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The Transcendent Unity of Religions … introduction by Huston Smith -001-

A Swiss Scholar … All Originals are in French

Frithjof Schuon

Quest BOOKS Theosophical Publishing House

Wkeaton, ill mois ♦ CHennai (Madras la Copyright © 1984 Frithjof Schuon

Second Quest edition 1993 Second printing 2005

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any manner without written permission except for quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. For additional information write to Quest Books Theosophical Publishing House

PO Box 270 Wheaton, IL 60189-0270 www. questbooks. net

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Schuon, Frithjof.

The transcendent unity of religions. (A Quest book)

Translation of: De l'unite transcendante des religions. Includes index.

1. Religion — philosophy. 2. Christianity and other religions.

3. Religions. I. Title.

ISBN-13: 978-0-8356-0587-8 ISBN-10: 0-8356-0587-6

BL51.S4643 1984 291'. 01 84-239 Printed in the United States of America

Spiritus ubi vult spirat: et vocum eius audis, sed nescis unde veniat, aut quo vadat: sic est omnis, qui natus est ex spiritu.

The wind blowest where it listeth, and thou nearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the Spirit

(John 3:8)

T.H. (Reformatted) Some Corrections to English are made; BUT TEXT remains Integral !!!

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Contents Introduction to the Revised Edition by Huston Smith ix -002-

Preface xxix

1. Conceptual Dimensions 1 -013-

2. The Limitations of Exoterism 7 -015-

3. Transcendence and Universality of Esoterism Notes -077- 33 -026-

4. Concerning Forms in Art 61 -037-

5. Limits of Religious Expansion Notes -078- 79 -045-

6. The Ternary Aspect of Monotheism 95 -052-

7. Christianity and Islam Notes 106 -055-

8. Universality and Particular Nature of the Christian Religion -079- 126 -064-

9. To be Man is to Know 149 -075-

Chapters … 1-9 -013- to -075- Index 167 -083-

Of the first edition of this book, published in 1957, T. S. Eliot wrote: "I have met with no more impressive work in the comparative study of Oriental and Occidental religions." As I would myself raise his estimate to the superlative, one wonders why the book is not better known. The subtlety of its arguments cannot be the sole reason; there appears to be something about Sermon s entire approach to the relation between religions that being foreign to the contemporary theological scene— a way of saying "original"— renders it peculiarly difficult of access. Instead of locking into the ongoing dialogue on the subject— names like Schleiermacher, Troeltsch, Barth, Brunner, Tillich, Hans Kung and Wilfred Smith never appear on his pages— he approaches it from a different angle, a distinctive bent Until this angle is perceived, his entire perspective is likely to seem askew; thereafter it falls into place. It then emerges as at once the most powerful statement of the grand, or better, primordial, tradition that is original in incorporating what our age for the first time demands: that religion be treated in global terms.

Introduction to the Revised Edition by Huston Smith x

I was myself baffled by the book on first round, with the consequence that it sat half-read on my shelves for a decade until a curious sequence of events opened me to its thesis. It was the autumn of 1969, and I was embarking on an academic year around the world. Of the decisions as to what to include in my forty- four-pound luggage limit the final one concerned a book that had just crossed my desk:

In the Tracks of Buddhism, by Frithjof Schuon.

My indifference to his earlier book made it seem clearly expendable, but its middle section, entitled "Buddhism's Ally in Japan: Shinto or the Way of the Gods," caught my eye. Two weeks hence, at our first stop, Japan, I would have to lecture on Shinto and I had little feel for its outlook. I badly needed an entree, and more in desperation than in hope, I wedged the book into my bulging flight bag.

It proved to be the best decision of the year. Before the sacred shrine at Ise, symbolic center of the nation of Japan, under its giant cryptomeria and at low tables in its rest-house for pilgrims, the Way of the Gods opened before me.

Ise's atmosphere itself could be credited with the unveiling but only if I add that it was Schuon' s insights that enabled me to sense within that atmosphere — its dignity, beauty, and repose— an intellective depth. I came to see how ancestors could appear less fallen than their descendants and thereby serve, when revered, as doorways to transcendence.

I saw how virgin nature — especially in its grand phenomena: sun, wind, moon, thunder, lightning, and the sky and earth that are their containers — could be venerated as the most transparent symbols of the divine. Above all I saw how Shinto, indigenous host for "the Japanese miracle," could be seen as the most intact instance of an archaic hyper-borean shamanism that swept from Siberia across the Bering Straits to the red Indians of America.

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Two months later, in India, the same thing happened. Perusing a bookstore in Madras, my eye fell on a study of the Vedanta entitled Language of the Self again by Frithjof Schuon. This time I didn't hesitate; the remaining weeks in India were spent with that book under my arm, and I was happy. A decades tutelage under a swami of the Ramakrishna Order had

Introduction to the Revised Edition by Huston Smith xi

familiarized me with Vedantas basic outlook, but Schuon took off from there as from base camp, while showing at each step, through a stunning series of cross-references, how the Vedantic profundities being treated were Indie variations on themes that are universal because grounded in mans inherent nature as related to his Source.

Would one believe a third installment? In Iran the leading Islamicist of the land pointed me to Sermon s Understanding Islam as "the best work in English on the meaning of Islam and why Muslims believe in it".

I had been to East Asia, South Asia, and West Asia, and in each the same personage had surfaced to guide and illumine. Here was someone doing what I had myself been trying to do, but doing it at a level of competence that differed not in degree but in kind. Needless to say, on returning home I reached for his original book, the one here reissued, with new interest And with new eyes. The overview was as impressive as the individual studies that had schooled me for it. As other readers cannot be expected to have undergone that schooling, I propose in this introduction to do two things by way of propaedeutics: to summarize the authors thesis and to relate it to alternatives that are being proposed.

1. The Relation between Religions: Schuon's Thesis

The Essence/Accident Distinction in Religions

It is a priori evident that everything both resembles and differs from everything else: resembles it at least in existing, differs or there would be no multiplicity to compare. Paripassu with religions: had they nothing in common we would not refer to them by a common noun; were they undifferentiated we would not speak of them in the plural and the noun would be proper. Everything turns on how this empty truth is filled with content Where is the line between unity and plurality to be drawn and how are the two domains to be related?

Introduction to the Revised Edition by Huston Smith xii

Schuon's Version of the Essence/ Accident Distinction: Esoteric versus Exoteric

Schuon draws the line between esoteric and exoteric. And immediately we begin to suspect that we are in the presence of something different The fundamental distinction is not between religions; it is not, so to speak, a line that reappearing, divides religions great historical manifestations vertically, Hindus from Buddhists from Christians from Muslims, and so on. The dividing line is horizontal and occurs but once, cutting across the historical religions. Above the line lies esoterism, below it exoterism.

It could be objected that this horizontal line is not as original as it might appear; the thesis that religions are alike at heart or in essence (read "esoterically") while differing in form ("exoterically ,, ) has often been advanced. The point is well taken; we do n ot arrive at Sermon s originality until we ask into the nature of religions generic essence or (in the title of this book) transcendent unity.

Introduction to the Revised Edition by Huston Smith xiii

For Schuon existence is graded, and with it cognition as well. Metaphysically, in God at the apex, religions (or rather the revealed religions, a distinction to which we shall return) converge;* below they differ. The epistemological concomitant of this metaphysical fact is that religious discernment too, unites at its apex while dividing below it.

Our objector could protest that we still have not been taken beyond the essence-unity/accident-diversity framework, for no one claims that the unity posited in this framework is evident to everyone. Again the point is in order and it presses us to specify what for Schuon is the nature of the requisite discernment and what appears to it.

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What appears to it is Unity: absolute, categorical undifferentiated Unity.

Anthropologically this Unity precludes final distinction between human and divine, epistemologically between knower and known. It bespeaks a knowing that becomes its object or rather is its object for temporal distinctions are likewise inapposite at this point.

This should get us past the notion that Schuon’s version of the essence/accident distinction is run of the mill. From his perspective the defect in other versions of this distinction is that they claim unity in religions too soon, at levels where, being exoteric, true Unity does not pertain and can be posited only on pain of Procrusteanism or vapidity.

The Absolute Unity that is God defies visualization or even consistent description, but is nonetheless required, for … ♦"That they all may be one ... in Thee"♦ (John. 18:21).

