Fuad Fadel Jim Fish Kevin Kaznica Matthew Krajna.

CONSTELLATION BRANDS

Fuad FadelJim FishKevin KaznicaMatthew Krajna

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Business Segments Wine Spirits Crown Joint Venture

Key Risks Health of the Consumer Joint Venture uncertainty Financial condition Corporate governance

Valuation Multiple Scenario DCF Sum of Parts Market Multiples

Sell Recommendation: $17 Price Target

Wine

Spirits

Crown Joint Venture

Business Segments

WINE SEGMENT

Constellation Lags industry CAGR of 3% Approx. 90% of sales Overall depletion trends lag industry Levered to the United States

Industry Mature industry EM drive growth Value Trend Franzia Winetaps (The Wine

Group) has largest market share of 7.9%

Constellation lacks a Top 5 Wine Brand within the industry, by market share

WINE GROWTH

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E

2013E

2014E

2015E

2016E

2017E

Growth

0.190017111138934

0.134670688083047

0.187921122581443

-0.018317115054379

-0.031380864033925

2

-0.079297323920538

9

-0.00974797907750826

-0.178811524609844

0.0225

0.022500000000000

1

0.022500000000000

1

0.0225

0.022500000000000

1

-17.50%-12.50%-7.50%-2.50%2.50%7.50%

12.50%17.50%22.50%

% G

row

th

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E

-10.00%

-5.00%

0.00%

5.00%

10.00%

15.00%

20.00%

5 Year Wine Sales CAGR

Wine Sales YoY

Forecast 2.25%

growth -20% Actual

Decreasing CAGR Lagging

industry CAGR of 3%

SPIRITS

Constellation Approx. 10% of sales SVEDKA double-digit growth No EM exposure, small market share

Industry Global competitors EM driving growth Driven by flavored vodkas

SVEDKA GROWTH

Geographic Reach SVEDKA primarily U.S.

based U.S. consumer remains

fragile

CROWN IMPORTS

Constellation Crown Imports ≈ 40% of EPS FY2011

43% of EPS FY2012 No solid commitment from Modelo beyond

2016 3% growth in Net Sales Industry

Craft/Imports are fastest growing category

Social trend away from “traditional” beers

Joint Venture Uncertainty

Financial Condition

Corporate Governance

Health of the Consumer

Key Risks

HEALTH OF THE CONSUMER

Dependence on U.S. Economy Not levered to EM or international markets U.S Economy seen as “fragile”

Outlook for U.S. Economy PCE & Off-Premise consumption are flat

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

FY2012 Weaknesses: Weak consumer not able to trade up to premium Constellation took pricing on best wine brands No pricing power Decreasing volume trends Increased Marketing Spend Crown JV sales grew 3%, yet Equity Earnings decreased 6.3%

2009

1Q

2Q 3Q 4Q 2010

1Q

2Q 3Q 4Q 2011

1Q

2Q 3Q 4Q0

4000

8000

12000

Food & Beverage Off-Premise v. Personal Consumption Exp

F&B PCE

POSSIBLE JV OUTCOMES

1. JV does not renew, Modelo imports own brands

2. JV does not renew, Modelo chooses new importer with more scale

3. JV renews

Key Dates & Outcomes Modelo must give notice by 2013 to

terminate The current JV agreement expires in

2016

FINANCIAL CONDITION HIGHLIGHTS

Cash Flows $500M sustainable

Balance Sheet Quality High Debt Level

$2.6B on balance sheet $6B including purchase obligations and leases Low Times Interest Earned

Poor quality 50% of assets Goodwill/Intangibles

Income Statement Reliance on Crown JV for 40% EPS

No Dividend

Geographic Sales in 2011

CREDIT RISK

FY12 Earnings Release Target leverage ratio of 3.0-4.0x

Results in debt level of $2,000M-$2,650M $2,600M / $664M = 3.92x projection

New $1,000M share buyback Funded through NEW debt issuance

Could increase leverage ratio Market will demand higher interest rate

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Private Company Characteristics

Dual-Class share structure Over 50% of voting rights 11.81% Equity stake Elect majority of Directors

Strong resistance to changes in class structure

Strong Academic Support Harvard, Wharton, Stanford Entrenchment decreases

performance

Value Destruction Share repurchases

Source: GMI

AGR: Aggressive accounting

and governance behavior

VALUE DESTRUCTION

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011(800.00)

