From the Dixie Mission to the Marshall Mission: U.S. Relations … · America’s Failure in China,...

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1 From the Dixie Mission to the Marshall Mission: U.S. Relations with the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang, 1943-1946 April 2016 Introduction During World War II and in the immediate post-war years, a deep economic and political crisis gripped China. Ever since 1927, the Chinese Guomindang (GMD) had tried to suppress the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) politically and militarily. This struggle took new forms during World War II, when Japan occupied much of China and the U.S. government actively intervened in Chinese politics. From 1943-1945, a four-star U.S. general and several Foreign Service and Army officers attempted to pressure Chiang Kai-shek’s Guomindang to prioritize military operations against Japan and to form a coalition government with the CCP, led by Mao Tse-tung. With the support of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman and two Presidential Envoys, Chiang demanded that the CCP merge its military forces into the GMD’s armies, and that the CCP give up control of its base areas in north China. Chiang also opposed the CCP’s proposals for a coalition government, since it would have ended his one-party regime. Beginning in the summer of 1944, a U.S. Army Observer Group stationed at the headquarters of the CCP in north China (the Dixie Mission) developed proposals to send limited amounts of aid to the CCP’s military forces. The assessment of these Foreign Service and army officers concerning the corruption and lack of popular support for Chiang Kai-shek’s government and armies proved to be much more accurate than that of two Envoys to China and the Presidents they served. Instead Presidents Roosevelt and Truman responded to the crisis in China by supplying Chiang Kai-shek’s regime with hundreds of millions of dollars annually in military and economic assistance with no strings attached during and after World War II. This made a civil war in China inevitable. A secondary theme of this paper will be the relationship of the Soviet Union to the Guomandang and to the CCP during these same years. Up to the fall of 1945, Stalin and the Soviet Union believed that only Chiang’s GMD could successfully resist Japan and unify China. One of the most important books on the relations between the GMD, the CCP and the U.S. from 1943 to 1945 is Barbara Tuchman’s Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945 1 In her chapters on the 1943-1944 period, Tuchman focuses on General Joseph Stilwell’s attempts to force Chiang Kai-shek to take the field against the Japanese military and to institute democratic reforms. Tuchman’s book is primarily political and military; she devotes relatively little attention to social conditions in the Guomindang areas and the CCP’s base areas, 1 Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945 (Grove Press, 1970).

Transcript of From the Dixie Mission to the Marshall Mission: U.S. Relations … · America’s Failure in China,...

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FromtheDixieMissiontotheMarshallMission:U.S.RelationswiththeChineseCommunistPartyandtheGuomindang,1943-1946April2016Introduction

DuringWorldWarIIandintheimmediatepost-waryears,adeepeconomicandpoliticalcrisisgrippedChina.Eversince1927,theChineseGuomindang(GMD)hadtriedtosuppresstheChineseCommunistParty(CCP)politicallyandmilitarily.ThisstruggletooknewformsduringWorldWarII,whenJapanoccupiedmuchofChinaandtheU.S.governmentactivelyintervenedinChinesepolitics.From1943-1945,afour-starU.S.generalandseveralForeignServiceandArmyofficersattemptedtopressureChiangKai-shek’sGuomindangtoprioritizemilitaryoperationsagainstJapanandtoformacoalitiongovernmentwiththeCCP,ledbyMaoTse-tung.

WiththesupportofPresidentsRooseveltandTrumanandtwoPresidentialEnvoys,ChiangdemandedthattheCCPmergeitsmilitaryforcesintotheGMD’sarmies,andthattheCCPgiveupcontrolofitsbaseareasinnorthChina.ChiangalsoopposedtheCCP’sproposalsforacoalitiongovernment,sinceitwouldhaveendedhisone-partyregime.

Beginninginthesummerof1944,aU.S.ArmyObserverGroupstationedattheheadquartersoftheCCPinnorthChina(theDixieMission)developedproposalstosendlimitedamountsofaidtotheCCP’smilitaryforces.TheassessmentoftheseForeignServiceandarmyofficersconcerningthecorruptionandlackofpopularsupportforChiangKai-shek’sgovernmentandarmiesprovedtobemuchmoreaccuratethanthatoftwoEnvoystoChinaandthePresidentstheyserved. InsteadPresidentsRooseveltandTrumanrespondedtothecrisisinChinabysupplyingChiangKai-shek’sregimewithhundredsofmillionsofdollarsannuallyinmilitaryandeconomicassistancewithnostringsattachedduringandafterWorldWarII.ThismadeacivilwarinChinainevitable. AsecondarythemeofthispaperwillbetherelationshipoftheSovietUniontotheGuomandangandtotheCCPduringthesesameyears.Uptothefallof1945,StalinandtheSovietUnionbelievedthatonlyChiang’sGMDcouldsuccessfullyresistJapanandunifyChina. OneofthemostimportantbooksontherelationsbetweentheGMD,theCCPandtheU.S.from1943to1945isBarbaraTuchman’sStilwellandtheAmericanExperienceinChina,1911-19451Inherchaptersonthe1943-1944period,TuchmanfocusesonGeneralJosephStilwell’sattemptstoforceChiangKai-shektotakethefieldagainsttheJapanesemilitaryandtoinstitutedemocraticreforms.Tuchman’sbookisprimarilypoliticalandmilitary;shedevotesrelativelylittleattentiontosocialconditionsintheGuomindangareasandtheCCP’sbaseareas,

1BarbaraTuchman,StilwellandtheAmericanExperienceinChina,1911-1945(GrovePress,1970).

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whichhadapopulationof90millionin1944.Tuchman’snarrativeendswithStilwell’srecallfromChinabyPresidentRooseveltinOctober1944.Thusthescopeofherbookdoesnotincludethethree-waynegotiationsbetweentheGMD,theCCPandtheU.S.inAugust1945andearly1946,andtheoutbreakofcivilwarinthesummerof1946. AsecondbookthatfocusesontheworkoftheDixieMissionisCarolleCarter’sMissiontoYenan:AmericanLiaisonwiththeChineseCommunists,1944-1947.2CarterprovidesausefuldescriptionofthepoliticalandmilitaryconditionsintheCCPbaseareasfrom1944to1945.WithaYenanfocus,Carter’sbookprovidesrelativelylittledescriptionoftheGuomindangandthesocialconditionsintheareasitcontrolled.TheseconditionsareessentialinordertounderstandtheGMD’srefusaltoengagewiththeJapanesemilitary,anditsstubbornoppositiontoacoalitiongovernmentwiththeCCPandindependentdemocraticforces. AthirdbookthatprovidesimportantmaterialforthispaperisMichaelSheng’sBattlingWesternImperialism:Mao,StalinandtheUnitedStates.3Sheng’sbookcontainschaptersontheCCP’sunitedfrontpolicytowardstheU.S.from1942-1945,theimpactoftheColdWaronChinabeginninginlate1945,andtheCCP’sapproachtotheMarshallMissionin1946.Sheng’sbookisprincipallypoliticalhistory,andprovideslittleonsocialandeconomicconditionsintheCCPandGMDareas. OneoftheearliestacademicstudiesofthistimeperiodwhichisstillusefulisAmerica’sFailureinChina,1941-1950byTangTsou.4WrittenattheheightoftheColdWar,TsouarguesthattheU.S.shouldhaveappliedmoresubstantialanddirectmilitarypowerinChinawiththegoalofbuildinga“Sino-AmericanpositionofstrengthinChina,”andavertingacommunistvictoryinthecivilwar.

YenanandtheGreatPowers:TheOriginsofChineseCommunistForeignPolicy,1944-1946byJamesReardon-Andersonalsoprovidesvaluablematerialforthispaper.5However,Reardon-AndersonprovideslittledescriptionandanalysisofthepoliticsoftheGuomindanganditsrelationshiptotheChinesepeople,withoutwhichitisimpossibletounderstandthepoliticsoftheCCPanditsrelationshiptothe

2CarolleCarter,MissiontoYenan:AmericanLiaisonwiththeChineseCommunists,1944-1947(TheUniversityPressofKentucky,1997).3MichaelSheng,BattlingWesternImperialism:Mao,StalinandtheUnitedStates(PrincetonUniversityPress,1997)4America’sFailureinChina:1941-1950,Volumes1and2(UniversityofChicagoPress,1963).Quotefrom258-259,also217.5YenanandtheGreatPowers:TheOriginsofChineseCommunistForeignPolicy,1944-1946byJamesReardon-Anderson(ColumbiaUniversityPress,1980).OntheCCP’sdiplomacy,see115,163;onitsmilitaryexpansionandthedevelopmentofcivilwar,see78,132,161.6TheNationalistErainChina,1927-1949,withsubmissionsbyLloydEastman,JeromeCh’en,SuzannePepperandLymanVanSlyke(CambridgeUniversityPress,1991).Pepper’sarticleforthis1991compilationfollowedherbook,CivilWarinChina:ThePoliticalStruggle,1945-1949(UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1978).

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Chinesepeople.Furthermore,Reardon-AndersonclaimsthattheCCP’sdiplomaticproposalsforacoalitiongovernmentwereapoliticalcharade,andthattheCCPwasmainlyresponsibleforthedevelopmentofcivilwar. AnotherimportantsourceforthispaperisanarticlebySuzannePepper,“TheKMT-CCPConflict,1945-1949.”ItappearedinTheNationalistErainChina,1927-1949.6Pepper’sarticledescribesconditionsinboththeGMDandCCP-controlledareasthatwerethebackdroptothenegotiationsbetweentheGMD,theCCPandtheU.S.in1945-1946andtotheoutbreakofnationwidecivilwarinmid-1946.Pepper’sdescriptionofthepoliticalandmilitarynexusbetweentheU.S.governmentandtheGuomindangprovidesanin-depthunderstandingoftheGMD’sdefeatatthehandsoftheChineseCommunistPartyin1949.

JayTaylor’sbook,TheGeneralissimo:ChiangKai-shekandtheStruggleforModernChina,7defendsChiangKai-shekandtheGMDinseveralareas.Taylorclaimsthat“ultra-reactionaries”intheGMDratherthanChianghimselfwereresponsibleforsabotagingnegotiationsandusingmilitaryforceagainsttheCCP.8Inaddition,accordingtoTaylor,“agents”ofCCPleaderChouEn-lai“fabricatedorexaggeratedmanyaccountsofcorruptioninthepostwarperiod”intheGuomindang.9

ThemostimportantprimarysourcesforthisarticlearetheStateDepartment’sUnitedStatesRelationswithChinawithSpecialReferencetothePeriod1944-1949(“TheChinaWhitePaper”);thetwovolumesetofMarshall’sMissiontoChina;memoirsofmembersoftheDixieMission;reportsbyForeignServiceofficersJohnServiceandJohnDavies;officialstatementsbytheCCPandtheGuomindang;andarticlesandspeechesbyMaoTse-tungandChiangKai-shek. Sincetheabove-mentionedbooksandthePepperarticlecoverdifferentsubjectsandtimeperiods,thispaperwilldrawonallofthem.Atthesametime,theyarenotsufficientlycriticalofPresidentsRooseveltandTruman,whomadethefinaldecisionstosendsubstantialamountsofmilitaryandeconomicaidtotheGMD.TheyproppedupChiang’sone-partydictatorship,andwhenitsmilitaryequipmentwascaptured,theU.S.becamethequartermasterfortheCCP’sarmies.

ThegrowingpopularsupportfortheCCP,thesteadyerosionofsupportfortheGuomindang,proposalsbytheCCPtoformacoalitiongovernmentthatwererejectedbytheGMD,thecontradictoryroleoftheSovietUnioninChina,andaboveall,increasingsupportbytheU.S.governmentandmilitaryforacorruptandreactionaryGuomindang,willbeongoingthemesofthispaper.StilwellandOthersAdvocatetheFormationoftheU.S.ArmyMissiontoYenan

TheinitialimpetusforaU.S.ArmyObserverMissiontonorthChinacamefromGeneralJosephStilwell,whowastheChiefofStafffortheU.S.ArmyinChina,

7TheGeneralissimo:ChiangKai-shekandtheStruggleforModernChina(HarvardUniversityPress,2009)8Ibid.347,363.9Ibid.330.Taylordoesnotprovideanyreferencesforthisassertion.

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BurmaandIndia.StilwellfirstencounteredtheCCPin1936whileonatriptonorthChinaasamilitaryattache.

StillwellobservedwidespreadcorruptioninGuomindangChina.AtamajorAmericanbaseinsouthwestChinaheobserved:“Noitem,frommedicinetohalf-tontrucks,wasnotforsaleontheblackmarketsofKunming.”10InJuly1943,ForeignServiceofficerJohnServiceobservedlargegroupsofconscriptsbeingmarched,ropedtogether,underthewatchofarmedguards.11

AccordingtoSuzannePepper,intheHonanfamineof1944,“NeithertheChongkinggovernmentnortheauthoritiesinHonanpreparedforthefamine,thoughitscomingwasclearlyforeseen.Farfromprovidingreliefwhenthefaminehit,theauthoritiescollectedtaxesandotherleviesasusual.”WheneliteJapanesetroopsattackedHonaninthespringof1944,angrypeasantsturnedontheirowntroops.ManyGMDsoldiersdroppedtheirgunsandfled.12

Stilwellwroteinhisdiaryinearly1944thatChiangKai-shekwasviscerallyopposedtosharingpowerwiththeCCP.“ChiangisbewilderedbythespreadofCommunistinfluence.Hecan’tseethatthemassofChinesepeoplewelcometheRedsasbeingtheonlyvisiblehopeofrelieffromcrushingtaxation,theabusesoftheArmy,andTaiLi’sGestapo(theGMD’ssecretpolice)…ChianghatestheRedsandwillnottakeanychancesongivingthematoeholdinthegovernment.”13

InJune1943,JohnDavies,ayoungForeignServiceofficerdetailedtoGeneralStilwell,wroteaprescientmemorandumaboutthecontestbetweentheGuomindangandtheCCP:

TheKuomintangandChiangKai-shekrecognizethattheCommunists,withthepopularsupportwhichtheyenjoyandtheirreputationforadministrativereformandhonesty,representachallengetotheCentralGovernmentanditsspoilssystem.TheGeneralissimocannotadmittheseeminglyinnocentdemandsoftheCommuniststhattheirpartybelegalizedanddemocraticprocessesbeputintopractice.TodosowouldprobablymeantheabdicationoftheKuomintangandtheprovincialsatraps.

