FSLN Wins by Hook and by Crook Pag. 14-20

7/30/2019 FSLN Wins by Hook and by Crook Pag. 14-20

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ELECTIONS 2011

The FSLN painstakingly planned to win theseelections by hook or by crook. And it won them byboth Well never know how many votes the FSLNwon fairly and how many were pillaged either in the votingcenters or in Roberto Ali Baba Rivas Supreme ElectoralCave with his more than 40 thieves. This scramble reversedthe trend of previous elections in two rather startling ways:First, Daniel Ortega, who limped into office in 2006 withonly 38% of the vote, skipped away this time with 62%,leaving his former meager percentage to his combined

opponents. Even more inexplicably and a-historically, thiswhopping win, only topped by the same candidate in 1984,in the middle of a war, was significantly exceeded by thevotes adjudicated to his hand-picked National Assemblycandidates.

FSLN wins by hook and by crook

JOS LUIS ROCHA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

There were all kinds of voting centers in these fraudulent elections:terrorist ones, pregnant ones, necrophilic ones, stingy ones, inky ones

By a thousand and one ballot box tricks we get another term of Orteguismo.

But various dangers are already stalking this new power project.

Ortegas still the king

The electoral piata that so richly benefited Daniel Ortegahas a dual mission. On the one hand, it establishes his totalcontrol of the State through an absolute majority in theNational Assembly, the only branch of government stillcoveted by the Sandinista leadership after privatizing andadministering like their personal companies the executivebranch, the judicial branch and the electoral branch, not tomention the offices of Comptroller General, Attorney Generaland the Ombudsperson for the Defense of Human Rights,

increasingly the National Police and, not quite yet, the Army.On the other hand, the suddenand unlikely but to manyunquestionableincrease in Ortegas sex appeal since thelast poll sends a message back to his party, to all restless,potential crown princes and their followers who aspire to

14envo


2/7

ELECTIONS 2011

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15november 2011

The effectiveness of Ortegas social

investments cant be measured in

rational resultswhether theyll pay off

in the future, whether they have more

benefits than costs or whether theyre

the most imperativebut by the

mythical evocations they produce

succeed the invincible leader: Im still king; the throne andthe kingdom are mine.

In a political party and elsewhere, succession is animportant issue. Theres no expectation of abdication, andadulation as a survival mechanism has eliminated allembryonic criticism and self-criticism in the FSLN and, withthem, any attempt at the healthy sloughing off of old cells

all living organisms need. In such situations, only the GrimReaper and failed health can exact a change.

That brings us to Venezuelan President Hugo Chvezserious illness and the fatal outcome of the Gaddafi saga,international events that unquestionably sent a chill intothe patriarchal autumn of Ortega and his circle. It becameimperative to send a message to one and all about his politicalstrength.

Regardless of the inclinations and orthodoxy of Ortegaspopulismif there is orthodoxy in populismits veryimportant to be clear about three elements on which itssuccess is based.

First: whatever they may be, the goals, means and levelsof populism arent the same as those of demagogy. Demagogywants to conquer people with speeches. Populism conquersthem with deeds. Ortegas government has made invest-ments that are changing many Nicaraguans daily lives.

Second: Many shades of populism are tolerated, forgottenor even clarified by the lack of even a glimmer of morepromising alternatives on the immediate horizon. Thegovernments preceding Ortegas didnt bother to make theinvestments hes making. They underrated them assuperfluous, electorally unprofitable and, of course,populist. They opted for strengthening the institutional

framework and other entelechies. Ordinary people say thatthe institutional framework, trampled on by Ortegaspopulism and defendedso they claimby his opposition,feeds nobody but the NGO officials who get funding linkedto these missions, visions and mandates.

Third: Ortegas social investments have been selectedwith neurotic meticulousness to soothe very raw nerves. Inthe hearts and minds of his supporters and co-believers, theyhave the power to evoke what for many were the golden80s. The effectiveness of Ortegas social investments cantbe measured in rational resultswhether theyll pay off inthe future, whether they have more benefits than costs orwhether theyre the most imperativebut by the mythical

evocations they produce.

