7/29/2019 Ganzon vs. CA Digest

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Facts: A series of administrative complaints, ten in number, was filed by various city

officials against Petitioner Mayor Ganzon. During the pendency of the charges,

Respondent Secretary of Department of Local Government issued a preventive

suspension order for a period of sixty (60) days. Later on, when prima facie

evidence was found to exist on the charges, the respondent ordered the petitioner's

second preventive suspension for another sixty (60) days. Then, for the third time,respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon

for another sixty days.

Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government acted with grave abuse of

discretion in the manner by which he suspended petitioner

Held: Yes

Ratio Decidendi:

Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension maybe imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is aprovincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent isan elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if therespondent is an elective barangay official.

(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issuesare joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that therespondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when theevidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense sowarrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent couldinfluence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of

the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive suspensionshall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.

(3) At the expiration ofsixty days, the suspended official shall be

deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the

continuation of the proceedings against him until its

termination. However ' if the delay in the proceedings of the case is

due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be

counted in computing the time of suspension

Under the Local Government Code, it cannot exceed sixty days, 62 which is to

say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwisesufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have

achieved their purpose in a shorter span .

Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the

accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the

respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty

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Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local Government Code provides, it

may be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held, 63 a longer

suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less

than tyranny .

As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not aremote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make

him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all

intents and purposes, his suspension permanent

It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the

Mayor's guilt has not been proven. Worse, any absolution will be for

naught because needless to say, the length of his suspension would have,

by the time he is reinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably

We reiterate thatwe are not precluding the President, through the

Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of theopinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that power

oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion

The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under questions, and that any

talk of future suspensions is in fact premature. The fact remains, however, that

Mayor Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension

and the possibility of sixty days more is arguably around the corner

(which amounts to a violation of the Local Government Code which brings to

light a pattern of suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor the rest of his natural

tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to us as a concerted

effort of the State to perpetuate an arbitrary act