10Tuchman354.11“MilitaryMovementsNotedAlongRoadfromChungkingtoLanchow,”LostChanceinChina:TheWorldWarIIDespatchesofJohnS.Service,editedbyJosephEsherick(RandomHouse,1974)35.12TheKMT-CCPConflictbySuzannePepper354;Reardon25.DuringaninvestigationofafamineinHonanin1942,Servicefoundthatinadditiontoincreasedtaxation,starvingpeasantswereburdenedbyhigherratesoflaborandmilitaryconscription,andmoregrainwastakenfromthemfortheuseoftheGuomindangmilitary,makingita“man-madefamine.”LostChance12-13.13TheStilwellPapers:GeneralJosephW.Stilwell’sIconoclasticAccountofAmerica’sAdventuresinChina,editedbyTheodoreWhite(ShockenBooks,1948)317,321.

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TheCommunists,ontheotherhand,darenotaccepttheCentralGovernment’sinvitationthattheydisbandtheirarmiesandbeabsorbedinthenationalbodypolitic.Todosowouldbetoinviteextinction.Thisimpassewillprobablyberesolved,AmericanandotherforeignobserversinChungkingagree,byanattemptbytheCentralGovernmenttoliquidatetheCommunists.Thisactionmaybeexpectedtoprecipitateacivilwarfromwhichoneofthetwocontendingfactionswillemergedominant.14

DaviesconcludedthattheU.S.governmentshouldnotcommititselfunalterablytoChiangKai-shek,butshouldworkforapoliticalrealignmentandacoalitiongovernmentthatincludedtheCCP.DavieswasoneofthefirsttoproposesendinganofficialU.S.observermissiontoYenantoobtainfirst-handinformationabouttheworkandviewsoftheCCP. AmbassadorClarenceGausswasundernoillusionaboutthefutureofGuomindang-CCPrelations.Inthefallof1943hereportedtoWashingtonthat“thecontinuedstrugglebetweenthetworivalparties”pointedtooneconclusion—“civilwarwillcomepriortotheconclusionofthewaragainstJapanorafterthatdatewouldseemtodependlargelyupontheKuomintang’sestimateofthepossibilitiesofsuccess.”15 Inthefallof1943,WilliamDonavan,theheadoftheU.S.OfficeofStrategicServices(OSS),approachedChiangKai-shekaboutsendingasmallU.S.armyobservergrouptotheCCP’sheadquartersinYenan.Chiangstalled,statingthathewouldpermitsuchaU.S.militarymissiononlytoanareacontrolledbytheGMD. Chiang’spositionwasconsistentwithhisstrategyofseekingamilitarysolutiontothechallengeoftheCCP.Atthe11thPlenarySessionoftheGuomindanginSeptember1943,ChiangstatedforpublicconsumptionthatitsdifferenceswiththeCCPshouldbesettledbypoliticalmeans.However,healsotoldtheGMDleadershipthattheCCPhadto“abandonitspolicyofforciblyoccupyingournationalterritory,giveupitspasttacticsofassaultingNationalGovernmenttroops[and]discardthepolicyofconfiscatingourlandbyforce.”16AyearlaterChiangwroteinhisdiary:

TheessentialsoftheorganizationoftheCommunistPartyare:(1)violence(i.e.oppression)andruthlesskilling;(2)specialagents(i.e.controlandsurveillance)andrepression.Thepurposesofitstrainingare:(1)eliminationof

14JohnDavies,“MemorandabyForeignServiceOfficersinChina,1943-1945,”24June1943inTheChinaWhitePaper571.15FRUS1943citedinTsou,America’sFailureinChina,1941-1950,Volume1,16116“StatementbyGeneralissimoChiangKai-shektotheFifthCentralExecutiveCommitteeoftheKuomintang,”13September1943,TheChinaWhitePaper,Annex39.

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nationalisticspiritanddevelopmentofinternationalistspirit…(2)eliminationofhumannatureanddevelopmentofanimalnature(arbitrarilydividingthesocietyintoclassesandcausinghatredandstruggle)...Whenthereisnootheralternative,thentheonlywaytodealwiththesituationistocuttheentangledhempwithasharpknife.

ChiangthoughtthatoncetheCCP’smilitaryforcesweredefeated,“ifourarmiesreachtheseareas,thepeoplewillwelcomeourliberatingthem.”Chiangalsobelievedthat,whentheyhadtheopportunity,manyCCPmembersandcadrewouldcomeovertohisside.17

AccordingtoBarbaraTuchman,atthetimeofChiangKai-shek’sspeech,theGMDhadstationed450,000ofitsbesttrainedandequippedtroopsinablockadeofCCPbaseareasinnorthChinainsteadofengagingJapaneseforces.18Twoyearslater,CCPChairmanMaoTse-tungreportedthatcommunistguerillaunitspinneddown64percentoftheonemillionJapaneseoccupationforcesinChina,whiletheGuomindangfaced36percent.19Inreportsfrom1943-1945,theU.S.ForeignServiceofficersrecognizedthattheGuomindangwasnotfightingtheJapanesebecauseitwasconservingitsmilitaryforcesinorderto“eliminateallpoliticalopposition,byforceofarmsifnecessary.”20

In1943,whenJapanesearmieswereattackingChinesepositionsintheYangtzeRivervalley,GeneralStilwelldrewupaplantouseCCPforcestoexecuteadiversionaryattackinnorthwestChina.HealsoproposedthattheCCPbegivensuppliesfromthestockofU.S.armsandequipmentinthepossessionoftheGMD.In1944,StilwellandChief-of-StaffGeorgeMarshallproposedthattheCCPlaunchanattacktobluntamajorJapaneseoffensiveineastChina,code-namedICHIGO.BothplanswererejectedbytheGeneralissimo.21 InSeptember1944,GeneralStilwellsteppeduphispressureonChiangKai-shektotaketothefieldagainsttheJapaneseforces.StilwellarguedthatthesixteenGMDdivisionsthatblockadedthecommunistrearareasinnorthChinamustberedeployedtotheEastChinafront,wheretheforcesofICHIGOhadoverruntheU.S.airbasesinsoutheastChinaandwereapproachingKweilin,themainU.S.militarycenterinChina.

Stilwellalsoobjectedtothefactthat“G-mo”(theGeneralissimo]demandeda

17MyFatherbyChiang’sson,ChiangChing-kuo(Taipei,1956),chapter3,1-4,August-October1944.18Tuchman440,461.19“OnCoalitionGovernment,”SelectedWorks,VolumeIII(Peking,1975)218.20“MemorandabyForeignServiceOfficers,”TheWhitePaper,569-575;reportbyJohnServiceandRaymondLudden,14February1945,575.21Stilwell’sMissiontoChina(GovernmentPrintingOffice,1953)citedinTsou171.

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“blankcheck“onU.S.Lend-Leaseaid.22ThiswasatatimewhenU.S.marinesandarmyunitsweretakingheavycasualtiesfromentrenchedJapaneseforcesintheirisland-hoppingcampaignsinthePacific.DuetoChiangKai-shek’sobstructionismandtheoppositionoftheWarandStateDepartmentstouseLend-Leaseaidasleverage,ChiangdidnotmovehisblockingarmiessouthduringWorldWarII.

OneofthemosteffectiveopponentsofChiang’sblockadeofthecommunistareaswasMadameSunYat-sen,thewidowofthefounderoftheGuomindangintheearly1920s.ShesentmessagestonewspapersandorganizationsintheU.S.andBritaincallingforliftingtheblockadesothatmedicineandothersuppliescouldreachnorthChina,andallChinesecouldbegivenanequalchancetofightJapan.Duetoherstature,shetoldJohnService“Alltheycandoistokeepmefromtraveling.”23

ChiangKai-shek’stopadviserssuccessfullyusedblackmailtoobtaineverlargeramountsofaidfromtheU.S.In1943,T.V.Soong,theGuomindang’ssecond-in-command,threatenedtomakeaseparatepeacewithJapanunlesstheGMD’sdemandsforU.S.aidweremet.24IntheyearsaftertheJapaneseinvasionin1937,ChiangKai-shekmaderepeatedsecretoverturestoJapanforan“honorablepeace”ratherthanitscompletedefeat.In1943,SoongdemandedthattheU.S.supplytheGuomindangwith$1billionineconomicaid.Fourmonthslater,theU.STreasuryDepartmentgrantedacreditof$500milliontotheGMD.25

AccordingtoRoosevelt’sadministrativeassistant,ColonelAlbertElsey,thePresidentbelievedthat“nootherChinesefigureappearedtohavesomanyoftheelementsofleadershiportooffersogoodachanceforcooperationwiththeU.S.”26TheworsemilitaryandpoliticalconditionsbecameinGuomindangChina,themorewillingPresidentRooseveltwastosupportChiangKai-shek’sone-partydictatorship.InameetingwiththeJointChiefsofStaffinlate1943,Rooseveltstatedthat“thesituationofChiangKai-shekwascritical,”andthathewas“determinedtogiveChiangKai-shekasfaraspossiblewhathewanted,withoutaquidproquo.”27

Roosevelt’salarmatthedeterioratingpositionoftheGMDwasexploitedbyChiangKai-shek,hisAmerican-bornwifeandtheright-wing“ChinaLobby”intheU.S.28AttheinsistenceofChiangKai-shekandtheChinaLobby,PresidentRoosevelt

22TheodoreWhite’seditorialnotes,September1944;StilwellPapers,8September1944,327,329.23LostChanceinChina,February14,1944,108-109.24Tuchman37125“SecretaryofWarStimsontoPresidentRoosevelt,”26May1944inTheChinaWhitePaper496.26“ThePresidentandU.S.AidtoChina”inSino-SovietRelations,1945-1955,editedbyHarryHardingandYuanMing(SRBooks,1989)55.27Tuchman368-369.28Apowerfulgroupofconservativecongressmen,retiredgenerals,corporateexecutives,publishersandmissionarieswhofoughtformoremilitaryandeconomicaidforChiang.TheChinaLobbyinAmericanPoliticsbyRossKoen(Harper&Row,1974).

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finallyrecalledGeneralStilwellinOctober1944,andfailedtoimposetheconditionthattheGMDarmiesengagemainlywiththeJapaneseoccupationforces.

InMay1944,PresidentRooseveltsentVice-PresidentHenryWallacetoChinatotrytobreakthedeadlockbetweentheGuomindangandtheCCP.29ChiangtoldWallacethathehadheardof“criticismofChinaappearingintheAmericanpress,andsaidthatthiscriticismshouldbestopped.”Chiangclaimedthat“thelowmoraleofthepeopleandarmywasduetoCommunistpropaganda.”InatelegramtoWashingtonD.C.,Wallace“expressedamazementatthisstatement.”30

AfterPresidentRooseveltsentChiangKai-shekatelegramonJune23thatstressedtheneedforU.S.intelligencefromnorthChinainordertorescuecrewsofdownedB-29bombers,ChiangfinallyagreedthattheU.S.ArmycouldsendasmallmilitaryobservermissiontoYenan.ThreedaysbeforeWallacemetwithChiangKai-shek,ForeignServiceofficerJohnService,whowasdetailedtoStilwell,describedthedeterioratingconditionsinGuomindangChinainalengthyreport:

Chinafaceseconomiccollapse.Thisiscausingdisintegrationofthearmyandthegovernment’sadministrationapparatus....Peasantresentmentoftheabusesofconscription,taxcollectionandotherarbitraryimpositionshasbeenwidespreadandisgrowing.…Thegovernmentdoesnothingtostoplarge-scaleprofiteering,hoardingandspeculation—allofwhicharecarriedonbypeopleeitherpowerfulinthePartyorwithintimatepoliticalconnections.…Themultipleandomnipresentsecret-policeorganizations,thegendarmerieandsoforth—itcontinuestostrengthenasalastresortforinternalsecurity.ObsessedbythegrowingandpotentialthreatoftheCommunists,whoitfearsmayattractthepopularsupportitsownnaturemakesimpossible,theKuomintang,despitethepretext—tomeetforeignandChinesecriticism—ofconductingnegotiationswiththeCommunists,continuestoadheretopoliciesandplanswhichcanonlyresultincivilwar.

ServicecalledforreformsintheGMD,usingLend-Leaseaidasalever.

WemustseektocontributetowardthereversalofthepresentmovementtowardcollapseandtherousingofChinafromitsmilitaryinactivity...bythecarefulexertionofourinfluence,whichsofarhasnotbeenconsciouslyandsystematicallyused.…IfwecometotherescueoftheKuomintangonitsownterms,wewouldbebuttressing—butonlytemporarily—adecadentregime.BothChinaandourselveswouldbegainingonlyabriefrespitefromtheultimatedayofreckoning.31

29RooseveltalsochoseWallacefortheChinamissioninordertoremovehimfromtheU.S.duringtheDemocraticParty’s1944PresidentialNominatingConvention.ThisclearedthedecksforthenominationofthemoreconservativeSenatorHarryTrumanasvice-presidentialcandidate,whobecamePresidentuponRoosevelt’sdeathin1945.Garver233.30“AmbassadorGausstoSecretaryHull,”31August1944inTheChinaWhitePaper,Annex45.31JohnService,“TheSituationinChinaandSuggestionsRegardingAmericanPolicy,”LostChance,20June1944,149-155;alsoTheChinaWhitePaper567-573.

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Inthismemorandum,Serviceheldouthopeforthereplacementofthe

Guomindangby“aprogressivegovernmentabletounifythecountryandhelpusfightJapan.”However,ServicedidnotexplainhowthiscouldhappenundertheGMD’sone-partypolicestatethatwasrecognizedasthesolelegitimategovernmentinChinabytheU.S.

AsfortheCCP,ServicestatedthattheU.S.shouldcooperatewithcommunistswhowerewillingtoresumetheUnitedFront,andpointedoutthatadvancingactiveoperationsagainsttheJapaneseinnorthChinaraised“thequestionofassistancetoorcooperationwithCommunistandguerillaforces.”

Inthefallof1944,twotop-levelCCPreportsproposedhowthepartyshouldapproachtheupcomingDixieMissionandPresidentRoosevelt:

HeisontheonehanddissatisfiedbyJiang’sfascisttendencyandthepassivisminfightingtheJapanese;henonethelesscontinuestosupportJiangpolitically,militarilyandfinancially...TheU.S.willnevergiveupitsdominationoverChinesepoliticsandeconomy,norwillitreduceitspowertoinfluenceChina’scentralgovernment...Wehavetogothroughtheprocessinwhich[our]newdemocracymuststruggleagainst[U.S.]olddemocracy.32

Thesecondreport,“OnDiplomaticWork,”whichwasmostlikelyauthoredby

ChouEn-lai,markedtheofficialbeginningoftheCCP’sforeignpolicy.Withthegoalofachievinggreatergrowthoftheliberatedareas,thereportinstructedpartycadretowelcomeforeignmilitary,diplomatic,economicandculturaldelegationsaspartofdevelopinganinternationalunitedfront.

“ThemilitarypersonnelandarmedforcesoftheAlliesmay...enterourareasinordertocarryoutthejointtasksoffightingagainsttheenemyandobtainourassistance.Meanwhileweshouldalsowelcomemilitary,medical,materialandtechnologicalassistance.