Social programs that evoke the 80s

What social investments by Ortegas government were

We dont know how many,

but we know how: The carrot

Elections the European Union described as lacking neutralityand transparency cant be characterized by how many votesI got. Well never know how many the FSLN won and howmany it begged, borrowed, stole, bought, rented, traded,transmuted or prefabricated and stuffed into the ballot boxes.But we do know that some were obtained fairly and othersthrough skullduggery. What carrots and what sticks were used?What sand is Ortega standing on, firm or quick?

Lets start with the carrots. Political analysts haveexcessively made light of the Ortega couples modelIllcall it that to give it a status not always accorded the amalgamof whimsical improvisations and eclectic spiritualism that

reveres Cardinal Obando on a level with Yiye vila, one ofLatin Americas most famous and respected evangelistpreachers, or Sai Baba, the Indian guru listed by Watkins Reviewjust prior to his recent demise as one of the 100 most spirituallyinfluential people in the world. Analysts tend to label themodel as populistas if dealing with an immovable anddefinitive tombstone inscriptionon the assumption that thisword can invoke all the political incubi and succubae.

But populism is a very wide-ranging label. It coversKeynesian economic policy and Peronism, agrarianism inMexico and the New Deal in the US, Ronald Reagansconservative populism and John F. Kennedys progressivepopulism, the governments of Lzaro Crdenas in Mexico

and Getulio Vargas in Brazil, Berlusconis populist Rightand Chvez vociferous Left. Leaders both right and left,dictatorships both hard and soft, are painted populist. Whenused so lavishly and recklessly, the concept loses explanatoryutility and political effectiveness.


3/7

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16envo

NICARAGUA

Although our country is rapidly

advancing backward, what do the

many poor people care about this time-

trip if they can see so many and such

tangible benefits?

underrated by those preceding him in power? A literacycampaign that didnt achieve the scope touted by govern-mental propaganda but, however inflated its achievements,begs the question: Why did no previous government thinkliteracy was important? Seeing the touched-up publicitypictures, many individuals commented nostalgically: Its a

campaign like in the 80s, with the literacy guerrillas.Grassroots health campaigns were another reissue:vaccination, water treatment and international medicalbrigades treating for free conditions that are usually veryexpensive. Just like the 80s! Scholarships to study inVenezuela and Cuba giving Sandinista Youth access touniversity studies abroad. Were back in the 80s! Brigadesof young construction workers who build schools inneighborhoods and villages that have never had them before,in exchange for nothing more than the cost of housing themwhile they work. Theyre like the coffee brigades but nowtheyre bricklayers! From production battalions toconstruction battalions!

Just to give a little idea of what can trigger peoplesgratitude, we note on the overwhelming but by no meansexhaustive list of donations and investments the paving ofstreets and roads in hard-to-reach neighborhoods and towns;Houses for the People; the Roof Plan (10 sheets of corrugatedzinc plus a sack of nails to each poor family); land titles inthe name of their inveterate occupiers at constant risk ofimminent eviction; a Christmas park with free amusementsand an exotic ice rink; new Russian buses for public transportin Managua; frozen bus fares in the capital (they haventrisen in five years and are the cheapest in Central America);heifers, sows, chickens and other gifts from the Zero HungerProgram; loans that seemingly dont have to be paid back...

Analysts who underrate these achievements effecttheir real value plus their evocative powerare condemnedto a myopic vision of whats happening in Nicaragua.Although our country is rapidly advancing backward, whatdo the many poor people care about this time-trip if they can

see so many and such tangible benefits? This Christian,socialist and solidarity largesse is what pulled the at least50% of the votes the FSLN probably won fairly.

Those votes didnt come from Rosario Murillos dailystereotyped and reiterated messages, despite the hypnotic,sedated state her tediousness brings on. Nor did they comefrom Daniel Ortegas speeches, from his uneven ideas that

dont add up to three. Never before have so many wordsbeen used to express so little. They also didnt come fromhis skills as a bone collector, gathering together politicaldeadbeats, small-time Coast political hacks who exchangeCaribbean forests for a seat in the National Assembly andburnt-out Resistance leaders who together dont fill half aballot box. And they certainly werent won over by theFSLNs ideological apparatus, which now looks like adilapidated radio that only transmits mantra-like litaniesand has replaced intellectuals of stature with servile,decadent, obsequious hagiographers, insufferable apologistsfor the inexcusable.

