From Civil War to Civil Society

The Transition from War to Peace in Guatemala and Liberia

the World Bank and the Carter Center

1

Background

The Liberian Civil War

Freed American slaves began to settlewhat is currently known as Liberiain the 1820s, often in the face of

hostility from the local inhabitants. By1847, the ex-slaves and their descendantshad declared a republic and began a 150year period of Americo-Liberian elite rulebased on domination and exploitation ofthe indigenous population. In 1980,Americo-Liberian rule ended with amilitary coup staged by Samuel Doe. Theensuing regime, violently suppressed anyform of opposition for the next ten years,creating deadly ethnic cleavages.

In late 1989, the National Patriotic Frontfor Liberia (NPFL), under the leadershipof Charles Taylor, began a rebellion in thenorth. When it reached the capital,Monrovia, during the summer of 1990,the NPFL was repelled by an EconomicCommunity of West African States(ECOWAS) peacekeeping force(ECOMOG). Shortly after, President Doewas killed by a splinter faction of theNPFL and a Liberian National TransitionalGovernment (LNTG) under the leadershipof Amos Sawyer was installed.

Major peace talksstarted the subse-quent year in Yamoussoukro, Côted�Ivoirefailed and new factionsemerged. The next five years witnessedfactional fighting and numerous failedpeace accords. Heightened conflict in1992 and 1996 exposed ECOMOG�slimitations in providing security for acomprehensive settlement. Violentclashes between armed factions aroundMonrovia in April of 1996 resulted in theevacuation of most foreigners and manyLiberians. However, in August of 1996, anew peace accord was signed in Abuja andpartial demobilization began a few monthlater. During the same period, ECOMOGforces were bolstered to enable them to

secure most of the country. More recently,an electoral commission has been estab-lished, efforts to repatriate the refugeeshave began, 25,000 ex-combatants havebeen demobilized, and elections areplanned for May of this year.

Historical tribal and political divisionshave been exacerbated by the continuingstruggle for power and material gain.Wholesale profiteering and looting havebeen key factors in the continuation ofwar. Illegal resource trading is an esti-mated $350 million per year business.And at the combatant level, living by thegun has become a way of life. A dangerousexternal and internal equilibrium hasdeveloped in a country where the stateapparatus has almost completely disap-peared. Hence, a major component of anypeace process will be handing control ofnatural resources over to civil society,breaking oligopolistic access to the largeprofits which have underwritten theviolent conflict. To date, both interna-tional donors and the UN system havebeen ambivalent about supporting secu-rity measures and more willing to providehumanitarian assistance rather thanmaking a long-term commitment toreconstruction measures.

The Guatemalan civil strife

Twentieth-century Guatemalan historyhas two key characteristics:authoritarianism and instability. With 6coups d�etat, 5 constitutions and 35different governments (15 of them mili-tary juntas) in 96 years, the Guatemalanpeople have suffered widespread physicaland human destruction, and wide-scalesocial fragmentation and polarization.Effectively, the civil war began in 1960with a group of young army officersrevolting against corruption, accompa-nied by the training of anti-Cuban forces

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From Civil War to Civil Society

on Guatemalan territory. The revolt failedbut the officers disappeared into the ruralareas, formed a guerrilla army, and begana war against the government.

Initially, the movement was aligned withCuban revolutionary forces and concen-trated in the Ladino areas of the country.However, over the next two decades,political and social reforms became arallying point, with the indigenouspopulations playing a major role. Thegovernment counter-insurgency cam-paign, characterized by large-scale humanrights violations, successfully restrainedthe guerrilla movement. Yet, the strugglecontinued, partly due to the strength ofguerrilla movements in neighboringcountries. In 1982, the groups unitedinto the Unidad Revolucionaria NacionalGuatemalteca (URNG).

The transition to peace began in the earlyto mid-1980s with a new constitution, theelection of a civilian president, politicalpluralism, and personal liberties such asfreedom of speech. In 1987, the Guatema-lan president, in concert with otherCentral American heads of state, signed adeclaration outlining procedures for theestablishment of sustainable peace in theregion. For Guatemala, an importantcomponent of this agreement was theestablishment of National ReconciliationCommissions (NRC).

The next three years were spent preparingfor the negotiations. This process in-cluded a series of NRC consultations withpolitical parties, the private sector,religious groups, academics, labor unions,and other members of civil society. Thesemeetings were mediated by the CatholicChurch and a UN observer. In 1991,formal discussions began between theURNG and the newly formed governmentcommission for peace (COPAZ).

Three years later, civil society was explic-itly brought into the negotiations with theestablishment of a Civil Society Assembly.The ensuing agreementbringing to-gether accords on democratization,human rights, displaced populations,indigenous rights, socioeconomic issues,and the role of civil society and themilitarytook almost six years to reachand was signed in December 1996.

From civil war toFrom civil war toFrom civil war toFrom civil war toFrom civil war tocivil societycivil societycivil societycivil societycivil society

Though the transition from war to sus-tainable peace is multifaceted and non-linear, we can distinguish the threeoverlapping phases of making peace,keeping peace and sustaining peace, witheach phase requiring a mix of political,security, humanitarian and developmentalactivities. Yet, it is difficult to determinewhich set of activities will achieve itsobjectives in a given situation. Moreover,the appropriate timing of and the interac-tion between the various interventions isnot well understood. The internationalcommunity is working within a multi-disciplinary and inexact science.

The following report has four main sec-tions: the three overlapping phases of warto peace transition and a brief conclusion.The first section, making peace, discussesthe peace process, including the role ofcivil society and the international commu-nity. The second section, keeping peace,addresses post-conflict governance,elections and issues related to implement-ing the peace accords. The third section,sustaining peace, explores reconstructionand reconciliation. The final sectionconcludes by emphasizing the need for anintegrated strategic framework�a coher-ent approach to sustainable peace.

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The peace processThe peace processThe peace processThe peace processThe peace process

The essential element of a peaceprocess is political willingness by allwarring factions to enter into

negotiations and a security framework tomaintain the peace. This usually requiresextensive investments in time and moneybefore the parties are brought to thenegotiating table. In particular, thevarious parties must overcome the lack ofinterpersonal trust that has developedduring the conflict. Another importantcomponent is the need for all involved toview the negotiations as a �way out� ofthe conflict where not all demands will bemeet. As conflict results from differingsocietal perceptions, even the best peaceprocess will result in a compromise.

However, to minimize discontent, main-tain momentum and reach the �largestcommon denominator,� the process needsto be comprehensive, transparent, andinclusive. This means that all social,economic and political aspects of theconflict should be addressed in an openforum, allowing all interested members ofthe society an equal opportunity toparticipate. Throughout the process, nosector of society should dominate. Civilsociety, including women�s associationsand even the combatants who may beresponsible for atrocities, should berepresented. To expedite the process,each group and/or faction should have anegotiator with a clear mandate.Marginalization of a significant group orissue often leads to more violence.

The following premises were suggested foreffective negotiations: (a) dialoguebetween factions allows for the conceptu-alizing of peace; (b) an agreement on howto identify issues, participants and proce-dures, thereby legitimizing the processand actors; (c) a consensus that thesubstantive agenda should include eco-

nomic, social and political issues, address-ing the major underlying causes of theconflict; and (d) a prioritizing of issues,negotiating the substantial areas beforedealing with operational aspects.

For the peace to extend beyond thenegotiating table to the larger society, anumber of transformations need to occur.First, behavior must be altered from theapplication of violence to more peacefulforms of dispute settlement; second, atransition from a wartime to a peacementality needs to occur; third, the

Making Peace

Not only is physical capital destroyed and financial capi-tal flight common in the course of violent struggles, butequally devastating is the loss of human and social capi-tal. Many of the best trained are killed or flee, familiesare separated, commercial and social networks are frac-tured, and trust is diminished.

The machinery of the UN and of the international agen-cies was designed to deal with wars between states, butnow most wars tend to be within states.

We must think in terms of a socially and environmen-tally sustainable development strategy itself as one con-tributing measure to prevent conflict: equity, social co-hesion, mobility and participation being the hallmarksof a more stable society.

...to reduce the misery and horror that accompany civilstrife...we [must] bear witness to theirmisery...contribute to the collective efforts...[and build]on the synergies so that the whole is more than the sumof the parts.

Ismail Serageldin, Vice President of EnvironmentallySustainable Development, World Bank

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From Civil War to Civil Society

system of risks and rewards shouldencourage peaceful pursuit of livelihoods,rather than intimidation, violence andrent-seeking; fourth, adversaries must

come to view each other asmembers of the same society,working toward a commongoala peaceful and prosperousfuture; and fifth, structures andinstitutions must be amended atall levels of the society tosupport these new peacefultransformations.