Thereportalsostatedthat:

Weshouldenhanceourconfidenceinandself-respectinournation,butavoidxenophobia;ontheotherhand,weshouldlearnfromtheadvancedexperienceofotherpeoplesandshouldbewillingtocooperatewiththem,butweshouldnotfearthemorfawnonthem.33

32“TheAnalysisonDiplomacyandSuggestionstothePartyCenterbytheComradesintheSouthChinaBureau,”16August1944,Sheng81.33CCPCentralCommittee,“OnDiplomaticAffairs,“18August1944.ChineseCommunistForeignPolicyandtheColdWarinAsia:NewDocumentaryEvidence,1944-1950,editedbyShuguangZhangandChenJian(ImprintPublications,1996)13-17.ThesedocumentswerereleasedbytheChinesegovernmentinthe1980s.

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ThesereportsconcludedthattherewasapossibilitythattheU.S.wouldprovidemilitaryaidtoYenanandforcetheGMDtoenteracoalitiongovernmentwiththeCCP,butitwasonlybecauseWashingtonwantedJapan’stotaldefeat.

IninterviewswithServiceinthefallof1944,MaoandotherCCPleadersexplainedthatitsoughttherapideconomicdevelopmentofChinainordertoraisethelivingstandardsoftheChinesepeople,andthatunderpresentconditionsthiscouldonlybeaccomplishedbymeansofcapitalismwithforeignassistance.SincetheSovietUnionwasfacingyearsofreconstruction,Maoexplained,onlytheUnitedStatecouldprovidethenecessaryeconomicassistance.However,hewarnedthatthisdidnotprecludetheCCPfromturningtotheSovietUnion“inordertosurviveanAmerican-supportedKuomintangattack.”34 In1944,theCCP’sthree-yearZhengFeng(Rectification)campaignended.UnderMao’sleadership,theCCPdevelopedself-reliantresponsestotheeconomicandmilitaryhardshipsimposedbytheJapanesearmy.ZhengFengpopularizedthemethodofcommunistleadershipembeddedintheconceptofthemassline—whichstatedthatideasandpoliciesmustbedevelopedandtested“fromthemasses,tothemasses.”ZhengFengcalledfortheintegrationofMarxism-LeninismwithChineseconditions,andrejectedattemptstoimposeSovietpoliciesonChina.ThedissolutionoftheSoviet-dominatedCominternin1943contributedtothesuccessofthiscampaign.ItalsoestablishedMaoastheundisputedleaderoftheCCP,andallowedhimtowalkathinlineofsupportingtheSovietUnionwhileretainingtheCCP’spoliticalindependenceofaction.35TheDixieMissionComesIntoExistence

AfterRooseveltandWallaceneutralizedChiangKai-shek’soppositiontoaU.S.militaryobservergroup,theDixieMissiongearedupinthesummerof1944.AnumberofForeignServiceandArmyofficersagreedwithStilwell’sassessmentofthegovernmentinChungking.TheybelievedthattheU.S.shouldexplorethedevelopmentofcloserpoliticalandmilitarytieswiththeCCPinnorthChina.36

TheU.S.ArmyObserverGrouptoYenan—calledtheDixieMissionbecauseitwassenttorebelterritory–-cameintoexistenceinJuly1944.Thefirstcommandingofficerandthepersonmostcloselyassociatedinpeople’smindswiththemissionwasColonelDavidBarrettfromArmyintelligence,G-2.BarretthadbeeninChinaonactivedutysince1924andspokefluentChinese.However,BarrettcreditsForeignServiceofficersJohnServiceandJohnDavieswithplayingtheprincipalrolesinthe

34JohnService,“TheOrientationoftheChineseCommunistsTowardtheSovietUnionandtheUnitedStates,”LostChance308-309.35Garver242.36ThiswasnotcompletelynewterritoryfortheU.S.Inthelate1930s,beforetheimpositionoftheGuomindangblockadeonthecommunistbaseareasinnorthChina,severalforeigncorrespondentshadvisitedtheseareasandreportedfavorablyonwhattheyfound.InRedStarOverChina,EdgarSnowwroteindetailabouttheLongMarchandconditionsinYenan,andpublishedthefirstinterviewofMaobyaforeignjournalist.

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formationofthemissionandwritingaboutitswork.37ServicewasidentifiedastheleadingpoliticalofficerinthemissiontowhomCCPChairmanMaoTse-tung,theCCP’schiefnegotiatorChouEn-lai(ZhouEnlai)andEighthRouteArmycommanderChuTeh(ZhuDe)gavelengthyinterviewsuptoService’srecallinApril1945.InoneofhisfirstreportsfromYenan,Servicewrotethat:

ReportsoftwoAmericanofficers,severalcorrespondentsandtwenty-oddforeigntravelersregardingconditionsintheareasofNorthChinaunderCommunistcontrolareinstrikingagreement...TheJapanesearebeingactivelyopposed...Thisoppositionispossibleandsuccessfulbecauseitistotalguerillawarfareaggressivelywagedbyatotallymobilizedpopulation...ThereiscompletesolidarityoftheArmyandpeople.Thistotalmobilizationisbaseduponandhasbeenmadepossiblebywhatamountstoaneconomic,politicalandsocialrevolution.Thisrevolutionhasbeenmoderateanddemocratic.Ithasimprovedtheeconomicconditionofthepeasantsbyrentandinterestreduction,taxreformandgoodgovernment....Thecommonpeople,forthefirsttime,havebeengivensomethingtofightfor.TheJapanesefoughtnownotmerelybecausetheyareforeigninvadersbutbecausetheydenythisrevolution.38WritingfromYenan,ForeignServiceofficerJohnDaviesadvocatedthatthe

U.S.governmentshiftitsstrategytoheadoffSovietinfluenceinChina:WemustforthetimebeingcontinuerecognitionofChiang’sgovernment.Butwemustberealistic.Wemustnotindefinitelyunderwriteapoliticallybankruptregime.AndiftheRussiansaregoingtoenterthePacificWar,wemustmakeadeterminedefforttocapturepoliticallytheChineseCommunistsratherthanallowthemtogobydefaultwhollytotheRussians...ByreasonofourrecognitionoftheChiangKai-shekGovernmentasnowconstitutedwearecommittedtoasteadilydecayingregimeandseverelyrestrictedinworkingoutmilitaryandpoliticalcooperationwiththeChineseCommunists.

Daviesalsoreportedthatfrom1937to1944,thepopulationoftheCCPbaseareashadgrownfrom1.5millionto90million,“andtheywillcontinuetogrow.”39 InDecember1944,Daviespointedoutthat“theGeneralissimowillcontinuetorefuseuspermissiontoexploitmilitarilytheChineseCommunistpositionextendingintothegeographicalcenterofJapan’sinnerzone.WiththewaragainstJapanprovingsocostlytous...itistimethatweunequivocallytoldChiangKai-shek

37ColonelDavidBarrett,DixieMission:TheUnitedStatesArmyObserverGroupinYenan,1944(TheCenterforChineseStudies:UniversityofCaliforniaatBerkeley,1970)23.38JohnService,“MemorandaofForeignServiceOfficers,”9October1944,TheWhitePaper566.39JohnDavies,“MemorandaofForeignServiceOfficers,”7and15November1944inTheWhitePaper566-567,574.

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thatwewillworkwithand,withinourdiscretion,supplywhateverChineseforceswebelievecancontributemosttothewaragainstJapan.”40

InJanuary1945,SecretaryofStateEdwardStettinius.informedRooseveltthat“Chiangisinadilemma.CoalitionwouldmeananendofconservativeKuomintangdominationandopenthewayforthemorevirileandpopularCommuniststoextendtheirinfluencetothepointperhapsofcontrollingthegovernment.FailuretosettlewiththeCommunists,whoaredailygrowingstronger,wouldinvitethedangerofaneventualoverthrowoftheKuomintang.”41ThepositionsofStilwellandStettiniushelpedtoopenthedoorfortheworkoftheDixieMission.

TheobjectivesoftheMissionweretogeneratereportsonconditionsintheCCPareasandproposalsforU.S.relationswiththeCCP;toobtainintelligenceontheJapaneseforces;toteachcommunistsoldiersU.S.tacticsandtheuseofAmericanweapons;andmostimportantly,togatherintelligenceontheCCP’smilitaryforcesinnorthChina.

Inlate1944,thegeneralsoftheCCP’sEighthRouteArmybriefedBarrettonthedeploymentoftheirmilitaryforcesandtheirstrategyintheanti-Japanesewar.ThisinformationenabledBarretttocomposereportsonthestrengthofthecommunistforcesand“whattheywerelikelytobeabletocontributeinthefuture.”Barrettrecommendedthat“initiallytheCommunistsshouldbegivenarelativelysmallnumberofrifles,machineguns,trenchmortars,bazookas,andsomelightartillery.IftheymadegooduseofthearmsandequipmentinfightingtheJapanese,Irecommendedtheybegivenadditionallargeramounts.”42AbriefingforServiceinAugust1944demonstratedtheimportancetotheCCPofacquiringweapons;outof2,610,000regularsandmembersofthePeople’sMilitia,only282,000hadrifles,mainlycapturedfromtheJapaneseorJapanese-ledpuppettroops.43

InSeptember1944,theCCPPartyCenterheldameetingonhowtorelatetotheDixieMissionandtheRooseveltadministration.Afterthemeeting,ChouEn-laiwrotealettertoGeneralStilwellinwhichheraisedthreepoints:ThecrisisinChinawascausedbytheGMD’spoliticalfascismandmilitarydefeatismanditshouldthereforebereplacedbyacoalitiongovernment;incontrasttotheGMD,theCCP

40JohnDavies,Ibid,12December1944,574-575.41FeisHerbert,TheChinaTangle:TheAmericanEffortinChinafromPearlHarbortotheMarshallMission(PrincetonUniversityPress,1965)219-220.42Barrett36,90.43LostChance205-208.

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wasfightingtheJapanesevictoriously,sotheCCPshouldrecognizedandsuppliedwithatleastone-halfofthetotalU.S.weaponsandmunitionsforChinaundertheLend-Leaseprogram;andtheGMDmilitaryblockadeagainstthecommunistbaseareasshouldberemoved.44 TheCCPleaderssawsomeprogressinthisdirectionasaresultoftwotripsbehindenemylinesledbyrankingDixieMissionofficersbetweenSeptember1944andJanuary1945.ThefirsttriptonorthShensiwasledbythemission’schiefmedicalofficer,MajorM.A.Casberg,andincludedthreereportersfromtheNewYorkTimes,LondonTimesandtheBaltimoreSun.AccordingtoCasberg:

Oneofthemostimpressivefactsgleanedfromthistripwasthecompletesolidarityofthesoldiersandthecivilians.Thissolidarityincreasesasoneapproachesthefront....Thevillagersareverygenerousinsupplyingtheneedsofthesoldiers,allfoodbeingpaidforinfull.OnecannottravelveryfarnearthefrontwithoutmeetingthePeople’Militia,whoatintervalsaveragetwotothreemilesasguards…MinewarfarehasbeenconvertedintoaneffectiveweaponbythePeople’sMilitia,somuchsothatitmanyareastheJapaneseareafraidtoventurefarfromtheirblockhouses….Besidesgainingmilitaryintelligence,membersofthePeople’sMilitiaactasguidesforthesoldiersoftheEighthRouteArmy.Muchofthefightingisdoneatnightandtheterrainisrough,soitisagreatadvantageforthesoldierstohaveasguidesmenwhohavebeenbornandraisedinthevicinityandknoweveryinchoftheground.

ThecorrespondentsonCasberg’stripwitnessedthecaptureoftwoJapanese

blockhousesand70rifles.Intheareatheyvisited,thePeople’sMilitiaparticipatedinfightingandcapturedseveralblockhouseswithouttheaidoftheregulars.FortyChinesepuppettroopsdesertedandcameovertothecommunistforceswiththeirweapons.ThecorrespondentsalsodescribedasystemofcooperativelaborwherebypeasantsandsoldiersharvestedtheircropsassoonaspossibleinordertofrustrateJapaneseforagingraids.45

FromOctober1944toJanuary1945,ColonelW.J.Peterkin,ForeignServiceofficerRaymondLuddenandfiveothermembersoftheDixieMissionmadeafour-monthtripbehindenemylines.Theyobservedthemilitarytacticsemployedbycommunistguerillas,includingtunnelwarfare.Peterkin’steaminspectedseveraltunnelsystems,whichextendedadistanceoftwotofourmilesunderground.Thesecave-liketunnelsenabledthevillagersandguerillastoescapefromenemyraidingpartiesandtohideharvestedcropsfromtheJapanese.Theteamalsoreceiveddemonstrationsofthemanufactureofcrudeweaponsinlocalmachineshops,andobservedhowtheguerillasworkedinthefieldstogetherwithlocalfarmers.ReliableintelligencefromthesepeasantsenabledthesereadilyidentifiedAmericanstotravelwithinamileofoneblockhouse,andprotectedthemfrompursuingJapaneseforces. 44Sheng83.45“AmericanOfficersandForeignCorrespondentsReportActivePopularSupportoftheEighthRouteArmyatFront,”9October1944,LostChance,234-244.

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Peterkin’steammetupwiththecrewofadownedB-29whohadbeenrescuedbycommunistguerillas,andsentthemontheirwaytoYenan.AccordingtoService,asofearly1945,almostalloftheimportantcommunist-heldareasinnorthandcentralChinahadbeenvisitedbyU.S.militaryobserversorrescuedaircrews.ThisverifiedCCPclaimsofcontrollingthecountrysideofmostof“Japanese-occupiedChina.”46

Afterhistrip,ColonelPeterkinrecommendedtoGeneralWedemeyerthatdemolitionequipmentbesenttoYenaninordertoassisttheCCP’sforcesinsabotagingJapanese-heldrailwaysandcommunicationsystemsinnorthChina.47EventhoughPeterkin’sproposaltoprovidelimitedamountsofmilitaryaidtotheCCPwouldhavestrengthenedtheanti-JapaneseresistanceinnorthChina,itmetthesamefateasColonelBarrett’splanonthedesksofmilitaryleadersandgovernmentofficialsinWashingtonD.C.andChungking.Rejectingtheseplans,AmbassadorHurleywroteinFebruary1945,“IamofthefirmopinionthatsuchhelpwouldbeidenticaltosupplyingarmstotheCommunistarmedparty,andwouldthereforebeadangerousprecedent.”48

AnimportantsourceofintelligenceonJapaneseforcescamefromprisoners.ThepolicyoftheCCPinYenanwastotreatitsJapanesePOWshumanely.AJapanese-speakingForeignServiceofficer,JohnEmmerson,spenthoursquestioningabout150JapanesePOWs,whowillinglyprovidedimportantintelligenceontheirunits.ThecommunistsinvitedEmmersontoinspecttheirPOWoperation,whichwasaneducationalinstitution.Inthis“workersandpeasantsschool,”JapanesecommunistsandJapanese-speakingCCPmembersconsultedthePOWsinthepreparationofpropagandaaimedatJapanesetroops.TheyalsoraisedthePOWs’politicalconsciousnessanddevelopedthemintorevolutionaries.49

Servicereportedontheabsenceofbanditryinthecommunistbaseareas,statingthatthiswasduetoimprovementoftheeconomicconditionsofthepeasants,andtothemobilizationofthepopulationintomassorganizationsinsupportoftheanti-Japanesewar.Incontrast,ServicegavethefollowingreasonsfortheprevalenceofbanditryinGuomindangterritory:“Oppositiontoharshmilitaryconscription;impoverishmentbyheavytaxationandgraincollections;thepresenceoflargenumbersofdesertingandhalf-starvedsoldiers;discriminatorytreatmentofaboriginalorminoritygroups(suchastheMiaotribesinKweichowortheMohammedansinKansu);andpopularresentmentofoppressiveandcorruptgovernment.”50

46“VerificationofCommunistTerritorialClaimsbyDirectAmericanObservation,”17March1945,LostChance,244-246.47InsideChina:AnEyewitnessAccountofAmerica’sMissiontoYenan(GatewayPress,1992)36-49,147-148.48“TheMilitarySituationintheFarEast,”citedinTsou178.49JohnDavies,ChinaHand:AnAutobiography(Univ.ofPennsylvaniaPress,2012)223.EmmersonlaterwroteTheJapaneseThread:ALifeintheU.S.ForeignService(Holt,1978).50LostChance,October2,1944,188-190.