This distinction of levels is fundamental: without it confusion is inevitable. Here is a sample: in the introduction to Attitudes toward Other Religions, ed. Owen Thomas (New York: Harper & Row. 1969). we read:

"It is sometimes asserted that all religions are equally true. But this would seem to be simply sloppy thinking, since the various religions hold views of reality which are sharply different if not contradictory" (p. 20). To cite an analogy Schuon himself invokes, if A sees a red light and B one that is blue, it is not sloppy thinking to assert that both are seeing light The same point applies to the statement that appears on the page following the one just quoted: "What is really true for us must be universally true, for that is what truth means."

Introduction to the Revised Edition by Huston Smith xiv

in the symbolism of the spirit the separation on which duality rides tokens ignorance epistemologically and privation affectively. The Unity must however, be of an exceptional, indeed unique, kind, for it must include everything; if anything possessed reality apart from it this would reintroduce the division that Absolute Unity by definition precludes. Absolute Unity must be All -Possibility: every possibility must be actualized within it — with God in his personal mode all things are possible (Matt. 19:26; Mark 10:27); in his absolute mode all things are actual. Man's mind cannot imagine a Something that excludes nothing save distinctions, any more than it can visualize light that is simultaneously wave and particle, electrons that jump orbit without traversing the intervening space, or a particle that travels alternate paths simultaneously without dividing.

Physics transcends the paradoxes nature poses for human imagery and the ordinary language that derives from it by means of mathematics: nature cannot be consistently imaged, but it can be consistently conceived, through equations. Metaphysics in the etymological meaning of that which lies "after" or beyond physis, or nature, transcends by means of the Intellect the parallel paradoxes that Reality poses for language and visualization.

The Intellect is not reason. Reason proceeds discursively, through language, and like a bridge, joins two banks, knower and known, without removing the river between.

The Intellect knows intuitively and (as noted above) identifies the knower with what he knows, causing one to become the other.* Or rather, to invoke again the point about time, the Intellect is the Absolute as manifest in the human soul; Eckhart states the case precisely when he writes: "There is something in the soul that is uncreated and increatable; . . . this something is the Intellect" What appears from mundane perspective as the Intellect coming to know the Absolute is *In Sanskrit one who knows in this mode is evamvit. a Comprehensor. one who has "verified" in his own person. As long as one knows only of his immortal Self, he is^ still in the realm of ignorance; he really knows it only when he becomes it. in actuality the Intellect as Absolute-in-man becoming perceptible to phenomenal awareness.* Atman is Brahman from the beginning. "Wonder of wonders, all things intrinsically are the Buddha-nature."

Introduction to the Revised Edition by Huston Smith xiv

The Esoteric/Exoteric Distinction as Deriving from Spiritual Types

Intimations and realizations of this supreme identity appear in varying degrees of explicitness in all revealed religions and constitute the point at which they are one. But this establishes religious unity on the esoteric plane; it is hidden and secret not because those who know will not

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tell but because the truth to which they are privy is buried so deep in the human composite that they cannot communicate it, not in any way the majority will find convincing. As the Intellect undercuts the world of distinctions, from the stand- point of discriminating perception that divides into subject and object it appears nonexistent So the issue of unity and diversity in religion is

converted into one of spiritual types: esoteric and exoteric.

The esoteric minority consists of men and women who realize that they have their roots in the Absolute. Either they experience the identification directly or, failing this, they stand within earshot of its claim; something within them senses that the claim is true even if they cannot validate it completely. The exoteric majority is composed of the remainder of mankind for whom this way of talking about religion is sterile if not unintelligible.

Ambivalence as the Attitude of Each toward the Other

The attitude of each spiritual type toward the other must in the nature of things be, at best, ambivalent The esoteric *"In Shinran's teaching the so-called 'in the future' [when applied to man's deliverance] means, in reality, 'in the infinite depth of one's con- sciousness " (Shojun Bando, "Significance of the Nembutsu," Studies in Comparative Religion, Autumn, 1972, p. 215).

"Those who say do not know; those who know do not say" ( Tao TeChing, ch. 56).

will honor the exoterics faith, for he will see it as invested in scripture and/or incarnation that truly are God's revelations. He will not however, be able to share the exoterics conviction that the text or life in which he encounters his revelation is the only, or in any event supreme, mode in which God has spoken. The exoterics assessment of the esoteric is likely to be less charitable, not because exoterics are less endowed with that virtue, but because, a portion of the esoteric position being obscured from him, he cannot honor it without betraying the truth he does see. If, as the esoteric maintains, Revelation has multiple and equal instances, no single instance can be absolute. But single instance — be it Christ, the Koran, or whatever — is what the exoterics faith is anchored in, so esoterism looms as exoterism's subverter. It is in this light that Christianity's ambivalence toward its mystics and Islam's toward its Sufis, to the point even of crucifying an Al-Hallaj, are to be understood.

Esoteric and Exoteric as Hierarchical

We are focusing on Schuon's notion of personality types as entree to his understanding of the relation between religions, but the types he delineates are not on a par, like the Greeks' sanguine, choleric, phlegmatic, and bilious; Jung's extraverted and introverted, or his sensing, thinking, feeling, and intuiting types; or Sheldon's ectomorphs, endomorphs, and mesomorphs. They are graded, like Vedanta's sattvic (balanced), rajasic (dynamic), and tamasic (lethargic) character s. This returns us to the hierarchy of being, for if mankind admits of degrees, it is because being does; a hierarchy of worth arising out of a qualitatively undifferentiated, dead-level substrate is a superficial and ultimately contradictory image. Anthropology, ontology, and epistemology as well— all graded or none.

Introduction to the Revised Edition by Huston Smith xvii

And once more we are struck by the originality in the contemporary West of Schuon's approach. Soon we shall be matching it against other voices on the relation between religions, but to anticipate, the central difference is that none of the others sets the problem in the context of degrees of being.One wonders if anything separates the modern world from its predecessors more than its leveling of reality to a single dimension* with, one is tempted to add, Marcuses One-Dimensional Man as its inevitable corollary. Faithful to his incorrigible impression that certain disclosures were more profound than others, traditional man adduced the natural correlate that they activated a profounder mode of knowing that in turn carried him further into being than was normally the case. The supposition is so natural, that one must.

The modern world does, of course, see nature as hierarchical stretching from items measuring billionths of billionths of an inch to a universe twenty-eight billion light years across. From the metaphysical standpoint, however, this continuum is not hierarchical at all; it falls on a straight, horizontal line, the line of quantity as measured by size and strength of forces. The difference between the traditional and the modern world view comes to this: in the former, reality is as stupendous qualitatively as quantitatively, whereas the latter, while sharpening our understanding of the world's quantitative aspects, has collapsed its qualitative dimension to the distance between

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inanimate matter and human consciousness, a micro-spectrum when placed beside the ens perfectissimum in which the traditional world was anchored.

For the West, Plato forged the paradigm. The degrees of knowing are three. At bottom is opinion, or as we should say, observation. As this is constantly changing it grasps nothing permanent and worthy of being called "truth." The only knowledge fully deserving the name stands at the opposite end of the ladder, wholly transcending the senses. It is the con- templation by pure intelligence of the divine archetypes, above all the summum bonum, the Idea of the Good. The overlap of these two modes of knowing, sensory and intellectual, results in an intermediate activity that Plato stigmatized as "bastard," though as a stepping stone to true knowledge it was invaluable. This middle "knowledge" was geometry, or as we should now say, deduction.

It has, in one form or another, been the dominant official philosophy of the larger part of civilized mankind through most of its history, (taught) in their several fashions and with differing degrees of rigor and thoroughness [by] the greater number of the subtler speculative minds and of the great religious teachers" (Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being :

[New York: Harper & Brothers, I960), p. 26).

Introduction to the Revised Edition by Huston Smith xviii

The History of an Idea ask why it has receded. The answer is not far to seek Since the Great Chain of Being collapsed with the rise of modern science, something in scientific aims and methods must be inimical to it It is. Modern science deals with the physical, perceptible world in that its hypotheses take off from this world and return to it for verification. As matter and perception (pointer readings, on/off flip-flops) are ultimately of a kind, differences in complexity and in the way matter behaves on different levels of size not being at issue here, the subject matter of science is one-dimensional. The modern world sees being as one-dimensional because scientific epistemology has pre-empted the epistemological field, not (one hastens to add) so much because scientists are imperialists as because humanists, certain theologians not excepted, have clamored to become satraps. The achievements of science make its take-over understandable, but this does not alter the fact that it is founded on a logical mistake, a kind of grand mistake whose consequences, conceptual and social each is free to judge for himself.

