned earlier, there was also a 25 feet-wide

anti-tank ditch which prevented ready access from the beach to

the coastal road. Aircraft arrived 30 minutes late to conduct

the three scheduled smoke-laying runs. TWO runs were

eventually conducted, which provided good cover to the

engineers, but the third was made to the seaward side,

resulting in the engineers being silhouetted until the smoke

drifted in-shore.

Continual strafing and bombing of enemy positions on the beach

forced the Japanese to withdraw inland from Lingkas, leaving

their strongly-built pillboxes which were sited in an

2 3 These details have been compiled from a number of papers contained in the Oboe One Box File held by RAAF Historical Section, Canberra.

3 4 Oboe

embankment and which provided good fortifications from which

to defend the beach.

The assault convoy sailed from Morotai on 27 April, with the

1st TAF (RAAF) providing fighter cover until dusk. The convoy

comprised 69 vessels.24 Despite the Operations Instruction

which requested cover be provided through the dusk period as

well, the fighter cover was not forthcoming on that first

evening. Neither was the dawn cover for 28 April provided,

although it too had been ordered. Throughout the day, cover

was provided but the timing of relief flights was poor and one

relief experienced difficulty in locating the convoy.

Provision of fighter cover improved subsequently.

Not all pilots appeared to be aware that they could be

vectored to the convoy by the Fighter Director Ship (also

detailed in the Operations Instruction). Moreover, RAAF

pilots appeared to have been inadequately briefed as to

communications procedures and IFF codesz5 to be used.26

The RAAF provided cover from Morotai to a position at

longitude 125 degrees East (about 400 km). From the 123rd

Meridian to Tarakan (about 600 km), the 13th AF provided

fighter cover (including at dawn and dusk). This cover was

reported as satisfactory in all respects. Reference point for

fighter direction was Lingkas Southern Pier (latitude 3

degrees 17 minutes north, longitude 117 degrees 35 minutes

east) and was referred to as 'John'. Radar contacts were to

'' George Odgers, Air War A g a i n s t Japan 1943-1945, p.456.

25 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) codes allow an aircraft or ship to interrogate another aircraft or ship for a responding 'friendly' code.

2 6 Lack of punctuality of RAAF fighters, use of incorrect IFF codes, and problems with dawn and dusk cover should not have occurred as the details were specifically set out in RAAF Command Operations Instruction No 78/1945. Perhaps the fact that the information was contained as far from the front of the Instruction as Appendix H may have had some bearing.

Tarakan' 35

be reported by bearing and distance in nautical miles from

'John'. Aircraft within 75 miles (120 kilometres) of the OA

were reported to Commander Support Aircraft.

In the main, anti-submarine patrols were provided as

requested, with one minor lapse on the first day, which was

caused by 'a misunderstanding of requirement^'.^'

Shore defences, supply and personnel areas were attacked on

28th and 29th by 29 Mitchells and 11 Lightning~.~'

The Toli Toli seaplane base was hit by two Beaufighters on 26

and 27 April. A re-visit on 1 May resulted in no sightings

and the alternate at Lalos was hit.

US P.38s, B.25~ and B.24~ attacked airfields and aerodromes on

26, 28 and 29 April at Kuching, Miri, Tarakan, Gorontalo

(secondary target), Samarinda, Balikpapan, Labuan, and Kudat."

Phase Three (From 1 May Onwards)

Air strikes by the 13th AF along the landing beaches on 1 May

were not conducted as planned. Adverse weather prevented the

aircraft from arriving on time and even with an extension

granted from the Attack Force Commander, not all aircraft

could be brought over the target in time. However, those that

did bomb, provided excellent coverage.

Direct support aircraft arrived on station every two hours

from 1 May, but on that first day, due to communications

2' RAAF Command AAF, SWPA, Report of OBOE One Operations, May 1945, p.6.

28 George Odgers, Air War Against Japan 1943-1945, p.456.

29 This material was compiled from papers contained in the Oboe One Box File held by RAAF Historical Section, Canberra.

36 Oboe

failures with the Commander Support Aircraft (CSA)," not all

aircraft were used. For the first three days (from the

morning of 1 May to the night of 3 May), 17 missions (43

sorties) were flown in direct support of ground forces. Bombs

dropped included 250-lb and 500-lb General Purpose bombs and

clusters of 20-lb fragmentation bombs. P.38 Lightnings, B.24

Liberators and B.25 Mitchells successfully provided direct

support.

On 1 May, medium and heavy bomber aircraft attacked the beach

area and gun positions for 45 minutes before H-Hour. The

Japanese had already been forced to withdraw inland from

Lingkas, and this, coupled with the bombing of the foreshore,

allowed the assault battalions to land unscathed.

From 7 May, 1st TAF was to provide CAIRS to its 'maximum

ability'. Once 1st TAF relieved 13th AF of all CAIRS

commitments, CSA ashore passed to the RAAF.

On 29 May, two Beaufighters fired on and hit two enemy

aircraft in the air, but the aircraft escaped. This was the

first time Beaufighters had encountered airborne enemy

aircraft in 18 months.31

In areas with heavy concentrations of enemy forces, heavy

artillery, Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) and napalm-bomb air

strikes were used to allow the Pioneer Battalions to advance.

The bombing was accurate but there was little evidence of any

Japanese killed; however, they were forced to abandon their

positions. Sixteen days after the landing, Australian forces

reached the east coast, NE1 troops occupied the southern

'"he Commander Support Aircraft, whether afloat (in the Command ship USS Rocky Mount) or ashore had operational control of all aircraft in the Objective Area, and was in direct communications with all aircraft tasked with providing direct support.

George Odgers, A i r War Against Japan 1943-1945, p.460.

Tarakan 3 7

peninsula and two-thirds of the island was in allied hands,

including the Pamoesian and Djoeata oilfields.

By 15 June all organised resistance had ended.32 In clearing

remaining enemy strongholds, dropping of 'inflammable belly

tanks' proved effective. Mopping up operations continued

until 27 June when a native ceremony was held in the Pamoesian

oilfields celebrating the rout of the Japanese. A cow was

slaughtered and its head buried near the restored pumphouse.

This local custom meant that the evil spirits were buried and

bad accidents would not occur on the field. On 29 June, an

Auster reconnaissance aircraft landed on the airstrip and on

the 30th, 20 Kittyhawks arrived.

There are conflicting reports about the effectiveness of

napalm, which appears explicable. Inspections of enemy

positions on Tarakan indicated that the bombing was well-

directed but did not achieve any direct hits on enemy

positions. The burnt area from each napalm bomb covered

approximately 30 by 40 metres, but was only superficial in

that while undergrowth leaves were burned, branches of trees

were only charred and leaves on the trees were only withered.

Despite this, the general feeling among AIF personnel was that

the Japanese soldiers withdrew whenever subjected to napalm

bombing.

Use of Napalm

After-action reports (dated 4 July 1945) indicate that P.38~

flew at 200-300 feet, at high speed, which prevented highly-

accurate attacks with napalm. The belly tank of napalm

adopted an erratic path on release, thus compounding the

problem of accuracy. Furthermore, many targets were on ridges

and were obscured by hills and other ridges; hence, aircraft

" ibid, p.461.

3 8 Oboe

had to make their attacking run along the ridge line to have

any likelihood of hitting their targets. There were also

cases of tanks not releasing immediately ('hanging-up').

The containers of napalm needed to be streamlined and have a

tail welded on. The problem was not only technical though, as

pilots tended to bomb the mortar smoke itself (which had

drifted) rather than the source of the smoke. This smoke was

used as a target indicator.

The interesting point here is that the RAAF continued to use

belly tanks, even though the Americans had passed on details

of modifications that they had developed to improve accuracy."

A 55-gallon drum, with a tail fin from a 1000-lb General

Purpose bomb spot-welded to its base had been used by the

Americans. Different igniters had been developed for land and

sea targets - a white phosphorous igniter for targets on land, and a sodium igniter for targets on water. Both igniters

could be carried in the case of targets situated in wharf and

dock areas.

These drums (with tail fins) could be loaded empty on to the

aircraft and then filled with the napalm mixture. The effect

of temperature variations could be accommodated by using only

50 gallons of mixture in each 55-gallon tank.

Reconnaissance

Australian Army Air Liaison Officers (ALO) specially trained

in air observer duties provided valuable reconnaissance on the

1st and 2nd of May, flying in B.24 Liberators of the 1st TAF.

This reconnaissance provided information on the changing

situation on the ground and assisted air co-ordinators in

33 See memo TR18 of 25 April 1945, from Operational Research Section of 1st TAF, held in Oboe One Box File, RAAF Historical Section.

Tarakan 3 9

finding and recognising targets against which attacks had been

ordered.

Direct communications between these ALOs and the Air Support

Parties (ASP)34 would have been useful, especially in terms of

ASPS displaying ground panels to mark positions of friendly

ground forces.

On 3 May, the support air observation aircraft failed to

appear as the RAAF aircraft had expended the total operational

hours allocated. This inflexibility of planning ran counter

to the claims of the RRAF about the flexibility of air power.

The problem was rectified quickly and support air observation

missions were resumed without further difficulties.

Air Observation Post Operations

Four Auster aircraft were to provide, at an early stage of the

assault, local reconnaissance, air observation, short-range

communications flights and medical evacuation. The landing at

Lingkas was the first one in which an RAAF flying unit

accompanied the troops ashore. Flight Lieutenant R.H. Drabsch

was the Officer Commanding No 16 AOP flight of 83 Wing. He

reported that the Austers were landed from LSTs and readied

for flight within 1 1/2 hours (under constant sniper fire).

Despite this alacrity, the aircraft could not be used until a

temporary strip was prepared. The first aircraft that tried

to use the strip crashed, and before the strip could be

finished, Tarakan airfield was captured by the allies. The

remaining three aircraft were disassembled and carried to

'' An Air Support Party (comprising one officer and 11 other ranks) was allotted to each battalion headquarters. There was also one Air Support Section (comprising one officer and 24 other ranks) which was allotted to the Brigade headquarters, which was meant to be CO-located with Advanced TAP (RAAF) Headquarters.

4 0 Oboe

Tarakan airfield.

Courier Services

RnAF Catalinas provided daily courier services between Morotai

and Tarakan (about 1100 h) and Manila and Tarakan (about 1300

km). Courier services operated to the complete satisfaction

of all users except on 1 May when the pilot of the Morotai-

Tarakan courier reported to the wrong person over the radio.

He reported to the Fighter Director instead of CSA afloat;

this would appear to be another indication of lack of

knowledge of the contents of the Operations Instruction No

78/1945.

Combat Air Patrol

The 13th AF provided CAP over Tarakan. Four fighters were

maintained on-station during the day and two provided cover

during dawn and dusk. RAAF aircraft were to take over CAP

duties on 7 May, but because of the unserviceability of the

Tarakan strip, 13th AI? continued to provide CAP until 15 May.

When the RAAF assumed CAP responsibility from this date, they

operated Kittyhawks of No 76 Squadron and Beaufighters of No

77 Wing from Tawi Tawi, in the Sulu archipelago. Tawi Tawi

was about 300 kilometres from Tarakan.

The procedure was for No 76 Squadron (of No 78 Wing) to cover

Tarakan in the morning and for No 77 Wing to do likewise in

the afternoon. No 76 Squadron also attacked Sandakan and

Kudat, in co-operation with 13th Air Force aircraft.

" 5 Historical records contain a brief report by Flight Lieutenant Drabsch on AOP operations.

Tarakan 41

DDT Spraying

The 13th AF was tasked with the DDT spraying of 2,600 acres as

an anti-malarial measure. The concentration of DDT was 1/2 lb

per acre, in the form of 5% solution in oil solvent with a

0.014% concentration of Pyrethrum added. The 13th AF carried

out DDT spraying on the lst, 3rd and 6th May.

AIR SUPPORT ORGANISATION

The Commander Support Aircraft (CSA) onboard the USS Rocky

Mount had operational control of all aircraft in the OA. He

was in direct communications (over the Support Air Direction

net) with all aircraft tasked with providing direct support.

Aircraft that were airborne over the OA were allotted to

targets by the CSA, based on requests from the Brigade

Commander. Once RAAF Air Support Parties/Section were

established ashore, operational control passed from CSA afloat

to CSA ashore.

An RAAF officer was appointed as the airborne co-ordinator,

and was airborne over the OA as required. Communications with

CSA and aircraft on station to provide air support were over

the Support Air Direction net. The airborne co-ordinator

recommended targets to CSA and co-ordinated strike details

with the aircraft on station (either by radio or by leading

the strike aircraft to the targets and indicating which were

to be attacked).

One Army Air Liaison Officer (ALO), trained as an Airborne

Observer, was airborne over the OA during daylight hours to

provide detailed information of the ground situation to the

CSA. The Airborne Observer communicated with CSA over the

Support Air Observer net.

4 2 Oboe

To provide the communications for forwarding of air support

requests, one RAAE Air Support Section (comprising one officer

and 24 other ranks) was allotted to the Brigade/Advanced TAF,

(RAAE) Headquarters; and one RAAE Air Support Party (one

officer and 11 other ranks) was attached to each battalion

headquarters. Each Party and the Section was in direct

communications with the CSA (over the Support Air Request

net) . Air support requests could originate from forward unit

commanders, Brigade Headquarters, the Airborne Co-ordinator,

or the Airborne Observer. Battalion Headquarters' requests

were lodged with their respective RAAF Air Support Party (ASP)

and Brigade Headquarters' requests were lodged with the RAAF

Air Support Section (ASS).

Air support requests followed the format:

- Map reference.

- Target description (eg troops, machine guns, supplies

etc) .

- Time over target (eg NOT before ..... hours, NOT after ..... hours, or time immaterial). This information was

vital for co-ordinated air and ground attacks.

- Position of forward troops, to avoid fratricide.

- Special instructions such as:

* target indication (smoke marker or reference to

special feature such as '200 yards south of road

junction');

* whether air attack was to be co-ordinated with

ground attack; and

Tarakan 4 3

* alternative target.

- Target bombline, in which natural features were used,

rather than a grid line.

All direct support was controlled from the Command ship USS

Rocky Mount and the CSA (Afloat) until 3 May, when control

passed to the CSA (Ashore)." The ASPs landed with the assault

battalions but were unable to establish communications for

more than two hours, and even then communications were not

satisfactory as Army No 108 lightweight portable HF R/T sets

had to be used until the ASPs' heavier equipment could be off-

loaded. Good communications were not forthcoming until the

morning of the following day, once that heavy equipment was

ashore and became operable.

Tactical loading of ships at Morotai had been poor in that

personnel and their equipment were separated during loading.

The problem was compounded at Tarakan as unloading priorities

were insufficient to ensure that the equipment could be

provided when needed, and LSTs with some of the equipment on-

board became stuck in the mud at a distance from shore. As

well, the anti-tank ditch on the foreshore caused further

delays.

The poor tactical loading could be attributable to the late

arrival of the ASS, ASPs and No 114 Mobile Fighter Control

Unit (MFCU) at Morotai which necessitated unloading and

loading equipment without sorting it, or indeed even knowing

if it were all re-loaded for Tarakan.

Advanced Headquarters 1st TAF and Brigade Headquarters were

not located together once ashore and the ASS had to function

inside the Brigade Headquarters as an ASP. The decision had

been made that one ASS could cover both the Advanced

The CSA was provided by 13th AF, with a CSA observer provided by the RAAF.

44 Oboe

Headquarters 1st TAF (RAAF) and Headquarters 26th Australian

Infantry Brigade because both headquarters would be physically

adjacent. Delays were experienced in receiving all equipment

in similar fashion to the three ASPS allocated to the

Battalion Headquarters.

To make matters worse, long-range communications equipment of

the 1st TAF's Mobile Telecommunications Unit (MTU) was not

unloaded from the Headquarters ship before it departed Tarakan

on 3 May, and interim communications had to be provided by No

114 MFCU. Long-range communications were needed to link

Tarakan to Palawan, Zamboanga, Leyte and ~0rotai.j'

ASPS were to provide regular reports on friendly ground force

positions so that CSA could maintain a bombline. As well as a

target bombline for direct air support aircraft, a bombline

was determined over which friendly troops could not cross.

ASPS were kept informed by Battalion Headquarters of changes

in position of forward troops. Brigade Headquarters, in

conjunction with ASS, determined and advised the bombline.

Because too little information was received, CSA found it

necessary to insist on maximum information on friendly forces

being provided at the time of each request for direct air

support.

An observation recorded by Flight Lieutenant R. MC. Stewart,18

Officer Commanding No 2 ASP, was that lack of effective

opposition meant a fast rate of advance, and not all alert

aircraft could be used. However, all support requested was

provided on time. Aircraft attacked alternative targets and

some were handed to another sector (presumably a different

'' 13th AF Fighter Command was at Palawan, Commander Maritime Air Group was at Zamboanga, Headquarters 13th AF was at Leyte, and Headquarters 1st TAF was at Morotai.

From a note by Flight Lieutenant MC. Stewart, contained in the Oboe One Box File held by RAAF Historical Section, Canberra.

Tarakan 4 5

ASP).

Compounding the problem, the Brigade Commander left the

headquarters ship on 1 May and ordered that only targets which

were located well in advance of his troops could be attacked

unless he gave specific approval. CSA was, therefore, unable

to order strikes until satisfactory communications were

established with Brigade Headquarters ashore.

Once the ASPs and the ASS obtained their own equipment,

requests for direct air support were passed without

difficulty, although reception was degraded during afternoons.

Procedurally, the ASPs did not appear to realise the need to

listen to the Support Air Observer net at all times and thus

the Battalion Commanders were not always provided with the

best information available. A considerable amount of direct

air support was prevented from being used during the first two

days due to indifferent communications, both for procedural

planning and equipment shortfall reasons.

An observation to arise from Tarakan in terms of close air

support was that withdrawal of friendly troops to permit

bombing of enemy positions created problems in that a

withdrawal of say 900 metres meant that the time taken to re-

occupy previously-held positions after bombing ceased was

approximately one hour, in which time Japanese forces could

reinforce their own positions.

Another issue was that fire support from ground elements was

most effective within ranges of 90 metres. If these elements

had to withdraw just 180 metres, they were no longer able to

influence enemy positions once bombing ceased. Thus, for both

reasons, if medium or high-level bombing was not intense

enough to saturate and destroy the target area, there was

little point in having friendly troops withdraw, only to find

they needed to fight to regain positions previously held.

There were even calls to adopt a policy of 'lesser withdrawal'

4 6 Oboe

and accept the additional risk of fratricide.

The effect of High Explosive (HE) and napalm bombing (which

was minimal) led to a recommendation for development of a

retarded, delay-fused napalm-type incendiary, fitted with a

bursting charge. Recommendations were also made for supply

dropping to be effected in future from Catalina or transport

aircraft, and for long parachute cords to be fitted such that

stores would still reach the ground even if the parachutes

became entangled in trees.

Maps and Map References

Most maps used were suitable; however the map of Tarakan

Island (scale 1:25,000) had grid squares sub-divided into 25

sub-squares, each marked with the appropriate letter for that

square. The amount of printing obscured some of the map's

detail. Subsequently, different colours were used and only

occasional grid squares were sub-divided and lettered.

ASPS passed map references in the form of six figure co-

ordinates to the Headquarters ship. On board the ship, the

co-ordinates had to be converted to four figures and one

letter to conform to the standard system used with support

aircraft.

Equipment

Some of the ASS and ASP equipment was not sufficiently mobile

which necessitated occasional use of landlines to link the ASP

to its Battalion Headquarters. Battery charging posed

problems as well. The chargers were too noisy to be used at

night (for fear of disclosing positions, and they interfered

with night patrols) and had insufficient output to fully

charge batteries during the day to compensate for power used

Tarakan 4 7

on the many transmitters and receivers. Furthermore, the

chargers themselves were difficult to maintain.

Re-organisation Of Air Support

As a result of problems experienced during the Tarakan

operation, the RAAF subsequently reorganised the provision of

air support. ASPS were more suitable for attachment to

Brigade Headquarters rather than to Battalion Headquarters and

a smaller organisation which would be capable of operating and

moving without vehicles was needed at the Battalion level.

The fluidity of battle during the early stages of an assault,

with the probability of frequent enemy contacts, meant that

reliable and effective ASS/ASP communications were essential.

The new organisational structure was as follow^:'^

* Air Support Section (as a component of the Air Formation

Headquarters tasked with providing air support), to be

located at the Air Formation Headquarters, which itself

would be located close to the Headquarters of ,an Army

Division. The ASS would contain 30 signals personnel

plus several officers.

* Two Air Support Parties to be allocated on the basis of

one ASP at each of the two Brigade Headquarters. The ASP

would contain 17 signals personnel plus one officer.

* Four Air Liaison Parties (ALP) to be allocated on the

basis of one ALP at each of four Battalion Headquarters.

The ALP would consist of three signals personnel.

This structure was based on a standard tactical deployment of

an Australian Infantry Division. The new ALPS had to be self-

'' This structure was first promulgated in RAAF File No 311.2373 dated 16 May 1945, a copy of which is held by RAAF Historical Section, Canberra.

4 8 Oboe

contained and capable of operating for seven days without

resupply, except in cases of complete breakdown or loss of two

personnel.

FIAAF FIGHTER CONTROL ORGANISATION

1st TAF (RAAF) had the responsibility of establishing early

warning facilities in the OA. This involved two radar

stations and a headquarters section of MFCU (to provide the

link between the radar stations and the Fighter Director Ship)

being established and operational 14 hours after the landing.

Subsequently, two additional stations were to be established

at Sadau Island and Cape Pasir by 6 May. In addition, the

communications network was to be expanded considerably to

provide seven High Frequency (HF) and four Very High Frequency

(VHF) channels.

As with ASS and ASP equipment, poor tactical loading of No 114

MFCU40 and unloading priorities meant that non-essential

equipment was unloaded well in advance of the radar stations.

Moreover, the Ground Control Intercept (GCI)" station

equipment had been loaded on two different vessels and

erection of the radar had to be delayed by one day. Technical

faults compounded the problem with the GC1 radar and it was

not functional until 6 May.

The air warning station (the second radar)" was not unloaded

until late on 2 May and erection could not begin until dawn

4 0 The term Mobile Control and Reporting Unit (MCRU) is now used in the RAAF; although in 1945 the unit was referred to as a Mobile Fighter Control Unit (MFCU).

41 GC1 stations were used to control fighters. The effective area of control may be represented by a circle of 50 miles radius (80 kilometres), surrounding the station.

'2 Air warning stations were used to give early warning of approaching aircraft out to 50-150 miles (80-240 kilometres).

Tarakan 4 9

the following day. Furthermore, vehicles with radar equipment

appeared to be mis-directed and considerable effort was wasted

in tracing the vehicles and the much-needed equipment.

Some 56 personnel of the MFCU were required ashore to erect

and operate the radar equipment but were held on-board the

'Titania' to form a working party. Meanwhile, surplus

personnel were ashore, causing congestion.

Approximately half the equipment for the two air warning

radars to be erected on Sadau Island and Cape Pasir was

unloaded on 4 May. The sets were meant to be operational by

the 6th but all attempts to trace the remaining equipment

proved unsuccessful.

Siting of the MFCU beside the GC1 station would have provided

the best effect, but difficulty was experienced in doing so

because of siting priorities made by Army authorities. The

need to establish a GC1 site on the beach-head within four

hours of landing was later questioned. It was argued that it

would be far better to maintain direction/control from the

Headquarters ship for an additional two to three days, thereby

allowing the GC1 station to be set up at the best available

site - to achieve more reliable results for the remainder of the operation.

No 1 Australian Air Formation Signals Unit lay landline

communications from the MFCU to Headquarters 1st TAF well

before the radar stations were established. At least, in this

respect, planning and execution came together.

There was an obvious need for training of RAAF officers in

beach movement, of Army personnel in matching unloading

priorities for ASS/ASP to respective headquarters, and in

rehearsal for setting up GC1 and air warning stations.

Additionally, the use of common codes and cyphers was shown to

be necessary. During the first few days of the assault, the

50 Oboe

13th AF and the ASS at Tarakan experienced difficulty in

communicating due to the use of different codes and cyphers.

ADMINISTRATION

Embarkation and disembarkation created problems for most

units. As an illustration, the example of Headquarters No 30

Squadron is cited. The Headquarters, as part of No 77 Wing,

was ordered to report for embarkation at 0830 hours on 4 May.

Embarkation did not begin until 1530, and the nine officers

and 99 other ranks were split over two ships - the Manoora and

the Westralia. The convoy left Morotai at 0630 on 5 May, and

No 30 Squadron Headquarters disembarked at Tarakan at 0930 on

the 7th. The personnel did not have an allocated camp site

and had to live with No 78 Squadron personnel, using verandahs

and rooms of a damaged house, and borrowed tents for

accommodation. Even after a camp site was allocated, they

still had to wait until 16 May, when appropriate tools,

equipment and mechanical transport arrived. By 18 May, they

were finally established at their own camp site.')

The traffic congestion at Tarakan also proved to be a problem

and was compounded by the unloading of personnel and equipment

before areas had been cleared of the enemy. Thus, too many

people were held in a small area that required ease of access

to facilitate subsequent unloading and dispersal. An RAAF

Police squadron leader advised that from the time of the

landing on 1 May until 2100 hours the following day, 1500

vehicles had passed along the road (which was less than two

kilometres long). Thus, vehicles had to be parked along a

piece of highway which was essential for the movement of

supplies to the front and to evacuate casualties. In fact, a

4 3 See 24/5/Air (47A) of 29 May 1945, held as folio 147 of Oboe One Box File, RAAF Historical Section.

Tarakan 5 1

line of vehicles was just behind the advancing troops.44

Planning staff at Headquarters 1st TAF remained in close

contact with the Air and Administrative planning staffs of

Advanced Headquarters (W). RAAF re-supply to the Tarakan

area was handled through a RAAF staff officer attached to

Advanced Land Forces Headquarters.

I?ost action reports indicated the following weaknesses in

i~dministrative arrangements:

* Initial ship loading in Australia was poor (compounded by

loading around the Easter period and inadequate military

control over loading).

* Logistics supplied by units were inadequate for

requirements.

* Orders and instructions were not produced and circulated

in time to be seen by all personnel.

* Some responsible officers did not appear to read orders

and instructions that were circulated in time and hence

implementation of procedures was found wanting.

* Rehearsal for loading procedures (and unloading and

subsequent erection of equipment and facilities) was not

conducted.

* Units carried too much surplus equipment and vehicles

were often over-loaded or poorly loaded.

* Unit personnel and equipment were separated in different

vessels.

'bee 2/17/1B of 11 May 1945, held as folio 135, Oboe One Box File, RAAF Historical Section.

52 Oboe

* Not all commanding officers travelled with their units.

The various problems experienced at Tarakan led Group Captain

Murdoch to argue that:'5

* personnel and equipment must travel together on one ship.

* Manifests must be maintained to prevent loss and mis-

direction.

* Units should not be unloaded until required.

* A traffic circuit must be established to clear the

landing area rapidly, and suitable parking areas must be

set up.

* Unloading must occur in a pre-planned order.

* Personnel should be briefed thoroughly and given maps of

the landing and camp site areas to obviate the need for

each person to reconnoitre his camp site, which added

significantly to traffic congestion at Tarakan.

Comunications

Despite several planning conferences on the use of radio

signals and radar, and promulgation of clear instructions for

the use of radios, RAAF aircraft tasked with providing air

cover over the assault convoy still used incorrect frequencies

and call signs when communicating with the convoy. AS

mentioned earlier, the wrong IFF code was used on at least one

occasion and the first courier aircraft used the wrong

frequency and call sign (and hence reported to the wrong

person).

" See 1/2/9 of 29 May 1945, held as folio 123 in Oboe One Box File, RAAF Historical Section.

Tarakan 5 3

Logistics

Logistics received a 3 1/2 page Appendix (Appendix F) to the Headquarters RAAF Command Operations Instruction No 78/1945.

Despite specific detail such as 15 days initial supply of

,aviation POL (petrol, oils and lubricants), 25 days of motor

transport POL, and 30 days supply of rations, instructions

were very general.

For example, in conjunction with BAAF Headquarters, 1st TAF

units were asked to provide adequate initial supply of bombs,

ammunition, pyrotechnics and explosives; RAAF technical and

airborne supplies; and RAAF non-technical, non-airborne and

non-common-usage stores. There was no further level of detail

given.

PREPARATION OF TARAKAN AIRFIELD

Two Airfield Construction Squadrons (ACS) were believed to be

essential to construct the necessary works requirements that

would permit RAAF aircraft to begin operating from Tarakan

airfield from 7 May. However, due to the poor surface, much

of the heavy equipment proved useless and could have been left

at Morotai. Moreover, most of the work required manual

labour, which could be provided by local natives; hence, the

second squadron was not needed.

Another observation that can be made is that ACS personnel

began disembarking on 2 May, although the airfield was not

captured until the 5th. Consequently, personnel and their

heavy equipment compounded the congestion problem mentioned

earlier

4 6 See report by Group Captain Rooney, on file 1/2/9, held as folio 131 of the Oboe One Box File, RAAF Historical Section.

54 Oboe

work on the airfield was delayed because, as just mentioned,

the airfield itself was not captured until the evening of 5

May. It was seriously damaged, waterlogged and mined. A RAAF

bomb disposal unit cleared 114 mines from the airstrip and

dispersal areas during 6 and 7 May." One intelligence report

observed that on Tarakan, 'land mines, booby traps and depth

charges had been used on an unprecedented scale'." As areas

were cleared of mines, Japanese would infiltrate through an

extensive tunnelling system and lay more mines at night.

Continued enemy action and sniper fire affected work on the

airfield during the first few days. Then, heavy rain on 10

May and enemy shelling on 19 and 20 May slowed work on the

airfield even further. The shelling was followed up on 26 and

28 May by Japanese air attacks. Continual harassment on the

ground occurred nightly. As a result, ACS personnel, who had

worked all day, were posted as guards at night. The

experience of Tarakan led to 1st TAF arguing later that

personnel who had reached their limit of physical endurance

during daytime should not be posted as guards at night.

Wet weather, a corresponding high water table, bad soil

conditions, and lack of suitable paving materials conspired

against the hard work of the ACS engineers. By 6 June, the

engineers required only four dry days to have the airfield

serviceable. Yet, from the 6th to 25th June, there were only

two dry days. Finally, the first aircraft (other than an

Auster) landed at Tarakan on 28 June, and operations began two

days later (to support the Balikpapan operation). Even then,

problems continued, in that the strip was not suitable for

Beaufighter operations and they had to be withdrawn to

Morotai. Kittyhawks continued to operate.

" George Odgers, A i r War A g a i n s t Japan 1943-1945, Australian War Memorial, 1957, p.458.

4 8 RAAF Command Intelligence Summary No 20 of June 16 1945, p.23; held as PRO, Air 40/1761.

Tarakan 55

In relation to the delays experienced in readying the airfield

at Tarakan, Air Chief Marshal Sir Neville McNamara observed:

'It was terribly frustrating as you can well imagine. I was

with 75 Squadron, and when we eventually did get away (from

Morotai) we went in two waves of 12'." As the aircraft

approached a weather front, the formation became separated.

ACM McNamara was the first of this flight to land at Tarakan.

One aircraft ran out of fuel and ditched in the ocean, near a

PT boat (the pilot was rescued), two others ran out of fuel as

they landed at Tarakan (with one sustaining damage), and

another landed with only one engine working (although this was

as a result of a mechanical problem). But, as ACM McNamara

was moved to comment - 'all in all it was a near disa~ter'.'~

On the subject of the usefulness of the strip, ACM McNamara

commented that pilots could only take off to the west and land

into the east. As he said, 'it was one of the few airfields

in the world where one end rose and fell with the tide. There

was in fact a bulldozer buried beneath the strip because it

just sunk to such a depth that they gave up trying to get it

outr . 51

The inability to develop the airfield fully, or on time, and

indeed the shortcomings of intelligence which suggested that

an airfield could be developed, meant that most of the 1st

TAF's combat strength remained at Morotai and contributed

little to the operation. Since the primary reason for

launching Oboe One was to establish an airfield on Tarakan,

the operation would have to be regarded as a failure. The

real tragedy is that as Air Commodore Scherger said:

-

" The 12 Kittyhawks were led by a Beaufighter. See Group Captain Gary Waters, 'The Tarakan Operation - Air Power Lessons', in The RAAF in the SWPA 1942-1945: RliAF History Conference 1993, p.135.

50 ibid.

ibid, p.136.

56 Oboe

'it was quite obvious.......that a satisfactory strip

could never be constructed, nor indeed could a strip be

made, capable of intensive use for even a short period'.52

52 ibid, p.461.

CHAPTER THREE

OBOE SIX - LABUAN/BRUNEI BAY

OVERVIEW

Eight days after Oboe 1 started, the fighting in Europe ended.

For the Australians in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA), the

fighting still had a long way to run after 8 May. Despite the

situation in the SWPA, the Australian War Cabinet began its plans

for de-mobilisation.

It was important that Oboe Six be completed on time as some of

the assault shipping forces and ground force elements had to be

released for Oboe Two - the Balikpapan operation. The Objective

Area (OA) for the Labuan/Brunei Bay operation was to extend

almost 300 kilometres along the north-west coast of Borneo (from

Miri in the south to Jesselton' in the north). The object was to

secure Labuan Island and Brunei Bay to ensure uninterrupted air

and naval operations to help seize Miri-Lutong and Seria.'

The 1,300 square kilometres of sheltered Brunei Bay provided the

best anchorage in the area. Establishment of air and naval

facilities there would complete a chain of mutually-supporting

bases, some 2,500 kilometres long, which would allow allied air

and naval cover to be provided along the coast from Singapore to

Shanghai. As well, Japanese overland Lines of Communication

(LOCs) and escape routes into Indo China and Malaya could be

interdicted. Moreover, Brunei was at the geographical centre of

enemy occupied areas - including Sulawesi, Bali, Java, Sumatra,

Jesselton is now known as Kota Kinabalu. It is 160 kilometres north east of Brunei town and housed the headquarters of the army constabulary and the residence of the Governor of British North Borneo.

Oil producing fields were at Miri and Seria, with a refinery at Lutong. Miri field had been in production since 1910, while Seria was discovered in 1928. Miri-Seria supplied 28% of the East Indies crude oil and 40% of black oil. Lutong refinery ranked fifth amongst the refineries in the east Indies before the war started.

5 8 Oboe

Malaya and Indo China.3

Japanese forces had landed in Brunei Bay and Kuching on 24

December 1941. Japan relied on the oil from Miri and Seria and

rubber from Kuching, Brunei and Jesselton. In 1944, Brunei was

a major Japanese advance naval base, but as the Japanese Southern

Fleet suffered a series of reversals, the base was used more as

a staging port for coastal shipping.

Throughout the area, road infrastructure was poor, but the sea

and rivers provided reasonable means of movement. Also, at low

tide, the beach could be used. Brunei Bay offered the best

harbour along the Brunei north-west coast, with Labuan Island

commanding the northern and southern seaward entrances. The

island measures 22 kilometres (north-south) by 10 kilometres

(east-west). Labuan township and its port of Victoria Harbour

are sited in the south-east corner of the island. Two airfields

(built by the Japanese) were in the south but both had been

damaged by bombing. The largest airfield offered a strip that

was 4,000 metres long. The smaller airfield known as Timbalai,

just five degrees from the equator, was not planned to be used

by the Allies.