(700.00)

(600.00)

(500.00)

(400.00)

(300.00)

(200.00)

(100.00)

0.00

100.00

200.00

EVA under different WACC assumptions

7.18% WACC10% WACC15% WACC

Year

EVA (millions)

Value destruction at all discount rates

ROIC lags cost of capital

ACQUISITIONS

o $5B in acquisitions since February 2001

o $3.3B of which was Goodwill/Intangibles

o $1.25B in write downs & impairments since 2001

BUILD-UP RATE JUSTIFICATION

Additional Risk Factors Private Company Aspect Governance Risks Company-specific risk

e.g. JV termination

Mid-Range WACC 10.41%

Build-Up WACC 13.97%

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Financial ConditionJV RiskCorp GovSMIDMRPRisk-Free Rate

Build-up Cost of Equity

Multiple Scenario DCF

Market Multiples

Sum of Parts

Valuation

DCF SCENARIOS

11 Scenarios Base Worst Best Possible Crown JV Impacts Efficiency Gains 5 & 10 Year Valuations

Sensitivity Analysis 2 Discount Rates 3 EV/EBITDA Terminal Values

Price Target: $17

1. JV does not renew, Modelo imports own brands

2. JV does not renew, Modelo chooses new importer with more scale

3. JV renews

FY 2012 EARNINGS RELEASE

Constellation Brands Canisius College “Base Case”

Net Sales $2,654M $2,661M EBIT $769M $782M EPS $2.34 (tax benefits) $1.89 Tax Rate 17% 35% Growth -1.0% growth 2.25% growth

FY 2013 EPS $1.89-2.03 $2.09, 10% growth FCFE $425-475M forecast $440M estimate Tax Rate 34% 35%

MARKET MULTIPLES

Median: 9.38Average: 11.13

Historical Avg. PE (Restated): 10.5

P/CF valuation price target of $16

P/E valuation price target of $22 P/E multiple: 10.5 Projected FY2013 EPS: $2.09

Measures Constellation value as a whole Does not discount additional risks

SUM OF PARTS

Valuation Wine SVEDKA Crown JV

3 Scenarios

Sensitivity Analysis 2 Discount Rates

Appropriate Scenario Conservative Simple Average

Price Target: $17

PRICE TARGET

SELL TARGET:

$17

21.3% downside

$17

$15.60

$17.10

Average sum of the parts valuation

Average of all 11 scenarios WACC 10.49%, 13.97%

Price on 4/5/2012:

$21.61$22

P/CF

P/E approach

INVESTMENT SUMMARY

Key Risks Low growth/mature wine industry Weakness of U.S. consumer Corporate governance weakness Value Destruction

Share buybacks Crown JV uncertainty Weak financial condition

Market is inadequately pricing in risks of STZ

SELL Recommendation: Price target of $17

QUESTIONS?

APPENDIX

•Earnings Release (25)•Price Matrix (26)•Crown JV graph (27)•SG&A / 10yr scenarios (28)•Hispanic graph (29)•Modeled Growth (30)•Margins (31-32)•Diageo (33)•WACC (34-35)•Sum of Parts (36-39)

PRICE TARGETS5yr- Crown CASH NOW

5yr- Crown CASH LATER

10 w/5yr- Crown CASH NOW


Average

(BEST) (BEST) JV con’t. (BASE) (BASE)(see excel tab)

Buildup $14.54 $13.06 $19.08 $18.33 $11.37 $22.28 $19.20 $12.94 $13.90 $17.59 $11.33 $15.78 Midrange $19.26 $17.52 $24.69 $26.11 $18.63 $28.47 $24.01 $17.37 $21.98 $22.07 $15.43 $21.41 WACC $23.24 $21.29 $29.44 $33.46 $25.58 $33.72 $28.03 $33.63 $29.71 $25.81 $30.45 $28.58



Average

JV con’t. (BASE) (BASE)(see excel tab)


5yr- Crown CASH NOW




Average

(BEST) (BEST) JV con’t. (BASE) (BASE)(see excel tab)


Average of all Buildup and Midrange scenarios is $17.10

5yr- Crown CASH NOW


EV/EBITDA of 8

Scenario 1 (BASE)

Scenario 2 (WORST)