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Attheendof1944,theCCP’stopgeneralsheldameetingtodiscusstheconditionsinwhichCCP-U.S.militarycooperationcouldtakeplace:U.S.troopsthatlandedinShandongProvinceandotherCCP-heldareasmustobeyCCPpoliciesandlaws;GMDtroopscouldnotfollowtheAmericansintoCCP-heldareas;andU.S.armsandmunitionsfortwentybrigadesofcommunisttroopsshouldbedeliveredtotheCCP.51

In1944andearly1945,theCCPleadershipheldaseriesofdiscussionswithU.S.officersaboutassistingAmericanunitsiftheylandedintheShandongPeninsulaandothercoastalareasinnorthChinacontrolledbytheCCP.ThegoalofYenanintheseplanswasthedefeatofJapanandliftingthepressureoftheJapaneseArmyonitsbaseareas.AtleastuntiltherecallofGeneralStilwellinOctober1944,theCCPwaswillingtoconsidertheappointmentofanAlliedSupremeCommanderinordertocoordinatealloperationsagainstJapaninChina.52

InDecember1944,Maj.GeneralRobertMcClurepresentedYenanwithaplanforanairborneunitof4,000-5,000whowouldleadCCP-U.S.sabotageteamsbehindJapaneselines.ThisplanwasvetoedbythenewAmbassador,PatrickHurley,beforethedetailswereworkedout.53

AtthesametimethatMcClurevisitedYenan,Lt.ColonelWillisBird,theDeputyChiefoftheOSSinChina,broughtEighthRouteArmygeneralsaplantoprovidecompleteequipmentfor25,000guerillasand100,000one-shotpistolsforthePeople’sMilitia.54

However,theOSSwasplayingadoublegamewithYenan.ItfailedtodeliverthismilitaryequipmenttotheEighthRouteArmy.WhenGeneralChuTehrequested$20milliontobeusedtobribeChinesepuppettroopstodefectandrelinquishtheirweaponstoCCPguerillas,theOSSstalledanddidnotactonChu’srequest.55

TheOSSwasalsodevelopinganotherplanformilitaryaidtoYenanthatwasaimedatcollectingintelligenceontheCCP’sforces.TheOSSproposedthattheU.S.ArmyprovidetheCCP’sEighthRouteArmywithradiofieldunitsaspartofanexpandedmilitarycommunicationsystemthroughoutmuchofChina.TheCCPpulledoutofthisplanwhenitlearnedthattheOSSwouldcontroltheradionetwork,andthattheOSSwasrunningitsownoperationsinareasofnorthChinathatwereunderthecontroloftheCCP.EvenbeforetheJapanesesurrenderinAugust1945,CCPforcescapturedseveralOSSteamsthatwereoperatinginnorthChina.Whileit

51Sheng85.52“ReportbyJohnServiceonConversationwithChouEn-lai,”July28,1944,LostChance261.53HurleyremovedBarrettasleaderoftheDixieMissionduetohisinvolvementinthesenegotiationsforU.S.militaryaidtotheCCP.Reardon61-64.54Barrett77-78;Sheng91-92.55MaochunYu,OSSinChina:PreludetoColdWar(NavalInstitutePress,1996)195,220.

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negotiatedwiththeCCPinYenan,theOSSwasbasedinXian,southofYenan,whereitworkedcloselywithGuomindangarmyintelligenceunits.56

InMay1945,aftercommunistguerillascapturedfourOSSofficersandamemberoftheGMDsecretpoliceinFuping,ShensiProvince,itdiscoveredthatthegoalofthismissionwastoestablishcontactwithtwoChinesepuppetgeneralsandtosupplythemwitharmsthatwouldbeusedagainstCCPforces.TheU.S.militaryissuedaformalprotesttotheCCP,whichYenanpromptlyrejected.

TheCCPCentralCommitteethenissuedaninner-partydirectivethatitsforcesarrest,disarmandholdallunauthorizedAmericansfoundinareascontrolledbytheCCP.IttookastrongerpositionofrefusingtocooperatewithU.S.forcesintheJapaneserear,denyingAmericanrequeststobuildairfieldsinnorthChinaand,mostimportant,opposinganyAmericanmilitarylandinginthecommunist-controlledareasofcoastalShandong.57

TheCCP’sapproachtopossibleU.S.landingsinChinadependedonthetimeperiodinquestion.Throughout1944andthespringof1945,officialsintheStateDepartmentandevenRooseveltpubliclydiscussedalandinginChina.AdmiralNimitzrepeatedlytoldthepressthattheAmericanmilitarywasaimingattheChinacoast.58ByitsSeventhCongressinApril1945,theCCPhadconcludedthatAmericanmilitaryassistancewouldnotbeforthcoming,butwouldbesenttotheGuomindangexclusively.

TheCCP’sapproachtocooperationwiththeU.S.militaryduringWorldWarIIwasdrivenbythefactthattheU.S.ratherthantheSovietUnionwasdominantinChinafrom1941to1945.TheCCPandtheU.S.sharedacommonenemy,Japan.

TheSovietUnionunderStalin’sleadershipprovidedallofitsmilitaryaidtoChinaduringthewartotheGuomindangratherthantotheCCP.AfterthesigningoftheSino-SovietNonaggressionTreatyin1937aimedatJapan,Chiang’sregimereceivedseveralhundredmilliondollarsinarmamentsfromtheSovietUnion,including900aircraft,82tanksandlargenumbersofweaponsforitsinfantry.43percentofChina’sstrategicmineralstradewenttotheSovietUnioninexchangefortheseweapons,muchofwhichwasusedagainsttheCCP.59 BeginninginJune1941,theSovietleadershippressedtheCCPtoattackmajorJapanesetroopconcentrationstokeepthemawayfromtheSovietborderinthenameof“proletarianinternationalism.”MaoandtheCCPinsteadpursuedastrategyofconductingextensiveguerillawarfareandcampaignsofpolitical

56Ibid.167,186-187,224.57“OnOurStrategiesTowardtheReactionaryU.S.ChinaPolicy,”7July1945,inChineseCommunistForeignPolicy24-25.58AccordingtoonesourcewithaccesstoNimitz’sthinkingonthissubject,hisstatementstothepressweremadewiththepurposeofdivertingJapaneseattentionfromtherealtarget,thePhilippines.Reardon27,177.TheCCP,ofcourse,wasnotawareofNimitz’sstrategy.59SovietmilitaryassistancetoChinaendedin1941aftertheGermanattackontheSovietUnion,whenitsignedaNeutralityPactwithJapansoitwouldn’thavetofightawarontwofrontsinEuropeandAsia.TheDragon’sWar:AlliedOperationsandtheFateofChina,1937-1947byMaochunYu(NavalInstitutePress,2006)12-13,17,21.

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mobilizationsamongthepeasantrythatpreservedtheCCP’sarmedstrengthandallowedittoexpanditsbaseareasinnorthChina.StalinwasnotprimarilyconcernedwithsupportingtheCCP,butwithkeepingtheGMDinthewartotiedownasmuchoftheJapaneseoccupationforcesaspossibleandpostponetheopeningofaSovietsecondfrontagainstJapanintheFarEast.

Atthesametime,MaosoughttoutilizeSovietpressureontheGuomindangtorestrainChiangfromlaunchingmajoroffensivesagainsttheCCPduringthewar.MaoalsosoughttomaintainfraternalrelationswithStalinandtheSovietUnionintheeventthattheRedArmyenteredthewaragainstJapan.60TheHurleyMissionandtheCCP’sSeventhCongress:PositionsHarden

Inthesummeroff1944,RooseveltandtheJointChiefsofStaffdecidedtogiveGeneralStilwellcommandpoweroverChinesearmies.ChiangrespondedwiththeclaimthathecouldnotworkwithStilwell,objectingtoStilwell’sproposaltotakecommandofallAlliedarmiesinChinaandcontrolofLend-Leaseaidasa“newformofimperialism.”

InSeptember,PresidentRooseveltsentPatrickHurleytoChinaasaPresidentialEnvoy.HurleyhadbecomewealthyinMexicanoillitigation,andwasHoover’sSecretaryofWar,whenhereceivedthetitleofMajor-General.InNovember1944,HurleyreplacedAmbassadorClarenceGauss,whohadbeenclosetoStilwell.

AfterhearrivedinChina,HurleypresentedChiangKai-shekwithafive-pointagendathathadbeengeneratedinWashingtonD.C.Thisincluded“theunificationofallmilitaryforcesinChina”and“tosustainChiangKai-shekasPresidentoftheRepublicandGeneralissimooftheArmies.”61ThiswasconsistentwithwhatChiangtoldGaussinAugust:“TheAmericangovernmentshouldtelltheCommuniststosettletheirdifferenceswith,andsubmitto,theNationalGovernment.”62

HurleyalsobackedupChiang,tellingRooseveltthat“ifyousustainStilwellinthiscontroversyyouwillloseChiangKai-shekandpossiblyyouwillloseChinawithhim.”63InOctober1944,PresidentRooseveltreplacedStilwellwithAlbertWedemeyerasArmyChiefofStaffinChina.WedemeyerhadbeenaplannerintheWarDepartment.EventhoughGeneralWedemeyerhadcontroloverAmericanLend-LeasesuppliestoChina,hedidnotusethemasleveragetoforceChiangtotakethefieldagainsttheJapanesemilitary. ThestrategyofCCPChairmanMaoTse-tungandChouEn-laiwastodriveawedgebetweenChiangKai-shek’sone-partydictatorshipandtheU.S.’sstatedgoalofa“democraticChina.”AttheSeventhPartyCongressbeginninginApril1945,

60JohnGarver,Chinese-SovietRelations,1937-1945(OxfordUniversityPress,1988)137,238-239;Reardon12-13.61RussellBuhite,PatrickHurleyandU.S.ForeignPolicy(CornellUniversityPress,1973)165-166;“GeneralHurley’sInstructions,”18August1944,TheWhitePaper71.62FRUS1944,6:547,citedin“Hurley’sMissiontoChina”inSino-SovietRelations86.63ChinaHand190-191,204.

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MaostatedthatallChinesemilitaryforcesmustengagewiththeJapanese;thattheGMDmustrevokealllawsthatsuppressedtheChinesepeople’sfreedomofspeechandassembly;andthatagriculturalrentsandinterestmustbelowered.FortheCCP,theonlywayforwardwas“theimmediateabolitionoftheKuomintang’sone-partyregimeandtheestablishmentofacoalitiongovernmentenjoyingnationwidesupport,includingrepresentativesofalltheanti-Japanesepartiesandpeoplewithoutpartyaffiliation.”64WhileMaoandtheCCPleadershipknewthatChiangKai-shekwouldrejecttheCCP’sproposalforademocraticcoalitiongovernment,theybelievedthatitwasessentialtoraiseandsticktothisdemandinordertotakethepoliticalhighgroundamongthewar-wearyChinesepeople. AttheSeventhCongress,MaoaddressedthepositionofthedemocraticpartiesandwhyitwasintheirinteresttoallythemselveswiththeCCP:

Thesepeople[Chiangandhisfollowers]saidtotheCommunists:“Ifyougiveupyourarmy,weshallgiveyoufreedom.”Ifthesewordsweresincere,thenthepartieswhichhadnoarmyshouldhaveenjoyedfreedomlongago...TheDemocraticLeagueandthedemocraticfactionoftheKuomintanghadnomilitaryforce,yetneitherofthemenjoyedanyfreedom...Justbecausetheyhadnoarmy,theylosttheirfreedom.

InMay1945,theGuomindanghelditsSixthNationalCongress.Chiangstated

that“ourcentralproblemtodayishowtodestroytheCCP.”HealsoannouncedthataNationalAssemblycomposedexclusivelyofGMDleaderswouldbeheldin1946,therebyclosingthedoortoacoalitiongovernmentwiththeCCPandthesmalldemocraticparties.65TheCCPrespondedbyinitiatingtheprocessofformingaCongressofPeople’sRepresentativesoftheLiberatedAreasthatwouldbeconvenedatthesametimeastheGMD’sNationalAssembly.66 Inlate1944,HurleyacceptedtheinvitationofGeneralChuTehandJohnDaviestovisitYenan.MaoandHurleysignedafive-pointplanthatstated,mostimportantly,that“thepresentNationalGovernmentistobereorganizedintoaCoalitionNationalGovernment.”HurleyknewlittleaboutChinesepolitics.InadditionhethoughtthatboththeChineseCommunistPartyandtheone-party,one-manGuomindangwere“strivingfordemocraticprinciples”similartotheU.S.Constitution.

WhenHurleyreturnedtoChungking,ChiangandSoongangrilyrefusedtosigntheagreement,andtoldHurleythathehadbeen“soldabillofgoodsbytheCommunists.”WhenBarretttoldHurleythatMaomightshowasignedcopyofthe

64OnCoalitionGovernment236-238.InAugust1944,Maowrotethat“giventhefeelingsofthepeople,itispossible,throughourownstruggles,tolocalizethecivilwarordelaytheoutbreakofacountry-widecivilwar.”TheKMT-CCPConflictbySuzannePepper289.65ChenJian,Mao’sChinaandtheColdWar(UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,2001)25;LostChance366,375.66“CCPCentralCommitteetoZhouEnlai,”12August1946,ChineseCommunistForeignPolicy75.