Fundamental to overall mission success would be the ability of

the air forces to support the amphibious landings and subsequent

land operations. As Air Vice-Marshal Bostock was to observe

after the operation: 'the conduct of air operations was generally

satisfactory and it was apparent that commanders of wings and

squadrons had benefitted as a result of experience during the

Oboe One ~peration'.~

Air distances in kilometres to Brunei Bay are as follows: Balikpapan - 650, Tarakan - 300, Morotai - 1450, Sanga Sanga - 480, Zamboanga - 730, Manila - 1150, and Miri - 100. Road distances from Miri (in kilometres) were: to Lutong - 15, Seria - 67, and Brunei - 155.

Report of Oboe Six Operation, Morotai, June 1945, signed by AVM Bostock, p.2.

Labuan/Brunei Bay 5 9

Bostock went on to summarise the two worst problems experienced

during Oboe Six, in relation to air operations. On 8 June, B.24

Liberators of 13th AF failed to obtain prior permission to bomb,

which was subsequently referred to as a 'serious breach of

combined operations procedure^'.^ The second problem arose when

No 80 Wing did not provide dusk cover for the convoy because the

commander of the wing decided not to mount the mission despite

clear orders to do so.

On the positive side, the loading at Morotai was far more orderly

than had been the case for Oboe One; although difficulties were

still experienced in the OA - such as difficult beach conditions and excessive numbers of vehicles.

No 110 Mobile Fighter Control Unit (MFCU) , which was at Morotai, was supposed to be attached to No 80 Wing for deployment to

Labuan. However, because of depleted equipment and lack of

personnel, it was unable to be deployed and No 111 MFCU, attached

to No 78 Wing, deployed instead. No 111 MFCU did not arrive in

Morotai until two days before the convoy departed for Labuan.

In his concluding comments in the foreword to the Oboe Six

report, AvM Bostock stated that General MacArthur was delighted

with the results of Oboe Six and had indicated to his senior

commanders that 'the execution of the Brunei Bay operation has

been flawle~s'.~

USN Task Group 78.1 provided the convoy. The 230 vessels sailed

in different echelons (one from Tarakan, one from Leyte, and

several others from Morotai), with the main echelon (consisting

of 76 vessels) departing Morotai on 4 June. The main group

suffered three nights of storms en route to Labuan; their

suffering was made worse because most of the troops were

ibid.

ibid, p.3.

6 0 Oboe

accommodated on open decks.

OBJECTIVE OF OBOE SIX

MacArthur's Operation Instruction issued on 21 April listed the

aims for the task force as being: to establish an advanced fleet base in Brunei Bay, to recover and protect oil and rubber

resources, and to re-establish British Government control. No

1 Australian Corps (9th Division less 26th Brigade Group) was

given the task.'

It was to be a three-phase operation as follows:

* Neutralise Japanese airfields so that enemy aircraft would

not oppose allied landings, and destroy defence

installations in the OA.

* Conduct multiple landings on Labuan Island and near Brunei

town; secure the airfield on Labuan; and, from Labuan,

conduct further landings along the north-west coast to

secure Brunei Bay from the north.

* Consolidate the OA; establish the advanced fleet base;

conduct shore-to-shore operations south of Miri; protect

and develop oil and rubber resources; and re-establish

British civil administration.'

A beach 1,400 metres long (code-named Brown Beach) at Hamilton

Point in Victoria Harbour afforded the best site for a landing.

At the same time as Brown Beach was secured, an overland assault

would be needed to capture the wharves and jetties at Yellow

Beach (inside the bay near Bro~keton)~ and another amphibious

' 26th Brigade Group was at Tarakan. E.G. Keogh, The South West Pacific 1941-45, Grayflower

Productions, Melbourne, 1965, p.444.

"rooketon is 32 kilometres south west of Labuan.

Labuan/Brunei Bay 61

landing on Muara Island (to clear Japanese troops)."'

For the assault on Yellow Beach, a landing would be made first

at Green Beach, on the other side of the peninsula. On Muara

Island, the best beach from which to operate was at Red Beach,

but first a landing would have to be made on White Beach,

followed by an overland assault on Red Beach. Red Beach would

provide a transshipment point for forces and equipmentmoving to

Yellow Beach, on the mainland. All landings were to be made on

Z-day, 10 June 1945.

INTELLIGENCE

Japanese Anti-Aircraft Strengths

Only one coast defence gun position was located, near Ramsay

Point. No artillery pieces were believed to be on Labuan;

although 12 medium gun positions (only one of which was manned)

and 12 light Anti-Aircraft (AA) positions were identified on 25

April 45." AA fire had not been noticed over Labuan since 9

May. In the Brunei area, four light AA positions had been

detected at Cape Sapo and one heavy and one light AA position at

Brooketon. l'

The Miri airfield and Lutong refinery were protected by 15 medium

AA positions (11 of which were occupied), 11 heavy AA positions

(none of which were occupied), six light AA positions and one

searchlight position. In the Miri township, an additional eight

heavy AA positions (two occupied), a searchlight, and a medium

'O Muara Island, at the north-west end of Brunei Bay near Brooketon, is three kilometres long and almost one kilometre wide.

" See 1 Australian Corps Intelligence Review No 3 dated 8 May 45, p.4, held in Labuan boxfile as folio 53.

6 2 Oboe

dual-purpose position were present. At Kuala Belait,13 there

were two medium and three light AA positions, all of which were

unoccupied. At Seria, three light and four medium positions had

been detected."

Enemy Airfields

The main air bases which posed threats to the convoy were the

airfields and float plane bases in North Sulawesi. The main

threats to the Oboe 5ix base were from airfields in south-west

Borneo, Malaya (with possible staging through Soebi Ketjil-

Natoena), or French Indo-China. In the case of the convoy,

allied aircraft from Balawan could respond; whereas in the latter

case, the enemy bases were over 1,000 kilometres away.

The following airfields were still serviceable at the end of

April: Brunei, Timbalai, Jesselton, Kudat, Ranau (emergency use

only), Keningau and Bintulu. The airfield at Miri and the main

airfield at Labuan were unserviceable.

Outside the OA, but within range, were many other airfields - Kuching, Soebi Ketjil, Sepinggan, Manggar, Singkawang (three

airfields), Kotawaringin, Tabanio (two runways), and Oelin (three

runways). Other staging fields were at Asa, Dajoe, Lahad Datu,

Melak, Mukah, Sandakan, Sibu and Boelin Island (Natoena).

Anticipated Enemy Reaction

Enemy reaction at the amphibious landing sites was expected to

be similar to that at Tarakan. Hence, Japanese forces were

expected to position themselves on the high ground behind the

" Kuala Belait, at the mouth of the Belait River, was the administrative centre for Seria oilfield.

l4 1 Australian Corps Intelligence Review No 3, pp.9-10.

Labuan/Brunei Bay 6 3

beaches and to use mines along roads and on the airfields. Booby

traps could be expected in the town areas.

Enemy Aircraft Strengths

Because Oboe Six posed a greater threat to Japan's LOCs with its

southern bases than did Oboe One, the possibility of air attacks

from French Indo-China, Malaya or Sumatra was always likely.

Enemy operational air strength was:15 three fighters and eight

float planes on Borneo; eight fighters, five float planes and two

reconnaissance aircraft on Sulawesi; and 15 fighters, 14 bombers,

18 float planes and six reconnaissance aircraft on Java and the

Lesser Sundas - for a total of 79 combat aircraft.16

In the area of potential support, the numbers were more

significant. For example, in French Indo-China there were 40

fighters, 22 bombers, 14 float planes and 10 reconnaissance

aircraft. In Sumatra there were 70 fighters and five

reconnaissance aircraft; while in Malaya, Burma and Thailand

there were 75 fighters, 25 bombers, nine float planes and 13

reconnaissance aircraft. Thus, another 282 aircraft could have

been used to disrupt Oboe Six."

Weather

A weather summary for air operations over the period May-June was

provided in the Operations Instructi~n.'~ Assessments for

bombing, reconnaissance, air-to-ground and parachute operations

l5 Refer to Appendix B to 1st TAF Operations Order 1/1945, Labuan Box File, RAAF Historical Section.

l6 The Operations Instruction 98/1945 showed a total of 99.

" The Operations Instruction 98/1945 showed a total of 280.

Refer Appendix C to Operations Instruction 98/1945.

64 Oboe

were the same as for ~arakan."

The Airfield

One all-weather runway measuring 5,000 feet by 100 feet was to

be constructed, permitting intensive air operations for up to

one month. All-weather alert aprons were to be provided at

each end of the strip, and undispersed parking areas would be

needed to accommodate four squadrons of fighters and one AOP

flight. A building had to be constructed for the MFCU and a

Base Operations building with a control tower also had to be

erected. All these works were required by 16 June.

By 25 June, increased undispersed parking was needed for three

squadrons of attack aircraft and one squadron of Air Sea

Rescue (ASR) aircraft. By 30 June, another two squadrons of

fighters and two squadrons of attack aircraft would need

staging facilities. No 4 Radio Installation and Maintenance

Unit (RIMU) and No 61 Airfield Construction Wing were to

prepare the airfield and facilities.

In addition, buildings were required to house each wing and

squadron, and service aprons were needed for each wing.

Buildings and storage areas were needed for logistics,

including separate special storage areas for fuels and bombs.

Alert huts at each alert apron, an air evacuation building and

a bore-sighting range also had to be constructed.

Refer to Chapter 2 for the assessment.

Labuan/Brunei Bay 6 5

RAAF PLANNING

IRAAP planning was contained in 1st TAF Operations Order No 1/45

(dated 21 May 1945, which was issued in accordance with W

ICommand Operations Instruction No 98/45 dated 13 May 45. Target

date (Z-Day) was 10 June, and had been postponed from 1 June

because 9 Division was not ready on time. D-Hour was the Labuan

landing (0914, Brown Beach); J-Hour the Muara Island landing

(0915, White Beach); and H-Hour the Brunei Bluff landing (0918,

Green Beach).

General Officer Commanding (GOC) Oboe Six was Major General

Wootten, Air Support was under the control of Air Vice-Marshal

Bostock (AOC-in-C RAAF Command), GOC 20th Brigade was Brigadier

Windeyer, GOC 24th Brigade was Brigadier Porter, and Air

Commodore Scherger was AOC 1st TAF.

Tasks for 13th AF

Aircraft of the 13th AF were tasked with the following:

* Locating and destroying specified military targets in the

Brunei-Brunei Bluff-Muara Island area and on Labuan Island

prior to 10 June.

* During the night of 9/10 June, attacking the built-up

objectives in the OA at least once every two hours.

* Providing convoy fighter cover (four aircraft on-station

0730-1800 daily) over specified areas (the task was shared

with the W).

Oboe

Providing two night fighters for dawn and dusk convoy

protection between Morotai and the OA: cover was to be

provided 0600-0730 and 1800-2000 daily.

Providing Combat Air Patrol over the OA (four aircraft on

constant air alert 0730-1730 from 7 June until relieved by

1st TAF - which was expected to be 16 June).

Providing dawn and dusk cover with two night fighters over

the OA from 7 June until relieved by 1st TAF (which was

expected to be 16 June).

Providing close air support south of 5 degrees 10 minutes

North during and subsequent to the assault (using six

Mitchells airborne continuously over the OA 0800-1600).

Providing photographic coverage as requested by AOC-in-C

RAAF Command.

Providing fighter cover and direct support for PT boats in

Brunei Bay from 9 June onwards.

Providing anti-submarine cover for convoys proceeding to

and from Morotai.

Providing weather reconnaissance between Tawi Tawi and

Brunei Bay during the nights of 9-11 June inclusive.

Providing cover for minesweeping operations from 7 June.

Labuan/Brunei Bay 6 7

Tasks for 1st TAF

The aircraft of 1st TAF were also tasked with discrete operations

encompassing:

* Locating and destroying specified military targets in the

Brunei Bluff-Muara Island area and on Labuan Island prior

to 10 June.

* Providing convoy cover with fighters (sharing the task with

13th AF) .

Providing close air support in Brunei Bay, north of 5

degrees 10 minutes North during and subsequent to the

assault.

* Providing an Air Observer over the OA 0730-1600 daily from

6-9 June inclusive. Providing two Air Observers over the

OA 0730-1730 daily from 10 June until relieved.

* Providing ASR between Morotai and the OA and within the OA,

using 13th AF for assistance if necessary.

* Providing a daily courier service between Morotai and

Labuan and between Labuan and Manila. (To carry SWPA

Public Relations officers from General Headquarters).

* Providing aircraft for DDT spraying in the OA from 10 June.

* Providing Austers for reconnaissance on Labuan Island from

10 June.

* Providing officers to act as CSA on each of the

headquarters ships.

6 8 Oboe

On and subsequent to 10 June, strikes were not to be conducted

in the OA unless authori~ed.~~ Furthermore, strikes were to be

cancelled if communications could not be established with CSA.

Restrictions on Operations

The following areas and installations were not to be attacked if

possible: piers and jetties, main roads on Labuan Island, POW and

internee camps, water installations, civil and military

hospitals, oil producing plants at Miri and Seria, and Brunei

town (unless contraryorders were given by Advanced Headquarters,

RRAF Command).

Notwithstanding these exclusions, if any installation or area

could be used to hamper operations of the assault forces, it

could be attacked.

There were also operating restrictions on aircraft. First, they

were to avoid low-flying over, or up and down, waters in the

vicinity of friendly surface craft. Second, theywere prohibited

from attacking surface craft after 6 June unless specifically

authorised by CSA (as PT boats would be operating in the Brunei

Bay area). Additionally, aircrews were advised that Naval

Observation aircraft would be operating in the OA from 8 June.

Also, aircrew were advised to clear and test guns only over areas

not occupied by friendly forces.

Courier Service

From 10 June, 1st TAF Catalinas were to provide a daily courier

service Morotai-Labuan-Tarakan-Morotai. Once the Labuan strip

became operable, C.47 aircraft were to take over from the

See p.3 of Operations Order 1/45.

LabuadBrunei Bay 69

Catalinas.'' They would fly Morotai-Tarakan-Labuan-Tarakan-

Morotai. All courier aircraft were to report to CSA for approach

and landing instructions in the OA.

Line of Approach

From 10 June, all aircraft approaching Labuan were to do so from

l0 nautical miles on a course of 180 degrees, at a height of

1,500 feet or less.

Direct Support

The OA was divided into two sectors at the parallel 5 degrees 10

minutes North. Close support in the southern sector was provided

by 13th AF and in the northern sector, by 1st TAF. As formations

arrived to provide direct support, the flight leader reported to

CSA the number and type of aircraft in the formation, their

position and altitude, time available on station, and type of

bombs carried.

Aircraft would orbit specific points ('Baker' in the north,

'Easy' in the south) until directed to targets by CSA. Flight

leaders reported completion of mission and results to CSA, prior

to their departure from the OA. CSA (Afloat) provided co-

ordination between air and naval strikes - suspending NGS as necessary or determining minimum altitude for aircraft attack.22

Map references were to accordwith the Standard Target Designator

Grid (four figures and one letter). ASPS passed requests to CSA

who, in turn, briefed the pilots. If artillery or mortar smoke

was used to indicate targets, CSA would advise pilots by saying

21 This was expected to be on 16 June.

2 2 The R/T callsign for NGS was PIPEDREAM.

7 0 Oboe

'Splash ... The reference point for fighter direction was Kuraman Island

lighthouse (5 degrees 13 minutes north, 115 degrees 8 minutes

east), code-named 'Sarah'. All radar contacts were reported by

bearing and distance in nautical miles from 'Sarah'.

No 82 Wing

No 82 Wing squadrons operated from Darwin and in-theatre, and

were tasked with bombing specified targets (including possible

staging strips) in the Sulawesi area during the period 21 May-l0

June, and providing Liberators to conduct air observation over

the OA from 0730 to 1600 hours daily from 6-9 June inclusive.

Three Liberators were stationed at Palawan from 5-8 June to

conduct these observation missions.

Two Air Observers were to be maintained over the OA from 10 June,

0730-1600 daily (one aircraft in each sector). On 10 June, the

Air Observer pilots each dropped a stick of six white flares to

signal the target areas inland, for NGS. The flares ignited at

1,500 feet, above the level of smoke and dust." Six B.24

Liberators, which had been based at Palawan for five days,

provided the cover. Other 82 Wing aircraft, operating from

Morotai, attacked targets in the Labuan-Sulawesi area. In this,

they prosecuted attacks in support of the landings on Labuan

Island, Brunei Bluff and Muara Island - dropping anti-personnel bombs from above 5,000 feet.

23 See Operations Order 1/45, p.6.

2 4 The targets indicated were at Labaun Island (1,000 metres west of the point, when the first assault boats were 1,500 metres from the beach) and at Muara Island (over Sapo Point on the island's south-east tip, when the first assault boats were 800 metres from the beach).

Labuan/Brunei Bay 7 1

The bombing by 13th AF and 82 Wing was coordinated by the

Commanding General 13th All aircraft reported to CSA on

entering the area.

No 81 Wing

The only squadron from No 81 Wing to participate was No 76, which

operated from 28 May. Flying from Tawi Tawi, the squadron

provided air alert and convoy cover as directed. From 16 June,

No 81 Wing assumed responsibility for Labuan, with one squadron

arriving on that day, followed by the other two squadrons on 20

June. No 77 Wing Beaufighters escorted the squadrons. The two

squadrons that arrived on the 20th were to carry out direct

support missions and offensive sweeps as directed by Headquarters

1st TAF.

No 80 Wing

No 452 Squadron was tasked to operate from Tarakan once the strip

became operable." From 28 May, No 79 Squadron was to provide:

* Night and day air defence of Morotai.

* Direct. support as requested.

* Attacks on Halmahera.

Four fighters daily between 0730 and 1800 as convoy cover

between Morotai and the OA, east of Longitude 125 degrees

2 5 Eight squadrons from 13th AF and one squadron from No 82 Wing participated.

2 6 On 10 June, strikes against specified targets could be executed without the authority of CSA.

" AS directed in 1st TAF Operations Instruction 63/45.

72 Oboe

East.

* Two night fighters (0600-0730 and 1800-2000 daily) as

convoy cover between Morotai and the OA, east of Longitude

125 degrees East.

Nos 452 and 79 Squadrons continued operating after the landings.

No 457 Squadron (which had been non-operational from 28 May), was

escorted by No 77 Wing Beaufighters as it deployed to Labuan

(flying Morotai-Zamboanga-Labuan), where it assumed night and day

air defence of Labuan. Six aircraft were on constant ground

alert during the day, and during the night one aircraft remained

on ground alert and one on air alert.

No 83 Wing

The wing remained non-operational except for No 9 Local Air

Supply Unit (LASU), a detachment of which operated from Tawi Tawi

on DDT-spraying missions over 24th Brigade, 20th Brigade and the

camp area. Spraying was not to occur until the areas had been

captured. Each brigade commander advised the AOC 1st TAF (on the

primary Headquarters ship) when spraying could begin. The AOC,

through 1st TAF Headquarters Tarakan, then advised No 83 Wing

detachment when spraying could commence.

Six Austers of the wing accompanied the assault party and

conducted operations after the beach-head had been secured.

Additionally, one flight of No 4 Squadron carried out tactical

reconnaissance (four sorties per day) from 16 June.

No 113 ASR

No 113 ASR was responsible for maintaining two ASR aircraft at

Tarakan whenever the strip was occupied by a fighter squadron,

and maintaining two ASR aircraft at Morotai. These aircraft were

Labuan/Brunei Bay 7 3

also to report to CSA if approaching within 50 miles (80

kilometres) of the convoy or the OA on land. In conjunction with

No 113 ASR, the RAN ASR unit maintained two surface vessels each

at Morotai and Tarakan.

No 77 Wing

Operating from Tawi Tawi, the wing conducted bombing, strafing

and sweep missions. From 7-9 June inclusive, between 0730 and

1600, four Beaufighters were on ground alert at Tawi Tawi to

respond to CSA. They were armed for strafing and minimum

altitude bombing.

From 9-13 June inclusive, six Beaufighters provided direct

support from 0730 to 1630 hours daily, with an aircraft arriving

on station every 90 minutes. After the 13th, six Beaufighters

were held on ground alert for CAIRS missions, being armed for

strafing and minimum altitude bombing.

To indicate the areas for air support, 20th Brigade used yellow

fluorescent panels, while 24th Brigade used red panels.

Pyrotechnic signals were also used.

No 78 Wing

No 78 Wing contributed two squadrons in direct support of Tarakan

land forces. From 16 June, the wing was tasked to cover all

convoys in the vicinity of Tawi Tawi, between Longitudes 123

degrees East and 117 degrees 30 minutes East. Between 0730 and

1800 daily, four fighters were on-station; and two night fighters

were on-station 0600-0730 and 1800-2000. These aircraft operated

from Tawi Tawi.

74 Oboe

Other Forces

No 86 Wing's task was to fly to Labuan on 25 June to conduct

rocket, bombing and strafing sweeps with their Beaufighters and

Mosquitoes. No 13 Squadron arrived at Labuan on 30 June to

conduct search missions.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command of all amphibious attacks rested with Commander Naval

Task Force who commanded the operation until the landing force

was established ashore - then command passed to the Commanding Officer of the landing force.28 Transfer of command was agreed

by both commanders, all subordinate commanders notified, and a signal sent to Headquarters 9 Division.

The intention was that Headquarters 1st TAF would move from

Morotai to Labuan and absorb the Command Post. Meanwhile,

Advanced Headquarters 1st TAF would remain at Tarakan and

Advanced Headquarters RAAF Command would remain at Morotai.

For the RAAF, 1st TAF was again the main force, with North

Western Area and Western Area in support, and Northern Area in

reserve (but continuing active local operations in Northern

Area). 13th AF was placed in support of RAAF Command, and 5th

AF was available to support 13th AF as necessary. 13th AF

retained operational control of all 13th AF units within the area

of responsibility of W Command. The whole air effort was

under the direction of AOC-in-C RAAF Command (AVM Bostock).

2 8 In the Lutong landing, which occurred at 0930 on 23 June, command passed to CO 2/13 Battalion. The Lutong landing is discussed later in this chapter.

Labuan/Brunei Bay 7 5

Command Posts

The following command posts were in operation at the time:

* Headquarters Allied Air Forces - Manila (rear echelon at Brisbane).

* Headquarters Far East Air Forces (FEAF) - Manila.

* Headquarters FEAF Service Command - Hollandia (forward

echelon at Manila).

* Headquarters 5th AF - Clark Field.

* Headquarters 13th AF - Leyte (rear echelon at Morotai).

* Headquarters RAAF Command - Brisbane (advanced Headquarters at Morotai).

* Headquarters 1st TAF - Morotai (advanced Headquarters at Tarakan) .

CONDUCT OF AIR OPERATIONS

For the air campaign, General Kenney (Commander Allied Air

Forces) allocated three tasks to RAAF C~mmand.~~ First, to

neutralise enemy resources capable of interfering in Oboe Six;

second, to support 9th Division during the assault and

consolidation phases; and third, to establish air forces on

Labuan Island as soon as the airfield became available.

1st TAF, 13th AF, two bomber groups (Nos 90 and 380) of 5th AF,

and heavy bomber squadrons of NWA and Western Area constituted

George Odgers, A i r War A g a i n s t J a p a n 1943-1945, Australian War Memorial, 1957, p.466.

7 6 Oboe

the air forces. 5th AF bomber groups were to be used in pre-

assault bombardment of Brunei Bay, while Australian heavy bomber

squadrons were to neutralise enemy bases outside the range of

Australian and US bombers operating from Morotai and the

Philippines.

1st TAF was to establish at the airfield on Labuan, facilities

for one fighter wing (No 81 Wing, which comprised Nos 76, 77 and

82 Squadrons of Kittyhawks); one squadron of Spitfires (No 457

Squadron) ; one Army cooperation wing (No 83) ; one attack wing (No

86 - Beaufighters and Mosquitoes - as well as search aircraft of No 13 Squadron, and ASR air~raft).~'

The air campaign was conducted in three phases. Prior to 7 June,

air operations neutralised enemy airfields, blockaded enemy sea

lanes, destroyed targets of military importance in the OA, and

protected convoys en route to the OA. From 7-9 June inclusive,

air operations supported underwater demolition teams, protected

naval forces in the OA, protected convoys en route to the OA,

provided fighter defence of the OA, destroyed targets of military

importance in the OA, and provided air observation to locate

targets for Naval Gunfire Support (NGS). From 10 June, air

operations provided direct air support, convoy protection, and

fighter defence of the OA.

Phase One (Prior to 7 June)

During the pre-assault bombing phase, attacks were directed

against Jesselton, Sibu, Bintulu, Kuching, Keningau, Brunei,

Brooketon, Miri, Seria, and Pontianak in support of Oboe Six; and

against Balikpapan, Manggar, Sepinggan, Balan, Bandjermasin,

Sulawesi, Singapore, Java and the Flores Islands in support of

other operations."

ibid, pp.466-467.

" ibid, p.468.

Labuan/Brunei Bay 7 7

On 3 May, Victoria town on Labuan Island and Brooketon were

attacked by Lightnings, Venturas and Mit~hells.~' Targets

included buildings, barges and small shipping. Two days later

the first attack (with napalm) occurred in the Miri-Seria area

and on 12 May, the first attacks against targets on Muara Island

were conducted (also with napalm). On the 12th, the RDF station

on Labuan was destroyed by P.38 Lightnings.

On 15 May, Liberators of No 82 Wing bombed Manggar to support

Oboe Two and also dropped leaflets - their main task until then

had been to strike targets in Sulawesi, such as Kendari and

Menado. They were also to operate air observer aircraft from

Palawan in the Philippines. In early June, Nos 21 and 2 4

Squadrons moved to Morotai, followed later by No 23 Squadron."

A detachment of 21 Squadron was based at Palawan (which had been

captured by the Allies in February) to support the Labuan Island

and Brunei Bay operations."

Targets on the north-west and north-east coasts of Borneo were

attacked for 15 to 20 days prior to the landings. Priority was

afforded airfields throughout the Sulawesi-Borneo area from 7

June. For two nights prior to 10 June, nine aircraft patrolled

the areas.

NWA and Western Area squadrons attacked eastern Java and southern

Sulawesi to support Oboe Six. NWA aircraft also lay mines and

maintained an air blockade of Macassar Strait, Celebes, Arafura,

Timor, Banda and Flores sea^.'^ The Catalinas mined Surabaya

harbour and Banka Strait. Airfields at Malang (in Java) and many

32 ibid.

Michael V. Nelmes, Tocumwal to Tarakan: Australians and the Consolidated 8-24 Liberator, Banner Books, Canberra, 1 9 9 4 , p.110.

ibid, p.111.

35 Odgers, p.475.

7 8 Oboe

others on Sulawesi were attacked by Catalinas and Liberators.

No 20 Squadron Catalinas mined Hong Kong harbour on the night of

1 June.

No 25 squadron, which had supported the lead up to Oboe One, did

not fly at all in May due to spares and maintenance problems; not

the least problem being the remoteness of Cunderdin and Corunna

Downs from facilities on the east coast of A~stralia.~~ In June,

the squadron resumed flying in support of the Labuan and Brunei

Bay landings.

1st TAF Beaufighters and Kittyhawks, flying from Sanga Sanga

started operating over North Borneo. Sanga Sanga had to be used

because Tarakan airfield was still not operable. Parking areas

had to be extended prior to Nos 22, 30 and 31 Beaufighter

Squadrons deploying to Sanga Sanga, which delayed operations.

On 3 June, six Beaufighters of No 30 Squadron strafed oil tanks

at Bangsal, oil derricks and buildings, while six Beaufighters

of No 22 Squadron attacked Brunei town, scoring direct hits on

buildings. No 76 Squadron, operating Beaufighters and

Kittyhawks, attacked re-inforcement routes near Jesselton. The

effect of these attacks could not be determined due to the heavy

jungle.

There should be little doubt that the preliminary air bombardment

that started on 3 May was successful and contributed to the

unopposed nature of the landings. A total of 507 sorties was

flown in the OA.~' Due to the unavailability of Tarakan and

37 This total comprised 208 B.24 Liberator sorties, 115 8.25 Mitchell sorties, 121 P.38 Lightning sorties, 24 Ventura sorties and 39 Beaufighter sorties. The Liberator sorties were flown by 13th AF and 1st TAF from Morotai and Samar; the Beaufighter sorties by the 1st TAF from Sanga Sanga airfield (southern Philippines); and the remainder by 13th AF aircraft from Puerta Princessa airfield on Palawan Island. See Oboe Six report, p.5, in Labuan Box File, RAAF Historical Section.

Labuan/Brunei Bay 7 9

delays in establishing RAAF Beaufighters at Sanga Sanga, a

'material loss of effort' was ~uffered;~' indeed, the

Beaufighters were not able to begin operations until 3 June.

The accuracy of the air bombardment during this phase can be

attested by the fact that piers and docks, which were restricted

targets, were not damaged, despite the destruction of targets in

their immediate vicinity.

Bombing attacks extended to Pelong Rock, Brunei Town and Weston

throughout May and on the 30th, the Tagai sawmill was extensively

damaged. On 5 June, the runway at Timbalai was hit by Liberators

(49 bombs hit the runway). Coastal defences at Brunei Bluff were

attacked on 6 June.

In the Miri-Seria area, the Miri airfield was attacked several

times, as was the township. Barracks and defences at Seria and

Lutong were hit and oil fires started in the refinery. Buildings

at Beaufort and Kuala Belait were destroyed. Four Beaufighters

destroyed a bridge over the Padas River on 4 June.

Attacks against airfields were not confined to the airstrips, but

also included attacks on personnel, supply areas and other

airfield facilities in the vicinity. Radar installations and

nearby towns were also attacked. RAAF Liberators and 13th AF

Liberators, Mitchells and Lightnings flew 948 sorties against

airfield targets. jg

Another 216 sorties4' were flown between 15 May and 11 June, with

attacks conducted against ships, docks and waterfront areas. The

See Oboe Six report, p.5.

This total comprised 635 Liberator sorties, 142 Mitchell sorties and 171 Lightning sorties. See Oboe Six report, p.5.

This total consisted of 171 Liberator sorties, seven Mitchell sorties, 28 Lightning sorties, eight Beaufighter sorties and two P.40 sorties.

80 Oboe

RAAF flew the Beaufighter and P.40 Kittyhawk sorties from Sanga

Sanga and 13th AF flew the Liberator, Mitchell and Lightning

sorties from Morotai and Palawan (Puerta prrincessa airfield).

RAAF Catalinas from Darwin flew two mine-laying sorties in the straits around Laoet Island.

Despite the difficulty in ascertaining the direct effects of

bombing Japanese reinforcement areas and concentration points,

the OA was not reinforced and thus the missions were deemed a

suc~ess.'~ The area from Miri to Kudat and east to Tawao was

also attacked. In all, 1,414 sorties were flown against Japanese

reinforcement routes.42

Pre-assault bombardment had been running from 3 May to 5 June.

From 5 June, the intensity of bombing increased substantially.

At the end of phase one, a total of 3,088 sorties had been

flown.

Phase Two (7-9 June)

The amphibious assaults were preceded by minesweeping operations

and air and naval bombardment from 7 June. Spotting for NGS was

provided by a Kingfisher and six Mitchells of 13th AF over the

Brunei area, while Beaufighters carried out similar duties over

Labuan.

41 The concentration of Japanese forces in Jesselton was of concern as it was felt they could threaten the capture of Labuan- Brunei Bay.

" 223 sorties by RAAF and 13th AF Liberators, 70 by RAAF Beaufighters and Kittyhawks, 95 sorties by USN Venturas under operational control of 13th AF, and 497 Mitchell and 529 Lightning sorties by 13th AF. The aircraft operated from Puerta Princessa (Palawan), Sanga Sanga, Morotai and Samar.

4 3 1,240 Liberator sorties, 761 Mitchell sorties, 849 Lightning sorties, 119 Ventura sorties, 69 Beaufighter sorties and 50 P.40 sorties. See Oboe Six report, p.6.

Labuan/Brunei B a y 81

During phase two, air operations were well-executed, and correct

reporting procedures were followed on all but two occasions.

Aircraft were to be equipped with standard Target Designator Grid

maps. On 7 June, the Liberator crews did not carry the standard

maps and had to report to CSA in latitude and longitude, which made co-ordination with NGS difficult. On the next day, 13th AF

Liberators bombed targets in the immediate vicinity of underwater

demolition teams. The aircraft failed to indicate their presence

and did not obtain CSA's permission to prosecute the attacks.

This was in direct contravention of standing orders (referred to

earlier by AVM Bostock). The after-action report indicates

'appropriate action has been taken to prevent a reoccurrence'.44

No 77 Wing Beaufighters provided on-call support over the OA: one

task was to cover the underwater demolition teams that were

clearing obstacles prior to the landing. The teams were working

within 100 metres of Japanese forces who were attacked

successfully by the beau fighter^.^^ The procedures for CSA to

call in Beaufighter strikes to support the underwater demolition

teams were not fully understood aboard the Advanced Headquarters

ship which wasted some of the air effort. On 9 June, during a

four-ship attack on Beaufort, No 30 Squadron lost a

~eauf ighter. 46

Fighter defence of the OA by 13th AF Lightnings from Palawan was

very good. Once the aircraft had been relieved on-station, they

strafed specific targets just prior to their departure from the

OA. In particular, barges and installations were attacked in

this manner.

The success of the Support Air Observers was such that the after-

action report remarked on their accuracy and their reliable

4 4 Oboe Six report, p. 7

" Odgers, p.469.

" ibid.

82 Oboe

reports, and commented that 'their presence in the area.....was

fully justified'." Their main tasks were to search for enemy

ground movement and forces, reconnoitre reinforcement and

withdrawal routes, search for enemybarges and suicide craft, and

direct fighter and strike aircraft that had been diverted from

previously briefed targets.

Phase Three (From 10 June)

Simultaneous landings were made on 10 June in the Muara-Brooketon

area using 20th Brigade (White Beach on Muara Island at 0915 and

Green Beach on Brunei Bluff at 0918) and on Labuan Island using

24th Brigade (Brown Beach, at 0914) ." The landings were

unopposed. In one author's words: 'There was no anti-aircraft

fire and almost no resistance to the landing barges'." 2/17

Battalion crossed the peninsula from Green Beach and captured

Yellow Beach at 1230.

The first air bombardment on assault day involved six 13th AF and

two RAAF squadrons of Liberators (seven aircraft from No 23

Squadron and seven aircraft from Nos 21/24 Squadrons). The

aircraft dropped anti-personnel bombs immediately behind the

beach-heads. The RAAF Liberators bombed from 7,000 feet, just

before 0800, with all bombs except three hitting their targets.50

Due to mechanical problems with the leading bomb aimer's

bombsight, one squadron was unable to bomb; however, once the

problem had been rectified, the squadron bombed an alternative

target. Another Liberator conducted pre-assault reconnaissance

of Brown Beach to determine the extent of enemy resistance - there was none on the beach.

" Oboe Six report, p.7

Keogh, p.452.

4 9 Nelmes, p.111.

Odgers, p.470.

Labuan/Brunei Bay 8 3

1st TAF Beaufighters and 13th AF Mitchells provided direct air

support over the Australian soldiers after the landings.

Aircraft maintained Combat Air Patrol (CAP) between 0800 and 1600

hours daily, in flights of six. The Beaufighters were relieved

every 90 minutes and the Mitchells every two hours.

While these aircraft had been tasked to provide Close Air Support

(CAIRS), the light opposition on the ground allowed the aircraft

to be redirected on to secondary targets. They were used (in

similar fashion to the Lightnings in phase two) to attack staging

points along the reinforcement routes. For example, No 31

Squadron Beaufighters attacked barracks and roads and a railway

bridge at Papar.

