From Humans to Persons - Niklas Luhmanns Posthumanism- Final

8/13/2019 From Humans to Persons - Niklas Luhmanns Posthumanism- Final

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From Humans to Persons: Niklas Luhmann's Posthumanism

Thomas Mavrofides Ph.D.

Instructor, Dpt. of Cultural Technology and Communication, University of the AegeanSapfous & Arionos Str., Mytilene, esvos !""##, $reece

email% lac'tom(aegean.gr

Abstract

)i'las uhmann*s theory is gaining in significance the last t+enty years,

mostly in the uropean sociological literature. Admittedly, uhmann created a

comple- theoretical frame+or' that tac'les uite successfully the prolems of social

change and evolution, revie+s the main aspects of traditional functionalism and offers

efficient theoretical tools to deal +ith the phenomena of a society that ecomes more

and more comple- daily.

This article focuses on the main aspects of the criticism on uhmann*s theory,

in an endeavor to resolve +hat initially may seem as parado-es, contradictions and

fla+s, that misguided some /aleit only a fe+0 scholars to characteri1e his theory as

anti2humanistic.

ntroduction

)i'las uhmann +as a proliferate author and is considered y many

sociologists and systems theorists as one of the most influential thin'ers of the late

3#thcentury. 4ut, as it might e e-pected in cases li'e this, his theory has also

attracted a lot of criticism, mainly ecause his +or' +as not fully understood y many

scholars and academics5 only no+, as the studies around his +or' are proliferating

that criticism starts to e replaced y admiration and adaptation of his theories in

many fields, including social anthropology, social net+or's theory, cultural studies,

communication theory etc., not to mention of course sociology itself. That criticism

can e codified to the follo+ing su6ects%


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definition of the living5 that is, to define +hat can legitimately /in a iological sense0

e considered as a living machine. According to Maturana and >arela /"

8An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of

processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components that

produces the components which: (i) through their interactions and transformations

continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that

produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in

which they (the components) eist by specifying the topological domain of its

realization as such a network. It follo+s that an autopoietic machine continuously

generates and specifies its o+n organi1ation through its operation as a system of

production of its o+n components, and does this in an endless turnover of components

under conditions of continuous perturations and compensation of perturations.

Therefore, an autopoietic machine is a homeostatic /or rather relations2static0 system

+hich has its o+n organi1ation /defining net+or' of relations0 as the fundamental

variale +hich it maintains constant8". As the authors emphasi1e, the unity of

autopoietic machines should e understood in terms of continuously reconstituted

relations, rather than a property of their components or static relations.

This definition has profound conseuences, for it outlines the concept of

autonomy and self2recreation as the constituting propertiesof the living machines and

leaves no place for hetero2constitution of the living% either a living machine is self!

reproduced in every meaning ! i"e" in every selection made in each and every aspect

of its operations ! or it is not classified as living. Therefore, autopoietic machines are

operationally closed, and all feedac' is internal to them. Their environment provides

them +ith energy and perturations, ut the transformation of energy to action and of

perturation to information ta'es place inside the autopoietic machine only5 this is

also to say that, the autopoietic machines are in full control of their components and

can destruct them and regenerate them at +ill.

The endeavour to adapt the theory of autopoiesis in a sociological conte-t,

faced a asic prolem% if social systems are consisted y humans, then the idea of an

autopoietic society that creates and destructs humans at +ill, +ould e

counterintuitive, scientifically unacceptale, not to mention grotesue5 such an

approach +ould oppose all of the achievements of nlightenment and could

contingently 6ustify authoritarian and rute regimes."mphasis in the original.