Scenario 3 (BEST)

Scenario 4: 10yr ($2B CASH)

Scenario X: 10yr (NO $2B CASH)

Stress Tested Scenario 3, test 1

Stress Tested Scenario 3, SG&A

EV/EBITDA of 9

Scenario 1 (BASE)

Scenario 2 (WORST)

Scenario 3 (BEST)




EV/EBITDA of 10

Scenario 1 (BASE)

Scenario 2 (WORST)

Scenario 3 (BEST)



CROWN JV

POTENTIAL CATALYSTSEV/EBITDA of 10

Stress Tested Scenario 3, SG&A

10 w/JV con’t.

Buildup $22.28 $13.90 Midrange

$28.47 $21.98

WACC $33.72 $29.71

EV/EBITDA of 9


10 w/ JV con’t.

Buildup $19.72 $12.76 Midrange

$25.41 $20.36

WACC $30.23 $27.60 EV/EBITDA of 8


10 w/ JV con’t.

Buildup $17.16 $11.62

Midrange

$22.36 $18.73

WACC $26.75 $25.49

Average of Midrange

$25.41 $20.36

• Margin Expansion• Through Reduction in SG&A (Project

Fusion)• From 20.5% of Sales to 15% over 5

years• We feel this type of efficiency is

excessive• Need for increased promo and ad

spend• Due to value proposition

• Crown JV Continuing for another 10 years• We feel this is unlikely• Modeled 8% Crown Equity Earnings

growth

• BEST Case Scenario:• 5% Wine growth• 20% Svedka growth• 10% Crown JV growth

• Price Target $21, SELL

OPPORTUNITY TO GROW CROWN EARNINGS

• Hispanic population growth is also highly focused in a few key geographic markets

• Strategic opportunity for Crown Imports • Increase market share through increased

distribution efforts• Key states include California, Texas, Florida, New

York, and Illinois.

REVENUE & EPS GROWTH RATES EPS Growth modeled at 10%

EBIT growth aggressively modeled at 5% Bucking 5 year negative growth trend

FY12 MARGINS

Gross Margin 40.1%, up 420bp YoY

Operating Margin 20.3%, up 430bp YoY

Upward biased changes due to divestiture of lower margin European and Australian wine business

MARGINS

COMPETITION: DIAGE0

Diageo: U.S. Spirits business driven by flavored Vodkas “[The U.S.] is showing very good signs of

improvement. It’s not a snapback…Now the U.S. is not going to offer us the same growth that Brazil can.”

Key takeaway: U.S. does not offer the growth that Emerging Markets offer

Constellation Brands LACKS EM exposure Thus stuck with 90% of sales from a mature U.S. market

Source: WSJ, March 26, 2012

SUM OF PARTS

• Target Price of $17 with Conservative Scenario, using build-up and mid-level discount rates

SUM OF PARTS

• Wine value comes from “Best Case” scenario

• PV of wine sales only

• SVEDKA purchase price $384 million, adjusted for inflation, and multiplied by 4x to represent case vol growth

• Crown valued as the PV of forecasted equity payments

SUM OF PARTS

• Crown value based on PV of future equity earnings

• Includes options that will be exercised

• Based on build-up method, discount rate of 13.97%

SUM OF PARTS

• Crown value based on PV of future equity earnings

• Includes options that will be exercised

• Based on build-up method, discount rate of 13.97%

• Conclusion: Using both the build-up and mid-level discount rates, an average target price of $17 can be obtained, AFFIRMING SELL RECOMMENDATION

Additional risk Build-up premiums (1-2% per item)

PV OF GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES PVGO: The present value of growth

opportunities is a tool to extract the market’s expectations on future growth potential for Constellation.

Using the CAPM we determined a cost of equity of 10.41% for Constellation.

PVGO for Constellation under current market conditions is 16.97%.

Peer median of 46.52% Market does not feel that

Constellation has much growth potential.

Given that Constellation has lagged the wine industry growth rate of 3%, the PVGO is justified, especially compared to its peers.

