August 19972

This funded Air Force AIA ALMANAC is an authorized publication for the members of the U.S. military services. Contents of the AIA ALMANAC are notnecessarily the official views of, or endorsed by, the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or the Department of the Air Force. The editorial contentis edited, prepared, and provided by the Public Affairs Office of the Air Intelligence Agency and its public affairs representatives throughout the command.Al l photographs are property of the U.S. Air Force, unless otherwise indicated. Send art ic les or byl ine edi tor ia ls to AIA/PAI,Attn: Spokesman Editor, 102 Hall Blvd, Suite 234, San Antonio, Texas 78243-7036, or use DDN E-Mail: EDITOR@MAIL.AIA.AF.MIL

From The Commander ............................................ 3

Technology and Intelligence.................................. 4

About the Agency .................................................. 12

NAIC ........................................................................ 14

AFIWC ..................................................................... 20

497th Intelligence Group...................................... 28

544th Intelligence Group...................................... 30

AFTAC...................................................................... 33

AFCCO ..................................................................... 42

67th Intelligence Wing .......................................... 43

Cobra Ball ................................................................ 54

Rivet Joint................................................................ 56

IW Battlelab ............................................................ 58

TIBS .......................................................................... 59

AFCERT ................................................................... 60

Commanders ........................................................... 62

AIA Civilian Personnel ........................................ 64

Demographics......................................................... 66

AIA Vision and Mission ....................................... 67

Page 29 - AFIWC Page 59 - 67th Intelligence Wing

Maj. Gen. Michael HaydenAIA Commander

Capt. Amber CargileDirector of Public Affairs

1st Lt. Matthew MayberryChief of Internal Communications

Tech. Sgt. Mary SellingerEditor

Airman 1st Class Jennifer GregoireStaff Writer

Credits: Front and back cover photo and unit emblems,Tim Johnson Jr., AIA visual Information specialist

Graphic illustrations, Tim Johnson Jr.,Stan Doeringand Catherine Hammer, AIA visual information specialists

AIA photographic support by Boyd Belcher andStaff Sgt. Glen Barton

Technology and Intelligence Master Sgt. GabrielMarshall and Dr. Dennis Casey, AIA History office

National Air Intelligence Center, Rob YoungAir Force Information Warfare Center, Master Sgt.

Curt Sheppard, 2nd Lt. Mark Haddorf, Dora Ojeda andStaff Sgt. Dave Gonzales

497th Intelligence Group, 2nd Lt. Jeffrey Kelman544th Intelligence Group, Senior Airman Michael

Konardy67th Intelligence Wing, 1st Lt. Laura KubikAir Force Technical Applications Center, Staff

Sgt. Marilyn HollidayAir Force Cryptologic Operations Center, Master

Sgt. Lisa BeckerAIA Civilian Personnel, Bill NicholsonMilitary demographics, Tech. Sgt. Kevin Glover,

AIA Directorate of PersonnelAnd thanks to all the people who contributed

articles and photographs from AIA units worldwide

AIA ALMANACAIR INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Volume 4, Number 1 August 1997

Contents

Photo by Boyd Belcher

3

From The Commander

his year’s AIA Almanac gives usall an opportunity to reflect on

needs, requirements, and issues origi-nate. Embedding takes deliberatesteps to enhance our combat rela-tionship as a full participant inwarfighting.

In redefining who we are, wehave made some significant changesto the ideas of “intelligence” and“operators.” Intelligence used to berather narrowly viewed as threatbriefings and aircraft recognition,“beeps and squeaks,” and imageryinterpretation, all shrouded in a veilof secrecy. Now, intelligence is lessabout secrets and more about thetimely and accurate transfer of infor-mation, as well as the discovery thatin many contingencies information it-self can be the decisive force. TheAir Force has embraced the conceptthat information itself is not only anenabler of operations, but also is adomain within which military op-

erations take place, and therefore has added many dynamicfeatures to what we once thought of as “intelligence.”

The move to “information operators” may have beengenerated by this agency, but it is taking root throughout theAir Force hierarchy. We are in the midst of redefining whooperators are; we’ve expanded the definition to include thosewho understand the doctrine and employment of air andspace power. In June, Secretary of the Air Force SheilaWidnall spoke at the Air Force Intelligence Awards Banquetand had this to say:

“This [Bosnia] is an information operation. Thepeople executing it are information operators – not

intel people, not photo interpreters – they are operators.So I view this operation as a huge milestone along

our path to the future. It’s a future in which our abilityto gain, exploit, attack, and defend information is central

to everything we do … Your role is not to support thewarfighters – you are the warfighters,

integral members of the operational team.”

These all represent milestone events. We have movedourselves and the Air Force into a very exciting time ofchange and discovery, of new strategies and tactics and waysof envisioning the battlespace. I consider myself exceedinglyfortunate to have been with you at this time in our journeyinto the future. You should know that I’ve been very pleasedand proud to be your commander, and I hope to get to seeyou and work with you on other endeavors, as you aredistinctly the best and the brightest! Jeanine and I wish youall God speed and good luck.

TAIA’s accomplishments, and we havecertainly had an impressive year!

