“From the Small Wars Manual to Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq… can the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College institutionalize

irregular war in its curriculum?”

by

Lieutenant Colonel Willard A. BuhlUnited States Marine Corps

19 May 2006

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Submitted in Partial FulfillmentOf the Requirements for the Marine Corps War College

Marine Corps UniversityMarine Corps Combat Development Command

Quantico, VA 22134-5067

2

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Government,

Department of Defense, United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps University, or the Marine War College.

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ABSTRACT

The U.S. Marine Corps’ Command and Staff College (CSC) has lacked an institutional approach to studying counterinsurgency operations over the last Century. After World War II, Title 10 responsibilities have required CSC students to achieve core competencies in conventional operations with an emphasis on the Marine Corps’ amphibious role. Despite recurring irregular war interventions in the previous century, percentages of the CSC curriculum devoted to irregular war have varied dramatically based on real or perceived threats to national security, and the ability of academics or military leaders within the institution to make changes in doctrine and education.

On 23 November 2005, Dr. Wray Johnson conducted a seminar at the Marine Corps War College entitled, “Find, Fix, and Destroy” Versus “War of Interlocking” – Lessons from a Clash of Western and Oriental World Views in the Second Indochina War.” In this seminar I was intrigued by Dr. Johnson’s critical assessment of the U.S. Military and, in particular, the U.S. Marine Corps’ educational and operational incorporation of counterinsurgency principles into doctrine in the last Century. I found of particular interest the apparent cyclical nature of military emphasis on this topic in terms of what author Keith Bickel describes in his book, Mars Learning, as “stimuli internal and external to the institution” in terms of “individuals who control the development process itself or are civilian interlopers.”

In June 2003, the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) prepared to transfer authority of Southern Iraq to U.S. Army and Coalition partners in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I. The Marine Corps’ intent was to reconstitute this force as rapidly as possible in order to resume standing naval contingency force operations as part of Marine Expeditionary Units and the Unit Deployment Program in Okinawa, Japan. Returning to the United States, I MEF was immediately ordered to prepare to return to Iraq to conduct counterinsurgency operations in the Al-Anbar Province in Iraq. As part of this effort, a crash program at the I MEF and 1st Marine Division was instituted, preparing re-deploying units for the complexities of counterinsurgency operations. Marine Corps schools, however, did not significantly adjust their curriculum, and continued to conduct their warfighting exercise as a conventional amphibious operation scenario. The Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) section of the course continued to be scheduled for the end of the school year.

Comparing and contrasting the period prior to World War II, Vietnam, and current operations, with personal experiences as an infantry officer over the past 25 years, the thrust of my paper will be to assess the causes for periods where our institutional focus on studying counterinsurgency warfare has waned despite the recurring theme of U.S. involvement in irregular warfare around the world. Additionally, I will provide recommendations for future U.S. Marine Corps counter insurgency doctrine and training, particularly after our war in Iraq is concluded.

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Contents

Page

DISCLAIMER.........................................................................................................3

ABSTRACT.............................................................................................................4

INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................6

INFLUENCE FROM INTERVENTIONS DURING THE INTERWAR PERIOD9

MAJOR CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS - WORLD WAR II AND KOREA11

VIETNAM.............................................................................................................12

POST VIETNAM..................................................................................................17

IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN AND BEYOND............................................................21

Bibliography..........................................................................................................26

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Introduction

“With the end of the Vietnam War, small wars doctrine has risen or fallen according to the perceived threat to the national security interest of the United States, concurrent with the success or failure of scholars and military professionals in persuading the national security bureaucracy to make qualitative changes in doctrine and force structure.”

- Dr. Wray R. Johnson, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College

The United States Marine Corps arguably created the finest single military

doctrine for small wars when it published the Small Wars Manual in 1940.1 Based upon

the extensive collective experience of a group of talented Marine officers who

participated in repeated interventions in the Caribbean and Central America between the

world wars, the Small Wars Manual was the first military doctrine to address the political

nature of emerging revolutionary warfare.2 This seminal document was written by the

faculty at the Marine Corps Schools Field Officers’ Course, under the direction of Major

Harold Utley.3 This work was produced immediately prior to American entry into World

War II, when small wars instruction reached a peak of 12% of the Field Officers’ Course

curriculum, including two map problems.

Following World War II, small wars education and training was relegated to an

afterthought at the Marine Corps Command and Staff School.4 Indeed, after the Korean

War, counterinsurgency training and education virtually disappeared from the curriculum

at the Command and Staff School’s Senior Course until newly elected President John F.

1 Small Wars Manual. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Schools, 1940. (Reprint, Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1987).2 Johnson, p. 20. “In Nicaragua from 1927 to 1933, the Marines faced a ‘modern’ guerrilla opponent, schooled and educated by Mexican Marxists, with international support.”3 Keith Bickel, Mars Learning- The Marine Corps Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940 (Westview Press 2001). p. 214. Major Utley served in both of the Caco campaigns in Haiti and the Nicaraguan campaign from 1928-9, returning to teach at the Field Officers’ Course. He gained attention around the Marine Corps publishing his own doctrinal treatise on small wars in the Marine Corps Gazette.4 MC Historical Archives Box 6-A-6 – Class Syllabi 1936-39 and Box 7 – Class Syllabi 1946-49. This despite the fact that Col R.E. Hogaboom was the director of the Command and Staff College Senior Course, and Brigadier General O.P Smith was the deputy director for Marine Corps Schools. Both of these officers had taught small wars courses during the 1930s at the Field Officers’ Course, the equivalent at that time to today’s Command and Staff College.

