From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for ... · 6 Anne-Marie Gardner, “Putting...

From Promise to Practice:Strengthening UN Capacities

for thePrevention of Violent Conflict

International Peace Academy

FINAL REPORT

Chandra Lekha Sriram and Karin Wermester

New York, May 2003

Program Staff

Senior Program Associate: D r. Chandra Lekha SriramSenior Program Officer (April 2002-June 2003): Ms. Zoe NielsenSenior Program Officer (September 2000-April 2002 ) : Ms. Karin We r m e s t e r

Acknowledgements

This project is generously funded by the governments of the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands,Sweden, Italy, and Portugal.

“FROM PROMISE TO PRACTICE: STRENGTHENING UN CAPACITIES FOR THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT CONFLICT”

I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

II. From Reaction to Prevention, andFrom Promise to Practice: Conflict Prevention and the IPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

From Reaction to Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System in theNew Millenium (June 1999-June 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Preventionof Armed Conflict (June 2000-June 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

III. Taking Stock and Moving Forward:Conflict prevention at the IPA, the UN, and beyond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

IV. Conclusion: Problems and Prospects for Conflict Prevention in the Future . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Activities and Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Table of Contents

Contents

I. Introduction

While the promise of conflict prevention has risento the fore of international policy agenda sincethe end of the 1990s, its practice and effectivenessremains elusive. Following in the footsteps ofpeacebuilding, conflict prevention is a loose concep-tual framework for the increasingly broad range ofactors engaged in conflict-affected zones. The conceptof conflict prevention expands the scope ofpeacebuilding temporally and spatially, calling for theearly prevention of violent conflict and the preventionof further outbreaks through “structural” as well as“operational” initiatives.1 It promises cross-cuttingapproaches to mitigate the sources of potential conflictrather than merely the symptoms at arguably a lesser

cost and with great potential for lasting peace thanother forms of intervention.2 The challenge, of course,is that violent conflict can be hard to predict, especiallyin the early phases when efforts to prevent its escala-tion might be most valuable. More, it is harder toprevent effectively, and further to demonstrate thatpreventive initiatives have been successful.

The purpose of this report is to take stock of theInternational Peace Academy’s (IPA) research andpolicy development work on conflict prevention since1999. This work has focused on strengthening evolvingpractices of conflict prevention in the UN system andbeyond. The report seeks to identify achievements aswell highlight some of the opportunities, and keychallenges, that remain for the future.

II. F rom Reaction to Prevention, andF rom Pro m ise to Practice: ConflictP revention and the IPA

The evolution and overlap of the UN system’sengagement in peacekeeping, peacemaking andpeacebuilding activities, as elaborated in UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace,3

has been examined in great detail. For the most part,such analyses converge around two major points: first,the idea that the evolution of peaceke e p i n g ,peacemaking and peacebuilding in the UN system hasbeen piecemeal and largely reactive to the newlypermissive environment that emerged with the end ofthe Cold War4; second, that the UN system faced someof its most serious and well-documented failures in thepost Cold War period, most notably in Somalia,Rwanda and the Balkans.5 Together, these experiencesled to the call for a shift in the UN’s engagement in


IntroductionFrom Reaction to Prevention, and From Promise to Practice:Conflict Prevention and the IPA

1

H.E. Ms. Anna Lindh (Foreign Minister, Sweden) andMs. Isobelle Jaques, Associate Director, Wilton Park

1 These terms were coined by the large-scale study that helped placed conflict prevention at the center stage of international policy,the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. See Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing DeadlyConflict: Final Report (New York: Carnegie Commission, 1997), chapters 3 and 4.2 Michael E. Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance, The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena (Lanham MD: Rowmanand Littlefield, 1999).3 An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping, UN Doc. A/47/277 - S/24111 (17 June 1992);Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, UN Doc. A/50/60 - S/1995/1 (3 January 1995).4 David M. Malone and Karin Wermester, “Boom and Bust? The Changing Nature of Peacekeeping” International Peacekeeping ,Special Issue edited by Adekeye Adebajo and Chandra Lekha Sriram, vol. 7 no. 4 (Winter 2000).5 On Somalia, see Ameen Jan, “Somalia: Building Sovereignty or Restoring Peace?” Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar withKarin Wermester, eds. in Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers,


conflict affected zones; a shift from a culture ofreaction to a culture of prevention - a shift frompromise to practice.

With a view to identifying opportunities to move theprevention agenda forward, the IPA launched its firstproject devoted to conflict prevention in 1999.Following the success of that program, in 2000 the IPAlaunched a three-year project aimed at assisting the UNsystem to strengthen its efforts in this area.

From Reaction to Prevention: Opportunities for theUN System in the New Millennium (June 1999-June 2000)

In 1999, the IPA, in collaboration with the UNExecutive Office of the Secretary-General and theGovernment of Sweden, developed From Reaction toPrevention: Opportunities for the UN System in theNew Millennium, a project that sought to strengthenexisting and nascent capacity for conflict preventionwithin the UN system and its family of agencies. Thepremise of the project was that the UN system had anincreasing wealth of information at its disposal, butrelatively limited capacity to prioritize and analyzecase-specific knowledge. Further, there was a lagbetween emerging research on conflict dynamics andpolicy and programming at the UN.

The first phase of the project began with a review ofmajor studies on the causes of, and trends in, armedconflict in order to clarify areas of agreement anddisagreement and identify contradictions and gaps.Two background papers were commissioned to shedlight on these issues.6 These papers formed the basis ofdiscussions at the Expert Workshop that convenedmajor experts and practitioners to apply the findings of

scholarship to current practices within the UN system. 7

The research and discussions led to further refinementof the background papers and set the stage for aninternational policy conference that brought togetherclose to one hundred policymakers to take stock ofexisting, if nascent, efforts in conflict prevention andto consider the implications of emerging research witha view to identifying concrete steps to improve the UNsystem’s capacity in prevention. 8

From Reaction to Prevention yielded several notablefindings on both the research and policy fronts.Among these is the finding that, contrary to conven-tional wisdom, civil wars actually decreased in bothnumber and magnitude from 1992 to 1998. In addition,most studies indicated that poverty in and of itself isnot a major factor in the incidence of armed conflict;rather, what has been termed “horizontal inequality”—that is, inequitable access to basic resources (andpower)—and resource scarcity are more likely tocontribute to conflict. Conversely, nascent research on

2 From Reaction to Prevention, and From Promise to Practice:Conflict Prevention and the IPA

2001); on the Balkans, see in particular Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The fall ofSrebenica, 15 November 1999, A/54/549; and on Rwanda see the Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the UN Duringthe 1994 Genocide, 15 December 1999, at www.un.org.6 Anne-Marie Gardner, “Putting Prevention on Solid Ground: Recent Findings from Studies of Conflict Trends and Causes”, and FenOsler Hampson, “Preventive Diplomacy: A Review of the Scholarly and Policy Literature.” These papers were included as chapters inFen Osler Hampson and David M. Malone, eds., From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System (Boulder, CO:Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).7 From Reaction to Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System in the New Millennium, Expert Workshop, West Point, NY, 31January-1 February 2000.8 See Charles K. Cater and Karin Wermester, “From Reaction to Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System in the New Millennium”(New York, International Peace Academy Conference Report, 13-14 April, 2000).