At no time did any aircraft leave the OA with unexpended bombs

or ammunition that had been allocated for use within the OA, as

had happened at Tarakan. In particular, the use of Beaufighters

resultedinthe destruction of railway bridges between Weston and

Papar River.

The six Beaufighters of No 77 Wing that maintained standing

patrols over Labuan on 10 June eliminated many pockets of

resistance and were praised by the Army for 'the accuracy,

effectiveness and co-operation of their workp."

The first RAM member ashore at Labuan was a safehand courier

(just nine minutes after the assault) and at 1015, a detachment

of No 5 Bomb Disposal Unit arrived to assist Army bomb disposal

section in 'delousing' operations on mines, booby traps and

bombs.

'l See briefing notes entitled 'Joint Operation - Brunei, Labuan', held as folio 64 in Labuan Box File. A hand-written comment indicates that General MacArthur attended the briefing.

84 Oboe

Air Vice Marshal-Bostock and Air Commodore Scherger were aboard

the USS Rocky Mount. Scherger, Murdoch and Duncani2 established

their command post on 10 June; the airstrip was secured that day

and repair work began the next day. Weather conditions were

ideal. The light opposition led the historian George Odgers to

say that 'merit of the assault lay more in its excellent

organisation than on the achievement of results against enemy

forces ' . 5 3

From 10 June, increasing numbers of aircraft were used for direct

support as ground forces met resistance on their inland march.

Some attacks were conducted within 100 metres of forward

positions of friendly forces, yet there were no casualties from

air attack during this period. Beaufighters and Mitchells on air

alert demonstrated the value of air power when closely

coordinated with the ground commander's plan.

During the first three days of the landings and subsequent

operations, Army Air Liaison Officers, flying in RAAF Liberators,

provided a description of the battle and continual updates on

enemy and allied force dispositions. For naval and air

bombardment requests, an overlay (known as a target overprint)

was used. It identified numbered squares around the Lutong area.

In all, 186 squares appeared on the map, which was issued as

Appendix D Part I1 to the 9 Division Operation Order of 17 June.

Air co-operation with PT boats was provided by 13th AF, through

the provision of fighter cover over the boats as they departed

the convoy and moved separately to the OA (0700-1800 on 9 June) . Then, on 11 June at 0800, a B.25 Mitchell rendezvoused with PT

boats two miles west of the entrance to Padas Bay for operations

on the eastern side of Brunei Bay. On 12 June, two B.25~

rendezvoused with PT boats that were operating at Gaya Bay and

j2 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Group Captain Murdoch was the Senior Air Staff Officer and Group Captain Duncan was the Senior Administrative Officer.

j3 Odgers, p.471.

Labuan/Brunei Bay 85

Jesselton (0800-1000). Anti-submarine patrols and weather

reconnaissance were also carried out by 13th AF.

Brunei town was captured on the evening of 13 June. Just over

a week later, 2/13 Battalion landed unopposed at Lutong and

occupied Miri. Several beachheads were secured subsequently at

Mempakul, Sabang and Kibidang in the move towards ~eaufort.'~ By

27 June, Beaufort had been captured by the Australians. Japanese

counter attacks were repulsed and from 6 July, the Australians

advanced northward, capturing Papar on the 12th.

Just before Miriwas captured by 2/13 Battalion, over 100 Indian

POWs were killed at Kuala Belait. Despite the capture of Miri,

the Japanese were not far away and after the general surrender

by Japan, another 28 civilian hostages, who were held just

outside Miri, were shot.55 Reports indicate that there were

still others who were executed. In fact, the Japanese were

forced to exhume the bodies and take them to Miri. Subsequently,

a day of public mourning took place, involving an Australian

Christian, a Moslem Haji, an Indian and a Chinese - such had been

the diverse nature of the hostages who were executed.56

Naval and air opposition was always expected to be minimal to

negligible, and on the ground, only 650 troops were expected on

Labuan. In addition, 1,550 ground troops were expected around

Seria and Miri, and 6,600 around ~esselton. '' These estimates

and predictions proved to be highly accurate. For example,

during the landings on 10 June, only one Japanese aircraft

interfered - dropping one bomb which missed a landing craft. One grim tale to emerge from Jesselton was that local Chinese had

" Keogh, p.454. Athol Moffitt, Project Kingfisher, Angus & Robertson,

NSW, Australia, 1989, p.141.

5 6 i b i d , p.28.

Keogh, p.447.

86 Oboe

caused the death of 40 Japanese troops just outside Jesselton.

Some 1,000 local inhabitants, including women and children, were

subsequently massacred in retaliati~n.~'

From an air operation5 point of view, the assault on Brown Beach

was critical so that the nearby airfield could be captured, which

it was by the evening of the assault. Facilities were to be

established at the air£ ield by 16 June for two fighter squadrons.

By the time troops reached Seria on 19 June, the Japanese had

fired the oilfields. Thirty-one individual fires were counted.

Muara Island and Brooketon were captured on the 10th. On 11

June, six Beaufighters attacked enemy tunnels, while two others

collided and crashed just off Sanga Sanga - only one aiman was rescued from the sea. A Liberator of No 22 Squadron crashed on

take-off from Sanga Sanga and a Beaufort, tasked with DDT

spraying at Brunei Bay, also crashed. The DDT-spraying mission

was successfully carried out by three other Beauforts (of No 9

LASU) .

With the invasion of Balikpapan drawing near, 13th AF Lightnings

had to deploy to Sanga Sanga. Thus, three days into Oboe Six,

No 77 Wing Beaufighters and No 76 Squadron Kittyhawks had to move

to Morotai to make room for the Lightnings. The RAAF aircraft

were supposed to move to Tarakan, but it was still not ready.

As a consequence, CAIRS had to be provided by 13th AF aircraft

from Palawan Island during the fourth day. One aspect of the

13th AF provision of CAIRS was that the aircraft remained on

ground alert at Palawan until requested by CSA to prosecute a

strike. 59

On 17 June, No 76 Squadron aircraft landed at Labuan and began

Moffitt, p.22

Puerta Princessa airfield on Palawan Island was approximately 670 kilometres from Labuan.

Labuan/Brunei Bay 8 7

operations the next day. The two aircraft destroyed two enemy

aircraft on the ground at Keningau.=' Twelve Spitfires of No 457

Squadron left Morotai on 17 June, refuelled at Zamboanga and

landed at Palawan. They landed at Labuan the next day, with two

crashing on the rough strip. The remaining aircraft began

operations on 19 June, the same day that the Austers flew to

assist Army operations at Labuan, Weston and Beaufort.

Japanese aircraft approached Labuan on the nights of 13-14 and

14-15 June, and both were shot down, one in air-to-air combat (by

an American night fighter) and one by AA guns. On 20 June, two

Spitfires of No 457 Squadron engaged in the squadron's first air

combat since 1943, and shot down a Dinah, east of Labuan.=' The

Dinah was a Mitsubishi Ki-46 Type 100 Command Reconnaissance

aircraft. 62

A ground counter-attack on 20 June cost 20 Australian lives, but

the enemy lost 90 dead and one prisoner of war. The Japanese-

held defensive position was over-run on the next day and Labuan

Island was in Australian hands.63 Some 20 Japanese aircraft were

captured at ~abuan . 6 4

On Labuan, the Japanese occupied bunkers, trenches and tunnels

in a heavy jungle area and along a ridge. On 16 June, the

positions were attacked heavily by air, naval and artillery

bombardment. This continued on 17 and 18 June, until the 19th

when Mitchell bombers in low-level attacks dropped Napalm and

60 Odgers, p.472.

ibid.

John Bennett, Defeat to Victory: No 453 Squadron RAAF, RAAF Museum, Point Cook, Victoria, 1994, p.152.

63 The Japanese position had been heavily attacked from 16 June by artillery, naval gunfire, and Mitchell bombers operating from low-level.

64 PRO, Air 40/1761 - RAAF Command Intelligence Summary No 23 of July 7, 1945.

88 Oboe

500-lb High Explosive bombs. That night the enemy staged a

break-out from their defensive positions, and mounted several

suicide attacks. Before dawn on 21 June, 100 Japanese, each with

an already-fused aerial bomb, made their way towards the airfield

and beach areas. Several skirmishes resulted, but all Japanese

were either killed or captured by 0730, and by 1300 the remainder

of the Japanese in the defensive pocket were routed. In the

skirmishes at the airfield and on the beach, 14 allied personnel

were killed and 24 wounded. The enemy lost 49 killed and one

wounded. In the ensuing fight in the defensive pocket, another

90 Japanese were killed.

The landing at Lutong was made on the 23rd, and Miri field was

captured that day. No 4 Squadron Wirraways had deployed to

Labuan that same day and provided tactical reconnaissance, while

Labuan Kittyhawks and Spitfires covered the Lutong landing. No

82 Squadron began operations from Labuan on 26 June, providing

CAIRS; the same day that a Kittyhawk from No 76 Squadron was lost

during a successful attack against a fuel dump and camouflaged

huts at Keningau airfield. On 29 June, No 76 Squadron Kittyhawks

again atacked the airfield and destroyed a Dinah, with its crew

on-board.

In the attack on Lutong, certain targets were prohibited from

being attacked from the air. They included the Lutong oil

refinery, the bridge over Miri River, wharves, public utilities,

hospitals, churches and mosques. Additionally, the beaches were

not to be rater red.^^

From 21-30 June, No 76 Wing flew 40 sorties over eastern Java and

southern Sulawesi to neutralise the airfields within striking

distance of Balik~apan.~~ Five Catalinas from No 11 Squadron

were attached to the wing to assist. 'From 19 to 25 June, 82

65 See 9 Australian Division Operation Order 4 dated 17 June 45, held RAAF Historical Section.

Odgers, p.476.

Labuan/Brunei Bay 89

Wing [Liberators] dropped some 120 tonnes of bombs on Balikpapan

and environs, destroying oil facilities and anti-aircraft

emplacements. Then the attacks were stepped up even more,

heavily fortified coastal areas being hit particularly

No 25 Squadron prosecuted a daylight attack against Malang on 29 June. The nine Liberators flew from Corunna Downs, Western

Australia at 0800 hours and bombed the airfield at 1422. The

next night, six Liberators from the squadron attacked Tanjong

IPerak airfield near Surabaya. The squadron attacked again on 22

July - this time the shipbuilding and harbour installations at Semarang in Central Java were targeted. This attack involved

nine Liberators, flying from Learmonth, Western Australia. The

aircraft attacked in threes, with the first two formations

scoring excellent hits and two out of three aircraft of the

remaining formation hitting their targets.=' That evening, No 76

Wing Catalinas attacked Semarang. They flew from Darwin,

refuelled at Broome and bombed the Semarang dock area and

shipbuilding yards. Five aircraft found the target, and a sixth

attacked an alternati~e.~~

All aircraft of No 82 Wing joined 1st TAF by July, as did Nos 2

and 18 Squadron Mitchells of No 79 Wing. There was little left

of NWA Command and No 1 Wing Spitfire pilots flew infrequently

because of a scarcity of aircraft.

No 85 Wing was formed and was intended to replace No 82 Wing at

NWA. Nos 12 and 99 Liberator Squadrons were to be formed. These

squadrons and No 82 Wing were supposed to neutralise all Japanese

bases in NEI, with No 82 Wing eventually being based at

67 Nelmes, p.113.

Odgers, p.474.

ibid, p.476.

90 Oboe

Balikpapan."

No 77 Squadron aircraft arrived at Labuan on 30 June and began

operations on 3 July against Keningau. That day, Kittyhawks

(from Nos 77 and 82 Squadrons) and Spitfires (from No 457

Squadron) strafed and bombed Sapong. From 4-6 July, Kittyhawks,

Spitfires, Wirraways and Austers (of No 81 Wing) flew 230 sorties

in covering 9th Division. A succesful ASR was carried out by a

Catalina on 7 July, to rescue a downed Kittyhawk pilot who had

been shot down the day before." On 13 July, No 76 Squadron

Kittyhawks attacked the Riam road and Tengoa River areas - losing

their second pilot since arriving at Labuan.

No 86 (Attack) Wing was due to arrive at Labuan on 25 June, but

the first aircraft did not arrive until 23 July, when the

lengthening of the airstrip was completed, to cater for the

Wing's Mosquitoes. The Wing's two squadrons were to fly rocket,

bombing and strafing attacks. No 1 Squadron Mosquitoes had been

trained in low-level intruder work and only took part in one

operation before the war ended. No 93 Squadron Beaufighters took

part in only two operations. No 93 Squadron aircraft prosecuted

rocket attacks against craft at the mouth of the Tabuan River on

7 August; however, one aircraft was 10st.'~

The extensive nature of the air effort after 10 June can be

ascertained through the following statistics. On 11 June alone,

66 Lightnings, six Venturas, 14 Liberators, 18 Mitchells and 30

Beaufighters attacked Oboe Six targets. On the next day, 24

Mitchells and 36 Beaufighters prosecuted attacks. These attacks

'O These squadrons were promised by General Kenney to Lord Louis Mountbatten for the recapture of Singapore - see General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Paci f ic W a r , reprinted by Office of Air Force History, USAF, Washington, D.C., 1987, p.564.

'l Odgers, pp.473-474.

7z The two crew members found their way to safety on 20 August. For further comments on Beaufighter operations, see Chaz Bowyer, Beaufighter a t W a r , Ian Allan Ltd, UK, 1976.

LabuadBrunei Bay 9 1

continued until 20 June, with Kittyhawks being used from the 18th

and Spitfires from the 19th.'3

The bombing results contained within the Labuan files indicate

extensive attacks being prosecuted in the following areas:

Balikpapan, Manggar, Sepinggan, Oelin, Batavia (float plane

base), Balang (float plane base), North Borneo, North West

Borneo, Southern Borneo, Kotawaringin, Laoet Island,

13andjermasin, East Coast Borneo, Brunei Bay, Southern Sulawesi,

Mandai, Bingkalapa, Northern Sulawesi, Itu Aba, Kangean,

Xeningau, Pensingan, Kota Bardoe, Kuching, Kudat, Langkon, Lawas,

Limbung, Macassar, Macassar Strait, Miri, Seria, Muara,

Pontianak, Labuan Island, Ranau, Tenom, Singapore, Java, and

Flores Islands.

Many raids were highly successful. As an example, the raid

against Bingkalapa resulted in 88% of bombs on target - a

pleasing result considering the lack of bombing practice by the

crews involved, particularly as they had only recently moved to

Liberators."

No 79 Squadron flew 290 sortie^'^ during June over Halmahera against small watercraft, including barges, small ships, canoes

and prahus. RAAF and 13th AF Liberators, and Beaufighters joined

in these attacks in July and August. No 79 Squadron Spitfires

destroyed Japanese bombers on Lolobata airfield on 30 and 31

July. The squadron continued its attacks over Halmahera each day

until RARF Command terminated operations on 14 August.

On 8 August, No 82 Squadron Kittyhawks destroyed three O~cars'~

" Compiled from the Oboe Six report.

Nelmes, p. 109.

'5 Compiled from the Oboe Six report.

" The Oscar was a Mitsubishi Ki-43 Type 1 Fighter. See John Bennett, p.152.

9 2 Oboe

that were preparing to take-off from Kuching airfield. Kuching

was 750 kilometres from Labuan and the Kittyhawks were airborne

for four hours forty minutes, exceeding the accepted sortie

duration time." That day, No 1 Squadron Mosquitoes strafed

barges and barracks near Kuching, but lost an aircraft, with both

aircrew killed.

Air Observation

Six AusterS of No 16 AOP were with the main convoy - the

intention being to assemble them on the beach at Labuan, for

immediate operations. They were on the beach by 1800 that first

night. Work began on a temporary strip about 400 metres from the

beach and the aircraft were assembled by 1600 on 11 June.

Unfortunately, the 2/7th Field Company engineers were given a

higher priority task than making ready an airstrip. They had to

repair road surfaces that had been destroyed by retreating

Japanese troops. Yet, the Army engineers were still able to

prepare the strip rapidly and at 1440 on 12 June, the first

Auster took-off.

Three RAAF personnel accompanied the assault forces at Muara

Island to conduct a ground reconnaissance for an airstrip.

However, the overwhelming success of the Army in its advance to

Brooketon, negated that and a site was selected and prepared at

Brooketon instead. (It was ready on 11 June, after only 1 1/2

hours work). Austers began operations from Brooketon on the

13th.

On 17 June, the Brunei strip was ready and the two Labuan Austers

that were operating from Brooketon were moved to Brunei.

" Odgers, p.475.

Labuan/Brunei Bay 9 3

Photography

In terms of the photographic flying and production undertaken by

13th AF, some effort was wasted due to insufficient background

information for mission planning. Consequently, an Air Liaison

Officer was established at 13th AF to interpret Army

requirements; after this, the system proved most satisfactory.

In total, 42,672 basic prints and 10,628 reprints were produced

for Oboe Six.la

Detailed air support photographs were not used for simplicity

reasons. Maps to the scale 1 in 25,000 and 1 in 50,000 annotated

with the standard Target Designator Grid proved entirely

satisfactory.

No 2 Airfield Defence Squadron

All RAW units were responsible for their own internal security

and defence against enemy attack or sabotage, and to implement

passive defence measures. No 2 AFDS was responsible specifically

for: guarding RAAF aircraft and vital installations;

supplementary airstrip defence in co-ordination with Army

elements; close protection of radar stations in co-ordination

with Army elements; defence of ACS units employed on survey, soil

testing or road building; and defence of Headquarters 1st TAF.

No 200 Flight

No 200 Flight was formed on 20 February 1945 with Liberators, and

flew its first operations from Mindoro (the Philippines) on 18

March - a reconnaissance mission. Two attempts to carry out an

operational insertion were stalled due to bad weather, but on 24

March, two aircraft successfully dropped Z Special Unit forces

'' Oboe Six report, p.15.

94 Oboe

near Bario, north-east of Brunei Bay. One of the aircraft was

lost, presumably during an attack on an enemy ship. This, and

subsequent missions enabled Z Special forces to arm the local

Kelabit populace who proved successful in driving the Japanese

out. 'g

Army/air force coopexation was fundamental to the success of

these and resupply drop missions. Problems experienced were in

the poor quality maps used and in the level of support from 1st

TAF at ~orotai." Two other 200 Flight Liberators were lost - one on 17 May (over Timor) and the other about four days later

(over North Borneo).81

AIR SUPPORT ORGANISATION

The experience of Tarakan had demonstrated the lack of mobility

of ASPS to operate with Battalions. Hence, ALPS were formed, to

accompany the Battalions and to communicate with the Brigade ASP.

Each ALP comprised one NCO and two Other Ranks, with one VHF pack

set and one H/F pack set.

The ASS was allocated to the 1st TAF control post, two ASPS (Nos

1 and 2) were allocated to 24th and 20th Brigades respectively,

and four ALPS (Nos l to 4) were allocated to the infantry battalions - 2/28, 2/43, 2/17 and 2/15 respectively.

Officers-in-charge of ASPS would examine all requests for air

support to ensure the target description was clear, bomblines

were identified, and position of own troops, air-ground signals,

and time-on-target were included. The ASS controlled all direct

support, courier, photographic, air observer and ASR aircraft.

Nelmes, pp.131-132.

ibid, p. 132.

ibid.

L a b u a n / B r u n e i B a y 9 5

Air support requests followed the standard formatsZ and a target

I bombline was always included in the request. Fluorescent panels

were not used to indicate bomblines, but yellow fluorescent

panels were used to indicate the forward position of Australian

troops. This was to prevent any confusion previously associated

with complex marking arrangements.

For the Lutong landing, air support was organised differently.

One ASP was included in the order of battle of 2/13th Battalion.

Air alert aircraft reported to ASS Labuan when 50 miles (80

kilometres) from the OA and were handed over to the 2/13 ASP.

The ASP directed aircraft on to targets as ordered by the

Battalion Commander. Air alert aircraft which were not tasked

by the ASP during the specified air alert period reverted to

control of ASS Labuan. Any air alert aircraft that were not used

by the 2/13th during the air alert period were allotted secondary

targets by 9 Division. 2/13 Battalion had to be asked not to

request air support and NGS simultaneously.

Air Support Requests

Requests for air support were originated at Battalion level and

passed by the ALP to the Headquarters ship prior to the

establishment of ASPS ashore. Any requests that originated below

Battalion level were passed to Battalion headquarters through

Army signals channels. Once the ASPS were established, the

requests were directed through them, and they liaised with CSA

until the ASS was established within the 1st TAF Command Post

(CP). The plan was for the ASS and a Mobile Telecommunications

Unit (MTU) to be established quickly and to assume control for

all support requests. Although the ASS was established on time,

the MTU was not sufficiently mobile; consequently establishment

of control over the land-based air support net was delayed.

See Chapter 2.

9 6 Oboe

The ALPS proved to be a welcome addition; although calls were

still made for more mobility in the ASPS, to allow them to become

established more quickly. The ALPS kept the Headquarters ship

informed of progress of the land battle and passed, without

problem, requests for support and instructions for control.

System of Control

Labuan is 40 kilometres to the north of the Brunei area. Because

of distances involved, two sectors had to be established and

control had to be exercised separately until 1st TAF CP was

established on Labuan. Transfer of direct air support control

(afloat) to control (ashore) occurred as follows:

* RAAF formation leaders reported initially to CSA (Afloat,

Northern Sector - aboard USS Rocky Mount) and 13th AF

formation leaders reported to CSA (Afloat, Southern Sector

- aboard USS Nashville).

* CSA (Afloat, Northern Sector) could exercise control of all

direct air support formations in the OA if necessary for

co-ordination purposes.

* CSAs (Ashore) moved from the two Headquarters ships to the

two ASPS once the ASPS became operative within the two

Brigades.

* CSAs (Ashore) notified their respective ships that they

were ready and direct control then passed ashore; although

co-ordinating control still remained with CSA (Afloat,

Northern Sector).

* Once ready, AOC 1st TAF assumed control of all direct air

support aircraft in the OA, co-ordinating control passed to

CSA (Ashore), within 1st TAF CP; and the two CSAs

established within the ASPS were withdrawn.

Labuan/Brunei Bay 9 7

Advanced Headquarters RAAF Command (Morotai) allocated targets

to 13th AF and 1st TAF as necessary. The initial targets were

prescribed and included, on Labuan Island: Japanese defensive

positions, all buildings in the town area, enemy defences that

could enfilade the landing beaches, the airstrip, and radar sites

and coastal defence guns which could interfere with shipping.

In the Brunei-Brunei Bluff-Muara Island area, the following

targets were designated: naval stores and installations,

including all buildings and any underground storage facilities;

coastal defence installations and any high ground defences; and

all buildings in the Brooketon town area. In addition, napalm

and anti-personnel bomb attacks were prosecuted on the Brooketon

beach-head area.

Before 1st TAF CP was established, the two sectors still had a

dedicated communications channel (referred to as Inter-Commander

Support Aeroplanes) to provide co-ordination between the two

Headquarters ships. The channel malfunctioned and close co-

ordination was always difficult until the CP began operating.

After the assault landings, all ALPS established communications

within 22 minutes (with the first communicating within only seven

minutes). Notwithstanding the co-ordination problem mentioned

above, the Headquarters ships exercised satisfactory control of

all strikes until the ASPS took over. The ASP with 24th Brigade

landed at D+2 hours and established full communications just two

hours later.83

There was always going to be a delay with the ASP attached to

20th Brigade, due to the need to off-load vehicles on Muara

Island for transshipment to Brooketon. The ASP did not land

until 1700 on the loth, due to problems with the LST (first, the

anchor jammed in coral and second, the LST became grounded on a

sandbank). Consequently, the Air Support Officer established a

24th Brigade landed at Brown Beach on Labuan Island at 0914 hours.

98 Oboe

limited capability to link the ALPS with the USS Nashville

(Headquarters ship Southern Sector). The ASP finally reached

Brigade Headquarters at 1600 on 11 June, and was fully operable

by dawn on the following day.

Meanwhile, the ASS accompaniedthe Divisional Headquarters ashore

at 1730 on 10 June and became operable by 0730 hours the next day

- almost 24 hours ahead of the ASP in the southern sector. Due

to several relocations of the Divisional Headquarters and

consequent moves by the ASS, the ASS had to close down most of

its circuits and was not re-established until 1700 hours that

day. Consequently, control was not passed ashore until 1100

hours on 12 June.

Previous problems that had been encountered with cyphers occurred

again. Out of date publications were used in the USS Rocky Mount

and lack of familiarity of some personnel with the cyphers caused

considerable delays initially.

Due to the problems experienced by one ASP in becoming

established (as discussed above), the value of ALPS for immediate

operations was clearly demonstrated. The mobility of the ALPS

and indeed the redundancy that they afforded the overall system

was a valuable observation for the future.

The success of the Command Post notwithstanding, there was an

obvious lesson for future operations. Because frequent moves of

the CP may be a regular feature of operations, such as Labuan,

the ASS would need to adopt different procedures. The ASS,

having set up in the first location, should remain in operation

until the CP and air support communications could be re-

established in the new location. In other words, half of the ASS

could remain and maintain land line communications with the CP

and the other half of the ASS until they became re-established.

Then the first half of the ASS could join the CP. At Labuan, the

CP also established communications with Headquarters 1st TAF at

Morotai .

Labuan/Brunei Bay 99

There was an RAAF concern that not all personnel involved in air

support operations understoodthe necessity of ALPS, ASPS and the

ASS providing communications to ensure support. The concern was

summarised quite dramatically as: 'Those concerned should bear

in mind that a decision to delay movement of any part of the Air

Support organisation is tantamount to a decision to do without

Direct Air Support during the period that the Air Support

organisation is inoperativer."

Similar concerns arose over the delays experienced by No 111

MFCU, with the recommendation that 'The establishment of Fighter

Control facilities ashore is a matter of urgency and the

equipment of the Mobile Fighter Control Unit must be given

priority to permit rapid movement when ashore'."

One clear breakdown was in the indication of targets. Support

Air Observers (SAOs) were able to recognise targets nominated by

CSA, but attack aircraft sometimes had difficulty. The SAOs

complained that they should have been able to communicate with

the attack aircraft to relay more accurate instructions and

corrections for a second run. Procedurally, it was relatively

straightforward for the SAOs to do just that, but they did not

know that at the time. The SAOs simply needed to obtain approval

from CSA to change frequency to the Support Air Direction

frequency, and they would have been in direct R/T communication

with the attack aircraft.

Transmissionwith CSASouthexperienced considerable interference

at night, leading to the conclusion tha.t a separate night

frequency was needed for long-range transmission.

Oboe Six report, p.14.

ibid, p.15.

100 Oboe

Eighteen strikes were directed in four days (10-13 June) by the

Air Support ~rganisation.'~ The Beaufighters proved to be highly

accurate and exercised great care in identifying the target. The

Commander of 24 Brigade passed on his personal thanks to the CO

and pilots of No 22 Squadron for their CAIRS efforts."

TAF CP

Ten personnel made up the Command Post Party, and once ashore

moved several times until a site was allocated. As other units

moved in, the CP site became too congested for any expansion or

use of radio. Equipment had not arrived and the ASS was not

landed until 1730 on 10 June. Thus, communications with USS

Rocky Mount were not established until the next day. That same

day, the CP/ASS moved to a more suitable site; unfortunately the

site was approximately one and a half kilometres from 9 Division

Headquarters. This meant that delays were experienced in

obtaining divisional decisions on requests for air support and

advice to Division Headquarters was delayed by up to several

hours.

Senior staff officers of the CP were allocated personal call-

signs which improved the responsiveness of the command and

control system considerably. Lack of such call-signs had posed

problems during Oboe One.

Recommendations that flowed from the Labuan experience were:"

* A vehicle should accompany the CP team, so that the

The breakdown was four on 10 June, six on 11 June, six on 12 June and two on 13 June.

'' See Report from No 1 ASP, appended to the overall ASS Report on Labuan, held as folio 3 in Labuan Box File, RAAF Historical Section.

See 'Oboe Six Operations: TAF Command Post', folio 39 of Labuan Box File.

Labuan/Brunei Bay 101

reconnaissance party could establish a site immediately

after landing. l

* Additional organic transportation was required to move all l the necessary equipment.

* Non-immediate personal gear should be carried in follow-up

vehicles.

Army and RAAF Headquarters should be located adjacent to

one another.

FIGBTER CONTROL ORGANISATION

1st TAF Routine Order No 10 of 20 June 45 called for reports on

the move to Labuan." Confusion was experienced during loading,

caused by a lack of knowledge by Army loading authorities of the

nature of the MFCU equipment. While No 9 Transportation and

Movements Office (TMO) provided the loading orders as directed,

some instructions were changed by the loading officer, which

resulted in confusion and delays for the MFCU. For example, the

loading officer ordered some equipment, which he considered to

be non-essential, to be left at Morotai for a follow-up convoy.

His argument was that it exceeded the limit of tonnage; however,

the limit approved by No 9 TMO was sufficient to cover all of No

111 MFCU's equipment.

Some of the equipment left behind consisted of transit cases for

radar, transmitting and other technical gear. This gear had been

'mobile-loaded' for the beach assault. However, if necessary,

the gear could be packed in the transit cases and floated ashore;

thus, the gear could be protectively packed if necessary.

See Report entitled 'Oboe Six Operation', by CO No 111 MFCU to HQ 1st TAF Command Post at Labuan, on 1 July 45. Copy held as folio 74 in Labuan Box File, RAAF Historical Section.

102 Oboe

Similarly, the gear could be protected from the weather until it

became operational. As a consequence of the transit cases being

left at Morotai, some technical gear did deterioriate at Labuan

due to exposure to weather and contact with salt water.

Another annoying point: was that all equipment had been sorted and

forwarded for loading in a specific order. Not only did the

loading operation fail to maintain the order, but during the

offloading, further mixing occurred. Moreover, some of the

fragile equipment was damaged. The recommendation from No 111

MFCU was that unit personnel should be responsible for loading

and unloading their own equipment.

Despite equipment shortages and delays in setting up at the

allocated site (due to a battery of field guns temporarily

occupying the MFCU site), the MFCU became operational in 'what

was regarded as record time'." However, the unit was forced to

move several times before a permanent site was established.

No 111 MFCU used five lightweight air warning radar stations

(LW/AW) and two lightweight ground control intercept (LW/GCI)

radar stations and wireless observer posts (WOP). Initially, in

order to be operable 16 hours after the landings, one LW/AW was

set up at the Labuan beach-head and one at the Brooketon beach-

head, with one LW/GCI set up at Labuan for fighter control.

Different blocks of target numbers were allocated to each MFCU

to avoid confusion throughout the entire Oboe series. For

example, No 114 MFCU used 300-349; No 111 MFCU used 450-499.

No 4 Radio Installation and Maintenance Unit (RIMU) installed an

AN/APN-2 Interrogator in the control tower once Labuan airfield

became operational, and calibrated the LW/GCI station and the

LW/AW stations.

ibid, p.2.

Labuan/Brunei Bay 103

Deception

False plots were sent for all operational flights, to confuse the

enemy. They were identical to true plots except for the suffix

M ' . Pre-flight details of all operational flights were

contained in 'Frag' messages, sent to the relevant MFCU or

fighter control centre, and at the time of take-off, false plots

would be sent. A 'Frag' message is a partial or fragmentary

order from the 24-hour tasking schedule. The tasking schedule

itself provides all the details of one day's air operations.

Fighter Operations

The Plan for fighter operations was as follows:

* Fighter cover was to be provided by 1st TAF for convoys

between Morotai and 125 degrees East and between 123

degrees East and 117 degrees 30 minutes East.

* Fighter cover was to be provided by 13th AF for convoys

between 125 degrees East and 123 degrees East and between

117 degrees 30 minutes East and the OA. Four fighters were

to be on-station between 0730 and 1800 daily.

* Dawn and dusk cover was to be provided by two 1st TAF

nightfighters for convoys between Morotai and 127 degrees

East. Aircraft were to be on-station between 0600 and 0730

and between 1800 and 1900.

* Dawn and dusk cover was to be provided by 13th AF for

convoys between 127 degrees East and the OA. Aircraft

were to be on-station between 0600 and 0730 and between

1800 and 2000.

* Fighter cover was to be provided by four 13th AF fighters

on constant air alert over the OA from 0730 to 1730 daily

104 Oboe

from 7 June until relieved by 1st TAF (expected to be on 16

June ) .

* Dawn and dusk cover was to be provided over the OA by two

13th AF nightfighters during the periods 0600-0730 and

1730-2000 daily from 7 June until relieved by 1st TAF

(expected to be on the 16th).

* Fighter cover was to be provided by 13th AF for all P/T

boats operating in Brunei Bay from 9 June onwards.

Conduct of Fighter Operations

Convoy cover was good; although bad weather prevented fighters

from reaching the convoy on two days, but the 13th AF P.61 Black

Widow nightfighters were on-station according to plan. Fighter

cover over the OA was effective, but 13th AF had to provide more

than planned due to the airfield problems being experienced by

1st TAF (inoperability of Tarakan and forced move from Tawi Tawi

and Sanga Sanga to Morotai).

On the first day of convoy cover operations, 1st TAF

nightfighters left at 1835 without reason, despite the

requirement to provide cover until 1900. On the following

morning, dawn cover was provided 20 minutes late. One report

indicates that bad weather then prevented 1st TAF aircraft from

reaching the convoy to provide cover on subsequent occasions.

The after-action report indicates that the unit commander

considered that the operation would expose his Spitfires to

unwarranted operational hazards, and on his own initiative

disobeyed the Operations Instruction. The after-action report

stated that: 'This instance of ignorance of the fundamental

principles of discipline on the part of a senior officer is

inexcusable' . 91

Oboe Six report, p.13.

Labuan/Brunei Bay 105

The time available in the OA for 13th AF to neutralise enemy

defences was limited; yet, all specified targets were

neutralised.

No 81 Wing was allotted responsibility for the air defence of the

Brunei Bay area from 16 June. No 111 MFCU was responsible for

issuing airraidwarnings, allocating responsibilities to air and

ground defences, and controlling fighters until visual contact

with enemy aircraft (E/A) was made. The MFCU controller had the

responsibility of co-ordinating all air and ground defences

during daylight. At night, ground defences were permitted

unrestricted attack against E/A until 'mid-point' was reached,

after which RAAF night fighters could inter~ept.'~ If RAAF

aircraft were unable to reach E/A in time, they would advise No

111 MFCU which would then advise ground defences to maintain

their attack.

Navigation Radio Aids

?'he following navigation radio aids were used - a high frequency direction finding (H/F D/F) station was installed by 24 June; a

medium frequency homing beacon was installed by 16 June; a VHF

homer was installed and operated by No 111 MFCU, and was linked

to the Base Operations room; and an ASV Beacon was installed by

NO 4 RIMU at the radar station, and replaced later by a similar

beacon in the control tower.

'Mid-point' was a geographical position determined by 15 June which was used as a datum for co-ordinating air and ground defences.

" The RARF call was 'NO GO'. In cases where pilots suffered from the searchlights below, they used the call 'BLACKOUT' to cause the lights to be switched off.

106 Oboe

Identification Friend or Foe

As a matter of standard operating procedures, IFF had to be

switched on prior to take-off and left on continuously during

flight. For additional safety, aircrew had to physically check

that the IFF was on, when 250 kilometres from Labuan.