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five-pointplantotheChineseandforeignpress,Hurleyyelled,characteristically,“Themotherfucker,hetrickedme.”67

DuringhistenuresasPresidentialEnvoyandAmbassador,HurleyworkedwithGMDofficialstocensorWesternjournalistswhoheconsideredtobeclosetotheCCP,andpreventedthemfromtravelingtoYenan.68HeremovedDaviesfromYenanandChinainJanuary1945,andServiceinApril.

WhilehewasinWashingtoninFebruary1945,AmbassadorHurleywasfuriouswhenallofthepoliticalofficersintheembassyinChungkingsentatelegramtotheStateDepartmentstatingthat“militarynecessityrequiresthatwesupplyandcooperatewiththeCommunistsandothersuitablegroupswhocanassistthewaragainstJapan.”69

WhenRooseveltlearnedaboutproposalsforprovidingmilitaryaidtotheCCP,heorderedChiefofStaffGeorgeMarshallandWedemeyertoconductaninvestigation.AsaresultWedemeyerorderedhissubordinatesinChinatosignapledge:“WeAmericanofficers,weAmericanmilitarypeople...supporttheCentralGovernmentandwillnotgiveanyassistancetoanyotherindividual,anyactivity,oranyorganizationwithinChinatheater.”70InFebruary1945,HurleyassuredtheGeneralissimothat“whenthewarwithJapanisover,yourwell-equippeddivisionswillhaveawalkoverintheirfightwiththeCommunists.”71

MaoandtheCCPleadershipobservedthisshiftinU.S.policy,firstwiththerecallofStilwellandthenwiththeappointmentsofHurleyandWedemeyer.Inanattempttocircumventthem,inJanuary1945MaoandChouofferedtosendadelegationtoWashingtonD.C.,orifnecessarytheywouldgopersonally,totalkwithPresidentRoosevelt.72BasedonRoosevelt’srecordofconsistentsupportforChiangKai-shek’sregime,itishighlyunlikelythattheinterestoftheCCPleaderswasreciprocated.

SincetheywerenotsuccessfulinobtainingmilitaryaidfromtheU.S.,theprincipalobjectiveoftheCCPleadershipafter1944wastoconvincetheU.S.governmentandmilitarytoremainneutralintheconflictbetweentheCCPandtheGuomindang.73Whenthatprovedunattainable,theCCP’sinterestinapoliticalaccommodationwiththeU.S.cametoanendinthespringof1945.Stilwell,ServiceandDavieshadbeenrecalled,noAmericanaidhadbeenreceived,andAmbassadorHurleytoldreportersonApril2that“therecanbenopoliticalunificationinChina

67MichaelSchaller,TheU.S.CrusadeinChina,1938-1945(ColumbiaUniversityPress,1979)200.68“MemorandumbytheDeputyDirectoroftheOfficeofFarEasternAffairs,”28April1945,FRUS19457:348-350;Buhite192;Carter124-125.69LostChance358.70FRUS1945:7233,citedin“ChinesePoliciesTowardstheUnitedStates,1937-1945”inSino-AmericanRelations8971Schaller209.72Garver257;Tuchman,“IfMaoHadCometoWashington:AnEssayinAlternatives,”ForeignAffairs,October1972.73Garver253.

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aslongastherearearmedpoliticalpartiesandwarlordswhoarestillstrongenoughtodefythenationalgovernment.”74

Hurley’sterminologytrackedChiangKai-shek’sghost-writtenbook,China’sDestiny.In1943Chiangwrotethat“alladultcitizensmustjointheKuomintangandyouthfulcitizensmustjointheYouthCorps.”ReferringtotheCCP,“Iftheanti-revolutionaryforcesbaseduponthepartitionofterritoriesbyforceandfeudalwarlordismremaininexistenceforasingleday,thenforthatday..theperiodofmilitaryrulecannotbeended.”75

AttheCCP’sSeventhCongressinApril1945,MaowarnedofthedangerofChinabecomingan“Americansemi-colony”alongthelinesofthePhilippines.InthelaststageofthePacificWar,MaowasincreasinglyconcernedwithU.S.militarylandingsonbehalfoftheGuomindang,probablyinsouthandcentralChina.InGreece,BritishGeneralRonaldScobielandedinAthensinlate1944,suppressedGreece’scommunist-ledforces,withtheGreekmonarchistforcesfollowingbehindtheBritisharmy.ThusMaowarnedthattheCCPshouldwatchoutforthedangerofanAmericanmilitaryinterventionofthe“Scobietype.”76However,in1945theU.S.militarydecidedtoconcentrateitsforcesoncapturingJapan’spossessionsinthePacific,andthenuseatomicweapons,ratherthanprosecutealandwarinChina. MaowasnotawarethatonMarch27,AmbassadorHurleyandGeneralWedemeyerdiscussedChinawiththeJointChiefsofStaffinWashington.D.C.AccordingtoArmyChiefofStaffWilliamLeahy,“TheywerealloftheopinionthattherebellioninChinacouldbeputdownbycomparativelysmallassistancetoChiang’scentralgovernment.”77ForAmerica’stopgenerals,theCCPwasnolongeranallyinthefightagainstJapan,butratherwasanillegitimate“rebellion”againsttheGuomindang.

InJune1945.Maoissuedaninner-partydirectivestatingthatwhiletheCCPshouldcontinuetonegotiatewiththeGMDandtheU.S.,itshouldprepareforacivilwarlaunchedby“Mei-Jiang”(theU.S.-GMDforces)inthenearfuture.OnAugust10,Maocabledhiscommanders:“Acivilwarispending.Consideringyourcircumstances,youcannotseizemajorcities;nonetheless,youshouldtakeadvantageofthesituationtoexpandyourterritory,toseizeweapons,tostriveforsmallcities.”78However,thisoffensivehadtobecalledoffaweeklater.TheSovietUnion,theGMDandtheCCP,August1945

InFebruary1945,Roosevelt,ChurchillandStalinmetatYaltaandmadesecretplansforhowGermanyandJapanwouldbedefeated.StalinagreedtoenterthewaragainstJapanthreemonthsafterthedefeatofGermany.RooseveltandGeneralMacArthurbelievedthatanoffensiveoftheRedArmyagainstJapanese

74FRUS19457:318,citedinReardon86.75China’sDestiny(1943).PublishedinEnglishin1947(RoyPublishers)216,225.76OnCoalitionGovernment225.77LostChance394.78Sheng96,100-101.

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armiesinNortheastAsia,comingbeforeaU.S.assaultonJapan’smainislands,wouldsignificantlyreduceAmericancasualties.79

InearlyApril1945,theSovietUnionannouncedthatitwouldnotrenewits1941neutralitypactwithJapan.WiththetotaldefeatoftheJapaneseImperialArmyapproaching,MaoandtheChineseleadershipbelievedthattheRedArmywouldmoveintoManchuriainamatterofmonths,andthatmightprovidetheCCPwithanopportunityforrapidexpansion.InhisreporttotheSeventhCongress,Maostatedthat“intheinternationalarenatheSovietUnionisoursingleandbestfriend.”80However,theSovietUniondidnotprovetobeareliableallyfortheCCPfromthemiddleof1945tothespringof1946.

OnAugust14,1945,theGuomindangandtheSovietUnionsignedabilateralpeacetreaty,thedayofJapan’ssurrender.ThisaccordlostanyrationaleforsupportingChina’sresistancetoJapan.Underitsterms,theSovietUnionrecognizedtheGMDasthesolelegitimategovernmentofChina,andstatedthatSoviet“militarysuppliesandothermaterialresources”wouldbeprovidedonlytotheGMD,astheyhadfrom1937-1941.

Inthe1945Sino-SovietTreatyofFriendshipandMutualAssistance,StalinplacedSovietnationalinterestsoveritsprofessedsupportfortheChineserevolution.Stalinobtainedthe“independence”ofOuterMongoliaasaSovietsatellite,joint-Sino-SovietcontroloftheManchurianrailroads,andtheformationofaSoviet-controlledmilitaryzone,excludingDairen,ontheLiaotungPeninsulainsouthernManchuria.ToMaoTse-tungandtheleadersoftheCCP,thistreatywasa“cruelbetrayal”oftheChineserevolution.81

MaolatersaidthatStalinhadattemptedtotietheCCP’shandsatthisjuncture.“They[theSovietUnion]didnotpermitChinatomakerevolution;thatweshouldnothaveacivilwarandshouldcooperatewithChiangKai-shek,otherwisetheChinesenationwouldperish.Butwedidnotdowhathesaid.”82 BesidesStalin’spursuitofSovieteconomicandmilitaryinterestsinManchuria,hehadalowestimateoftheCCP’schanceofsuccessinacivilwarwiththeGuomindang.In1944,StalintoldU.S.AmbassadorAverellHarrimanthattheCCPwere“notrealcommunists,theyare‘margarine’Communists,”andthatChiangwas“thebestmanunderthecircumstancestoleadChina,andmustbesupported.”83InadiscussionwithSovietandYugoslavleadersin1948,StalinexplainedhisthinkingaftertheJapanesesurrender:

79ChinaHand249-250.80Garver260.81Tsou272-283;Mao’sChina27-28.82ChairmanMaoTalkstothePeople,TalksandLetters:1956-1971,editedbyStuartSchram(PantheonBooks,1974)191.Talkgivenon24September1962attheTenthPlenumoftheEighthCentralCommitteeoftheCCP83Reardon71.

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WeinvitedtheChinesecomradestocometoMoscowandwediscussedthesituationinChina.WetoldthembluntlythatweconsideredthedevelopmentoftheuprisinginChinahadnoprospect,andthattheChinesecomradesshouldjointheChiangKai-shekgovernmentanddissolvetheirarmy....NowinthecaseofChina,weadmitwewerewrong.ItprovedthattheChinesecomradesandnottheSovietcomradeswereright.84

In1945,MaowasawarethattheCommunistPartiesinFranceandItaly

hadacceptedpostsinpro-U.S.governmentsafterthedefeatofGermanoccupationforcesintheircountries.UnderpressurefromMoscow,thecommunist-ledresistancemovementinFrancesurrendereditsarmstoDeGaulle;theItalianpartisanforceshandedovertheirarmstotheU.S.armyinearly1945.85

OntheeveofnewnegotiationsinAugust1945,Maowrotethat“Relyingontheforcesweourselvesorganize,wecandefeatallChineseandforeignreactionaries.ChiangKai-shek,onthecontrary,reliesontheaidofU.S.imperialismwhichhelooksuponashismainstay...U.S.imperialismwantstohelpChiangKai-shekturnChinaintoaU.S.dependency,andthispolicy,too,wassetlongago.ButU.S.imperialismwhileoutwardlystrongisinwardlyweak.”86

ChiangKai-shek,alongwithHurley,WedemeyerandtheirsuperiorsinWashingtonD.C.,believedthatSovietsupportfortheGuomindangwouldforcetheCCPleadershiptoagreetothetermsimposedbytheU.S.andtheGMD.UnderpressurefromStalintonegotiatewiththeGMD,MaoagreedtorestartpeacetalkswithChiangKai-shekinChungkinginAugust1945.WithU.S.support,theGuomindangagaindemandedthattheCCPmergeitsarmedforcesintotheGMD’sarmiesandrelinquishcontroloveritsgrowingbaseareas.

TheCCPstatedthatitwouldonlyagreetoaproportionalreductioninthesizesoftheGMDandCCParmies,andthatitwouldnotgiveupcontrolofitsbaseareas.TheCCPproposedtheorganizationofatransitionalfour-partPoliticalConference,andthentheformationofacoalitiongovernmentafterthedemocratizationoftheGMDgovernmenthadbeencompleted.87TheCCPalsoagreedtoremoveitsmilitaryforcesfromeightbaseareasincentralandsouthernChina,whichitsenttothebattlegroundareasofnorthChinaandManchuria.

ChouEn-laibelievedthatMao’sunwillingnesstomakesubstantialconcessionsonmilitaryandstrategicissueshadbeenthemajorCCPmistakeduring

84TitoSpeaksbyVladimirDedijer(1953)331.85Garver252;FernandoClaudin,TheCommunistMovement:FromCominterntoCominform,VolumeII(NewYork,1975)362.86“TheSituationandOurPolicyAftertheVictoryintheWarofResistanceAgainstJapan,”13August1945,SelectedWorks,VolumeIV,20.87Tsou296-298,318-324.88Westad127;“OnPeaceNegotiationswiththeKuomintang,”26August1945,SelectedWorks,VolumeIV,49.

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thesenegotiations.Maorepliedthat“therearelimitstosuchconcessions;theprincipleisthattheymustnotdamagethefundamentalinterestsofthepeople.”88Inhisinner-partyspeeches,Maoneverwaveredfromthepositionhefirsttookin1938that“withoutapeople’sarmy,thepeoplehavenothing.”

DuringtheChungkingNegotiations,800,000GMDtroopsattackedCCPbaseareasinnorthernandcentralChina,anddrovethroughShansitowardstheGreatWall.ThislatteroffensivecouldhavecutoffYenanfromthemaincommunistforcesinnorthChina.Maoorderedacounterattack.InatelegramtoGeneralNieRongzeninnorthChina,Maostatedthat“themorebattlesyouwin,thesaferwearehere,andthemoreinitiativewehaveinthenegotiations.”89From1945totheoutbreakofnationwidecivilwarinthesummerof1946,boththeGuomindangandtheCCP“talkedandfought”—talkedtopreparetofight,andfoughttoimprovetheirpositionsinnegotiations.

AftertwomonthstheChungkingnegotiationsstalemated,andbothsidespreparedforbattleinthepost-warperiod.InanindicationofwhichsidetheU.S.wouldsupport,inAugust1945GeneralDouglasMacArthurissuedGeneralOrderNo.1,whichdirectedJapanesecommandersinChinatosurrendertheirtroopsandequipmentonlytotheGMD.BytheendofWorldWarII,teamsofAmericanmilitaryadvisers(“liaisongroups”)wereoperatingthroughouttheGuomindangarmies.90

InresponsetotheactionsofMacArthurandWedemeyer,GeneralChuTeh,commanderoftheEighthRouteArmy,issuedanordertohistroopstodemandandacceptthesurrenderofJapaneseandChinesetroopswithJapanesecommanders(puppettroops).Frommid-Augusttomid-October,220,000puppetandJapanesetroopswerecapturedandacceptedthetermsoftheCCP.ThreedivisionsofpuppettroopsjoinedtheEighthRouteArmy.InanactionthatbodedillfortheGMDintheimpendingcivilwar,thecommanderofaGuomindangarmygroupwentovertothecommunistside,attributinghisactiontodiscriminationbythegovernmentagainsthistroopsinthedistributionofsupplies.91ConditionsintheGuomindangandCommunistAreasin1945-1946

Thebreakdownofeconomic,socialandpoliticalorderintheGuomindangareasaftertheendofWorldWarIIsetthestageforitsdecisivedefeatinthecivilwarthateruptedin1946.ThefirstsignofthisbreakdownwastheseizureoflargeamountsofJapanesepropertybyGMDofficialsbeginninginAugust1945.Manyof

88Westad127;“OnPeaceNegotiationswiththeKuomintang,”26August1945,SelectedWorks.VolumeIV,49.89Ibid.104;ChineseCommunistForeignPolicy,28October1945,43.90Tsou194.91Ibid.314.