Participants also noted that the�nature of war determines the

nature of peace.� This means that thefactors which produce and sustain theconflict will directly impact the ensuingpeace settlement.

The Guatemalan peace process offersmany lessons: first, transparent processesincreased trust and reduced suspicion;second, participation by most of thestakeholders built a sense of partnershipamong the various components of society,legitimizing the process and outcome;and third, the agreements addressed theroot causes of the conflict, providing ablueprint for socioeconomic development.In this manner, the agreements wentbeyond addressing military arrangementsto provide a comprehensive package for anew nation. Participants stressed that thepeace was brokered by the Guatemalansthemselves, not imposed by outsiders.

The role of civil society

Civil society can play an important roleduring the peace process by: (a) ensuringthat discussions and recommendationstake into account the needs of the largersociety, and (b) monitoring the implemen-tation of these very recommendations. Inthis manner, the agreements become an

exercise in national conflict resolutionand reconstruction. As already noted, civilparticipation legitimizes the peaceprocess and outcome.

However, participation by civil societyrequires that the factions open theprocess to all interested members ofsociety, that institutional mechanisms arein place to guarantee civil participation,and that resources are available to sup-port local peace-building and conflictmanagement efforts. A workshop partici-pant described this as �inclusiveness inmeaningful institutions.� This processmay be very difficult in a highly milita-rized society.

Involving civil society in the peace processcan contribute to psychosocial healing.Civil societythe network of informal andformal relationships, groups and organiza-tions which bind a society togethercanprovide the environment within which thelevels of trust and sense of communitynecessary for durable peace are con-structed. By allowing civil society to

participate in the peace settlement,reconciliation becomes part of the peace-making process itself.

The displacement and destruction associ-ated with conflict usually has an adverseeffect on civil society. Yet, some aspects ofcivil society usually survive and can bebuilt on. This is the case, even in Liberia,where civilians were targeted by the

The nature of war

determines the

nature of peace

Involving civil society in

the peace process can

contribute to psychoso-

cial healing

5

various warring factions. Involving civilsociety in the peace process is a way ofarticulating social capital (societal trustand cohesiveness), the backbone of everysociety, in the political arena.

The international community can supportcivil participation by �creating space� forcivil society to realize its fullpotentialboth as peacemaker andpeacekeeper. Local methods of disputesettlement, reconciliation, and institu-tion-building should be encouraged.

During the Guatemalan peace process,civil society played a unique role. It wasinstrumental in defining the issues andagreements, and nurturing the peaceprocess itself. This potential has yet to berealized in Liberia, conceivably threaten-ing the emerging peace. The establish-ment of a multi-sectoral electoral com-mission with broad representation couldbe a fundamental transitional politicalinstrument for bringing Liberian civiliansinto the peace process.

The role of theinternational community

The international community plays animportant role in facilitating or expedit-ing peace processes. Development institu-tions and donor governments can providetechnical and financial support, as well asprograms which strengthen civil society.The �Group of Friends,� an organizationof countries supporting the Guatemalanpeace process, played a critical role inthat country�s conflict resolution. TheUnited Nations, which is considered moreimpartial than any one government, canfill another important role. However, theUnited Nations can only play a meaningfulrole if (a) its participation is based on anunderstanding of and sensitivity to the

problem, and (b) it is invited by all war-ring factions.

The international community should becareful not to contribute to or exacerbatethe conflict. Often, foreign interventionlacks coherence or even a commondesired outcome. Moreover, externalsolutions may not be able to influence thesource of the conflict. It is important forexternal assistance to go beyond settlingcompeting local claims to engaging thefactions in more comprehensive dialogue.However, outsiders should not impose apeace process or agreement on the localpopulation; peace that is not �home-grown� tends to be weak and short-lived,as the case of Angola illustrates.

Regional organizations also may beinstrumental in the process, especiallywhere refugees and regional support fordifferent factions produce a regionaldimension to the conflict. Regional bodiesmay be better-placed to assist the peaceprocess because their judgments arebased on a more comprehensive under-standing of the conflict and its regionalimplications. In Central America, forexample, the Contadora Group hasinfluenced the settlement of severalconflicts. However, in West Africa, at-tempts by ECOWAS and ECOMOG tobring about a resolution to the Liberiancivil war by intervening militarily havedemonstrated that regional solutions alsocan be hindered by regional politics.

Peace that is not �home-

grown� tends to be weak

and short-lived

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From Civil War to Civil Society

The peace accord

The end of violence does not mean theend of conflict. Disputes and differingviews on social, political and economicdevelopment will continue. Moreover, thesigning of an accord is just the beginningof a lengthy and arduous process ofbuilding a society on a nonviolent funda-ment. Sustainable peace requires accom-modating the divergent needs and time-tables of various segments of society. Thisusually means the reconciliation ofcompeting agendas and addressing themany factors which lead to the conflict.

Yet, as mentioned above, it is importantto recognize that no accord will compre-hensively address all demands. Even withthe Guatemalan accord, perhaps the mostcomprehensive set of peace agreementssigned in the post-cold war era, oppositioncontinues from a small number of groupswho feel that they gained comparativelylittle.

The peace accord is a critical step towardrestoring the fundamental element of afunctioning society: confidence. Confi-dence rests on the mutual understandingthat former adversaries will not take uparms again. A participant noted thatconfidence also demands mutual respect.

Building confidence often involves atrade-off between justice and reconcilia-tion. A society emerging from conflict hasto balance the quest for justice for thevictims of violence with the need to geton with life as one society. In some cases,further conflict can erupt when judg-ments are deemed excessively harsh. Inother cases, the process becomes time-consuming and expensive without contrib-uting to reconciliation. A �culture ofimpunity,� on the other hand, couldundermine the reconciliation process andencourage people to take the law intotheir own hands. A participant suggestedthat �justice as opposed to vengeance�may be the appropriate balance.

Post-genocidal Rwanda is a dauntingexample of the difficulties of balancingjustice with reconciliation. So far, theprocess has been expensive, mismanagedand time-consuming, with little justice orreconciliation. The process in Guatemala,on the other hand, is illustrative. Thereconciliation process began with a�national dialogue� where over onehundred organizations �learned� tocommunicate about previously shroudedissues. Next, arrangements were made toidentify the needs of direct victims ofviolence and create conditions for themto pardon their aggressors. These arrange-ments were then institutionalized into acommission to investigate human rightsviolations. However, a participant ques-tioned the validity of comparing genocidewith civil war.

The end of violence

does not mean the

end of conflict

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Post-conflict governance

In the final analysis, two importantelements of successful peace accordsare active involvement by civil society

and skillful governance. With the stateapparatus and civil society both weakenedby conflict, good governance themanagement of resources on behalf of allcitizens with fairness and openness isan important goal. Successful governance,in this and other contexts, has several keyfeatures:

Transparency, which requires budget,debt, expenditure, and revenuedisclosure. Who pays and who benefitsmust be apparent to all.Accountability, which means that thegoverning body will be responsible forhow it is generating revenue andallocating expenditure.Rule of law, which demands a legalframework by which government andsociety conduct themselves.Institutional pluralism rather thanunitary structures, which supports theforgoing conditions.Participation, which implies theinvolvement and empowerment of allthose affected by governance.

Participants suggested that the followingconsiderations might ease the burden onpost-conflict governing bodies and facilitategood governance. To the extent possible,authority should be decentralized toincrease the participation of civil society.Community-centered development andincreasing capacity at the local level mayproduce quick impact and sustainability.Decentralization may also avoid a �winnertakes all� scenario. Another importantconsideration is that the relatively weakadministrative capacity of the governmentmeans that it should concentrate on a fewpriorities. A small number of targets shouldbe set and pursued with vigor. Overly

ambitious programs may produce publicdissatisfaction and loss of faith in theprocess. Moreover, while establishing amacroeconomic framework may benecessary to reduce inflation and stabilizethe economy, regulatory and administra-tive procedures should be kept to aminimum. Incentives for good behavior,however, need to be included early on.

Participants also emphasized that goodgovernance does not always requirepolitical democracy. Unelected regimescan manage public resources openly andfairly, while democratically elected gov-

ernments can be corrupt and incompe-tent. Such distinctions have importantimplications for societies emerging fromconflict. While ill-advised to follow politi-cal blueprints, such societies should seekto establish the institutional basis for amove toward democracy.

In search of arepresentative government

Although democracy may not alwayscoincide with good governance, popularparticipation in decision-making doesencourage transparency and accountability.These are two key features of good gover-nance, and in the long term, good gover-nance is correlated with socioeconomicdevelopment. Representative government�and elections as a means of achieving it�

Keeping Peace

Good governance

does not always

require political

democracy

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From Civil War to Civil Society

becomes an important consideration forpost-conflict societies.