ADMINISTRATION

Communications for co-ordinating MTB and aircraft action against

enemy shipping, as well as communications and radar on

Headquarters ships and fighter director ships, had to be

established. Similarly, communications had to be established for

fighter control, air warning, navigation radio aids, CAIRS and

command purposes. Also, an interlinked system of communications

had to be established for air warning, weather, coastwatch,

intelligence and guerilla forces.g4

It was important for communications systems to provide adequate

warning of the approach of enemy aircraft, as well as any

movement of enemy surface forces. In addition, communications

systems allowed other intelligence on the enemy to be received

and distributed.

The Operations Order detailed the requirement for signals

security with strict guidelines on wireless silence, use of unit

address signs, and use of telephones and R/T channels. The enemy

was expected to jam radio circuits, transmit false and deceptive

messages, and to use electronic jammers and 'window' ."

9 ~ p e c i f i c details are contained in Appendix C to Operations Order 1/45.

95 Window or chaff are thin metal strips which, when deployed from an aircraft, scatter and produce radar returns which can obscure the aircraft's return and confuse the enemy.

Labuan/Brunei Bay 107

Authentication and cipher systems were used and a plan for

jamming and deception of the enemy was developed.

Personnel

The briefing of personnel prior to embarkation was much-improved

over previous operations. Personnel had a better understanding

of their functions ashore; although there were still several

written complaints.

By the end of June, 1st TAF included 21,893 personnel, with

another 3,134 (mostly from No 82 Wing) joining in July; although

4,381 were to leave the Command that month, some 700 on

completion of tours of duty.96

Medical

No 24 Medical Clearing Station (MCS) landed at Labuan on 12 June.

In this instance, all unit personnel and their equipment were on

the one ship. Some No 24 MCS equipment was stolen despite clear

markings, and on the night prior to embarkation, the unit had to

sleep in the open in mud.9'

No 22 MCS reported accepting patients within two hours of

landing, and receiving casualties who required surgery, within

24 hours (that is, they were fully operational within 24 hours).

Procedures for evacuating casualties involved backloading on

C.47~ to Morotai - usually evacuating sick and wounded within 24

hours of request.

96 Odgers, p.477.

'' See file 4/5/Air dated 27 June 45, held as folio 73 in Eabuan Box File, RAAF Historical Section.

108 Oboe

Logistics

Units deployed with sufficient breathing oxygen, technical and

non-technical equipment to last 30 days. Responsibility for

providing domestic stores such as rations, water, POL and

aviation fuel was clearly delineated in administrative

instructions accompanying all operations instructions. In

addition, 15 days' initial supply of aviation fuel and 30 days'

supply of aviation oils were shipped to Labuan in the assault

convoy. Similarly, 30 days' requirements of M/T POL, range fuel,

lighting and power kerosene were shipped to the OA. Thirty days'

requirements were also taken for bombs, ammunition, pyrotechnics,

and explosives. The RAAF carried non-common stores, operated

bulk fuel installations at airfields and stored and maintained

drummed aviation fuel. Furthermore, clear instructions were

given to the effect that units were to sort equipment for loading

and to follow directives from No 9 TMO."

Movements

As an indication of the numbers of RAAF units involved throughout

the Oboe operations, the following extract is provided for Oboe

Six - RAAF units that deployed to ~abuan:" Similar numbers

deployed to Tarakan and Balikpapan, but this level of detail is

not provided in the other chapters.

- Headquarters let TAF (less Advanced Headquarters at

Tarakan), with 237 personnel.

- No 13 General Reconnaissance Bomber Squadron (Ventura) from

Gove, with 333 personnel.

See 1st TAF Administrative Instruction No 9 dated 14 April 1945, p.7.

Taken from Appendix E to Operation Instruction 98/1945.

Labuan/Brunei Bay 109

No 113 ASR flight (less detachments at Tarakan and Morotai

for Oboe Two), with 109 personnel.

No 4 Radio Installation and Maintenance Unit (less

detachments at Tarakan and Morotai for Oboe Two), with 156

personnel.

1st TAF Teleconununications Unit (less detachments at

Tarakan and Morotai for Oboe Two), with 257 personnel.

No 2 Malaria Control Unit (less a detachment at Tarakan),

with 30 personnel.

No 11 Postal Unit detachment, with 14 personnel.

No 9 Transportation and Movements Office (detachment), with

62 personnel.

Service Police detachment with 11 personnel.

No 2 Airfield Defence Squadron (less detachments at

Morotai, and at Tarakan and Morotai for Oboe Two), with 356

personnel.

Air support group of one ASP and two ALPS, with 40

personnel.

A similar air support group from Brisbane, with 40

personnel.

No 1 Australian Air Formation Signals Unit (less a

detachment at Tarakan), with 189 personnel.

- No 10 Replenishing Centre (less a detachment at Tarakan),

with 76 personnel.

- No 47 Operational Base Unit with 259 personnel.

110 Oboe

- No 5 Medical Receiving Station with 80 personnel.

- No 81 Wing with the following:

-- a Wing Headquarters with 52 personnel,

-- No 76 Squadron (Kittyhawk) (272 personnel),

-- No 77 Squadron (Kittyhawk) (272),

-- No 82 Squadron (Kittyhawk) (272),

-- No 24 Medical Clearing Section (32),

-- No 22 Repair and Servicing Unit (384),

-- No 25 Air Stores Park (El),

-- No 457 Squadron (Spitfire) (261),

-- No 9 RSU detachment (30),

-- No 111 MFCU (290),

-- Nos 163 and 166 Radar Stations (each with 31

personnel) and

-- Nos 316, 323, 324, 325 and 342 Radar Stations (each

with 34 personnel).

No 86 (Attack) Wing with the following:

-- a Wing HQs (63),

-- No 1 Squadron (Mosquito) (374),

-- No 93 Squadron (Beaufighter) (302),

Labuan/Brunei Bay 111

-- No 84 OBU (171),

-- No 30 Air Stores Park (97),

-- No 29 MCS (34), and

-- No 1 RSU (400).

- No 83 (Army Cooperation) Wing with the following:

- - a headquarters (less detachment at Morotai for Oboe

Two) (48),

-- No 4 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron Wirraways (less

detachment at Morotai for Oboe Two) (340),

-- No 16 AOP Austers (less detachments at Tarakan and

Morotai for Oboe Two) (SE),

-- No 9 Local Air Supply Unit Beauforts (less detachment

at Morotai for Oboe Two) (log), end

-- No 32 Air Stores Park (81).

In addition, the airfield construction wing, its squadrons and

ancillary units, and No 4 Wireless Unit deployed.

Most reports indicated a lack of co-ordination, considerable

wasted effort and inadequate facilities at embarkation and

disembarkation points. Many lessons had been learnt from

Tarakan, but many failings were still in evidence. For example,

the move from Morotai to Labuan of No 4 Squadron is illustrative.

Three officers, 69 other ranks and 15 vehicles were spread over

three vessels. loo

loo See file 305/3/E of 6 July, held as folio 146 in Labuan Box File, RAAF Historical Section.

112 Oboe

Allocation of Sites

Allocation of sites posed a problem for several units. For

example, the advanced party of No 457 Squadron landed on 11 June

and moved to their allocated site. However, other 81 Wing

personnel had occupied the site and No 457 Squadron personnel had

to wait 18 days before an alternative site could be made

available. This led the CO of No 457 Squadron to recommend that

units retain their allotted camp sites so that they 'may make

plans accordingly to speedily set up camp and go into

operation' .l0'

No 82 Squadron personnel had to camp out in the open in pouring

rain on the night of 1 June, at the embarkation point at Morotai.

There was neither cover nor stretchers, and personnel embarked

as a wet, tired and bedraggled lot (a formal redress was

subsequently submitted). The convoy arrived at Labuan on the

11th and disembarked on the 12th. Squadron personnel occupied

a temporary camp site until they had completed work on their own

site, to which they moved on 20 June, with squadron aircraft and

pilots arriving on the 25th. No 82 Squadron officers oversaw all

loading and unloading of squadron equipment and recommended this

as the only method of obviating losses of equipment.'''

Airfield Construction Squadrons

No 4 ACS left Biak on 8 May, arrived at Morotai on the 13th, left

again on 4 June to arrive at Labuan on the 10th. They arrived

at Labuan just on sunset. Despite the low tide, unloading was

delayed until the morning, by which time they had to contend with

''l See file 2/42/Air of 27 June 1945, 'Unit Move Morotai to Labuan Island', held as folio 146 in the Labuan Box File, RAAF Historical Section.

lo2 See file 1/2/10 of 1 July 1945, held as folio 148 in the Labuan Box File, RAM Historical Section.

Labuan/Brunei Bay 113

a four feet draught. Consequently, some equipment suffered water

damage and led to subsequent delays in operation^.'^^

No 5 ACS arrived at Labuan at 1800 hours on 10 June, onto a dry

beach. In this case too, off-loading was delayed, this time by

four hours, which resulted in some vehicles being unloaded in

almost four feet of water. Because the tide rose rapidly, off-

loading had to be delayed until the next day. Once work began

on the airstrip, ACS personnel had to be posted as guards to turn

back unauthorised traffic (referred to as sightseeing

tourists) .lo4

RESULTS

Ulse of Labuan Airfield

Craters on the Labuan airfield measured up to 35 feet in diameter

and 15-20 feet deep, and were filled with water. Compounding the

problem was the absence of suitable filling material nearby.

Work began on a temporary strip which would be unsurfaced and

would become inoperable after heavy rains. The main strip was

to be completed by 16 June, but estimates indicated that it would

not be ready until 22 July, unless pierced plank matting could

be provided (in which case the strip could be completed within

five days of the arrival of the matting).

The capture of Labuan airfield meant that RAAF Kittyhawks and

Spitfires could support the Australian Army within a radius of

500 kilometres, and could provide air cover for naval convoys in

the vicinity. The Labuan strip would not be suitable for heavy

bombers, however, and they would operate from Balikpapan,

lo3 See file 1/2/10, undated, held as folio 149 of the Labuan Box File, RAAF Historical Section.

'04 See file 2103/13/E of 30 June 45, held as folio 151 in Labuan Box File, RAAF Historical Section.

114 Oboe

provided the operation there was successful.

Bomb Damage

Inspection by the operational research section of 1st TAF allowed

specific observations to be made in relation to bomb damage.

Conclusions from the study included:'05

Delay-action bombs proved successful in a concentrated

built-up area.

* A near-miss by a delay-action bomb on scattered or isolated

buildings had a poor to negligible result. In these

situations, an instantaneously-fused bomb would be more

effective.

* Use of rod extensions, which allow a bomb to detonate above

the ground, near a target, inflicted considerably more

damage than neas-misses that impacted the ground.

* Blast and fragment damage did not destroy buildings. Use

of incendiaries would have added significantly to the

destruction.

* Near-misses achieve very little damage on gun positions

that are surrounded by earth revetments. Fragmentation

clusters would increase the likelihood of hitting inside

the revetments and hence achieve better results. If low-

level attack is possible, then use of napalm would be

highly successful.

* The soft sandy soil of Labuan reduced the damage.

lo5 Refer 'Bomb Damage: Some Observations at Labuan Island', Report TR20, dated 20 June 45, held in the Labuan Box File (folio 5 9 ) , RAAF Historical Section.

CHAPTER FOUR

OBOE TWO - BALIKPAPAN OVERVIEW

Japan was using Balikpapan as one of its main aviation fuel

sources,' hence Liberators had been bombing the area sporadically

since September 1944. The Dutch had partially destroyed the oil

installations in January 1942 but most of the infrastructure was

re-constituted by the Japanese during that year. There were

three refineries at Balikpapan - Pandansari, Edeleanu, and Dubbs Cracking Plant.

The Allied plan was to land at Balikpapan on 1 July 1945 (F-Day, with H-Hour being 0900 hours). 1st TAF was to support 1st

Australian Corps' 7th Australian Division, which would be the

assault force. Two brigades of 7th Division were to be used,

with one held in corps reserve. However, as planning continued,

lt became obvious that two brigades would be needed for the

assault and the third would be required as a divisional reserve.

This posed transportation problems and to accommodate the

additional brigade some 7,000 RAAF personnel (out of a total of

'10,500) did not proceed to the Objective Area (OA).'

The OA covered some 34 kilometres of south-eastern coastline

around Balikpapan' with Balikpapan Bay offering shelter, good

depth and an entrance more than one and a half kilometres wide.

Other than in the developed areas, the foreshores were tangled

mangrove swamps. Thus, the landing beach just east of Klandasan

was selected for its firm sandy surface and good seaward

approaches. In addition, the main coastal road was positioned

George Odgers, Air War A g a i n s t Japan 1943-1 945, Australian War Memorial, 1957, p.480.

E.G. Keogh, The S o u t h West P a c l f i c 1941-45, Grayflower Productions, Melbourne, 1965, p.459.

i b l d , p.455.

116 Oboe

not far from the beach.4

Other than excellent port facilities, Balikpapan also boastedtwo

suitable airfields, withManggar situated some 20 kilometres east

of Klandasan being the largest, and the smaller Sepinggan, just

10 kilometres east of Klandasan.

After the Tarakan operation, General ~lamey' had questioned the

need for Balikpapan to go ahead. He did not want 7th Division

committed to an operation from which it could not have been

extracted."fter all, the war in Europe was over and Australia

was looking at reducing its commitment against Japan, as the

strength of the United Nations was expected to be concentrated

against Japan.'

Additionally, as a result of the Tarakan operation, effective

Allied fighter control was assured past Balikpapan, thereby

affecting Japan's ability to operate shipping in the Samarinda-

Balikpapan area. It marked the first time that all land and sea

areas of the South-West Pacific could be covered by Allied

aircraft . a

Prime Minister Curtin asked MacArthur whether the Balikpapan

operation was necessary and was met with the response that the

plan had been prepared and the forces were ready to deploy; so

if Curtin wanted to withdraw 7th Division then he should advise

accordingly and immediately so that another division (American)

Keogh, p.456.

Blarney was Commander-in-Chief of all Australian forces in the SWPA.

John Robertson and John McCarthy, Australian War Strategy 1939-1945, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia Queensland, 1985, pp.422-424.

' ibid, p.425. PRO, Air 40/1761 - See RAM Command Intelligence Summary

No 14 of May 5, 1945, p.3.

Balikpapan 117

could be used.' Curtin supported MacArthur and 7th Division

carried out Oboe Two.

Curtin's support was not surprising as the Australian government

believed that the one Commander-in-Chief was essential for unity

in operations. That C-in-C was MacArthur, and despite General

Blamey's protests (and others) that Balikpapan was unnecessary,

and indeed that Blarney's headquarters was being used purely for

liaison and not command, Curtin adhered to MacArthurfs wishes on

all operational matters.

OBJECTIVE OF OBOE TWO

The General Headquarters order was issued on 23 May 1945 with 7th

Division's tasks to seize and occupy the Balikpapan/Borneo area;

establish naval, air and logistics facilities; and conserve

petroleum producing and processing installation^.'^

This essentially translated to securing the beach-head,

dominating Balikpapan Harbour, destroying the enemy in

Balikpapan, and securing Sepinggan and Manggar airstrips.

Planning expected air support to be provided from Tarakan and the

Labuan-Brunei Bay area, to support the amphibious assault on the

Balikpapan-Manggar area. Additionally, allied air power was to

neutralise all enemy anti-aircraft (AA) installations, gun

emplacements, oil storage and pumping stations, and enemy

airfields in the NE1 within range of the OA.

Amphibious landings were made at three beaches - Able Green (21 Brigade), Able Yellow and Able Red (18 Brigade), and 25 Brigade

was the divisional reserve.

Athol Moffitt, Project Kingfisher, Angus & Robertson, NSW, Australia, 1989, p.256.

' O Odgers, p.481.

118 Oboe

Task Group 78.2 was tasked with providing the naval force and Air

Vice-Marshal Bostock vith providing the air force. The

responsibility of naval support was to:"

* Transport land forces to Balikpapan and protect convoys.

t Bombard beaches, in support of the landings.

Intercept enemy attempts to reinforce Balikpapan by sea.

Escort and protect friendly shipping along Lines of

Communication (LOCa) to Balikpapan.

t Conduct Motor Torpedo Boat (MTB) operations in the

Balikpapan area.

* Establish naval forces in the OA to assist 7 Division.

Destruction of oil storage facilities and gravity flow pipelines

became primarily an air force responsibility due to the

limitation that Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) could only be used

in shallow water offshore.

INTELLIGENCE

Some 6,000 Japanese troops held Balikpapan (with 1,500 at

Samarinda and the remaining 4,500 in Balikpapan-Manggar). Of

these latter troops, 1,500 were infantry, 1,500 were artillery

and 1,500 were AA gunners. There were another 4,500 Japanese,

Indonesian and Formosian civilians still operating the oil wells

and refineries .l2

" See 21 AIF Administrative Order No 1, held RAAF Historical Section, Canberra.

Balikpapan 119

The guns represented a significant threat to the naval force, and

General Kenney estimated that 3,000 tons of bombs would be needed

to destroy them.13 The guns included 18 coast defence guns

(located mainly on Parramatta Ridge above Balikpapan), 26 heavy

dual-purpose guns, and 78 medium and light AA guns.I4

Enemy Airfields

Airfields in Balikpapan were at Manggar and Sepinggan.

Additionally, those that could be used as staging bases included

Samarinda, Oelin, Tabanio, Kotawaringin, Mandai and south-west

Bulawesi. Japanese aircraft were based primarily at Malang,

Tanjong Perak, Kalidjati, Kemajoran, Bandung and Den Pasar.

Enemy Aircraft

The early RAAF Operation Plan which indicated only 34 enemy

aircraft of different types in the Borneo-Sulawesiarea, with 400

others available from NEI, Malay Peninsular and Indo-China,I5

appears to have been the basis for George Odgers to state that

the Japanese air strength in NE1 was estimated as having been

reduced to 17 fighters, 17 bombers and some float planes.16

However, the Operation Order of 8 June 1945 was quite specific

in listing 23 enemy combat aircraft in Borneo and Sulawesi, with

an additional 54 in Java and the Lesser Sundas." In the area of

potential support, the strengths were as follows: 87 in Sumatra,

*' Odgers, p.481. l4 ~eogh, p.456.

See RAAF Operation Plan 6-45, Annex E.

l6 Odgers, p.481.

l' 1st TAF Operation Order No 2/45 dated 8 June 1945, Appendix B, p.2.

120 Oboe

68 in Malaya, 52 in Burma-Thailand, and 74 in French Indo-

China. "

While the Operation Order noted that the landing force at Tarakan

had suffered three enemy raids by three to five float planes at

night, it surmised that 'in the circumstances, it can be expected

that the enemy will not put forward in its defence any but a

minor air effort' .l9

While the main air threat was expected to be sporadic dawn and

dusk raids against shipping, enemy aircraft were also expected

to:

* be used to defend the OA,

* conduct suicide attacks and other offensive attacks,

* evacuate VIPs,

confine air attacks to the hours of darkness, and

* conduct reconnaissance flights during dawn and dusk

periods.

Japanese bombers were expected to be held in reserve for the

inevitable Allied assault on Singapore, and it is doubtful that

Balikpapan would have been considered to be of sufficient

importance to warrant suicide attacks. Furthermore, any attacks

against the convoy could be expected to come through the North

Sulawesi or Balikpapan area - hence, the Allied attacks on

military targets in these areas. Once the convoy was in the

Macassar Strait and thereafter, attacks could come from float

plane bases in the Macassar Strait or Bandjermasin areas. The

" ibid.

l9 1st TAF Operation Order 2/45 of 8 June 45, Appendix B, p.1.

Balikpapan 12 1

Oboe Six operation at Labuan-Brunei Bay was expected to

neutralise enemy aircraft on the west Borneo coast, thus removing

the threat from that area. Despite the assessment that enemy

bombers would probably not be used to defend Balikpapan, there

was still the concern that Balikpapan was within bombing range

of enemy aircraft based in Java. And nothing is sure in war.

It was doubtful that the Oboe Two task force could effect

surprise as the enemy would be expecting an attack on Balikpapan

and the first sighting of the Allied amphibious force approaching

East Borneo would be a clear indication that landings at

Balikpapan were imminent. However, the enemy would be uncertain

of the actual points selected for the landings.

Flying Conditions

Based on the meteorological information available, flyimg

conditions could be expected to be good. The most favourable

time over targets would be 0800-1100, when morning fogs had

dissipated. Daytime over-sea conditions would also be good, but

would be less-favourable at night. Heavy showers and high build-

up of cloud (above 25,000 feet) over the interior's higher

mountains would affect operations in mid-afternoon. A detailed

weather summary for air operations was provided in Operation

Instruction No 154/1945 of 26 May 1945, which was the same as for

the previous Oboe operations."

The Airfield

Immediately following the assault, and by 7 July, an all-weather

runway with dimensions of 5,000 feet by 100 feet, alert aprons

and undispersed parking for one fighter wing (three squadrons of

Kittyhawks and one of Spitfires), one ASR flight and one Army

20 See Chapter Two for specific assessments.

122 Oboe

Cooperation Wing2' had to be constructed. Intensive operations

would be required for one month. In addition, an MFCL

headquarters building, a base operations building and a control

tower had to be con~tructed.~~

By 16 July, increased undispersed parking for an additional twc

fighter squadrons (P.38~ staging through), and one attack bomber

wing of two squadrons (one of Mosquitoes and one of Beaufighters)

was required. An additional all-weather runway measuring 7,OOC

feet by 100 feet and undispersed parking for an additional twc

squadrons of heavy bombers were required by 31 July.

RAAF PLANNING

Connnand and Control

The General Officer Commanding Oboe Two was Major General

Milford, with Brigade Commanders being Brigadiers Chilton (18

Brigade), Dougherty (21 Brigade), and Eather (25 Brigade). Ail

Vice-Marshal Bostock was AOC-in-C RAAF Command and Air Commodore

Scherger was AOC 1st TAF, responsible for air support of Oboe Two

and for maintaining air garrisons at Labuan, Tarakan and Morotai.

As with the previous Oboe operations, aircraft were under commancl

of respective unit or base commands until reporting on station,

after which they were under the control of Commander Support

Aircraft (CSA), who was embarked in the headquarters ship.

The Army Cooperation Wing was to contain one tactical reconnaissance squadron (~oomerangs), one communications uni.. IBeaufortsI, one AOP flight (Austers), one troop carrier squadro~ (C. 47 Sky rains) , one search squadron (PV1 venturas ) , one-photo.. charting squadron (F~s), and one ASR flight (Catalinas).

22 Overruns, flight strips and approaches also had to bc prepared. Overruns would be at each end of the runway and hacl to be 500 feet in length, and flight strips had to be 100 feet on each side of the runway.

Balikpapan 123

Operation Instruction 154/45 of 26 May 45 carried the following

note: '13th Air Force US- will retain operational control of

all 13th Air Force units located within the area of

responsibility of RAW Command, A M ' .23

Air Tasks

The RAAF was to provide air cover over the convoy and OA for

Cruiser Support and Covering Group (CTG 74.2), and the Attack

Group; and convoy cover only for resupply convoys as requested

by Commander Oboe-Two Attack Group (CTG 78.2). Similarly, cover

and supporting aircraft were to be provided for MTB operations. Convoy air cover was to be provided by two fighters on station

from 0600 to 1900 daily. The cover was to be provided from

Morotai, Tawi Tawi, Zamboanga and Tarakan.

All OA air cover was to be provided by the RAAF. Four fighters

were to be on-station from 0730 to 1800 hours daily and one night

fighter from 1800 to 0730. Cover was to be provided from 15 June

until notified to stop. Air cover for MTB operations involved

two fighters on-station from 0730 to 1800 hours daily.

Fighter/bomber aircraft were to assist in the neutralisation of

enemy targets at the OA prior to FOX-Day (F-Day), and to provide

close support for ground forces during the assault and

consolidation phases. Aircraft were also to provide ASR, and in

conjunction with 13th AF, provide heavy air strikes prior to and

after F-Day. Three Austers were to operate from 1 July and an

additional three to operate from 2 July, for AOP duties. Smoke-

laying aircraft were also to be used. Courier services were to

be provided between Tarakan and Balikpapan from 1-7 July and

another service between Manila and Balikpapan from 1-4 July. ASW

was provided by the RAAF and air forces of the Seventh Fleet.

23 See Operation Instruction 154/45 of 26 May 45, p.6, paragraph 17.

124 Oboe

AOCs North Western Area (NWA) and Western Area (WA) supported

Oboe Two. NWA aircraft prosecuted attacks against air bases,

installations, LOCs, and troop concentrations; maintained an air

blockade; conducted mining operations; protected convoys;

provided tactical reconnaissance and photography as required:

provided a safe-hand courier service: and carried out search

plans. WA aircraft also provided air protection for convoys,

carried out tactical reconnaissance and photography, and

conducted long-range attacks against enemy targets."

Tasking for 13th AF was meant to be limited to:

* Long-range attacks against enemy airfields and

installations within staging range of Balikpapan-Manggar.

* Air photography as ordered by AOC-in-C RAAF Command.

* Night fighter cover, with one aircraft over the OA from

2000 until 0700 each day from 1 July until relieved by No

452 Squadron (expected to be 7 July).

* Daylight fighter cover for convoys proceeding to and from

Balikpapan between 122 degrees East and 125 degrees East.

* Anti Submarine cover for convoys between Morotai and the

OA .

* Night fighters on-station 0600-0730 and 1800-2000 daily for

convoy cover between 122 degrees East and 125 degrees East.

However, the non-operational status of Tarakan airfield meant

that 13th AF had to provide more support as the RAAF could not

undertake certain tasks which were to begin on 15 June.

Z 4 North Western Area and Western Area aircraft carried out these types of activities for all three Oboe operations, but they have been recorded in this chapter only, to eliminate unnecessary duplication.

Balikpapan 125

Specifically, 13th AF had to provide daylight air alert in the

OA, direct support of 7 Division, and convoy fighter cover

between 122 degrees East and the OA. 13th AF operated Lightnings

from Tawi Tawi to meet the air alert and convoy fighter cover

tasks. Two squadrons of Mitchells, operating from Zamboanga,

provided the direct support on six hours notice.25 Once RARF

aircraft began operating from Tarakan, the extra 13th AF tasking

ceased. Nos 77, 78, 81 and 86 Wings and No 452 Squadron were

relying on the availability of Tarakan airfield to allow them to

participate in the Balikpapan operation.

13th AF also had other tasks which included establishing an air

blockade of the South China and Sulu Seas to deny movement of

hostile naval forces and shipping, and to attack enemy air

forces, bases and installations along the French Indo-China coast

from the 13th AF boundary to Saigon.

5th AF was also allocated specific bombing tasksz6 along the

China and French Indo-China coasts (against military

installations), and along the Yangtze River (against LOCs). As

with the previous Oboe operations, 5th AF had to be prepared to

support 13th AF upon request, depending on the availability of

forces . RAAF planning appeared to be more comprehensive than for the

previous Oboe operations. For example, an air support plan was

prepared that listed details of enemy and friendly aircraft and

the procedures to be adopted. As an illustration, the following

areas were specifically covered in the air support plan:" enemy

aircraft, support aircraft available, the Air Support Plan prior

Six hours notice meant that from the time of origin of the request for direct air support at the ASS to the time that the strike was required had to be a minimum of six hours.

26 See Operation Instruction 154/45 of 26 May 45.

27 S,ee 21 AIF Operation Order of 11 June 1945, Appendix J, copy held RAAF Historical Section.

126 Oboe

to 1 July, the Air Support Plan for 1 July, the Air Support Plan

for 2-5 July, the Air Support Plan from 6 July, procedures during the assault and as soon as ASPS were operating ashore, and

procedures when control passed ashore. In addition, general

communications procedures were promulgated.

For the first time in the Oboe operations, there is evidence of

a requirement to follow doctrine p~blications.~' Specifically,

the following publications were to be used: Air Defence Battle

Orders, Radar Filter Instructions, RAAF System of Operational

Control, and Manual of 'Standing Operating Procedure for Attack

Aviation in Close Support'.

Restrictions on Operations

Instructions indicated that certain areas and installations were

to suffer only minimum damage, although damage was not to be

avoided at the expense of destroying the primary target. These

areas and installations were:29

* highways and rail systems;

oil producing facilities (except those targeted as capable

of being used in defence of enemy positions);

* docks and port facilities;

* public utilities, power houses, etc; and

* other areas so designated on target maps.

See 1st TAF Operation Order 2/45 of 8 June 45, held RAAF Historical Section.

29 See 1st TAF Operation Order 2/45 of 8 June 45.

Balikpapan 127

From 15 June, aircraft were ordered not to attack surface craft

in the area as friendly mine-sweeping was underway. As well,

naval observation aircraft were in the OA from 16 June and RAAF

aircraft were advised to exercise caution.

Courier Service

C!atalinas were to provide courier services between Tarakan and

Balikpapan until the Balikpapan strip was opened and C.47~ could

begin operations. No 76 Wing operated a courier service from 1

July between Manila and Balikpapan.

Line of Approach

All aircraft approaching the Oboe Two convoy from 1 July were to

Ely an approach from 10 nautical miles on a heading of 225

degrees, at a height of not more than 1,500 feet.

CONDUCT OF AIR OPERATIONS

RAAF Command*s objective prior to 1 ~uly" was to destroy hostile

ground forces in Balikpapan-Manggar and the oil installations

that could be used in defence against allied ground forces.

These operations constituted phase one. The other two phases

will also be examined in terms of those operations carried out

on 1 July, and those conducted after 1 July.

F-Day was initially planned as 22 May but eventually became 1 July.

128 Oboe

Phase One (Prior to 1 July)

The enemy AA positions had to be destroyed before 15 June, when

minesweeping operations were to begin. Bad weather during the

period 1-15 June meant that most Allied attacks had to be

switched to alternate targets." Thus, by 15 June the planning

staffs had become quite concerned. In the end, naval and air

bombardment was able to neutralise the Japanese defences in time.

The minesweeping operation was, at the time, the biggest

undertaken by the Allies in the SWPA.~~

AVM Bostock's plan was to use Liberator's of Nos 21, 23 and 24

Squadrons and from North Western and Western Areas for bombing;

as well as No 77 Wing Beaufighters and No 78 Wing Kittyhawks,

reinforced by squadrons from No 81 Wing. No 77 Wing was to

provide two aircraft each day to attack the area, while No 78

Wing was to be on air alert over the OA and provide air cover

over the convoy. All aircraft (except the Liberators) were meant

to operate from Tarakan from 8 Junes3 but that was not po~sible.~'

Thus, the RAAF missed an opportunity to provide comprehensive

support, and 13th AF Lightnings from Sanga Sanga provided the air

cover. In addition, three USN escort carriers with fighters were

allotted to the Task Force C~mmander.~~ Bostock also had to

change other plans and operate Liberators from Morotai, Samar and

31 This included a formation of RAAF Liberators on 12 June, which was unable to attack Balikpapan. Next day, however, American Liberators were able to get through and bomb the anti- aircraft defences at Balikpapan township and Sepinggan airfield. See Odgers, p.482.

33 Odgers, p.482.

34 As discussed in Chapter 2, the Tarakan airfield did not become operational until 28 June, with the first sortie being flown on 30 June.

35 The Navy was not prepared to risk the chance of bad weather keeping the 13th AF Lightnings grounded.

Palawan to provide direct support for the assault on Balikpapan.

So, although Bostock had 40 squadrons (including 25 squadrons of

heavy bombers), many had to operate from remote airfields up to

1,100 kilometres away.j6

On 15 June, RAAF Liberators were unsuccessful in their attack on

Balikpapan (with only six out of 12 reaching the target area and

many bombs falling into the sea).3' From 19-25 June, RAAF

LLberators were more successful, dropping 119 tons of bombs on

the Balikpapan area and destroying oil installations and one AA

position, as well as starting large fires." From 27 June, heavy

attacks were launched, including against the strong enemy coastal

dlefences. On this day, 123 Liberators (including six from No 82

Wing) and 73 Mitchells prosecuted the first raids.

From 26-28 June, RAAF aircraft attacked targets as a diversion

to allow underwater reconnaissance to be undertaken in advance

of underwater demolition.

On 27 and 29 June, from 0810 to 1000, high-level bombing attacks

were made near the landing beaches. Bombs were dropped on land,

not closer than 100 metres inland from the high water mark as

underwater demolition teams were present on the beaches.

No 25 Squadron Liberators attacked Malang on 29 June - attacking from 15,000 feet at night, they placed 90% of their bombs between

a hangar and barracks area at the southern end of the airstri~.~'

On 30 June, the squadron attacked an airfield near S~rabaya.~'

36 Odgers, p.482.

" ibid, p.483.

" ibid. Michael V. Nelmes, Tocumwal to Tarakan: Australians and

the Consolidated 8-24 Liberator, Banner Books, Canberra, 1994, pp.127-128.

" ibid, p.128.

130 Oboe

Beaufighters and Kittyhawks began deploying to Tarakan airstrip

once it became serviceable on 28 June. After the long wait to

use the strip, landings on that first day were not without

mishap. One Beaufighter ran out of fuel and crash-landed off the

runway, one Kittyhawk over-ran the airstrip, and another crashed

into the sea. In all, five Beaufighters and 18 Kittyhawks landed

successfully on that first day.41

From 30 June, No 78 Wing (comprising Nos 75, 78, 80 and 452

squadrons) flew fromTarakanto support the Balikpapan operation.

It was found that the Beaufighters could not operate from Tarakan

and they had to be withdrawn to Morotai. No 78 Wing's first

missionwas against Labuan and Mensalung (involving 16 Kittyhawks

and four Spitfires).

Phase Two (1 July)

On 1 July, a concerted 40-minute air bombardment of the landing

beaches was conducted by 10 squadrons of Liberators (from 5th AF,

13th AF and 1st TAF). Twenty-four 13th AF aircraft dropped 50

tons of bombs, then came the Australian Liberators between 0810

and 0824 hours, just before 7th Division landed. The RAAF

Liberators were from No 21 Squadron (seven aircraft), No 23

Squadron (six aircraft) and No 24 Squadron (seven aircraft).

They attacked from altitudes of 6,900 to 8,000 feet and dropped

approximately 200 500-lb bombs (almost 50 tons). Next, 38

Liberators from 5th AF dropped 70 tons of bombs on targets near

the beaches. Then, Mitchells laid smoke to cover the amphibious

craft as they landed on the beach.42 Pre-landing operations had

been conducted off Manggarto deceive the Japanese into believing

that the landing would occur there, rather than between Stalkoedo

and Klandasan.

" Odgers, p.483. Refer also to Air Chief Marshal McNamara's comments in Chapter 2.

42 ibid, p.484.

Bal ikpapan 131 i

As 7th Division was to move ashore near Balikpapan township,

buildings near the beach had to be destroyed to prevent the

Japanese using them for protection during the assault.

Similarly, all oil tanks were destroyed to prevent the enemy from

using burning oil against the assault forces.

There was also a continuous 14-feet wide anti-tank ditch along

the beach from Stalkoedo to Sepinggan. A similar ditch existed

in the Klandasan area. Off-shore there was another obstacle

which covered the Klandasan to Manggar area and exposed only a

Eew gaps - rows of stout poles had been pile-driven into the sea- bed, braced with timber and protected by barbed wire." These

all had to be overcome.

The Command ship USS Wasatch received progress reports over the

beach from an RAAF Liberator of No 24 Squadron, which came under

fire from AA guns. It appeared that some AA guns had been moved

to positions along the Samarinda road after the assault began.

Tragically, the relieving Liberator (also of No 24 Squadron) was

hit by AA fire and ditched in the sea, with some loss of life.