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Kennedy made it a top administration priority, signing a counterinsurgency plan (CIP)

just one week after entering office in January 1961.5

As U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War expanded, the Marine Corps

incrementally increased counterinsurgency emphasis in the Command and Staff College

curriculum (the name was changed in 1964). Cultural awareness training at that time

even included Vietnamese language training.6 With the end of U.S. presence in South

Vietnam, counterinsurgency training and education was dramatically reduced in size and

scope. “Counterinsurgency” became “Foreign Internal Defense” and was replaced in the

late 1970s with “Low Intensity Conflict.”7 Education and training over this period saw a

gradual return to pre-Vietnam war conventional warfare tenets focused on application in

Northern Europe and the Middle East. This paradigm shift occurred in spite of the many

hard lessons learned during complex counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam and

Marine Corps success with its Combined Action Program (CAP).8

Despite periods of great analysis, innovation, and advances in counterinsurgency

doctrine, the Marine Corps has consistently failed to institutionalize counterinsurgency

education and training in its field grade officer Professional Military Education (PME),

and has missed opportunities to influence the U.S. military at large to better prepare for

this type of warfare.

Today, in the wake of several years of experience in recent operations in

Afghanistan and Iraq, the curriculum at Command and Staff College has once again

5 The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2,Chapter I, "The Kennedy Commitments and Programs, 1961," pp. 1-39 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971) See also Volume 1, Chapter 4, "U.S. and France in Indochina, 1950-56", Section 1, pp. 179-214. The U.S., led by Lieutenant General John “Iron Mike” O’Daniel, USA, of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group Indochina, actually assumed full responsibility for training of Republic of Vietnam forces on 12 February 1955.66 Vietnamese language training was added to a curriculum already providing French and Spanish language instruction of approximately 114 hours during the 1966-7 Academic Year. It was retained for one additional year, but offered as a voluntary elective. MCH archives 1966-69 Command and Staff College Syllabi. 7 Johnson, pp. 96-7. The U.S. Army FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict, was published in 1981.8 U.S. Marine Corps Historical Archives, Haynes Board Report -Volume 1, 29 March 1976, Major General Fred Haynes, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

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adjusted to “enable graduates to emerge as more highly skilled warfighters and proficient

planners… bringing into sharper focus the character of irregular warfare.”9 We have

made these changes based upon the recognition that, as the sole remaining superpower,

we can expect adversaries around the world to fight us asymmetrically, using irregular

warfare.

Despite repeated small wars interventions in the 20th Century in Cuba, Haiti,

Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Somalia, and Bosnia to name a few,

directors at Command and Staff College traditionally focused education and training on

the Marine Corps’ Title 10 responsibilities, with emphasis on core competencies and

conventional amphibious operations. Adjusting the present curriculum to meet the

proximate challenges of contending with extended counterinsurgency operations, the

College is contending with internal dynamic tension as it prepares students for immediate

service fighting irregular war, while concurrently maintaining instruction in conventional

operations. Currently, the curriculum has dedicated approximately 40% of classroom and

practical exercise instruction to irregular war. In Fiscal Year 2007 this percentage will be

increased to 50% of the curriculum.

The author strongly endorses these changes while recognizing that we must

maintain a balanced curriculum that educates students across the spectrum of conflict.

Realizing that the US Marine Corps must maintain its core competency in amphibious

operations, I concurrently believe that our institution cannot ignore its rich heritage in

developing small wars doctrine. Indeed, if history is a judge, we must institutionalize

small wars education into the Command and Staff College curriculum in order to avoid

9 Colonel J.A. Toolan and Dr. Charles D. McKenna Educating for the Future, Curriculum changes at Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Gazette, February 2006, pp 12-13. Also referred to as small wars or guerilla war, irregular war differs from conventional war in that regular war pits adversaries more or less symmetric in equipment, training, and doctrine. In irregular warfare, the adversaries are asymmetric in capabilities, with the weaker opponent normally adopting an erosion strategy, and using the cumulative effects of tactical actions to achieve strategic aims.

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future knee jerk increases when confronted by future adversaries in an irregular warfare

environment.

Influence from Interventions during the Interwar Period

“We received no training in [small wars] when we were ordered to these places… I arrived in Managua… and three days later I was out in bandit territory with a patrol, having received no instruction whatsoever on the situation, the general intelligence situation, the methods to be employed, training. I always thought if only they’d had a school in Managua that could have briefed the officers thoroughly before they went out that might have saved some lives.”