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theseofficialssoldfactorymachineryratherthanoperateit,withdevastatingeffectsontheirworkforces.ManyofficialswhoservedtheJapanesewereentrustedwithimportantpostsbythereturningGMDgovernments.92ApopularpuninnorthChinainthefallof1945wastochangetheChinesecharactersfor“takeover”(jieshou)tothesimilarlysoundingcharactersfor“plunder.”93 Hyper-inflationwasamajorfactorinthelossofpublicconfidenceintheGuomindang.Withmilitaryexpenditurestakingupto90percentofthebudget,thegovernmentprintedlargesumsofpapermoneytopayitsbills.Workers’wagescouldnotcovertheirlivingexpenses.In1946,therewere1,716strikesandlabordisputesinShanghaialone.TherealincomeofcollegeteachersinthesoutheasterncityofKunmingdroppedby98percentby1946.94

TheGMDgovernmentsettheexchangerateattheexorbitantrateofoneGMDorgolddollarto200“puppetdollars,”whichwerewidelyheldbythepopulation.Thepeopleinthenewly“liberated”areassuddenlyfoundthemselvespauperized.AccordingtoaneditorialinaGuomindangnewspaper:“WealthwhichhadtakengenerationstoaccumulatewastransferredinatwinklingtothosewhoheldgolddollarsandNationalistdollarsintheirhands.”Thisprocesscreatedfoodshortagesandstarvationinmanyareas.95

Inordertomaintain“lawandorder”inareaswhereJapanesearmiessurrendered,theGuomindangreliedonJapaneseofficersandChinesepuppettroopsin1945-1946,particularlytoguardkeyrailwaylinesthattheyhadoccupiedduringthewar.OnAugust11,ChiangofferedthepuppetofficersanopportunitytoshifttheirallegiancefromtheJapanesetoserveunderGMDcommanders.96

In1935,studentsinBeijingformedtheDecember9thMovement,whichdemandedthattheGuomindanggiveupitssuppressionoftheCCPandfocusonresistingJapan’saggressionagainstChina.Thismovementpickedupsteaminearly1945,whenChinesestudentsinmanycitiesprotestedrepressionbyTaiLai’ssecretpolice;manyarrestedstudentssimply“disappeared.”Anti-AmericandemonstrationsprotestedthereportedrapeofaPekingUniversitystudentbyaU.S.Marine.InKunminginNovember1945,largecrowdsofcollegeandhighschoolstudentswereattackedbypoliceandsoldiers.97By1946and1947,studentsweredemandinganimmediateendtothecivilwar;anendtoU.S.backingoftheGuomindanginthewar;andashiftinpublicexpendituresfrommilitarytocivilianpriorities.

TheseeconomicandpoliticalconditionshelpedtheChineseCommunistPartywinthebattleforpopularopinionintheGMDareasduringthenegotiations

92TheKMT-CCPConflict307-308.93Westad112.94TheKMT-CCPConflict309-313.95Tsou312-313.96Ibid.310.97TheKMT-CCPConflict314-316;SuzannePepper,CivilWarinChina:ThePoliticalStruggle,1945-1949(UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1978)44-52.

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in1945-1946.TheyalsocreatedmorefavorableconditionsforthegrowthoftheCCPundergroundinmanycitiescontrolledbytheGuomindang.

TheU.S.governmentsteppedupitsmilitaryassistancetotheGMDinlate1945.GeneralWedemeyermadeatriptoconsultwithPresidentTrumaninNovember.TheydecidedthattheU.S.wouldarmandtrain39GMDdivisions,15airsquadrons,andestablishaU.S.advisorygroupofupto1,000officers.98WedemeyerhaddeclaredatapressconferenceinlateAugust:“IdonotbelievethattheCommunistsarestrongeitherinnumberoreffortanywhereinChina....IdonotanticipateanydifficultywiththeCommunists.”99 Initseighteenlargeandsmallbaseareasinnorth,centralandsouthChina,theCCPmadechangestothelimitedrentreductionpolicythatithadfollowedfrom1937-1945duringtheanti-Japanesewar.In1946,theCCPwentbeyond“reductioninrentandinterest”toredistributionoflandinordertostrengthenitseconomicandpoliticalsupportamongthepoorandlandlesspeasantsinitsbaseareas.100

900,000ofthesepeasantsservedintheCCP’sregulararmiesandguerillaforces(renamedthePeople’sLiberationArmyinJuly1946);2.2millionjoinedthePeople’sMilitias,whichgarrisonednewly–occupiedareas,keptcommunicationslinesopen,preventedenemyinfiltration,andparticipatedinmilitaryoperations;LocalSelf-DefenseCorpstransportedsuppliestothefrontandcarriedthewoundedtotherear;andWomen’sAssociationsorganizedhospitalworkandhandicraftproductiontosupportthewar.101

AnotherimportantorganizationoftheCCPwastheArmedWorkingDetachment.Themostimportantdutiesofthesesmallandhighlymobileunitswerepoliticalworkandmobilization,especiallyinareasoccupiedbytheJapanese.102Alloftheseforceswerevolunteers.TheCCP’spoliticalandmilitarymobilizationofmillionsofpeasantsinitsbaseareasstoodinsharpcontrasttotheGMD’srelianceonthelandlordsandthepress-gangingofsoldiersintheareasitcontrolledthatJohnServiceobservedin1943.

98TheGeneralissimo324-325,343.ReardonclaimsthatGeneralGeorgeMarshall,Wedemeyer’ssuperiorandthenextPresidentialEnvoytoChina,was“impartial.”137,192.99ChinaHand309.100InFanshen:ADocumentaryofRevolutioninaChineseVillage(VintageBooks,1966),WilliamHintondescribestheredistributionofland(the“SettlingAccountsMovement”)inLongBowvillageinShensi,northChina.ForsettlingaccountsinLongBowinlate1945andin1946,see128-156and198-240ofHinton’sbook.101TheKMT-CCPConflict319,322-323.102LostChance204-205.

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U.S.MarinesLandinNorthChina,September1945

AftertheJapanesesurrenderinAugust1945,therewasagrowingdangerofdirectU.S.militaryinterventioninChina.Thelandingof58,000MarinesinnorthChinainSeptember-October1945wasinadditionto60,000AmericantroopsintheChinatheatreafterV-JDay.103

TheseU.S.forceswereasourceofgrowingfrictionbetweentheCCPandtheU.S.military.TheMarines’statedmissionwastorepatriateJapanesesoldiersandcivilians.However,inmid-November1945,GeneralWedemeyerestimatedthatofthe1,091,000JapanesetroopsinChina,excludingManchuria,67percenthadbeendisarmed,butlessthan1,000hadbeenrepatriated.104

TheMarines’actualmissionwasdescribedbyadisillusionedmarineinalettertoWashingtonD.C.:“WeweretoldwhenenroutetoTsingtaothatweweretoassistinthedisarmingofJapanesetroopsinthearea.[We]havegonesofarastorearmsomeJapaneseunitsforaddedprotectionagainstChineseCommunistforces.…WeareheretoprotectGeneralChiang’sinterestsagainstpossibleCommunistuprisings.”105AtameetingoftheSecretariesofState,WarandNavyinNovember1945,SecretaryofWarRobertPattersonboastedthatthe60,000MarinesinnorthChina“couldwalkfromoneendofChinatotheother.”106

InOctober1945,YenangaveitscommandersinnorthChinainstructionsonhowtodealwithU.S.troopswholandedinChina.“IftheAmericantroopsforcetheirwayintoourareas,oriftheyhelptheGMDtroopstoconstructtransportationlines,ourlocalmilitaryandadministrativeauthoritiesshouldstopthemimmediatelybyformalnotice,andshould,inthemeantime,preparetousforcetostoptheiradvanceifnecessary.IftheAmericantroopspaynoattentiontoourwarningandforcetheirwayahead...weshouldstillnotopenfirefirst,butshouldmaintainastanceofself-defense.”107

Inlate1945,heavilyarmedMarinessuppliedguardsforstrategicallyimportantrailways,bridgesandcoalminesforGMDforcesinnorthChina.GeneralWedemeyersentMarinecontingentstosecuretheairfieldsofTientsinandPekinginordertoairliftGMDarmiestoManchuria.TheMarinesprovidedsupportfor

103Feis373fromGeneralWedemeyer’snewsconferenceon22October1945.104NewYorkTimes,17November1945.105Schaller273-274.106Ibid.281.107CCPCentralCommittee“PoliciesTowardAmericanTroopsinChinaandSomePointsforAttention,”29October1945,ChineseCommunistForeignPolicy45;Sheng116.

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JapaneseandChinesepuppetforceswhichwereinthemidstofbattleswiththeCCP’sEighthRouteArmy.Inaddition,theU.S.militarymadedirectuseof“surrendered”JapanesetroopsagainsttheCCP.AsPresidentTrumanwroteinhismemoirs:“ThisoperationofusingtheJapanesetoholdofftheCommunistswasajointdecisionoftheStateandDefenseDepartments,whichIapproved.”108

U.S.militaryinterventionledtoanumberofarmedincidentsbetweenU.S.andCCPunits,includingfirefightsinTsingtaoandAntinginnorthChinathatleftthreeMarinesdeadand12wounded.109OnDecember13,LiberationDailyinYenanissueditsmostbitterattacktodateontheMarinesinconnectionwiththeirshellingofavillageinHopeh,southoftheGreatWall.110

BasedonTruman’sdirectives,WedemeyerorderedtheMarinestoperformtheiractualduties:ToturnovertheequipmentofthesurrenderingforcestotheGuomindangassoonaspossible,andtoundertakeamassiveU.S.seaandairliftof80percentoftheGMDarmiestonorthChinaandManchuria.TheCCPwasnowconvincedthatGeneralWedemeyerwasplayingtheroleofGeneralScobieinChina.

TheCCPinYenancalledontheAmericanpeopleto“riseupanddemandthecompletewithdrawalofAmericantroopsfromChinabyChristmas.”111AstheCCPpublicizedtheU.S.militarytransportsystemthatsupportedtheGMD’smilitaryoffensivestotheChineseandinternationalpublics,GeneralMarshallcalledthis“distortedpropaganda”againsttheU.S.governmentbytheCCP.112

Thishitarawnerve,sincethedemandforrapiddemobilizationoftheU.S.armedforcesafterV-JDaywasspreadinginthemilitaryandamongtheAmericanpublic.ByNovember1945,nearly4millionsoldiershadbeendischargedfromthearmedforces,withanadditional2millionbyJune1946.113Chief-of-StaffGeorgeMarshallpaintedadirepicture:“ThemilitaryestablishmentcannothopetoinsurethesafetyoftheUnitedStatesverymuchlongeratthepresentrateofdemobilizationunlesssomepermanentpeace-timeprogramisestablishedatanearlydate.”114Marshall’sspeechindicatedthattherewouldbelimitsontheextentofdirectU.S.militaryinterventioninthecomingcivilwarinChina.

TheU.S.government’ssharpeningcontentionwiththeSovietUnioninEuropeandtheMediterranean,whichwerethoughttobemoreessentialtotheU.S.,alsoplacedlimitsonU.S.militaryinterventioninChina.TheWarDepartmentthoughtthatdirectU.S.militaryinterventioninChinacreatedthepossibilityof 108HarryTruman,YearsofTrialandHope:1946-1952(Doubleday&Co.,1956)62.109Marshall’sMissiontoChina,VolumeIwithanIntroductionbyLymanVanSlyke,July4,1976(UniversityPublicationsofAmerica,1976).110Reardon129.111Schaller274.112MarshallMission380-389.113Tsou,Volume2,365.114SpeechtotheNewYorkHerald-TribuneForumon29October,1945,citedinFeis422.

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counter-interventionbytheSovietmilitary,whichhadshortersupplylinesandagreaterabilitytobringmilitarypressureinManchuriaandnorthChina.

Thus,Truman’spublicstatementonChinaonDecember15,1945ruledoutdirectmilitaryinterventioninChina.ThispositionwassupportedbyhisRepublicancriticsinCongress.Atthesametime,TrumanstatedthattheUnitedStatesrecognized“thepresentNationalGovernmentoftheRepublicofChinaastheonlylegalgovernmentinChina”andas“theproperinstrumenttoachievetheobjectiveofaunifiedChina.”ThesentencesinTruman’spublicstatementconcerningthedecisionstocontinuetofurnishmilitarysuppliestotheGuomindang,toemployanAmericanmilitaryadvisorygroupfortheGMDarmies,andtoassisttheGMDtore-establishcontrolovertheCCP-controlledareasofManchuriawereomittedfromthepressrelease.115 TheMarshallMissionandtheDevelopmentofCivilWarin1946

SoonafterHurley’sresignationinNovember1945,TrumanappointedGeneralGeorgeMarshallashisSpecialRepresentativetoChina.InsendingMarshalltoChina,TrumanmadeamajorcommitmentofAmericanmilitarysupplies,economicaidandprestigeinordertoneutralizethegrowingstrengthoftheCCP.

Marshall’spositionwasinherentlycontradictory.Whileheofferedtomediateasaneutralparty,theU.S.recognizedonlyoneside,theGuomindang,asthelegalgovernmentinChina,andcontinuedtosupplyhundredofmillionsofdollarsinaidannuallytotheGMD.Truman’sdirectivetoMarshallstatedbluntlythat“theexistenceofautonomousarmiessuchasthatoftheCommunistarmyisincompatiblewith,andactuallymakesimpossiblepoliticalunityinChina.”Thus,“autonomousarmiesshouldbeeliminatedassuchandallarmedforcesinChinaintegratedeffectivelyintotheChineseNationalArmy.”116

U.S.policymakingforChinainlate1945and1946tookplaceinthecontextofadevelopingU.S.-SovietColdWarthatspreadfromEuropetoEastAsia.TheTrumanadministrationshelvedthewartimeproposalsoftheDixieMissionforpoliticalandmilitarycooperationwiththeCCP,andacceleratedtheprovisionofU.S.militaryandeconomicaidtotheanti-communistGuomindang.