2. Critique of Other Positions

Schuon will point out errors as he comes upon them, but he has no interest in elaborating a typology of the ways that the relationship between religions has been conceived; his ey e is on the issue at stake rather than the ways men have construed it I, on the other hand, do propose to sketch, in the balance of this introduction, a skeletal typology, to a double end. First situating Sermon s thesis within it can etch that thesis more sharply; second, comparing his thesis with others may serve to feed it into the stream of ongoing discussion of the subject.

The continental divide that separates views on the relation between religions is the issue of commitment The slopes on either side may be designated variously as existential versus objective, committed versus detached, or theological versus phenomeitological; the three formulations are different ways of stating a single dichotomy.

Introduction to the Revised Edition by Huston Smith xix

The Theological Committed Position

Rooted in theological conviction, the committed position necessarily concludes that the object of its commitment excels. In its baldest form it sees other commitments as evil opposed to its good, false as opposed to its truth. The invectives can be deserved. If the Old Testament inveighs against the surrounding paganism in categorical terms, it is because these nature religions had degenerated to the point where they had ceased to be saving yanas (vehicles) and deserved to be castigated. The epithet "false" is also appropriate when a faith that is valid in its own sphere bids to extend beyond that sphere into territory it could not incorporate salvifically; for the esoteric, it is in this light that Koranic objections to Judaism and Christianity are to be read.

According to that perspective, the Koran does not deny the validity of these religions for their own adherents; it denies only that they were intended for could save the Arab world.

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The true/false dichotomy forfeits its validity when invoked against other revealed religions — "People of the Book"; roughly the great enduring religions and archaic ones that have not degenerated — in ways that are aggressive rather than defensive, that is, ways that deny di gnity and legitimacy to other religions rather than defending these rights for one's own religion. With the exception of fundamentalists who disregard the specific targets to whic h the scriptural epithet "false" were directed and generalize the epithet to indict all faiths save the Christian, contemporary theologians concede that such blanket condemnations are indefensible. They are forced, however, to stop short of granting other revelations status equal to their own. Why forced? Because their faith (a) lodges in a particular revelation (b) from which other revelations differ. John is romantically in love with Mary; Jane is not Mary; John is not romantically in love with Jane. The twofold objection to this analogy is invalid. That Mary means the world to John, it might be argued, does not require John to deny that Susan can mean the world to Paul; but this overlooks the fact that.

Introduction to the Revised Edition by Huston Smith xx

"Lord of all" is ingredient to the concept of God whereas "beloved of all" is not ingredient to Mary. Second, to say that although John cannot love two women simultaneously romantically, he can love them simultaneously in other ways is to phase out of the analogy entirely, for as Kierkegaard put the matter, only the swains love for the princess, that is, only romantic love by virtue of its all-consuming character and the way it sweeps out an entire world for the lover, can provide a paradigm for the love of God.

Denied the possibility of according full equality to other faiths, theology's compromise position — other religions contain some but lesser truth— has been formulated in several ways. In Christendom the classical formula has been "development-fulfillment": mans universal religious gropings find in Christ's incarnation of the Logos what they have sought implicitly from the beginning. Couched in terms of twentieth-century Biblical theologians' ruling concept of Heilsgeschichte (salvation history) — history as the field wherein God is working to accomplish his purpose of r edeeming mankind — other religions are seen as valid responses to God's universal saving activity and thereby redeeming for their adherents without this prejudicing the fact that His most explicit, indeed decisive, redemptive act was in Christ Karl Barth, architect of twentieth century neoorthodoxy, pushed this view a step further. Building on Calvin's point that it is sin, man's rebellion, that prevents man from responding wholeheartedly to God's offer of salvation, he went on to argue that as sin is universal, Christianity must be distorted in the same way other religious responses are. By this analysis the divide is not between Christianity and other religions, but between the kerygma (divine message, God's saving overture) and religions' responses thereto, the Christian response included. But again the theological imperative that one's own revelation take precedence over others surfaces, here in the assumption that the kerygma is most decisively disclosed in Christ When Bonhoeffer extrapolates from the sindistorted character of religion generally to envision a "religionless Christianity," it continues to be assumed that Christianity is in the best position to perceive religions selfseeking, and so to transcend it Down the "religionless" road lies secular a nd death-of-God theology, but this reductio ad absurdum — the absurdity that man can discard religion before he discards his finitude — has to do with religion itself rather than the relationship between its instances, so it need not occupy us here.

Introduction to the Revised Edition by Huston Smith xxi

The Objective, Detached Position

Whereas the foregoing position gauges the relation between religions through the eyes of a life involved in saving its soul the objective, detached position — roughly the Religionswissenschafi of the last one hundred years — makes a point of having no commitment that might prejudice pure, impartial understanding. Not proceeding from within a religion, it approaches the field without presuming better or worse in its population. Some in this camp are nominalists and feel no compulsion to discover an essence that unifies the field; of religion in general they say as Troeltsch said of Christianity, it has no essence. The opposing camp of realists or essentialists divides into two subgroups. On the one hand stand reductionists who, being primarily interested in something other than religion, reduce religion to a manifestation or expression of this or that other entity: social reality (Durkheim), class struggle (Marx), ontogeneti c development (Freud). Opposing them are the phenomenologists, whose slogan, "Let the phenomena (appearances) speak for themselves, ,, was aimed precisely against reducing religion and certain other life domains to matrices that could only prove procrustean. Phenomenologists believe in religion's autonomy: man is

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inherently Homo religiosus and must be respected as such. All moves to explain why he is so in terms of other aspects of his existence dismantle his religiousness; in explaining it they explain it away and thereby falsify. Kant located the irreducibly religious in the moral imperative, Schleiermacher in man's feeling of absolute dependence, Rudolf Otto in his sense of the numinous. Today Eliade finds it in the dichotomy man erects between the sacred and the profane.

Note that these "essences" all fall on the human side of the God/man divide. Phenomena are not noumena. Phenomenology, trying to be a science, deals exclusively with the former and refrains in principle from pronouncing on trans-human, metaphysical entities.

Introduction to the Revised Edition by Huston Smith xxii

The Search for a Compromise: The "Parliament of Religions" Approach

The two positions, theological and phenomenological pull in opposite directions, and as each has a claim on something in man — were this not so they would not have arisen — leave him, as it were, with one foot on shore and the other on an unmoored craft Ungainly at best, the stance is also precarious, so one could predict even before looking that efforts would be made to close the gap, to contrive a via media that retains the virtues of both positions (commitment and fair play) while eliminating their defects (prejudice and relativism). One can also see a priori the formal conditions a middle way must satisfy. First, it must center in something the great traditions have in common. But second, this something must be God-ward of the God/man divide, for attitudes, sentiments, and experiences, however lofty, are only human states and do not elicit worship: this silences phenomenology. By the same token, moral virtues cannot provide the common core, for though they may be common they are not the core. From the religious point of view ethics is always derivative: the ethical half of the Ten Commandments follows the theological half.

Introduction to the Revised Edition by Huston Smith xxiii

In the rationalism and deism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Parliament of Religions (Chicago, 1893), Gilbert Reid's International Institute ( Shanghai, 1894-1917), and the Temple of Understanding today, one sees earnest groupings to discover a theological core that religions share in common. What the endeavors are against is plain: the tragic and often contemptible prejudice, cresting at times into persecution, that can derive from religious alignments — the wars of religion that provoked Cardinal Newman's exclamation, "O how we hate one another for the love of God," But rebound from evils is not enough. Suppose we see the evils; what are we to do, relinquish religion or believe alike? As neither alternative is likely, the Parliament of Religions route brings us to an impasse as intractable as that between theology and phenomenology. As we have seen, the fact that the religions all endorse the Golden Rule isn't enough: men don't worship morality. If one moves beyond morality to archetypes — goodness, truth, and beauty — these too are common to the religions, but they fall between the stools: to the exoteric they appear abstract and no more capable of inspiring devotion than "womanhood" can trigger full-blown love, while to the esoteric they are not ultimate, but derive from a source beyond themselves to which they point. Beyond the archetypes exoterics cannot proceed in concert, for on the next echelon stands God in his immanent informed, and personal mode, which mode has been differently disclosed to accommodate the differing characters and needs of the various civilizations.