UN Deputy Secretary-General Ms. Louise Fréchette withIPA President David M. Malone


economic factors in civil wars suggested that anabundance of natural resources could increase theprobability and duration of violent conflict as actorsseek to enrich themselves through illicit means.9

Finally, the findings confirmed what many suspected:that there were few case studies from which to draw“best practices” on conflict prevention.

These findings suggested two major areas for furtherresearch and policy development in conflict preven-tion. First, the dearth of case study literature suggestedthe need to develop a body of case-studies from whichto draw a greater understanding of what might work,and what might not, in conflict prevention. Second, therole of economic factors in both potentiallycontributing to and mitigating conflict suggested theneed to develop a greater understanding of thelinkages between development and security initiativesin the area of conflict prevention.

From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UNCapacities for the Prevention of Armed Conflict(June 2000-June 2003)

On the basis of this initial work, and with theunderstanding that conflict prevention is most likely tobe effective where action is taken early to addresspotential sources of conflict, the IPA launched FromPromise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities forthe Prevention of Armed Conflict, a multi-year researchand policy development project. The purpose of thisproject has been to provide operational and practicalsuggestions for the development and implementationof conflict prevention initiatives by the UN system andits agencies. In particular, the project has devotedconsiderable attention to gaining a betterunderstanding of how best to strengthen the UN’scapacity to address the causes of armed conflict, ratherthan merely the symptoms. As such, the project hasfocused not on conflict management or preventivediplomacy, but rather on what is sometimes calledstructural prevention. The emphasis has been on therole that development and governance actors can play

in ensuring that normal conflicts within a society donot become violent, but rather are resolved peacefully.The project has developed on two closely relatedresearch and policy development tracks.

Research: Case Studies on Conflict Prevention

The research track of the project has proceeded in twophases. The first entailed the development of a series ofcase studies focusing on a broad range of countries inwhich preventive efforts were either attempted or inwhich opportunities for prevention were missed. Thesecond phase of research built on many of the findingsof the first, and sought to address a perceived need togain a greater understanding of regional variations inthe causes of conflict. In both instances the purpose ofthe research was to help provide an analytical founda-tion for the policy community in and around the UNsystem.

Policy Development: Strengthening OperationalCapacities and Linkages

The policy development track of the project hasinvolved convening meetings with a range of experts,practitioners, and policy makers at all levels workingaround the world on relevant topics. Such meetings

From Reaction to Prevention, and From Promise to Practice:Conflict Prevention and the IPA

3

Ms. Isobelle Jaques, Dr. Stefan Amer, H.E. Ms. Anna Lindh, and Dr. David M. Malone, at Wilton Park

9 Hampson and Malone, From Reaction to Conflict Prevention; Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, eds., Greed and Grievance:Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001). The role of economic agendas in civil wars was developed intoa separate multi-year research and policy development project at the IPA, Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (2000-2003).



often play a facilitative role, strengthening the linkagesbetween research and policy analysis, headquartersand field, the member states of the UN and theSecretariat and UN agencies, and among differenttypes of actors—regional organizations, civil societygroups, the private sector, international and localNGOs, and others. Thanks in large part to the flexibilitythat was built into the design of the project, the IPAhas been able to be both responsive to particular needsemerging within various parts of the UN system, andforward looking in its approach. Such events have alsobeen linked to the research undertaken by both the IPAand other scholars and practitioners.

Main Themes, Key Findings

Four main themes have been developed by the IPA aspart of its multi-year prevention project: structuralprevention; regional, subregional, and local actors;member states and prevention and peacebuilding; anda cross-cutting theme: the importance of regionalapproaches in both understanding how conflictsbegin and end, and how best to tackle their preven-tion. Each of these themes is discussed in greaterdepth below.

A. Structural Prevention: the increasingly central roleof development actors

The first theme has been the importance of structuralprevention—that is, seeking to address the causes ofconflict early, often through the work of developmentactors. Initiatives that seek to harness the preventivepotential of development initiatives involve more thanmerely packaging “old wine in new bottles”. Bringingdevelopment actors into the conflict prevention arenaalso involves ensuring a coordinated, and at timesintegrated, approach to development and securitystrategies and responses. Given the “stovepipe”structure of the UN system and many governments andmultilateral institutions and NGOs, the challenges ofoperationalizing an integrated approach are bothorganizational and policy-related; they are alsoongoing. Added to these institutional challenges are

the substantive hurdles. Bringing developmentprograms to bear on conflict dynamics in meaningfulways requires a greater understanding of whether andhow “development problems” impact on the incidenceand perpetuation of armed conflict. It also involvesdecisions about how best to plan and implementdevelopment programming such that the potential forviolent conflict can be reduced both in the immediateand in the longer-term. However, given that conflictdynamics and their causes involve a host of political,economic, historical, sociological, cultural and othervariables, development initiatives must tread carefully,and often in politically charged contexts. In short,there are both promising prospects and significantchallenges to the engagement of development actors inconflict prevention at the operational and substantivelevels.

Deepening our Understanding of Structural Prevention

The IPA has sought to remedy, at least partially, apersistent and much lamented lack of systematicanalysis of conflict prevention mechanisms that havebeen applied, their successes or failures and the reasonsbehind the outcomes. Believing it to be especiallyimportant to capture the experiential knowledge, ideasand best practices of field staff and others working inthe area, on both developmental and political/securitysides of the equation, the IPA commissioned a series ofnine country case-studies. The case studies looked atconflict prevention initiatives in Georgia (Javakheti),Burundi, Tanzania (Zanzibar), Fiji, Kenya, East Timor,Colombia, Tajikistan and Liberia. The case studiesexamine successes, failures, and results that fallsomewhere in between the two extremes.10 T h ecentrality of development actors in conflict preventionwas one of the main lessons that emerged from thecountry case studies. However, a number of dilemmasfaced by actors working in conflict-affected zones alsoemerged from the research.

Whether to act? The dilemma of how best to act inconflict-prone contexts is a major challenge fordevelopment actors. The access of such actors is

10 See Chandra Lekha Sriram and Karin Wermester, eds., From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Preventionof Violent Conflict (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003); a summary is provided in Chandra Lekha Sriram, From Promise to Practice:Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict. Case Studies In Prevention (New York: IPA Policy Report, 2002).



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typically based on the consent of host governments,and while there are a variety of points of leverage thatcan be employed to ensure such access, these are fewerand far between during those phases of potentialconflict when the activities of such actors are likely tohave the most effective preventive outcome. Forinstance, their increasing engagement in areas such asgovernance and security sector reform—key pillars inthe effort to prevent the outbreak of organizedviolence—may not be welcome by host governmentsunwilling to acknowledge, externally, the potential forviolent conflict. In such instances, donors face avariety of choices, each of which are accompanied byassociated costs and trade-offs: withdrawing; contin-uing their traditional development activities; adoptingeuphemisms to avoid directly referring to conflict or itspotential; or highlighting the “technical” aspects ofsuch initiatives. It became clear that what worked inone situation will not necessarily work in another. Forinstance, the use of euphemisms was more effective inthe Javakheti region of Georgia, and less effective inKenya.