If conflict is about power, then elections area peaceful method of allocating power. Theycan be a first step in the peace-buildingprocess where political institutions arecreated to represent political positions andmanage diversity without violence. Elec-tions are also a way of admitting the�public into the negotiations.� However,elections must not be seen as an end inthemselves. As a workshop participantwarned, �Once on the right road, it isimportant to keep moving, otherwise yourisk being run over by subsequent events.�

Although there appears to be littleconsensus on the necessity of precondi-tions for elections, it is important to buildtrust and legitimize the process by involv-ing all factions and civil society (includingrefugees and the displaced). Internationalactors can add legitimacy to the process

by allaying suspicions ofrigging or intimidation.Peer contacts, such asmeetings betweenBritish Parliamentariansand their South Africancounterparts, can bevery useful. Anothercritical factor is the roleassigned to the loser. Asthe success of a democ-racy is often contingenton how it treats itslosers, it is often wise to

define this role before elections takeplace.

In many cases, elections, or �first-classdemocracy,� may not provide immediateanswers. Winner-takes-all solutions maynot be appropriate as the cases of Angolaand Cambodia illustrate, especially if thestate is a major employer and can with-hold or provide various benefits based onpolitical affiliation. Power-sharing alterna-

tives such as South Africa�s transitionalgovernment of national unity may provemore effective in the medium-term.Democracies can have various forms ofarticulating participation. In Guatemala,the peace process involved almost sixyears of negotiations and involved threedifferent governments. When electionswere held, the voter turnout was relativelylow given the level of civil involvement inthe electoral process. This may have beendue to the fact that elections had becomemeaningless after many years of authori-tarian rule. Still, democracy not onlypreceded but also influenced the peaceprocess.

In Liberia, the election process remains indoubt: 700,000 refugees have not re-turned and will not be able to participatefrom their camps, offering an advantageto any faction that can transport its ownethnic supporters. The time frame istight, an electoral register has not beenestablished, and the media is dominatedby one faction. In addition, elections willlargely depend on security, especially thecontinuation and sustainability of thedemobilization program. Given thecurrent state of affairs, elections presenta formidable challenge.

Implementing thepeace accord

CHALLENGES

Once a transitional or elected governingbody is in place, it faces the complex taskof implementing the peace accords. Majorchallenges in this area include:

· Avoiding business as usual. Conflictand the subsequent peace need to beviewed as a means by which societycan recreate itselfestablishing a newset of behaviors, mindsets, institu-tions, etc. Otherwise, a return toviolence is inevitable. An end to the

The success of a

democracy is often

contingent on how it

treats its losers

9

fighting is one stop on the long roadtoward improving the living standardsof society.

· Meeting expectations. In order toachieve consensus among warringfactions and other groups with com-peting agendas, peace accords oftenoffer a wish list, ignoring resourceconstraints. Translating politicaldiscourse into concrete actions willrequire a more realistic approach andtimetable.

· Restructuring the wartime economy.Conflict societies undergo fundamen-tal economic changes, which may takeyears to reverse. The implementationof peace accords can restore confi-dence and promote the return ofprivate capital. Legitimate activitiesmust replace the exploitation ofresources that sustains the warringfactions.

· Targeting high-payoff interventions.Given the weak economic base thatcharacterizes most post-conflictsocieties, targeted interventions withimmediate impact are essential.Access to land and alternative sourcesof income, and support for civilsociety and women�s groups, interalia, should be considered.

· Neutralizing private violence. Theinstability caused by the transitionperiod coupled with sluggish imple-mentation of the peace accord oftenleads to an increase in crime rates.Reductive measures in this area needto include �carrots� (counseling,training and employment generationprograms for vulnerable groups,especially ex-combatants) and �sticks�(a civilian security force and justicesystem).

HUMAN AND INDIGENOUS RIGHTS

Neglected during conflict, human rightsprotection and promotion are crucial inwar to peace transitions. To begin theprocess, human rights could be incorpo-rated in peace accords, including protec-tion for indigenous identity and rightswhere necessary. The Guatemalan accordswere very successful in this area. If humanrights monitors are deemed necessaryduring the transition process, their roleshould be clearly defined.

The United Nations High Commissionerfor Human Rights recognizes five roles forhuman rights monitors: (a) dissuasivepresence in the rural area, (b) humanrights verification and monitoring, (c)strengthening and training the justicesystem, i.e., civilian police, prisons, judgesand courts, (d) facilitating the return ofinternally displaced populations (IDPs)and refugees, and (e) human rightspromotion, institutional development andsupport for civil society.

Participants suggested the followingmeasures to improve a country�s humanrights situation, increase social cohesionand prevent the escalation of ethnictensions: (a) drawing on revered interme-diaries (teachers, lawyers, etc.) fromdifferent groups, (b) promoting economicautonomy at the group and, where pos-sible, individual level, (c) providing apredictable degree of rule of law, (d)ensuring absorptive capacity in theeconomy to encourage private invest-ment, and (e) encouraging ethnic identityand heritage development, includingreconstruction of historic and religioussites. All members of society, includingthe different ethnic groups and factions,should participate economically, sociallyand politically.

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Participants stressed that achieving alasting peace requires time andpatience. The impact of war is

profound and resentments run deep. Itusually takes years for the economy totake off and generations for the wounds toheal. Achieving the peace dividend is even

more challenging for poor, multi-ethnicstates. Involving civil society in the processis one way of buying social patience andconsensus, sharing the burden of waitingand ensuring that everyone receives a bit ofthe pie as it becomes available. In Guate-mala, for example, a national consensus hasemerged that taxes need to be raised to payfor the reconstruction effort.

Post-conflict economicmanagement

Peace also requires a wide range ofconfidence-building measures (e.g., jobcreation, training for ex-combatants, roadrehabilitation) in the area of economicmanagement. Otherwise, as one partici-pant noted, the society will begin towonder: what is peace for, if not improvedliving standards?

Catalyzing the private sector is an impor-tant part of this confidence-building. Thisrequires the reduction of three keyconstraints: lack of business confidence,lack of capital, and lack of infrastructure.Reducing uncertainty and boostingbusiness confidence is a precondition fortransforming the private sector into anengine of growth for the economy, permit-ting the flow of capital necessary forreconstruction. The removal of thisconstraint will catalyze the removal of theother two. Decreasing uncertainty re-quires: (a) reestablishing political author-ity and direction; (b) increasing security,i.e., demobilization, police and militaryreform; (c) providing a stable macroeco-nomic framework; and (d) establishing atransparent legal and regulatory environ-ment. Yet, support for demobilization andpolice reform are often underfunded ornot addressed up-front; and the process ofstabilizing the economy (controllinginflation, consolidating fiscal manage-ment, improving the tax system, establish-ing a customs agency, setting up a legalframework, and normalizing financialintermediation) requires considerableeffort, commitment, and capacity. With-out political direction, authority andsecurity, i.e., an enabling environment,the private sector will not rise to thechallenge.

An enabling environment is also impor-tant in the context of a Marshall Plan-like

Sustaining Peace

We have more conflicts on earth now than ever beforein history, and the reasons are well known tous...declining power of the military in areas like theformer Soviet Union...lifting of colonialdomination...abject poverty...deterioration of theenvironment...movement of massive populations fromthe rural areas where they were self-sufficient into ur-ban areas dependent on largess.

For every soldier killed today, there are about nine ci-vilians who perish from landmines, bombs, stray bul-lets and exposure to the elements.

How do we get beyond the crisis management of a di-saster, or even the maintenance of peace,...and move toa permanent realization of the hopes and dreams ofpeople who have suffered so long?

...the core of future activities [should]...sustain peaceonce a tenuous peace has evolved, sustain democracywhen an embryonic or juvenile democracy has beenformed, and try to avoid the disillusionment that forcespeople back into repetitive or sustained despair.

President Jimmy Carter, Chairman, the Carter Center

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response during the post-conflict period.Some participants raised the issue ofjump-starting the economies of recentpost-conflict societies in the same manneras the European economies were revital-ized after World War II. However, it wasalso mentioned that the absorptivecapacity of the particular country isimportant. Typically, post-conflict econo-mies undergo long periods of recoverywith a slow buildup of business confidenceand local investment.

Assistance to ex-combatants

Peace requires confidence, which is inturn contingent on security. When acountry is transitioning from war, disar-mament and demobilization becomedefining features of security and thesubsequent peace. With peace, the mostvulnerable and potentially destabilizinggroup is the ex-combatants. In thiscontext, demobilization and reintegrationprograms (DRPs), which disarm soldiersand provide them an alternative to thegun, are critical.