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The auto"oiesis of social s#stems

)i'las uhmann +as a+are of that prolem. And he defined the social

systems as unities consisting (and reconstituted) by communicationsrather than

humans. 7or uhmann, an aggregation of humans is not a social system% onlya

network of interdependent communicative actions, that are connected to each other

with meaning and regulated (the network) by rules set and transformed continuously

by the network itself, is a social system. The social system then, produces

communicative actions, cataly1es them, connects them together +ith its o+n means

/i.e. producing meaning y communication0, and pushes communication on+ard, thus

reproducing itself. This is not to say that a social system could e-ist +ithout humans

/i.e. psychic systems0, for the same reasons a nervous system could not e-ist +ithout

nervous cells. 4ut it is the continuously reconstructed regulativesystem that

guarantees communication, +ithout +hich communication /as meaning production0

+ould e improale.

et*s try to elaorate on this. The psychic system, is one among three self2

referential autopoietic systems according to uhmann /"

operate through consciousness +hile social systems operate through communication.

viously at this point, one could logically assume that psychic systems operate

through communication too5 ut according to uhmann /"

those are not communicated in any +ay, then they are irrelevant for communication

and therefore for any social system. This is to say that, humans can communicate only

through communicative actions. The nervous systems of the living are operationally

closed and there cannot e direct interaction et+een t+o distinct nervous systems%

the only possiility for interaction is communication, and the only manifestation of


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communication is communication itself. Admittedly no+, the theoretical distinction

et+een psychic and social systems does not seem so strange.

7urthermore, communication is a select2or2stop process5 any communicative

action paves the +ay for the ne-t one. To e sure, communication at every moment

reali1es a hori1on of contingent selections, that is +hich the ne-t communicative

action +ill e, and if communication +ill continue or stop. ven to stop the

communication is a communicative selection, although a final one.

So, communicative actions recreate continuously communication, and 2 as

events2 are fading a+ay as soon as they are manifested% a certain communicative

event cannot repeat itself circularly and still remain a component of communication.

To understand +hy this is, +e have to ta'e under consideration $regory 4ateson*s

famous definition of information% 8f this infinitude @of differencesB, +e select a very

limited numer, +hich ecome information. In fact, +hat +e mean y information 2

the elementary unit of information 2 is a difference which makes a difference, and it is

ale to ma'e a difference ecause the neural path+ays along +hich it travels and it is

continually transformed are themselves provided +ith energy. The path+ays are ready

to e triggered. Ge may even say that the uestion is already implicit in them.8

/4ateson $., 3###% :


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From humans to "ersons

4ut ho+ can communication e possile at allH Usually, communication is

ta'en as a given as if it +ere a sui generis aility of the humans. 4ut recent research

sho+s that this is not the case /Maturana ;. E., >arela 7. F., "


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operation unless stimulated y an environment. In the conte-t of contemporary

systems theory, the preferred term for stimulation isperturbation /Maturana ;. E.,

>arela 7. F., "

system is considered to e pertured y its environment and this triggers the cycle of

autopoiesis ane+. ut differently, a lac' of perturation results to a halt of autopoiesis

and a disintegration of the system.

The +hole phenomenon of personality is ased upon those premises.

According to ;umerto Maturana /3##0, the emergence of persons, is due to

coordinations of coordinationsad infinitum.

et*s try to e-emplify that. A human is a iological apparatus as is5 no

personality is inherent in its structure no matter ho+ complicated that structure may

e. 4ut, as soon as the nervous system starts to function, and it does that in

operational closure /iid0, the human finds out that repetitive actions could

/contingently0 lead to repetitive results% that is, coordinations of the nervous and

muscular system, as the infant learns to control hers or his lims, starts to trivialize

certain perceptions. This creates the infrastructure for learning and therefore

cognition. To e sure, the child learns that through its o+n internal coordinations can

achieve certain goals, ut there are other entities that cannot e control y him or her,

no matter ho+ever hard she or he tries. The totality of the direct2controlled entities

ecomes a +hole, 'no+n asself. So, a universe of controllaleJuncontrollale, or

perhaps put in a etter +ay, predictaleJunpredictale entities emerges. 7rom that

point on, the idea of distinction is ta'en as given. Concurrently, the child finds out

that certain coordinations he or she selects, can trigger correspondingcoordinations