How to act? Many of the studies highlighted not onlythat development initiatives have a role to play inaddressing the underlying causes of conflict, whichrange from poverty and inequality to flawed institu-tions, but that their role is critical at all phases ofpotential and actual conflict. That is, developmentinitiatives are useful whether there is low-level,scattered violence, widespread human rights abuses, oreven wider civil conflict.11 At the same time, theengagement of development actors, while frequentlybilled as technical, is often deeply political. Forexample, in the Javakheti region in Georgia and inTajikistan, the critically weak state is a majorunderlying source of potential conflict; clearly,addressing institutional reform has implications forpolitical processes and outcomes both in individualcountries and for their neighbors. Similarly, institu-tions such as the judiciary played a vital role inmanaging the constitutional crisis that had thepotential to escalate into organized violence in Fiji;

while development initiatives can provide importantsupport for judicial reform, they have implications forpower sharing arrangements. There is no doubt thatsuch challenges have spurred, at least in part, the effortto mainstream—and thereby render less visible—conflict prevention activities into developmentprogramming.

Widening the Scope of Structural Prevention

In keeping with the project’s mandate to strengthen theUN system’s capacity in conflict prevention, the IPAhas sought to engage with UNDP and the Office for theCoordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) inparticular and to support their evolving efforts todevelop programming that is conflict-sensitive. At thesame time, the project has sought to facilitate andstrengthen linkages across relevant departments andunits within the UN Secretariat and between theSecretariat and various agencies.

Conflict Indicators. In June 2001, the Secretary-General issued his far-reaching report on the preven-tion of armed conflict. Central to the report was theargument that “[p]revention should be initiated at theearliest possible stage of a conflict cycle in order to bemost effective”. To do this, however, there must be aprompt recognition of and response to early warningof the potential for conflict. Responses must be tailoredto the particular risks and be implemented system-wide. The attempt to operationalize this earlywarning/early response approach within the UN systemin early 2001 led to the development of a set of earlywarning indicators designed to aid the identification ofpotential conflict situations, ensure a common basis ofunderstanding across UN departments and agencies,and promote coherent policy responses. The indicatorswere designed to produce analysis that could be ofuse by the Framework Team for Coordination inp a r t i c u l a r, as well as in the development of CommonCountry Assessment/United Nations DevelopmentAssistance Framework (CCA/UNDAF) reports, and inanalysis in the field and at headquarters. In this light,

11 The case-study volume develops five “phases” of prevention, identifying sets of challenges and risks, as well as appropriate preven-tive actors. These phases are not linked to a conception of conflict as linear, playing out in a cycle, or otherwise time-bound; ratherthey are linked to the content of the problems that preventive actors face. See Sriram and Wermester, From Promise to Practice,chapter 2.

on November 9, 2001, the IPA hosted MainstreamingEarly Warning and Conflict Prevention in the UNSystem—Rationalizing Tools, a small experts meeting todiscuss the utility of the (draft) clusters of indicatorsand their potential usability in the field.

The experts meeting elicited broad recognition that,while the indicators could be “sliced and diced” inmyriad valid ways, far more important was how theywere ultimately used for early warning reporting andanalysis. Among the most salient issues to be consid-ered at a conceptual level was the utility of a genericset of conflict indicators given the case-specificity ofthe regions and countries to which they are applied. Arelated issue was the question of how best to weigh theimportance of different indicators in any given case.Practically, the key challenge is how to translate theearly warning analysis derived from such indicatorsinto effective preventive practice at headquarters andperhaps more importantly, at the UN Country Teamlevel.

Justice and Security Sector Reform. Justice andsecurity sector reform (JSSR) includes, among othercomponents, judicial, military, and penal reform. Oneof the challenges of JSSR is the limited understandingand practice of the relationship between policeeffectiveness and accountability, and what types ofprogramming can address the potential conflicts inthat relationship. A common assumption in the JSSRliterature and policy discussions is that there is atension between police effectiveness and accounta-bility. This tension is presumed to occur in a post-conflict environment when crime rates soar anddomestic actors demand more stringent and “tougher”policing while international assistance focusesprimarily on issues of police accountability to ensurethat past abuses do not recur. However in practice, thepolice accountability-effectiveness relationship is morecomplicated and involves at least two additionalelements. The first is the role of legal protections (dueprocess, etc.) and police powers. While legal protec-tions do put real constraints on police, oversightmechanisms do not necessarily limit effectiveness.Accountability and effectiveness might well, in thiscase, exist in a mutually reinforcing relationship. Asecond element, transparency, may also be added tothe police effectiveness-accountability relationship.

Police policies, operations and activities must be madeintelligible and known to the publics the police serve.As public servants, police services are an integral partof public administrations and, therefore, the principlesof good governance apply to them.

From the perspective of the UN and its developmentcapacities, the issue then becomes, how can fieldprogramming strengthen police effectiveness andaccountability simultaneously and what sort ofapproaches can UNDP adopt? In an attempt to shedlight on this question, in September 2002 the IPAorganized Justice and Security Sector Reform:Developing Guidance for the Field, a workshop thatwas organized in collaboration with the new Justiceand Security Sector Reform team of the Bureau forCrisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), UNDP. Themeeting brought together approximately thirty partici-pants, including UN practitioners from headquartersand the field, experts from the World Bank, NGO’s,academics, and representatives of key donor govern-ments. The aim of the workshop was to developguidance for the field as well as articulate challengesand options for practitioners engaged in police reform,particularly with respect to the relationship betweenpolice effectiveness and accountability. The meetingexamined several specific cases from which usefullessons were drawn: Serbia, Indonesia, and Haiti.

Several key findings emerged from the discussion. Thefirst was that JSSR activities must adopt an integratedapproach; a small judicial or police reform project, forinstance, is likely to fail if not tied into a more compre-hensive JSSR framework. The development of such aframework could be facilitated by supporting thecreation of domestic dialogue through the use ofroundtables to ensure that all the relevant stakeholdersbuy into the reform process. At the implementationphase, overcoming a cycle of confrontation at the verylocal level and encouraging participation and conver-sation could be supported through community-basedpolice programs. In addition, discussions during themeeting highlighted the importance of being selectivegiven the enormity of the task and picking niches forUNDP and its partners. What is required is the selectionof entry points that have strategic resonance and arecatalytic in nature. The projects generated from theseentry points must not only achieve “quick wins”, but



must also be mutually reinforcing and additive overtime.12

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration(DDR). While disarmament and demobilization havebeen studied extensively and are relatively wellunderstood as military processes (though lessexamined as social and economic processes) reintegra-tion has received less attention, both in terms ofanalysis and resources, from the internationalcommunity. It is, however, clear that unless formerfighters become functioning and productive membersof society, long-term peace will not be possible. Unlikedisarmament and demobilization, which can bedescribed as time-bound, reintegration is a process. Assuch, it necessarily involves many variables that arebeyond the control of donors or the internationalcommunity, including the willingness of ex-combat-ants to reintegrate and of communities to accept them.U l t i m a t e l y, ex-combatants must reintegratethemselves, and the role of the internationalcommunity can only be to facilitate this process. To alarge extent, the success of a DDR program thendepends upon winning the hearts and minds not onlyof ex-combatants but also of the government and thecommunity at large. Political will is crucial; unless thepopulation and the government are committed to peaceand combatants are ready to return to civilian life, DDRprograms are unlikely to succeed.

In December of 2002, IPA organized a workshop withBCPR, UNDP, A Framework for Lasting Disarmament,Demobilization, and Reintegration of FormerCombatants in Crisis Situations. The approximatelyfifty-five participants included experts and practi-tioners from various UN departments and agencies, aswell as representatives from the World Bank, theInternational Organization for Migration (IOM),academics, and NGOs. With a specific focus on thereintegration of former combatants, participantsanalyzed the cases of Mozambique, Sierra Leone, andthe Democratic Republic of the Congo, to draw out

insights and find common features across the cases.The goal of the workshop was to encourage a moreholistic view of disarmament, demobilization, andreintegration and to address the gaps in knowledgebetween disarmament and demobilization on the onehand and reintegration on the other.