Twelve B.25 Mitchells with 100-lb General Purpose bombs

(instantaneously fused) bombed the landing beach to destroy beach

mines. Then, B.24 Liberators, armed with anti-personnel bombs,

attacked the beach defences immediately prior to the assault.

Throughout the day (from 0730 until 1630), Beaufighters attacked

Japanese targets every 90 minutes.

Australian Army soldiers securedthe beach-head within 15 minutes

of landing, and some hours later (by 1415) took Parramatta Ridge

(a 300-foot high ridge which allowed command of the entire

Klandasan beach) ."

4"eogh, pp. 456-458.

" Odgers, p.485.

132 Oboe

An air strike was requested for 1600 hours on 1 July. Despitc

protests from Air Vice-Marshal Bostock, USN dive-bombers werc

used, resulting in some bombs landing among the 2/10tl1

Battalion, causing casualties. It was the 2/10th that hac

captured Parramatta Ridge. Air Vice-Marshal Bostock had arguec

that there were differences between close support procedures for

armies and navies, and in addition, the USN pilots did not knob

the terrain. The Australians held the ridge that night despite

a Japanese counter-attack and the USN bombing.

It was important to provide heavy bombardment in advance of the

assault as the task force consisted of 200 American, Australian

and Dutch ships - the largest amphibious operation in the SWPA since January, when forces landed at Lingayen. Despite two hours

of this heavy bombardment, the assault forces still experienced

artillery, mortar and small arms fire. Nevertheless, 17 assault

waves landed without suffering any casualties." At 1900 hours

on 1 July, command of operations passed ashore to the General

Officer Commanding 7th Divi~ion.'~

Destruction was complete, with oil storage tanks, the refinery,

houses, shops and warehouses virtually razed. Those structures

still standing were burned out and railway tracks were torn up."

Japanese concrete bunkers were abandoned (as they were on

Tarakan) as the troops withdrew inland to escape the allied air

bombardment.

Brigadier Dougherty's 21 Brigade landed on Able Green beach in

the vicinity of Klandasan Besar River, consolidated the position

and captured Sepinggan airstrip. Brigadier Chilton's 18 Brigade

landed on Able Yellow and Able Red beaches and captured

Balikpapan town.

4 5 Odgers, p.484.

" Keogh, p.462. '' Odgers, p.484.

Balikpapan 133

The 23 Squadron diary on 1 July recorded the following in

relation to Balikpapan operations that day - 'A great day for Australia's fighting men. It was in fact a wholly Australian

showr

Phase T h r e e ( A f t e r 1 July)

Sepinggan airfield was secured on 2 July by the 2/14th Battalion

,and work began immediately to repair the extensive cratering of

tlhe strip.

Tlhe first 24 Squadron Liberator was lost on the first day.4g On

tlhe next day (2 July), a second Liberator was lost (hit by flak

at less than 1,000 feet), just inland of ~alikpapan." The third

aircraft was lost on 5 July, near Sepinggan airfield.5'

On the 2nd and 5th July, No 24 Squadron lost two Liberators at

1,~w-level to AA fire. They were employed on observation duties

and each carried an Army observation officer.

Auster aircraft had been taken ashore on 1 July but the proposed

temporary landing field proved unsuitable and they had to wait

for Sepinggan airfield to be repaired. By noon on 3 July, the

strip was ready and the first Auster was airborne an hour later.

By the end of 3 July, 7th Division had captured Balikpapan

township and the Klandasan peninsula.

" NelmeS, p.115. ibid, p.114.

ibid, p.115.

51 ibid.

134 Oboe

An immediate problem faced the Australian units trying to move

from the beach to the airfield. Bridges, gutters and culverts

along Vasey highway had been destroyed and had to be repaired

before heavy equipment could be moved. Hence, the full use of

the airfield was denied for several days. No 61 Airfield

Construction Wing was to begin work on 4 July but was delayed by

two days. Although the centre of the airfield was extensively

cratered, the ends were in reasonably good condition.

No 78 Wing, operating from Tarakan, had to divide its attention

between providing CAIRS for 7th Division and striking enemy

concentrations in Sandakan and elsewhere in north-east Borneo.

The 13th AF, using Liberators, Mitchells and Lightnings provided

constant strikes against the Japanese forces around Balikpapan.

No 75 Squadron Kittyhawks and No 452 Squadron Spitfires attacked

Kalabakan and Simalumong on 2 July and two Kittyhawks were lost.

Another was lost on 7 July. More Spitfires arrived at Tarakan

on 9 July to bring No 452 Squadron to full strength. On the

loth, Kittyhawks and Spitfires attacked Tawao in a coordinated

attack with USN PT boats. Two bridges and several huts were

destroyed, but one Spitfire was lost. Another was lost two days

later over the same target.

While the bombing of Balikpapan was claimed as excessive in some

circles, Allied commanders had called for heavy bombardment to

reduce Allied casualties. The RAAF Command Report summarised

that 'damage incidental to achieving this result [landing with

only slight casualties] can only be regarded as completely

j~stified'.~' Despite the heavy air bombardment, only 17 of the

26 heavy dual-purpose guns were destroyed. Direct hits by

aircraft proved difficult and naval bombardment was needed to

silence the remaining guns.

Odgers, p.484.

Balikpapan 135

The Sepinggan airfield was ready for use from 13 July, with its

operable 3,000-foot runway. No 452 Squadron Spitfires arrived

with USN Catalinas on 15 July, eight days later than originally

planned. Flying from Sepinggan, the Spitfires strafed dug-in

Japanese positions. Meanwhile, No 80 Squadron had arrived at

Tarakan (on 13 July) from Morotai and flew four Kittyhawk armed

reconnaissance missions against Redeb on 14 July.

On 19 July, eight Kittyhawks from No 75 Squadron, eight

1:ittyhawks from No 80 Squadron and 15 Spitfires from No 452

Ijquadron flew close support missions for Australian ground forces

around Balikpapan. The Spitfires sunk llbarges, some containing

Japanese soldiers, and the Kittyhawks of No 75 Squadron bombed

iin enemy barracks area. The Kittyhawks refuelled at Sepinggan

before returning to Tarakan. On 22 July, No 452 Squadron

destroyed four vehicles and damaged seven others.

A Japanese reconnaissance aircraft flew over Balikpapan on the night of 22 July, and two nights later, Japanese bombers dropped

25 bombs which damaged one RAAF Catalina. This raid represented

Japan's largest air attack since the beginning of the Borneo

(campaign. No 110 MFCU had detected the attacking aircraft and

two Spitfires were launched to intercept. One Spitfire achieved a kill but had to return to base out of fuel, while the second

was unable to contact the enemy aircraft.

Because the Allies believed that the Japanese aircraft had staged

through Bandjermasin airfields, an attack was launched on 23

July. Twelve Kittyhawks from Nos 75, 78 and 80 Squadrons (four

from each) flew from Tarakan to Sepinggan. From here they

attacked Ulin and Tabanio airfields. Kittyhawks returned again

on 24 July. For the same reasons, Limbung airfield was attacked

by No 82 Wing Liberators, flying from Morotai. On 22 July, No

25 Squadron Liberators, flying through Learmonth, attacked

Semarang . 53

136 Oboe

During July, 1st TAF Kittyhawks and Spitfires flew 877 sorties,

flying from Tarakan and Sepinggan. These aircraft continually

attacked enemy concentrations, preventing the Japanese from

consolidating their positions. This continued throughout August

until offensive air operations ceased. On 14 August, 1st TAF

sent out a message as follows: 'Offensive operations against

enemy cities, land communications and other land targets except

direct support for allied ground forces in contact with the enemy

will cease until further orders. Reconnaissance and photo

missions, anti-shipping strikes and fighter attacks against

airborne enemy aeroplanes will continue. Forces charged with air

defence will be especially alert'.54

Bostock, in a letter to the interim Prime Minister F.M. Forde on

12 July 1945, stated that at least 120 concrete gun emplacements

covered the beaches. Aircraft reduced these defences to less

than half a dozen effective units.55 In doing so, Bostock had

employed some 300 Liberators (or 25 squadrons), and 15 squadrons

of other less-capable aircraft.

On Balikpapan, conditions were better than elsewhere on Borneo

or at Morotai - electric lighting and showers were provided, although personnel still lived in tents.56 On 27 July, another

Liberator was lost, over the northern tip of ~ulawesi.~' Four

days later, another Liberator was lost over the ~almaheras.~'

Odgers, p.490. It was felt necessary to stress the need to stay alert because of the possibility of Kamikaze attacks; although none eventuated.

55 Australian War Memorial:54,81/3/9, as cited in Robertson and McCarthy, p.427.

56 Nelmes, p.116.

'' ibid, p.116. 58 ibid, p.118.

Balikpapan 137

Anti-Submarine Warfare

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) was provided by the RAAF and

Commander, Air Seventh Fleet and involved PBM and PBY type5'

aircraft based at Tawi Tawi and Morotai. Patrols started at

daylight each day from 15 June until notified to stop. Barrier

patrol covered an east/west line from the Borneo coast to the

Sulawesi coast (that is, from the east coast of Borneo to the

west coast of Sulawesi). After being relieved, aircraft would

return to base through Macassar Strait. Another RAAF ASW patrol

would fly the route west from Morotai (during daylight hours from

10 June).

A,ir Observation

From 1 July, air observation was provided over 7th Division in

t.he OA by RAAF B.24 Liberators, between 0730 and 1630 each day.

These aircraft were used to coordinate CAIRS or provide actual

direction to CAIRS aircraft.

Air Sea Rescue

Air Sea Rescue (ASR) in the OA was provided whenever aircraft

were airborne in the vicinity, but dedicated ASR missions were

not flown.

Photographic Services

On 26, 28, 29 and 30 June and 1 July, aerial photographs were

taken of the landing beaches and adjacent areas, and the

negatives were dropped to the Attack Group.

5 9 Both were Catalina variants.

138 Oboe

Routine Reconnaissance

Daily reconnaissance by Fleet Air Wing aircraft from bases in

Mindoro, Palawan and Morotai was flown to cover all sea areas in

north-eastern, northern and eastern Borneo and the Sulu

archipelago. Armed reconnaissance was conducted by the RAAF and

13th AF over Halmahera, Sulawesi and NEI.

Reconnaissance aircraft in the OA or over convoy routes reported

enemy sightings directly to CSA, otherwise results would appear

in the daily despatches via the normal communications circuits.

Smokelaying

Smokelaying aircraft were on standby to protect minesweeping

operations beginning on 15 June. Requests were generated by CTG

74.2 Commander Support and Covering Group to Advanced RAAF

Command at Morotai at least 24 hours in advance of the

requirement. From 27-29 June, one aircraft was used to provide

protection for the underwater demolition teams and was on-

station from 0800 to 1000 each day. Use of smokelaying aircraft

had to be coordinated with NGS. All smokelaying aircraft

received fighter protection fromthe aircraft affording local air

cover.

No 2 Airfield Defence Squadron

As with the previous Oboe operations, RAAF units were responsible

for their own internal security, ground defence, and passive

defence measures against air attack.@' No 2 Airfield Defence

Squadron was responsible for:61

Operation Order 2/45 of 8 June 45, Appendix F.

Listed in 1st TAF Operation Order 2/45 of 8 June 45, which differed slightly in wording only fromthe responsibilities at Labuan.

Balikpapan 139

* ground defence and guarding of RAAF aircraft and vital installations;

* supplementary defence of the airstrip in coordination with

the Army;

* defence of ACS units employed on road building, survey and

soil testing: and

* defence of Headquarters 1st TAF CP.

Aircraft Weapon Loads

The following attack aircraft were used:

-- B.24 Liberator bomber with 6,000 lbs weapon load;

.- B.25 Mitchell medium bomber with 3,000 lbs;

.- Beaufighter attack bomber with 1,000 lbs (or 8 rockets) and

4x20mm cannon;

- Mosquito attack bomber with 3,000 lbs and 6x20mm cannon;

- P.38 Lightning fighter with 4x.50 cal guns, lx20mm cannon

(could also carry drop tank filled with napalm); and

- P.40 Kittyhawk fighter with 6x.50 cal guns, (could also

carry 2x500 lb bombs).

The type of bombs carried included 1,000-lb, 500-lb and 100-lb.

140 Oboe

AIR SUPPORT ORGANISATION

As well as providing the ASS, ASPs and ALPs, 1st TAF provided a CSA and two officers for the Headquarters ship and a CSA for the

Advanced Headquarters ship. Specific call signs are listed in

RAAF Command Operation Instruction 154/1945, Appendix B,

Attachments B1 and B3.

ALPs were allocated as follows: No 5 ALP with 2/9 Battalion, No

6 ALP with 2/10 Battalion, No 7 ALP with 2/12 Battalion, No 8 ALP

with 2/14 Battalion, No 9 ALP with 2/16 Battalion, No 10 ALP with

2/27 Battalion, No 11 ALP with 2/31 Battalion, and No 12 ALP with

2/33 Battalion. The ALPs embarked with their respective

battalions, proceeded ashore with the battalion commander, and

opened communications with CSA (Afloat) as soon as the battalion

headquarters was sited. When brigade headquarters became

established ashore, they ceased transmitting to CSA and began

communicating with their respective ASPs.

Similarly, the ASPS embarked with their respective brigades,62

proceeded ashore with the advanced brigade headquarters and

opened communications with CSA and ALPs. They relayed all

messages between CSA, ALPS and the brigade commander and provided

specialist air advice to the brigade commander. Finally, they

examined all requests for air support and ensured that targets

were suitable, clearly defined and that pertinent information was

included on bombline, position of friendly troops, air-ground

signals, and time by which the support was required.

The ASS itself embarked with relevant elements of 1st TAF CP and

Headquarters 7 Division, and proceeded ashore with them.

Communications were established quickly and control was assumed

over all air support as quickly as possible. The ASS advised all

ASPs when CSApassed ashore, received all ASP communications, and

controlled all direct support aircraft, as well as courier,

62 NO 5 ASP with 18 Brigade, No 6 ASP with 21 Brigade, and No 7 ASP with 25 Brigade.

Balikpapan 14 1

photographic, ASR and Support Air Observer aircraft.

Ground forces marked their front-line positions by fluorescent

panels,63 while the targets to be attacked were marked by white

smoke. If the white smoke was to be provided by mortar, the Air

Support Party would receive its timing direct from the Battalion

Commander. However, if the smoke was to be provided by

artillery, then the ASP would have to use land wire or direct

radio communications with the artillery battery to receive its

t.iming .

All strike leaders had to establish communications with Commander

Support Aircraft and could be asked to make a dummy run before

t.he live run. CSA had responsibility to coordinate artillery and

NGS to ensure the safety of the strike group.

An air coordinator remained airborne over the OA, identifying

targets and guiding attacking aircraft. Additionally, Army Air

1,iaison Officers (ALOs), specially trained as airborne observers

flew in RAAF Liberators over the OA each day from 1 July, during

0730-1600 hours. They reported activities of friendly and enemy

ground forces, conducted ranging for NGS, and dropped messages.

NGS was provided from 16 June and had to be coordinated with

aircraft movements (through CSA) so that it could be suspended

if necessary or aircraft could be providedwithminimum altitudes

from which to prosecute their attacks. CSA could reduce, cancel

or place on ground alert, the direct support aircraft.

The AOP Austers (three on 1 July and three more on 2 July)

provided observation of artillery fire, limited short-range

reconnaissance, and emergency communication flights.

63 Red indicated 18th Brigade front-lines, yellow indicated 21st Brigade front-lines, and black and white panels with the relevant number indicated the specific unit headquarters.

142 Oboe

As for the other Oboe operations, the flight leader of aircraft

formations reported to CSA the number and type of aircraft in the

formation, position and altitude, time available on station, and

type of bombs carried. Aircraft orbited the east end of

Sepinggan airstrip until called onto targets. Radio aids such

as a H/F D/F station, medium-frequency homing beacon, VHF homer, and ASV beacon were installed at the airstrip to aid navigation.

Map references were given in Standard Target Designator Grid

(four figures and one letter). ASPS passed requests to CSA who

then briefed the pilots. Where possible and appropriate,

artillery or mortar smoke was used to indicate targets for direct

air support aircraft. CSA would advise when artillery or mortar

smoke was being used to indicate targets by using the words

'Splash ..... Seconds'. In the Operation Order,64 specific

targets were provided in six-digit map references (causing

confusion and necessitating time to convert) on bunker shelters,

pillboxes, barracks, stores areas, gun positions, AAA positions,

the anti-tank ditch, cunnel entrances, trenches, minefields,

searchlights, oil tanks, and radar sites. These were all noted

as targets of military imp~rtance.'~

Priorities for allied attacks were: firstly, all AA and coastal

defence guns in Balikpapan, Sepinggan and Manggar areas. Next

were major defence installations and positions, then oil

installations, then barracks and stores areas. Finally, at least

two breaks in the oil pipeline between Manggar and Stalkoeda were

required so that the pipeline could be kept unserviceable.

Action was also taken to keep Manggar and Sepinggan airstrips

non-operational until they were in Allied hands.

Operation Order 2/45 of 8 June 45.

This showed a clear concern for the laws of war, or as it is now termed, law of armed conflict.

Balikpapan 143

Reference point for fighter direction and warning was one degree

17 minutes South, 116 degrees 49 minutes East and was referred

to as Point Freida. All radar contacts in the OA were reported

by bearing and distance in nautical miles from Point Freida.

From 15 June, all aircraft approaching within 50 miles (80

kilometres) of the OA reported to CSA.

Air intents were exchanged between 1st TAF, 13th AF and 1st TAP

CP Balikpapan, specifying exact target area and times over

target .

FIGHTER OPERATIONS

Fighter Direction

The Fighter Director on CTG 78.2 was responsible to CSA for air

defence. Advance Group Fighter Director on CTG 74.2 handed over

ell responsibility on 1 July.

Fighter Director Destroyer teams were used to exercise tactical

c:ontrol of CAP aircraft assigned for defence of all forces in the

OA and were to: maintain a continuous plot of all information

affecting the defence of friendly forces; and maintain a plot of

all action against enemy forces, loss of friendly aircraft and

information on downed pilots.

CAP aircraft could be used on CAIRS strafing missions while

awaiting scheduled time of departure for CAP missions. CSA had

the responsibility for requesting such support.

The RAAF Mobile Fighter Control Unit (MFCU) assumed control

ashore once communications and radar facilities had been

established. To assist in coordinating air defence in the OA,

144 Oboe

a MFCU representative accompanied CSA. The operation order66

included the following: 'Should control of American aeroplanes

be passed to No 110 MFCU, American controllers may be made

available for duty at No 110 MFCu'.

No 110 MFCU employedthree LW/AirWarning (LW/AW) radar stations,

one LW/GCI, and wireless observer posts for air warning and

fighter control. The assault echelon of the MFCU landed within

four hours of the assault and set up two LW/AWs at Sepinggan

beach-head, and 12 hours later had the LW/GCI established. The

follow-up section landed on 3 July and was fully operational two

days later.

Radar stations were camouflaged and No 4 RIMU calibrated the

LW/AW and LW/GCI stations, as had been the case with the previous

Oboe operations.

Coordination of Air Defence

Coordination of air defence with land forces was described well

in the Operation Order.6' The Commanding Officer of No 54

Squadron had responsibility for air defence of the Balikpapan

area from 7 July. No 110 MFCU was responsible for issuing air

raid warnings, allocating responsibilities to air and ground

defences, and controlling fighter aircraft until visual contact

with enemy aircraft had been made. The MFCU had full

responsibility for coordinating air and ground defences during

daylight hours.

At night, ground forces had unrestricted scope for attack upon

enemy aircraft until mid-point, after which RAAF aircraft were

See Operation Order 2/45 dated 8 June 45, Appendix C, p.4.

See Operation Order 2/45 dated 8 June 45, Appendix G. l

Balikpapan 145

allowed to intercept unrestricted by ground defen~es.~' However,

aircraft could not begin interception until the last shell had

burst. If aircraft could not effect interception, they would

report 'NO GO' to the MFCU controller who then allowed

unrestricted scope for the ground defences.

Close Air Support

Starting from 15 June until 1 July, Beaufighters were armed to

bomb, fire rockets and strafe targets in the OA from 0930 to 1630

each day. Aircraft were assigned primary and secondary targets

prior to departure from base but could be instructed to attack

specific targets as designated by Advance Commander Support

Aircraft, embarked in the flagship of Commander Cruiser Support

and Covering Group (CTG 74.2). Upon arrival of CTG 78.2 in the

OA, this air commander handed over to Commander Support Aircraft

who was embarked in the flagship of Commander Oboe-Two Attack

(;roup (CTG 78.2). CSA handed over to RAAF Air Support Section

at a time agreed by Commander Oboe-Two Attack Group and GOC 7th

Iiustralian Division.

llestrictions for Aircraft

After 15 June, aircraft were not to attack surface craft in

Macassar Straits north of latitude two degrees south without

permission from CSA (or Advance CSA). Aircraft were not

purposely to destroy docks, piers, jetties, lighthouses or other

navigation aids unless specifically directed. Oil producing

facilities which could not be used by the enemy in tactically

defending the OA were not to be destroyed. After the 15th, no

air strikes were to be conducted without notifying CSA or Advance

Mid-point was a geographical position used as a datum. The Commanding Officer of No 54 Squadron determined the position after consultation with 7 Division.

146 Oboe

CSA as appropriate.

Aircraft had to maintain strict radio frequencies and approach

patterns into the OA, and had to identify themselves as friendly.

Coordination of NGS during the assault involved the Air Observer

dropping white flares in salvo over Balikpapan when the lead boat

was 500 yards from the beach. Flares ignited at some 1,200-1,500

feet above the level of smoke and dust.

ADMINISTRATION

Administrative Instruction No 11, issued in conjunction with 1st

TAF Operation Order 2/45, showed clearly that lessons had been

learned from Oboe One. For example, pre-embarkation instructions

covered the possibility of delays; traffic control at the landing

sites was explained; congestion at beach-heads was addressed; and

RAAF transit areas were provided. Instruction No 11 was very

detailed, and was broken into groupings for movement,

organisation, supplies, equipment, maintenance, accounting, and

medical and hygiene. The level of detail was substantially

greater than for previous operations, and a list of major

headings is provided to indicate the breadth of administrative

information.

PART I - MOVEMENT

A. Movement Organisation (covering division o f

responsibilities and provision of courier services).

B. Movement Program (which provided for embarkation, departure

and arrival, as well as an order of disembarkation).

C. Embarkation Arrangements (which covered logistical limits,

detailed instructions, manifests, nominal rolls,

intercomunication, traffic control, messing arrangements,

Balikpapan 147

etc) .

D. Disembarkation Arrangements (covering control of

disembarkation, beach group organisation, traffic control,

congestion of beach-head, transit areas, and directional

signposts).

PART I1 - ORGANISATION

A. General (covering command, subdivision of units into

echelons and lodger units).

3 Allocation of Areas (covering beach maintenance area, camp

sites and briefing of personnel).

C. Works and Buildings (covering works projects, building

material and water reticulation requirements).

U. Personnel Administration (covering labour, replacements,

discipline, relationship with civil population, security,

burials, and amenities).

IPART I11 - SUPPLIES

A. Supply Responsibilities.

B. Fuel and Explosives.

C. Breathing Oxygen.

D. Rations and Expense Stores.

E. water.

F. Canteen Supplies.

148 Oboe

PART IV - EQUIPMENT

A. Unit Holdings.

B. Resupply.

C. Anti-gas equipment.

D. Marking of Cases.

E. Size of Packages.

P. Allocation of Units to Air Stores Parks.

PART V - MAINTENANCE

A. Aircraft (including pools and unserviceabilities).

B. Mechanical Transport, Marine Craft and Fixed Plant

(including preparation for shipment, waterproofing, de-

waterproofing, etc).

PART V1 - ACCOUNTING

A. Pay.

B. Stores and Other Accounting.

PART V11 - MEDICAL AND HYGIENE

A. Medical (including hospitalisation, casualty evacuation,

first aid, medical rations).

B. Hygiene (including latrines, kitchens, inspections, camp

site evacuation, general equipment).

C. Protective and Precautionary Measures (covering protective

Balikpapan 149

clothing, anti-mite measures, anti-malarial precaut'ions,

swimming, washing of clothes, precautions against

diarrhoea1 diseases).

D. Dental.

In addition to this administrative detail, Operation Instruction

lL54/1945 of 26 May 45, Appendix F divided administrative

responsibilities between the Australian Services. RAAF

:responsibilities were as follows:69

3 i Provide RAW technical supplies in OA.

,k Provide non-common stores for aircraft in OA.

3 Control air evacuation of casualties when such evacuation

is practicable.

;'. Provide stripside medical services as required.

.t Provide aircraft for safehand courier service and

transportation of urgent stores and key personnel to and

from OA.

* Operate bulk aviation fuel installations at airfields.

* Store and maintain drummed aviation fuel.

* Account for aviation fuel and oil issued to Allied forces

through reserve lend-lease procedure.

6 9 See Operation Instruction 154/1945 of 26 May 45, Appendix P, pp.9-10.

150 Oboe

Furthermore, Far East Air Service Command was to make available

any technical supplies for 1st TAP that could not be provided by

the RAAF.''

" This was in accordance with War Department Circular No' 203.

CHAPTER FIVE

OBSERVATIONS

There was almost a casualness to FlAAF planning for Oboe One'

and in particular to detailed briefings on the contents of the

Operations Instruction. Without doubt, any notion of 'it will

be alright on the day', disappeared from subsequent planning

of Oboes Six and Two. The careful planning and close co-

ordination required of air operations testified to the need

for military Services, in this case the W, to ensure

professional mastery. The full potential of the air

environment can only be exploited through such mastery, which

must provide 'the depth of expertise necessary for planning,

directing and executing the application of air power'.? This

has become a doctrinal tenet of the W.

If Tarakan had been disappointing, MacArthur's observation

that the Labuan-Brunei Bay operation was executed flawlessly

must have afforded the Australians some consolation,

especially Bostock.

Because Tarakan airfield could not be used to support Oboe

X RAAF Beaufighters and Kittyhawks had to operate from

!;anga Sanga or Tawi Tawi, adding considerably to the distance

and hence, reducing time on-station. But before the

Beaufighters could operate, parking areas at Sanga Sanga had

to be extended. This delayed their operations until 3 June.

The problem of Tarakan airfield was to continue. Three days

into Oboe Six, FlAAF Beaufighters and Kittyhawks had to leave

Sanga Sanga and move to Morotai. The facilities at Sanga

Sanga were required by 13th AF Lightnings, in preparation for

As a reminder, the Oboe One (Tarakan) landing occurred on 1 May; Oboe Six (Labuan Island/Brunei Bay) on 10 June; and Oboe Two (Balikpapan) on 1 July 1945.

Air Power Studies Centre, AAP 1000, RAAF A i r Power Manual, 2nd E d i t i o n , RAAF Base Fairbairn, Canberra, 1994, 1p.45.

152 Oboe

the Balikpapan operation (only a little over two weeks away).

This move meant that the RAAF aircraft could not provide CAIRS

at Labuan-Brunei Bay, and from the 14th of June (four days

after the landing), 13th AF (flying from Palawan) assumed

responsibility for CAIRS. Fortunately for the RAAF, the

Labuan airstrip was readied quickly and the Kittyhawks

deployed there on 17 June and began operations on the

following day. Spitfires joined them one day later.

Beaufighters had not encountered enemy aircraft in the air for

18 months when they fired on and hit two enemy aircraft on 29

May, after the Tarakan landing. It seems significant that

although the Beaufighters hit the enemy aircraft, they did not

bring them down. This may add weight to the argument that it

was difficult to maintain a combat edge when not actually

engaged in combat.

Alert aircraft that had completed their missions over the

Objective Area (OA), would attack targets of opportunity just

prior to their departure from the OA. This demonstrated the

basic understanding that having risked an aircraft and crew on

a mission, it was not efficient for that aircraft to return

home with unexpended weapons. The lesson of Tarakan was well-

learnt and at Labuan, no aircraft departed the OA with

unexpended bombs or ammunition that had been allocated for use

within the OA.

RAAF Beaufighters provided Combat Air Patrol (CAP) over the

landings at Labuan Island and Brunei Bay on 10 June, but once

the light opposition on the ground had been ascertained, the

aircraft were directed on to secondary targets such as staging

points along known reinforcement routes. Again, this

demonstrated a flexibility of air power that saw more

effective operations being conducted than those that had been

planned initially. Later, small pockets of Japanese

resistance were eliminated by accurate and effective air

attacks.

Observations 153

This flexibility was demonstrated clearly, once again on 10

June over Labuan, where a RAAF Liberator could not bomb its

designated target due to a technical malfunction. Once the

malfunction had been rectified, the aircraft attacked an

alternate target.

Reference points for fighter direction were set for each of

the Oboe operations, to provide more effective control over

aircraft as they entered the OA. At Tarakan, aircraft had to

report to Commander Support Aircraft (CSA) when they were

within 75 miles (120 kilometres) of the OA; this was reduced

b3 50 miles (80 kilometres) for the subsequent Oboe

operations, which would have reduced the load on CSA

significantly.

The failure of Liberator crews to carry standard maps on 7

June added to the workload of the two CSAs (Afloat) for Oboe

Six. It had been clearly articulated that standard Target

Designator Grid maps were to be carried. While the mistake

occurred on only one day, it certainly compounded the problem

that day in co-ordinating Liberator attacks and Naval Gunfire

Support (NGS).

Failure of 13th AF Liberators to obtain prior permission to

bomb at Labuan (on 8 June) showed that problems still existed

with aircrew not being aware of procedures promulgated in

Operations Instructions.

While the effects of bombing enemy forces in the jungle could

not be determined, the precision of attacks around the piers

and docks could be gauged. At Labuan and Brunei Bay, targets

in the vicinity of piers and docks were destroyed, yet the

restricted areas (piers and docks) remained unscathed. Even

though bombing effectiveness could not be measured directly in

jungle areas, Japanese positions, once bombed, tended not to

be reinforced; hence, the bombing was deemed to be successful.

154 Oboe

Bombing was, to a large extent, accurate, but not many

Japanese soldiers appear to have been hit from the air. They

were, however, driven from their fortified positions, which

simplified the task for the Australian troops on the ground.

Enemy resistance on Labuan Island was met by napalm and High

Explosive (HE) attacks by Mitchell bombers. While these air

attacks did not destroy the enemy's defensive position, they

did force the Japanese to stage a break-out, and enemy forces

were totally routed by Australian ground forces a little over

24-hours later.

The early bombardment (prior to the landings) was very

effective - at the Tarakan landing, no air opposition was met, although there were a few air attacks against the airfield.

At Labuan, only one enemy aircraft appeared over the landing

beaches and it did not cause any damage with its bomb. The

few instances of Japanese aircraft approaching after the

Labuan landings resulted in swift action. A US night fighter,

a RAAF Spitfire and AA guns claimed successes. The Spitfire

'kill' was No 457 Squadron's first air combat since 1943.

Although subsequent to the Oboe landings, during an RAAF

attack on 8 August, Kittyhawks destroyed three enemy aircraft

on Kuching airfield. The attack, while important, was

overshadowed by the fact that the Kittyhawks had been airborne

for four hours and forty minutes, which exceeded the accepted

sortie duration time. This underscores a point that aircrew

were sometimes called upon to take what they may have

construed as unnecessary risks. The issue that arises here is

that the risk of losing aircraft and crews must be balanced

against the operational value of the target.

Failure to provide convoy air cover on all occasions did not

endear the air forces, especially the W, to those onboard

the ships in the convoy. While lack of protection for the

Tarakan convoy might have been excusable, the lack of such

Observations 155

protection for the Labuan convoy certainly was not. In the

latter operation, a commanding officer decided not to conduct

a mission and did not advise higher authority, nor indeed, the

convoy. AVM Bostock was to comment on this scathingly later.

The precision obtained by Beaufighters, during Oboe Six, in

attacking Japanese forces on the beach, who were within 100

metres of Australian underwater demolition teams, is worth

noting. However, as with the Tarakan operation, a lack of

understanding by some on-board the Headquarters ships saw some

of the air effort wasted.

The presence of Air Sea Rescue (ASR) aircraft was welcomed by

one Kittyhawk pilot who was shot down on 6 July, and rescued

by a Catalina on the 7th. The importance of inspiring

confidence in aircrew by providing an ASR capability has been

a lesson of note from all conflicts, and one which should

attract more attention in peacetime.

command and control was interesting. Several analyses of the

Oboe operations indicate that Bostock had all air forces under

his operational control. This is simply not true. While the

arrangements for Tarakan are a little obscure, there can be no

misinterpretation for Oboe Six. Here it was clear that 13th

AF aircraft remained under operational control of 13th AF,

even when in the area of responsibility of RAAF Command.

Essentially, AVM Bostock was able to exercise direction over

USAAF aircraft, but not operational control. The confusion

probably arises because Kenney clearly delegated operational

control to Bostock for RAAF aircraft of 1st TAF, and by

implication, similar control of other RAAF aircraft that

entered his area of responsibility.

Communications were again proven to be essential in war.

Direct air support depended so much on communications and up-

to-date information. Communications between Air Liaison

Officers (ALOs) and Air Support Parties (ASPS) would have been

156 Oboe

beneficial, and while operations were effective and were co-

ordinated, both co-ordination and effectiveness could have

been improved had the Army airborne observer been in direct

contact with the ASPS. Another issue worth commenting on here

is that despite communications procedures and specific

frequencies being laid down in operations instructions, too

many mistakes occurred. It reflected a notion of 'we will fix

it on the day', which is not befitting a professional force.

There was great value in having the trained Army observer

airborne, as he understood the situation on the ground and was

able to provide up-to-the-minute information to CSA, to allow

the CSA to better co-ordinate direct air support and ground

force requirements. Similar value was derived from the RAAF

airborne co-ordinator who either co-ordinated strike details

by radio or led the strike aircraft to their targets. This is

indicative of how closely controlled Close Air Support (CAIRS)

and certain Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) missions need

to be, to ensure effort is not wasted and friendly lives not

endangered unnecessarily. The value of the Support Air

Observers (or co-ordinators) was more pronounced in Oboe Six,

which led to specific praise of their efforts in the after-

action report.

Complaints were voiced after Tarakan that the Support Air

Observers (SAOs) could not communicate directly with the

attack aircraft, which reduced responsiveness and

effectiveness. At Labuan, these same complaints were again

voiced. It is amazing that it was not until after Oboe Six

that the issue was clarified. Procedurally, the SAOs could

communicate with the attack aircraft - they simply had to

obtain approval from the CSA to change frequency to the direct

air support net.

It became apparent that information of ground situations,

bomblines and direct air support aircraft (formation size,

weapons and time-on-target) needed to be passed continually to

Observations 157

, CSA so that a current tactical air/land picture could be l maintained. This tended not to happen and CSA had to request

more information continually, with the effect that information

would be passed in relatively intense pulses, unnecessarily

adding time pressures and undoubtedly, confusion, as large

amounts of information - some routine and some priority - had to be processed in short time periods.

The RAAF's No 16 AOP flight accompanied troops ashore at the

Lingkas Beach landing (Tarakan Island). This showed how close

certain RAAF elements were to Army counterparts in the Oboe

operations from the very beginning, and continued throughout.

Despite problems with communications and information overload,

as the rate of advance on the ground increased, the air

support system was flexible enough for aircraft to be directed

to alternate targets and handed over to different ASPS.

However, some airborne alert aircraft effort was wasted.