It’s obvious from the number ofawards we’ve garnered as an agency,as units, and as individuals that wehave excelled in a variety of missionareas, but there are a few milestones Ifeel have been especially important toour overall growth and development.

Probably the most definitive mo-ment for AIA, came during June’s Co-rona Top meeting of the Air Force fourstar generals at Scott Air Force Base, Ill.We were specifically invited to briefInformation Operations, and throughthe efforts of a lot of people, we filledour two-hour time slot with our phi-losophy, demonstrations of our capa-bilities, and our vision of and concernsfor the future. The confidence we havein being number one in InformationOperations was rewarded by the reaction we received —completely, totally positive! Our vision of Information Op-erations - information as a weapon, a target, and a place …not just an enabler – is on the mark.

We’ve worked long and hard and taken steps to make theChief of Staff’s Global Engagement strategy, which includesInformation Superiority, a working reality.

First, we’ve streamlined the headquarters to create billetsurpluses to be reinvested where we need them most insupport of our changing missions. This includes the mergerof the Communications and Information Directorate with theOperations Directorate, based on the reality that informationoperations and connectivity are inseparable. We have alsostrengthened the Information Operations Center; now theheadquarters’ 24-hour-a-day nerve center, it provides situ-ational awareness for Lackland’s Force Protection Group,Information Operations reachback to customers, and is build-ing an indications and warning set for Information Warfare.

Second, following the Chief’s Innovation theme, we es-tablished the first of six Air Force Battlelabs. The InformationWarfare Battlelab’s charter is to think beyond our everydaymissions, to originate ideas in doctrine, tactics, organizationand training, as well as technology, and then apply them towhat we are doing today and to help guide our planning forthe future. Our Battlelab will explore innovative concepts forinformation protect, attack, gain, and exploit, and furtherprove their practical use for Air Force operations.

Third, we are redefining who we are and where we arethrough embedding and co-locating with our other opera-tional counterparts. Our embedded AIA people at the Num-bered Air Forces produce an information lifeline enhancingoverall operations by providing an umbrella of informationsuperiority. We’ll be visible “at the fight” where information

Photo by Boyd Belcher

August 19974

Technology & Intelligence

The Impetus for Intelligence

Intrigue, espionage, coded corre-spondence, meetings behind closeddoors, and clandestine operations de-scribed much of the European politi-cal scene during the Renaissance.These activities also took center stageoccasionally in the 17th and 18th cen-turies.

Accounts of these fascinatedAmericans. Most Americans, busycarving their futures out of the vastNorth American wilderness in the17th and 18th centuries, found littletime, however, to practice these artsat home. Generally, Americans feltsuch activities belonged in distantEurope.

The practitioners of this so-called“Black Art” included several of themost notable people in Europe.Nicolo Machiavelli wrote The Princeto instruct young Cesare Borgia inthe art of subversion and the uses ofintelligence. Sir Francis Walsingham,Secretary of State for Queen Eliza-beth I, devised the first permanentpeacetime intelligence apparatus.

Both numbered among those whoused intelligence to achieve nationalobjectives in early modern Europe.Cardinal Richlieu became perhaps themost sophisticated user of intelligence,

wielding nearly complete power inFrance in the early 17th century.

The presence of the AtlanticOcean minimized European influ-ences upon many of the colonies inAmerica. American intelligence de-veloped early in the nation’s historyout of the necessities of war. It oftengravitated to new developments intechnology.

The First Uses ofIntelligence in America

Few people think of GeorgeWashington, the father of his coun-try, as one who employed spies. Yet,during the Revolutionary War he di-rected a large spy network.

Some records indicated he mayhave employed as many as severalhundred agents. They usedcryptology or secret writing to com-municate with him when he was thecommander of the Continental Army.Washington personally supervisedmany of them.

His records show a payment of$333.33 to an agent not ever identi-fied to go into Boston and establish ameans of secret correspondence. Theagent received instructions to forwardnews of troop movements and otheractivities.

Washington’s agents wrote secretmessages between the lines of per-sonal letters using invisible ink (lemonjuice) and other substances. Hollowedout shoe buckles, shoes or boots, snuffboxes and the folds of clothing be-came convenient hiding places forsensitive information.

Alexander Hamilton, Washington’ssecretary for a time, worked exten-sively with secret inks, codes and geo-metric designs to conceal valuable in-formation from British detection.

During the siege at Yorktown,Washington received news about Brit-ish troop positions from Boston schoolteacher James Lovell, the father ofAmerican cryptanalysis. Lovell’snews, once deciphered, proved use-ful in leading to the victory that fol-lowed.

Technology andIntelligence:

The Narrowing Gap

Confederate Cipher Disk

5

Technology & Intelligence

As the first president of theUnited States, Washington continuedto support intelligence operations.Long after his death, information sur-faced that Washington made moreextensive use of intelligence than anyother American president prior to the20th century.

The end of the American Revolu-tion brought an end as well to theactivities associated with intelligence.The interest Thomas Jefferson, Ben-jamin Franklin and others had in cryp-tography largely disappeared asAmerica, now a new republic, con-centrated its attentions on other issues.