Participants at the workshop agreed that there is noblueprint for DDR. It is clear that programs and strate-gies that are successful in one situation might not fitthe circumstances or realities of another. Appropriatetiming, sequencing, and relevant actors depend on ahost of issues and necessarily differ from case to case.The nature of the conflict, its duration, and causes, forexample, have implications for the DDR process andinfluence what type of program will be most suitable.The workshop also identified key issues that needfurther elaboration and discussion. Those includemainstreaming a gender perspective, addressing healthconcerns such as mental health and HIV/AIDS, stream-lining funding mechanisms, including neglectedactors, and improving international and nationalcoordination. These issues have to be addressed in aDDR strategy that is itself integrated into an overallrecovery framework. Attention must now turn to howthe international community, and developmentagencies such as UNDP, can best address thesechallenges as part of a broader concept of develop-ment.13

B. Regional, subregional, and local actors: ke ypartners for the UN system

The second theme examined by the IPA’s conflictprevention project is the importance not only of theUN system but also and crucially of r e g i o n a l ,subregional and local actors in the prevention ofarmed conflict. Such actors are important in manyrespects, not least because local actors, in particular,enjoy unique access to information and key actors onthe ground. However, the UN system has traditionallyfound it difficult to engage with these key actors in



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12 Chandra Lekha Sriram, UNDP, Justice, and Security Sector Reform: Developing Guidance For the Field (New York: IPA WorkshopReport, 23 September 2002), online at www.ipacademy.org; see also Charles Call, Challenges in Police Reform: Promoting Effectivenessand Accountability (New York: IPA Policy Paper, September 2002).13 Lotta Hagman and Zoe Nielsen, A Framework for Lasting Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatantsin Crisis Situations (New York: IPA Workshop Report, 12-13 December 2002).

ways that are mutually supportive. In addition,regional, sub-regional and local actors often have verylimited resources, and may, as in the case of develop-ment actors, also find it difficult to work independ-ently while maintaining access and leverage to ke yplayers in a conflict. As such, the IPA has sought tofacilitate effective linkages among the UN system andregional, subregional and local actors by holding aseries of meetings that have sought to betterunderstand and strengthen the comparativeadvantages of each type of actor with a focus on earlyjoint efforts and initiatives.

Local actors. There are a multiplicity of organizations,networks, businesses and people that fall under thedefinition ‘local actor’. The term civil society organiza-tions (CSOs) can encompass a range of non-state actorsactive in conflict prevention work including religiousorganizations, the media, trade unions, civic associa-tions, registered NGOs and private sector organiza-tions. In this sense, CSOs are not in opposition togovernments; rather civil society encompasses therange of domestic and international social organiza-tions that surround, and in many ways shape, the state.Similarly, the UN is multifaceted: it comprises a set ofdepartments, funds, and agencies with differingmandates, objectives and structures. The public face ofthe UN in any country or region may be very differentfrom that experienced in another. Typically a numberof agencies have an established, long-term presence in“the field”—this is especially true of UNDP. Often,several agencies and sometimes departments will beactive, and their efforts coordinated by a UN ResidentRepresentative or Coordinator. In some countries, aSpecial Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)may have been appointed. Because every case is likelyto be unique, partnerships between the UN and CSOscan be difficult to arrange and even harder to replicate.

In an effort to confront and discuss such challenges,the IPA held an international policy workshop in NewYork in December 2001. Empowering Local Actors: TheUN and Multitrack Conflict Prevention b r o u g h ttogether approximately fifty members of the UNsystem and civil society organizations from around the

world. The purpose of the workshop was to follow-upon the June 2001 report of the United NationsSecretary-General on the Prevention of ArmedConflict14 and to address some of the opportunities andchallenges involved in working in tandem withrelevant local actors. In particular, this workshopattempted to focus on the extent to which modes ofengagement can move beyond ad hoc arrangements tosome generalized guidelines for cooperation applicablein multiple situations.

Several key lessons emerged from the proceedings. Thefirst and most prominent was that the primary obstacleto improving collaboration between these groups, andto empowering local actors to play a lead role inconflict prevention, is the difference in perceptions andexpectations within and between CSOs and the UNsystem. Nonetheless, while increased mutualfamiliarity between UN and civil society actors shouldenhance the process of empowerment, not all barriersto increased cooperation can be explained by meremisunderstandings. In some cases CSOs have clearexpectations of what the UN ought to contribute in agiven situation, and yet they find that the UN does notdeliver—sometimes because it cannot, sometimesbecause it should not, and at other times because ittries, but fails.

At the same time, both the UN and local actors havemuch to gain from working together in conflict



Julia Taft, Eleanor O’Gorman, and Tecla Wanjala, in New York

14 Report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict, UN Doc. A/55/985 - S/2001/574, (7 June 2001).

prevention. This means that the UN must trust theexpertise of local actors, and that local actors seekingUN cooperation must accept the limits and operatingprocedures of the UN system. The UN is not an alterna-tive to local or domestic political processes, but acomplement to them. Moreover, in many cases regionalorganizations and neighboring states offer the besthope of mobilizing political leverage to effect change:a reliance on local actors may sometimes obscure othermore appropriate or effective mechanisms of conflictprevention. Finally, when engaging with each otherboth inter-governmental and civil society organiza-tions should be clear about what they expect from eachother, from themselves and from other organizations.15

Regional and subregional actors. Regional andsubregional organizations are uniquely placed to affectseveral factors that are crucial in the prevention ofviolent conflict. Many of these factors can facilitateand help move forward the efforts of the UN systemthroughout its engagement in situations of conflict orpotential conflict. First, member states may be morewilling to a l l o w the involvement of regional/subregional organizations. The actions of regional/subregional organizations are likely to be more discreetthan those undertaken by the various bodies of the UN,particularly at the early stages of potential conflict.Moreover, such organizations may be better placed toact because they are familiar with the actors involvedin the dispute and the situation on the ground. Inaddition, although their interests are not alwaysbenign, neighbors frequently have a greater interest inpreventing conflicts that could potentially escalate tothe regional level. Second, regional/subregionalorganizations have an important role to play indeveloping a regional “culture of conflict prevention”through the promotion of democracy, human rightsand sustainable development. Third, they can and havebeen quite successful at longer-term and sustainedconflict prevention efforts involving capacity building

and technical assistance. In the past few years, this hasbegun to include election monitoring and broaderdemocratization assistance in several regions. Perhapsmost significantly, such organizations are ideallyplaced to serve as a conduit between the internationaland national or local levels. Meaningful participationat the national and local levels is crucial for theimmediate and effective implementation of conflictprevention measures, and there is an urgent need todevelop better practices in this area. What is requiredis a comprehensive international and regional/subregional approach to conflict prevention that takesthe local ownership of conflict prevention seriously.

With the understanding that the comprehensive impactof the UN system and regional/subregional actorsengaged in conflict prevention is likely to yield moreeffective overall results, the IPA designed two meetingsthat sought to develop a greater understanding of howbest to optimize the relationship between the UN andregional and subregional actors.