Key assumptions:EPS: 1.79 TTM restatedPrice: 423.62 on 1/12/12

WINE IMPORT DATA Imported wines ≈ 1/3 U.S. wine sales USD appreciating against the Euro and Aussie Dollar

Floods market with competitively-priced alternatives

This is a negative for Constellation, as the U.S. consumer is still trending towards value brands

WINE

STZ Vincor, Robert Mondavi, Ravenswood, Arbor Mist, and Ruffino Approximately 90% of sales Lags the industry growth rate Sold only 12.7% of the wine cases during 2010 Negative EPS between 2008-2010 Negative organic growth in 2011 Extremely low exposure to emerging markets, leading to lack of revenue growth

Industry: Smallest segment in the alcoholic beverage industry compared to beer and spirits 3% CAGR on average Mature and slow growth industry Large conglomerates, such as STZ Competitors are E & J Gallo, The Wine Group, Vina Concha y Toro, and Treasury Wine Estates 4-6% CAGR prior to the recession On-premise v. off-premise sales

Larger growth in off-premise sales than on-premise (use graph showing this off Bloomberg) Value v. Premium Wine Sales

Trend towards value brands continues Remains to be seen if producers can successfully persuade consumers to abandon value brands for premium

Franzia Winetaps (The Wine Group), a value wine, has the largest market share of 7.9% High growth seen in developing markets, but mainly China where CAGRs are in the mid-teens

WINE CRUSH DATA

California’s 2011 wine grape crush, from all varieties, totaled 3,342,689 tons, down 7 percent from 2010

varieties accounted for the largest share of all grapes crushed, at

1,917,132 tons, down 7 percent from 2010. The 2011 white wine varieties crush totaled 1,425,557 tons, down 7 percent from 2010.

On the price side, record highs were set for both red and white wine

grapes average price for the 2011 crop of red wine grapes was $702.70, up

12 percent from 2010, while the average price for white wine grapes came in at $541.11, up 8 percent from last year. The 2011 average price of all varieties reached a record high of $588.96, up 8 percent from 2010 and 3 percent above the previous record high set in 2009.

ON/OFF PREMISE

SPIRITS

STZ SVEDKA, Black Velvet, & Paul Mason Brandy

Since acquisition, Svedka is quadrupled in case sizes Approximately 10% of sales Miniscule market share with many global competitors Lacks brand recognition that competitors have Growing at double-digit rate

Driven mainly by SVEDKA

Industry: 2nd largest market segment of alcoholic beverage industry Led by vodka and whiskey

Smirnoff, Absolut, Grey Goose, & Skyy Diageo, Brown-Foreman, & Beam Global & Spirits

Diageo controls the spirits market Shift towards spirits over wine and beer

BEER

STZ Crown Imports

Corona, Corona Extra, Corona Light, Modelo Especial, Negra Modelo, St. Pauli Girl, Tsingtao, & Victoria JV 43.6% of EPS in 2011

Equity Earnings No solid commitment from partners beyond 2016 JV between 2008-2010 was the only positive earnings segment for STZ

Without which, it would not have been able to cover interest payments Not a beer company

Industry: Largest market share compared to wine and spirits Dominated by major companies

Anheuser-Busch InBev, Miller Coors, Crown Imports, Growing trend towards Imports and Craft Brews in the US

Double digit growth rate compared to stagnant growth for whole industry 16.4% volume growth compared to -2%; Dollar growth, craft up 17.5% compared to .3% for the industry

Attempt by companies to innovate with new products, such as Bud Light Platinum recently Strategy: Fast-growing acquisitions by major companies

Ex: SAB Miller’s acquisition of Foster’s Ex: Major companies acquiring craft breweries

Company had negative earnings

CROWN JV

• Personal Income rising, while personal savings decreasing, yet off premise spend on food/beverage flat

HEALTH OF THE CONSUMER

ACADEMIC SUPPORT

Manager’s protected from the market for corporate control tend to pursue inefficient investment products

Journal of Finance August 2007; Masulis, Wang, Xie

Democratic corporate governance strongly associated with higher relative returns Most democratic: 3.8 abnormal Most dictatorial: -5%

Gompers, Ishi, Metrick

Firm value increases with the cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder, but decreases when voting rights exceed cash-flow rights

Claessens et al.