Schuon's Alternative ... Enter Schuon.

There is a unity at the heart of religions. More than moral it is theological, but more than theological it is metaphysical in the precise sense of the word earlier noted: that which transcends the manifest world. The fact that it is thus transcendent however, means that it can be univocally described by none and concretely apprehended by few. For these few the problem of the relation between religions is, by it solved; for the many the problem is unsolvable, because for the many the generic is abstract and the concrete is not generic, * and only what is concrete * Aristotle spoke for the many in this regard and in so doing effected, against his teacher Plato, the basic divide in Western philosophy. For Plato forms were concrete and existed in their own right; for Aristotle they existed only as aspects of materialized objects. Correlatively. for Plato the infinite can be loved and worshipped (this last holds for everyone).

Introduction to the Revised Edition by Huston Smith xxiv -009-

Cut-Flower Esoterism

For positions on the relationship between religions we now have before us the theological the phenomenological, the parliament-of-religions unsuccessful effort to discover a common exoteric essence, and Schuon s transcendent unity. A final position, which I shall call cut -flower esoterism, will complete the typology.

Our times are witnessing an efflorescence of esoterism, but largely of a rootless variety.

Unconvinced by theology, which along with theory of every sort is dismissed as a "head trip," the young especially are looking for experience: direct unmediated God-awareness through altered states of consciousness. For Schuon this amounts to asking for end without means, kernel without husk, soul without body, spirit without letter. But as man is by definition finite as well as infinite, body as well as soul this one-sided approach holds little promise. Short of being ajivanmukta (realized soul), so few of which exist as to be negligible in this context man cannot keep God- realization in constant focus, and the way to keep it in focus as much as possible is through dedicated and faith-filled observance of the forms stipulated in one of the revealed traditions. The tradition's codes help to establish the soul in equilibrium socially and thereby emotionally, while theology provides a road map to point the direction and show where desert stretches fit in. As the Intellect is everywhere, its Truth can flash anywhere; but to be steadied, sustained, and increased, a "rheostat" is needed Traditions are such for the human spirit.

To speak less metaphorically, negatively Schuon doubts that transcendent Truth, the Reality common to the great was real, whereas for Aristotle it was a potentiality. Thus Aristotelianism may be regarded as a kind of external or exoteric rendering of Platonism, the line running through Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, and Plotinus. St. Bonaventura attributed "science" to Aristotelianism and "wisdom" to Platonism religions, is directly accessible to many; the mentality of most men and women being exoteric, their choice is between, on the one hand, a faith that is patently exoteric, and on the other, sentimental infatuation with rosy abstractions, this latter resembling being in love with love itself or taking as ones prophet Kahlil Gibran. Positively Schuon argues that even esoterics must almost without exception, submit to exoteric rites. Forms are to be transcended by fathoming their depths and discerning their universal content not by circumventing them. One might regard them as doorways to be entered, or rather as windows, for the esoteric doesn't leave them behind, but continues to look through them toward the Absolute. But because the symbolism of the spirit always requires that in the end, space (distance) be transcended, even this will not do. The esoteric finds the Absolute within the traditions as poets find poetry in poems.

Introduction to the Revised Edition by Huston Smith xxv

3. The Esoteric/Exoteric Distinction Restated

As the esoteric/exoteric distinction is the key to this book, it merits a concluding section devoted to clarifying its character and implications.

Man does not dwell in pure immediacy; he lives in a world of symbolic forms. Transcendence can appear on the human plane only through these forms; it cannot appear directly because it transcends by definition the planes spatiotemporal categories. Symbols for their part consist of a form/content complex. Exoterics are persons whose meanings derive from forms that are more restricted in scope than are those of esoterics. One is tempted to say that their forms are more concrete, but this could be misleading, for it would imply that esoteric forms are, in contrast abstract and hence vacuous — shells of reality only, so to speak. Beyond a certain level of generality symbols do appear abstract in this denatured sense to exoterics, but to esoterics they remain full-bodied, if anything thereby gaining in force and reality.

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An infant once he can identify his mother, equates her initially with her tactile or visual presence; if she leaves the room she ceases to exist and the infant cries. Everyone agrees that it is an advance in understanding when "Mother" acquires for the child a reference more extended than "a certain X in my visual or tactile field." But when we continue up the scale of extended meanings Logos. For exoterics, less supple in their capacity for "spiritual abstraction," in precise to "No man cometh unto the Father, but by me," men divide. For esoterics "me" will designate the proportion as the word relaxes its hold on the concrete historical personage of Jesus of Nazareth, the assertion forfeits its saving power.

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Another way to indicate the distinction is to say that for the exoteric form and content are less distinguishable. As they present themselves to him as welded together or fused in a homogeneous alloy, he sees no way of having one without the other. By this alternate route we arrive at the same conclusion: forms for exoterics are relatively non-negotiable.

Esoterics ride them more loosely, knowing that because they are finite they are, at best limited keys to the lock, restricted doors to the mystery.

In one of his most powerful analogies, Schuon likens esoterism to command over spiritual space. Anchored to a single spot the exoteric is unable to circumambulate spiritual objects, so to speak, and this makes it difficult for him to distinguish them as they are in themselves from the way they appear from his frame of reference — a visual example of confounding an idea with the form in which it is clothed. That an idea assumes a form is itself a virtue, for unless it did so it could seldom connect with man. But when a form becomes possessive toward its content usurping and pre-empting it to itself alone, then instead of opening onto further understandings of the idea through a successive sequence of expanding forms, it runs the danger of becoming paralyzed and constricting.

The tenacity with which the exoteric clings to the forms in which his meanings are manifest is understandable. As he cannot enter concretely into truth on a higher level of universality,* any suggestion to the effect that the forms in which truth comes to him are relative is tantamount to relativism in every sense. Absolutize the relative or fall into relativism — these, for the exoteric, are the only options and he does right of course to choose the former.

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But his choice is bought at a double price. (1) He will be debarred from according equal rights to other revelations, as the "No man cometh unto the Father" example illustrated. (2) He will encounter theoretical problems that are insuperable — theological instances of Godef s theorem to the effect that every formal system with precise specifications must contain at least one question that cannot be answered by the stipulations of the system itself. If God is self-sufficient why did He create the world; if He is perfect, why did He create a world that is imperfect?

For exoterism such questions cannot be "brought to heel."

For esoterism it is not so much that they have answers as that they do not arise.

The corollaries of the esoteric/exoteric distinction are far-reaching …

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For the exoteric, God's personal mode is his only mode; for the esoteric this mode resides in one that is higher and ultimately modeless: the Absolute, the Godhead, Nirguna Brahman of the Vedantists, the Tao that cannot be spoken.

For the exoteric, the world is real in every sense; for the esoteric it has only qualified reality from the human standpoint and no separate reality whatsoever from the standpoint of the Godhead. The same holds for the human soul:

For the exoteric, God is primarily loved; for the esoteric He is primarily known; though in the end the exoteric comes to know what he loves and the esoteric to love what he knows.

But this is to point beyond the book in hand to Schuon’s work as a whole.

*One must say "universality" rather than "abstraction" for to repeat, though greater universality moves toward abstractness for the exoteric it moves toward concreteness for the esoteric.

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This book is founded on a doctrine that is metaphysical in the most precise meaning of the word and cannot by any means be described as philosophical. Such a distinction may appear unwarrantable to those who are accustomed to regard metaphysic as a branch of philosophy, but the practice of linking the two together in this manner, although it can be traced back to Aristotle and the Scholastic writers who followed him, merely shows that all philosophy suffers from certain limitations that even in the most favorable instances such as those just quoted, exclude a completely adequate appreciation of metaphysic. In reality, the transcendent character of metaphysic makes it independent of any purely human mode of thought In order to define clearly the difference between

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the two modes in question, it may be said that philosophy proceeds from reason (which is a purely individual faculty), whereas metaphysic proceeds exclusively from the Intellect The latter faculty has been defined by Meister Eckhart— who fully understood the import of his words — as follows: "There is something in the soul that is uncreate and uncreatable; if the whole soul were this it would be uncreate and uncreatable; and this is the Intellect" An analogous definition, which is still more concise and even richer in symbolic value, is to be found in Moslem esoterism: "The Sufi [that is to say, man identified with the Intellect] is not created."