To provide security, however, DRPs needto be designed and implemented in detail.Participants believed that the followingshould be addressed in the design andimplementation of DRPs: (a) including areintegration component to demobiliza-tion at the planning stage; (b) offering acredible and sufficiently lucrative alterna-

tive to violence; (c) sensitizing communi-ties receiving ex-combatants, especiallywhere atrocities had been committed bythe returning veterans in the samecommunity; (d) accommodating othervulnerable groups (refugees, IDPs, widows,the disabled) to avoid resentment; (e)timing and duration; (f) addressing thespecial needs of child soldiers; and (g)managing ethnic dimensions, which areoften difficult for outsiders.

Local leaders can play a role in rekindlingthe social fabric around the veterans.Guerrilla and other forms of informalwarfare, where casual fighting has becomea coping strategy, present unique chal-lenges during demobilization and reintegra-tion. It may be difficult to get factionleaders to demobilize, especially when theyare used to commanding many people andcontrolling lucrative resources.

In Liberia, previous DRPs have not beenwell designed or supported. The currentdemobilization is not linked to reintegra-tion, and neither cantonment nor civiceducation were planned, though theresources were available. Moreover, thetimetable of only ten weeks was unrealis-tic. There is thus a need for a moredetailed preparatory exercise beginningwith a profiling of the ex-combatant

Reducing uncertainty and boosting

business confidence is a precondition

for transforming the private sector into

an engine of growth

Involving civil society in

the process is one way

of buying social patience

and consensus

12

From Civil War to Civil Society

characteristics, needs and aspirations.Reinsertion and reintegration opportuni-ties should then be provided in the formof transitional safety nets and programspromoting sustainable livelihoods.

Assistance to otherwar-affected populations

The other main categories of war-affectedpopulations include refugees, IDPs andthose who stayed. The third group oftensuffers equal hardship but is frequentlyoverlooked in post-conflict reconstructionefforts. These groups, like the ex-combat-ants, have special needs that must beaddressed with well-designed programs.For example, a participant noted that thereturn of displaced persons should ensuretheir safety and dignity, and they shouldbe provided legal documentation.

Reintegration programs for all war-affected groups should concentrate onaddressing basic needs, i.e., food, health

care, shelter, and building morale. Also,where possible, people should be empow-ered to meet their own needs, especiallyin the area of employment. However,providing basic primary education for all,training and large-scale employment willstretch an administratively weak transi-tional government. Experience in LatinAmerica has shown that land reform andpossibly access to credit can also be

important for long-term reintegration,especially for the transitional poor.

An important subgroup within all of thesegroups is women. As single heads ofhouseholds, they have unique socioeco-nomic needs; and as victims of sexualviolence, they require particular attentionduring the reconciliation processes,especially since most of them will notdisclose such information due to shameand fear of rejection.

From emergency todevelopment assistance

As a society makes the transition from warto peace, the role of the internationalcommunity changes from saving lives tosustaining livelihoods, from relief- todevelopment-oriented activities. Sustain-ing livelihoods after a period of prolongedviolence requires (a) rebuilding social,economic and political infrastructure, and(b) providing credible economic alterna-tives to avoid further conflict. In thiscontext, the international communityneeds to consider the following set ofissues to ensure successful reconstructionand sustainable socioeconomic develop-ment.

PLANNING. Preparation is crucial to thesuccess of any reconstruction program.Often this process can begin before anofficial cease-fire is in place.

CONTINUITY. Building on the experiencegained during the emergency phase, e.g.,the secondment of relief staff, is importantfor informing reconstruction planning andimplementation.

COORDINATION. To avoid duplication andimprove collaboration, the internationalcommunity, could work towards (a) jointtraining, (b) joint needs assessment, (c)

Land reform and, possibly, access to

credit can also be important for long-

term reintegration, especially for the

transitional poor

13

joint planning, (d) complementary inter-ventions, (e) agreed indicators/measuresof success, and (f) single leadership.

SPEED. Procurement, funding, and report-ing procedures need to be expeditedduring the transition phase. A trade-offexists, however, between quick disburse-ments, and transparent and accountableuse of funds. Civil society can play animportant role in ensuring that govern-ments follow an acceptable set of prin-ciples.

LIMITING THE SCOPE. Immediately after acease-fire, small-scale interventions playan important role in reducing the likeli-hood of renewed violence. When thesituation becomes more stable, moreelaborate projects and programs becomeuseful.

WORKING CAPITAL. Transitional support forcurrent expenditures is important forfinancially restrained governments under-taking massive reconstruction programs.

REACH. The donor community needs toadopt more flexible and responsive proce-dures to reach beneficiaries.

SECURITY. The reduction of illegal resourcetrafficking requires, inter alia, externalsanctions (on the companies trading withthe factions), and support for internalcensures (policing) and incentives (jobopportunities, training, access to credit).

LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE. The short-terminterests of donors must not compromisethe longer term interests of war-tornsocieties.

ON THE GROUND. Field presence is instru-mental to ensuring appropriate interven-tions and necessary alterations.

The impact of any donor-sponsoredmeasure ultimately depends on support atthe local level. In this context, it isimportant for governments to set theirown priorities and say �no� to projectsand programs that do not conform totheir agenda, even when they involvegrants. Also, civil society can be empow-ered to assign roles to and responsibilitiesfor the international community.

14

A theme that emerged repeatedlyduring the workshop was that thetransition from war to peace is a

highly complex process, laden with dilem-mas, paradoxes and tensions. Moreover,each situation is unique and requires a

singular approach. However, we havelearned some lessons which can improvethe design and implementation of futuretransition programs.

Toward an Integrated Strategic Framework

PEACE HAS A PRICE. During the transitionphase, the overriding objective needs to bepolitical. Financial assistance and peacebecome mutually dependent. Hence, the�wait-and-see� and �show-us-first� mental-ity which demands peace on the ground

before funds are available is notappropriate. Limited political willneeds to be overcome and risks taken.

THERE IS NO CONTINUUM BETWEEN RELIEF

AND DEVELOPMENT. Humanitarian anddevelopment agencies should worktogether to fill the gaps between theirrespective mandates. For example,relief agencies should consider thelong-term economic impact of foodaid, while development programscould take advantage of the lessonslearned and institutional arrange-ments established during reliefoperations.

POVERTY AND INEQUALITY OFTEN LEAD TO

INSTABILITY. Wealth in the wrong handscan exacerbate conflict.

ELECTIONS DO NOT EQUAL DEMOCRACY.Elections are not an end in them-selves. And it is often important tohave certain conditions in placebefore they take place. For example, itmay be important to mitigate thedivisive elements of the electoralprocess by assigning a clear role forthe loser and avoiding a �winner-takes-all� scenario. Failed electionscan lead to renewed violence and lossof faith in the democratic process asdemonstrated by the Angolan experi-ence. It is also important to recognizethat democracy can take many formssuch as power-sharing arrangementsand a council of elders.

TIMING IS IMPORTANT. It is essential to (a) seta realistic timetable, (b) target peace frommany angles, starting many interventions at

There is no continuum from peace-keeping to relief to development. All of these thingshave to go together. We need concurrent and integrated action on many fronts at once.Also, every country is different. We cannot have a standard recipe.

I have been struck by the number of what I would call dilemmas, paradoxes andtensions....poverty as one of the root causes for instability...excesses of riches in thewrong hands can become an incentive to maintaining a conflict...winner takes all isnot a recipe for stability...powersharing before the elections can equally be prejudicialto peace...conventional macroeconomic wisdom may run counter to politicalobjectives...dilemma between reconciliation and justice...

How do we empower civil society? When do the outside players enter? How do theyenter? A need for a realistic timetable and a realization that you are in for the longhaul....the question of the timing of elections...what comes after the elections...democracycan take many forms...

...the need for a comprehensive approach..the need for partnerships, the need for pool-ing of resources, the need for complementary actions...downstream into the creationof livelihoods...upstream to give increased attention to emergencies.

I see an emerging consensus in two areas...the need for a broad gamut of confidence-building measures...[and] the need for new approaches and techniques.

We are faced with a plethora of actions and there are also a plethora of actors.

[The international community should approach] these situations with great humilitybecause, after all, we do not have the answers. The answers are somewhere there atthe local level. We can perhaps help to bring them about. Essentially our role is mediat-ing and supporting, making the maximum use of national resources for peace. So theaim must be to foster national institutions, capacities and self-reliance. Now, in manycases this requires a very different mindset and approach.