Found a significant negative relationship between disproportional voting rights and firm value

Gompers (Harvard), Ishii (Stanford), Metrick (Wharton)

OPPOSITION TO MORE BALANCED CLASS STRUCTURE

PROPOSAL 5 — STOCKHOLDER PROPOSAL

Mr. Kenneth Steiner of 14 Stoner Avenue, 2M, Great Neck, New York 11021, who has indicated that he owns 1,100 shares of our stock, has given notice that he or his designee intends to make the following stockholder proposal at the Meeting. The Board recommends that you vote AGAINST the stockholder proposal. In accordance with applicable regulations, we include this stockholder proposal and supporting statement in the form proposed by Mr. Steiner:

Equal Shareholder Voting RESOLVED: Shareholders request that our Board take steps to adopt a plan for all of our company’s outstanding stock to have one-vote per share. This would include all practicable steps including encouragement and negotiation with family shareholders to request that they relinquish, for the common good of all shareholders, any preexisting rights, if necessary…

The Board of Directors recommends that you vote AGAINST Proposal 5. Unless you properly direct otherwise, the shares represented by your proxy, if properly submitted and not revoked, will be voted AGAINST such proposal.

ADDITIONAL SCENARIOS

Key Assumptions: Scenario 4 – “10yr No Real Growth & JV Termination”: Base Case, but with termination of JV. AB InBev

would increase their stake in Grupo Modelo, triggering a cash payment of 4x EBIT to Constellation. In 2017, earnings from the Crown Imports JV will only incorporate 10 months due to the timing of the termination. Equity earnings going forward will be significantly impacted and no longer material. Constellation would receive a cash payment, estimated at $2 billion, upon notice being granted for FY2014. The scenario shows the effect of the joint-venture termination by Grupo Modelo.

Scenario X – “10yr No Real Growth & JV Termination”: Base Case, but with termination of JV. AB InBev would increase their stake in Grupo Modelo, triggering a cash payment of 4x EBIT to Constellation. In 2017, earnings from the Crown Imports JV will only incorporate 10 months due to the timing of the termination. Equity earnings going forward will be significantly impacted and no longer material. Constellation would receive no cash payment. The scenario shows the effect of the joint-venture termination by Grupo Modelo.

Stress Tested Scenario 3 – “Decreasing SG&A significantly”: Same as Scenario 3, but with SG&A decreasing as a perfect of sales from 20.5% to 15%. We feel this significant of an efficiency gain would be significant, but drastic, and unlikely.

5yr Crown Cash Now, Best Case -- Modeled Scenario 3 with a $2 billion cash payment in year 2014. 5yr Crown Cash Later, Best Case -- Modeled Scenario 3 with cash payment of $300 million approximating

estimated 50% of BV of the joint venture, upon termination this payment would be received by Constellation. 10yr Model with JV Continuing -- Base case, but assuming 10yr model 5yr Crown Cash Now, Base Case -- Modeled Scenario 1 with a $2 billion cash payment in year 2014. 5yr Crown Cash Later, Base Case -- Modeled Scenario 1 with cash payment of $300 million approximating

estimated 50% of BV of the joint venture, upon termination this payment would be received by Constellation.

FINANCIAL CONDITION

CASH CONVERSION CYCLE

ASSET TURNOVER

INVENTORY TURNOVER

FIXED ASSET TURNOVER

DEBT/EQUITY

REVERSE ENGINEERING

Reverse Engineering:

Holding all else equal for Scenario 1:

At WACC of 7.18%, in order to justify price approximating current levels:

A growth rate of 5% in CWNA

A growth rate of 30% in Spirits

A COGS of 56% in all five years

SGA of 17% in all five years

Equity earnings growth rate of 20%

Income tax rate of 19%Gro

wth C

WNA

Growth

in sp

irits

COGSSG

A

Equi

ty e

arni

ngs

Inco

me

tax

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%

Underlying Market assumptionsExpected Levels

GENERATIONAL SEGMENTS

Total estimated US Population 2011 312 M

Boomers (2010) 79 M

Millenials (2010) 77 M

Generation X (2010) 51 M

Baby Boomers (42-60)Millenials (18-25)Generation X (26-41)Other

Source: US Census, Pew Research

SMID PREMIUM

U.S. mid-caps have historically provided only minor diversification benefits, having a correlation to large caps of more than 0.94 over the past 10 years. Mid-caps have behaved similarly to U.S. small-cap equities, exhibiting a correlation of 0.98. The volatility of return on mid-cap stocks as measured by standard deviation was 18.8%, more than 3 percentage points greater than that of large caps. One way to interpret this number is to assume a normal distribution of returns. If you expect mid-caps to earn an average return of 6% in any given year, there is at least a 2% chance that the return will be less than 31.6% (two standard deviations less than the average). Viewed in this light, the 36% drop in 2008 should be viewed as unlikely but not impossible.