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Since purely intellectual knowledge is by definition beyond the reach of the individual, being in its essence supraindividual, universal, or divine, and since it proceeds from pure Intelligence, which is direct and not discursive, it follows that this knowledge not only goes infinitely further than reasoning, but even goes further than faith in the ordinary sense of this term. In other words, intellectual knowledge also transcends the specifically theological point of view, which is itself incomparably superior to the philosophical point of view, since, like metaphysical knowledge, it emanates from God and not from man; but whereas metaphysic proceeds wholly from intellectual intuition, religion proceeds from Revelation. The latter is the Word of God spoken to His creatures, whereas intellectual intuition is a direct and active participation in divine Knowledge and not an indirect and passive participation, as is faith. In other words, in the case of intellectual intuition, knowledge is not possessed by the individual insofar as he is an individual, but insofar as in his innermost essence he is not distinct from his Divine Principle. Thus metaphysical certitude is absolute because of the identity between the knower and the known in the Intellect. If an example may be drawn from the sensory sphere to illustrate the difference between metaphysical and theological knowledge, it may be said that the former, which can be called "esoteric" wh en it is manifested through a religious symbolism, is conscious of the colorless essence of light and of its character of pure luminosity; a given religious belief, on the other hand, will assert that light is red and not green, whereas another belief will assert the opposite; both will be right insofar as they distinguish light from darkness but not insofar as they identify it with a particular color. This very rudimentary example is designed to show that the theological point of view, because it is based in the minds of believers on a Revelation and not on a knowledge that is accessible to each one of them (an unrealizable condition for a large human collectivity), will of necessity confuse the symbol or form with the naked and supraformal Truth, while metaphysic, which can be compared to a point of view only in a purely provisional sense, will be able to make use of the same symbol or form as a means of expression while at the same time being aware of its relativity. That is why each of the great and intrinsically orthodox religions can, through its dogmas, rites, and other symbols, serve as a means of expression for every truth known directly by the eye of the Intellect the spiritual organ that is called in Moslem esoterism the "eye of the heart."

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We have just stated that religion translates metaphysical or universal truths into dogmatic language. Now, though dogma is not accessible to all men in its intrinsic truth, which can only be directly attained by the Intellect it is nonetheless accessible through faith, which is, for the great majority, the only possible mode of participation in the Divine Truths. As for intellectual knowledge, which, as we have seen, proceeds neither from belief nor from a process of reasoning, it goes beyond dogma in the sense that without ever contradicting the latter, it penetrates its internal dimension, that is, the infinite Truth that dominates all forms.

In order to be absolutely clear on this point we must again insist that the rational mode of knowledge in no way extends beyond the realm of generalities and cannot by itself reach any transcendent truth; if it may nevertheless serve as a means of expressing suprarational knowledge — as in the case of Aristotelian and Scholastic ontology — this will always be to the detriment of the intellectual integrity of the doctrine. Some may perhaps object that even the purest metaphysic is sometimes hardly distinguishable from philosophy inasmuch as it uses arguments and seems to reach conclusions. But this resemblance is due merely to the fact that all concepts, once they are expressed, are necessarily clothed in the modes of human thought which is rational and dialectical. What essentially distinguishes the metaphysical from the philosophical proposit ion is that the former is symbolical and descriptive, in the sense that it makes use of rational modes as symbols to describe or translate knowledge possessing a greater degree of certainty than any knowledge of a sensible order, whereas philosophy —called not without reason, ancilla theologiae — is never anything more than what it expresses. When philosophy uses reason to resolve a doubt this proves

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precisely that its starting point is a doubt that it is striving to overcome, whereas we have seen that the starting point of a metaphysical formulation is always essentially something intellectually evident or certain, which is communicated to those able to receive it by symbolical or dialectical means designed to awaken in them the latent knowledge that they bear unconsciously and it may even be said eternally within them.

To illustrate the three modes of thought we have been considering, let us apply them to the idea of God. The philosophical point of view, when it does not purely and simply deny God even if only by ascribing to the word a meaning it does not possess, tries to "prove" God by all kinds of argument; in other words, this point of view tries to "prove" either the "existence" or the "nonexistence" of God as though reason, which is only an intermediary and in no wise a source of transcendent knowledge, could "prove" no matter what Moreover this pretension of reason to autonomy in realms where only intellectual intuition on the one hand and Revelation on the other can communicate knowledge, is characteristic of the philosophical point of view and shows up all its inadequacy.

The theological point of view does not for its part trouble itself about proving God — it is even prepared to admit that such proof is impossible — but bases itself on belief. It must be added here that "faith" cannot be reduced to a simple matter of belief; otherwise Christ would not have spoken of the "faith which moves mountains," for it goes without saying that ordinary religious belief has no such power. Finally, from the metaphysical standpoint there is no longer any question either of "proof or of "belief but solely of direct evidence, of intellectual evidence that implies absolute certainty; but in the present state of humanity such evidence is only accessible to a spiritual elite that becomes ever more restricted in number.

It may be added that religion, by its very nature and independently of any wish of its representatives, who may be unaware of the fact contains and transmits thi s purely intellectual Knowledge beneath the veil of its dogmatic and ritual symbols, as we have already seen.

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The truths just expressed are not the exclusive possession of any school or individual; were it otherwise they would not be truths, for these cannot be invented, but must necessarily be known in every integral traditional civilization. It might, however, reasonably be asked for what human and cosmic reasons truths that may in a very general sense be called "esoteric" should be brought to light and made explicit at the present time, in an age that is so little inclined to speculation. There is indeed something abnormal in this, but it lies, not in the fact of the exposition of these truths, but in the general conditions of our age, which marks the end of a great cyclic period of terrestrial humanity — the end of a maha-yuga according to Hindu cosmology — and so must recapitulate or manifest again in one way or another everything that is included in the cycle, in conformity with the adage "extremes meet"; thus things that are in themselves abnormal may become necessary by reason of the conditions just referred to.

From a more individual point of view, that of mere expediency, it must be admitte d that the spiritual confusion of our times has reached such a pitch that the harm that might in principle befall certain people from contact with the truths in question is compensated by the advantages other will derive from the self-same truths; again, the term "esoterism" has been so often misused in order to cloak ideas that are as unspiritual as they are dangerous, and what is known of esoteric doctrines has been so frequently plagiarized and deformed — not to mention the fact that the outward and readily exaggerated incompatibility of the different religious forms greatly discredits, in the minds of most of our contemporaries, all religion — that it is not only desirable but even incumbent upon one to give some idea …

firstly, of what true esoterism is and what it is not, and secondly, of what it is that constitutes the profound and eternal solidarity of all spiritual forms.

To come now to the main subject of this book, it must be emphasized that the unity of the different religions is not only unrealizable on the external level that of the forms themselves, but ought not to be realized at that level even were this possible, for in that case the revealed forms would be deprived of their sufficient reason. The very fact that they are revealed shows that they are willed by the Divine Word If the expression "transcendent unity" is used, it means that the unity of the religious forms must be realized in a purely inward and spiritual way and without prejudice to any particular form. The antagonisms between these forms no more affect the one universal Truth than the antagonisms between opposing colors affect the transmission of the one uncolored light (to return to the illustration used already).

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Just as every color, by its negation of darkness and its affirmation of light, provides the possibility of discovering the ray that makes it visible and of tracing this ray back to its luminous source, so all forms, all symbols, all religions, all dogmas, by their negation of error and their affirmation of Truth, make it possible to follow the ray of Revelation, which is none other than the ray of the Intellect, back to its Divine Source.

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The true and complete understanding of an idea goes far beyond the first apprehension of the idea by the intelligence, although more often than not this apprehension is taken for understanding itself. While it is true that the immediate evidence conveyed to us by any particular idea is, on its own level, a real understanding, there can be no question of its embracing the whole extent of the idea, since it is primarily the sign of an aptitude to understand that idea in its completeness. Any truth can in fact be understood at different levels and according to different conceptual dimensions, that is to say, according to an indefinite number of modalities that correspond to all the possible apects, likewise indefinite in number, of the truth in question. This way of regarding ideas accordingly leads to the question of spiritual realization, the doctrinal expressions of which clearly illustrate the dimensional indefinitude of theoretical conceptions.