In the early 1840s, Edgar AllenPoe, known as the author of oftenbizarre and macabre poetry, surfacedas a master cryptographer. In hiswork, “The Gold Bug,” he rekindledpopular interest in the art ofcryptanalysis. The story focused on amystery that developed around asecret message.

Like many of his readers, secretcodes and secret writing fascinatedPoe. This avocation came to life in“The Gold Bug.”

Poe’s interests and writings popu-larized cryptanalysis across America.What would bring together intelli-gence on the one hand and secretcodes and secret writing on the other?

Balloons and the Telegraph

The Civil War represented thefirst major event in America that en-couraged openly the marriage of in-telligence with new technology.

Balloons, used in Europe as earlyas 1794 for reconnaissance, had notbeen popular in the United States.Nevertheless, they captured the in-terests of several who publicized theirpotential. By 1861, leading aeronautssuggested the Union Army shouldconsider the use of balloons.

June 18, 1861, Thaddeus S. C.Lowe, a 28-year-old self-styled pro-fessor from New Hampshire, demon-strated the military possibilities ofballoons to President Lincoln.

During an ascent over the Co-lumbia Armory near Capitol Hill in atethered balloon, Lowe communicatedwith the War Department’s telegraphsystem. Once aloft, he sent a mes-sage from a telegraph set in the bal-loon connected by cable to anotherset on the ground.

Impressed by what he witnessed,President Lincoln se-cured an appoint-ment for Lowe inGen. GeorgeMcClellan’s Army ofthe Potomac. De-spite remarkableachievements, theUnion Army’s bal-loon corps dis-banded in 1863, avictim of unimagina-tive thinking.

The telegraphemerged in 1863 as awelcome replace-ment to visual flagsignaling and to balloons. Operatorsconveyed information quickly andsecurely.

By 1864 telegraph lines connectedWashington to most Union headquar-ters across the country. Telegrapherssent information routinely fromWashington to subordinate command-ers in the field. Confederate forcesused the telegraph as well but on amuch more limited basis.

The telegraph, however, had aproblem. Wiretapping made it highlyvulnerable. Both sides used taps tosend false information. In addition,an operator’s touch on the key iden-tified him as surely as his voice.

To protect the security of military

telegraphic communications, bothsides developed simple cryptologicalsystems and ciphers that used wordtransposition. By 1864, both Unionand Confederate forces employedfalse telegraphic messages to misin-form the enemy.

Sherman did this in March 1864,when he learned the Confederates hadtapped telegraph wires near Mem-phis, Tenn. He sent out false orderstelling one of his units to go to Sa-vannah. This drew out the illusiveConfederate Nathan Bedford Forrestwho led his troops to Savannah to

cut off the allegedUnion force. Amuch strongerUnion cavalry forceunder secret ordersfrom Shermannearly capturedForrest.

While thetelegraph enabledintelligence activitiesto be carried out, itdid not take long be-fore those who usedit had to contendwith the possibilityof discovery because

of the manipulation of the technology.

The First Photo Intelligence

Just two decades after the CivilWar, a new technology married intel-ligence. In 1887, the Office of NavalIntelligence ordered ships to photo-graph foreign coastal defenses. Thisrepresented the first carefully orga-nized example of photographic intel-ligence. As Matthew Brady, the fa-mous photographer of the Civil War,had so ably demonstrated, a picturecould say volumes.

By the late 1880s, photographicintelligence had become a major stra-tegic collection effort for the U.S.Navy.

M209 Decoder

August 19976

Technology & Intelligence

The Birth of the Radio

In 1895, an Italian physicistbrought to the attention of the worlda device that would revo-lutionize how nations car-ried out intelligence activi-ties. G. M. Marconi’s firsttransmission of radiowaves went the distanceof a football field.

Four years later, twoBritish warships equippedwith Marconi radios sentand received messages adistance of 89 miles. By late 1901,Marconi transmitted a radio messagefrom Newfoundland to Cornwall, En-gland, a distance just over 2,000 miles.

The possibilities seemed endless.Military forces could now communi-cate considerable distances without aphysical connection. In 1910 severalnations including Great Britain, Ger-many and Japan admitted to usingradios extensively in their officialcommunications.

Pancho Villa

In 1912, America made use of theradio when Ralph Van Deman de-signed and built the United StatesArmy’s first mobile intercept van

called a radio tractor unit. VanDeman developed it primarily for useby the army while in the field.

Its first use came un-expectedly in 1916. Inresponse to PanchoVilla’s raid on Colum-bus, N.M., March 9,1916, Brig. Gen. JohnPershing received or-ders to cross the RioGrande with 4,000American troops anddisperse Villa’s band.Pershing’s soldiers

took radio tractors with them. Theyproved invaluable in communicatinginformation to forward units.

Pershing also became the firstAmerican commander to employ airpower in his quest for Villa. Capt.B e n j a m i nFoulois com-manded the1st AeroSquadron. Inthe course oftheir dutiesthe aerosquadron pi-lots with theunit’s eightCurtiss JN-3scarried the mail, conducted observa-tion missions, engaged in aerial pho-tography, tracked ground troops andgenerally flew reconnaissance mis-sions. Foulois and his airmen carriedout these duties for the first time in acombat environment.