/+hich are perceived as inputs0 from certain /ut not any0 entities in his or hers

environment. This is to say that the child starts to communicate+ith persons in hers

or his environment, and a second conception emerges, namely that of communication

as a contingent state of affairs. To e sure, communication emerges as coordinations

of coordinations, that is coordinations et+een t+o /or more0 autonomousentities that

each one coordinates itself. And, concurrently again, the distinction et+een

livingJnon2living, humansJnonhumans emerges as +ell. ventually, +e find ourselves

to live /that is% operate0 in a +orld that is consisted of entities +e have the aility to

communicate +ith 2 and +e conceive of them as similar to us, other animals /+ith a

reduced aility of communication as +e conceive of it0, and 8things8. 8If one oserves

the mother child relation in early childhood, one can see that the gro+ing ay


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ecomes a languaging eing in the flo+ of its living in the intimate relation of care

and play +ith his or her mother in the consensual co2ordinations of emotions and

doings that such relation entails. ne can see that the flo+ of doings that an oserver

may recognise as languaging egins to appear +hen there are consensual co2

ordinations of doings that ecome recursive in the play of the mother and child much

earlier than the appearance of vocal sounds. As an oserver sees that the motherJchild

interactions of co2ordinations of doings ecome recursive consensual co2ordinations

of doings, he or she sees language arising as a domain of living together in consensual

distinction of o6ects that soon ecomes an e-panding domain of recursive co2

ordination of consensual distinctions of o6ects and relations et+een o6ects. Ghen

this happens, the oserver sees that the child egins to live +ith his or her mother and

other people around him or her, in an ever gro+ing domain of inter2o6ectivity in

+hich parts of his or her ody, and eventually him or herself as a relational totality

and identity appear as distinguishale operational centres of the realisation of his or

her living8 /Maturana ;. E., 3##% ":0.

The point is that the very moment the child learned that there can e mutual

coordinations, and coordinations of coordinations, the society achieved its own

reproduction once more. As )i'las uhmann /"


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At this point it +ould e useful to recall 4ateson*s definition of information as

8the difference +hich ma'es a difference8. That is, not any difference ma'es a

difference and therefore not every event counts as a stimulus.

verything referred hereto, implies something important% the environment is

the sine ua non for any self2referential system. Again, this is not to say that the

environment controls the system. The system selects its o+n states calculated upon its

o+n autopoietic operation and preserving its operational closure. Social systems for

e-ample develop their o+n lingo +hich is not something to overloo'% it is a

manifestation of the system*s internal cohesion, a reali1ation of its identity as an

idiosyncratic system of perception. ach and every social system /and this is also the

case +ith any self2referential system, including psychic ones0, develops its o+n

identity. 4ut +e need to clarify that that is not a constant% +hat is viale for the

system is topreserve the ability to reconstruct its identityas a clear distinction

through the +holeness of the environment. ut simpler, only the aility to reconstruct

an identity is crucial, and not the preservation of a certain stale identity, +hichever

that may e. f course, through the recursive reconstruction of identity, some

variales tend to staili1e so to spea', although in a dynamic euilirium% this is to

say that they too change, ut in longer time periods than others. )o matter +hat

happens out there, the system primarily reinvents itselfand through that operation

(and only through that) reinvents its own environment/7oerster von, ;., "

3##90. The system themati1es itself in correlation to an environment that is

(perceived to be) different than itself. That is, as the system encounters events to

+hatever it conceives as its environment, it rearranges its o+n functions, so to avoid

disintegration% therefore the system changes so to avoid a profound /and final0

change.

4ut 4ateson*s definition points out that a trivial environment is a non!

environment. Since communication cannot continue on repetitive patterns, it follo+s

that identity reconstruction cannot e triggered y the most proale events.9

Therefore, a self2referential system is in a continuous loop through +hich it tries to

defeat comple-ity y triviali1ation of its environment. The system is al+ays striving

9Interestingly enough, Claude Shannon in his famous technical paper 8A Mathematical

Theory of Communication8 /"


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to rearrange its environment, so to assure an optimal life+orld around it /opper K.,

3##90, that is to construct an environment that favours its o+n autopoiesis. This is a

hopeless strive though% its environment is consisted y other self2referential systems

that are reacting e-actly the same +ay in order to preserve their o+n autopoiesis. So

the cycle is triggered ane+.