We dont know how many,

but we know how: The stick

Along with the carrot, the FSLN brandished the stick. Itsmass media didnt hesitate to slander its rivals orexaggeratedly extol its own works. On election day theoppositions monitors were constantly intimated with totalimpunity, the consequences of which were still reaping inthe murder of opponents and flight of rural communities.Public employees were persuaded of the personaladvantages of voting pink (the ubiquitous bubble-gum hueFirst Lady Rosario Murillo selected elections ago to replace

the more combative red and black of the FSLN flag).One of the most direct strategies to benefit the FSLNwas to force abstention by holding back opponents ID/votercards. But an even more efficient device to promoteabstention was to hype an atmosphere of emergency. In thelead up to election day there were clear signs that somethingserious could happen at any moment: police stationssuspended all proceedings the preceding week; the ArmyGeneral who was Ortegas running mate increased his publicappearances; the FSLN cancelled its campaign closure event;a strange epidemic of swine flu (H1N1) appeared to havecropped up in Nicaragua and no other country in CentralAmerica; and in Masaya there were even meetings of the

CPC announcing the imminent eruption of the Santiagovolcano. Perhaps Ortegas headquarters were evenresponsible for the rumors of the Presidents health problemsat the climax of the electoral operetta to heighten the feelingof catastrophe. All these emergencies prepared the ground


4/7

ELECTIONS 2011

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17november 2011

for fatalism: theres nothing to be done, voting is a risk; itsfutile.

But there was even more application of the stick. Letslook at the most compelling, effective ways the hook and thecrook insured success.

Improving the odds in the campaignThe FSLNs only real rival was the PLI Alliance. But toimprove its own odds, the FSLN created or nurtured threenow-stunted pseudo-opposition parties: PLC, APRE andALN. These false rivals, Ortegas political satellites, craftedspeeches to take votes away from the PLI Alliance, assumingall were from the same electoral well. If the 1990 electionswere guided by the slogan Everyone against the FSLN, inthese the guideline was Everyone against the PLI.

The upshot of this alignment tactic was the disap-pearance of the satellite parties, the end of the FSLN-PLCpact and a resounding rejection of Arnoldo Alemn, whosebody reflects the rise and fall of his political investments:dangerously obese at the height of his mandate and prosperity,his now big-loss form, devoid of triple chins, anticipated thePLCs spectacular shrinkage in these elections. Reduced inbody and probably in soul, hes like a dried up orange thatthe FSLN squeezed to the last drop and has now tossed intothe non-recyclable political garbage bin.

The FSLN played its final card against the PLI Alliancein the last stretch: one group of old men and another ofdubious militants from the historic Independent LiberalParty (PLI), founded in the 1940s and now fallen on hardtimes like so many others, swore they had been robbed oftheir party. With that, the Supreme Electoral Council hung

an ominous sword of Damocles over the PLI legislativecandidates. The same magistrates who took no time at all todetermine the rightfulness of Daniel Ortegas unconstitu-tional candidacy, have still not determined who will havethe right to represent this party in the National Assembly.But no fear, this will happen once tempers cool and they cansafely move this last chip, with magnanimous generosity orsevere punishment depending on the turn of events.

Religious manipulation

Meanwhile, the FSLN moved stealthily towards victory, nowplaying the religious card. The manipulation began with

Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo, now virtually the Ortegafamilys chaplain, who has devoted himself to blessing allpublic events hosted by the presidential couple, in additionto being their personal confessor and officiator at the

weddings and baptisms of their growing progeny. He couldntnor has he wanted to stop participating in national politics.

Although the unforgettable, far from subtle, viperparable with which Obando persuaded many to reject theFSLN on the eve of the 1996 elections was quite unam-biguous, he was even more explicit this timefrom theopposite sidein listing the wonders the FSLN has done to

benefit the Nicaraguan people and the honor and glory ofGod. During the three days prior to the elections his laudatorylitanies were endlessly repeated, contravening the mandatorycampaign silence. Because Obandos political clout hasdiminished, its more than doubtful what effect his spot hadon the voters. But the FSLN motto seems to be every littlebit helps.