Source: Morningstar

P/S

Common to use P/S valuation for: New company Company with accounting issues

Value based on total net Sales

Standard Deviation of 0.33

Highest target price is $16.15 = CONFIRMS SELL

P/S Projected Valuation Average 2011 P/S 2009-2011 AverageP/S Multiple 0.99 1.30 1.02Projected FY13 Net Sales 2,737.89 2,737.89 2,737.89Projected FY13 Shares (Diluted) 221 221 221

Target Price 12.21 16.15 12.68

SEGMENT BASED P/S

Segment P/S Using projected sales for

each segment & the 2000-2011 average P/S and the 2011 P/S

Use Crown earnings to find what investors are willing to pay for those earnings because STZ does not give Crown Revenue but Crown earnings

Highest target price: Based on 2011 P/S alone,

which is above average, a target price of $19.16 is obtained

CONFIRMS SELL

As Equity Earnings for Crow n

Summation P/S Projected Valuation Average 2011 P/SCWNA P/S 1.37 1.70 CWNA Projected Net Revenue 2,673.67 2,673.67CWNA Price Target 16.60 20.55 *Used Projected Shares Above = 221Crow n Imports P/S 16.38 17.82

Crow n Imports Projected Equity Earnings 284.37 284.37Crow n Imports Price Target 21.08 22.93 *Used Projected Shares Above = 221Svedka P/S 1.10 1.10Svedka Projected Revenue 268.18 268.18Svedka Price Target 1.34 1.34*Used Projected Shares Above = 221

CWNA Target as % of Earnings (82.87%) 13.76 17.03 Crow n Imports as % of Earnings (8.81%) 1.86 2.02 Svedka Target as % of Earnings (8.3%) 0.11 0.11

Total Target Price 15.72 19.16

WINE IMPORT DATA

Imports grew 3.9 percent to 109.8 million cases. - account for 32 percent of the volume of wine sold in the U.S.

As the USD appreciates in value against the Euro and Aussie Dollar, imported value wines become cheaper to import, thus flooding the market with value brands

This is a negative for Constellation, as the U.S. consumer is still trending towards value brands

CROWN JV POTENTIAL OUTCOMES

1. Modelo gives notice by 2013 that the JV will NOT renew after 2016, and Modelo will import their brands into the U.S.

2. Modelo does NOT renew JV, chooses different party (other than STZ) as importer

3. Modelo renews the JV for another 10 years

BUILD-UP RATE JUSTIFICATION

Significant Governance Risk Private Company Aspect Company-specific risk

e.g. JV termination

WACC 10.41% WACC 13.97%

Governance DiscountSMID discountMRPRisk-free

Build-up Cost of Equity

CAPM UNDERSTATES WACC

• CAPM• Book Weights

WACC 7.18%

• Market WeightsWACC 7.81%

• Effective debt costAverage 7.42%

BASE CASE SCENARIO

Scenario 1 – “5yr Base Case”: CWNA grown at

2.25%/year Spirits growing

at 10%/year driven by SVEDKA sales

Equity earnings, driven by Crown Imports, grew 8%/year

WORST CASE SCENARIO

Scenario 2 – “5yr Worst Case”: CWNA, Spirits, and

Crown Imports sales grow at an inflation rate of 2%.

Based on the fact our “Worst Case” scenario was a SELL rating, we did not do further sensitivity testing of lesser growth rates for wine, spirits, or Crown segments.

BEST CASE SCENARIO

Scenario 3 – “5yr Best Case”: CWNA sales growing

at 5% YoY, which outpaces the industry average

Spirit Sales driven by SVEDKA growth at 20%

Equity earnings from Crown grow at 10% YoY.

SUM OF PARTS

Valuation Conservative: $17 Possible: $20 Unlikely: $24 Unlikely & Possible: $22

All: $20

Fuad Fadel Jim Fish Kevin Kaznica Matthew Krajna.

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Transcript of Fuad Fadel Jim Fish Kevin Kaznica Matthew Krajna.