While Foulois’s airmen did notfind Villa, they demonstrated againstoverwhelming odds several uses ofthe airplane when aviation had notyet grown out of its infancy.

A relatively new and only brieflytested innovation had been used tocarry out reconnaissance and opera-tional missions as part of the Puni-tive Expeditionary Force.

American Intelligencein World War I

During World War I and theyears immediately following, tech-nology and intelligence grew as in-separable twins.

The airplane really came into itsown during the war as an observa-tion platform and an instrument ofwar. World War I initially confirmedits versatility and laid the founda-tion for its future development, oftenagainst stiff odds.

Immediately after the war, theestablishment of a foreign data sec-tion at McCook Field, Ohio, broughtthe United States into the business ofcollecting information about scien-tific and technological developmentsin foreign countries.

A i r p l a n e sand related dis-coveries re-ceived specialattention. Thissection wouldlater evolveinto the For-eign Technol-ogy Divisionand later again

into National Air Intelligence Center.

Essentially, communications andelectronic intelligence as we under-stand them today got their start inthe first two decades of this century.Also during this period, Americanintelligence began to rely significantlyupon technology.

The Growth of AmericanIntelligence Between Wars

The development of Americanintelligence between the wars focusedupon the roles played by WilliamFriedman and Herbert Yardley.

Yardley got his start in intelli-gence as a telegrapher at the U.S.

Radio Tractor Unit used during the Punitive Expedition.

Pancho Villa and his horse “SevenLeagues.”

7

Technology & Intelligence

State Department during World War I.

After the signing of the Armisticeending the war, Yardley created acryptanalytic bureau whose job it be-came to decipher codes used in dip-lomatic correspondence by other na-tions.

His new organization, dubbed theAmerican Black Chamber, set up op-erations in a brownstone row housenear Columbia University in NewYork City. Yardley’s group provedtheir worth when they succeeded indecrypting Japanese diplomatic ci-phers. Armed with this news, theAmerican Secretary of State, CharlesEvans Hughes, was able to obtainterms favorable to the United Statesduring the Washington Naval Con-ference of 1921.

By 1929, however, America’s lead-ership saw little reason to continuefunding for Yardley’s operation.Yardley received orders to shut downand turn over his materials to Will-iam Friedman and the Signal Intelli-gence Service.

Angry, out of a job, and disap-pointed over his future prospects,Yardley wrote a book called TheAmerican Black Chamber.

In this book he explained in con-siderable detail the activities of hisformer unit. The United States Gov-ernment forbade the publication of asecond edition of the book, but itscontents quickly became publicknowledge. When descriptions fromthe book reached Japan and the othernations Yardley discussed, tensionsran high for months. They promptlychanged their codes.

It would take Friedman and ateam several years to break the newJapanese (Purple) Code for example.Nevertheless, it was Friedman andhis associates whose work in decod-ing would ultimately culminate in the

formation of the National SecurityAgency whose specialties today in-clude SIGINT and cryptography.

American Intelligencein World War II

World War II represented a flow-ering of technological changes andrefinements to innovations appearingin the 1900s. Sometimes technologymoved fasterthan the abilitiesof humans tomaster it.

In August1940, Army In-telligence hadbroken the Japa-nese diplomaticcode. The de-cryption effort bore the name MAGIC.

By late November 1941, MAGIChad produced information thatAmerican installations in the Pacificmight well be in danger and that warwith Japan was entirely possible. OnDec. 7, 1941, MAGIC intercepted anddecoded a radio message from Tokyoto the Japanese Embassy in Washing-ton.

The message signaled a break indiplomatic relations between Japanand the U.S. While the informationwas available 8 hours before the firstbombs fell on Pearl Harbor, thereexisted no national decision-makingprocess at this time. There were noanalysts to sort out quickly all thepossibilities and there were no estab-lished procedures to notify those em-powered to make the appropriate de-cisions.

Signals intelligence brought ma-jor allied successes in World War II.Admiral Chester Nimitz, significantlyoutnumbered by superior Japanesenaval forces in the Pacific, usedCOMINT to confirm the Japanese in-tent to attack Midway.

With this prior knowledge,Nimitz positioned his forces in ad-vance and inflicted heavy losses onthe Japanese Navy. The Japanesenever recuperated.

In early April 1943, U.S. ArmyIntelligence, through Purple, inter-cepted news that the commander inchief of the Japanese Imperial Navywould be visiting bases in the

Bougainvillearea of theSouth Pacific.

U s i n gCOMINT de-rived fromMAGIC, thedate, place andtime of arrivala l l o w e d

American forces to ambush theadmiral’s bomber. Admiral IsorukoYamamoto’s plane crashed, leavingno survivors.

World War II also bore witnessto important improvements in tech-nology. These made easier the job ofbeing intelligence officers. Scientistsand engineers with M-209 converters,preliminary versions of what laterwould become computers, processedvast amounts of data quickly.

New cameras and better filmbrought tremendous advances toaerial photography. Improvementsin radios allowed the Allies to trans-mit coded instructions to the Frenchresistance just before zero hour on DDay.

The Allied landings at Normandyand the successes that followedbrought into the spotlight the utterimportance of coordinated intelligenceon many fronts to military operations.