The overriding objective is political in nature. We are trying to avert a relapse intoconflict and that means that all actions must combine toward that end.

There is quite a consensus on what needs to be done in these situations, but, with theexception of certain countries, there is not sufficient political will to do something andput the money there.

Dame MarDame MarDame MarDame MarDame Margggggarararararet Jet Jet Jet Jet J. Anstee. Anstee. Anstee. Anstee. Anstee, f, f, f, f, former UN Underormer UN Underormer UN Underormer UN Underormer UN Under-Secr-Secr-Secr-Secr-Secretary Generetary Generetary Generetary Generetary General and fal and fal and fal and fal and formerormerormerormerormerSpecial RSpecial RSpecial RSpecial RSpecial Reeeeeprprprprpresentaesentaesentaesentaesentativtivtivtivtive ofe ofe ofe ofe of the Secr the Secr the Secr the Secr the Secretary-Generetary-Generetary-Generetary-Generetary-General to Angal to Angal to Angal to Angal to Angolaolaolaolaola

5

15

once but avoiding duplication, and (c) becommitted to long-term objectives, notquick-fixes.

RECONCILIATION VS. JUSTICE. A tension existsbetween getting on with reconstructionand building new lives and bringing thosewho have committed atrocities to justice.Each society needs to decide how it willaddress the reconciliation process.

EMPOWERING CIVIL SOCIETY is an importantway to inform the design, implementation,and monitoring of transition programs andto buy social patience during this volatileperiod.

RECOGNIZING THAT CONFLICT IS PART OF SOCIAL

INTERACTION and that the challenge is findingnonviolent forms of conflict managementand resolution.

In terms of responding to these tensions,consensus is emerging in two areas. First,though every society is different andrequires its own mix of interventions, thereis a need for a broad gamut of confidence-building measures early in the transitionprocess. These include restoration ofeconomic processes (demining), demobili-zation, reintegration (training, job cre-ation), good governance, human rights,security (neutral police, sound judicialsystem), democratic institutions, andempowerment of civil society and women.Second, new approaches and techniquesare needed. Perhaps most important is theneed to mobilize local human and financialresources for peace, and to identify andaddress demands at the local level.

What are the implications of these lessonsand the emerging consensus? At theinternational level (UN Security Counciland Secretary-General), there is a need forpreventative actions and early warningsystems, and more collaboration betweenthe UN system, governments, and NGOs.Intervention should be limited to situations

where they are deemed necessary andbeneficial. At the country level, interven-tions should (a) reflect local realities andaspirations, (b) be homegrown and bottom-up, (c) be inclusive of political, social andeconomic institutions, (d) have clearobjectives and priorities, (e) be flexible, (f)mobilize not displace local human andfinancial capital, and (g) be monitorablewith distinct indicators.

In more general terms, the participantsadvocated an integrated strategic frame-work characterized by:

• a coherent and comprehensive ap-proach by all actors;

• partnerships and coordination betweenthe various members of the interna-tional community and the nationalgovernment;

• a broad consensus on a strategy andrelated set of interventions;

• careful balancing of macroeconomicand political objectives;

• the necessary financial resources.

Perhaps most important, however, is a senseof humility. The international communityshould not underestimate its level ofignorance as to why conflicts occur andhow they can be resolved. Also, the ulti-mate responsibility lies with the peoplesand governments themselves. The interna-tional community can only play a support-ing role, fostering local institutions, capac-ity and self-reliance. We have come a longway in our understanding of war-to-peaceissues, activities and processes. We arebeginning to know what needs to be donein generalbut the question often remainshow. The answers are complex and ill-understood at the country level. As statedby a participant at the conclusion of theworkshop, what is needed is �less intelli-gence and more wisdom.�

16

Annex 1

Wednesday, February 19The Carter Center, Atlanta5:30pm Opening remarks: Greetings by President Carter and World Bank Vice

President Ismail M. Serageldin; discussion of workshop objectives

6:15pm Plenary Discussion: Panel on Peace Negotiations and DemilitarizationModerator: Nat Colletta, World BankPanelists: Jean Arnault, United NationsJimmy Carter, The Carter Center

7:30pm Reception for workshop participants

Thursday, February 20The Carter Center, Atlanta8:30am Continental Breakfast

9:00am Small Group Discussion

10:30am Coffee Break

10:45am Plenary Discussion: Reports from small groups

11:30am Plenary Discussion: Panel on Post-Conflict Governance and EconomicManagementModerator: Gordon Streeb, The Carter CenterPanelists: Robert Pastor, The Carter CenterNils Borje Tallroth, World BankIan Bannon, World BankThomas O. Melia, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs

12:45pm Lunch

2:00pm Small Group Discussion

3:30pm Coffee Break

Annex 1Workshop Agenda

17

3:45pm Plenary Discussion: Reports from small groups

4:30pm Plenary Discussion: Panel on Social and Economic Reintegration ofVulnerable Groups in TransitionModerator: Anne Willem Bijleveld, UNHCRPanelists: Carlos Boggio, UNHCR GuatemalaIan Martin, University of EssexEdelberto Torres Rivas, UN Research Institute for Social DevelopmentVictor Tanner, Creative Associates

5:45pm End of day

Friday, February 21Ritz Carlton Hotel-Downtown, Atlanta8:00am Continental Breakfast

8:30am Small Group Discussion

10:00am Coffee Break

10:15am Plenary Discussion: Reports from small groups

11:00am Plenary Discussion: Panel on Conflict Transformation, Restoration ofSocial Capital, and Strengthening of Civil SocietyModerator: Harry Barnes, The Carter CenterPanelists: Mamadou Dia, World BankRoger Plant, MINUGUAChristopher Mitchell, Institute for Conflict Analysis and ResolutionWilliam Partridge, World Bank

12:15pm Lunch

1:30pm Small Group Discussion

3:00pm Coffee Break

18

Annex 1

3:15pm Plenary Discussion: Reports from small groups

4:00pm Plenary Discussion: Integrated Strategic PlanningModerators: Nat Colletta and Gordon StreebPanelist: Margaret J. Anstee

5:30pm Closing Remarks

19

Group A Group B Group C

Arne Aasheim Preeti Arora Napolean AbdulaiRodrigo Asturias Amadou Ould Abdallah Jean ArnaultAndy Agle Dame Margaret J. Anstee Eileen BabbitMikael Barfod Mikihiro Arakawa Harry BarnesTahseen M. Basheer Alejandro Bendana Peter BellAnne Willem Bijleveld Carlos Boggio Hans-Petter BoeLandrum Bolling Sumana Brahman Hugh CholmondeleyHans Brattskar Horst Breier Robert CoxAlvaro Colom Caballeros Jason Calder Tom CrickMark Cackler Nat Colletta Adrienne Yande DiopDavid Carroll Rachel Fowler Nigel FisherBecky Castle Mike Godfrey Johanna M. FormanFermina Lopez Castro Bernd Hoffman Benjamen JlahM.S.Kappeynevan de Coppello Steven B. Holtzman Markus KostnerMamadou Dia Morris Kaba Krishna KumarAhmed Baba Ould Deida Anders Kompass Terrence LyonsChristina Eguizabel Lisa Kurbiel Yuji MiyamotoMukesh Kapila Comfort Lamptey Otto Perez MolinaKari Nordheim-Larson Ian Martin Byron MoralesMike Mahdesian Thomas O. Melia Joyce NeuDayton Maxwell Charles E. Nelson Jean-Victor NkoloChristopher Mitchell Taies Nezam Angel OropezaElizabeth Mulbah Susan Palmer Famatta OsodeInga M.W. Nyhamar Roger Plant Vitalino Similox SalazarWilliam Partridge Pierre Pont Colin ScottPamela Reeves Chanpen Puckahtikom Ismail M. SerageldinEdelberto Torres Rivas Barnett Rubin Alejandro Guidi VasquezTimothy Siklo Jennifer Schirmer Christine WingJohn J. Stremlau Gordon Streeb Mark WoodwardNils Borje Tallroth Ricardo Stein Sally ZeijlonEngelbert Theuermann Victor TannerSara Tindall Samuel K. Woods, II

Facilitator: Liz McClintock Facilitator: Nat Colletta Facilitator: Diana Chigas

Annex 2Working Groups

20

Annex 3 Annex 3List of Participants

Mr. Arne AasheimRegional Adviser for Latin AmericaRoyal Ministry of Foreign AffairsOsloNORWAYphone: (+47-22) 24 34 48FAX: (+47-22) 24 95 80

Mr. Napoleon AbdulaiProgram OfficerInternational Alert1 Glyn St.London SE11 5HTUKphone: (+44-171) 79 38 383FAX: (+44-171) 79 37 975