When aircraft were available for tasking and there were

missions that needed to be conducted, it was inexcusable for

these aircraft not to be used. Tarakan provided salutary

lessons that procedures (especially communications procedures) had to be established in advance; indeed, they even needed to

be rehearsed in advance.

Communications posed problems at Labuan too, where the two

CSAs (Afloat) were unable to communicate effectively with one

another - the dedicated channel malfunctioned. Once the 1st

TAF Command Post (CP) had been established ashore and control

passed ashore to the ASPS with the two Brigades, close co-

ordination was afforded.

The issue of maintaining good communications was highlighted

when the Brigade Commander left the Headquarters ship on l May

(at Tarakan) and could not be contacted until he had

established his Brigade Headquarters ashore. The commander

158 Oboe

would have been better off maintaining communications afloat,

until his headquartezs had established itself and its

communications ashore.

Because communications posed several problems during Oboe One,

planners appeared to react decisively. By the time of Oboe

Six, communications orders reflected strict security

guidelines, plans for jamming and deception, and an

expectation that the enemy may do likewise. This did not, of

course, prevent equipment from malfunctioning and so forth,

but it did highlight a deliberate attempt to address the

possibility of enemy-induced problems (referred to later as

friction).

It seemed easier for tasks to be allocated to squadrons,

rather than to mix forces. For example, CAP over Tarakan was

provided by 78 Wing squadrons in the mornings and 77 Wing

squadrons in the afternoons. While this would have simplified

procedures, it may be indicative that planners expected

squadrons to have difficulty in operating too closely

together. This translates to combined operations as well,

where RAAF and US= units operated as discrete elements.

Again, while this would have simplified procedures, it may not

have been the most effective use of air assets.

While air forces had argued that it was preferable for troops

to withdraw from an engaged position so that aircraft could

attack the enemy positions, the lesson of Oboe was not so

clear-cut. Air attack did not necessarily destroy or rout the

enemy, and friendly ground forces had to re-take their

previous positions against an enemy who had been able to

consolidate his position.

As a general observation, ground forces beyond 100 metres of

enemy forces under air attack were unable to capitalise on the

gains from air attack. Moreover, their organic firepower

could not be used in a co-ordinated fashion with air strikes

Observations 159

because it was out of range. Thus, close co-ordination of air

attack was seen to be more critical as friendly forces

I realised that they needed to be within 100 metres of the enemy ' positions that were being attacked from the air. Perhaps, the

lesson from this was that if air attack was not likely to be

concentrated or lethal enough to destroy or rout an enemy, it

would have been more appropriate for ground forces to hold

their position and 'take on' the enemy. In other words, if

friendly ground forces were in a winning position, it was not

I advisable to call in an air attack. However, had they been in

danger of being overrun, it would have been sensible to

withdraw and call in concentrated air strikes.

The resistance of enemy forces inland of Brunei Bay was more

significant than had been encountered before and CAIRS

missions had to be conducted within 100 metres of friendly

troops. It is testament to the accuracy and overall success

of the air/land organisation that there were no friendly

casualties from air attack. Indeed, the whole Oboe Six

operation was testament to an improved air/land co-ordination

which had to be tied to the experience gleaned in taking

Tarakan the previous month and virtually minute-to-minute

experience from the current operation. There should be little

doubt that rehearsals are a significant force multiplier. In

this case, an earlier operation provided the ideal rehearsal.

Lessons were learned in terms of delay fuses for HE bombs for

better effect, and for improved air supply drops to cope with

the dense jungle canopy. For the former, experience was

gained that showed when delay fuses were superior to

instantaneous ones.' For the latter, longer cords were used to

This is covered in detail at the end of Chapter 3. Broadly, delay-action bombs proved successful in concentrated built-up areas, whereas instantaneously-fused bombs were more effective for near-misses on scattered buildings. In the case of near-misses, it was more effective to detonate the bomb above the ground: hence, rod extensions were fitted to some bombs.

160 Oboe

attach supplies to parachutes to cater for the likelihood that

parachutes would become entangled in tree tops.

In retrospect, it seems amazing that standardised map

references were not used. For example, ASPS used six-figure

co-ordinates, but the Headquarters ships used four figures and

one letter codes to accord with those used by the direct

support aircraft. Despite this being commented on in the

Tarakan post-action report, it was not acted upon for the

subsequent Oboe operations. It is also amazing that the 13th

AF and the Air Support Section (ASS) at Tarakan, for example,

had different codes and cyphers. Even more amazing is that

the situation had not improved one month later at Labuan-

Brunei Bay, nor would it appear to have improved another month

later at Balikpapan.

The reorganisation of air support parties after Tarakan did

show that the RAAF could respond at short notice to improved

organisational arrangements. Formation of Air Liaison Parties

(ALPS) allowed the RAAF to be more responsive to the fluidity

of the situation on the ground, and afforded greater mobility.

So successful was the Labuan-Brunei Bay operation on 10 June

that the 1st TAF CP was ashore and the airfield secured that

same day.

When problems were experienced at Brooketon (during Oboe Six),

when the second ASP was delayed in setting up, ingenuity came

to the fore. The Air Support Officer established a limited

capability between his ALPS and the USS Nashville, which

allowed operations to continue for the two days until the ASP

was fully operable.

One of the clear lessons of Tarakan was that the precipitate

establishment of a Ground Control Intercept (GCI) site on the

beach-head was inappropriate, as direction and control could

be afforded just as well from the Headquarters ship (for the

Observations 161

short-term) until the position ashore had stabilised and the

optimum site for the GC1 radar had been secured. There was

every indication that short-term goals were driving activities

at the expense of more effective longer-term solutions.

, The ingenuity of the Americans in terms of napalm attacks

could not be mirrored by the RAAF. While it is easy to be

critical in hindsight, it is difficult to understand why the

simple modification to 55-gallon drums could not have been

made.

The need for close liaison between air forces and armies has

been commented on already, but was reinforced in yet another

instance. A liaison officer had to be positioned at 13th AF

to interpret army requirements and assist with mission

planning for aerial photography. This was not realised at

first, and valuable time and photographs were wasted until the

liaison officer was established.

Poor tactical loading and the late arrival of units at points

of embarkation created problems subsequently at the landing

beaches. Embarkation, disembarkation, traffic movement, and

allocation and establishment of units' sites ashore, all added

to the friction of war. This was not enemy-induced friction,

and quite simply should have been minimised. The

administrative task seemed to be daunting for the Australians,

and yet, had they been under substantial fire, it is quite

likely that resolve would have hardened and problems would

have been rectified. But that simply should not have had to

happen. War is difficult enough without administrative

problems detracting from combat capability.

l The problem of units arriving late at Morotai, prior to

1 embarkation, was still evident after Tarakan. In particular

No 111 MFCU arrived only two days before the convoy sailed for

This is discussed in Chapter 2.

162 Oboe

Labuan. Admittedly, the unit was called in at short notice

because No 110 MFCU did not have sufficient equipment nor

personnel to deploy. Nevertheless, it would appear to be a

failing of No 110 MFCU in not advising of their predicament

sooner or of higher authority not responding quickly enough.

Loading did improve for Labuan-Brunei Bay over that for

Tarakan (although there were still reports of mistakes and

confusion), but the landing area still became congested with

vehicles, personnel and equipment.

Inadequate accommodation at Morotai and on-board convoy ships

indicated poor planning. In respect of the latter, tropical

storms were frequent at that time of the year, and to

accommodate personnel, who were about to go into action, on

open decks reflects a questionable commitment by

administrative planners to the morale of those troops.

Co-location of Advanced Headquarters 1st TAF and Divisional

Headquarters was a continual problem. Even after the obvious

lessons for co-location at Tarakan, the CP/ASS was separated

from Divisional Headquarters by one and a half kilometres at

Labuan-Brunei Bay, which delayed requests for air support from

the Divisional Headquarters, and delayed the passing of vital

advice from the CP/ASS to the Divisional Headquarters.

Allocation of individual call signs to CP senior staff

improved responsiveness - another lesson that had been learnt from Tarakan, but this one was applied.

Site locations also posed problems at Labuan-Brunei Bay.

Incredibly, the Divisional Headquarters relocated several

times which meant that the ASS had to close down, open again,

close down, etc. Control did not pass ashore until 1100 hours

on 12 June, despite the ASS being ashore by 1730 on the 10th

and fully operable by 0730 on the 11th. This provided a

valuable lesson for the future, such that the ASS, once set

up, should have remained in operation until new circuits could

have been established at a new location. While this would

Observations 163

have reduced capacity by one-half, it would have provided

access to an ASS all the time.

Even at Labuan-Brunei Bay, there was still confusion that the

MFCU, the ASS, ASPS and ALPS were all fundamental to the

effective provision of air support. It was still not

realised, even after Tarakan, that these units had to have

priority in setting-up their equipment - they required rapid movement to their sites. No 111 MFCU experienced several

moves during Oboe Six, and had cause to complain about loading

procedures at Morotai.

Administration, communications and logistics instructions

improved in Oboes Six and Two, so it was pleasing to note that

the support tail was able to react to external and self-

criticism after Tarakan.

The intelligence effort on Tarakan airfield can only be

regarded as appalling. The mis-match of heavy equipment to

the conditions, the unsuitability of the airfield itself, and

lack of suitable paving materials should have been known

through good technical intelligence. It would seem that

considerable effort was expended on tactical intelligence (for

combat operations, especially for ground force operations and

specific air operations) but not enough on intelligence for

support operations and technical purposes, such as for

airfield suitability.

This may be endemic to the time, for there have also been

complaints of lack of technical intelligence in other specific

instances, for example on Japanese Zeroes. At a RAAF history

conference in Canberra in 1993, Group Captain Herb Plenty

observed that the intelligence of the time indicated that

there was no Japanese aircraft that could overtake a Hudson.

Imagine Plenty's surprise when he first encountered a Zero and

it gained on him, while he was flying a Hudson. He escaped

unscathed that time, but the experience did have him wonder

164 Oboe

why intelligence on the Zero's capability was not more

comprehensive and accurate, especially as one had made a

forced landing in China and both the British and Americans

would have had accurate performance data.

Dr Chris Coulthard-Clark also made the observation at the same conference that an RAAF Reserve Officer was serving as an air

adviser to Jiang Kai Check at the time and would have observed

Japanese aircraft capability over China.6

Herb Plenty's experience has been described in the book Bloody

Shambles with the account concluding with 'Not a single bullet

hole was found in the Hudson'.' Subsequently, Plenty was shot

down by a pair of Zeroes; the crew managed to es~ape.~ There

is also an account of Buffalo crews being surprised by the

Zero's ability to out-pace, out-climb and out-manoeuvre the

Airfield Construction Squadron (ACS) personnel, having worked

all day on the Tarakan airfield, and having reached the limits

of physical endurance, were then posted as guards at night. While the use of 'support' personnel in base combatant roles

was fundamental for effective self-defence, there needed to be

some commonsense applied.

1st TAP was dispersed in Noemfoor Island, Morotai, Tarakan and

Labuan and its mobility suffered as long lines of

communication and additional administration became essential.

See RAAF History Conference 1993 - The RAAF in the SWPA 1942-1945, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1993, pp.15-16.

ibid, p.16.

' Christopher Shores and Brian Cull with Yasuho Izawa, Bloody Shambles - Volume One, The Drift to War to the Fall of Singapore, Grub Street, London, 1992, p.312.

ibid, p.343.

ibid, p.291.

Observations 165

The administrative tail and the garrisoning of newly-occupied

areas where the enemy still operated, demanded a new

organisation. Thus, No 11 Group was formed - using elements of Northern Command and 1st TAF - and assumed administrative control of all Morotai units on 30 July. Air Commodore

Brownell, the AOC Western Area, assumed command, with Group

Captain Lush as Senior Air Staff Officer and Group Captain

Curnow as Staff Officer ~dministration."

' No 11 Group was to cover all Dutch territory north of latitude

7 degrees south and east of longitude 108 degrees east,

British North Borneo and Sarawak. The air bases which had to

be garrisoned immediately included Hollandia, Biak,

Middleburg, Morotai, Labuan and Tarakan. No 11 Group had to

provide local air defence, protect sea lanes, support adjacent

formations, attack enemy targets within range, and provide

lines of communication."

The war ended before the group became fully functional - although it had operational control of No 79 Squadron

Spitfires and No 82 Wing Liberators.

Conduct of the air operations over Tarakan revealed that it

was possible to have an air force, yet not deliver effective

air power on every occasion. There were other examples of

this throughout the subsequent Oboe operations. The conduct

of effective air operations is predicated on a complete system

- not a collection of air power 'bits and pieces', but a complete, operable and functional system. Quite obviously,

such a system can only be as strong as its weakest link.

Vertical integration of the elements of air power was

'O Odgers, p.478.

166 Oboe

fundamental to success in the three Oboe operations.12

Following on from the previous point, administrative support

had to be tied to operations. In this, the identification of

operational logistics, communications, and infrastructure was

vital. The current RAAF organisation recognises these lessons

of the Oboe operations. A dedicated Air Defence (Radar) Wing

exists - No 41 Wing, based at Williamtown. Similarly, the

RAAF maintains an Air Transportable Telecommunications Unit

(ATTU) which provides tactical and temporary Communications

Electronics" facilities and services, and an Operational

Support Unit (No 1 OSU) which provides operational,

administrative and logistics support for deployments.

There was a need to bring together all operational planning

staffs for the Oboe operations. For example, it is apparent

that 1st TAF and 13th AF did not, in a combined sense, plan

convoy protection procedures, which would have compounded the

problems facing the Commanders of the amphibious Task Groups.

Commonality of procedures for both joint and combined

operations could have been improved. Tarakan underscored the

need to determine procedures, and to promulgate, teach,

understand and rehearse them. It underscored too that

rehearsal must be in realistic operational scenarios. Today,

the sophistication of simulation makes operational scenarios

easier and cheaper to achieve, although rehearsal is still a

costly business.

This truism that 'you can have an air force but exercise no air power' was developed conceptually in Air Marshal R.G. Funnell, A i r Power a n d S m a l l e r P a c i f i c N a t i o n s - An A u s t r a l i a n [ A i r m a n ' s ] P e r s p e c t i v e , an unpublished Chief of the Air Staff Paper to Asian Aerospace 90 held on 15 February 1990, pp.9-10.

" Communications Electronics facilities and services encompasses: ground-to-ground and ground-to-air communications; navigational aids; air traffic control facilities; communications security monitoring facilities; and data and interfacing facilities.

Observa tl ons 167

Finally, perhaps the most abiding lesson to emerge from an

analysis of the Oboe operations is that the observations are

related to doctrine. Doctrine is a body of fundamental

principles which guide military forces in their actions. It

is authoritative but requires judgment in its application.

Air power doctrine across the three levels of war - strategic, operational and tactical - provides fundamental and enduring principles; distinct objectives, force capabilities, broad

mission areas and operational environments; and specific

weapon systems and a clear articulation of roles and tasks.14

A clear and unambiguous doctrine for the RAAF would have

provided less chance for 'error' during the Oboe operations.

ITurthennore, an Australian joint doctrine would have provided

for the better integration and employment of the RAAF with

naval and land forces. Similarly, a combined air power

doctrine would have provided for better integration of the 1st

' PAF and 13th AF. Because doctrine is so important to

effective operations, the final chapter is devoted to relating

the foregoing analysis of the Oboe operations to doctrine.

Epilogue

W offensive air operations ceased from 15 August, after

which RRAF Liberators carried out many surveillance, leaflet

drop and food/medical drop missions. No 82 Wing moved its

headquarters from Balikpapan back to Morotai on 5 September,

although detachments still remained.15

'' An excellent encapsulation of these notions appears in Directorate of Defence Studies, AP 3000, RAF A i r Power Doctrine, 2nd Edition, London, 1993, pp.8-9.

Michael V. Nelmes, Tocumwal t o Tarakan: Austral ians and t h e Consolidated 8-24 Liberator , Banner Books, Canberra, 1994, p. 140.

168 Oboe

On 10 September, it was announced that Lord Louis Mountbatten

would accept the surrender of Field Marshal Count Teraguchi at

Singapore on 12 September. l6 Lieutenant General Baba (GOC

Japanese forces in Borneo) flew to Labuan on the 10th and

formally surrendered to GOC 9th Australian Division." On the

13th, Lieutenant General Roberts (Commander 34 Indian Corps)

accepted the surrender of Lieutenant General Ishiguro

(Commander of the Japanese 29th Army) who formally surrendered

the Malay Peninsula, at Kuala Lumpur." And on 25 October,

Major General Nakamura ordered all Japanese troops at Semarang

to surrender to the Indonesians. Nakamura was then taken to

Batavia (Jakarta) .l9

Liberators were used to repatriate thousands of Australian

POWs. Even though the war was over, the RAAF found itself

still flying missions at sustained high rates of effort.

Maintenance became a real problem yet again, as a 25 Squadron

diary entry for November 1945 shows: 'Maintenance is becoming

extremely complicated, the majority of personnel with the

requisite knowledge of Liberator aircraft maintenance having

been posted for discharge, and are being replaced by

inexperienced per~onnel'.~~vacuation of POWs and other

Service personnel was completed by early November.

" PRO, Air 40/1437 - Malaya Far East Daily Summary No 143 of 10.9.45.

l' PRO, Air 40/1417 - Malaya Far East Daily Summary No 145 of 12.9.45.

l8 PRO, Air 40/1437 - Malaya Far East Daily Summary No 149 of 17.9.45.

'' PRO, Air 40/1417 - Malaya Far East Daily Summary No 176 of 29.10.45.

20 Nelmes, p.143.

CHAPTER SIX

DOCTRINE

There does not appear to have been any record of the air power

doctrine used during the Oboe operations. It is likely that

the doctrine from earlier operations in the Pacific theatre

was continued, and that considerable carry-over would have

occurred from the European and Middle East theatres.

Accordingly, it would be prudent to look first at some broad

observations that can be drawn from the use of close air

support prior to 1945. Next, the thoughts of leading airmen

such as Lord Tedder, Air Vice Marshal Wrigley and General

Arnold need to be assessed for relevance to the Oboe

operations. Certain principles espoused by Tedder for

tactical air forces provide a useful framework to analyse the

Oboe operations for their adherence to 'doctrine'. Finally,

the emergence of post-war doctrine requires comment as it

succinctly summarises many of the observations discussed

throughout this book.

Air Operations and Existing 'Doctrine'

The campaign in France in 1940 and the Western Desert

campaigns of 1941 had highlighted the importance of one single

authority having responsibility for command and administration

of all Royal Air Force (RAF) formations in the theatre. An

extension of this was the observation that all air forces in a

theatre needed to be under the one supreme air commander.' The

importance of a discrete air support organisation led the

British to form Army Co-operation Command before the end of

1940.2

RAF AP3235, Air Support, Air Ministry, London, 1955, p.21.

170 Oboe

In 1941, certain enduring principles emerged from the close

cooperation between the 8th Army and the Desert Air Force.

The Tactical Air Force (TAF) grew out of the Desert Air Force

and formed on 18 February 1943 under Air Vice-Marshal

Coningham who was made responsible for North West African

tactical air operations.

Within the TAP concept, the air commander (who had centralised

control over all aircraft) enjoyed equal status to a land

force commander. Notwithstanding, the air forces had to

provide support to the ground commander during all phases of

the operation. The two critical elements of close cooperation

were mobility and close contact between Army and Air Force for

planning, training and the conduct of operations. Close

contact could only be achieved if the TAF and Army

Headquarters were co-located.'

Two earlier campaigns are worthy of study to determine the

principles that were adopted by the TAF. General O'Connor

advanced from Sidi Barrani to Beda Fomm in 1940-41, with such

powerful support from the RAF that John Terraine was moved to

comment that O'Connor's advance was planned and executed

'virtually without regard to the opposing air force - a rare luxury' .

General Cunningham could not advance through East Africa in

1941 until the Italians had been defeated in the air, after

which the air effort was directed to support the advance. The

Army commander of the leading troops and the air commander

(Air Commodore Sowrey) occupied the same command post. This

close co-operation allowed immediate air cover to be provided

which 'engendered the greatest confidence amongst both

ibid, p.44.

' ibid, p.69. John Terraine, T h e R i g h t of the L i n e , Hodder and

Stoughton, London, 1985, p.316.

Doctrine 171

commanders and men'.

Translating this across to the Oboe operations. The desire to

CO-locate Advanced Headquarters 1st TAF (RAAF) with the Army

Headquarters on Tarakan and observations from the Middle East

theatre were not sufficient. It took the control problems

experienced at Tarakan to reaffirm the need for CO-location,

yet the problem was still not rectified at Labuan, although by

the time of the Balikpapan operation, it was finally

recognised as absolutely essential.

The success of O'Connor's and Cunningham's campaigns resulted

in a set of operational imperatives being developed. Among

others, fighter support was fundamental to success, air

casualty evacuation was necessary, and precision bombing of

selected targets was vital. These issues were addressed in

detail in the planning of the Oboe operations.

While air superiority proved essential in the Middle East

theatre, close support still could not work unless forces were

adequately positioned' and communications were reliable. While

this was not so much a doctrinal point as commonsense, there

were examples of poor communications leading to problems on

]Borneo.

So important was close support to General Auchinleck in May-

June 1942, that he observed of the RAF: ' . . . it alone enables us to retain any semblance of the initiati~e'.~ Translating

Auchinleck's observation across to the South West Pacific Area

(SWPA), close support was instrumental in allowing the

initiative to be taken at all Oboe landings, and the pre-

Terraine, p.325.

. ' Where enemy land forces were concentrated prior to engagement, they became excellent targets for air attack.

John Connell, Auchinleck: A Biography o f Field Marshal S i r Claude Auchinleck, Cassell, London, 1 9 5 9 , p.622.

172 Oboe

assault bombing in all cases ceded the initiative to the

Australians who undertook the landings.

While accolades were heaped upon the gallant aircrews in the

Middle East, after RouUnel had taken Tobruk it was the RAF

groundcrew who provided the foundation for success. They

moved from one base to another, prepared the new base while

another crew remained at the previous base, launching and

recovering aircraft until the base was overrun by the Germans.

Aircraft were actually able to conduct operations even while

their landing grounds were being captured.

In the SWPA, a similar philosophy in moving from base to base

(which entailed moving from island to island, or island-

hopping as it came to be known) was employed. In relation to

Oboe specifically, the inability to prepare Tarakan airfield

on time (7th May) led to significant operational problems

until 30 June, when Kittyhawks were able to operate from

there. Even so, the Beaufighters could not use the strip and

had to operate from Morotai. This affected RAAF support

operations for the subsequent Oboes Six and Two.

General Alexander, after the Allied invasion of Sicily,

commented to General ~paatz:~

'air attacks had not only heightened the morale of ground

and naval forces, but had seriously interfered with the

enemy's movements, disrupted his communications and

prevented the concentration of his forces to launch

large-scale counter attacks'.1°

Major General Spaatz was in command of the North-West African Strategic Air Force.

Marshal of the Royal Air Force The Lord Tedder, G.C.B., With Prejudice: The War Memoirs o f Marshal o f t h e Royal A i r Force, Lord Tedder, G.C.B. , Cassell, London, 1966, p.467.

Doctrine 173

The discussion in chapters 2,3 and 4 on each of the Oboe

operations showed that, due to air attacks against Japanese

ground forces, morale of the Australian troops was heightened,

that Japanese troop movements were significantly affected

(although there were not the concentrations about which

General Alexander was referring), and that enemy counter

attacks could not be launched.

Another campaign of relevance was the capture of Pantelleria

in June 1943. Situated in the narrows between Tunisia and

Sicily, Pantelleria offered another airfield to support those

on Malta. Concentrated air attacks were launched against the

island from 8 May to 11 June 1943. By the time Allied ground

forces arrived, the Italian garrison was ready to surrender.

While the Japanese on Borneo were not ready to surrender quite

so easily, air attack did force them out of their fortified

positions, set them on the run, and cede the initiative to the

advancing Australian troops.

l'he new TAF organisation in the Middle East was tested in

September 1943 in supporting the landings at Salerno, Italy.

The TAP had occupied Sicilian airfields which brought them

within range of the beachhead at Salerno. Once the airfield

at Montecorvino (near Salerno) was captured, airfield

construction engineers laid a 'prepared strip'. Although

under enemy fire, the task of laying the prepared strip was

relatively straightforward, which should be contrasted to the

experience of Tarakan. Allied bombers attacked airfields,

Lines of Communication (LOCs) and areas which the enemy could

use to oppose the Salerno landings in the lead-up to

September.

In May 1944, the lessons from tactical air support in the

European, North African and Mediterranean theatres to date

were integrated by Allied Force Headquarters and issued as an

174 Oboe

Operation Memorandum." The 'doctrine' reiterated the need for

close integration in air/land planning, and observed that land

operations may have to be adapted on certain occasions to

either assist or take full advantage of air operations.

Air support operations in Burma, especially by 1944, had

indicated certain fundamental requirements, which were

reflective of those on Borneo. First, good air-to-ground

communications were essential, and an air force liaison

officer was needed to be with the ground forces. Precise

target identification was often needed, through the use of

smoke mortar bombs, and complete photographic coverage of the

Objective Area (OA) was needed in advance.''

During 1944-45, advancing friendly ground forces in Burma

depended heavily on closely controlled air support. While

success of that air support was difficult to gauge, the low

incidence of friendly casualties during assaults has been

generally attributable to the efficiency of air support.'' Air

support tended to fail against entrenched enemy positions if

friendly ground forces could not advance rapidly and take

advantage of the bombing. The need for forward airstrips was

again evident, but in Burma, the monsoon rains conspired to

make some airfields unserviceable. These experiences in Burma

occurred again in Borneo some months later.

Air support over north-west Europe in 1944-45 also elicited

some important observations for the Borneo operations. First,

coordination of artillery and air support from aircraft based

over 200 kilometres away was exceedingly difficult in terms of

concentration of firepower and timing of coordinated attacks.

" Issued as Operation Memo. 54, 6 May 1944 - The Employment of Bombers and Fighter Bombers in Co-operation with the Army.

lZ Air Support, p. 139.

Doc t r ine 175

Second, air attacks did not become more accurate with

successive strikes, which was the case for artillery

bombardment. Third, precise location of the areas to be

attacked was difficult. The bottom-line was that air attacks

were more profitable in interdiction rather than against

targets near the frontline. Thus, the success of air support

was in interrupting enemy movements and helping to maintain

ithe momentum of advancing friendly land forces."

Often, the value of air attack lay in 'the ability of the

ground forces to exploit the confusion which followed

immediately after the air attacks'.15

,\part from the use of radio aids, the determination of a

bombline and use of ground marking panels were found to be

effective in ensuring friendly casualties did not eventuate

from any air attacks close to friendly positions. The advent

(of the mobile radar control post into the RAF in late 1944

simplified the process of air support. Similarly, the RAAF

Ibenefited from Mobile Fighter Control Units (MFCUs) during the

Borneo operations.

The obsemations discussed so far have all been positive, but

there were other more worrying lessons to emerge from the

European theatre. On 7 July 1944, Operation CHARNWOOD saw

2,000 tons of high explosive dropped in under 40 minutes on

,enemy rear areas on the outskirts of Caen.16 Carlo D'Este

recorded that 'not a single dead German or any enemy equipment

had been found in the area that had been bombedf."

l4 i b i d , p.181.

l5 i b i d .

l6 The operation is described in Terraine, p.651.

l' Carlo D'Este, Decis ion i n Normandy: The Unwri t t en S t o r y o f Montgomery and The A l l i e d Campaign, Collins, London, 1983, p.316.

176 Oboe

Continuing this observation - too much air-delivered firepower can be a hindrance. Destroyed villages actually slowed the

Allied advance through France. Asher Lee was to coment that

excessive aerial fire support became 'profligate and quite

useless' .ls

An obvious observation was that aerial reconnaissance was

needed to elicit the best targets to attack and the most

opportune time for the attack. The air attack on enemy troops

around Cassino (north-west of Naples) in February 1944 failed

to dislodge well dug-in ground forces. Success came only

after an air interdiction effort isolated the Cassino forces,

and Allied ground forces encircled and captured them on 18

May. l9

In terms of the operations on Borneo, there was not a lot of

dead bodies or destroyed enemy equipment, but the effect of

the bombing did drive the Japanese from their positions.

There was not the concentration of villages on Borneo that was

the case in France, and the Australian forces on Borneo were

much smaller in number and less encumbered with heavy

equipment than their counterparts in France and Italy.

Sufficient instances of air forces bombing friendly troops

occurred in the Middle East and European theatres to sound

alarm bells for the Pacific theatre. One example which

clearly showed the need for close co-ordination occurred on 14

August 1944 in Normandy. The British Army had marked its own

position with yellow flares and called in bombing support.

RAF Bomber Command also used the colour yellow, but in this

case, to indicate targets. 'The more the troops burnt yellow

flares to show their position the more the . . . . aircraft

lB Asher Lee, Air Power, Gerald Duckworth, London, 1955, pp.125-126.

l9 See Terraine, p.595.

Doctrine 177

bombed them'.20 On Borneo, co-ordination did appear to be

well-planned and executed, and while there were some close

calls, the problems experienced in Europe and the Middle East

were not replicated. Use of airborne Army observers and

airborne RAW co-ordinators (Support Air Observers) certainly

decreased the likelihood of 'fratricide'.

The Allies in the Middle East employed a 'cab rank' system, in

which aircraft arrived in an area at intervals of 30 minutes.

The crews were briefed to attack pre-selected targets, but 20

minutes before attacking, the aircraft would be in position

overhead to attack any higher priority targets that may have

arisen since the briefing. If a call was not received, the

aircraft would attack their pre-selected targets."

Similarly, in the Oboe operations, targets were pre-selected,

but if a target could not be attacked for any reason

(including if it had been destroyed already), aircraft could

be directed on to other targets. The use of Commander Support

Aircraft (CSA), Support Air Observers (SAOs), and airborne

Army observers has been described in detail in each of the

Oboe operations. Suffice it to say that provision of a CSA

ensured that air effort was not squandered and the SA0 was

able to co-ordinate the air support with ground force

requirements.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the lessons were well-

learnt by the time of the Labuan landing and no aircraft

departed the OA with unexpended bombs or ammunition that had

been allocated for use within the OA. Similarly, Beaufighters

that provided support for the landings were directed on to

targets further inland, once light opposition on the beaches

had been contained.

20 Terraine, p.661.

Terraine, p.596.

178 Oboe

Perhaps the greatest lessons for the Australians taking part

in the Oboe operations would have come from the invasions of

Sicily, Italy and Normandy. These amphibious assaults

required sound intelligence on the strength and disposition of

enemy forces and on the ability to capture nearby airfields.

The landings had to be covered by aircraft, as did the

subsequent break-out from the beach-heads. The air forces

also had to interrupt enemy communications, obtain air

superiority, and neutralise enemy air defences.

As well, the question of morale needs to be addressed.

Whether or not the enemy suffered significant material

destruction was a moot point. Many reports indicate that

concentrated aerial bombardment led to low morale in enemy

troops. These reports which originated from friendly Army

commanders were substantiated by diaries from captured enemy

forces. As well, bombing that was carried out in daylight and

within sight of friendly troops, led to a corresponding rise

in morale of those troops.22

In the SWPA, there were many instances of the RAAF flying

close support missions before the 1st TAF (RAAF) formed during

October 1944. RAAF Kittyhawk squadrons - Nos 75 and 76 -

contributed significantly to the Allied victory at Milne Bay

in August 1942. The RAAF was called upon in September to

contribute to the Allied victory on the Kokoda Track by

disrupting Japanese supply lines and air-dropping equipment.

Close support operations were flown by No 4 (Army Co-

operation) Squadron where Wirraway and Boomerang aircraft

contributed to the recapture of Lae, Salamaua and Finschhafen.

Other RAAF squadrons flew close support missions throughout

New Guinea.

22 Air Support, pp. 181-182.

23 Gary Waters, The Architect of Victory: Air Campaigns for Australia, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1991, pp.163-164.

D o c t r i n e 179

No 10 Operational Group formed at Nadzab in January 1944 and

provided close support to the 5th Division from Sio to Saidor,

and to the 7th Division in reaching Madang and Alexishafen.

RAAF squadrons supported Allied landings on New Britain in

December 1943 and during 1944 at Hollandia, Aitape, Biak,

Noemfoor and Morotai. They also contributed to the re-taking

of Bougainville in November 1943 by locating enemy positions,

directing artillery fire, conducting photographic

reconnaissance, operating a casualty evacuation service, and

air-dropping supplies and equipment.24

Even with the legacy of Tedder and Coningham and their

principles for close air support operations, many lessons

would have been forthcoming from this earlier RAAF experience

in the SWPA. Judging by the Operations Instructions issued

during the Oboe operations, and comparing them with several

aiir support directives that were issued in the Middle East in

particular, it seems a reasonable supposition that RAAF

planners were well-aware of the doctrine in-place in other

t.heatres . 2 5

A Manual o f D i r e c t A i r Support had been endorsed in June 1943,

and despite concerns over clarity and structure was used by

t.he Allies in the SWPA.26 They also used the US FM31-35,

A v i a t i o n i n Suppor t o f Ground Forces , which had been issued in

April 1942.27 The unsatisfactory nature of both documents led

in July 1943 to the promulgation of FM100-20, Command and

24 i b i d , p.164.

These directives include: Middle East (Army and RAF) Directive on Direct Air Support - September 1941; Air Support for the Eighth Army (from Elmhirst and Barratt Reports - August 1942); and Employment of Bombers and Fighter-Bombers in Co-operation with the Army - 6 May 1944.

Nicola Baker, More Than L i t t l e Heroes: A u s t r a l i a n Army A i r L i a i s o n O f f i c e r s i n t h e Second World War, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 106, SDSC, Australian National University, Canberra, 1994, p.43.

i b i d , pp.70-71.

180 Oboe

Employment of Air Power, which argued air superiority,

interdiction and close air support as priorities, flexibility

as air power's principal characteristic, and centralised

control as necessary to exploit the inherent fle~ibility.~'

And so it was that Kenney, in July 1943, issued his own Allied

Air Force SWPA Air Support Doctrir~e.~~ The RAAF followed

Kenney's doctrine, based on the beliefs in FM100-20, and

obtained valuable direct support experience throughout 1943

with its No 4 Army Cooperation Squadron (of Wirraways and

Boomerangs), No 22 Squadron (of Bostons), and No 30 Squadron

(of Beaufighters) over New Guinea; however, the squadrons were

withdrawn from direct support operations in July. From then

until the Oboe operations, the RAAF could only be said to have

been involved in direct support operations inte~mittently.~~

The landings and subsequent allied advances at Lae and Nadzab

in late 1943 allowed air liaison and direct support procedures

to be tested. From then on they were refined. These

refinements resulted in August 1944 in the compilation of

Army-Air Cooperation in New Guinea, produced by the Australian

Army's Advanced Land ~eadquarters.?' Similarly, experience in

amphibious operations had resulted in a well-honed system of

CAPS and CSAs (Afloat and Ash~re).~~

Then in September 1944, GHQ SWPA issued its Cooperative Action

of Land-Based and Carrier-Based Aircraft in Support of Landing

Operations, which codified procedures including the use of

Support Air Observers. It would appear that RAAF Air Support

ibid, p.71.

2 9 ibid, p.72.

'O ibid, pp.75-77.

ibid, p.111.

'' See Baker p.119, where she refers to Combat Air Patrol (CAP) as Air Alert and Commander Support Aircraft (CSA) as Support Air Controller (Afloat and Ashore).