Like the telegraph in the Ameri-can Civil War, the radio in WorldWar II proved invaluable. Enemyoperators could intercept its messages.

RC-135 Cobra Ball

August 19978

On several noteworthy occasions, di-sastrous consequences resulted.

World War II represented a wa-tershed in the close relationship be-tween technology and intelligence.What would follow would be a muchcloser relationship between the two.

Post World War IIIntelligence Restructuring

At the end of World War II, thenation’s leaders clearly understoodthe expanded role the U.S. wouldhave to play in post World War IIinternational affairs.

The debacle at Pearl Harbor be-came a sober reminder of the need tohave a cohesive intelligence structurein place in an emergingCold War security envi-ronment.

Had senior leader-ship been given sufficientwarning of the impend-ing Japanese sneak at-tack, they could have in-formed the service com-manders in Hawaii to bevigilant.

The lack of central control overcryptologic operations in the imme-diate post war era greatly concernedsenior U.S. officials. With the Sovietdomination of Eastern Europe alreadycompleted, the looming specter ofCommunist domination over the war-torn nations of Western Europe ap-peared a very real possibility.

The modern American cryptologicefforts born in the years prior toWorld War II and perfected duringthe conflict clearly pointed to the needto change the manner in which intel-ligence activities were carried out.

In an effort to deal with the fastchanging world situation, a combinedintelligence board to oversee crypto-

logic issues began operations in late1945.

Consisting of members from theState Department, Army and Navy,the board recognized that the unco-ordinated and fractionalized crypto-logic apparatus in place since the1920s had to be better controlled.

On Feb. 15, 1946, after approvalby the Army and Navy, a new execu-tive organization called the Coordi-nator for Joint Operations was estab-lished.

The CJO’s role in the nation’s intel-ligence structure involved carryingout the routine business of coordinat-ing central cryptologic matters.

Prior to the birth of the CJO inSeptember 1945, the cryptologic func-tion of the U.S. Army, the Signal Se-curity Agency, gained status as aseparate independent commandcalled the Army Security Agency, cut-ting its ties to the Army Signal Corps.

In an effort to put into perspec-tive the need to restructure intelli-gence within the U.S. government, itis necessary to examine the broadintelligence picture in the U.S. at theend of World War II.

President Truman’s disestablish-ment of The Wartime Office of Stra-tegic Studies Sept. 10, 1945, ended thatintelligence organization’s activities.

In its place, Truman created theCentral Intelligence Group, the fore-

runner of the Central IntelligenceAgency. Tasked with providing thePresident with a single source of in-formation, the CIG began operationson Jan. 22, 1946.

The State Department and themilitary branches worked out ar-rangements to provide the new CIGwith manpower to carry out its im-portant mission.

The National Security Actof 1947 andAir Force Intelligence

By early 1947, the deterioratingrelationship between the United Statesand Soviet Union presented itself as aprominent factor in the need to re-structure America’s National Defense

establishment.

The National SecurityAct of 1947 stated theintent of Congress wasto provide for the au-thoritative coordinationand unified direction ofthe armed forces undercivilian control but notto merge them.

A separate, but equal issue withinthe act itself dealt with the need tocreate a peacetime foreign intelligenceorganization—the CIA. Congress hadvirtually no role in the creation anddevelopment of the CIG.

The CIG formally became the CIASept. 18, 1947 — the same day theU.S. Air Force gained its genesis. Theearly relationship between the newCIA and the DOD quickly became anindispensable link within the new na-tional security establishment.

In a time before high technologyintelligence tools like the U-2 or space-borne intelligence satellites existed,early CIA intelligence estimates some-times lacked objectivity. Indeed, inone of the more important early CIA

TR-1 Reconnaissance Aircraft

Technology & Intelligence

9

intelligence estimates on the status ofthe Soviet Nuclear Weapons program,only the Air Force dissented with theCIA — accurately predicting that theSoviets would explode a nuclear de-vice by late 1949 — four years earlierthan the CIA prediction.

The CIA experienced early grow-ing pains and in January 1951 thenewly-formed office of current intel-ligence began publishing the all-source Current Intelligence Bulletin.

The United States Air Forceand the need for aSeparate Intel Organization

Until September 1947, and theimplementation of the National Secu-rity Act which created the Depart-ment of Defense and sanctioned theUnited States Air Force, SIGINTmatters remained largely a service-specific operation.

The first vice chief of staff of theAir Force, Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg,endorsed theestablishmentof a separateAir Force cryp-tologic intelli-gence organi-z a t i o n .Vandenberg,an astute userof cryptologicproducts as an air commander inWorld War II, recognized the impera-tive and clear need to have an inde-pendent air force entity to providethe same type support to the stillfledgling Strategic Air Command.

U..S Air Force Security Services’roots began to grow in mid 1948 in atransition agreement worked out be-tween the Army Security Agency andthe Air Force. The agreement pro-vided for USAFSS to have only amobile and tactical role for the newservice’s cryptologic organization.The agreement established the Air

Force Security Group June 23, 1948,to oversee the transfer of ASA re-sources and personnel to a new andas yet unestablished, Air Force cryp-tologic organiza-tion.