In April 2002, in collaboration with the SwedishInstitute in Alexandria, the project organized theworkshop, Sharing Best Practices on ConflictPrevention: The UN, Regional and Subregional,National and Local Actors.16 The small, operationallyfocused workshop convened approximately thirtyparticipants from within the UN system and variousregional and subregional organizations, as well asdiplomats, civil society activists, and academics. Theworkshop had a dual focus: first, it aimed to identifyand share concrete best practices and experiences thatcan inform conflict prevention within and between theUN, regional and subregional, national and localorganizations. Second, it aimed to explore comparativeadvantages and opportunities for partnering in thisarea. Discussions drew upon several backgroundpapers, which examined the role of, inter alia, training,local actors, and quiet diplomacy.17



9

15 Ben Rawlence, Empowering Local Actors: The UN and Multi-Track Conflict Prevention (New York: IPA Workshop Report, 10December 2001).16 Chandra Lekha Sriram, Albrecht Schnabel, John Packer, and Augustine Touré, Sharing Best Practices on Conflict Prevention: TheUN, Regional and Subregional Organizations, National and Local Actors (New York: IPA Policy Report, April 2002); Sara J. Lodge,Sharing Best Practices on Conflict Prevention: The UN, Regional and Subregional Organizations, National and Local Actors(Alexandria, Egypt: IPA Workshop Report, 8-10 April 2002). 17 Sriram, et. al., Sharing Best Practices Policy Report.

Several lessons emerged from this meeting. First, thereis considerable room for further coordination amongthe UN, regional, subregional, national and localorganizations, particularly in the areas of earlywarning and risk analysis, training and capacitybuilding. The role of external actors, such as the UNsystem, governments and international NGOs, must beto support locally and regionally led conflict manage-ment processes. Second, shared methodologies,terminology, and strategies help to prevent duplicationand to enhance cooperation and informatione xchange. There are innovative practices acrossinstitutions that may be adapted and shared in earlywarning, training, and quiet diplomacy.

Building upon these initial discussions, the IPAw o r ked in collaboration with Wilton Park to develop aconference on Creating Conditions for Peace: WhatRole for the UN and Regional Ac t o r s ? This conference,which was held in July 2002, brought together some65 participants, including practitioners from the UNand several regional and subregional organizations,government policy-makers, academics, and represen-tatives of NGOs. Building on the findings fromAlexandria, several key lessons emerged from thesedeliberations. It is clear that working relationshipshave to be forged between regional organizations andthe UN; among regional organizations themselves;and among organs, departments and institutions of

the UN. Where such relationships exist at rudimentarylevels, they need to be improved dramatically.S i m i l a r l y, there ought to be a greater sharing of bestpractices in prevention, including training and earlywarning, and the development of country strategies.H o w e v e r, while this process must be nurtured, it mustproceed cautiously, as there is a risk that many organi-zations will expand too rapidly and take on additionalmandates and responsibilities that they are not able tofulfill. Most subregional organizations have tried tot a ke on too many new demands and tasks, expandingbefore they have developed the institutional andpolicy capacity to implement new activities.Harmonization should proceed at a deliberate andrealistic speed, beginning with manageable preventioninitiatives, such as: the development of regionalconfidence-building measures; training in earlywarning and risk assessment; and the adoption andimplementation of protocols concerning regionalproblems such as small arms, illicit trade and drugt r a f f i c k i n g .1 8

C. Member states and prevention and peacebuilding—central partners

The third theme of the IPA’s conflict prevention projecthas been the role of the UN member states, bilaterally,in clusters and through the main intergovernmentalorgans of the UN system (namely, the General



18 David Carment, Creating Conditions for Peace: What Role for the UN and Regional Actors? (Wilton Park, UK: IPA ConferenceReport, 1-3 July 2002).

Ms. Nasra Hassan, H.E. Mr. Pierre Shori, and Mr. Samuel Doe, at theSwedish Institute in Alexandria

Sir Lopo do Nascimento, Mr. Lansan Kouyate, and Rear Admiral RolfHauter, at Wilton Park

Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and theSecurity Council). Often neglected, yet hugelyimportant, the member states have a key role to play inthe prevention of violent conflict through political willand resources, as well as through information sharingand analysis. At the same time, member states can bethe key obstacle to prevention and its operationaliza-tion. They may seek to promote their particularinterests, or to control, limit, or even halt discussionabout certain potential conflicts for a variety ofreasons. The IPA has sought to support the positiveengagement of member states at a general level bysupporting advocacy on conflict prevention withstrong analytical foundations, in addition toattempting to bring key member states on boardimportant initiatives such as the Secretary-General’s2001 report on prevention. The IPA has also sought tobring the UN’s inter-governmental organs closertogether in meaningful ways such that the comprehen-sive impact of the membership can be heightened inconflict prevention and peacebuilding.

In order to support the drafting of the UN Secretary-General’s report on conflict prevention, the IPA held aworkshop in February 2001 which brought SecurityCouncil members, representatives of UN departmentsand agencies, and key experts in prevention together atWest Point, NY.19 The meeting sought to draw out, forthe benefit of the Council members, key rationalesunderpinning the move towards conflict prevention,the various roles to be played by the member states, theSecretariat, and the Secretary-General himself. Thedistinction between prevention and intervention, therole of development in prevention, the role of leader-ship in fomenting and preventing conflict, theimportance of accurate and sophisticated analysis, andthe difficulty of assessing preventive efforts were allsubjects of debate. A smaller brainstorming meetingwas then held to discuss ways forward for the draftingof the report. These meetings, and the retreat report,

helped feed into the drafting process at the UN, as wellas the reception, of the report.

In October 2001, IPA hosted a high-level retreat inTarrytown, NY that brought together 30 key permanentand deputy permanent representatives of countries onthe UN Security Council and the Economic and SocialCouncil (ECOSOC), a few other member states andrelevant high-level Secretariat representatives, entitledThe United Nations System in the New Millennium:Fostering Substantive and Operational Linkages in theImplementation of Peace.20 The purpose of the retreatwas to discuss the division of labor among the primaryUN intergovernmental bodies with a view to height-ening their comprehensive role, and impact, inensuring the establishment of self-sustainable peace.The meeting occasioned rich debate on the currentinvolvement of the intergovernmental bodies inconflict prevention and peacebuilding and a diagnosisof the need for, but also of the obstacles to, theireffective engagement and interaction. Concreteproposals to improve their consultation and, possibly,coordination in the future emerged.