Lieutenant General Edward Craig, USMC10

As is often the case, “stimuli within the institution” proved the catalyst in

developing the Small Wars Manual.11 Combat veteran officers were returning to

Quantico fresh from the Nicaraguan insurgency and recalling the lack of training they

had received before deploying.12 Major Harold Utley, who rotated back from duty in

Nicaragua to become an instructor, assistant director, and finally director of the Field

Officer’s School, led this effort.13 Intellectually interested in small wars, Major Utley

began “a private effort to codify the doctrine and historical lesson of minor conflicts.”14

In 1930, he was assigned to lead the Small Wars Course at the Field Officer’s School.15

Lieutenant General John Russell, Commandant of the Marine Corps, initially

sidetracked Major Utley and his supporters in their efforts. Despite having commanded a

brigade in Haiti and having served as High Commissioner there, Russell strongly

“believed [in] the traditional missions of ships’ guards, security of naval bases, and [that]

expeditionary forces in ‘small wars’ were not in the Corps’ nor the nation’s interest.”16 In

10 Quoted from Bickel, p. 144 (LtGen E. Craig Oral History p. 30).11 Bickel, p. 7. Bickel cites Graham Allison’s bureaucratic organizational model as described in chapters 3 & 5 in Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).12 See Bickel, Chapter 5. “In 1931, 11 Marine Officers were killed in action or died from wounds received, one of the highest mortality years for Marine Officers in any insurgency.“ Bickel, p. 163.13 Bickel, pp. 192-3.14 Bickel, p. 206.15 Bickel, p. 206.16 Dr. Donald Bittner, “Russell, John Henry” in The War of 1898 and U.S. Interventions, 1898-1934, ed. Benjamin Beede (New York: Garland Publishing, 1994), p. 472. quoted from Bickel, p. 211.

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fact, in keeping with General Russell’s intent to emphasize the Corps’ amphibious role,

he ordered the Marine Corps Schools to close for the 1933-1934 academic year to

produce a landing operations manual. Thus, in June 1934, the Marine Corps Schools

published the Tentative Manual on Landing Operations, confirming the Marine Corps’

now stated primary mission of seizing and holding advanced bases in cooperation with

the Fleet, as well as defending such bases until relieved by the Army.17

No different from today, differences of opinion regarding Marine Corps’ roles and

missions existed at every level in the pre-World War II Marine Corps. Indeed, the

Marine Corps Schools Commandant at that time, Brigadier General James Breckenridge,

who had commanded Marines in a number of interventions from the Philippines to the

Caribbean, believed that small wars “still had a place in Marine education.”18 General

Breckenridge did not challenge Lieutenant General Russell by reopening debate on roles

and missions, he simply ordered the Small Wars Manual to be drafted concurrently by

students as a series of separate “pamphlets” bound together with an the intention that they

be constantly revised as appropriate.19 However, in the end, the officer instructors of the

small wars course wrote the various chapters of the Small Wars Manual, with the first

edition published in 1935.

In keeping with the value placed upon small wars subjects by influential members

of the faculty, during academic years 1936-1938, the Senior School placed greater

emphasis on small wars education, adding two map problems totaling 115 hours on top of

17 Bickel,p. 213.18 Bickel, p. 146. General Breckenridge served in the Philippine insurrection and in the Cuban Pacification (1906-1909). He commanded a regiment in the Dominican Republic for a year and then commanded the Guardia National. From 1928 to 1930, and then again from 1932 to 1935, he was commandant of Marine Corps Schools.

19 Bickel, p. 214. 10

56 hours dedicated to small wars in the classroom.20 The combined total accounted for

“roughly 12 percent of senior officer’s time spent studying small wars.”21

In 1939, General Russell decided to have the 1935 Small Wars Manual updated

and published. Despite disagreements between Generals Russell and Breckenridge from

1933-1934, and tension between the small wars specialists and the advanced base

adherents throughout the decade, it was clear to most that a major war loomed in the

Pacific. General Russell’s imperative was to develop solid doctrine for the role the

Marine Corps “would play in a major war between the Great Powers, [incorporating]

what changes the Corps would need to make to play that role,” preparing the Corps for

success in the most dangerous course of action it could be assigned to fight.22

Major Conventional Operations -World War II and Korea

Overshadowed by the Tentative Landing Operations Manual (1935), the Tentative

Manual for Defense of Advanced Bases (June 1936), and the subsequent amphibious war

against Japan, the Small Wars Manual fell into relative obscurity after America’s

victorious drive across the Pacific. Afterward, education and training at the Command

and Staff School remained focused on amphibious operations.23 Indeed, in the wake of

the largest conventional war in history, the Command and Staff School syllabus for 1947-

8 indicates only six of 1,211 academic instructional hours were dedicated to small wars

topics.24 And with the advent of the Korean War just two classes later, the Marine Corps

once again found itself committed, for the most part, to conventional operations ashore in

20 Bickel, p. 221. The map problems were based upon hypothetical interventions in Puerto Rico and Colombia. See also Bickel pp. 222-23. 21 Bickel, p. 221.22 Bickel p. 211. See also, The Commandants of the Marine Corps, Chapters 15 & 16, on Generals Ben Fuller and John Russell, USMC. Millet and Shulimson, (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD 2004). 23 William E. Simons, Professional Military Education in the United States, (Greenwood Press, Westport CT, 2000). The chapters on Marine Corps Schools are written by Dr. Donald Bittner, a 30-year veteran of the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College faculty and a retired Lieutenant Colonel of Marines. See also, Alan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis, (The Free Press, NY, NY, 1991), pp. 331-5.24 U.S. Marine Corps Historical Archives 1947-8 Command and Staff School Syllabus, Colonel R.E. Hogaboom, Director.