Ambassador Amadou Ould-AbdallahExecutive SecretaryGlobal Coalition for Africa1750 Pennsylvania Ave., NWSuite 1204Washington, DC 20006USAphone: (202) 676-0845FAX: (202) 522-3259

Mr. Andy AgleDirector of OperationsGlobal 2000The Carter CenterOne Copenhill, 453 Freedom ParkwayAtlanta, GA 30307USAphone: (404) 420-3850FAX: (404) 874-5515

Dame Margaret J. AnsteeFormer UN Under-Secretary-GeneralFormer Special Representative of theSecretary-General to Angolac/o Ms. Sirkka CorpelUNDP Resident Representative1350 Marizqual Santa Cruz9072 La PazBOLIVIAFAX: (+591-2) 39 13 79

Mr. Mikihiro ArakawaConsulConsulate of JapanAtlanta, GAUSAPhone: (404) 892-2700 Ext. 18FAX: (404) 881-6321

Mr. Jean ArnaultSpecial Representative of the SecretaryGeneral to GuatemalaMINUGUAAvenida Las Americas 18-36, Zona 13Guatemala CityGUATEMALAphone: (+502) 33 93 431FAX: (+502) 36 12 460

Ms. Preeti AroraCountry Economist for LiberiaThe World Bank GroupWashington, DC 20433USAphone: (202) 473-8275FAX: (202) 473-8136

Mr. Rodrigo AsturiasComandanciaUnidad RevolucionariaNacional GuatemalitecaMexico CityMEXICOphone: (+525) 45 52 943FAX: (+525) 60 40 818

Dr. Eileen BabbittFletcher School of Law and DiplomacyTufts UniversityMedford, MA 02155USAphone: (617) 627-3796FAX: (617) 627-3712

21

Mr. Ian BannonChief Economist Central AmericaThe World Bank GroupWashington, DC 20433USAphone: (202) 473-9042FAX: (202) 676-1464

Mr. Mikael BarfodHead of UnitPolicy Analysis and Strategic PlanningEuropean Community HumanitarianOfficeRue de la Lol 200B-1049 BursselsBELGIUMphone: (+32-2) 295 45 78FAX: (+32-2) 299 28 53

Ambassador Harry BarnesDirectorConflict Resolution and HumanRights ProgramsThe Carter CenterOne Copenhill, 453 Freedom ParkwayAtlanta, GA 30307USAphone: (404) 420-5189FAX: (404) 420-3862

Ambassador Tahseen M. BasheerThe National Center of Middle EastStudies1 Saad El Aly Street Apt. 163Midan Koulry El-GalaaDoukki, GizaCairoEGYPTphone: (+202) 36 12 029FAX: (+202) 36 08 717

Mr. Peter BellPresidentCARE151 Ellis Street NEAtlanta, GA 30303USAphone: (404) 681-2552FAX: (404) 577-5977

Dr. Alejandro BendanaDirectorCentro de Estudios InternacionalesApartado 1747ManaguaNICARAGUAphone: (+505) 27 85 413FAX: (+505) 26 70 517email: CEI@nicarao.apc.org

Mr. Anne Willem BijleveldRegional RepresentativeU.N. High Commissioner for RefugeesRegional office for the U.S. and CaribbeanWashington, DCUSAphone: (202) 296-5191FAX: (202) 296-5660

Mr. Hans-Petter BoeChief of MissionInternational Organization for Migration1750 K St., NWSuite 1110Washington, DC 20006USAphone: (202) 862-1826FAX: (202) 862-1879

Mr. Carlos BoggioChief of MissionUNHCR GuatemalaGuatemala CityGUATEMALAphone: (+502) 339-0463FAX: (+502) 332-5982email: guagu@unhcr.ch

Dr. Landrum BollingDirector at Large for the BalkansMercy Corps International2852 Ontario Rd., NW Apt 32Washington, DC 20009USAphone: (202) 518-9466FAX: (202) 241-2850

22

Annex 3

Ms. Sumana BrahmanAssistant DirectorOffice of Public Policy and GovernmentRelationsCARE USAWashington, DCUSAphone: (202) 223-2277FAX: (202) 296-8695

Mr. Hans BrattskarAssistant Director GeneralDivision of Development CooperationRoyal Ministry of Foreign AffairsOsloNORWAYphone: (+47-22) 24 36 00FAX: (+47-22) 24 95 80

Mr. Horst BreierHead, Economics and EnvironmentDivisionDevelopment Co-operation DirectorateOrganization for Economic Cooperationand Development2 Rue Andre-Pascal75775 Paris Cedex 16FRANCEphone: (+33-1) 45 24 90 20FAX: (+33-1) 45 24 19 96

Mr. Alvaro Colom CaballerosExecutive DirectorFondo Nacional Para la Paz (FONAPAZ)A Ave 8-50 Zona 9Guatemala CityGUATEMALAphone: (+502) 33 14 155FAX: (+502) 33 14 155

Mr. Jason CalderProgram CoordinatorGlobal Development InitiativeThe Carter CenterOne Copenhill, 453 Freedom ParkwayAtlanta, GA 30307USAphone: (404) 420-3722FAX: (404) 420-5196

Dr. David CarrollAssociate DirectorLatin American and Caribbean ProgramThe Carter CenterOne Copenhill, 453 Freedom ParkwayAtlanta, GA 30307USAphone: (404) 420-5172FAX: (404) 420-5196

President Jimmy CarterChairmanThe Carter CenterOne Copenhill, 453 Freedom ParkwayAtlanta, GA 30307USAphone: (404) 331-3900FAX: (404) 331-0283

Mrs. Rosalynn CarterThe Carter CenterOne Copenhill, 453 Freedom ParkwayAtlanta, GA 30307USAphone: (404) 331-3900FAX: (404) 331-0283

Mrs. Becky CastleProgram CoordinatorLatin American and Caribbean ProgramThe Carter CenterOne Copenhill, 453 Freedom ParkwayAtlanta, GA 30307USAphone: (404) 420-5146FAX: (404) 420-5196

Ms. Fermina Lopez CastroFounder and CoordinatorCoordinadora Nacional de Viudas deGuatemala (CONAVIGUA)8a. Avenida 2-29Zona 1, Guatemala CityGUATEMALAphone: (+502) 25 37 914 or 23 25 642FAX: (+502) 23 25 642

23

Ms. Diana ChigasRegional DirectorConflict Management Group20 University RoadCambridge, MA 02138USAphone: (617) 354-5444FAX: (617) 354-8467

Mr. Hugh CholmondeleySenior AdvisorUN Development ProgrammeUnited Nations Staff College Project10 Waterside Plaza, Apt 36DNew York NY 10010-2609USAphone: (212) 889-9473FAX: (212) 213-8128email: 72762.2646@compuserve.com

Mr. Nat CollettaLead Social Policy SpecialistEconomic Management and Social PolicyDepartmentAfrica RegionThe World Bank Group701 18th StreetRoom J-2145Washington, DCUSAphone: (202) 473-4163FAX: (202) 473-7913

Ms. Marion S. Kappeyne van de CoppelloDirector, Conflict Management andHumanitarian Aid DepartmentMinistry of Foreign AffairsBezuidenhoutseweg 67P.O. Box 200612500 EBThe HagueTHE NETHERLANDSphone: (+31-70) 34 85 001FAX: (+31-70) 34 84 486

Mr. Robert R. CoxAdvisor and Coordinator of OperationsEuropean Community HumanitarianOfficeRue de la Lol 200B-1049 BrusselsBELGIUMphone: (+32-2) 299 94 22FAX: (+32-2) 299 11 72

Mr. Tom CrickExecutive Assistant to the Director ofProgramsThe Carter CenterOne Copenhill, 453 Freedom ParkwayAtlanta, GA 30307USAphone: (404) 420-5156FAX: (404) 420-5196

Mr. Ahmed Baba Ould DeidaSenior Special Advisor to the DirectorGeneralUNESCOParisFRANCEphone: (+33-1) 45 68 2110FAX: (+33-1) 45 68 5552

Mr. Mamadou DiaCountry Director West AfricaThe World Bank GroupWashington, DC 20433USAphone: (202) 477-1234FAX: (202) 477-6391 or 473-5450

Dr. Adrienne Yandé DiopDirector of InformationEconomic Community of WestAfrican States (ECOWAS)LagosNIGERIAphone: (+234-1) 263-7075FAX: (+234-1) 263-7052

24

Annex 3

Ms. Cristina EguizabelProgram OfficerHuman Rights and InternationalCooperationFord Foundation320 East 43 StreetNew York, New York 10017USAphone: (212) 573-4937FAX: (212) 599-4584

