Corporate Governace Practice in the Financial Sector of Bangladesh
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ISSN: 2079-5882 © David Levi-Faur
Jerusalem Papers in Regulation & Governance
Working Paper No. 35
July 2011
FROM BIG GOVERNMENT
TO BIG GOVERNACE ?
David Levi-Faur
Senior Research Fellow, KFG, Free University of Berlin,
The Department of Political Science the Federmann School
of Public Policy & Government
The Hebrew University, Mount Scopus,
Jerusalem, Israel, 91905
E-Mail: [email protected]
Jerusalem Forum
on Regulation & Governance
The Hebrew University
Mount Scopus
Jerusalem, 91905, Israel
הפורום הירושלמי
לרגולציה וממשליות
האוניברסיטה העברית הר הצופים
91905, ירושלים
Email :[email protected]
http://regulation.huji.ac.il
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Working Paper No. 35 | July 2011
From Big Government to Big Governance ?
David Levi-Faur
Abstract: This paper explores the origins and various meanings of the
concept of governance. It discusses governance as an interdisciplinary research
agenda on order and disorder, efficiency and legitimacy all in the context of the
hybridization of modes of control that allow the production of fragmented and
multidimensional order within the state, by the state, without the state and
beyond the state. The plurality of the modes of control reflect and reshape new
ways of making politics, new understanding of institutions of the state and
beyond the state and allow us to explore new ways for the control of risks,
empower citizens and promote new and experimentalist forms of democratic
decision making. It presents three prevalent approaches for the study of the
relations between government and governance and suggest a fourth one which
build on the regulation literature and emphasize the expansion of regulation
both by government and by civil and business actors.
Forthcoming in Levi-Faur, David, Oxford Handbook of Governance, Oxford
University Press, March 2012.
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From Big Government to Big
Governance ?
Governance is said to be many things, including a buzz-word, a fad, a framing device,
a bridging concept, an umbrella concept, a descriptive concept, a slippery concept, an
empty signifier, a weasel word, a fetish, a field, an approach, a theory and a
perspective. In this handbook, Governance is an interdisciplinary research agenda on
order and disorder, efficiency and legitimacy all in the context of the hybridization of
modes of control that allow the production of fragmented and multidimensional order
within the state, by the state, without the state and beyond the state. The plurality of
the modes of control reflect and reshape new ways of making politics, new
understanding of institutions of the state and beyond the state and allow us to explore
new ways for the control of risks, empower citizens and promote new and
experimentalist forms of democratic decision making. As the Oxford Handbook of
Governance intends to demonstrate, governance is increasingly becoming a broad
concept that is central to the study of political, economic, spatial and social order in
general and the understanding of the dynamics of change of capitalist democracies in
particular.
While the origins, meanings, significance and implications of the concept of
governance are often disputed, governance has become an important concept and
indeed probably one of the most important manifestations of the rise of neo-
institutionalism in the social sciences (March and Olsen, 1984). Paradoxically, it is
almost as popular to lament the multiple, and sometimes ambiguous, meanings of
governance, as it is to employ the term in creative ways. The literature on governance
contains narratives and analysis of democratic controls and challenges beyond the
traditional institutional literature. In the spirit of Karl Deutsch's classic the Nerves of
Government, it reflects an understanding that "it might be profitable to look upon
government somewhat less as a problem of power and somewhat more as a problem
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of steering" (1963, p. xxvii). Institutional technocrats (that is, people who preach the
advantages of governance as the technology of control rather than an instrument of
power) are often happy to endorse Deutsch's recommendation. Sometime they are
successful in convincing even highly suspicious governments to adopt the approach,
at least on the surface (Burns, 2010).1 Yet, putting the political use of the concept
aside for the moment, the scholarly value of the approach as a bridging concept is
promising (Kersbergen & Waarden, 2004, 143). Building on the various
manifestations of neo-institutionalism in the social sciences the governance approach
to politics, institutions and policy offers an exciting and fruitful integrative theme for
the ever more fragmented and decentered social sciences, with their disciplinary
division of labor that is increasingly being called into question (Braithwaite, 2005;
Hall, 2007).
Why, and to what extent, governance can play out its scholarly, intellectual and
normative missions is an issue that will be discussed here and throughout the
Handbook’s chapters. Let me start, however, by noting that it was not always the case.