D. A cross-cutting theme: the increasing importanceof regional dimensions of and responses to conflict

In recent years there has been an increasing recogni-tion that the causes of conflict are seldom purelyinternal. Rather, there are regional or subregionaldimensions of conflict as they spill into and out ofcountries with flows of refugees, arms, resources, andcombatants. Leaders in one state frequently have avested interest in the outcome of conflict in aneighboring state, bolstering one side or the other. Thismeans that responding to the apparent internal causesof conflict is not sufficient. As noted above,regional/subregional actors, and the development ofregional strategies in conflict prevention, areimportant. However, it is equally important to



11

19 Chandra Lekha Sriram, From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict (West Point:IPA Security Council Workshop Report, 9-10 February 2001), and follow-on high-level brainstorming, off-the-record. See also UNDoc. S/RES/1366 (30 August 2001), and UN Doc. S/PV.4334 (21 June 2001).20 Karin Wermester, The United Nations System in the New Millennium: Fostering Substantive and Operational Linkages in theImplementation of Peace (Tarrytown, NY: IPA Workshop Report, 19-20 October 2001), also published as UN Doc. S/2001/1054 (7November 2001).

understand the nature of the potential conflict(s) thatrequire response(s). It is well known that there aremyriad causes of conflict, and that preventing violentconflict requires addressing root and proximate causesin a complex fashion. In addition, it is understood thatdifferent causes and types of conflict plague differentcountries to varying degrees. However, while researchin recent years has generated findings on the range ofpossible causes of conflict generally, and case studieshave applied many of these insights to particularcountries, less work has been done on the ways inwhich the relative significance of different causes mayvary in particular regions of the world.21

Generating a greater understanding of these regionalvariances is however significant to the elaboration of

preventive policy responses in two senses. First,regional variances in the causes and nature of conflictcan suggest a relative prioritization of tools andresources at the policymaking stage. Second, at theimplementation stage, they can aid a greaterunderstanding of the comparative advantages amongthe multiple preventive actors that are likely to be onthe ground and thereby inform better strategic coordi-nation. For this reason, the project has commissionedcase-studies examining the specific risks of conflict,with an eye to possible entry points for those interestedin developing tailored preventive responses, in foursubregions: West Africa, the Horn of Africa, CentralAmerica and Central Asia. The publication of these willbe finalized this year.22



21 There may further be variance in subregions, as work in Africa has demonstrated. See Report of the Secretary-General, “The causesof conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa,” (13 April 1998), UN Doc. S/1998/318. Seealso UK Department for International Development (DFID), “The Causes of conflict in Africa: Consultation Document,” (London: DFID,2001); “Regional Approaches to Conflict Management in Africa,” (New York: IPA Report, 2001).22 Chandra Lekha Sriram and Zoe Nielsen, eds., Subregional Causes of Conflict: Identifying Entry points for Conflict Prevention(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming).

Dr. Tapio Kanninen, Professor Assia Ben Alaoui, Ms. Raghda Quandour, and Ms. Nasra Hassan, at theSwedish Institute in Alexandria

III. Taking Stock and MovingForward: Conflict prevention atthe IPA, the UN, and beyond

Policy and practice in conflict prevention hasprogressed significantly since appearing on theUN’s policy and programming agenda at the end of the1990s. At the same time, significant challenges remain.At the IPA, several key findings stand out from itsfour-year engagement in conflict prevention. Some ofthese have begun to be internalized by different partsof the UN system, which itself has taken strides towardturning the rhetoric of conflict prevention into practicein recent years. At the same time, there is more tolearn, and more to be done, to move forward at the UNand beyond.

Key lessons in Conflict Prevention

While a number of notable findings have emergedfrom each of the research and policy developmentinitiatives undertaken by the IPA, five general—ifobvious—lessons stand out.

Opportunities and Challenges of the Development-Security Nexus. A key lesson to emerge from the projectis that development actors have an increasingly w i d eand d e e p role to play in domains that have traditionallybeen reserved for “security” and “political” arenas. Inaddition, their utility as conflict prevention actors existsacross the range of phases of potential and actualconflict. Associated challenges, and potentialunintended consequences, of the involvement ofdevelopment actors in security arrangements arehowever extremely important to assess. A coordinated,and at times an integrated, approach to developmentand security interventions is likely to help mitigatesome of these (however, other challenges are likely toemerge as a result).2 3 This requires overcoming bothsubstantive and organizational challenges.

The UN does not act alone. This is an obvious butimportant point: while the efforts of the UN system in

the prevention of violent conflict are important, theyare unlikely to be sufficient, and may even bemarginal. However, the UN system is ill suited to thedevelopment of systematic and mutually enhancinglinkages with other actors, and fruitful collaborationwith others tends to occur on an ad hoc basis and belargely dependent on personal leadership skills andnetworks. It is crucial that the UN system and itsrelevant parts develop more systematic ways ofunderstanding its comprehensive, as well as individual,comparative advantages in a given situation, andfurther how best to support the comparativeadvantages of others. It is also worth questioningwhether, in certain instances, the UN is in fact illplaced to act.

Key ingredients: Resources and Strategies. While theeffectiveness of conflict prevention initiatives isdependent on a variety of factors (including luck andcircumstances that are beyond the control of interlocu-tors), there are two key ingredients that are likely toheighten its effectiveness that are not “fixe dconstraints”. The first is the importance of sufficientresources allocated appropriately, and over time. Whilepolitical will, or what is more realistically termednational interest, is difficult to shift, regularization ofthe provision and allocation of resources is possible,and highly desirable. The second is the importance ofwell-informed and strategically coordinated strategies.This requires appropriate information and moreimportantly analysis of a given potential conflict,particularly at the gestation phase, and the develop-ment of strategy that attempts to capitalize on compar-ative advantages. While there are some generalizablelessons on particular issues, such strategies must betailored carefully to fit local needs—there can be noone-size-fits-all approach to conflict prevention.Further, key to the effective implementation of suchcomprehensive approaches are leadership andcommunication skills that can elicit consensus amongthe broad range of stakeholders involved.

Modest expectations. Perhaps the single mostimportant lesson emerging from the IPA’s engagementin conflict prevention is an understanding of just how


Taking Stock and Moving Forward:Conflict prevention at the IPA, the UN, and beyond

13

23 See for example Mark Duffield, Global governance and the new wars: the merging of development and security (London: Zed Books,2002).

difficult it is to achieve positive change. Beyond the“dog that didn’t bark” issue lies the enormity of thechallenge of shifting the interests and preferences ofthose leaders potentially or actually willing to useviolence to achieve their ends, and those factors thatcoalesce to shape and sustain these. In part as a result,rather than big successes of conflict averted, effectiveconflict prevention is likely to be found in small stepstoward creating the conditions in which violence is lesslikely to erupt. “Successful” conflict prevention islikely to be circumscribed and small-scale.24

Regional/Subregional and Transnational Dimensions.Looking to the future, the work undertaken by the IPAhas highlighted the mixed impact of the processes ofglobalization on the incidence and duration of violentconflict. They have been accompanied by an increase intransborder resource and information flows, and haveaffected the poverty, growth and inequality of societiesaround the world. In part as a result, violent conflictserupt, and are fought, locally in regions/subregions of theworld that are not defined by existing borders, and withthe help of transnational linkages of people, money andresources. Shifting to a mindset that results in policy andprogramming that transcends nation-state boundaries isa major challenge for the UN system in the future.

Key developments in the operationalization ofpreventive practice at the UN

Since 2000 there has been a shift within the UN, bothsubstantively and operationally, toward the adoptionof proactive responses to potential conflict and to theprevention of the recurrence of conflict. The Secretary-General has emphasized the importance of conflictprevention, including it as a key priority for the UN inhis speech to the 56th General Assembly (2001) and hisNobel Prize Acceptance speech that year.2 5 T h i scommitment was elaborated earlier in greater detail inhis report on the prevention of armed conflict in June2001. Numerous advances at the level of policy and

programming have been made across the UN, and whatfollows is necessarily not an exhaustive summary of allof these. The work of the IPA in conflict prevention hasto varying degrees and in formal and informal waysinformed and been informed by many of thesedevelopments.

At the strategic level, the operationalization of preven-tive practice within the UN system has been character-ized by efforts to bring development and securitystrategies to bear in a coordinated, and at timesintegrated, fashion on the prevention of conflict. Thishas been accompanied by a widening and deepening ofthe scope of development activities into political andsecurity sectors across the range of phases of potentialand actual conflict. Such strategic shifts have beencarried forward in part thanks to new or refinedinstitutional developments and tools and mechanismsthat have helped operationalize these.