With the De-partment of De-fense structurenow in place, theJoint Chiefs ofStaff in 1949moved to consoli-date control overthe separate ser-vices’ cryptologicefforts by settingup the Armed Forces SecurityAgency.

AFSA, announced by Secretaryof Defense Louis Johnson in thespring of 1949, provided for a uni-fied cryptologic organization in-tended to conduct intelligence andcommunications security activitieswithin the fast growing Departmentof Defense establishment. AFSA sur-

vived until1952, whenthe organiza-tion was redes-ignated as theNational Secu-rity Agency.At this time,NSA assumedthe responsi-

bilities as the executive agent of theU.S. Government for SIGINT infor-mation.

The 1950s

Following the Korean conflict, inwhich USAFSS earned a permanentseat at the table as an Air Force intel-ligence organization, technology con-tinued to drive command efforts toprovide quality intelligence products.

Following the War, USAFSSquickly moved to use the best com-munications technology available to

provide a direct and timely responseto the requirements of military com-mands and other organizations re-ceiving intelligence support.

In June 1954,USAFSS imple-mented the pointof analysis andreporting concepton a test basis atthe 6901st Com-munications Cen-ter in Europe andthe 6902nd Spe-cial Communica-tions Center inthe Pacific.

The organization also imple-mented the new concept of mobileoperations when the first mobile unitdeployed in late 1956 in response tounrest in the Middle East. Duringthe mid-to-late 1950s, USAFSS ful-filled the intelligence needs of tacticalcommanders during contingencies.

The command’s first modern air-borne operations commenced in 1954,complementing the new mobile con-cept. By the end of the 1950s, USAFSShad well established airborne, groundand mobile cryptologic operations,providing support for the now firmlyestablished U.S. Air Force.

The 1960s

The 1960s saw USAFSS deeplyinvolved in the Vietnam conflict. Inearly 1962, USAFSS deployed its firstEmergency Reaction Unit to South-east Asia. Later that year, USAFSSbegan providing a cryptologic capa-bility from Thailand in support ofU.S. operations in the Pacific.

Modern technology in airborneoperations also had its beginningsduring this time. In 1962, USAFSScrews began flying the first RC-135missions in the Arctic region. In Sep-tember 1964, with the Vietnam War

C-130 II

Technology & Intelligence

First home of the U.S. Air Force SecurityService Headquarters at Arlington Hall, Va.

August 199710

now raging in the aftermath of theGulf of Tonkin incident, USAFSSC-47 and C-130 aircraft began fullfledged airborne reconnaissance op-erations inSoutheast Asia.

In 1967,with U.S. mili-tary involve-ment in theVietnam con-flict growing,USAFSS tookon the job asthe centrale v a l u a t i n gagency for U.S.Air Force elec-tronic warfare activities. The newrole for USAFSS marked the first ma-jor change in the command’s missionsince its inception two decades earlier.

Transistors now enabled largemainframe computers to make sig-nificant differences in the large intel-ligence picture. New technology alsoallowed the introduction of systemslike STRAWHAT and TEBO atUSAFSS ground sites, further auto-mating many labor-intensive unit fieldoperations.

The 1970s

USAFSS’ application of technol-ogy during the 1970s began to set theframework for the later applicationof all-source intelligence support tothe warfighter.

Following the end of the Vietnamconflict, USAFSS, eager to supportand apply its experience with tech-nology to new missions, quickly be-came a main player in the EW arena.

The redesignation of the Air ForceSpecial Communications Center as theAir Force Electronic Warfare CenterJuly 1, 1975, moved USAFSS firmlyinto playing a central role in the AirForce’s now rapidly expanding EW

mission. By 1978, the AFEWC’s rolehad expanded involving new andstate-of-the-art EW technologies tocounter command and control sys-

tems of potentialenemies. TheAFEWC also real-ized significantstrides in theanalysis of de-fense suppressiontechniques for theF-4G and EF-111aircraft.

The Depart-ment of Defenserestructuring ofthe late 1970s ini-

tially envisaged several of the mainmission functions of USAFSS beingdivvied up and the disestablishmentof USAFSS as a major command.

The Air Force reorganizationplans announced April 12, 1978, calledfor a new Separate Operating Agencyand for the Air Force Intelligence Cen-ter to take over some of USAFSS’missions. Additionally, the AFICwould assume responsibility for theAir Force Foreign Technology Divi-sion at Wright-Patterson Air ForceBase, Ohio.

The reor-g a n i z a t i o nplans quicklychanged asU.S. securityi n t e r e s t sshifted focusto the PersianGulf. WithUSAFSS nowplaying an expanding EW role, thecommand was redesignated the Elec-tronic Security Command Aug. 1, 1979.

This decade saw the introductionof the simple integrated circuit whichwould later foreshadow even moresignificant technological break-throughs.

The rate at which communica-tions-electronics technology pro-gressed during the 1970s, essentiallydrove the need for the U.S. Air Forceto have a dedicated SIGINT/EWorganization in place as the 1980sbegan.

The 1980s

ESC thrived in a decade wheregrowing defense budgets allowed thecommand to take advantage of sev-eral technological break throughs.This enabled ESC to begin to focus itsattention on furnishing vital all-sourceintelligence support to warfightersand theater commanders.