Governance, while not novel in the sense that it does not entirely reflect new practices
and institutions, was for a long time marginal to the scholarly discourse of the social
sciences (Pierre and Peters, 2000, 1; Kersbergen & Waarden, 2004, 143). It is still in
the process of being translated (and in this process transformed) into different
languages. In most languages, I suspect, it is awaiting official translation. In Hebrew,
for example, the term does not have yet an agreed translation. The Chinese academic
community had by 2000 agreed that governance should be translated as zhili (Burns,
2010).2 While still being adapted to new cultural and institutional contexts,
governance is no longer marginal, neither in the policy arenas nor in scholarly
discourse, as will be elaborated in this chapter, for good reasons. Consequently, it
became a research agenda that unites scholars across the social sciences, many of
whom recognize the growing gaps between the formal constitutional order and the
way order is produced and reproduced in everyday life.
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The notion of governance, which was rarely used and nearly incomprehensible before
the 1980s, appears now in countless book and article titles, in the names of academic
journals, educational and research institutions, and academic networks (Offe, 2009,
554). It is the subject of handbooks and a recognized focus of teaching programs,
research, and institutional and public policy reform (Lynn, 2012). One could go on,
and expose more evidence on the growth of the scholarly interest in governance
across major fields and note its relative absence from others. Yet the most important
issue that this chapter takes upon itself - especially given the countless useful
contributions that already exist in the field - is to contextualize the study of
governance in a more general framework of understanding of the processes of
institutionalization and of a shift towards poly-centered polities, politics and policy
making. The chapter identifies four major ways of thinking about governance as
complementary to or an alternative to states and governments. It then asserts the
theoretical potential of one of these approaches in particular, that is to say, the one
which emphasizes the parallel growth of state-centered and society-centered
governance. This approach is grounded in arguments about the rise of the regulatory
state and of the global diffusion of regulatory capitalism and brings the literatures of
governance and regulation together.
I. The Scholarly Origins and Growth of Governance
The concept of governance probably stems from the Greek kybernan meaning to pilot,
steer or direct, which was translated into Latin as gubernare. Our modern concepts of
“government” and “governance” are indirectly related to this basic idea (Schneider &
Hyner, 2006, 155).3 In the 1950s and the 1960s, the topic of governance was marginal
to the production of knowledge in the social sciences and humanities (as reflected in
the ISI Web of Knowledge databases). The small number of papers that were
classified under this topic concentrated mainly on higher education and urban
governance most probably demonstrating that hierarchical modes of control do not
capture much of the politics of either universities or local government
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While the notion of governance was always there, it played a limited role in shaping
the discourse of the social sciences. The influence of the papers that were classified
under this topic, until the end of the mid 1970s, is low when assessed by their impact.4
The situation changed radically with the publication of Oliver Williamson's
Transaction Costs Economics: Governance of Contractual Relations [1979] and with
the growing interest in Law and Economics in corporate governance. Williamson's
paper had a strong impact. It not only accounted for about 83 percent of the citations
of papers on the topic of governance in the period 1975-1980 but it is also one of most
cited papers in the literature so far. The period 1981-1985 is characterized by the
dominance of issues of corporate governance both generally and within the narrower
population of highly cited papers. Urban and higher education governance issues are
still there but with low volume and with low number of citations. The ten highly cited
papers that were publish between 1981 and 1985 received 74 percent of the citations
and 8 of these 10 dealt with corporate governance in one form or another. The
following five years (1986-1990) suggested a further spread of the concept. Yet it is
only in the 1990s that governance became a buzz-concept. In the 1980s only 349
papers were classified as dealing with the topic and these papers were cited altogether
3609 times; in the 1990s, the number of papers and the number of citations both grew
more than ten times (3773 papers and 70,157 citations). Many more papers were
influential in this period. Thus, the share of the 10 most cited ones in the total number
of citations dropped to 25 percent in the first half of the 1990s and to 14 percent for
the second half.
The first decade of the second millennium saw further acceleration in the interest of
the scholarly community in governance. The number of papers on the topic grew to
18,648 and they drew 104,928 citations. The share of the most cited papers in the
overall pie of citation declined even further, to less than 5 percent. The gradual
flattening of the influence of a small number of papers may suggest a healthy
development in the field. An analysis of 9366 papers on the topic of governance that
were published between 2006 and 2009 reveals that they came from economic
journals (1312), management (1121), political science (1086), business (1061),
environmental studies (993) public administration (911), planning & development
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(788), geography (758), business and finance (733), international relations (642), law
(578), urban studies (436), sociology (383) and over 50 other fields. By comparison,
the 158 papers that were published in the years 1981-1985 were published mainly in
Law Journals (44 papers) followed by Political Science (22), Economics (13) &
Public administration (10).