The Transcendent Unity of Religions

Philosophy, considered from the standpoint of its limitations — and it is the limitations of philosophy that confer upon it its specific character — is based on the systematic ignoring of what has been stated above … In other words … philosophy ignores what would be its own negation; moreover, it concerns itself solely with mental schemes that with its claim to universality, it likes to regard as absolute, although from the point of view of spiritual realization these schemes are merely so many virtual or potential and unused objects, insofar at least as they refer to true ideas; when, however, this is not the case, as practically always occurs in modern philosophy, these schemes are reduced to the condition of mere devices that are unusable from a speculative point of view and are therefore without any real value. As for true ideas, those, that is to say, that more or less implicitly suggest aspects of the total Truth, and hence this Truth itself, they become by that very fact intellectual keys and indeed have no other function; this is something that metaphysical thought alone is capable of grasping. So far as philosophical or ordinary theological thought is concerned, there is, on the contrary, an ignorance affecting not only the nature of the ideas that are believed to be completely understood, but also and above all the scope of theory as such; theoretical understanding is in fact transitory and limited by definition, though its limits can only be more or less approximately defined.

The purely "theoristic" understanding of an idea, which we have so termed because of the limitative tendency that paralyzes it may justly be characterized by the word "dogmatism"; religious dogma in fact at least to the extent to which it is supposed to exclude other conceptual forms, though certainly not in itself, represents an idea considered in conformity with a theoristic tendency, and this exclusive way of looking at ideas has even become characteristic of the religious point of view as such. A religious dogma ceases, however, to be limited in this way once it is understood in the light of its inherent truth, which is of a universal order, and this is the case in all esoterism. On the other hand, the ideas formulated in esoterism and in metaphysical doctrines generally may in their turn be understood according to the dogmatic or theoristic tendency, and the case is then analogous to that of the religious dogmatism of which we have just spoken. In this connection, we must again point out that a religious dogma is not a dogma in itself but solely by the fact of being considered as such and through a sort of confusion of the idea with the form in which it is clothed; on the other hand, the outward dogmatization of universal truths is perfectly justified in view of the fact that these truths or ideas, in having to provide the foundation of a religion, must be capable of being assimilated in some degree by all men. Dogmatism as such does not consist in the mere enunciation of an idea, that is to say, in the fact of giving form to a spiritual intuition, but rather in an interpretation that instead of rejoining the formless and total Truth after taking as its starting point one of the forms of that Truth, results in a sort of paralysis of this form by denying its intellectual potentialities and by attributing to it an absoluteness that only the formless and total Truth itself can possess.

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Dogmatism reveals itself not only by its inability to conceive the inward or implicit illimitability of the symbol, the universality that resolves all outward oppositions, but also by its inability to recognize, when faced with two apparently contradictory truths, the inward connection that they implicitly affirm, a connection that makes of them complementary aspects of one and the same truth.

One might illustrate this in the following manner: whoever participates in universal Knowledge will regard two apparently contradictory truths as he would two points situated on one and the same circumference that links them together by its continuity and so reduces them to unity; in the measure in which these points are distant from, and thus opposed to, one another, there will be contradiction, and this contradiction will reach its maximum when the two points are situated at the extremities of a diameter of the circle; but this extreme opposition or contradiction only appears as a result of isolating the points under consideration from the circle and ignoring the existence of the latter. One may conclude from this that a dogmatic affirmation, that is to say, an affirmation that is inseparable from its form and admits no other, is comparable to a point which by definition, as it were, contradicts all other possible points; a speculative formulation, on the other hand, is comparable to an element of a circle, the very form of which indicates its logical and ontological continuity and therefore the whole circle or, by analogical transposition, the whole Truth; this comparison will, perhaps, suggest in the clearest possible way the difference that separates a dogmatic affirmation from a speculative formulation.

The outward and intentional contradictoriness of speculative formulations may show itself, it goes without saying, not only in a single, logically paradoxical formula such as the Vedic/l/jam Brahmasmi … l am Brahma") — the Vedantic definition of yogi — or the Ana 'l-Haqq ("I am the Truth") of Al-Hallaj, or Christ's words concerning His Divinity, but also, and for even stronger reasons, as between different formulations each of which may be logically homogeneous in itself. Examples of the latter may be found in all sacred Scriptures, notably in the Koran: we need only recall the apparent contradiction between the affirmations regarding predestination and those regarding free will, affirmations that are contradictory only in the sense that they express opposite aspects of a single reality. However, apart from these paradoxical formulations— whether they are so in themselves or in relation to one another— there also remain certain theories that although expressing the strictest orthodoxy, are nevertheless in outward contradiction one with another, this being due to the diversity of their respective points of view, which are not chosen arbitrarily and artificially but are established spontaneously by virtue of a genuine intellectual originality.

To return to what was said above about the understanding of ideas, a theoretical notion may be compared to the view of an object. Just as this view does not reveal all possible aspects, or in other words, the integral nature of the object the perfect knowledge of which would be nothing less than identity with it so a theoretical notion does not itself correspond to the integral truth, of which it necessarily suggests only one aspect essential or otherwise.* In the example just given, error corresponds to an inadequate view of the object whereas a dogmatic conception is comparable to the exclusive view of one aspect of the object a view that supposes the immobility of the seeing subject As for a speculative and therefore intellectually unlimited conception, this may be compared to the sum of all possible views of the object in question, views that presuppose in the subject a power of displacement or an ability to alter his view-point hence a certain mode of identity with the dimensions of space, which themselves effectually reveal the integral nature of the object at least with respect to its form, which is all that is in question in the example given. Movement in space is in fact an active participation in the possibilities of space, whereas static ex tension in space, the form of our bodies, for example, is a passive participation in these same possibilities. This may be transposed without difficulty to a higher plane and one may then speak of an intellectual space," namely, the cognitive all-possibility that is fundamentally the same as the Divine Omniscience, and consequently of "intellectual dimensions" that are the internal modalities of this Omniscience; Knowledge through the Intellect is none other than the perfect participation of the *In a treatise directed against rationalist philosophy. AI-Ghazzali speaks of certain blind men who. not having even a theoretical knowledge of an elephant came across this animal one day and started to feel the different parts of its body: as a result each man represented the animal to himself according to the part that he touched … the first who touched a foot the elephant resembled a column, whereas the second, who touched one of the tusks, it resembled a stake, and so on. By this parable Al-Ghazzali seeks to show the error involved in trying to enclose the universal within a fragmentary notion of it or within isolated and exclusive aspects or points of view. Shri Ramakrishna also uses this parable to demonstrate the inadequacy of dogmatic exclusiveness in its negative aspect The same idea could, however, be expressed by means of an even more adequate example: faced with any object some might say that it "is" a certain shape, while others might say

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that it "is" such and such a material: others again might maintain that it "is" such and such a number or such and such a weight and so forth. Subject in these modalities, and in the physical world this participation is effectively represented by movement. When speaking, therefore, of the understanding of ideas, we may distinguish between a dogmatic understanding, comparable to the view of an object from a single viewpoint, and an integral or speculative understanding, comparable to the indefinite series of possible views of the object, views that are realized through indefinitely multiple changes of point of view. Just as, when the eye changes its position, the different views of an object are connected by a perfect continuity, which represents, so to speak, the determining reality of the object, so the different aspects of a truth, however contradictory they may appear and notwithstanding their indefinite multiplicity, describe the integral Truth that surpasses and determines them. We would again refer here to an illustration we have already used; a dogmatic affirmation corresponds to a point that, as such, contradicts by definition every other point, whereas a speculative formulation is always conceived as an element of a circle that by its very form indicates principally its own continuity, and hence the entire circle and the Truth in its entirety.