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the Pacific Theater. After the valiant defense of the Pusan Perimeter and the reversal of

fortunes with General MacArthur’s amphibious masterstroke at Inchon, the Marine Corps

fought three long years on the ground in Korea against the North Korean and Chinese

armies.25

With two hard fought conventional wars under their belt, by the “eve of U.S.

military intervention in Indochina, the Small Wars Manual was forgotten, and American

politicians and military leaders overlooked their own history in their attempt to craft

counterinsurgency doctrine.”26

Close scrutiny reveals that during the years between 1946 and 1959, only nine of

1,014 individual research papers (IRPs) at Marine Corps Schools were written on topics

related to small wars.27 In addition to the Marine Corps’ amphibious forte, dominant

themes of study included atomic warfare, employment of helicopter forces, and arctic

operations. From 1954-1959, the Senior Course at the Marine Corps Schools dedicated a

mere 40 of 4,821 cumulative hours of instruction in the curriculum to small wars related

topics (anti-guerilla operations, civil affairs, and unconventional warfare).28

Vietnam

“American readers—particularly those who are concerned with today’s operations in South Vietnam—will find to their surprise that their various seemingly ‘new’ counter-insurgency gambits, from strategic hamlets to large-scale pacification, are mere rehashes of old tactics to which helicopters, weed killers, and rapid-firing rifles merely add a new dimension of speed and bloodiness without basically changing the character of the struggle—nor its outcome, if the same political errors [emphasis in the original] that the French have made are repeated.”29

-Dr. Bernard Fall

25 See Col Robert Debs Heinl, Jr.,Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign, (The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, Baltimore, MD. 1979), or the five volume U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, Historical Division, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, (Washington, D.C., 1954-72).26 Johnson, p. 22. 27 Marine Corps Historical Archives, IRP Compilation Records.28 U.S. Marine Corps Historical Archives 1954-59 Command and Staff School Syllabi, Col John “Bushrod” Wilson, Col R.O. Bare, BGen E.W. Snedecker, Col H. Nickerson, and Col L. Day, Directors, respectively.29 Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare—A French View of Counter-insurgency (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), xviii, quoted in Johnson, Vietnam and American Doctrine for Small Wars, p.22.

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“When the U.S. military deployed to Vietnam, first as advisors and later to

include large numbers of ground combat forces, specific doctrine for counterinsurgency

did not exist.”30 Despite nearly two centuries of experience engaging guerillas,

particularly after the U.S. Civil War of 1861-65, “counter-guerilla operations had always

been considered an additional requirement within the conventional military role.”31

The conflict in Vietnam brought irregular and conventional warfare together in

new ways, but the senior military leadership in Vietnam was composed of men who were

a product of the experience and education described in the previous chapters of this

paper. These were men who, by “institutional heritage and predisposition for

conventional combat derived from core values originating in Clausewitzian dogma and

American culture,” could not help but “dilute if not wholly negate counterinsurgency

theory.”32 General William Westmoreland, who commanded the U.S. Military

Assistance Command Vietnam from 1964-1968, epitomized this leadership.33

America’s war in Vietnam lasted from 1955 to 1973.34 From 1955 to 1964, the

war developed along predominantly counterinsurgency lines, but shifted as the South

Vietnamese government faltered in 1965 and “President Lyndon Johnson introduced

ground combat forces and effectively made it an American war.”35 During this period,

30 Johnson, p. 2331 Johnson, p. 23. See also Andrew Birtle, “U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941”, (Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington D.C., 2003).32 Wray Johnson, “War Culture, and the Interpretation of History: The Vietnam War Reconsidered”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 9 No. 2 (Autumn 1998), pp. 84-85. Published by Frank Cass, London.33 General Westmoreland’s strategy was divided into three components, “search and destroy,” “clearing operations,” and “securing operations.” Among a number of problems encountered in his flawed strategy were insufficient American troops to undertake all operations simultaneously throughout Vietnam. He divided responsibilities between U.S. and Vietnamese troops and relied on American tactical firepower in “search and destroy” operations that formed the basis of a ground strategy of attrition that could never keep up with the North Vietnamese replacements. See Edward Doyle; Samuel Lipsman, America Takes Over 1965-67, (The Vietnam Experience), (Boston, MA: Boston Publishing Company, 1982). pp 54-73: Chapter 3: “Search and Destroy” and pp 170-183.34 Johnson, p. 47. Dr. Johnson uses the advent of the Kennedy Administration in 1961 and its focus on counterinsurgency doctrine as a point of departure for his study in Vietnam and American Doctrine for Small Wars. Although the U.S. ended its role in Vietnam in 1973 after signing the Paris Peace Accords, many consider the final defeat of South Vietnam following the North Vietnamese invasion in 1975 to be the end of the war. 35 Ibid, pp. 47-8.

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the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College ramped up counterinsurgency

instruction to meet the new challenges in Vietnam, only to virtually eliminate this subject

matter immediately following the war’s end.