Perhaps the FSLN campaign of presenting PLI Alliancemembers as inveterate abortionists was more effective,despite their presidential candidate Fabio Gadeas reiteratedrepudiation of all forms of abortion. Praying to God for lifeand the criminalization of therapeutic abortion, the FSLNfalsified the positions and presented as official doctrinecertain personal declarations by militants of the SandinistaRenovation Movement (MRS), allied to Gadea. The intendedeffect was a tacit confrontation between Catholicism andthe PLI Alliance. Some priests added to this effect,emphatically warning the citizenry against abortionistcandidates, inopportune declarations that the FSLNcelebrated and used as another piece in Ortegas indefinablepolicy of saving fetuses and killing men, facts and rights.

Did this manipulation of the abortion issue win theFSLN any votes? It seemed rather to be part of a long-standing ploy: stir up the waters for better fishing. Since2006, the criminalization of therapeutic abortion has

unquestionably formed part of the carrot given to a Churchrooted in the sexual morality of ancient history.The image of Catholic orthodoxy and Ortegas orthodoxy

joining to play out a relationship between Catholicism andthe Left was what Salvadoran poet Roque Dalton must havebeen trying to reflect in his Un libro levemente odioso (A

Reduced in body and probably in soul,

hes like a dried up orange that the

FSLN squeezed to the last drop and

has now tossed into the non-recyclable

political garbage bin


5/7

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18envo

NICARAGUA

If there are a thousand and one ways to

commit fraud, then that was the

number of assaults on the ballot boxes

made by FSLN-dominated vote

reception tables

Slightly Obnoxious Book), where three Communists talk oftheir experiences with the sacred-party and the militant-Church. The first doesnt agree that Catholic orthodoxy isstricter than Communist orthodoxy: They expelled me fromthe Communist Party long before they ex-communicated mein the Catholic Church. The second added: Thats nothing.They expelled me from the Communist Party after they

excommunicated me in the Catholic Church. The thirdconcludes with what was an unlikely case when Dalton wrotethe story, but could well describe present-day Nicaragua:Pah! They expelled me from the Communist Party becausethey excommunicated me in the Catholic Church!

up. Crack-of-dawn JRVs that opened before 6am to get thedrop on monitors and observers who would surely want tosee if their ballot boxes were empty. And pedophile JRVsthat allowed under-16s to vote.

Then there were the illiterate JRVs, which paid noattention to procedural regulations because there were nowritten guidelines or because they slipped one over on

untrained opposition monitors. And computer-illiterateJRVs, reportedly a third of the total, which made free withbad to worse counting procedures.

According to European Union observers, 20% of the totalwas Mandrake JRVs, which converted opposition votes intonull votes with a wave of their magic wand. The legalversion of that JRV was pickier: it only annulled the PLIvote if the X was slightly outside the circle.

Pettifogging JRVs28% of the totalturned peopleaway who were not on their electoral role, even when theirID certified their residence in the area where the pollingplace was and the law thus allows them to vote there. Thepsychopathic JRVs lived in a reality different from the onein front of them so their tallies didnt reflect the results.

The lazy JRVs only counted the used ballots, not theunused ones to see if the two totaled the number officiallyreceived. Needless to say their ballot boxes and those of thecrack-of-dawn JRVs were very prone to pregnancy. The VIPJRVs only admitted those on their voting list chosen by theregime. The second-table JRVs accepted votes for Ortegafrom those who had already voted elsewhere, while the refillJRVs received the ballots of thosegenerally FSLNmonitorswho voted right there two, five and up to eighttimes. The ballot boxes of the necrophilic JRVs gulped downvotes from the deceased while those of the Western Union

JRVs received votes from emigrants who had left the countryand probably didnt know someone had voted in their name.The voyeur JRVs angled the voting booths to prevent

secrecy so monitors could slip up behind voters to spy on andintimidate them. The migra JRVs treated oppositionsupporters like foreigners, denying them the right to vote,basically denying them citizenship.

The stingy JRVs applied the indelible ink appliedsparingly on the thumbs of Sandinistas in case they plannedto vote again elsewhere while the squid JRVs bathed thewhole digit in ink if the voters residential area was knownto be predominately pro-PLI Alliance. Lax JRVsthemajoritydidnt use the forms and codes that legally act as

security locks so tallies cant be altered. The tortoise JRVshanded in their results very late.