WhenMarshallarrivedinChungkinginDecember1945,hecalledfortheformationofaPoliticalConsultativeConference(PCC)madeupoftheU.S.,theGMDandtheCCP.Atalllevels,Marshallheadedupa“CommitteeofThree.”ThefirstactionofthePCCwastoorganizeacease-fireonJanuary13,1946.Inthespringof1946,MarshallproposedareductionofGMDforcesto90divisions,andareductionofCCPforcesto18divisions.Thecommunistnegotiatorsobjectedtotheunequal5:1ratiooftheGMDandCCPmilitaryforces.117

115TheWhitePaper607-609.116MarshallMission4;TrumanMemoirs70.115MarshallMission19,38.

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TheCCPmaintaineditspositionthatacoalitiongovernmentandtheendoftheGMD’sone-partydictatorshiphadtotakeplacebeforeintegrationoftheGMDandCCParmedforces.Inearly1946,MaostatedthatMarshallwasverygoodatputtingouta“longcord”withahookattheend,tryingtocatchthe“bigfish,”theCCP’sarmedforces.118

TherewasstruggleintheCCPleadershipoverwhethertoretaintheCCP’sindependentarmedforces.InFebruary1946,theCCPCentralCommittee,reflectingtheinfluenceoftheparty’ssecond-in-command,LiuShao-chi,issuedadirectivewhichstatedthat“theGMD’sone-partyruleisgoingtobeshaken,andtheprocessofnationwidedemocratizationwillstart.[This]willleadtothelegalizationofourParty,ourarmyandtheliberatedareas.ThisisagreatvictoryofChina’sdemocraticrevolution.Chinawillthusenteranewageofpeace,democracyandreconstruction.…Generallyspeaking,militarystrugglehasceased[and]weshouldbepreparedtotransferourParty’sworktononmilitarystrugglesconnectedwithmassworkandparliamentarypolitics.”119

MaolaterstatedthatLiuwasresponsibleforthisembraceofparliamentarypolitics.InoppositiontoLiu’s“rightistdeviationism,”MaoissuedadirectivefromthePartyCentersixweekslaterstatingthat“weshallbepsychologicallypreparedforasplit[withtheGMD]andnotbeafraidofacivilwar.”120

Bycontinuingtonegotiatein1945-1946,theCCPrespondedtothedesireoftheChinesepeopleforpeace,andithopedtodetachtheU.S.governmentfromtheGMDasmuchaspossible.TheCCPalsousedtheMarshallMissiontobuytimetomakemilitarypreparations,toheadoffmilitaryoffensivesbytheGuomindangarmies,andtoplacetheresponsibilitysolelyontheGMDfortheoutbreakofcivilwar.121 Marshall’s“impartiality”wasbeliedinMarch1946whenheleftChinatoarrangealoanof$500millionfromtheExport-ImportBankfortheGuomindang.122MeanwhileChiangKai-shek’sarmiesbroketheJanuarycease-fireandattackedthecommunistbaseareas.WhenMarshallreturnedtoChina,hebrokeredaceasefirebetweentheGMDandCCPinManchuriainJune1946.Chiangagreedtoitbecauseitlockedintoplacetherecentadvanceshisarmieshadmade,especiallyinManchuria.

Inalast-ditchattempttobolsterMarshall’sclaimtobeimpartial,andbreakthedeadlockbetweentheCCPandtheGMD,PresidentTrumanorderedapartialembargoonarmsshipmentstoChinaattheendofJuly1946.123However,theGMDalreadypossessedadequatestocksofU.S.weapons.Otherformsofaidundermined

118Sheng127.119CCPCentralCommittee“OntheCurrentSituationandOurTasks,”1February1946,ChineseCommunistForeignPolicy58-61;onLiu’sauthorship,seeSheng123.120Ibid.124,133.121Mao’sChina26.122Tsou411.123MarshallMission216;VanSlyke,Introductionxxvii.TheChinaLobbyintheU.S.wouldclaimthatashortageofmunitionswasamajorfactorinthedefeatoftheGMD’sarmies.

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theeffectofTruman’saction,suchasSurplusPropertysalesfromvariousPacificislandsonAugust30,1946,whichincludedtheprovisionofgasolineforU.S.-suppliedairplanes.TheCCPandevenMarshallrecognizedthatGMDofficialsweresellingthissurplusU.S.property,andwereusingU.S.loans,topurchasemilitaryequipmentfortheirarmies.124

InJuly1946,theGuomindanglaunchedageneraloffensiveaimedatseizingtenlargeandsmallcommunistbaseareas.MaoissuedadirectiveonJuly20thatcalledfor“completelysmashingChiang’soffensiveinawarofself-defense.”Maostatedthat

Weliveplainlyandworkhard,wetakecareoftheneedsofboththearmyandthepeople;thisistheveryoppositeofthesituationinChiangKai-shek’sareas,wherethoseatthetoparecorruptanddegenerate,whilethepeopleunderthemaredestitute.Underthesecircumstances,weshallsurelybevictorious.125TheCCPleadershipcalledthisnationwideGuomindangmilitaryoffensivethe

beginningofthe“ThirdRevolutionaryCivilWar.”InAugust1946,theCCPbroadcastatotalmobilizationordertodefenditsbaseareasfromstrongerGMDarmies.TheCCPcalledforastrategyofstrategicwithdrawalfromthetownstothecountrysidethatithadfollowedduringtheanti-Japanesewar.

InaninterviewwiththeAmericancorrespondentA.T.Steele,Maostatedthat“JudgingbythelargeamountofaidtheUnitedStatesisgivingChiangKai-shektowageacivilwaronanunprecedentedscale,thepolicyoftheU.S.governmentistousetheso-calledmediationasasmoke-screenforstrengtheningChiangKai-shekineverywayandsuppressingthedemocraticforcesinChina.”126

OnOctober1,MaosummeduptheresultsofthreemonthsoffightingsincehisJuly20directive.HestatedthatatthesametimeasnearlyhalfofChiang’s190brigadeshadtoperformgarrisonduty,makingitpossibleforthecommunistforcestodestroy25GMDbrigades.Hepredictedthatinthenextthreemonths,theCCPwouldbeabletohaltChiang’soffensives,recovermuchoftheterritorylosttotheGMDearlierin1946,andgooverfromthedefensivetotheoffensive.127

TheBattleforManchuriaBetweentheGMDandtheCCPintheContextoftheColdWar

AfteritsignedabilateralpeacetreatywiththeGuomindangonAugust

124TheKMT-CCPConflict304.125“SmashChiangKai-shek’sOffensivebyaWarofSelf-Defense,”SelectedWorks,VolumeIV,89-90.126“TheTruthAboutU.S.“Mediation”andtheFutureoftheCivilWarinChina,”29September1946,SelectedWorks,VolumeIV,109.127“AThreeMonths’Summary,”1October1946,SelectedWorks,VolumeIV,113-118.

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14,1945,thestrategiccalculationsoftheSovietUnionconcerningtheGMDandtheroleoftheU.S.inChinashifted.TheU.S.militarydeniedtheSovietUnionanyroleintheoccupationofJapan;itsenttensofthousandsofMarinestonorthChina;andtheU.S.NavyandAirForcetransportedGuomindangarmiestoManchuriaandnorthChina.TheU.S.governmentandmilitarythrewtheirweightcompletelybehindChiang’sregime,andsupportedtheGMD’srenewedmilitaryoffensivesagainsttheCCP’sbaseareas.

Inthefallof1945,thegrowingcontentionbetweentheCCPandtheGMDbecameanintegralpartofthedevelopingColdWarbetweenthetwodominantworldpowers.TheCCPleadershipfolloweddevelopmentsinGreece,Iran,IndochinaandEasternEuropecarefully.Churchill’s“IronCurtain”speechinFulton,MissouriinMarch1946announcedaglobalanti-SovietalliancebetweentheU.S.andBritain.Aspartofthisnewpost-warColdWar,SovietmilitarycommandersmadesecretarrangementswithCCPleaderstopreventGMDandU.S.militaryforcesfromoccupyingManchuria,whichhasalongborderwiththeSovietUnion.

AftertheSeventhCongressthatbeganinApril1945,theCCPbegantotransfertensofthousandsoftroopsandpoliticalcadretoManchuriaandotherpartsoftheNortheastinanticipationofthearrivalofSoviettroopsinthewaragainstJapan.HavingsecuredmajorterritorialconcessionsinitstreatywiththeGuomindang,theSovietUnionignoreditsrecognitionoftheGMDandthrewitssupportbehindtheCCPintheNortheast.TheRedArmydroveintoChina’sthreenortheasternprovincesofHeilungkiang,JeholandChahar.Withinweeks,itforcedthesurrenderoftheonce-powerfulJapaneseKwantungArmyinManchuria.

Someofthe100,000CCPtroopswhomarchedintoManchuriaaftertheJapanesesurrenderwereManchurians,ledbyManchurianofficers.BeginninginSeptember,theRedArmyprovidedlargequantitiesofcapturedJapaneseweaponstotheCCP’sforces,whichitdesignatedastheNortheastDefenseUnitedArmy(NEDUA).Thesecapturedweaponsoutfitted275,000soldiers,including925planes,370tanks,1,230piecesoffieldartilleryandothermodernweapons.TheCCP’sarsenalwascapableofarminganadditional350,000troopsastheywererecruitedinManchuria.128WiththeadditionofthesizablenumbersofU.S.weaponsthattheCCPcapturedinthecourseofbattleswithGMDarmiesinManchuria,theCCPnowhadthecapacitytoengageinlarge-scalemobileandeventuallypositionalwarfareforthefirsttime.

InNovember1945,Yenanissueda“DirectiveontheStrategyofStruggleagainstMei-Jiang.”Itread:“Thecentralprobleminthepost-warworldisthestrugglebetweentheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnion.ThereflectionofthisstruggleinChinaisthestrugglebetweenJiangandtheCCP.[TheU.S.Chinapolicyis]

128Sheng110-111;Tsou331.

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tosupportJiang,suppresstheCCP,andconfronttheUSSR.”129TheCCPmaintainedthisstandeventhoughtheSovietUnionhadstrippedManchuriaofitsnewestandmostadvancedindustrialequipmentas“warbooty,”alienatingmanynationalistforcesinChina.130

However,theSovietUnionreverseditspolicytowardstheCCPonceagain.OnNovember27,MoscowandChungkingannouncedanagreementtoprovideforthesmoothtransferofpowertotheGuomindang’sarmiesinManchuria.TheRedArmyorderedtheCCPtoretreatfromthecitiesithadseizedinthefall,andremoveditsobstaclestotheU.S.airliftandsealiftofGMDarmiesintoManchuria.InDecember1945andJanuary1946,theSovietUnioncooperatedfullywiththeGMD..131

MaorespondedbydirectingtheCCP’sforcestoretreattotheManchuriancountrysideandtosmallcitiesthatwereremotefromcentersofGMDoccupationinordertobuildupitsmilitaryandpoliticalbaseareas.132

Stalinmadeanotherpoliticalzig-zaginthespringof1946.BasedonitsincreasinglytensestandoffwiththeU.S.inEuropeandtheMiddleEast,theSovietUnionsetanewobjectiveofforcingtheU.S.militarytowithdrawfromChina.ByrefusingtowithdrawSovietmilitaryforcesfromManchuriauntilApril1946,StalinbelievedthathecouldforcetheU.S.toarrangeforasimultaneouswithdrawalofAmericanandSovietforcesfromChina.InJanuary1946,SecretaryofStateByrnesrejectedForeignMinisterMolotov’sproposalforsuchawithdrawal,claimingthatU.S.troopsinChinawereneededtodisarmandrepatriatetheJapanese.133

TheU.S.Marines,NavyandAirForceinsteadacceleratedtheirsupportfortheGuomindanginearly1946.WiththesupportofthewithdrawingRedArmy,theCCPcontrollednorthernManchuriainthespringof1946,andwasabletoextenditscontroltomuchofthecountrysideofsouthernManchuriabythesummer.TheCCP’sRevolutionaryTransformationsinManchuria ThemilitaryunitsandpoliticalcadrethattheCCPdeployedtoManchuriainthesecondhalfof1945confrontedsignificantobstacles.Duringthe1930s,theJapaneseKwantungArmyhaduprootedCCPunitsfromthecitiesofManchuria,andhadeliminatedCCPguerillaforcesthroughacombinationofcounter-insurgencycampaignsandbuildinganextensivesystemof“collectivehamlets”

.129Sheng114.130Reardon139.131Ibid.124-125.132MaoTse-tung,“BuildStableBaseAreasintheNortheast,”28December1945,SelectedWorks,VolumeIV,81.133AnvilofVictory:TheCommunistRevolutioninManchuria,1945-1948byStevenLevine(ColumbiaUniversityPress,1987)54.134AnvilofVictory201-207.

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thatisolatedtheguerillasfromtheirruralbasesofsupport.ThismeantthattheCCP’spartystructures,massorganizations,armyandpeople’smilitiasinManchuriahadtobebuiltfromthebottomup,andquickly. Beginninginlate1945,theCCPledarevolutionaryprocessinManchuria,particularlyalandreformthatbenefittedmillionsoflandlessandland-poorpeasants.Thislandrevolutionandthepoliticalmobilizationthatwasessentialtoitnourishedthecommunistarmedforceswithmanpowerandsupplies;andtheserevolutionaryarmiesbroughttheCCPtonationwidepowerwithinthreeyears. IntheManchuriancountryside,therewasgreaterinequalityinthepatternoflandholdingthaninnorthChina,inpartbecause10-15percentofthelandwasownedbyJapanesesettlersorlandcompanies.Fromthefallof1945tothespringof1946,themainpolicyoftheCCPinManchuriawasthereductionofrentandinterestforthepeasants.TheCCPalsopursuedthecompleteredistributionofJapanese-ownedlandandthatofChineselandlordswhohadcollaboratedwiththeJapanese-Manchukuoregime.Bothprocesseswereconductedbynewlyorganizedpeasantassociations.LinBiao,commanderoftheCCP’sNortheastDefenseUnitedArmy(NEDUA),urgedthatthousandsofcadres,manyofthemfromthearmy,besenttotheManchuriancountrysidetocarryoutlandreformwiththeguidanceof“wearpeasantclothesandeatsorghum.”134

AnotherkeytotheCCP’ssuccessinManchuriawasitsabilitytoabsorblargenumbersoflocalManchuriansintoitsmilitaryforces.Inthesummerof1946,theCCPemphasizedtherecruitmentoflocalmilitia,manyofwhom“graduated”totheNEDUA.Thisprocessrapidlyexpandedtheranksoftheregulararmyforthedecisivemilitarycampaignsof1947forcontrolofManchuria.Awell-knownpoemtitled“TheSevenPersuasionstoJointheArmy”includedtheseverses:

IfafathergetshissontoenlistTherevolutionwilltakethistoheart.IfasongetshisfathertoenlistHe’llbeforeverrevolutionized.IfayoungerbrothergetsanelderbrothertoenlistTheNationalistArmywillbesmashedtobits.IfaneldersistergetsayoungerbrothertoenlistVictorywillsoonbeours.IfawifepersuadesherhusbandtoenlistThere’llbenoworriesinthefamily.135

AnotherfactorintheabilityoftheCCPtoestablishrevolutionarybaseareasinruralManchuriawithstrongpopularsupportwasthesupportoftheSovietUnion.AstheColdWarheatedupinthespringof1946,theSovietUnionmovedtoapolicyofopenandfirmsupportfortheCCP.ThepresenceoftheRedArmyallowedtheCCPtoinitiatelandreformandrecruitlargenumbersofManchuriansintoits 135Ibid.152-153,155.