Doctrine 181

Parties (ASPS) and an Air Support Section (ASS) were first

formed in February 1945 to establish the link between 6th Division and No 71 Wing at Tadji (just south of Aitape).)' The

RAAP and Australian Army began running their 'own show' at

Aitape-Wewak and Bougainville, and by the time Oboe started,

they were experienced in such operations.

Before examining those principles of Tedder's, which might

provide a reasonable guide to the doctrine employed during the

Oboe operations, it would be useful to discuss command and

clontrol .

C:onrmand and Control

Because the British forces in North Africa were outnumbered,

t.he overall theatre commander, General Alexander, centralised

t.he control of all air forces under Sir Arthur Coningham.

Ceneral Montgomery was the ground force commander, and he and

Cnningham operated from CO-located headquarters and were

afforded equal status.

1:t was the American defeat at Kasserine Pass in February 1943

that led to a reorganisation of American air power. The

decentralised organisation changed to a centralised one, where

General Spaatz had control of American air power in the North

West African theatre.

Subsequently, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister

Churchill, recognising the effect that centralised control of

air assets had within their respective national forces,

decided to centralise control of RAF and USAAF forces in

theatre. Air Marshal Tedder was appointed as the overall

Allied air commander for the Middle East theatre.

33 Baker, p. 127.

182 Oboe

This command and control doctrine also found its way into the

SWPA where General Douglas MacArthur used General George

Kenney as his air commander. Kenney:

'reorganised, reallocated resources, streamlined

logistics, sped weapons developments, and devised an air

campaign that would be the critical element in

MacArthur's island-hopping strategy'.34

To quote MacArthur's summation of Kenney's role after the

Allies captured Buna in New Guinea (in January 1943):

'The outstanding military lesson of this campaign was the

continuous calculated application of air power, inherent

in the potentialities of the Air Force, employed in the

most intimate tactical and logistical union with ground

troops ' . l5

While integrated planning and co-ordination worked well at

Kenney's level, the question must be posed as to why it failed

to work as well for the Oboe operations, where 1st TAF(RAAF)

and 13th AF (USAAF) did not appear to coordinate convoy

protection procedures so as to achieve commonality. An

interesting point develops from this - that there may have been a tendency to ignore the need for closer coordination

because the air elements tended to operate in their own

discrete units.

Air Marshal Tedder's Principles

The next step in analysing the doctrine of the time is to turn

to Air Marshal Tedder's principles of air power. Developed in

' Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, HQUSAF, JFACC Primer, Second Edition, February 1994, p.3.

35 AS quoted in JFACC Primer, p.4.

D o c t r i n e 183

North Africa, these principles related directly to a tactical

air force. Tedder's success in 1942, at El Alamein in

particular, saw a new awareness emerge of the value of a

tactical air force. Indeed, these principles formed the

foundation for Allied tactical air doctrine that emerged from

the Casablanca conference in January 1943.36 Tedder ' s principles encompassed:

1. Air power had to be independent of land and sea forces.

2. The Army Headquarters in the field and the Air

Headquarters had to be adjacent to one another. This

close proximity facilitated communication and co-

operation between the two services.

3. Every night the air and ground commanders needed to hold

a joint staff meeting to discuss problems and decide the

next day's program. The close air support and air

interdiction campaigns could then be integrated into the

ground commander's overall concept of operations.

4. Radar was very important to air and land forces. It had

to be located on airfields so that fighters would not be

caught on the ground and destroyed by a surprise enemy

attack.

5 . The fighter was the basic weapon of an air force. It

needed to be used for the following missions in this

Concentration on Tedder's principles in no way undersells the contribution made by Coningham; however, it was Tedder who penned the principles of tactical air operations. Tedder did say of Coningham, however, 'It was to him personally more than to anyone else that we owe the initiative and development of the joint land-air technique which became the doctrine and practice of the 8th Army and the Desert Air Force and subsequently of the Allied Armies and TAFs in North Africa and Europe'. From T h e T i m e s , 14 Feb 48, as cited in Vincent Orange, C o n i n g h a m : A B i o g r a p h y o f A i r M a r s h a l S i r A r t h u r C o n i n g h a m , KCB, KBE, DSO, MC, DFC, AFC, Center for Air Force History, Washington D.C., 1992, p.257.

184 Oboe

priority:

a. Fighter sweeps to clear the enemy from the sky.

b. Escort for light and medium bombers.

c. Interception of enemy aircraft.

d. As a fighter bomber to provide Close Air Support for

ground forces.

6. Rapid communications had to be assured between the Air

Headquarters and the Unit Commander. Effective air power

was based on being at the right spot at the proper time

to destroy the enemy air and land forces, and rapid

communications were essential to any flexible response by

aircraft.

7 . The entire air force had to be commanded from an Advanced

Headquarters located close to the front lines.

8. Air power needed to have a simplified chain of command.

Commanders had to restrict the number of people who

reported to them. These men had to be directly

responsible for air operations. During the North African

campaigns, Air Marshal Tedder had only six men report

directly to him. Thus, his mind was not bothered by

trivial matters. These responsibilities he delegated to

his key staff members.

9. Intelligence was very important to an air or ground

campaign. Tedder had to have the information coming in

constantly, right where he could see it. His

Intelligence and Operations officers sat at adjoining

desks and shared telephone lines to the units. Hence,

Air Marshal Tedder could walk in and get any information

he wanted immediately.

Doctrine 185

10. Mobility was the key to successful air operations.

Tedder believed units should be broken down, even to the

squadron level in a 50/50 ratio - each divided into two parts, with each part self-maintaining in all

departments. If independent operations were needed, he

employed a leapfrog technique. The first element would

deploy to the front; when the next deployment occurred

the second unit would leapfrog past the first unit to the

frontlines. The most forward element would then become

the command element to control the battle. Tedder also

believed that units should be able to move within four

hours and should deploy to support their operations in

isolation for three to four days.3'

These 10 principles provide a good framework by which to

evaluate air aspects of the Oboe operations; that is,

independence, adjacent headquarters, integration, radar

siting, fighter aircraft priorities, rapid communications,

advanced headquarters, simplified command chain, intelligence,

and mobility. But before assessing the Oboe operations along

these lines, there are two other airmen whose thoughts are

worth noting - the Australian Air Vice-Marshal Wrigley and the

American General 'Hapwnold.

Air Vice-Marshal Wrigley's Views

Air Vice Marshal H.N. Wrigley wrote that the objective of air

warfare was to bomb an enemy to achieve the most direct and

decisive effect." But Wrigley posed two questions in stating

this objective, which then allowed him to qualify it - must we

" Lt Col Charles M. Westenhoff, USAF, Military Air Power, Air University Press, Alabama, October 1990, pp.43-45.

See Alan Stephens and Brendan O'Loghlin (eds), The Decisive Factor: Air Power Doctrine by Air Vice-Marshal H.N. Wrigley, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1990, p.128.

186 Oboe

first destroy the enemy air forces? And should the first

objective therefore be to destroy enemy air forces?

This first objective, of destroying enemy air forces, was

clearly evident during all three Oboe operations, where the

airfields that could be used by Japan to project air power

were attacked well before the convoys departed for the OA.

Wrigley was astute in that he recognised that the objective of

air warfare should depend on the situation - that air power

should be used to contribute to success in the most direct and

decisive manner. 39

Wrigley's comments can be transposed directly to the Oboe

operations viz: in the passage of an expeditionary force (that

is, the convoys in the Oboe operations), temporary air

superiority should be achieved by attacking enemy airfields

and defensive CAPS should be flown over the expeditionary

forces. 40

Once the Army was ashore, Wrigley's views again reflect the

priorities for air operations - attack military objectives for immediate effect, protect Army co-operation aircraft, and

intervene in the land battle using direct support aircraft

(but only where such attack is the best option)."

There was a clear indication from Wrigley that suitable

airfields had to be selected carefully:

'Aerodromes and landing grounds should be selected by air

force personnel in consultation with the military staff

and full consideration given to questions of supply and

39 Stephens and O'Loghlin, p.129.

'O Stephens and O'Loghlin, p.130.

" That is, where artillery or Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) does not offer the best option. See Stephens and O'Loghlin, p. 130.

Doctrine 187

defence' . ''

He went on to say that the general effectiveness of air power

depended on mobility, and this was tied to suitably-sited

airfield^.'^ The failure at Tarakan in establishing a usable

airfield in time, affected the Labuan and Balikpapan

operations. Although in these cases, lack of the airfield was

not as critical as it could have been due to the relatively

weak Japanese defences.

The ability for aircraft to launch from geographically-

separated bases, yet still be concentrated over an area within

a matter of hours was stated by Wrigley as a fundamental issue for the use of air power.'Phis was to be a powerful

ingredient in the success of the Oboe operations in terms of

virtually unopposed amphibious landings. Another important

doctrinal point was that aircraft could be switched to

different targets as the situation on the ground developed" - that is, air power was wonderfully responsive to fluid

tactical situations on the ground. An important point here (and Wrigley recognised it) was that while targets could be

switched quickly and easily, the propensity to change the

essential objective had to be resisted. Selection and

maintenance of the aim was a fundamental principle of war

(recognised by many nations as the premier principle), which

could be negated if the flexibility of air power was not used

wisely.

4 2 ibid, p.139.

4 3 ibid, p.140.

" ibid, p.153.

4 5 ibid.

188 Oboe

As Dr Alan Stephens has observed with respect to the Bornec.

operations, the RAAF was 'exposed to the full range of ail

power concepts and ~perations'.'~ Policy for the employment oi

Australian air power in the SWPA extended to: air superiority,

air bombardment (heavy and medium), light bombardment

(including use of dive bombers), torpedo attacks,

reconnaissance, fleet co-operation, and army CO-~peration.~'

As Dr Stephens has also observed, 'the critical importance of

establishing air superiority was emphasised'." In fact, A ~ I

Vice-Marshal Bostock went further than Wrigley in stating that

fighter aircraft should not be diverted to ground attack while

enemy aircraft posed a threat to operation^.^^

Again, it was Dr stephens who viewed Air Marshal Richard

Williams' comments as significant, viz Williams' delight at

'the success of the Australian forces in Borneo' and that

Australian land and air forces 'are at last working together

in what might be termed "their own little show"'.50 Stephens

has argued that the successful planning and conduct of

operations at Balikpapan 'demonstrated a sound understanding

of the principles, determinants and nature of air power, at

least at the operational and tactical levels'.51

46 Alan Stephens, Power Plus Attitude: Ideas, Strategy ana Doctrine in the Royal Australian Air Force 1921-1991, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1992, p.69.

4' ibid, p.70, and footnote 93.

ibid, p.70.

ibid.

ibid, p.70, and see footnote 98.

Doctrine 189

General Arnold's Principles

Throughout the War, General Arnold, USAAF had tried to have

the air force operate under his 10 principles. While there

are similarities with Tedder's, the obvious differences make

for interesting analysis; after all their respective foci

differed. Arnold argued in more of a strategic sense,

addressing all the issues of air power.52

1. The main job of the Air Force was bombardment: large

formations of bombers had to strike the enemy before the

enemy could hit friendly forces. In short, the best

defence was attack.

2. Friendly aircraft had to be able to function under all

climatic conditions from the North Pole to the South

Pole.

3. Daylight operations, including daylight bombing, were

essential to success, for it was the only way to bomb

precisely. A precision bombsight was essential, and

bombing could only be effective in daylight as decisive

combat eventually had to be waged with the enemy Air

Fozce.

4. Highly developed, highly trained crews working together

as a team - on the ground for maintenance and in the air for combat - were essential.

5. In order to bring the war home to Germany and Japan, and

deprive them of the things that were essential for their

war operations, strategic precision bombing of key

targets, deep in the enemy territory, such as aircraft

factories, oil refineries, steel mills, aluminium plants,

submarine pens, Navy yards, and so on had to be carried

Westenhoff, pp.28-30.

190 Oboe

6. In addition to strategic bombing, tactical operations in

co-operation with ground troops had to be carried out.

For that purpose fighters, dive bombers, and light

bombers for attacking enemy airfields, communications

centres, motor convoys and troops, were essential.

7. All types of bombing operations had to be protected by

fighters. This was proved to be essential in the Battle

of Britain, and prior to that, American exercises with

bombers and fighters indicated that bombers alone could

not elude modern pursuit aircraft, no matter how fast the

bombers travelled.

8. Air Forces had to be ready for combined operations with

ground forces, and with the Navy.

9. Research and development programs had to be maintained so

as to have the latest equipment that it was possible to

get, as soon as it was possible to get it.

10. Air power was not made up of aircraft alone. It was a

composite of aeroplanes, aircrews, maintenance crews, air

bases, air supply, and sufficient replacements in both

aircraft and crews to maintain constant fighting

strength, regardless of the losses inflicted by the

enemy. In addition, the backing of a large aircraft

industry in the United States to provide all kinds of

equipment, and a large training establishment that could

furnish the personnel when called upon were essential.

While Arnold's principles provide a solid doctrinal

understanding of air power and air forces, and have relevance

to any national air force, the tactical nature of the Oboe

operations and the tactical focus of Tedder's principles, make

the latter more useful in any study of the air operations over

Doctrine 191

Tarakan, Labuan and Balikpapan. Amold's principles are

discussed more to indicate the strategic view of air power, as

a scene setter so that Tedder's principles at the operational

and tactical levels can be viewed in context.

Independence

Air support of the Oboe operations was provided by an

organisation independent of the Army. Air forces had long

argued for an organisation that could be structured

specifically and optimally for air operations, that would

necessarily involve an organisation separate from the Army and

Navy. The RAF was the first independent air force to form,

with the Royal assent being granted in 1918, followed by South

Africa in 1920, Australia in 1921, Canada in 1922 and New

Zealand in 1937.53

Independence, however, was not the end of the matter. In a

theatre of operations, all aspects of an air force needed to

be under the one commander. Similarly, all air forces in the

theatre needed to be directed by the one commander. And so it

was for Oboe, with all RAAF elements under command of AVM

I3ostock, and all 5th and 13th AF elements at least under

Bostock's direction. While Bostock coordinated all planning

effort, and in this respect would have acted as a true

operational commander, he was rarely any further forward than

Morotai, and the detailed coordination of actual operations in

support of the Army once ashore was left to Air Commodore

Scherger as AOC 1st TAF.

Thus, the Oboe operations observed the doctrinal tenet of

independence, with the concomitant requirement for all RAAF

elements to be under the one single authority, and the logical

extension that all air forces in-theatre would, at least, be

53 Hilary St George Saunders, Per Ardua: The Rise of British Air Power 1911-1939, Oxford University Press, 1944.

192 Oboe

directed by the one air commander.

Adjacent Headquarters

The need for CO-location of Advanced Headquarters 1st TAF and

Divisional Headquarters was recognised from the very beginning

and siting plans reflected the need for the headquarters to be

adjacent. For this reason, planners had accepted that the one

ASS could service both headquarters. Once ashore at Tarakan

however, the headquarters were not located together, and the

ASS had to be scaled down to an ASP to operate within 26

Brigade Headquarters. This adversely affected the provision

of air support.

The lesson was well-learnt one month later at Labuan and the

1st TAF Command Post (CP) was located alongside 9 Division

Headquarters (HQ). Unfortunately the site was unsuitable due

to insufficient space and poor radio reception, and after

several moves, the CP was located one and a half kilometres

from the Divisional HQ. Thus, delays were experienced in

obtaining divisional decisions on requests for air support and

in passing specialist air operations advice to the Divisional

HQ. One of the observations after Labuan was that Army and

RAAF headquarters should be located adjacent to one another.

By the time of the Balikpapan operation, the lesson had been

learnt and the ASS and the 1st TAF CP moved ashore with HQ 7

Division and the CP set up adjacent to the Divisional

Headquarters.

Integration

Tedder's principle that a joint staff meeting should be held

each night to integrate the close air support and air

interdiction campaigns into the ground commander's overall

Doctrine 193

concept of operations is difficult to comment on in relation

to the Oboe operations.

It is unlikely that much joint nightly planning would have

occurred on Tarakan, since Air Commodore Cobby and his two

group captains were replaced not long after setting up their

CP. Air Commodore Scherger and his two group captains - Murdoch and Duncan - would likely have had their hands full just dealing with day-to-day issues, and coming to grips with

the unenviable situation in which they found themselves.

Additionally, with the difficulties associated with the

Tarakan airfield, and the problems of air support being

provided from distant bases, they would have been preoccupied

with predominantly air issues.

Fortunately, there was virtually no enemy air opposition at

'I'arakan, and 9 Division forces were able to prevail over their

opposing ground forces. However, had the situation on the

ground been more complex, there undoubtedly would have been

c:riticism of a lack of air/land coordination.

Even at Labuan, with the Headquarters situated one and a half

kilometres apart, it is hard to imagine nightly meetings

taking place since it appears that all decisions were being

delayed by several hours. Similarly, there is no evidence of

nightly meetings at Balikpapan, but the obvious improvement in

coordination would indicate that the staffs at least benefited

from being CO-located. They obviously met at sufficiently

frequent intervals to resolve any problems and it is

inconceivable to imagine that daily or nightly meetings would

not have occurred.

Radar Siting

The need to locate radar on airfields to ensure that the

airfield would not be surprised by enemy air attacks was

194 Oboe

certainly realised. Use of air warning and Ground Control

Intercept (GCI) radars and a Mobile Fighter Control Unit

(MFCU) was indicative of such a realisation. However, on

Tarakan, some radar equipment was late in arriving, and in

other cases, did not arrive at all. Additionally, the RAAF

could not site the MFCU and GC1 together. Another problem

arose on Tarakan - the RAAF was keen to establish the GC1 site as quickly as possible, which placed a strain on the movements

organisation at a critically early time, and also meant that

the site was probably not optimal and a new site would have to

be established later.

At Labuan, the radars were operable within 16 hours of the

landings. The principal observation would have to be that as

soon as the airfield and permanent radar sites could be

secured, the better would be the subsequent air support.

Similarly, at Balikpapan, the forward echelon of the MFCU had

the air warning and GC1 radars operating within 12 hours of

landing. The entire system at Balikpapan was fully

operational within four days of the landings.

By the time of Balikpapan, standard operating procedures for

air defence had been well-refined. The MFCU issued air raid

warnings, allocated responsibilities to air and ground

defences, and controlled fighter aircraft until they

established visual contact with any enemy intruder aircraft.

As well, the MFCU coordinated all air and ground defence

activities.

The fact that enemy aircraft were able to attack Tarakan

airfield (and escape), and that one month later they were

unable to reach Labuan airfield (with three aircraft being

shot down) indicates that the fighter control system was, by

then, very effective. Balikpapan airfields were not

threatened, but whether that was a product of effective air

defences or that Japan's offensive capability was severely

strained is difficult to say. Nevertheless, it would be

Doctrine 195

reasonable to assume that air defences and the fighter control

organisation would have been as effective at Balikpapan, had

it proved necessary, as they were at Labuan.

Fighter Operations

Comments on fighter operations are closely related to those on

radar siting, and the previous discussion on air defences and

the fighter control organisation applies equally here.

Tedder's doctrinal priorities were never an issue during the

Oboe operations, as the enemy did not contest the skies, and

while fighter escorts accompanied bombers in the lead-up to

all landings, after the landings, air alert fighters overhead

the respective OAs were considered sufficient protection for

any bombers in the OAs.

Air effort was dedicated exclusively to supporting the ground

forces, and there was never any argument about air effort not

being used to support ground force operations. Any problems

tended to be ones of inexperience or lack of coordination, and

by the time of Labuan and Balikpapan, problems experienced

earlier had been largely resolved.

Allocation of primary and secondary targets in the OA, use of

the cab rank system and the freedom to attack targets of

opportunity were all indicative of the importance that air

commanders placed on supporting the ground forces and not

squandering air effort. By the time of Labuan, air support

aircraft did not depart the OA with unexpended bombs or

ammunition that had been allocated for use within the OA.

Similarly, CAP aircraft tasked with supporting the landings

would be directed on to secondary targets if opposition on the

ground was sufficiently light that the Army commander felt he

could manage without the planned direct air support.

Instances of technical malfunction that meant primary targets

196 Oboe

could not be attacked, saw secondary targets attacked if the

malfunction had been rectified before the aircraft departed

the OA.

While aerial-delivered firepower may not have destroyed many

enemy defensive positions, or indeed killed many enemy troops,

it did force the Japanese to leave their defensive positions,

invariably in circumstances that favoured the advancing

Australians.

Air support over the landings was highly effective and little

enemy opposition was encountered on the beaches. Similarly,

precision attacks were prosecuted over the beaches and at

times on the inland advances, within 100 metres of friendly

forces. Other than one case of US aircraft attacking friendly

forces on Parramatta Ridge, the precision support was well

coordinated and well provided.

Precise air support was necessary because the most effective

close support occurred when friendly forces were within 100

metres of the enemy and could capitalise on the confusion and

damage caused by the bombing. If ground forces were just 200

metres away, they were generally unable to influence enemy

positions once bombing ceased.

Rapid Connnunications

While communications procedures with the attacking ground

forces appeared to be effective, problems were experienced

over the convoys. Incorrect frequencies, call signs and IFF

codes were evident during the convoy movement to Tarakan.

Once ashore, the Tarakan ASS had trouble communicating with

13th AF due to different cudes and cyphers, a problem which

was not rectified in the subsequent Oboe operations.

Doctrine 197

Landline communications were laid according to schedule, and

the respective MFCU and 1st TAF CP always had this particular

communications link established' on time in all three

operations. The ASPS experienced communications difficulties

in late afternoons which would have limited flexibility.

Perhaps the indicting observation to be made of communications

at Tarakan was that a considerable amount of direct air

support was prevented from being used during the first two

days due to indifferent communications - this was not a

problem at Labuan or Balikpapan.

While the communications links between CSA (Afloat) and direct

support aircraft worked well at Tarakan and Balikpapan,

communications between the two CSAs (Afloat) at Labuan were a

failure. Fortunately, the ASPS provided a solution until the

CP was established ashore.

~y the time of the Labuan operation, communications procedures

were well espoused in the Operations Instructions, even to the

extent of procedures for sending 'spoof' messages. A plan for

jamming and deception was implemented and procedures were

adopted to counter similar enemy moves at deception and

jamming .

There should be no doubt that the detailed coordination of all

activities depended on effective and rapid communications.

Coordination of ships, aircraft, and land forces once ashore

were fundamental to success, especially when joint operations

were involved. So too were communications for air warning,

fighter control, navigation, direct support, command purposes,

weather, coast watch and intelligence, fundamental to success.

Communications were also essential for coordinating NGS,

artillery fire and aerial fire support. Similarly,

communications were essential for coordinating air- and

ground-based air defences. Dedicated frequencies were used

more and more as the Oboe series proceeded, but there were

198 Oboe

instances where forces did not appreciate just what this

meant. For example, the Support Air Observers did not realise

that they could communicate directly with direct support

aircraft until after the Labuan operation.

One clear failing would appear to be the inability of Army

airborne observers to be in direct contact with the ASPS:

although the Army observer could communicate with CSA and the

ASS/CP. Another failing was the need foz CSA and the ASS/CP

to request additional information continually, which indicated

that many units did not realise that the changing air and

ground situations necessitated continual passing of relevant

information. What tended to happen was that units waited

until they were asked to pass the information. Not only did

this generate unnecessary communications (ie asking for the

information), but it also complicated matters as the

information would be communicated virtually at the time that

it needed to be acted upon (thus frustrating planners).

It would seem obvious that command communications needed to be

retained at all times; yet, at Tarakan, the Brigade Commander

was out of the communications link for a period, which meant

that air effort could not be applied in certain cirumstances

until communications were re-established with the Commander.

Advanced Headquarters

The doctrine for establishing advanced headquarters was

followed. From the RAAF's point of view, RAAF Command

established an advanced HQ at Morotai, while retaining its

main HQ at Brisbane. 1st TAF was headquartered at Morotai,

and established an advanced HQ at Tarakan for subsequent

operations at Labuan and Balikpapan. Although, the delays

experienced with the Tarakan airfield undoubtedly would have

complicated matters.

Doctrine 199

Similarly, Allied Air Forces (AAF), with its rear echelon at

Brisbane, established an advanced HQ at Manila, as did Far

East Air Forces (FEAF). 5th AF established an advanced HQ at

Clark Field in the Philippines, and 13th AF established its

advanced HQ at Leyte.

While one would expect the AAF HQ at Manila to control air

operations centrally, the execution of the actual operations

would have occurred at the other headquarters. For the Oboe

operations, AAF HQ would appear to have had little

involvement, with RAAF Command taking on the planning role of

an operational HQ.

Simplified C o m n d Chain

It is difficult to determine the precise span of command of

the key commanders, but air force doctrine to emerge after the

war indicated the need for commanders to allow subordinates

freedom to exercise initiative without delegating too much

responsibility .5'

From a 1st TAF perspective, the AOC (Scherger) delegated

responsibilities to his two key staff officers - operational matters to Murdoch and administrative matters to Duncan.

Intelligence

While it is relatively straightforward to comment on the

efficacy of intelligence prior to the landings, information on

intelligence activities during the subsequent air/land

operations is scant. Intelligence was quite reasonable on

geography, enemy strengths, airfields, anti-aircraft and

aircraft capabilities, likely Japanese target priorities and

5 4 ~ ~ 1 3 0 0 Operations, UK Air Ministry, March 1957, p.112.

200 Oboe

tactics, and weather for flying conditions and the conduct of

specific operations. Clearly, the intelligence on the

suitability of the airfield at Tarakan for prolonged

operations was flawed.

Effective tactical intelligence depended on rapid

communications, and would have improved as communications

improved; as the air support organisation and procedures were

refined; and once the 1st TAF CP and the divisional HQ were

CO-located, by the time of the Balikpapan operation.

Within the TAF, air intelligence had four principal functions.

First, it had to provide close liaison with Army as operations

were almost entirely devoted to direct support. Second, due

to the essential liaison requirement, effective communications

were essential. Third, the organisation had to be flexible

and responsive enough to cope with rapidly changing air and

ground situations. Finally, because the TAF could be cut-off

from the rest of the air force, the intelligence organisation

had to be able to continue operating.

To meet these requirements, the organisation was structured

around a chief intelligence officer with an operations

intelligence deputy and an administration and organisation

deputy. The latter had responsibility for administration

support of the intelligence organisation, intelligence

security, and escape and evasion procedures. The operations

intelligence deputy had responsibility for: current operations

reporting claims, enemy order of battle and airfields, target

planning and production, anti-aircraft weapons and radar,

communications intercept, POW intelligence, and technical

intelligence. The target planning cell provided the necessary

liaison with Army and included current reconnaissance

reporting.

Doctrine 201

Mobility

While Tedder's notion of mobility was more in terms of

leapfrogging forward on land (from airfield to airfield),

Scherger adopted a similar notion of leapfrogging airfields,

only he moved from one discrete OA to the next (which was not

necessarily forward). Scherger moved from Morotai to Tarakan

on Borneo's north east coast, then moved his CP to Labuan on

the north west coast, then back to the east coast, just south

of Tarakan, at Balikpapan. Once his advanced HQ had been

established at Tarakan, he was always able to maintain control

over his air operations in support of Labuan and Balikpapan.

As it turned out, the redundancy (afforded by his advanced HQ)

was never required, as the command posts were set up

effectively in each case.

As Tedder argued for effecting control from his most forward

element as it became established, with control being

relinquished from the immediate past control element, so it

was for the Oboe operations. Here we saw CSAs (Afloat)

controlling air support during the convoys and amphibious

landings. Once the streamlined air support organisation had

been introduced at Labuan, control passed ashore when the ASPS

became operational. This was only temporary, and once the 1st

TAF CP was established, control then passed to Scherger.

So, in a sense, Scherger did employ Tedder's leapfrogging

technique, although not quite along the symmetrical lines

enjoyed by Tedder; quite simply because the 'most forward

element' for Scherger was the particular landing at the time,

and the nearby airstrip.

Post-War Doctrine

While there was no universally endorsed operational doctrine

across all theatres, it is quite obvious that the refinement

202 Oboe

of air support procedures from the European and Mediterranean

theatres and Tedder's principles in particular, were not only

known by the RAAF planners for Oboe, but were also acted upon.

The tactical procedures used during the Oboe operations would

appear to have been well constructed, although there were

obvious breakdowns. However, the clear lack of doctrine at

the operational level must have adversely affected the

operational commanders - in particular, Bostock and Scherger. This apparent lack of operational doctrine also applied to the

RAF on the other side of the world, although the RAF had the

directives mentioned earlier and its basic doctrinal

publication for the conduct of air operations - the AP1300 - which devoted one chapter to air support. The third edition

of the AP1300 was released in 1950 and the fourth and final

edition in 1957. The AP1300 was a watershed for the RAF, and

the RAAF adopted the publication as an accurate reflection of

its own basic doctrine. It was not until 1955 that a

comprehensive doctrine for air support was issued as AP3235,

although this was largely an historical account of air support

throughout World War 11, as experienced by the RAF.

The post-War AP1300 does provide a good insight into the basic

doctrine (in a philosophical sense) that carried the air

forces through the war. It focused on the interdependence of

land and air operations, with three main principles. First,

the land and air staffs had to work as one team, from the

formulation of plans to their execution. Operations had to be

designed to exploit the combined potential of land and air

forces to the best advantage. Second, true flexibility of air

power would only be obtained through centralised command and

decentralised execution. Third, a land force commander should

have to deal with one air commander only.55

Doc t r ine 203

The doctrine argued that air forces could contribute to the

land battle in two ways - direct intervention (direct support) or indirect influence (indirect support). The former involved

close air support, air reconnaissance and tactical air

transport, and could be used offensively to support an advance

or defensively to counter an enemy attack. The latter

involved air operations outside the immediate battle area, to

paralyse enemy movements or simply to harass the enemy.

Tactical air operations involved five distinct roles - counter air (both offensive and defensive), interdiction, air

reconnaissance, close air support, and air transport support.56

The AP1300 also argued that close air support was not

appropriate when targets were within range of surface-to-

surface weapons organic to friendly ground forces. Although,

four caveats were articulated viz:

a. when surface-to-surface weapons were less suited than

air-delivered weapons,

b. when surface-to-surface weapons were incapable of

achieving the desired results,

c . when the urgency of the situation demanded support from

all weapons, and

d. when air-to-surface and surface-to-surface weapons, used

in conjunction, could produce decisive result^.^'

The doctrine argued that tactical air operations meant air

forces had to exhibit three fundamental characteristics - flexibility (to switch from one task to another), adaptability

(the ability to perform more than one role and to be equipped

56 ibid, pp.64-65. For the current Australian doctrinal definition of these roles, refer to the AAP 1000.

204 Oboe

to perform more than one role), and mobility (the ability to

deploy rapidly) . 5 @

The doctrine also described the necessary organisation for

controlling tactical air operations. A theatre commander

would have responsibility for overall policy direction of the

air/land battle. While control may be delegated, the theatre

commander would normally retain control over medium-range

transport aircraft, light bombers and medium-range

reconnaissance aircraft, as well as air defence aircraft

tasked with protecting the rear areas.59

At field force level, the doctrine argued for a Joint

Operations Centre which would determine the policy for the

conduct of the air/land battle, prepare plans for air action,

allot the air effort to particular roles, and coordinate all

air action. Specific cells would be required to coordinate

strike and reconnaissance, air defence (both air- and ground-

based) and air transport operations. The need for air support

and air liaison parties within brigade and battalion groups

was also highlighted.

Perhaps an appropriate point to close this discussion on

doctrine would be with final reference to the AP1300, with

respect to the future. The doctrine argued that while future

scientific and technological developments would abound, the

validity of well-proven principles for the conduct of tactical

air operations in joint warfare was unlikely to diminish. The

doctrine also cautioned that it was just as important not to

be so inflexible as not to formulate new operational and

tactical doctrines to fit new ~ircumstances.~'

5B ibid, pp.70a and 70b.

59 ibid, pp.70~ and 70d.

ibid, pp. 70e and 70f

Doctrine 205

It concluded:

'Finally, defence strategy is founded on the unity of

purpose of the three Services. To translate this unity

into effective action, common tactical doctrines,

standardised procedures, compatible equipment and a high

degree of inter-service understanding at all levels are

required so that the various elements of the air, land

and1 sea forces that are so inseparably linked in joint

operations can work effectively t~gether'.~'

This the Australians achieved as they prosecuted their most

comprehensive and successful joint operations ever - at

Tarakan Island, Labuan Island-Brunei Bay, and Balikpapan, in

1945.

CONCLUSION

Australia gained considerable national pride from planning and

conducting the Oboe operations. It was the first time that

substantial operations were conducted involving joint Australian

forces as the main force, with some support from Allies. Most

important of all, the Oboe operations were a success.

The three operations followed a well-planned sequence that was

refined after each operation. The fact that substantial changes

were not made during Balikpapan over the planning for Tarakan,

indicates that the original concept for air operations was sound.

This concept, firmly rooted in doctrine, saw a phased operation,

with enemy air capability and significant infrastructure attacked

first, followed by preparation of the battlefield, and then

finally, close air support.

Significantly, there were procedural and minor tactical lessons

to be progressively learnt as Tarakan, Labuan Island/Brunei Bay

and then Balikpapan were captured. The fact that many of these

lessons were adopted prior to the next operation is an indication

(of how responsive the doctrine was to actual operations. The

tabuan landing occurred less than six weeks after the Tarakan

landing, and there was only a three-week gap between Labuan and

Balikpapan.

The RAM carried with it the doctrine that had been developed in

other theatres and refined, to a limited degree, by it in the

South West Pacific Area. While RAAF doctrine was not

specifically written as such, many of the principles embodied in

effective air support operations were followed during the Oboe

operations. This probably should not come as a surprise, since

the R A A F was keenly aware of RAF doctrine in particular, and

readily adopted RAF doctrine (via the AP1300) as descriptive of

its own doctrine. What should come as a surprise, however, is

that the RAAF would cease to use the AP1300 in the 1970s and not

develop its own doctrine until the 1990s.

208 Oboe

Now that the RAAF has developed its own doctrine, with its first

edition of the AAP1000 appearing in 1990 and its second edition

in 1994, and now that, broadly speaking, the RAAF appears

comfortable with that doctrine, it is likely that further

refinements will come, in the main, from detailed historical

studies. While the fundamental issues raised in AAPlOOO are

unlikely to change, studies such as this one do indicate that

further refinement is possible, especially in relation to air

support doctrine.

As the Australian Defence Force focuses more and more on joint

operations and refines its joint procedures, there will be a need

to analyse both the history and concept of direct air support in

more detail. It is possible that such historical and conceptual

studies will lead to minor refinements of the RAAF's current

doctrine.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Unpublished Official Records

Public Record Office, Kew, UK

PRO, Air 40/1417 - Malaya Far East Daily Summary No 145 of 12 September 1945.

PRO, Air 40/1417 - Malaya Far East Daily Summary No 176 of 29 October 1945.

PRO, Air 40/1437 - Malaya Far East Daily Summary No 143 of 10 September 1945.

PRO, Air 40/1437 - Malaya Far East Daily Summary No 149 of 17 September 1945.

PRO, Air 40/1761 - RAAF Command Intelligence Summary No 9 of 31 March 1945.

IPRO, Air 40/1761 - RAAF Command Intelligence Summary No 14 of '5 May 1945.

PRO, Air 40/1761 - RAAF Command Intelligence Summary No 20 of 16 June 1945.

PRO, Air 40/1761 - RAAF Command Intelligence Summary No 23 of 7 July 1945.