The repeated conventional wars of the immediate past had effectively eradicated

the Marine Corps’ small wars corporate memory. This was evident in a Senior Course

curriculum nearly devoid of small wars instruction. It was also reflected in the

contending schools of thought behind the tactical and operational employment of Marine

forces in the Republic of South Vietnam, whether units transitioned ashore as part of

special landing forces on search and destroy missions in I Corps, or as part of the

combined action program (CAP) in 114 separate South Vietnamese villages.36

In Vietnam and American Doctrine for Small Wars, Dr. Wray Johnson describes

how the doctrine for counterinsurgency that emerged in the early 1960s had its “genesis

as an intellectual construct” during the Kennedy Administration in “response to indirect

aggression against the United States, perpetrated by the Soviet Union, and carried out by

insurgent proxies in the developing world.”37

In his book, Johnson highlights successful frameworks for combating

insurgencies suggested at the time by academics like Walt Rostow at the Massachusetts

Institute for Technology and Ralph Sanders at the Industrial College of the Armed

Forces. Existing theories of the time “essentially addressed the need for restrained

military operations, which avoided outright oppression, and social, political, and

economic reform.”38 While on the mark intellectually, as indicated in the opening

36 See Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight, (Annapolis Maryland Naval Institute Press, 1984) Chapter 12 pp. 187-190 and General Wallace M. Greene, Jr. Testimony to the Senate Committee on Armed Services and Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on Military Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal Year 1967, 89th Cong., 2d sess., 24 March 1966, 671-73. In his testimony before Congress, Gen. Greene stated that “the full-scale amphibious landing force was again demonstrated as effective and necessary by landing on beachheads in Vietnam.” Although unopposed, Gen. Greene described them as “a projection of our Nation’s sea power ashore.” Quoted from D.J. Mrozek, The U.S. Air Force After Vietnam, (Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL December 1988), p. 24. 37 Johnson, p. 24. 38 Ibid, p. 37.

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paragraphs of this chapter, application involved, among a number of critical components,

“details regarding military tactics in the field.”39 Indeed, historian Dr. Andrew

Krepinevich’s thesis in The Army and Vietnam, that our military failed in South Vietnam

“because it was wedded to a conventional concept of war,” holds constructive lessons for

our military today in Iraq.40

To prepare field grade officers for the challenges in Vietnam, a number of

successful counterinsurgencies were studied at Command and Staff College, including

the Greek Civil War from 1947-49, the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines from 1946-54,

and the Malayan Emergency from 1948-60. In each of these case studies or operational

models, “the principal measure was to sever popular support from the insurgents and

reattach it to the central government.”41 Showcased as a successful practitioner of

counterinsurgency was a British officer, Sir Gerald Templar. Templar was one of the

“first [who] advanced the idea that the answer lies not in pouring more troops into the

jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people.”42

With the aforementioned case studies integrated into the curriculum,

counterinsurgency studies at the Senior Course dramatically ramped up during the 1962-

63 academic year from nine to 33 hours, with 100 additional hours of French and Spanish

language training.43 The following year, the director, Colonel C.B. Drake, changed the

title of instruction from counter-guerilla operations to counterinsurgency, and further

increased instruction from 33 to 38 hours. The expanded counterinsurgency curriculum

included a 9-hour planning team exercise analyzing a notional counterinsurgency

39 Ibid, p. 37.40 Quoted from LtCol G. Daddis, “Chasing the Austerlitz ideal, the enduring quest for the decisive battle”, p. 40, Armed Forces Journal, April 2006 (Springfield, VA Volume 143, No. 9). See also, Andrew F. Krepenevich, Jr. The Army and Vietnam. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) pp. 264-268 from Chapter 10: “Paths Untaken, Paths Forsaken.”41 Johnson, p. 47.42 Ibid, p. 47.43 U.S. Marine Corps Historical Archives 1962-63 Command and Staff School Syllabus, Col Godbolt, Director.

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scenario in Southeast Asia. Additionally, a 9-hour counter-guerilla exercise was added to

the Marine Air Ground Task Force Operations (MAGTF Ops) section of the course. This

involved planning an amphibious landing and contingency operations ashore in a short

duration, counter-guerilla operation to assist a friendly government.44

Under Colonel Drake, Command and Staff College further increased

counterinsurgency education in the curriculum to 44 of 1,358 hours in 1965-66.45 In

1966-67, Brigadier General F.J. Karch had counterinsurgency operations listed in its own

category in the Command and Staff College syllabus, and increased instruction to 64 of

1,288 hours (approximately 5%). He also expanded the contingency planning exercise

from 12 to 20 hours, adding an execution phase. Additionally, General Karch added

Vietnamese language training to the already mandatory foreign language study in the

curriculum, and invited distinguished academics like Dr. Bernard Fall to provide an

“appraisal of active insurgency in Southeast Asia.”46

The next director, Brigadier General M.P. Ryan, maintained the curriculum with

one change related to language training, which now became a voluntary elective.47 In

the1969-70 academic year, Colonel R. Baird increased counterinsurgency instruction to

74 of 1,339 academic hours (approximately 5.5%). These changes included a 14-hour

foreign internal defense (FID) planning exercise, an area analysis exercise based on an

ongoing insurgency, a 27-hour contingency exercise based on a counterinsurgency

scenario, four hours of counterinsurgency case studies, and ten hours of regional

intelligence briefs.48

44 U.S. Marine Corps Historical Archives 1963-64 Command and Staff School Syllabus, Col C.B. Drake, Director.45 U.S. Marine Corps Historical Archives 1965-66 Command and Staff School Syllabus, Col C.B. Drake, Director.46 U.S. Marine Corps Historical Archives 1966-67 Command and Staff School Syllabus, BGen. F.J. Karch, Director.47 U.S. Marine Corps Historical Archives 1968-69 Command and Staff School Syllabus, BGen. M.P. Ryan, Director.48 U.S. Marine Corps Historical Archives 1969-70 Command and Staff School Syllabus, Col R. Baird, Director. Of note in this syllabus was the inclusion of 7 hours of civil disturbance operations instruction,