It follows from the above that in speculative doctrines it is the point of view on the one hand and the aspect on the other hand that determine the form of the affirmation, whereas in dogmatism the affirmation is confused with a determinate point of view and aspect, thus excluding all others.*

The Angels are intelligences that are limited to a particular aspect of Divinity; consequently an angelic state is a sort of transcendent point of view. On a lower plane, the "intellectuality" of animals and of the more peripheral species of the terrestrial state, that of plants, for example, corresponds cosmologically to the angelic intellectuality: what differentiates one vegetable species from another is, in reality, simply the mode of its "intelligence"; in other words, it is the form or rather the integral nature of a plant that reveals the state— eminently passive, of course— of contemplation or knowledge of its species; we say "of its species" advisedly, because, considered in isolation, a plant does not constitute an individual. We would recall here that the Intellect, being universal, must be discoverable in everything that exists, to whatever order it belongs; the same is not true of reason, which is only a specifically human faculty and is in no way identical with intelligence, either our own or that of other beings.

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The exoteric point of view is fundamentally the point of view of individual interest considered in its highest sense, that is to say, extended to cover the whole cycle of existence of the individual and not limited solely to terrestrial life. Exoteric truth is limited by definition, by reason of the very limitation of the end it sets itself, without this restriction, however, affecting the esoteric interpretation of which that same truth is susceptible thanks to the universality of its symbolism, or rather, first and foremost thanks to the twofold nature, inward and outward, of Revelation itself; whence it follows that a dogma is both a limited idea and an unlimited symbol at one and the same time. To give an example, we may say that the dogma of the unicity of the Church of God must exclude a truth such as that of the validity of other orthodox religious forms, because the idea of religious universality is of no particular usefulness for the purpose of salvation and may even exert a prejudicial effect on it, since, in the case of persons not possessi ng the capacity to rise above an individual standpoint this idea would almost inevitably result in religious indifference and hence in the neglect of those religious duties the accomplishment of which is precisely the principal condition of salvation. On the other hand, this same idea of religious universality— an idea that is more or less indispensable to the way of total and disinterested Truth — is nonetheless included symbolically and metaphysically in the dogmatic or theological definition of the Church or of the Mystical Body of Christ; or again, to use the language of the other two monotheistic religions, Judaism and Islam, we may find in the respective conceptions of the "Chosen People," Yisrael and "submission," Al-Islam. a dogmatic symbol of the idea of universal orthodoxy, the Sanatana Dharma of the Hindus.

It goes without saying that the outward limitation of dogma, which is precisely what confers upon it its dogmatic character, is perfectly legitimate, since the individual viewpoint to which this

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limitation corresponds is a reality at its own level of existence. It is because of this relative reality that the individual viewpoint, except to the extent to which it implies the negation of a higher perspective, that is to say, insofar as it is limited by the mere fact of its nature, can and even must be integrated in one fashion or another in every path possessing a transcendent goal.

Regarded from this standpoint, exoterism, or rather form as such, will no longer imply an intellectually restricted perspective but will play the part of an accessory spiritual means, without the transcendence of the esoteric doctrine being in any way affected thereby, no limitation being imposed on the latter for reasons of individual expediency. One must not therefore confuse the function of the exoteric viewpoint as such with the function of exoterism as a spiritual means: the viewpoint in question is incompatible, in one and the same consciousness, with es oteric knowledge, for the latter dissolves this viewpoint as a preliminary to reabsorbing it into the center from which it came; but the exoteric means do not for that reason cease to be utilizable, and will, in fact be used in two ways: on the one hand, by intellectual transposition into the esoteric order — in which case they will act as supports of intellectual actualization; and on the other hand, by their regulating action on the individual portion of the being.

The exoteric aspect of a religion is thus a providential disposition that, far from being blameworthy, is necessary in view of the fact that the esoteric way can only concern a minority, especially under the present conditions of terrestrial humanity. What is blameworthy is not the existence of exoterism, but rather its all-invading autocracy — due primarily perhaps, in the Christian world, to the narrow precision of the Latin mind — which causes many of those who would be qualified for the way of pure Knowledge not only to stop short at the outward aspect of the religion, but even to reject entirely an esoterism that they know only through a veil of prejudice and deformation, unless indeed, not finding anything in exoterism to satisfy their intelligence, they be caused to stray into false and artificial doctrines in an attempt to find something that exoterism does not offer them, and even takes it upon itself to prohibit.*

The exoteric viewpoint is, in fact doomed to end by negating itself once it is no longer vivified by the presence within it of the esoterism of which it is both the outward radiation and the veil. So it is that religion, according to the measure in which it denies metaphysical and initiatory realities and becomes crystallized in a literalistic dogmatism, inevitably engenders unb elief; the atrophy that overtakes dogmas when they are deprived of their internal dimension recoils upon them from the outside, in the form of heretical and atheistic negations.

The presence of an esoteric nucleus in a civilization that is specifically exoteric in character guarantees to it a normal development and a maximum of stability; this nucleus, however, is not in any sense a part, even an inner part, of it … This recalls the denunciation uttered by Christ: "Woe unto you. lawyers! for ye have taken away the key of knowledge: ye entered not in yourselves, and them that were entering in, ye hindered" (Luke xi. 52).

Exoterism, but represents, on the contrary, a quasi-independent "dimension" in relation to the latter.* Once this dimension or nucleus ceases to exist, which can only happen in quite abnormal, though cosmologically necessary, circumstances, the religious edifice is shaken, or even suffers a partial collapse, and finally becomes reduced to its most external elements, namely, literalism and sentimentality. Moreover, the most tangible criteria of such a decadence are, on the one hand, the failure to recognize, even to the point of denial, metaphysical and initiatory exegesis, that is to say, the mystical sense of the Scriptures — an exegesis that has moreover a close connection with all aspects of the intellectuality of the religious form under consideration; and on the other hand, the rejection of sacred art, that is to say, of the inspired and symbolic forms by means of which that intellectuality is radiated and so communicated in an immediate and unrestricted language to all intelligences. This may not perhaps be quite sufficient to explain why it is that exoterism has indirectly need of esoterism, we do not say in order to enable it to exist since the mere fact of its existence is not in question any more than the incorruptibility of its means of grace, but simply to enable it to exist in normal conditions. The fact is that the presence of this transcendent dimension at the center of the religious form provides its exoteric side with a life-giving sap, universal and Paracletic in its essence, without which it will be compelled *So far as the Islamic religion is concerned we may quote the following observations of an Indian Moslem prince: "The majority of non-Moslems, and even many Moslems who have been brought up in a European cultural environment, are ignorant of this particular element of Islam which is both its marrow and its centre, which gives life and force to its outer forms and activities and which by reason of the universal nature of its content can call to witness the disciples of other religions." (Nawab A. Hydari Hydar Nawaz Jung Bahadur, in his preface to Studies in Tasawwuf by Khaja Khan).

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Hence the increasingly marked predominance of "literature," in the derogatory sense of the word, over genuine intellectuality on the one hand and true piety on the other, hence also the exaggerated importance accorded to more or less futile activities of every kind that always carefully avoid the "one thing necessary" to fall back entirely upon itself and, thus left to its own resources, which are limited by definition, will end by becoming a sort of massive and opaque body the very density of which will inevitably produce fissures, as is shown by the modern history of Christianity. In other words, when exoterism is deprived of the complex and subtle interferences of its transcendent dimension, it finds itself ultimately overwhelmed by the exteriorized consequences of its own limitations, the latter having become, as it were, total.

Now, if one proceeds from the idea that exoterists do not understand esoterism and that they have in fact a right not to understand it or even to consider it non-existent, one must also recognize their right to condemn certain manifestations of esoterism that seem to encroach on their own territory and cause "offence," to use the Gospel expression; but how is one to explain the fact that in most, if not all, cases of this nature, the accusers divest themselves of this right by the iniquitous manner in which they proceed? It is certainly not their more or less natural incomprehension, nor the defense of their genuine right, but solely the perfidiousness of the means that they employ that constitutes what amounts to a "sin against the Holy Ghost";* this perfidiousness * Thus neither lack of understanding on the part of the religious authority concerned, nor even a certain basis of truth in the accusations brought by it, can excuse the iniquity of the proceedings instituted against the Sufi Al-Flallaj, any more than the incomprehension of the Jews can excuse trTe iniquity of their proceedings against Christ.