PRO, Air 40/2201 - Report of Japanese Air Order of Battle Conference 5-23 February 1945, Washington DC.

PRO, Air 40/2208 - Japanese Air Forces Order of Battle Report No 76 of 15th April 1545.

PRO, Air 40/2208 - Japanese Air Forces Order of Battle Report No 77 of 22nd April 1945.

PRO, Air 40/2217 - Headquarters Allied Air Forces Intelligence Report 'Japanese Fighter Tactics', January 1945.

RAAF Historical Section, Canberra

Oboe One Box File

Air Observation Post Operations (Flight Lieutenant Drabsch).

Air Support Party Operations (Flight Lieutenant MC. Stewart).

No 1 Australian Corps Intelligence Review No 2, 10 April 1945.

Memorandum TR18, 25 April 1945.

210 Oboe

RAAF Command AAF, SWPA, Report of OBOE One Operations, May 1945.

RAAF Command Operations Instruction No 78/45.

RAAF File 1/2/9, 29 May 1945.

RAAF File 1/2/9 (Group Captain Rooney).

RAAF File 2/17/18, 11 May 1945.

RAAF File 24/5/Air (47A), 29 May 1945.

RAAF File 311.2373, 16 May 1945.

Oboe Two Box File

21 AIF Administrative Order No 1.

RAAF Command Operations Instruction No 154/1945.

R A M Operation Plan 6-45.

1st Tactical Air Force Operations Order 2/1945.

Oboe Six Box File

No 1 Air Support Party Report on Oboe Six operations.

No 1 Australian Corps Intelligence Review No 3, 8 May 1945.

No 9 Australian Division Operation Order No 4, 17 June 1945.

Joint Operation - Brunei, Labuan.

No 111 Mobile Fighter Control Unit Report on Oboe Six operations.

RAAF Command AAF, SWPA, Report of OBOE Six Operations, June 1945.

RAAF Command Operations Instruction No 98/1945

RAAF File 1/2/10, 1 July 1945.

RAAF File 2/42/Air, 27 June 1945.

RAAF File 4/5/Air, 27 June 1945.

RAAF File 305/3/E, 6 July 1945.

RAAF File 2103/13/E, 30 June 1945.

RAAF Report TR20, 20 June 1945.

Bibliography 211

1st Tactical Air Force Administrative Instruction 9/45.

1st Tactical Air Force Command Post Report on Oboe Six operations.

1st Tactical Air Force Operations Instruction 63/45.

1st Tactical Air Force Operations Order 1/1945.

RAF Eendon Archives

Air Ministry Intelligence Summary No 290 of 24 March 1945.

Monographs and Monograph Chapters

Nicola Baker, More Than L i t t l e Heroes: Australian Army A i r Liaison O f f i c e r s i n the Second World W a r , Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 106, SDSC, Australian National University, Canberra, 1994.

Jrohn Bennett, Defeat t o Vic tory: No 453 Squadron RAAF, RAAF Museum, Point Cook, Victoria, 1994.

C!haz Bowyer, Beaufighter a t War , Ian Allan Ltd, UK, 1976.

John Connell, Auchinleck: A Biography o f Field Marshal S i r Claude Auchinleck, Cassell, London, 1959.

(:.D. Coulthard-Clark, 'An Extraordinary Group of People: I'ersonalities from the 1920s to the 1970s', in Aus tra l ia ' s A i r Chiefs: RAAF History Conference 1992, Air Power Studies C:entre, Canberra, 1992.

Carlo D'Este, Decision i n Normandy: The Unwritten Story o f Montgomery and The Al l ied Campaign, Collins, London, 1983.

General Kenney Reports: A Personal History o f the Pac i f i c War, reprinted by Office of Air Force History, USAF, Washington, D.C., 1987.

E.G. Keogh, The South West Pac i f i c 1941-45, Grayflower Productions, Melbourne, 1965.

Asher Lee, A i r Power, Gerald Duckworth, London, 1955.

Stephen J. McNamara (Lt Col, USAF), A i r Power's Gordian Knot: Centralized Versus Organic Control, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Base, Alabama, 1994.

Athol Moffitt, Project Kingfisher, Angus & Robertson, NSW, Australia, 1989.

Michael V. Nelmes, Tocumwal t o Tarakan: Australians and the

212 Oboe

C o n s o l i d a t e d B-24 L i b e r a t o r , Banner Books, Canberra, 1994.

George Odgers, A i r War A g a i n s t Japan 1943-1 945, Australian War Memorial, 1957.

Masatake Okumiya and Jiro Horikoshi, with Martin Caidin, Zero! The S t o r y o f t h e Japanese Navy Air Force 1937-1945, Cassell and Company Limited, London, 1957.

Vincent Orange, Coningham: A Biography o f A i r Marshal S i r A r t h u r Coningham, KCB, KBE, DSO, MC, DFC, AFC, Center for Air Force History, Washington D.C., 1992.

Sky Phillips, S e c r e t M i s s i o n t o Melbourne, November 1941, Sunflower University Press, Kansas, 1992.

John Robertson and John McCarthy, A u s t r a l i a n War S t r a t e g y 1939-1 945, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia Queensland, 1985.

Hilary St George Saunders, Per Ardua: The R i s e o f B r i t i s h A i r Power 1911-1939, Oxford University Press, 1944.

Christopher Shores and Brian Cull with Yasuho Izawa, Bloody Shambles - Volume One, The D r i f t t o War t o t h e F a l l o f S i n g a p o r e , Grub Street, London, 1992.

Alan Stephens and Brendan O'Loghlin (eds), The D e c i s i v e F a c t o r : A i r Power D o c t r i n e b y A i r Vice-Marshal H . N . W r i g l e y , Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1990.

Alan Stephens, 'The Office of the Chief of the Air Staff', in A u s t r a l i a ' S A i r C h i e f s : RAAF H i s t o r y Conference 1992 , Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1992.

Alan Stephens, Power P l u s A t t i t u d e : I d e a s , S t r a t e g y and D o c t r i n e i n t h e Royal A u s t r a l i a n A i r Force 1921-1991, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1992.

Alan Stephens, RAAF H i s t o r y Conference 1993 - The RAAF i n t h e SWPA 1942-1945, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1993.

Air Commodore C.R. Taylor, CBE, I S u s t a i n t h e Wings: A H i s t o r y o f No.11 R e p a i r and S e r v i c i n g U n i t , RAAF 1942-1945, published by the author, 1992.

Marshal of the Royal Air Force The Lord Tedder, G .C. B. , W i t h P r e j u d i c e : The War Memoirs o f Marshal o f t h e Royal A i r Force , Lord Tedder , G. C.B., Cassell, London, 1966.

John Terraine, The R i g h t L i n e o f t h e L i n e , Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1985.

Bib1 i ography 213

Gary Waters, 'Air Power Doctrine', in Waters and Dr John Mordike, Regional A i r Power Workshop 1993, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1993.

Gary Waters, The Archi tec t o f V i c t o r y : A i r Campaigns for Aus t ra l ia , Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1991.

Gary Waters, 'The Tarakan Operation - Air Power Lessons', in The RAAF i n t h e SWPA 1942-1945: RAAF His tory Conference 1993, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1993.

Lt Col Charles M. Westenhoff, USAF, M i l i t a r y A i r Power, Air University Press, Alabama, October 1990.

Published Doctrine

Air Power Studies Centre, AAP 1000, RAAF A i r Power Manual, 2nd Edi t ion , RAAF Base Fairbairn, Canberra, 1994.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, HQUSAF, JFACC .Primer, Second Edition, February 1994.

Llirectorate of Defence Studies, AP 3000, RAF A i r Power Doctrine, London, 1991.

Royal Air Force AP1300 Operations, UK Air Ministry, March 1957.

Royal Air Force AP3235, A i r Support, Air Ministry, London, 1955.

Journal Articles, Reports and Theses

T. Dodson Stamps and Vincent J. Esposito, eds., Combat A i r Forces o f World War 11, vo1.2, Operations i n t h e Mediterranean and P a c i f i c Theaters, US Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., 1956, as cited in Timothy D. Gann, Lt Col, USAF, F i f t h A i r Force Light and Medium Bomber Operations during 1942 and 1943: Building the Doctrine and Force t h a t Triumphed i n t h e B a t t l e o f t h e Bismarck Sea and the Wewak Raid, Air University Press, Alabama, November 1993.

Unpublished Papers

Air Marshal R.G. Funnell, A i r Power and Smaller P a c i f i c Nations - An Austral ian [Airman ' S ] Perspect ive , an unpublished Chief of the Air Staff Paper to Asian Aerospace 90 held on 15 February 1990.

INDEX

W 1 0 0 0 (RAAF Air Power Manual), 203. Able Green Beach, 117,132. Able Red Beach, 117,132. Able Yellow Beach, 117,132. Accommodation, 162. Adaptability, 203. Administration, 50-53,106-113,146-150,163,164,165,166.

- Weaknesses, 51. Admiralty Islands, Mapl. Advanced Headquarters, 198,199. Air Bases - Forward, 174. Air Base Garrisoning, 165. Air Blockade, 28,77. Airborne Coordinator, 41,141,156,

(see also Support Air Observer). Airborne Observer, (see Air Liaison Officer). Aircrew, 189. Air Defence, 29,81,84.

- Coordination, 144. Air Distances, 58. Air DroDs. 46.159. ~ i r ~ffort - Waste, 155,157. Airfield, 186,187, (see also Japanese Airfields, specific

airfield names). Airfield Attacks, 35. Airfield Construction Squadron (ACS), 53,54,112,113,164.

- 4ACS. 112. - 5 ~ ~ s ; 113.

61 Airfield Construction Wing, 134. Airfield Defence - ZAFDS, 93,138,139. 5th Air Force (USAAF), 75,76,125,199. 13th Air Force (USAAF), 9,18,21,31,40,74,75,128,182,196.

- Responsibility, 28,65,66,124,125. Air/Land Battle Doctrine, 204. Air Liaison Officer (BLO), 38,39,41,84,141,155,156,177,198 Air Liaison Party (ALP), 47,94,96,155,160,163. Air Missions, 179. Air Observation Post, (see AOP). Air Operations Restrictions, 68,126,

(See also Bombing Restrictions). Air Power Svstem. 165.190. Air Sea Rescue, jsee ASR) . Air Superiority, 171,178,180,186,188,195. Air Support Doctrine

- Allied Air Force SWPA Manual. 180. - G3235 (RAF), 202. - Landing Operations Manual, 180.

Air Support Organisation, 41-48,94-101,140-143,169. - Reorganisation, 47. - System of Control, 96,97.

Air Support Party (ASP), 39,41,42,46,47,94,98,160,163,181, 192.197.

Air support Plan, 125,126. Air SuDDort Problems. 99. Air support Requests; 42,43,95. Air Support Section (ASS), 41,42,46,47,94,98,160,162,163,181,

216 Oboe

192. Air Support Statistics, 100. Air-to-Air, 36,87,152. Air Transportation, 29,203. Air Warning Station, 48. Aitape, 179,181. Alert Aircraft, 44,152,195, (see also CAP). Alexander, General, 172,173,181. Alexishafen, 179. Allied Air Forces, 199, (see also specific air forces). Alternate Targets, 44. Ambesia, Map2. W o n , Mapl, Map2. Amphibious Operations, 180,195,196,

(see also Assault, individual Oboe Operations). Anti-Personnel Bombs, 70. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), 35,85,137. Anzac Highway, Map4. AOC North Western Area, 28. AOP Operations, 39,40,$2,141.

- 16 AOP Fliaht. 26,39.92.157. AP1300 (RAF Air ~owe; ~anuai),~202,~03,~04. -3235 (RAF Air SuDDort Doctrine). 202. - - , . Api, ~ = ~ 2 , 2 1 . Arafura Sea, Mapl. Arnold, General - Principles, 189-191. 8th Army, 170. Army/Air Co-operation in New Guinea - Manual, 180. Army Cooperation Wing, 122. Arthur, Group Captain, 18,29. Artillery, 21,141,174,197. Artillery Smoke, 69. Asa. 62. ASR. (Air Sea Rescue), 29,73,90,137,155. 113 ASR Flight, 26,72,73. Assault, 80,178. ATTU, 166. ~uchinleck, General, 171. Austers, 26,39,54,72.

Baba, Lieutenant General, 168. ~alan, 76. Bali, Map2,3,57. Balikpapan, Map2,Map3,Map6,3,7,35,76,115,193,194,195,197,198,

201. -. - - Bombing of, 134. - Enemy aircraft over, 135.

Balik~a~an Town, Ma~6.132~133. - . ~anda- Mapl ; Bandiermasin, Map3.3.7.76.120.135.

~ a n 6 a strait, 77. Barnr Commission. 12. -

~asiiai, 7. Batavia (Jakarta), Map1,8,168.

Index 217

2/13 Battalion (Australian), 85,95. 2/17 Battalion (Australian), 82. 2/24 Battalion (Australian), 133. Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI), 156. Beach Movement, 49. Beaufiahters. 26.54.139. - . .

- Loss, 86. Beaufort. Ma~5.85.87. - . . Beauf0rt'~ircraft Loss, 86. Beda Fomm, 170. Biak, Mapl, 165,179. Bingkalapa, 91. Bintulu, Map3,21,62,76. 'Blackout', 105. Blamev, General, 116,117. ~oelii- Island, 62. Bombina, 46,153,154,189,196, (see also Strategic Bombing). -

- Accuracy, 79. - Balikpapan, 134. - Damage, 114. - Mistake, 81. - Restrictions, 32. - Tactics, 82.

Bombline, 44,95,175. ~ooby Traps, 54,83. Borneo, Mapl,MapZ,Map3,6,165, (see also specific place names). Borneo - history, 1,3. Bostock, Air Vice-Marshal, 7,9,11,19,20,29,58,59,65,74,84,118,

122,128,132,136,151,155,188,191,202. - AS AOC-ink, is. .

Bougainville, 179,181. Brett, General, 9. 18 Briaade (Australian). 117,122.132. 20 ~riGade i~ustralianj ; 82. 21 Brigade (Australiar,), 117,122,132. 24 Brigade (Australian), 82. 25 Brigade (Australian), 117,122. 26 Brigade (Australian), 17,20,44. Brigade Commander, 45. Brisbane, 75,199. British Borneo, 8. Brooketon, Map5,60,61,76,77,82,86,160. Brown Beach, 60,82,86. Brownell, Air Commodore, 165. Brunei, MapZ,Map3,62,76. Brunei Bay, Map5,8,57.

- Description, 58. Brunei Bluff, 82. Brunei - history, 1. Brunei - Sultan of, 1. Brunei Town, Map5,79. Brutality, 14,15, (see also POWs). Buna, 182. Burma, 174.

Cab Rank, 177,195, (see also CAP).

218 Oboe

Caen, 175. Call Signs, 52,196. Cape Pasir, Map4,48. Cape Sapo, 61. Casablanca Conference, 183. Cassino, 176. Casualties, Friendly, 132,159,174,176,177,196. Casualty Evacuation, 171. Catalinas, 40. Cebu, Map2,7. Celebes Sea, Map2. Chaff, 106. Charnwood (Operation), 175. Chilton, Brigadier, 122,132. China, Mapl,Map2,164. Churchill, Prime Minister, 181. Civilians - Killed, 86. Clark Air Base, 75,199. Close Air support (CAIRS), 19,36,83,86,134,135,143,145,152,

156,158,159,171,172,175,178,179,180,184,190,195,203. - Tactics, 45.

Cobby, Air Commodore. 9.11.18.29.193. CO-location, 170,171; 183,192,200; (see also Siting). Combat Air Patrol (CAP), 40,83,84,143,152,158,180,186,195.

- CAP Point 'Baker', 69. - CAP Point 'Easv'. 69.

Combined Doctrine, 16?. . Combined O~erations. 158.166. Command an2 control; 29-30,74-75,1~2,155,181,182.

- Chain of Command. 184.199. - Command Posts, 75,98,i62,192,197,198,201. - Unity, 169,181,184,191,202.

Commander ~ i ~ ~ o r t ~ i r c r a f t (CSA), 35,36,41,42,43,69,122,141, 142,143,144,153,156,157,177,180,197,198,201.

~ommonalit~, 166. Communications, 34,52,106,155,156,163,166,171,184,196-198,200.

- Failures/Problems, 36,45,157,158,198. Concentration. 174.187. Congestion, ~raffic, 50,162. Coningham, Air Marshal, 170,179,181,182. Convoy, 162. Convov Cover. 34.154.155. coope;ation,. 170: Coordination. 156.158.159.161.174.177.182.193.197. Coral Sea, 4 1st Corps (Australian), 9,17,60.

- Headquarters, 29. . Cotabato, 7. Counter Air, 203. Courier Services, 40,68,127. Cunderdin, 11. Cunningham, General, 170,171. Curnow, Group Captain, 165. Curtin, Prime Minister, 116,117. Cyphers, 49,98,160,196.

Index 219

Dajoe, 62. Darwin, 80. DDT ~ ~ ; a ~ i n ~ , 41,72 Deception, 103,130,158,197. Delay Fuses, 159. Delousina O~erations, 83, (see also mines, booby traps). Den ~asa;, Map2, 119. Depth Charges, 54. Desert Air Force, 170. D-Hour (Oboe Six). 65. Dinah - '~estro~ed; 87,88. Direct SuD~ort, 36.69,lsee also CAIRS, Air Support). ~isembarkzion; 50; 161:

- Problems. 97.101. Distances by ai;, 58. 5th Division (Australian), 179. 6th Division (Australian), 181. 7th Division (Australian), 115,140,179,192. 9th Division (Australian), 17,29,60,98,168,192,193. Djoeta, ~a~4,3l. Doctrine, 13,126,167,169-205.

- AAPlOOO, 203. - Air/Land Battle, 204. - -1300, 202,203,204. - -3235, 202. - FM31-35, 179. - FM100-20, 179. - Landing Operations - Air Support, 180. - Operational, 202. - Post-War, 201-205.

Dougherty, Brigadier, 122,132. Drabsch, Flight Lieutenant, 39. Duncan, Group Captain, 30,84,193,199.

East Africa, 170. Eather, Brigadier, 122. El Alamein, 183. Embarkation, 50,161.

- Problems, 102. Epilogue, 167. Escort - Fighter, 184,190. Experience, 14.

F-Day (Oboe Two), 115. FEAF, 199. Fighter Control Organisation, 48-50,101-106. Fiahter Cover, 84, (see also CAP). ~ighter ~efence, 81; (see also ~ i r Defence) . Fighter Direction, 143,144. Fighter Escort, 184,190. Fighter Interceptor, 184. Fighter Operations, 103-105,143-146,183,184,195,196,

(see also Air Defence). Fighter Sweep, 184. Finschhafen, 178. Flexibility, 152,153,157,180,187,202,203.

220 Oboe

200 Flight, 93,94. Flores Island, 76. Flores Sea, Mapl,Map2. FM31-35 (Manual), 179. FM100-20 (Manual), 179. Forde, Prime Minister, 136. Formosa, Mapl. Forward Airstrips, 174. France, 169,176. Friction, 161.

Gairns, Len, 31. Gaya Bay, 84. GC1 Station, 48,160,161,194. Gibson, Group Captain, 11. Gorontalo, Map2,35. Green Beach, 61,82. Grew, Joseph, 2. Ground Attacks, 87. Ground Crew, 172. Ground Fire Support, 45. Ground Marking, 95,141,175. No10 Group, 179. No11 Group, 165. Guadalcanal, 4.

Halmaheras, Map2. Hamilton Point, 60. Headquarters Locations, 43,162, (see also Command Posts) Hemingway, Ernest, 2. H-Hour (Oboe Six), 65. Hollandia, Map1,75,165,179. Hong Kong, Mapl,Map2. Hull, Cordell, 2.

IFF Codes, 34,52,106,196. Independence, 183,191. Indo-China, Map1,5,58. Information, 156,157, (see also Intelligence). Infrastructure, 166. Ingenuity, 161. Integration, 192,193. Intelligence, 4,163,178,184,199,200,

(see also individual Oboe Operations). Interceptor - Fighter, 184, (see also Air Defence). Interdiction, 175,176,203, (see also Bombing, BAI). Ishiguro, Lieutenant General, 168. Isitt, Air Vice-Marshal, 9. Island Hopping, 172. Italy, 178. Iwahig Airfield (Palawan), 19.

Jakarta, Map1,8,168, (see also Batavia). Jamming, 158,197. Japan, Mapl.

Index 221

L

- Air Corps, 3. - Aircraft. 22.63.119. - ~irfields, 62,119. - Air Strength, 22,63. - Anti-Aircraft Strength, 21,61,119,128. - Bases, 5. - Break-Out, 88. - Fighter Tactics, 4,5,6. - Infiltration, 54. - Losses, 5. - Reaction, 62. - Tactics, 120. - Withdrawal, 33.

Java, Mapl,Map2,7,57,76. Java Sea, Map2. Jesselton, Map3,Map5,57,62,76,78,80,85. J-Hour (Oboe Six), 65. Jiang ~ a i Check, ' 164. Joint Doctrine, 167. Joint Operations, 166,190,202, (see also Coordination,

and individual Oboe Operations). Joint Planning, 183,193. Jolo, Map2,3,7. Jones, Air Vice-Marshal, 11. Jones-Bostock Feud, 10.

Kalabakan, Map3,134. Kalidjati, 119. Kangean, Map2. Karis Island, Map4. Kasserine Pass, 181. Kemajoran, 119. Kendari, Map2,77. Keningau, Map5,62,76,81,90. Kenney, General, 7,9,29,75,180,182. Kibidang, 85. Kitau, Map5. Kittyhawks, 24,26,54,139.

- Sortie Duration, 92,154. Klandasan, Map6,131,133. Kokoda Track, 178. Korea, Mapl. Kota Kinabulu, (see Jesselton). Kotawaringin, Map3,62,119. Kuala Belait, Map5,62,85. Kuala Lumpur, 168. Kuching, MapZ,Map3,21,35,62,76,92,154. Kudat, Map3,21,35,40,62,80. Kuraman Island, 70.

Labuan, Map2,Map3,Map5,3,8,21,35,61,62,77,82,87,130,164,165, 193.194.195.197.198.201. - ~escri~tibn, 58. - Use of, 88,113.

Eabuan Airfield, Map5,58,64,88,113,152.

222 Oboe

Labuan Town, Map5. Lae, 178,180. Lahad Datu, 62. Landing Operations - Manual for Air Support, 180. Laoet Island, 80. 9 LASU, 72,86. Lawas, Map5. Lead-up to Oboe, 1-15. Leaflet Drops, 77. Leap Frog Technique, 201. Leyte, Mapl,Map2,44,75,199. Liberators, 32,139.

- Losses, 136. Lightnings, 139. Limbang, Maps. Limbung, Map5,135. Line of Approach, 69,127. Lines of Communication, 57,80,164. Lingkas, Map4,20,31,32,36,157. Loading Priorities, 163. Logistics, 53,108,163,166. Lush, Group Captain, 165. Lutong, Map5,3,57,74,85,88.

- Landing, 95. Luzon, Mapl, Map2.

MacArthur, General, 7,8,83,116,117,151,182. Macassar Strait, Map2,120. Madang, 179. Maintenance, 168,189. Malang, Map2,77,89,119,129. Malaya, 5,58. Malta, 173. Mandai, 119. Mandate Campaigns, 8. Manggar, Map3,Map6,21,76,77,116,118,119,131. Manggar Airfield, Map6. Manggar Town, Map6. Manila, Mapl,Map2,75,199. Manoora, 50. Manual of Direct Air Support, 179. Maps/Map References, 46,69,81,142,153,160. McNamara, Air Chief Marshal, 55.

~edical Evacuation, 29. Melak, 62. Mempakul, 85. Menado, Map2,77. Mensalung, Map3,130. MFCU, 194,197. 110 MFCU, 59,135,143,144,162. 111 MFCU, 59,101,102,105,161,163. 114 MFCU, 26,43,44,48. Middleburg, 165. Mid-Point, 105,145.

Index 223

Midway, 4. Milford, General, 122. Milne Bay, 178. Mindanao, Map2. Mindoro, Map2. Minelaying, 28,77,80. Mines, 54.83. ~inesweeping, 80. Miri, Map2,Map3,Map5,3,21,35,57,61,62,76,77,79,85,88. Mission Types/Priorities, 31,180,186,188,203. Mitchell Aircraft, 139. Mitchell, General- 'Billy', 2. Mobilitv. 160,185,187,201,204. Moluccas; 6. ' Montclair Plan, 1,6. Montecorvino, 173. Montaomerv. General. 181. Moraie, 1;2,172,173;178. Morotai, Map2,9,19,31,43,44,75,77,80,128,151,162,164,165,167,

179,191,198,201. - conditions. 10.11. - Mutiny, 11;

Morshead, General, Mortar Smoke, 69. Mosquito Aircraft, Mountbatten, Lord, Movements. 108-111 .-- - MTU, 44,95. Muara Island, Map5,61,77,82,86. Mukah, Map3,62. Murdoch, Group Captain, 30,52,84,193,199

Nadzab, 179,180. Nakamura, Major General, 168. Napalm, 37,38,46,77,87,154,161. Naval Gunfire Support (NGS), 21,36,70,118,141,153,197.

- Spotting for, 80. Naval Support, 118. Naviaation. 105. Negros, Map2,7. Netherlands East Indies (NEII. 8. , . New Britain, Map1,8,179. New Guinea, Map1,8,178,180. Noemfoor, 19,164,179. 'No Go', 105. Normandy, 176,178. North Borneo, Map3. Northern Area, 74. North Western Area, 18,74,75,77.

Oboe Lead-up, 1-15. Oboe Observations, 151-168, 191-201. Oboe One, 12, 17-56.

- Air Operations, 30-41. - Air Support, 41-48. - Intelligence, 21-24.

224 Oboe

- Objective, 20-21. - Overview, 17-20. - Phase One, 30-33. - Phase Three, 35-37. - Phase Two, 33-35. - RAAF Planning, 24-29.

Oboe Phase (Montclair), 6,7. Oboe Six, 12,57-114.

- Air Operations, 75-94. - Air Support, 94-101. - Intelligence, 61-64. - Objective, 60,61. - Overview, 57-59. - Phase One, 76-80. - Phase Three, 82-92. - Phase Two, 80-82. - RAAF Planning, 65-74.

Oboe Two, 12,115-150. - Air Operations, 127-139. - Air Support, 140-143. - Intelligence, 118-122. - Objective, 117-118. - Overview, 115-117. - Phase One, 128-130. - Phase Three, 133-136. - Phase Two, 130-133. - RAAF Planning, 122-127.

Observations on Oboe, 151-168. Obstacles, 21. 38 OBU, 26. O'Connor, General, 170,171. Oelin, ~a~3,21,62;119. Oil, 3.8.31. - - - - -

Okinawa , &;l. o~erational Control. 9.29.41.:.55.204 . . Gerational ~octrine, 202, (see also Doctrine) . O~erational Policv. 11. a.

~;erations, pattern of, 20. Oscar - Destroyed, 91. No1 OSU, 166.

Padas Bay, 84. Padas River, Map5. Pajau Island, Map4. Palawan, Map2,19,44,77,81,129. Palembang, 5. Pamoesian, Map4,31,32. Panay, Map2,7. Pantelleria, 173. Papar, ~ap5,83. Parramatta Ridqe, Map6,131,132,196. P-Day (Oboe one), 191 Pearl Harbor, 2. Pelong Rock, 79. Pensingan, Map3.

Index 225

Personnel, 107. Philippines, Mapl,Map2,6. Photography, 33,93,137,161. Pioneer Battalions, 36. Pitoe. 9. planning, 151,166,182,

(see also specific Oboe Operations - RA?@ Planning). - Joint, 183,193.

Plentv. Grow Ca~tain. 163,164. ~ontianak, ~>~3,?6. . Porter. Briaadier. 65. POWS, i4,15;85,168. Precision, 153,155,171,175,189,196. Puerta Princessa Airfield, 19,80, (see also Palawan).

RA?@ - Formation, 191. RAAF Command, 9,75,198.

- Advanced Headquarters, 29. - Responsibility, 26-28. - Tasks Oboe One, 17,18. - Tasks Oboe Six, 67. - Tasks Oboe Two, 123.

Radar/Radar Stations, 26,183,193-195. Radio Aids, 105,175. RAF, 169,172,202.

- Formation, 191. RAN ASR, 73. Ranau, Map3,62. RCAF (Canada) - Formation, 191. Reconnaissance, 38,138,176,203. Red Beach, 61. Redundancy, 201. Reference Point 'Freida', 143. Reference Point 'John', 34,35. Reference Point 'Sarah', 70. Rehearsal, 49,159,166. Repatriation of POWs, 168. Research and Development, 190. Responsiveness, 187. Restrictions on Air Operations, 68,145,146,153,

(see also bombing restrictions). Riam Road, 90. 4 RIMU, 102,105,144. RNZAF (New Zealand) - Formation, 191. ~oberts, ~ieutenant General, 168. Rommel, 172. Rooney, Group Captain, 53. Roosevelt, President, 181. RSAF (South Africa) - Formation, 191.

Sadau Island, Map4,20,48. Saidor, 179. Salamaua, 178. Salerno, 173. Samar, Map2,19,31,80,128. Samarinda, Map3,35,118,119.

226 Oboe

Sandakan, Map3,15,21,40,62. Sanga Sanga, Map2,19,78,80,128,151. Sangkoeliqang, Map3. Sapong, 90. Sarawak, Map3.165.

- history, 1. Scheraer, Air Commodore, 3 0 ~ 6 5 ~ 8 4 ~ 1 2 2 ~ 1 9 1 ~ 1 9 3 ~ 1 9 9 ~ 2 0 1 ~ 2 0 2 . - . . . . Semarang, Map2,89,135,168. Sepinggan, Map3,Map6,21,62,76,116,119,131 Sepinggan Airfield, Map6,133,135. Sepinggan Town, Map6. Seria, Map5,3,57,62,76,77,79. Sesajap ~iver, 17. Sesanip, 31. Setting-up Problems, 49. Sibu, Map3,62,76. Sicily, 172,178. Sidi Barrani, 170. Simalumong, 134. Simms, Group Captain, 11. Simulation, 166. Singapore, Map1,76,120. Singkawang, Map3,62. Sio, 179. Siting Problems, 49,112,160,162. Smoke Laying, 33,138. Smoke Screens, 21. Soebi Ketjil, 62. Solomon Islands, Mapl,8. Sortie Numbers, 78,79,80.

- from Sepinggan, 136. - from Tarakan, 136.

Sowrey, Air Commodore, 170. Spaatz, General, 172,181. Spitfires, 24,26.

- Kill, 135. - Loss, 134.

No1 Squadron, 90,92. - Loss, 92.

No4 Squadron, 72,88,178,180. No11 Squadron, 88. No13 Squadron, 74,76. No21 Squadron, 18,31,32,33,77,128. No22 Squadron, 26,78,86,180. No23 Squadron, 18,31,77,128.

- Diary, 133. No24 Squadron, 18,31,32,33,77,128,131. No25 Squadron, 11,18,31,78,89,129,135,168.

- Loss, 133. No30 Squadron, 26,78,180.

- Loss, 81. No31 Squadron, 26,33,78,83. No54 Sauadron C.O.. 144. No75 squadron, 24,55,130,134,135,178. No76 Squadron, 24,40,71,76,78,86,90,178.

- Loss, 88,90.

l . l. . ~. . . . ~ , . ~ ~, . ~ . . . . ,~ ~~. ,

l

Index 227

No77 Squadron, 76,90. No78 Suuadron, 50,130,135. No79 squadron, 72,91,165. No80 Squadron, 24,130,135. No82 Squadron, 76,88,90,91,112,135. No93 Squadron, 90.

- LOSS, 90. No452 Squadron, 24,26,71,72,130,134,135. No457 Squadron, 72,76,87,90,112.

- Kill, 154. Stalkoedo, Map6,131. Standard Operating Procedures, 194. Stewart, Flight Lieutenant, 44. Strategic Bombing, 3, (see also Bombing). Subang, 85. Sulawesi, Mapl,Map2,57,76,120. Sulu Archipelago, Map2. Sumatra, Map1,57. Support Air Observer (SAO), 41,70,81,137,156,177,198,

(see also Airborne Coordinator). Surabaya, Map2,7,129.

- Harbour, 77. Surprise - Allied, 121. Sweep - Fighter, 184. System - Air Power, 165,190.

Tabanio, Map3,62,119,135. Tabuan River, 90. Tactical Loading, 43,161. Tactical Procedures, 202. Tadji, 181. TAF (RAF), 170,173. 1st TAF, 1,9,17,18,29,44,48,67,76,164,171,178,182,198.

- Command Post, 98,100, (see also ASS, Command and Control). - ~ntelii~ence Organisation, 200.

Tagai, 79. Taiwan. Ma~2. ~anjonb ~e>ak, 89,119. Tarakan, Map2,Map3,Map4,3,7,35,75,134,164,165,194,196,197,

198,201. Tarakan Airfield, Map4,19,23,24,37,53-56,151,172,193,200.

- Use of, 130. Tarakan Island - descri~tion. 17. Tarakan Oilfields, 31. Tarakan Town, Map4. Target Priorities, 142,189. Tawao, Map3,21,32,33,80,134. Tawi Tawi, Map2,7,19,40. Taytay Airfield (Palawan), 19. Technology, 13. Tedder, Air Marshal, 179,181,201,202.

- Principles, 182-185. - Relevance of Principles to Oboe, 191-201.

Tengoa River, 90. Tenom, Map5.

228 Oboe

Teraguchi, Field Marshal, 168. Thailand. MaD1. Theory, i3. L

Timbalai Airfield, Map5,58,62,79. TimOr Sea, Mapl,Map2. Tjangkol, 31. 9 TMO, 101. Tobruk, 172. Toli Toli, Map2,35. Townsville, 19. Traffic Congestion, 50. Tiaining, 189. Tunnels, 54.

Ulin Airfield, 135. Unity of Command, 169,181,184,191,202. US Navy Dive Bombers, 132. USS Nashville, 98,160. USS Rocky Mount, 29,36,41,43,84. USS Wasatch, 131.

Vasey Highway, Map6. Victoria Harbour, Map5,58,60. Victoria Town, 77. Victor Phase (Montclair), 6,7. Visayan Island, Map2.

Wama, 9. Weapon Loads, 139. Weather, 23,35,63,121. Western Area, 18,74,75,77. Western Desert, 169. Weston, Map5,79,87. Westralia, 50. Wewak, 181. White Beach, 61,82. Whitehead, Brigadier, 20. Williams, Air Marshal, 188. Williamtown, 166. Windeyer, Brigadier, 65. 'Window', 106. No1 Wing, 89. No41 wing, 166. No71 Winq, 181. No76 wing; 88,89,127. No77 Wina. 25,40,50,71,73,83,86,128,1588 . . . . . No78 wing; 19,24,25,40,73,128,130,1j4,1~8. No79 Wina. 89. N&O wing; 71. No81 Wina. 19.71.76.90.128. . . . No82 wing; 70,71,89,165. No83 Wing, 72,76. No85 Wing, 89. No86 Wing, 74,76,90. Wootten, General, 29,65. Wrigley, Air Vice-Marshal, 185-188.

l1 A ~ I I ~ L I ~ - ~ - ~ ~ ~ - - - ---- ~ ~~ ~ ~- ~~

l

Index 229

Yellow Beach, 60,61,82. l

'~amboanga, Map2,19,44. 2-Day (Oboe Six), 65.