16

Once again, a look at IRPs provides insight into student and faculty interest in

counterinsurgency studies. From 1961 to 1972 Marine Corps Schools IRP topics related

to counterinsurgency totaled 84 of 1,156 hours or approximately 7%. Following the end

of the war, from 1972 to 1982, only two of 519 Command and Staff College IRPs dealt

with counterinsurgency topics.49

Post Vietnam

Just as the early pacification programs in Vietnam “took a back seat to the

growing ‘big unit’ war,” by the mid-1970s, counterinsurgency education began to wane

at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College as America’s involvement in Vietnam

ended. Counterinsurgency instruction dropped from a high of 74 hours in 1969-70, to 50

of 1,351 hours during the 1970-71 academic year under Colonel E.H. Haffey.50 Indeed,

during the 1971-72 academic year, under Brigadier General S. Jaskilka,

counterinsurgency instruction saw another dramatic drop to 32 of 1,178 hours.51 This

trend continued throughout the 1970s, with counterinsurgency instruction averaging just

22 of 1,200 academic hours during Colonel B.E. Trainor’s three-year tenure as the

Director of Command and Staff College from 1978-1981.52

“Following the [Vietnam] war ‘counterinsurgency’ virtually disappeared from the

military lexicon, to be replaced by “internal defense and development” as a general term

subsuming a whole array of activities related to assisting less-developed countries.”53

Much as small wars instruction had dwindled to an insignificant amount of instruction

following World War II and into the 1950s, the curriculum at Command and Staff

which continued unchanged for one more academic year and then was reduced to 2 hours annually until removed from the curriculum entirely in 1975.49 Marine Corps Historical Archives, IRP Compilation Records. The years of 1969 through 1972 included the IRPs of Captains attending Amphibious Warfare School. Many of the papers during the 1970s were related to retention and other manpower issues. 50 U.S. Marine Corps Historical Archives 1970-71 Command and Staff School Syllabus, Col R. Baird, Director.51 U.S. Marine Corps Historical Archives 1971-72 Command and Staff School Syllabus.52 U.S. Marine Corps Historical Archives 1978-81 Command and Staff School Syllabi.53 Johnson, p. 73.

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College declined from a high of 74 hours in 1969-70, to 23 hours and no IRPs dedicated

to the subject a decade later.54

A similar scenario occurred concurrently at the US Army Command and General

Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth. Vietnam received little or mention in the

curriculum. The few exceptions where Vietnam was discussed interpreted the war as a

conventional conflict and a “botched job” that was not a “worthy source of lessons for the

future”.55 Much like their Marine Corps counterparts during this period, the CGSC

curriculum developers relegated counterinsurgency and low intensity conflict as

“secondary players,” dedicating the bulk of the curriculum to conventional operations.56

Army doctrinal field manuals underwent revisions in the 1970s, with FM 100-20,

Internal Defense and Development, stressing “techniques emphasizing security

operations aimed at winning popular allegiance to the central government as opposed to

‘search and destroy’ operations.”57 In this new framework, “internal development” held

equal importance to “internal defense,” with the United States in a supporting role.58

However, in 1981, the term “low intensity conflict” appeared in FM 100-20,

encompassing counter-narcotics, combating terrorism, and peacekeeping.59 At Marine

Corps Command and Staff College in 1982, counterinsurgency instruction was reduced to

just eight of 1,247 academic hours.60 Earlier, in the declassified (31 December 1984) 29

54 U.S. Marine Corps Historical Archives 1979-80 Command and Staff College Syllabus, Colonel B.E. Trainor, Director.55 Mrozek, p. 38. Dr. Mrozek’s Chapter 3, Interpreting Vietnam, School Solutions, is a fascinating insight into the curriculum of the US Army CGSC during the 1970s and 80s. Mrozek describes the Army’s interpretation of the conduct of the Vietnam war and how its approach to education and training following that conflict reflected subsequent decisions of senior military advisors and political decision makers who, in the 1980s, avoided committing U.S. troops in Central America beyond a limited advisory role. Another interesting and related statistic provided by Dr. Mrozek is that in 1972-73, while we still had advisors in Vietnam, only one of 37 articles in the Naval War College Review were related to Vietnam, with the exception being a legal article. 56 Ibid, p. 41. 57 Johnson p. 88.58 Ibid, p. 88.59 Ibid, 88.60 U.S. Marine Corps Historical Archives 1982-3 Command and Staff School Syllabus, Colonel John Garcia, Director.

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March 1976 ‘Haynes Board’ Report, studying future USMC Missions and Force

Structure through 1985, Major General Fred Haynes posited that, “any orientation

towards low intensity conflict and small amphibious operations may generate a

‘commando complex’ which could lead us down the road of the Royal Marines. Such a

move would be to the detriment of a significant Marine Corps role in the National

Strategy. Organizing for a broad spectrum of conflicts ensures that we are capable of

accepting worldwide commitments.”61

Armed with this mindset on force structure and roles and missions, essentially

maintaining an emphasis on the Marine Corps’ naval character and emphasizing the most

dangerous (and least likely) course of action the Corps could fight, the Command and

Staff College continued to place little or no emphasis on counterinsurgency. The College

instead focused on preparing officers to fight in support of NATO commitments in

Northern Europe or in the Persian Gulf Region.