The cheaper-by-the-dozen JRVs received several ballotsfor each FSLN memberdelivered days before in occultolatent, or shrouded in obscurity, which, as Plautus said, is

Pregnant, illiterate, bulimic,

psychopathic, necrophilic JRVs

All of these preliminaries would have been useless agitationwithout the decisive, well-orchestrated actions by thousandsof FSLN militants on election day itself. A cabal of theliterary worlds best known rogues, rascals and tricksterswould have needed a hundred years to invent and implementall the fraudulent tricks that exceeded even those of Mexicos

PRI.If there are a thousand and one ways to commit fraud,then that was the number of assaults on the ballot boxesmade by FSLN-dominated vote reception tables, known inNicaragua as JRVs. My random record is a pale reflection ofthe total.

On November 6, we saw terrorist JRVs: voting carriedout in an atmosphere of emergency meant to instill a senseof imminent danger, risk to life or death. They started theday by expelling the PLI Alliances monitors.

We saw JRVs with pregnant ballot boxes: those arrivingstuffed with Sandinista votes before the voting table openedfor business. In the count, through a miraculous multipli-

cation of votes, some of these boxes even ended up with moremarked ballots than the total number of voters on the JRVroll.

We also saw JRVs whose bulimic ballot boxes swalloweddown many votes for the opposition then vomited them back


6/7

ELECTIONS 2011

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19november 2011

The FSLN, Nicaraguas champion of

21st-century socialism, is a veritable

transnational Robin Hood: it is robbing

rich Venezuelans to give to Nicaraguas

poor and to its own merry comrades in

the forest

often the way with the greatest talents. The sacred ballotboxes were exclusively guarded by FSLN monitors becausethe oppositions monitors were barred, thrown out later,bought off or frightened.

Will the opposition decide its preferable to allegepolitical pragmatism, take up its seats and send the bill forde-legitimization to the EU and US diplomats? Fabio Gadea,however, renounced the seat legally assigned to him forcoming in second in the presidential elections. It was anoutstanding act of dignity by the ultra-conservative,consistent and honest Gadea, and it set a more than plausible

precedent in the annals of Nicaraguan politics.

In the end, almost all were riddle ballot boxes becausethe Supreme Electoral Council said Abracadabra, how manyvotes have we here? And, as if by magic, up popped the

answer: nearly 63%.

What will happen with this power binge?

The saying that you can fool some of the people all of thetime, and you can fool all of the people some the time, butyou cant fool all the people all the time has been attributedto Abraham Lincoln, among others. But with its practicesthe FSLN seems to prefer George W. Bushs version: Youcan fool some of the people all the time, and those are theones you want to concentrate on. Its supporters, those whodidnt participate in the electoral theft, swallowed the story,and in fact are now more convinced than ever, that the voxpopuliof course, vox Deihas proclaimed Ortegasgovernment the best in history and rewarded it with a voteharvest. Meanwhile, Sandinista militants are prepared tocrack open any heads opposing recognition of their bumpercrop.

Delegitimacy can erode relationships. The EuropeanUnion issued a preliminary report recording the anomalieswitnessed by its observers, but Nicaragua wont be excludedfrom the inter-State system, the backbone of internationalrelations. The EU wont break relations with the FSLNregime. Itll make its report, then take a pragmatic view.Often the European Union as a whole weighs less than any of

its parts.The US journalist, Malcolm Beith, warned us thatWashington has turnedand will continue to turna blindeye to Ortegas authoritarianism. The only ones to fightagainst and curb what Dora Mara Tllez called Ortegaspower binge will thus be Nicaraguans. But, unfortunately,a large sector of the opposition is expecting foreigners andecclesiastics to give what Spanish poet Miguel Hernndez,champion of the Republican cause, described in 1936 as ahard slap, a cold blow, an invisible and homicidal cut or abrutal push. PLI politicians crave a thunderous statementdeclaring the elections illegal, but how many of those whowon a parliamentary seat will rush to take it, anxious to

receive their monthly salary of US $5,000 to feed theirpersonal and party coffers? What is the cost of delegitimizingthe coming National Assembly, born of fraud? ApproximatelyUS$12 million: the salaries of the opposition representativesfor the next five years.