Institutional developments. The Department ofPolitical Affairs (DPA), as the focal point for preven-tion, works closely with other UN departments andagencies in its support of the Secretary-General’spreventive functions. The Policy Planning Unit,established in 1998, provides DPA’s regional divisionswith analysis for early warning and conflict preven-tion. In 1998, the Prevention Team within DPA and theTrust Fund for Preventive Action were alsoestablished. In addition, DPA convenes meetings of theE xecutive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS)and uses this as a forum to promote inter-depart-mental and interagency discussions on conflictp r e v e n t i o n .2 6 Further to its role in the development ofa more integrated strategy in the UN system, DPA isactively engaged in improving UN coordination withregional and sub-regional organizations.2 7

Marking an important stride forward in operational-izing the still-nascent role of development actors in theprevention of conflict, UNDP has also become an


14 Taking Stock and Moving Forward:Conflict prevention at the IPA, the UN, and beyond

24 Hampson and Malone, From Reaction to Conflict Prevention.2 5 Speech of the Secretary-General to the opening of the UN General Assembly (1 November 2001); see also http://www.n o b e l . s e / p e a c e / l a u r e a t e s / 2 0 01 / a n n a n - l e c t u r e . h t m l .2 6 See Report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict, pg. 19, esp. para. 73; http://www. u n . o r g / D e p t s / d p a /docs/peacemak.htm. 2 7 Report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict, p. 20, fn. 80.

increasingly important actor in conflict prevention.Upgrading its Emergency Response Division, whichwas staffed with just over a dozen professionals in1999, to the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recoverywith over one hundred professional staff members in2003, UNDP has expanded its ambit in policy develop-ment and programming in new and novel arenas.These include conflict analysis and early warninggenerally, justice and security sector reform, and thereintegration of former combatants. Similarly, theWorld Bank has taken great steps forward analyticallyand practically on conflict prevention through itsConflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit (formerlythe Post-Conflict Unit).28

Tools and mechanisms. New mechanisms and toolshave been developed to enhance the early warning andconflict prevention capacities of the system. Bringingin the range of actors increasingly known to havepreventive potential, several mechanisms have soughtto better coordinate the activities of different parts ofthe system. The Framework for Coordination(Framework Team) is a headquarters-based coordina-tion mechanism comprising an ever-increasing numberof departments, agencies, and funds. Its purpose is toreview recommendations for preventive action andforward them, as appropriate, to the Exe c u t i v eCommittees on Peace and Security and HumanitarianAffairs.29

There has also been the innovative development ofinteragency task forces, which involve actors insideand outside the UN. The Secretary-General has sentsuch task forces to, for example, West Africa, enablingpartnership with ECOWAS with an eye to developing acomprehensive approach to conflict prevention andpeacebuilding in the subregion. Following this initia-tive, an office of the Special Representative of the

Secretary-General for West Africa was established inJanuary 2002 in Dakar, with a mandate to enhance thecapacity of the UN in the areas of early warning,prevention and peacebuilding.30

Further steps have been taken toward the operational-ization of peacebuilding and preventive practice. Mostnotable among these efforts has been the new innova-tion of Peacebuilding Support Offices. Such Officeshave been set up with Security Council mandates underthe supervision of DPA in Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, theCentral African Republic and Tajikistan between 1997and 2000.31 These support offices seek to develop moreintegrated peacebuilding and conflict preventionstrategies.32

Following the increasing involvement of developmentactors in this traditionally security-specific field,Common Country Assessments and UN DevelopmentAssistance Frameworks developed by UNDP are alsobeing revised to ensure the use of a conflict preventionlens in development programming. UNDP’s BCPR, in


Taking Stock and Moving Forward:Conflict prevention at the IPA, the UN, and beyond

15

28 http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/essd/essd.nsf/CPR/Home.29 "Note of Explanation on the Framework for Coordination Mechanism," (7 February 2000, on file with IPA). See also Report of theSecretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict, paragraph 68, page 18.30 Report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict, pgs. 15-16; Letter from the Secretary-General addressed tothe President of the Security Council (S/2001/1128) 26 November 2001.31 http://www.un.org/peace/ppbm.pdf; Report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict pp. 20-21, para. 77-78. 32 Report of the Joint Review Mission on the United Nations Post-conflict Peacebuilding Support Offices, Department of PoliticalAffairs/United Nations Development Programme, 20 July 2001.

Mr. El Ghassim Wane, M. Samuel Doe, and Professor Mwesiga Baregu,at the Swedish Institute in Alexandria

collaboration with the UN Development Group andothers, has undertaken to introduce a systematicapproach to mainstreaming conflict prevention intoUN development and governance assistance.33

Training and capacity building efforts have also begunto focus on conflict prevention. The UN Department ofEconomic and Social Affairs has developed a CapacityBuilding in Conflict Management project, which seeksto assist governments and their civil society partners inthe sub-Saharan African region to strengthengovernance capacities to anticipate and respond toconflict and crisis, defuse conflict-prone situations,and support local development initiatives with conflict

resolution tools, techniques and planningmechanisms.34

In addition, the UN Staff College has developed animportant tool for conflict prevention: an EarlyWarning and Preventive Measures (EWPM) course,designed to train field and headquarters staff in earlywarning analysis and in developing responsivepreventive measures. It has also developed country-specific workshops in several cases at the request ofhost governments, bringing in national governmentofficials, members of civil society and representativesof UN country teams and their implementingp a r t n e r s .3 5


16 Taking Stock and Moving Forward:Conflict prevention at the IPA, the UN, and beyond

33 “Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention in the UN system Analysis and Development Programming: A Review of Common CountryAssessment and UN Development Assistance Framework Processes,” Governance and Rule of Law Unit, BCPR, UNDP, October 2001.34 See www.unpan.org/discover.asp for more on the overall initiative, and the Capacity-Building in Conflict Management project.See also Report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict, pp. 24-25, para. 104.35 Report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict, Pg. 33 para 153; see also www.itcilo.it/unscp/programme-focus/earlywarning/.

Mr. Youssef Mahmoud, Ms. Karen Tañada, Dr. Mely Caballero-Anthony, and Ms. Naimah Hasan, at theSwedish Institute in Alexandria

IV. Conclusion: Problems andProspects for Conflict Preventionin the Future

Great strides have been made in conflict preventionover the past few years. The concept has beenrefined and the discourse has become common amonga huge range of actors, from the UN to the donorcommunity to academics. At the same time, and moreimportantly, the practice of conflict prevention hasbeen refined. Across the UN system, efforts are beingmade to ensure that early warning analysis isdeveloped in a timely fashion and that conflict-sensitive and conflict-preventive strategies aredeveloped. A range of new tools is beginning to ensurethat programming incorporates a conflict preventionlens. Nonetheless, more work remains to be done.

Research and policy challenges: next steps

The IPA’s research has highlighted two key themes—theimportance of regional/subregional dimensions ofconflict, as well as the vital but conflicted role thatdevelopment, humanitarian, and governance actorsplay in responding to conflict. More remains to belearned, however, about how preventive initiatives canbe designed to best address regional dimensions ofconflict, as well as how to address dilemmas faced bydonors. Questions to be explored include:

• How can integrated strategies be designed thatrespond both to the particular needs of countries,but also to regional threats where the spillover ofrebels, refugees, and arms, not to mentionnetworks of support to governments and rebels byneighbors, is rife?