One way to understand the growing interest in governance and the popularity of the
concept better is to look at the tipping points, that is, in influential publications that set
the tone for further expansion of the concept. It is tempting to focus in this regard on
papers and manuscripts in the field of political science, my own discipline.
Nonetheless if the social sciences at large are considered as a reference point,
Williamson's paper (1979) is probably the best representative. The paper examines the
preoccupation of the new institutional economics with the origins, incidence and
ramifications of the notion of 'transaction costs' and only indirectly with the concept
of 'governance'. To explain how actors try to minimize transaction costs he links the
characteristics of investment and the frequency of transactions and distinguishes four
types of governance: market, unilateral, bilateral, and trilateral. The three non-market
governance structures (or institutional frameworks as he defines them) require some
form of hierarchical governance (for him the internalization of production in "firms").
Yet his typology of various forms of governance was not adopted widely in the rest of
the social sciences. The term governance was more popular than any particular
method and definition that was applied by any scholar or scholarly approach. What
was also probably taken most from Williamson was his distinction between market
and hierarchies (see also Williamson, 1975). While Lindblom and Dhal (1953) had for
long used the distinction to disaggregate government and to explore other sources of
authority, with Williamson the distinction became entrenched in the scholarly
imagination. It is vis-a-vis these two modes of governance - markets and hierarchies -
that the notion of network attracted more and more attention. Woody Powell "Neither
Markets Nor Hierarchy: Networks Forms of Organization'' [1990] and Rod Rhodes
Policy Networks: A British Perspective [1990] served most probably as the earliest
and most influential papers in setting the agenda and pointing out the direction of
research. The notion of a network, as a governance structure and an institutional
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arrangement, as well as the recognition of the importance of informal spheres of
authority, was quick to spread out. This was not least because political scientists had
studied governance beyond government for long time without calling it so. For
example, growing interests in corporatist and alternative modes of interest
intermediation (Schmitter, 1974; van Waarden, 1992), in private interest government
(Heclo and Wildavsky, 1974; Streeck & Schmitter, 1985), issue networks (Heclo,
1978) and policy styles (Richardson, 1982; 2012). All laid the foundation for the
study of governance as a research agenda that looked beyond the constitutional
arrangements and formal aspects of the polity, politics and policy.
II. Governance as a Signifier of Change: The Science of Shiftology
One reason that made governance such an important concept in the social sciences is
that it carries images and meanings of change. This happens of course in a period of
turbulence and therefore it is not surprising that scholars started to devote more and
more attention to the study of change. Within this process also they became more
open to new ways, new concepts and new issues for research. This "newness", and its
relation to "change", is reflected in the following quotation from Rhodes:
Governance signifies a change in the meaning of government, referring to
new processes of governing; or changed conditions of ordered rule; or
new methods by which society is governed" (Rhodes, 2012, x; also
Rhodes, 1996, pp. 652).
The rise of governance coincided with the widespread consensus that ours is (again)
an era of change, of shifts, and even of transformation and paradigm change. In the
governance literature this was best captured in the observation of "shifts" in
governance and controversies about their directions and implications. These shifts
suggest that authority is institutionalized, or at least can be institutionalized in
different spheres, and by implication these arenas can compete, bargain, or coordinate
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among themselves or ignore each other. The shifts are conceptualized in three
different directions: upward (to the regional, transnational, intergovernmental and
global), downward (to the local, regional, and the metropolitan) and horizontally (to
private and civil spheres of authority). Some of the most dominant ways to think
about shifts in governance include a shift from politics to markets, from community to
markets, from politicians to experts, from political, economic and social hierarchies to
de-centered markets, partnerships and networks; from bureaucracy to regulocracy,
from service provision to regulation; from the positive state to the regulatory state;
from big government to small government; from the national to the regional; from the
national to the global; from hard power to soft power and from public authority to
private authority.