The dangers of the morning after

What will the FSLN do with all its now-unlimited power?Consolidate 21st-century socialism, as some of its supportershope against hope and believe against all evidence? TheFSLN isnt even proposing tax reforms to reverse theregressive nature of present-day fiscal policy. It trumpets itslove of the poor while embracing the wealthy Pellas familyand holding shares in Unin Fenosa (the much-criticizedSpanish transnational company in charge of distributingelectricity in Nicaragua). The FSLN, Nicaraguas championof 21st-century socialism, is a veritable transnational Robin

Hood: it is robbing rich Venezuelans to give to Nicaraguaspoor and to its own merry comrades in the forest. This fiestacan last as long as someone else is willing to pay for it, butthe Godfather is sick and there are many wolves in the woodseager to snack on Little Red-and-Black Riding Hood.

Lets count off the dangers to the Nicaraguan version of21st-century solidary socialism that could materialize in thenext five years and change things for the FSLN. The first isthe Godfathers health. As soon as Hugo Chvez abandonsthe presidential chair or the world of the living, rentiersocialism, which lives off Venezuelan oil, could suffer a seriousreversal. Given the improbability in such a case that areplacement godfather will emerge who is as generous and

content with meager compensations, the subsequent belttightening policies would bring us back to the hardly newand even less popular 20th century socialism.

The FSLN would have risen to power only to experiencea resounding fall and would have to enormously increase the


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20envo

NICARAGUA

The FSLN can rightly boast of having

managed both the cleanest and the

dirtiest elections in Nicaraguas

history: those of 1990 and 2011

public debt, the only way to maintain a minimum of socialpolicy with a maximum of personal wealth until the end ofits mandate. To offset the black hole that Chvez absencewould leave in the FSLNs finances, other options aretrafficking in drugs or in the dead, which is what suppressingpopular unrest would come to.

The second danger, particularly affecting the FSLNsupper echelons is that a party that leaves so little room forthe new generations to take over cant last forever. Todaysburgeoning youth cant be expected to settle indefinitely forbeing irregular fighting battalions, paid crumbs to trash theopposition. Without a party meritocracy system, the FSLNwill have no incentives or ways to insert the new generations,an enormous problem for a party that puts so much emphasison expanding its army of militants. Instead of being a livingorganism renewing its cells, the FSLN will experience thedisorderly and lumpy growth characteristic of cancer tumors.

The third danger comes from the very heart of thesystem: the increasingly paranoid presidential couple. Thesystematic purging of old cadres, penalized for minor

mistakes or as the result of runaway delusions of persecution,will deprive the FSLN of certain of its most expert andfaithfulalthough not necessarily most decentmilitants.Alienating those who built this partys organizationalframework is even more serious and could prove costly forthe authoritarian populist project, or whatever it calls itself.All manifestations of social unrest will penetrate like apoisoned dart, triggering even more paranoia. The enemywill be felt to lurk around every corner, in every fellow citizen,

even in every co-believer. Despite warnings, the presidentialcouple wont change and cant avoid this fate.

The Sandinista leadership must know that the morethey are identified with the presidential couple, the worse itis for them and for the FSLN. The possibility of furtherexploiting the party apparatus requires it not being reducedto a useless shell by the ambitions of those governed by the

principle of After me, the deluge.The fourth danger is the inevitable clash of Murillos

lyricismnot altogether unlike the ethereal ravings of Maoat his worstwith the realism of the FSLNs business sector.This will take place when the first and third dangers becomefait accompli, burrowing into the partys credibility and itsreal possibilities of continuity.

The fifth danger is the personalities and lessercharacters who, when the ship begins to go down, will look tovarnish their shabby public image to give themselves a patinaof propriety. Shouldnt we expect such an attitude fromthose wishing to leave a better memory of themselves to aNicaragua that has seen them plunge into the ridiculousnessof bubble-gum pink, the criminal red of the blood of thosemurdered in San Jos de Cusmapa, and the black of the deephole of electoral fraud?

If we dont stop you...

The FSLN can rightly boast of having managed both thecleanest and the dirtiest elections in Nicaraguas history:those of 1990 and 2011. The Sandinistas lost the clean onesand Ortegas machine won the dirty ones. Pragmaticresignation and weariness are now expected of Nicaraguans.But, unless we stop him, the President, Tirano Banderas

finest apprentice, could resort to officiating over the dead toput on his feast of goats and autumnal patriarchs.

Jos Luis Rocha is a researcher for the Jesuit Service for

Central American Migrants (SJM) and a member of the

envo editorial board.

FSLN Wins by Hook and by Crook Pag. 14-20

Documents

Transcript of FSLN Wins by Hook and by Crook Pag. 14-20