While counterinsurgency studies in the 1980s generally remained low, stimuli

within the system in the form of the prerogative of College directors added short periods

of additional emphasis. For example, during the 1986-87 academic year, Colonel D.D.

Weber increased counterinsurgency instruction to 48 of 1,234 hours. During his three-

year tenure, Colonel Weber dropped the Northern Ireland case study but added a regional

studies program including Latin America and Southeast Asia, with an emphasis on

counterinsurgency in Nicaragua and the Philippines. Colonel Weber also added a Beirut

case study, additional counter-terrorism instruction, and a “Perspectives on the Vietnam

War” section into the curriculum.62 On a related note, during the latter two years of

61 U.S. Marine Corps Historical Archives, Boxes 6-8 Haynes Board Report -Volume 1, 29 March 1976, Major General Fred Haynes, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps.62 U.S. Marine Corps Historical Archives 1986-89 Command and Staff School Syllabi, Colonel D.D. Weber, Director.

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Colonel Weber’s tenure, counterinsurgency related IRPs quadrupled from the two

previous years.63

The Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and in 1990-91, Operations DESERT SHIELD and

DESERT STORM successfully ejected Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Army out of

occupied Kuwait in a 96-hour conventional combined arms assault. Just a couple of

years later, however, the U.S. intervened in Somalia (1992-93) and has been involved in

Bosnia from 1995 to the present (though we arguably would not have remained in Bosnia

had we experienced the casualties we incurred in Somalia).

After great success in the application of conventional battle concepts during

DESERT STORM, the subsequent experiences in Somalia and Bosnia generated

revisions of the FM 100-20.64 They also provided the impetus for new joint doctrine for

military operations other than war (MOOTW) in Joint Publication 3-07.65

In the early 1990’s, Brigadier General P.K. Van Riper brought significant changes

to the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College curriculum. Dr. Don Bittner, the

senior professor currently on the faculty at Command and Staff College, described Van

Riper’s reforms as “the most significant since the 1930s.” Dr. Bittner stated that he

believes “the current reforms at U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College now are

building upon them.”66 Dr. Charles McKenna, a 14-year veteran of the College Faculty,

63 Marine Corps Historical Archives, IRP Compilation Records, 1985-1989. 64 FM 100-20 Stability and Support Operations (Final Draft). Washington, D.C.: April 1996. The FM 100-20 introduced the Internal Defense and Development strategy or IDAD. This concept integrated military & civilian programs, with military actions providing a level of internal security permitting and supporting growth through balanced development. Targeting the needs of vulnerable groups of people, measures to maintain conditions under which orderly development can take place usually compete with the inertia and incompetence of the host nation’s political system. We are currently experiencing great challenges in this area in Iraq. Closely related to establishing a legitimate government, are efforts to rectify the legitimate grievances of the people, as the “successful counterinsurgent must realize that the true nature of the threat to his government lies in the insurgent's political strength, not in his military power”. See FM 100-20 Chapter Two.65 Johnson, pp. 192-193. See also, Joint Publication 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (Washington, D.C.: 16 June 1995).66 Author’s interview with Dr. Bittner, February 2006.

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also described how the Marine Corps was teaching MOOTW in the 1990s before other

intermediate level schools.

As a graduate of Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School in 1993 and

Command and Staff College in 2001, I directly benefited from General Van Riper’s ideas

and influence. Still, I realized that all of the major war game exercises I had participated

in had involved conventional amphibious operations and did not include any insurgency

related scenarios.67 This, despite the October 2001 U.S. intervention in Afghanistan and

the subsequent use of proxy Northern Alliance forces with Coalition special forces to

remove the Taliban Regime and disrupt the Al Qaeda organization there.

Iraq, Afghanistan and Beyond

In January 2003, while a student at the School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW),

I was temporarily reassigned as an individual augment to the I MEF G-3 for Operation

IRAQI FREEDOM I (OIF I). Arriving in Theater in February, I participated in several I

MEF G-3 Future Operations planning teams. I had received training on the Marine Corps

Planning Process (MCPP) and I believe that Command and Staff College prepared me

well to “analyze, interpret, come to a conclusion, and act”, as Dr. Don Bittner described

the school’s mission.68

As history has shown, U.S. and Coalition forces were armed, equipped, and well

trained to rapidly defeat the Iraqi Army and to seize Baghdad. However, in the month

leading up to offensive operations many questions were raised inside the I MEF planning

staff regarding conditions in what is termed Phase IV, that is, the follow-on stability

phase after defeating the Iraqi armed forces.

67 The exercise title was OPEN ACCESS, and involved U.S. and coalition forces restoring freedom of navigation in the Straits of Hormuz in the face of Iranian military opposition.68Author’s interview with Dr. Bittner, February 2006.

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While I had received some MOOTW education at Marine Corps Schools in the

past, and had been on the ground in Somalia in 1992, I looked back into my own

educational experience to understand the changing conditions on the ground as the

occupation of Iraq began to develop into a counterinsurgency. Returning to Iraq in June

2004 as an infantry battalion commander, I was assigned to an 850 square kilometer area

of operations adjacent to the city of Fallujah. Our sector encompassed five cities, Abu

Ghraib Prison, dozens of agricultural villages, a variety of Iraqi tribes, Shia and Sunni

Muslims, and a population of several hundred thousand people.