Mr. Nigel FisherDirector, Emergency DivisionUNICEFUnited Nations PlazaNew York, NY 10017USAphone: (212) 326-7163FAX: (212) 326-7037

Dr. Johanna Mendelson FormanSenior AdvisorOffice of Transitional InitiativesU.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopmentWashington, DCUSAphone: (202) 647-3990FAX: (202) 647-0218email: jmendelson@usaid.gov

Ms. Rachel FowlerAssistant Program CoordinatorHuman Rights ProgramThe Carter CenterOne Copenhill, 453 Freedom ParkwayAtlanta, GA 30307USAphone: (404) 420-5182FAX: (404) 420-5196

Mr. Mike GodfreyGuatemala Country DirectorCARE InternationalGuatemala CityGUATEMALAphone (+502) 239-1139FAX: (+502) 239-1166

Dr. John HardmanExecutive DirectorThe Carter CenterOne Copenhill, 453 Freedom ParkwayAtlanta, GA 30307USAphone: (404) 420-5151FAX: (404) 331-0283

Mr. Bernd HoffmannHead of Division 426Emergency and Refugee AidGTZPostfach 5180D-65726 EscbornGERMANYphone: (+49-6196) 79 13 23FAX: (+49-6196) 79 71 30 or 79 61 70

Mr. Steven B. HoltzmanSocial Scientist, ENVSPThe World Bank GroupWashington, DC 20433USAphone: (202) 473-3455FAX: (202) 522-3247

Mr. Mukesh KapilaSenior Humanitarian Aid AdviserODA, UK Foreign OfficeMinistry of Foreign Affairs94 Victoria StreetLondon SW1UKphone (+41-171) 917-0778FAX: (+44-171) 917 0502

Ambassador Anders KompassAssistant Under Secretary of StateMinistry of Foreign AffairsStockholmSWEDENphone: (+46-8) 405 1000FAX: (+46-8) 723 1176

25

Dr. Markus KostnerHuman Resource EconomistThe World Bank GroupWashington, DCUSAphone: (202) 237-7501FAX: (202) 237-7505

Mr. Krishna KumarPolicy Program Coordination BureauU.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopmentWashington, DCUSAphone: (703) 875-4964FAX: (703) 875-4866

Ms. Comfort LampteyProgram SpecialistUNIFEM304 E. 45th St.6th FloorNew York, NY 10017USAphone: (212) 906-6891FAX: (212) 906-6705

Ms. Kari Nordheim-LarsonMinister of Development CooperationGovernment of NorwayOsloNORWAYphone: (+47-22) 24 39 26FAX: (+47-22) 24 95 88

Ms. Nancy LindborgSenior Program OfficerMercy Corps International2852 Ontario Rd., NW Apt 32Washington, DC 20009USAphone: (202) 518-9466FAX: (202) 518-9465

Dr. Terrence LyonsSenior Research AnalystThe Brookings Institution1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20036-2188USAphone: (202)797-6185 or797-6000FAX: (202)797-6004email: tlyons@brook.edu

Mr. Mike MahdesianDeputy Assistant AdministratorBureau for Humanitarian ResponseU.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopmentWashington, DCUSAphone: (202) 647-0216FAX: (202) 647-0218

Dr. Ian MartinFellowHuman Rights CentreUniversity of EssexWivenhoe ParkColchester, EssexUKphone: (+44-1206) 873764FAX: (+44-1206) 873627

Mr. Dayton MaxwellSenior Advisor, Complex EmergenciesWorld Vision Relief and Development, Inc.220 I Street, NESuite 270Washington, DC 20002USAphone: (202)547-3743FAX: (202)547-4834

Ms. Liz McClintockConsultantConflict Management Group20 University RoadCambridge, MA 02138USAphone: (617) 354-5444FAX: (617) 354-8467

26

Annex 3

Mr. Thomas O. MeliaSenior AssociateNational Democratic Institutefor International Affairs1717 Massachusetts Ave., NWFifth FloorWashington, D.C. 20036USAphone: (202) 328-3136FAX: (202) 265-0168

Dr. Christopher MitchellInstitute for Conflict Analysisand ResolutionGeorge Mason UniversityFairfax, Virginia 22030-4444USAphone: (703) 993-1300 or 993-1306FAX: (703) 993-1302

Mr. Yuji MiyamotoConsul GeneralConsulate of JapanAtlanta, GAUSAphone: (404) 892-2700 Ext. 29FAX: (404) 881-6321email cgoffice@mindspring.com

Mr. Byron MoralesUnion Sindical de Trabajadoresde Guatemala (UNSITRAGUA)9 Avenida1-43 Zona 1Guatemala CityGUATEMALAphone/FAX: (+502) 238 2272

General Otto Perez MolinaCOPAZRm. 5.5 Ruta al AtlanticoGuatemala CityGUATEMALAphone: (+502) 334 3622FAX: (+502) 232 0916

Ms. Elizabeth Sele MulbahExecutive DirectorChristian Health Association of LiberiaPost Office Box 10-90567th Street, Sinkor1000 Monrovia 10LIBERIAphone: (+231) 226 823FAX: c/o Lowell Lynch, USAID(+231) 226 152

Dr. Joyce NeuAssociate DirectorConflict Resolution ProgramThe Carter CenterOne Copenhill, 453 Freedom ParkwayAtlanta, GA 30307USAphone: (404) 420-5174FAX: (404) 420-3862

Taies NezamWar to Peace TransitionAfrica RegionThe World Bank GroupWashington, DCUSAphone: (202) 477-1234

Mr. Jean-Victor NkoloLiason OfficerBureau for Africa and the Middle EastInternational Organization for MigrationGenevaSWITZERLANDphone (+412) 2717 9111FAX: (+412) 2798 6150

Ms. Inga M.W. NyhamarRoyal Norwegian EmbassyWashington, DCUSAphone: (202) 333-6000/ 944-8982FAX: (202) 337-0870

27

Mr. Angel OropezaChief of Section for HumanitarianOperationsRegional Bureau for Latin AmericaInternational Organization on MigrationGenevaSWITZERLANDphone: (+412) 2717 9261FAX: (+412) 2798 6150

Ms. Susan PalmerSenior Advisor, Africa and theNear East International Foundationfor Election Systems(IFES)1101 15th Street, N.W., 3rd FloorWashington, DC 20006USAphone (202) 828-8507FAX: (202) 452-0804email susan@ifes.org

Dr. Robert PastorFellow and DirectorLatin American and Caribbean ProgramThe Carter CenterOne Copenhill, 453 Freedom ParkwayAtlanta, GA 30307USAphone: (404) 420-5180FAX: (404) 420-5196

Mr. William PartridgeChief of Social Division, LACThe World Bank GroupWashington, DCUSAphone: (202) 473-8622FAX: (202) 676-9373

Mr. Roger PlantAdvisor for Indigenous IssuesMINUGUAAvenida Las Americas 18-36, Zona 13Guatemala CityGUATEMALAphone: (+502) 339-3431FAX: (+502) 361-2460

Mr. Pierre PontHead of Delegation, ICRCRegional Delegation forthe United States and Canada2100 Pennsylvania Ave., NWWashington, DC 20037USAphone: (202) 293-9430FAX: (202) 293-9431

Mr. Jan PronkMinister of Development CooperationThe HagueTHE NETHERLANDSphone: (+31-70) 348 4445FAX: (+31-70) 348 5310

Ms. Chanpen PuckahtikomAssistant DirectorPolicy Development Review DepartmentInternational Monetary Fund700 19th St., NWWashington, DC 20431USAphone: (202) 623-8780FAX: (202) 623-4231

Mr. W. Stacy RhodesGuatemala Mission DirectorU.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopmentGuatemala CityGuatemalaphone (+502) 331-1541FAX: (+502) 331-8885

Dr. Edelberto Torres RivasDirector, Guatemala OfficeWar-torn Societies ProjectUN Research Institute for SocialDevelopmentGuatemala CityGUATEMALAphone: (+502) 337 0611FAX: (+502) 377 0304

28

Annex 3

Dr. Barnett RubinDirectorCenter for Preventive ActionCouncil on Foreign Relations58 East 68th StreetNew York, NY 10021USAPhone: (212) 734-0400FAX: (212) 517-4967email: brubin@email.cfr.org

Mr. Vitalino Similox SalazarExecutive SecretaryConference of Evangelical Churchesof Guatemala7 Avenida1-11 Zona 2Guatemala CityGUATEMALAphone: (+502) 232 2293 or 082 1121FAX: (+502) 232 1609email: ciedeg@guate.net