In a similar connection, one may ask why so much stupidity and bad faith are to be found in religious polemics, even among men who are otherwise free from such failings; this is a sure sign that the majority of these polemics are tainted with the "sin against the Holy Ghost" No blame can be attached to a person for attacking a foreign religion in the name of his own belief, if it is done purely and simply through ignorance; when, however, this is not the case, the person will be guilty of blasphemy, since, by outraging the Divine Truth in an alien form, he is merely profiting by an opportunity to offend God without having to trouble his own conscience. This is the real explanation of the gross and impure zeal displayed by those who. in the name of their religious convictions, devote their lives to making sacred things appear odious, a task they can only accomplish by contemptible methods.

The Transcendent Unity of Religions proves, moreover, that the accusations that they find it neces- sary to formulate, generally serve only as a pretext for gratifying an instinctive hatred of everything that seems to threaten their superficial equilibrium, which is really only a form of individualism, therefore of ignorance.

We remember once hearing it said that "metaphysic is not necessary for salvation"; now this is basically false as a generalization, since a man who is a metaphysician by nature and is aware of it cannot find his salvation by the negation of the very thing that draws him toward God; moreover, any spiritual life must of necessity be based on a natural predisposition that determines its mode, and this is what is termed "vocation"; no spiritual authority would advise a man to follow a way for which he was not made. This is the lesson of the parable of the talents, to mention but one example, and the same meaning is implicit in the following texts from St James: "For whosoever shall keep the whole law and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all," and "therefore, to him that knoweth to do good and doeth it not, to him is sin"; now the essence of the Law, according to Christ's words, is to love God with our whole being, including the intelligence that is its central part In other words, since we should love God with all that we are, we should also love Him with our intelligence, which is the best part of us. No one will contest the fact that intelligence is not a feeling but something infinitely greater; it follows, therefore, that the word "love" as used in the New Testament to indicate the relationship that exists between man and God, and especially between God and man, cannot be understood in a purely sentimental sense and must mean something more than mere desire. On the other hand, if love is the inclining of one being toward another, with a view to union, it is Knowledge that by definition, will bring about the most perfect union between man and God, since it alone appeals to what is already divine in man, namely the Intellect; this supreme mode of the love of God is therefore by far the highest human possibility and no man can wilfully ignore it without "sinning against the Holy Ghost" To pretend that metaphysic, in itself and for all men, is a superfluous thing and in no case necessary for salvation, amounts not only to misjudging its nature, but also to denying the right to exist to those men who have been endowed by God with the quality of intelligence in a transcendent degree.

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A further observation should also be made that is relevant to this question. Salvation is merited by action, in the widest sense of the word, and this explains why certain people can be led into disparaging intelligence, since the latter may render action superfluous, while its wider possibilities show up the relativity of merit and of the perspective attached to it. Also the specifically religious point of view has a tendency to consider pure intellectuality, which it hardly ever distinguishes from mere rationality, as being more or less opposed to meritorious action and therefore dangerous for salvation; it is for this reason that there are people who are quite ready to attribute to intelligence a luciferian aspect and who speak without hesitation of intellectual pride, as if this were not a contradiction in terms; hence also the exaltation of "childlike" or "simple" faith, which indeed we are the first to respect when it is spontaneous and natural, but not when it is theoretical and affected.

It is not uncommon to hear the following view expressed … since salvation implies a state of perfect beatitude and religion insists upon nothing more, why choose the way that has "deification" for its goal? To this objection we will reply that the esoteric way, by definition, cannot be the object of a choice by those who follow it for it is not the man who chooses the way, it is the way that chooses the man. In other words, the question of a choice does not arise, since the finite cannot choose the Infinite; rather the question is one of vocation, and those who are "called," to use the Gospel expression, cannot ignore the call without committing a "sin against the Holy Ghost" any more than a man can legitimately ignore the obligations of his religion.

If it is incorrect to speak of a "choice" with reference to the Infinite, it is equally wrong to speak of a "desire," since it is less a desire for Divine Reality that characterizes the initiate than a logical and ontological tendency toward his own transcendent Essence. This definition is of extreme importance.

Exoteric doctrine as such, considered, that is to say, apart from the "spiritual influence" that is capable of acting on souls independently of it by no means possesses absolute certitude. Theological knowledge cannot by itself shut out the temptations of doubt, even in the case of great mystics; as for the influences of Grace that may intervene in such cases, they are not consubstantial with the intelligence, so that their permanence does not depend on the being who benefits from them. Exoteric ideology being limited to a relative point of view, that of individual salvation — an interested oint of view that even influences the conception of Divinity in a restrictive sense — possesses no means of proof or doctrinal credentials proportionate to its own exigencies.

Every exoteric doctrine is in fact characterized by a disproportion between its dogmatic demands and its dialectical guarantees: for its demands are absolute as deriving from the Divine Will and therefore also from Divine Knowledge, whereas its guarantees are relative, because they are independent of this Will and based, not on Divine Knowledge, but on a human point of view, that of reason and sentiment For instance. Brahmins are invited to abandon completely a religion that has lasted for several thousands of years, one that has provided the spiritual support of innumerable generations and has produced flowers of wisdom and holiness down to our times. The arguments that are produced to justify this extraordinary demand are in no wise logically conclusive, nor do they bear any proportion to the magnitude of the demand; the reasons that the Brahmins have for remaining faithful to their spiritual patrimony are therefore infinitely stronger than the reasons by which it is sought to persuade them to cease being what they are. The disproportion, from the Hindu point of view, between the immense reality of the Brahmanic tradition and the insufficiency of the Christian counterarguments is such as to prove quite sufficiently that had God wished to submit the world to one religion only, the arguments put forward on behalf of this religion would not be so feeble, nor those of certain so-called "infidels" so powerful; in other words, if God were on the side of one religious form only, the persuasive power of this form would be such that no man of good faith would be able to resist it Moreover, the application of the term "infidel" to civilizations that are, with one exception, very much older than Christianity and that have every spiritual and historic right to ignore the latter, provides a further demonstration, by the very illogicality of its naive pretensions, of the perverted nature of the Christian claims with regard to other orthodox raditional forms.

An absolute requirement to believe in one particular religion and not in another cannot in fact be justified save by eminently relative means, as, for example, by attempted philosophico-theological, historical, or sentimental proofs; in reality, however, no proofs exist in support of such claims to the unique and exclusive truth, and any attempt so made an only concern the individual dispositions of men, which, being ultimately reducible to a question of credulity, are as relative as can be. Every exoteric perspective claims; by definition, to be the only true and legitimate one.

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This is because the exoteric point of view, being concerned only with an individual interest, namely, salvation, has no advantage to gain from knowledge of the truth of other religious forms. Being uninterested as to its own deepest truth, it is even less interested in the truth of other religions, or rather it denies this truth, since the idea of a plurality of religious forms might be prejudicial to the exclusive pursuit of individual salvation. This clearly shows up the relativity of form as such, though the latter is nonetheless an absolute necessity for the salvation of the individual. It might be asked however, why the guarantees, that is to say, the proofs of veracity or credibility, which religious polemists do their utmost to produce, do not derive spontaneou sly from the Divine Will, as is the case with religious demands. Obviously such a question has no meaning unless it relates to truths, for one cannot prove errors; the arguments of religious controversy are, however, in no way related to the intrinsic and positive domain of faith; an idea that has only an extrinsic and negative significance and that fundamentally, is merely the result of an induction — such, for example, as the idea of the exclusive truth and legitimacy of a particular religion or, which comes to the same thing, of the falsity and illegitimacy of all other possible religions — an idea such as this evidently cannot be the object of proof, whether this proof be divine or, for still stronger reasons, human. So far as genuine dogmas are concerne d— that is to say, dogmas that are not derived by induction but are of a strictly intrinsic character — if God has not given theoretical proofs of their truth it is, in the first place, because such proofs are inconceivable and nonexistent on the exoteric plane, and to demand them as unbelievers do would be a pure and simple contradiction; secondly, as we shall see later, if such proofs do in fact exist it is on quite a different plane, and the Divine Revelation most certainly implies them, without any omission. Moreover, to return to the exoteric plane where alone this question is relevant the Revelation in its essential aspect is sufficiently intelligible to enable it to serve as a vehicle for the action of Grace,* and Grace is the only sufficient and fully * A typical example of conversion by spiritual influence or Grace, without any doctrinal argument is afforded by the well-known case of Sundar Singh: this Sikh, who was of noble birth and the possessor of a mystical temperament though lacking in real intellectual qualities, was the sworn enemy, not only of Christians, but of Christia