Fortunately, I had read the Small Wars Manual, had grown up in the Marine

Corps with Vietnam veteran officers and staff noncommissioned officers, and had several

professors and mentors who had stimulated my interest in counterinsurgency theory and

operations in addition to the school curriculum. I was also fortunate that my division and

regimental commanders were keen students of insurgencies and pushed related

professional military education, albeit in a compressed manner, immediately prior to

I MEF’s re-deployment to Iraq. My point is that it was due to additional educational

influences that I was able to adequately prepare for complex counterinsurgency

operations in Iraq, and not necessarily the result of material presented in the curriculum

of Command and Staff College or School of Advanced Warfighting. In fairness,

however, the professors and military faculty advisors did teach me and my peers to think

critically, and to “analyze, interpret, and to arrive at a conclusion.”

In the year that I attended Command and Staff College six of 104 IRPs were

written on counterinsurgency related topics. The year prior saw just two of 89 papers

dedicated to this subject area.69 While the curriculum was balanced, it emphasized core

69Marine Corps Historical Archives, IRP Compilation Records, 2000-2002. 22

competencies in conventional operational art, with a joint amphibious warfighting

focus.70

As we prepare to enter our fourth year on the ground in Iraq, and our sixth year in

Afghanistan, Command and Staff College has once again shifted emphasis to increase

counterinsurgency education. Despite our amphibious heritage and Title 10

responsibilities, “during the past 2 years veterans [students of Marine Corps Command

and Staff College] of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)

have challenged the limited treatment of irregular warfare (IW) and were looking for

greater understanding regarding interagency operations, cultural intelligence, and

improved campaign design techniques.”71

Today the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College is embarked on its

greatest curriculum revision since the so called “Van Riper Reforms of 1990-1” and the

publication of the Small Wars Manual and the Tentative Landing Operations Manual.72

Exploiting lessons learned from recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, Command

and Staff College has placed special emphasis on counterinsurgency and cultural

awareness training embedded throughout the curriculum.73 Approximately 40% of the

current curriculum is devoted to irregular warfare. Will this last beyond the immediate

operational requirements of Afghanistan and Iraq?

With the United States presently engaged in what has been referred to as “the long

war,” the Marine Corps Command and Staff College is well positioned to institutionalize

counterinsurgency training in its curriculum.74 This author encourages Marine Corps

70 Interview with Dr. C.D. McKenna, Dean of Academics, USMC Command and Staff College, May 2006.71 Col J.A. Toolan and Dr. Charles D. McKenna Educating for the Future, Curriculum changes at Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Gazette, February 2006, p. 12.72 Interview with Dr. Donald Bittner, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, January 2006. 73 See Col J.A. Toolan and Dr. Charles D. McKenna Educating for the Future, Curriculum changes at Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Gazette, February 2006, p. 12. 74 See the Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) 2006, Chapter One, Fighting the Long War. pp. 9-16. See also James J.Carafano and Paul Rosenzweig, Winning the Long War: Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism and Preserving Freedom, Washington, D.C., The Heritage Foundation, 2005. See also the U.S. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Website,

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senior leadership to do just that, and not simply add it back into the syllabus every couple

of decades when counterinsurgency operations come to the fore.

Specific recommendations include adding a class into the Command and Staff

College curriculum that teaches the US Marine Corps’ historic approach to small wars.

This would highlight institutional awareness of the phenomenon of a historic varied focus

on irregular war when matched against the College’s curriculum over the past century.

Attention to how the College has approached education could be conducted in the initial

overview, and would enlighten students the challenges faced in the past and raise

awareness for those who might return to Marine Corps University in a future capacity.

This class would be just as important for new College directors and faculty as it would be

for students. Too often in the past, we have seen how the prerogatives of a director could

radically change to curriculum eliminating or marginalizing an aspect of war fighting.

In order to ensure that we address irregular war in the years to come, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff should write requirements for a minimum percentage of irregular war

studies into the every ILS curriculum. A review of the last 75 years of education would

indicate that 20% is an acceptable minimum, expanding as required based upon current

operations. Only stimuli external to the institution can insure that we maintain a balanced

curriculum that addresses irregular when contending with new directors that make

changes based upon personal prerogative.

The Marine Corps Command and Staff College can institutionalize a balanced

curriculum that addresses Title 10 responsibilities and core competencies in amphibious

operations, while including integrated education in irregular warfare. Education and

schoolhouse exercises must continue to be tailored to expose students to the full spectrum

http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/, which states, “The United States is a Nation Engaged in What Will be a Long War” accessed 14 March 2006.

24

of conflict, while encouraging critical thinking about the effects of cultural intelligence

on operations.

Although joint warfighting with an amphibious emphasis must remain the Marine

Corps primary occupational specialty, MAGTF officers must be trained to serve in

command and staff billets across the spectrum of conflict. As the world’s sole remaining

superpower, adversaries will continue to counter the U.S. with asymmetrical or irregular

warfare. Accordingly, our field grade officers who will continue to find themselves

planning and leading counterinsurgency operations in every clime and place deserve all

of the advantage education and training can provide. These advantages can only be

realized through institutionalized counterinsurgency education.

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