During the 1980s, ESC and itssubordinate centers stepped forwardin providing Air Force combat op-erators with unbroken command, con-trol and countermeasures (C3CM)support. By the middle of the de-cade, the AFEWC became the pri-mary source of EW/C3CM analysisand advice for the Air Force.

EW and C3CM support and pro-gram management activities for theConstant Web Data Base program mi-grated from the ESC Directorate of

Operations to theAFEWC in 1988.

By this time,AFEWC person-nel using micro-processor drivenhigh-speed com-puters providedsenior battle com-manders withanalytical reports

on major exercises and on EW sys-tems effectiveness throughout theworld.

ESC started its venture into therealm of space operations during thisdecade. In 1986, ESC began an asso-ciation with the U.S. Air Force SpaceCommand with the activation of the

Technology & Intelligence

6916th ESS members come together following theunit’s 4,000th RC-135 mission in October 1986.

Operations building of the 6917th ESG, San VitoDei Normanni Air Station, Italy, in 1984.

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Headquarters Space Electronic Secu-rity Division at Peterson Air ForceBase, Colo.

During this time, ESC providedinvaluable support to a number ofsignificant military operations andcontingencies including Urgent Fury,El Dorado Canyon and Just Cause.

ESC operations reaped the ben-efit of the capabilities of modern com-puter microprocessor based systems.The introduction of the ConventionalSignals Upgrade and other systemsprofoundly changed the mechanicsof ESC’s intelligence operations.Clearly, the 1980s portended the ar-rival of the information age.

In the area of global security,matters changed faster and more pro-foundly than technology. Perestroika,alive and well in the Soviet Union,provided the impetus for the Sovietpeople to question openly their sys-tem of government as Communismbegan to wane at the end of the de-cade.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in No-vember 1989 saw many of the SovietSatellite states of Eastern Europequickly wilt.

The 1990s

As 1990 began, ESC stood poisedto make an unprecedented contribu-tion affecting the future of both thecommand and the U.S. military.

ESC units served at the forefrontduring operations Desert Shield andDesert Storm. Personnel from sev-eral command organizations playedkey roles in helping to orchestrate theconcept of Information Dominanceduring the Persian Gulf conflict.

ESC helped to provide all-sourceintelligence to warfighters in DesertStorm with high tech microprocessor-based systems like the Tactical Infor-

mation Broadcast Service and Con-stant Source. Iraq’s command andcontrol system, annihilated byairpower several weeks before thestart of the ground war, became aprime example of how InformationDominance was used in warfare.

For thefirst time dur-ing a conflict,as retiredChairman ofJoint Chiefs ofStaff Gen. ColinPowell aptlystated: “Per-sonal comput-ers were forcemultipliers.”

As quicklyas Desert Storm unfolded, ushering inthe age of Information Warfare, un-paralleled tremors occurred in theglobal security environment as theSoviet Union disintegrated in Decem-ber 1991.

New security issues quickly aroseas America’s super power rival fadedinto the relative obscurity afforded tomany third-world nations. The clearneed to restructure Air Force intelli-gence encouraged the creation of astreamlined Air Force IntelligenceCommand to succeed ESC Oct. 1,1991.

AFIC, moving towards becominga truly all-source intelligence organi-zation, was formed by merging thepersonnel and missions of the AirForce Foreign Technology Divisionand elements of the Air IntelligenceAgency into a single command.

After 1991, the bi-polar securitylandscape of the Cold War gave wayto a global economy-oriented multi-polar world.

Information technology now ex-panded exponentially, merging and

interrelating with all aspects of theglobal economy. At the same time,the U.S. Air Force also changed. Itexperienced an unprecedented draw-down.

The objective Air Force pointedto the need to restructure intelligence

further and theAir Force Intel-ligence Com-mand found it-self redesig-nated as a FieldO p e r a t i n gAgency — theAir IntelligenceAgency on Oct.1, 1993.

Emphasizingincreased sup-

port to the warfighter, AIA wastedno time moving to exploit the fast-developing information technologiesof the 1990s.

During the course of the past fewyears, military forces have operatedin an “infosphere,” where the needfor precise, instantaneous intelligenceis increasing over the entire spectrumof military operations.

Now on AIA’s horizon is an agewhere the Agency plays a key role innot only helping the U.S. Air Forceachieve information superiority in the21st century, but helping all U.S.armed forces shape the battlespace.

In today’s world nearly all ac-tions depend on some link to a facetof information technology. More of-ten than not that link is to the micro-processor and its related hardware,software and network communicationinfrastructures.

Indeed, it is not an understate-ment to say that AIA’s ability to dealwith and exploit information tech-nologies will determine its destiny inthe next millennium.

Technology & Intelligence

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AIR INTELLIGENCE AGENCYAbout the Agency

The Air Intelligence Agency, headquartered at KellyAir Force Base, Texas, was activated Oct. 1, 1993.

MISSIONAn Air Force Field Operating Agency, AIA’s mission

is to exploit and defend the information domain. TheAgency’s 16,000 people worldwide deliver flexible collec-tion, tailored air and space intelligence, weapons monitor-ing and information warfare products and services.