Dr. Jennifer SchirmerFellow, Program in Human Rights PolicyPacific Basin Research CenterJFK School of GovernmentHarvard UniversityCambridge, MAUSAphone: (617) 496-2269FAX: (617) 496-0063email pbrc1@pobox.harvard.edu

Mr. Colin ScottOperations Evaluation DepartmentThe World Bank GroupWashington, DC 20433USAphone: (202) 473-6884FAX: (202) 522-3125

Mr. Ismail M. SerageldinVice President for EnvironmentallySustainable DevelopmentThe World Bank GroupWashington, DC 20433USAphone: (202) 473-4502FAX: (202) 473-3112

Mr. Timothy SikloFirst SecretaryEmbassy of LiberiaWashington, DCUSAphone: (202) 723-0437FAX: (202) 723-0436

Mr. Ricardo SteinSpecial Adviser to the President ofthe RepublicGuatemala CityGUATEMALAFAX: (+502) 221 4425email mbstein@gnate.net

Ambassador Gordon StreebInterim Director of ProgramsDirector, Global Development InitiativeThe Carter CenterOne Copenhill, 453 Freedom ParkwayAtlanta, GA 30307USAphone: (404) 420-5170FAX: (404) 420-5196

Dr. John J. StremlauSpecial Advisor to the DirectorCarnegie Commission onPreventing Deadly Conflict2400 N Street, NW, Sixth FloorWashington, DC 20037USAphone: (202) 429-7979FAX: (202) 429-9291

29

Mr. Nils Borje TallrothChief Economist West AfricaThe World Bank GroupWashington, DC 20433USAphone: (202) 473-4876FAX: (202) 473-8136

Mr. Victor TannerSenior AssociateCreative Associates5301 Wisconsin Ave., N.W.Washington, D.C. 20015USAphone: (202) 966-5804FAX: (202) 363-4771

Mr. Engelbert TheuermannCounselorPermanent Mission of Austria to theUnited NationsNew York, NYUSAphone: (212) 210-9869FAX: (212) 953-1302

Ms. Sara TindallProgram CoordinatorConflict Resolution ProgramThe Carter CenterOne Copenhill, 453 Freedom ParkwayAtlanta, GA 30307USAphone: (404) 420-5162FAX: (404) 420-3862

Mr. Alejandro Guidi VazquezProgram ManagerOrganization of American StatesDel Ministerio de Gobernacion1 cuadra al LagoManaguaNICARAGUAphone: (+505-2) 282072, 282073,

282074, or 223844FAX: (+505-2) 282056 or 282043

Ms. Christine WingProgram OfficerPeace and SecurityFord Foundation320 East 43 StreetNew York, New York 10017USAphone: (212) 573-5000FAX: (212) 599-4584

Mr. Samuel K. Woods, IIDirectorJustice and Peace CommissionP.O. Box 10-35691000 Monrovia 10LIBERIAphone: (+231) 227 657 or 225 930FAX: (+231) 227 838, 226 006, or

226 469

Mr. Mark WoodwardSenior Poverty OfficerThe World Bank GroupWashington, DC 20433USAphone: (202) 473-8112FAX: (202) 473-7913email: mwoodward@worldbank.org

Ms. Sally ZeijlonCountry Officer for Central AmericaThe World Bank GroupWashington, DC 20433USAphone: (202) 473-8780FAX: (202) 676-1464email: szeijlon@worldbank.org

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Annex 3

From Civil War to Civil Society

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As part of a global workshop series on the transition from war to peace, the World Bank, incollaboration with the Carter Center, held a workshop focusing on Liberia and Guatemala inAtlanta, Georgia between February 19-21, 1997.

The Workshop was organized by Nat J. Colletta, Head, War to Peace Transition, Africa Region,the World Bank and Gordon Streeb, Interim Director of Programs, the Carter Center. They wereassisted by Markus Kostner, Human Resource Economist, the World Bank, and Sara Tindall,Program Coordinator, Conflict Resolution Program, the Carter Center. Diane Chigas and LizMcClintock of the Conflict Management Group, Cambridge, Massachusetts, facilitated the smallgroup discussions.

This report was prepared by Markus Kostner, Taies Nezam, and Colin Scott under the guidance ofNat J. Colletta. It has been reviewed by the Carter Center, the World Bank, and participants fromGuatemala and Liberia. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and partici-pants, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Carter Center, the World Bank, or any ofthe World Bank�s affiliated organizations.

Lawrence Mastri provided valuable assistance in the final editing, design, and production of thereport. Cover design byTomoko Hirata.

June 1997

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Preface

Ending violent conflict in countriessuffering from chronic instabilityis a prerequisite for sustainable

social and economic development. Thetransition from war to peace, however, isa complex process marked by the needto establish basic security (includingdisarmament and demobilization),protect the most vulnerable war victims,reintegrate displaced populations,rehabilitate basic infrastructure andproductive assets, stabilize theeconomy, promote transparent andaccountable government, restore socialcapital, and strengthen civil society. Inrecent years, as the number of countriesundergoing violent conflict has in-creased, a growing number of govern-ments and agencies have becomeinvolved in the war to peace transition

process. Hence, lessons and experiencesneed to be shared on a more systematicbasis and support measures synchro-nized in this relatively new discipline. Itis also important to increase collabora-tion not only among the developmentcommunity but also between the devel-opment community and the peoples andgovernments of the war-torn societies.

The Atlanta workshop sought to facili-tate this process by promoting theexchange of knowledge and experienceamong politicians, policymakers, andpractitioners to (a) build capacity, (b)provide opportunities for collaboration,and (c) improve coordination amongdifferent actors involved in war to peacetransition.

Module Relevant Issues

Peace Negotiationsand Demilitarization

Methods of peace negotiations and demilitarizationInstruments for reconciling disputes and early warning systemsPotential for disarmament, demobilization, and arms conversionInstruments ensuring respect for human rights

Post-conflict Governanceand Economic Management

Good governance and available instrumentsDemocratization of society and processes towards electionsAn independent pressConflict-related imbalances in the economySustainable post-conflict macroeconomic frameworkEnhanced regional economic cooperationMarshall Plan-type approach for jump-starting economies

Identification of characteristicsPrerequisites for voluntary returnRisks of failed reintegrationRights and obligationsSupport strategies for emergency and developmentIntervention guidelines

Principles for international peacekeepingLocal dispute mediation mechanismsInstitutional requirements for conflict transformationApproaches to reconciliation and psychosocial healingInstitutions and mechanisms for strengthening civil society

Social and Economic Reintegrationof Vulnerable Groups in Transition

Conflict Transformation, Restorationof Social Capital, and Strengtheningof Civil Society

From Civil War to Civil Society

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OBJECTIVE: Using Liberia and Guatemalaas case studies, the workshop sought toenable discussion on resolving conflictspeacefully, facilitating the transitionprocess, and preventing future out-breaks of violence

ISSUES: Workshop discussions wereorganized around four issue areas ormodules: (a) peace negotiations anddemilitarization, (b) post-conflictgovernance and economic management,(c) social and economic reintegration ofvulnerable groups, and (d) conflicttransformation, restoration of socialcapital, and strengthening civil society.

ORGANIZATION: A plenary session andworking groups were organized aroundeach module. During the plenarysessions, resource persons with perti-nent experience made keynote presenta-tions. Participants and group facilitatorsthen divided into three working groupsto discuss the issues raised by thepresenters. A workshop coordinator wasresponsible for the overall organizationof the conference. For the workshopagenda and a list of working groupmembers, see Annexes 1 and 2.

PARTICIPANTS: Workshop participantsincluded senior government and opposi-tion officials from Liberia and Guate-mala, representatives from Liberian andGuatemalan civil society, and represen-tatives from UN organizations (UNRISD,UNHCR, UNIFEM, UNDP/OPS, UNICEF,MINUGUA), multilaterals (World Bank,IMF, OAS, EU, OECD), regional organi-zations (ECOWAS), bilaterals (USAID,ODA, GTZ), donor governments (Norwe-gian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DutchMinistry of Foreign Affairs, SwedishMinistry of Foreign Affairs), regionaland international NGOs (CARE, ICRC,IOM), foundations (Ford Foundation),and the Carter Center. A list of partici-pants is included in Annex 3.

WORKSHOP REPORT: The following reportsummarizes the presentations made byspeakers during the plenary sessionsand the ad hoc discussions of theworking groups. It does not offersolutions independent of the ideasexpressed by the workshop participants.While the report adheres closely to theactual presentations, discussions andobservations, it does not present anexhaustive treatment of the issues.Examples from Liberia and Guatemalaare given where possible; in cases whereparticipants had extensive experience inother countries, examples are citedfrom those situations.

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