;opefully at this point, it should come as no surprise to note that self2

referential systems are prolem2solvers% and that*s e-actly +hat they are. Due to their

o+n self2themati1ation they push other psychic or social systems to do the same% and

people ecome individuals and social systems emerge on the asis of common

constructions e those languages, values, goals, interests etc. It is deduced then that

society advances through internal differentiation that*s attriuted to the individuality

of humans as persons and social systems as discrete structures. It is also ovious that

any finality /if for the sa'e of discussion +e assume that there could e such a thing0

introduces a profound danger for the autopoietic operation of any 'ind of self2

referential system for it +ould reduce the contingency of the environment and

therefore +ould deprive the system from its raison d* Ltres% the system +ould not e

ale anymore to distinguish itself from the other, so it +ould have either to invent an

other or collapse. therness then and its importance, is the 'ey aspect to grasp )i'las

uhmann*s theory. As he notes 8Ge could ta'e the route of 7erdinand de Saussure

and Facues Derrida or $eorge2Spencer 4ro+n, and follo+ the in6unction to al+ays

start +ith difference and not identity, +ith distinction and not unity8 /uhmann ).,

"


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does their environment. So, it is a theory aout change through

conservation.

3. uhmann*s theory sets the human e-plicitly apart from the society and

reduces its importance. The ans+er is that uhmann does not deal +ith

humans 2 he deals +ith persons as individuals. lacing the persons at the

environment of social systems, he offers plausile e-planations on ho+ the

persons can dramatically influence communication and therefore social

systems.

9. The adaptation of the iological theory of autopoiesis is prolematic. n

the contrary, autopoiesis offers a coherent and fruitful scientific paradigm,

to understand social systems as comple- communicational systems, rather

than aggregations of individuals.

:. ;is theory is over2complicated and highly astract and therefore difficult

to grasp and use it as a social analysis tool. True partially, and there*s

nothing +e can do aout it% uhmann*s theory is indeed very comple-

since it tac'les each and every manifestation of the social phenomena. 4ut

systemic social analysis al+ays starts +ith some simple uestions, namely%

8Gho says it, +ho is the oserverH Ghat environment does that oserver

conceive ofH Ghy he selects that certain conceptionH ;o+ does that relate

+ith +hatever he rec'ons to e his identityH Ghat communicational

patterns does he select to staili1e and +hyH8.

8Fe suis nN plusieurs, et 6e suis mort, un seul. *enfant ui vient est une foule

innomrale, ue la vie rNduit asse1 tOt P un seul individu, celui ui se manifeste et

meurt8 /4orn as several, I die as one. The child +ho comes is an innumerale cro+d,

+hich the life rather early reduces to only one individual, that +hich appears and dies0

/aul >alNry as cited in uhmann )., "


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%uckle# )alter, 3##",ind and *rain: A ynamic %ystem odelin

%ociocybernetics: compleity, autopoiesis, and observation of %ocial %ystems,

$eyer 7eli-, Fohannes van der Qou+en, /ed.0, $reen+ood ress: :"2=.

Foerster von* Hein+, "

ulications.

Foerster von* Hein+* Poerksen %ernhard*, 3##3, nderstanding systems !-onversation on .pistemology and .thics, Carl2Auer2Systeme >erlag.

Foerster von* Hein+, 3##9, nderstanding understanding ! .ssays on -ybernetics

and -ognition, Springer.

Luhmann Niklas, "

/aradoes, 7. $eyer, F. van der Qou+en, /ed.0, ondon, Sage: "=32"

Katoptro.

Maturana H. ,., 3##, #he +rigin and -onservation of %elf!consciousness,

0eflections on four questions by 3einz von 'oerster,Kyernetes, vol.9:

/"J30% :2!!.

Pia&et ean, "

From Humans to Persons - Niklas Luhmanns Posthumanism- Final

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