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armedforceswithoutfearofattacksbyGuomindangarmiesthathadbeentransportedtoManchuriabytheU.S.military.SovietassistanceinrestoringManchuria’srailnetworkfacilitatedthemilitarycampaignsoftheNEDUA,andtheanti-plagueworkofSovietmedicalpersonnelhelpedcontainwhatcouldhavebeenafarmoredisastrousoutbreakofthedisease.136

AccordingtoawriterinaShanghainewspaperinMarch1948“TheChineseCommunistshadnosoldiersintheNorth-east;nowtheyhavethesoldiersnotwantedbythecentralgovernment.TheChineseCommunistshadnoguns;nowtheyhavethegunsthecentralgovernmentmanagedsopoorlyandsentovertothem,andsometimesevensecretlysoldtothem.”137AccordingtoNiuJun,aprominentChinesehistorianofCCPforeignrelations,thebattleforManchuriaservedasakeyjunctureintheCCP’s“marchfromYenantotheworld.”138CivilWarDevelopsandU.S.MediationEnds

FromJunetoNovember1946,theCCPdemandedanimmediateceasefireinordertostoptheGuomindang’snationwideoffensivesagainsttenCCPbaseareas.TheunarmedpoliticaladministrationsinsomeofthesebaseareaswerevulnerabletoreprisalsbytheGMDmilitaryanditssecretpolice.

Duringthesameperiodoftime,theGuomindangraisednewconditionsbeforeitwouldacceptaceasefire.ChiangKai-shekwasunwillingtogiveuptheterritoryintheCCPbaseareasthathisgeneralshadcapturedsinceJanuary1946.ChiangalsotoldMarshallthataceasefirewasunnecessary,since“itwasnecessaryonlyfortheCommuniststostopfighting.”InSeptember1946,ChouEn-laitoldMarshallthatChiangwasplacingnewconditionsontheCCPthatheknewwerenotacceptabletotheCCPinordertostallandcontinuehismilitaryoffensives.139Inaddition,ChiangconvenedaNationalAssemblyinChungkingonNovember15.ThisbodywasdominatedbytheleadersoftheGuomindang,andputanendtoanyprospectofacoalitiongovernmentinvolvingtheCCP.

BeforeflyingfromChungkingtoYenanonNovember19,ChouEn-laitoldMarshallthatfurthernegotiationswouldbefruitlessunlessChiangagreedtorestorethetrooppositionsofbothsidesasofJanuary13,andtodissolvetheNationalAssembly.140Twoweekslater,ChiangKai-shektoldMarshallthat“hefeltitwasnecessarytodestroytheCommunistmilitaryforces,[and]hefeltconfidentthattheCommunistforcescouldbeexterminatedinfrom8to10months.”141

InJanuary1947thePeople’sLiberationArmywentovertotheoffensiveintheNortheastandnorthChinabelowtheGreatWall.TheCCP’speasantarmieswereintactandhadhighmoraleevenaftertheGMD’soffensivesin1946.CapturedU.S. 136Ibid.240.137TheKMT-CCPConflict336.138Sheng106-108.139MarshallMission406.140“GeneralMarshall’sViewsontheSituationinChina,”TheWhitePaper212.141MarshallMission407,408.

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munitions,whenaddedtoJapaneseweapons,comprisedthemainsourceofarmsandequipmentforthePLA,whilesurrenderedgovernmenttroopswereanimportantsourceofnewrecruits.142

OnJanuary7,1947,MarshallleftChina.AsthenewlyappointedSecretaryofState,MarshallendedU.S.participationinthePoliticalConsultativeConference,removedthelastMarinecontingentfromPeking,andcloseddowntheDixieMissioninMarch1947.

UponhisarrivalinWashington,D.C.,MarshallissuedanofficialstatementtothepressonthesituationinChina.Accordingtohim,“sincereeffortstoachievesettlementhavebeenfrustratedtimeandagainbyextremistelementsonbothsides.”WhileMarshallreferredbrieflytothe“dominatinginfluenceofthe[Kuomintang]military,”heattacked“dyed-in-the-woolcommunists”who“misleadtheChinesepeopleandtheworldandarouseabitterhatredofAmericans.”Hementionedonceagainthefire-fightbetweenAmericanMarinesandCCPtroopsatAntinginlate1945.Marshallconcludedthat“Thesalvationofthesituation,asIseeit,wouldbetheassumptionofleadershipbytheliberalsintheGovernmentandintheminorityparties[whichwould]leadtounitythroughgoodgovernment.”143MarshalldidnotseearolefortheCCPinhisgoodgovernment,nordidhequestionwhethertherewereanyliberalsinChiang’sone-partydictatorship.

Accordingtoaleaderofthe”ThirdPartyGroup”ofwhichMarshallspokehighly,“theGeneralissimowasadictatorandhadbeenonefortwentyyears,andhewasaccustomedtocompleteandunquestionedauthority.”144ThepriceofspeakingoutagainstChiangKai-shekwashigh.TwoleadersoftheDemocraticLeaguewereassassinatedinJuly1946inKunmingbyTaiLai’ssecretpolice.145TheserepressiveactionsbroughtmanymembersoftheDemocraticLeagueandtheothersmalldemocraticpartiesintoananti-GuomindangunitedfrontorganizedbytheCCP. OnFebruary1,1947MaostatedthattheCCPwasenteringa“newhightideoftheChineserevolution.”Heexplainedthat

OurPartyandtheChinesepeoplehaveeveryassuranceoffinalvictory...Butthatdoesnotmeantherearenodifficultiesbeforeus.ChineseandforeignreactionarieswillcontinuetoopposetheChinesepeoplewithalltheirstrength...Someoftherevolutionaryforcesmaysuffertemporarylosses,andtherewillbelossesofmanpowerandmaterialresourcesinalongwar.ThecomradesthroughoutthePartymusttakeallthisfullyintoaccountandbepreparedtoovercomealldifficultieswithanindomitablewillandinaplannedway....Ourdifficultiescanbeovercomebecausewearenewandrisingforces,andhaveabrightfuture.146

142TheKMT-CCPConflict327,342.143TheWhitePaper,Annex113,687-688.144TheKMT-CCPConflict313,326,345.145Ibid.182-183.146“GreetNewHighTideoftheChineseRevolution,”1February1947,SelectedWorks,VolumeV,119-124-125.

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Onemonthearlier,LuTing-yi,ChiefoftheDepartmentofInformationofthe

CCP,predictedthat“thefaceofChinaandtheworldwillbevastlydifferentafterthreetofiveyears.”147Asitturnedout,thelowerfigurewasmoreaccurate.Hurley,theStateDepartmentandPresidentTrumanSilenceCriticsofU.S.PolicyinChina

InNovember1945,AmbassadorHurleyhandedSecretaryofStateJamesByrnesalengthyletterofresignation.Hurleypubliclyattributed“America’sfailureinChina”farandwide,especiallytofourForeignServiceofficersaffiliatedwiththeDixieMission.AtapressconferenceinWashington,D.C.,Hurleyclaimedthat“aconsiderablesectionofourStateDepartmentisendeavoringtosupportCommunismgenerallyaswellasspecificallyinChina.”148

HurleyreceivedsupportfromPresidentTrumanandthetopofficialsintheStateDepartmentinsilencingthevoicesofForeignServiceOfficerswhowerebasedinYenanandhadquestionedofficialAmericanpolicyinChina.149JohnDavieswasoneofthefirstofficerstocatchHurley’swrath.AccordingtoDavies,theChineseCommunistPartyhad“thefirstgovernmentsandarmiesinmodernChinesehistorytohavepositiveandwidespreadpopularsupport.”150

HurleyaccusedDaviesof“sneakingofftoYenan”tosabotagehisnegotiationswiththeGuomindang,andsaidthat“hewasgoingtohaveDavieskickedoutoftheStateDepartment”asa“communist.”151ThischargewasechoedbySenatorJosephMcCarthy,whoclaimedthatDavieshadhelpedto“loseChina.”From1949to1954,DavieswasbroughtbeforenineStateDepartmentLoyaltySecurityBoards.EventhoughDaviesworkedontheNationalSecurityCouncilandbecameanadvocateofboththe“containment”and“rollbackofcommunism,”SecretaryofStateJohnFosterDullesfiredDaviesin1954asa“securityrisk.”152

Inearly1945,JohnServicewaschargedinthepresswithleakingStateDepartmentdocumentsonChinatotheleftistpublicationAmerasia.AfterbeingbriefedontheAmerasiacase,PresidentTrumanorderedthat“Thesemenshouldbevigorouslyprosecuted,”andgavethegreenlightfortheFBItoarrestServiceandthe

147TheWhitePaper,Annex118,719,reprintingYenan’sEmancipationDailyfromJanuary4-5,1947.148Buhite269.149Ibid.129.ThefourForeignServiceofficerstargetedbyHurleywereJohnService,JohnDavies,RaymondLuddenandJohnEmmerson.150JohnDavies,“MemorandabyForeignServiceOfficers,”7November1944,inTheChinaWhitePaper567.151Buhite190.152ChinaHand333-337.

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editorsofAmerasia.ServicewasclearedofthesechargesbyafederalgrandjuryduetoillegalFBIwiretapsofhishome.153

Nevertheless,HurleyandtheStateDepartmenttransferredServicetoanon-Chinapost.InFebruary1950,McCarthychargedServicewithbeinga“communist,”alongwith204unnamedmembersoftheStateDepartment.AfterbringingServicebeforeitsLoyaltySecurityBoard,theStateDepartmentfiredhim.ServicebroughthiscasebeforetheU.S.SupremeCourt,whichvotedunanimouslyinhisfavorin1957.154ChargesofdisloyaltyfollowedServiceupto1970,whenhewassubpoenaedandcharged11yearsafterthefactwith“losingChina”bytheSenateInternalSecurityCommittee.Atthattime,thiscommitteewaschairedbyJamesEastland,astaunchanti-communistandsegregationistpoliticianfromMississippi.155Conclusion BythetimeSecretaryofStateDeanAchesonforwardedTheChinaWhitePapertoPresidentTrumanonJuly30,1949,theofficialU.S.positionofsupportfortheGuomindang’sgovernmentandmilitaryhadnotchanged.EvenastheCCP’sPeople’sLiberationArmycrossedtheYangtzeRiverinpursuitofChiang’scrumblingarmies,AchesonstatedthattheU.S.governmentshould“preserveandevenincreasetheinfluenceoftheNationalGovernment.”156

ThepoliticalobjectivesoftheDixieMissionandtheMarshallMissionreflectedthedifferentnecessitiesfacedbytheU.S.governmentandmilitaryinChinaintwodistincttimeperiods:Thefirstwasfrom1941-1945,andthesecondfrom1945-1946.TheeffortsofStilwell,membersoftheDixieMissionandseveralForeignServiceofficerstocreateacloserrelationshipwiththeCCPin1944-1945,wereattemptstomaintainaunitedfrontbetweentheU.S.andtheCCPuntilJapan’sdefeatinAugust1945.Fromlate1945to1946,thethree-waynegotiationsbetween

153HonorableSurvivor:Mao’sChina,McCarthy’sAmerica,andthePersecutionofJohnS.ServicebyLynneJoiner(NavalInstitutePress,2009)159-167.154Ibid.232,313-315.155Inhisreportsfrom1943toearly1945,collectedinLostChanceinChina,Servicearguedthateven-handedU.S.politicalandmilitarypoliciestowardtheCCPandtheGuomindangcouldhaveavertedcivilwarinChinaafterthedefeatofJapan.ServicealsowroteTheAmerasiaPapers(TheCenterforChineseStudies,theUniversityofCaliforniaatBerkeley,1971).156Acheson’s“LetterofTransmittaltoPresidentTruman,”30July1949inTheChinaWhitePaper9.WiththeGuomindangvanquished,anewPoliticalConsultativeConferencewasorganizedinPekinginSeptember1949.Itwasattendedby661representativesfromtheCCP,theDemocraticLeague,otherdemocraticgroups,andbyorganizationsofpeasants,workers,professionalsandothersectorsofChinesesociety.TheKMT-CCPConflict353.

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theCCP,theGMDandtheU.S.underthedirectionofTruman,HurleyandMarshallbecameapartoftheU.S.-SovietColdWar.Thesenegotiationsonlyservedtopostponetheoutbreakofnationwidecivilwaruntilthesummerof1946.

Inanycase,noone,includingthetargetedForeignServiceofficers,couldhave“lost”anationof450millionpeoplethatwasheadedintoacivilwarinwhichtherewouldbeonewinner.

BibliographyAnnexestoUnitedStatesRelationswithChina,withSpecialReferencetothePeriod1944-1949.PublishedbytheDepartmentofState,witha“LetterfromSecretaryofStateAchesontoPresidentTrumanTransmittingtheRecord,”30July1949(“TheChinaWhitePaper”).Barrett,ColonelDavid,DixieMission:TheUnitedStatesArmyObserverGroupinYenan,1944.TheCenterforChineseStudies:UniversityofCaliforniaatBerkeley,1970.Buhite,Russell,PatrickHurleyandAmericanForeignPolicy.CornellUniversityPress,1973.Carter,Carolle,MissiontoYenan:AmericanLiaisonwiththeChineseCommunists,1944-1947.TheUniversityPressofKentucky,1997.Ching-kuo,Chiang,MyFather.Taipei,1956.Claudin,Fernando,TheCommunistMovement:FromCominterntoCominform,VolumeII,NewYork,1975.Davies,John,ChinaHand:AnAutobiography.UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,2012.Davies,John,“MemorandabyForeignServiceOfficersinChina,1943-1945,”inTheChinaWhitePaper.Dedijer,Vladimer,TitoSpeaks,1953.Feis,Herbert,TheChinaTangle:TheAmericanEffortinChinafromPearlHarbortotheMarshallMission.PrincetonUniversityPress,1965.ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates(FRUS),1944and1945.Garver,John,Chinese-SovietRelations1937-1945:TheDiplomacyofChineseNationalism.OxfordUniversityPress,1988.Gauss,Clarence,“TheAmbassadorinChinatoSecretaryHull,”31August1944inTheChinaWhitePaper.Harding,HarryandMing,Yuaneditors,Sino-AmericanRelations,1945-1955,SRBooks,1989.

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