• How can donors’ dilemmas be alleviated? Is itreally feasible for development and security actorsto work with political actors, and maintain theirdesired impartiality? How can these actors pursueconflict prevention without drawing political ire?What impact does the engagement of developmentactors in conflict prevention have on humanitarianaction?

The IPA’s policy work has sought to addresschallenging issue-areas in conflict prevention for theUN system, in particular development work withsecurity dimensions engaged in by UNDP. Moreremains to be done, however, not only on theoperationalization of work in the security sector, butalso in governance and rule of law. Coming challengesincreasingly recognized by the policy community willalso need to be addressed by the UN system. Theyinclude the potential threats to security emanatingfrom environmental and health issues. Key themes tobe explored include:

• What are the coming challenges for developmentactors addressing justice and security sectorreform? How can they cope with the proliferationof private security corporations in zones ofconflict? How can they further elaboratecommunity policing efforts? What is theappropriate role of the development community insupporting corrections facilities?

• With regard to former combatants, how canpolicies be implemented that ensure lasting reinte-gration, given that post-conflict economies aregenerally weak, and rife with incentives forcriminality and return to conflict?

• What institutional development and capacitybuilding helps to ensure the long-term channelingof conflict into peaceful means? How can suchsupport, whether for judicial reform or elections,be designed better?

• What roles can capacity-building play insupporting long-term respect for human rights andrule of law? In post-conflict or mass atrocitycountries, what approaches to accountability andreconciliation should external actors support?

• What are the coming challenges and potential newsources of conflict, such as health, in particularHIV/AIDS, water and environmental stresses, andhow might they engender conflict? Who in the UNsystem is best placed to respond, and how mightthey begin to do so?


Conclusion 17


The Future of Prevention at the IPA

With From Promise to Practice drawing to a close inmid-2003, the IPA will no longer have a program thatconcentrates solely on conflict prevention. However,many of the broad themes will be taken up inStrengthening the Security-Development Nexus, a newprogram that will start in October 2003.

Strengthening the Security-Development Nexus w i l ldraw upon various strands of the IPA’s programmingin the areas of peace, security and peacebuilding todate but will also involve a more systematic andrigorous examination of the linkages between thetwin imperatives for security and development in a

global world. The program has two goals: first, toexamine to what extent the UN’s twin mandates fordevelopment and security have been integrated sincethe end of the Cold War; second, to make concreterecommendations about how the UN’s developmentagencies, as well as the wider international develop-ment community, can more effectively utilizedevelopment assistance for peacebuilding, includingconflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. The program will focus onthree thematic areas where the agendas for peace anddevelopment are beginning to merge – Governance,Security Sector, and Rule of Law – and will inject anexplicit developmental perspective into the currentpeace and security debates.

18 Conclusion


Activities and Publications

Activities

From Reaction to Conflict Prevention

• From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System in the New Millennium,Expert Workshop, West Point, New York, 31 January-1 February 2000

• From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System in the New Millennium,International Policy Conference, New York, 13-14 April 2000

From Promise to Practice

• Roundtable breakfast with Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, New York, 4 October 2000

• Expert meeting on Methodology (for country case study volume), New York, 3 November 2000

• Policy Forum on Preventing Conflict in the 21st Century: New Tools, New York, 29 November 2000

• Country Case Study Author Working Group Meeting (No. 1), New York, 19 January 2001

• Security Council Workshop on Conflict Prevention, West Point, New York, 9-10 February 2001

• Informal Brainstorm Meeting (Security Council Workshop follow-on), New York, 13 March 2001

• Country Case Study Author Working Group Meeting (No. 2), Tarrytown, New York, 18 June 2001

• Roundtable breakfast with OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities Rolf Ekeus, New York,10 October 2001

• The United Nations System in the New Millennium: Fostering Substantive and Operational Linkages inthe Implementation of Peace, Tarrytown, New York, 19-20 October 2001

• Mainstreaming Early Warning and Conflict Prevention in the UN System—Rationalizing Tools, New York,9 November 2001

• Empowering Local Actors: The UN and Multi-Track Conflict Prevention, New York, 10 December 2001

• Policy forum on Zanzibar’s Political crisis: The Quest for a Lasting Solution, New York, 7 March 2002

• Sharing Best Practices on Conflict Prevention: The UN, Regional and Subregional Organizations,National and Local Actors, Alexandria, Egypt, 8-10 April 2002

• Policy Forum and Book Launch: From Reaction to Conflict Prevention and No More Killing Fields,New York, 17 May 2002

Activities and Publications 19


20 Activities and Publications

• Creating Conditions for Peace: What Role for the UN and Regional Actors? Wilton Park, UnitedKingdom, 1-3 July 2002

• UNDP, Justice and Security Sector Reform: Developing Guidance for the Field, New York, 23 September2002

• Case Study Author Meeting: Regional Cases, New York, 29 October 2002

• Brainstorming on Internet Forum on Conflict Prevention Cases (Co-convener: Conflict Prevention andPeace Forum), New York, 4 November 2002

• A Framework for Lasting Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatants inCrisis Situations, New York, 12-13 December 2002

Publications

From Reaction to Conflict Prevention

Reports

• From Reaction to Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System in the New Millennium, ConferenceReport, 13-14 April 2000, Charles K. Cater and Karin Wermester

Books

• From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN SystemFen Olser Hampson and David M. Malone, eds., 2002

From Promise to Practice

Reports

• From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict,Workshop Report, 9-10 February 2001, Chandra Lekha Sriram

• The United Nations System in the New Millennium: Fostering Substantive and Operational Linkages inthe Implementation of Peace: Workshop Report, UN document S/2001 1054, New York), 19-20 October2001, Karin Wermester

• Empowering Local Actors: The UN and Multi-Track Conflict Prevention, Workshop Report, 10 December2001, Ben Rawlence

• From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, CaseStudy Policy Report, February 2002, Chandra Lekha Sriram

• Sharing Best Practices on Conflict Prevention: The UN, Regional and Subregional Organizations andLocal Actors, Policy Report, 8-10 April 2002, Chandra Lekha Sriram, Albrecht Schnabel, John Packerand Augustine Touré


Activities and Publications 21

• Sharing Best Practices on Conflict Prevention: The UN, Regional and Subregional Organizations andLocal Actors, Workshop Report, 8-10 April 2002, Sara J. Lodge

• Creating Conditions for Peace: What Role for the UN and Regional Actors? Conference Report, 1-3 July2002, David Carment

• Challenges in Police Reform: promoting effectivess and accountability (New York), 23 September 2002,Charles Call

• UNDP, Justice and Security Sector Reform: Developing Guidance for the Field, Workshop Report 23September 2002, Chandra Lekha Sriram

• A Framework for Lasting Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatants inCrisis Situations, Workshop Report, 12-13 December 2002, Lotta Hagman and Zoe Nielsen

Books

• From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, ChandraLekha Sriram and Karin Wermester, eds., 2003.

• Subregional Causes of Conflict: Identifying Entry Points for Conflict Prevention, Chandra Lekha Sriramand Zoe Nielsen, eds., forthcoming 2003.

International Peace Academy777 United Nations PlazaNew York, NY 10017-3521Tel: (212) 687-4300Fax: (212) 983-8246www.ipacademy.org

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