ORGANIZATIONS AND FUNCTIONSNational Air Intelligence Center

The National Air Intelligence Center,Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, is theprimary Department of Defense producer offoreign aerospace intelligence.

NAIC develops its products by analyzing all availabledata on foreign aerospace forces and weapons systems todetermine performance characteristics, capabilities, vul-nerabilities and intentions. Assessments are an importantfactor in shaping national security and defense policies.

As the Department of Defense experts on foreignaerospace system capabilities, center personnel histori-cally have also been involved in supporting Americanweapons treaty negotiations and verification. The Air

Like a coat of arms, the Air Intelli-gence Agency’s emblem lets the worldknow what we stand for.

On a blue field, a light blue globebearing a black chess piece is dis-played over a yellow key. The blue

and yellow are the Air Force colors.Blue alludes to the sky, the primary the-

ater of Air Force operations. Yellow refers to the sun and theexcellence required of Air Force personnel.

The globe signifies the intelligence support the agencyprovides to the Air Force Global Reach — Global Powermission. The key represents the agency’s efforts to unlock itsprotagonist’s secrets. The teeth on the ward symbolize thedisciplines of intelligence — SIGINT, HUMINT, IMAG-ERY and MASINT. The chess knight reflects counter-intelligence and the ability to use intelligence information ina variety of ways. The compass rose symbolizes intelligenceoperations reaching the four corners of the earth and the useof satellite information gathering.

Force Systems Command’s Foreign Technology Divisionwas the organizational beginning of today’s National AirIntelligence Center. Since the start of its organizationallineage in 1961, the unit’s mission and resources haveexpanded to meet the challenge of worldwide technologi-cal developments and the accompanying national need foraerospace intelligence.

In recent years, the emphasis has increasingly shiftedtoward evaluation of worldwide aerospace systems andthe production of “tailored,” customer-specific products.After name changes to Foreign Technology Center, andForeign Aerospace Science and Technology Center, theAir Force assigned the 480th IG to it and redesigned theunit National Air Intelligence Center Oct. 1, 1993.

Air Force Information Warfare CenterThe Air Force Information Warfare Center

at Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, is engaged in amyriad of activities supporting its role as theAir Force information warfare executive agent.

Its mission is to develop, maintain and deploy informa-tion warfare/command and control warfare capabilities insupport of operations, campaign planning, acquisition andtesting.

The center acts as the time sensitive, single focal pointfor intelligence data and C2W services. It provides techni-cal expertise for computer and communications securityand is the Air Force’s focal point for tactical deception andoperations security training.

The AFIWC was activated Sept. 10, 1993, by combin-ing the Air Force Electronic Warfare Center, and elementsof the Air Force Cryptologic Support Center’s securitiesdirectorate. The AFEWC provided electronic combat andtechnical expertise for Desert Storm C2W successes.Coupled with AFCSC’s technical skills in command, con-trol, communications and computer systems security, themerger of the two organizations provided a solid baselinefor the new IW mission.

497th Intelligence GroupThe 497th IG, Bolling Air Force Base, Wash-

ington, D.C., provides worldwide intelligenceinfrastructure support, physical and personalsecurity, threat support to weapon systemsacquisition and employment and automationsupport.

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About the Agency

The group also serves as the Washington-area focalpoint for Air Force intelligence planning, logistics andreadiness issues, communications/computer system sup-port and all military and civilian personnel actions andprograms. The 497th also includes the Air Force Depart-mental Imagery Requirements office. Formerly known asthe Air Force Intelligence Support Agency, the group wasrenamed the 497th Oct. 1, 1993.

544th Intelligence GroupThe 544th IG, Peterson Air Force Base,

Colo., directs, manages and supports unitsworldwide in the collection, refinement anddelivery of wholesale intelligence.

Personnel operate C4I systems, providing space sur-veillance, threat warning and technical analysis to AirForce Space Command, United States Space Commandand the North American Aerospace Defense Command.

The group acts as an interface in working infrastruc-ture issues between collocated and associated AIA units.The 544th was activated Sept. 7, 1993, to provide a singlefocal point for AIA involvement in worldwide space issuesand to posture AIA to better support national agencies.

67th Intelligence Wing The 67th Intelligence Wing, Kelly Air ForceBase, Texas, manages the agency’s global mis-sion. As the only intelligence wing in the AirForce, the 67th IW manages the planning of all-

source intelligence. It assists Air Force components in thedevelopment of concepts, exercises and employment ofAIA forces to support contingency, low-intensity conflict,counter-drug and special operations.

Subordinate to the wing are five intelligence groupsand 35 squadrons located in the Continental United States.,Hawaii and Germany. With more than 9,500 personnelassigned, the 67th IW is one of the Air Force’s largestwings. The 67th IW is the only Air Force wing with peopleand resources permanently located around the world,providing continuous coverage to fulfill its global respon-sibilities. The wing was activated on Oct. 1, 1993.

JC2WCAIA also supports the Joint Command

and Control Warfare Center, a Joint Chiefs ofStaff Organization collocated with Headquar-ters AIA. The AIA commander is also theJC2WC director.

Headquarters Air Intelligence Agency, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas. Photo by Jeff Marshall