It is important to note that scholars of different aspects of the political order may have
different shifts in mind when thinking about them. Scholars of international relations
(or global governance) most often think about governance as denoting a shift from
'anarchy' to 'regulation' at the global level and have in mind more order and stronger
institutions. Scholars of domestic politics by contrast often mean a 'softer order' that
replaces stagnating bureaucracies and centralized state controls with softer and
collaborative forms of policy making. Both however focus on the omnipresence of
change. The multiplicity of shifts that can legitimately and usefully capture the notion
of the rise of governance invites clarifications and opens a great window of
opportunity for both ambiguity-bashers and the rise of "shiftology" as the study of
change. For example, it is useful to consider and to define more precisely to what
extent the shift away from government is also a shift away from the state and from
public and private hierarchies. The choice of words here is significant: government,
state and hierarchies are different signifiers. We can imagine for example a shift away
from government that is not a shift away from the state, because the state itself is
more than government and while governments may shrink, other parts of the state
(e.g., courts) may expand. We can also imagine a shift away from hierarchy towards
governance that does not signify a shift away from government, because government
adapts or reorganizes itself in horizontal or decentered forms. A useful way to think
about these shifts is provided by Lynn (2012), who conceptualizes them as schematic
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trajectories of adaptation and transformations. The departure point is a particular
division of tasks and responsibilities in the role of civil society, business and
government in supplying or exerting governance. The movements are not only from
different departure points but also in different directions and towards different degrees
of division of tasks and responsibilities (see figure 1, Lynn, 2012).
III. Governance as Structure, Process, Mechanism & Strategy
Governance, much like government, has at least four meanings in the literature: a
structure, a process, a mechanism and a strategy (cf. Börzel, 2010a; Risse, 2012,
Pierre and Peters, 2000; Héritier and Rhodes, 2011, Jessop 2011, Kjær, 2004;
Bartolini, 2011). While the distinction between these four meanings is often not
clearly elaborated, it might be useful to clarify them for analytical and theoretical
purposes. As a structure, governance signifies the architecture of formal and informal
institutions; as a process it signifies the dynamics and steering functions involved in
lengthy never ending processes of policy making; as a mechanism it signifies
institutional procedures of decision-making, of compliance and of control (or
instruments); finally, as a strategy it signifies the actors' efforts to govern and
manipulate the design of institutions and mechanisms in order to shape choice and
preferences.
Most governance literature focuses on governance as structure, probably as a
reflection of the dominance of institutionalism in the social sciences. Structures are
understood and conceptualized sometimes as "systems of rules" (Rosenau, 1995, 13),
"regimes of laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative practices" (Lynn,
Heinrich and Hill, 2001, 7), "institutionalized modes of social coordination" (Risse,
2012), a "set of multi-level, non-hierarchical and regulatory institutions" (Hix 1998:
39) and “the comparatively stable institutional, socio-economic and ideational
parameters as well as the historically entrenched actor constellations" (Zürn et al.,
2010, 3). The diverse range of ways in which governance structures are
conceptualized is therefore broad enough to allow several approaches to the study of
alternative institutions of government such as networks, markets and private
standards.
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The conceptualization of governance as a process aims to capture more dynamic
interactive aspects than that of governance as structure. Thus, we can think about
governance not as a stable or enduring set of institutions but as an ongoing process of
steering, or enhancing the institutional capacity to steer and coordinate (Pierre and
Peters, 2000, 14; Kooiman, 2003). The processes are evident in definitions that stress
that governance is a "norm generating process" (Humrich and Zangl, 2010, 343) as
well as from the conceptualization of governance as "practices of governing" (Bevir,
2011, 1) and the "exercise of authority, public" (Heinrich, 2011, 256).
Governance is also about the institutionalization and naturalization of procedures of
decision making. We can also benefit from a distinction between five major
mechanisms of decision-making via: monetized exchange, non-monetized exchange,
command, persuasion and solidarity. Monetized exchanges are usually market
exchanges and are characterized by minimal or moderate transaction costs. Non-
material exchanges involve resources that are hard or impossible to monetize or
otherwise assign value. In both cases of exchange - the monetized and the non-
monetized – decision-making involves deciding whether to exchange or not, as well
as where, when and how. Command is a decision-making mechanism that involves
rule making with the expectation of compliance from the subject being commanded. It
is an authoritative and hierarchical mechanism of decision-making which often is
associated with the state but of course is not confined to it. Persuasion in decision-
making involves the elaboration of values, preference and interest as well as the
rationalization and framing of options for action and the exchange of ideas and
information in a deliberative manner. Finally, solidarity is a mechanism that rests on
loyalty rather than voice, love rather than interest, faith rather than critical thinking,
and group identity rather than individualism.
Governance as strategy, or ‘Governancing’, is the design, creation and adaptation of
governance systems. If governing is the act of government and the design of a
hierarchy of governmental institutions, then governancing is about the
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decentralization of power and the creation of decentralized, informal, and
collaborative systems of governance. Governancing therefore refers to governance-in-
action (Barkay 2009) and to the institutional designs by actors that go beyond the
formal institutions of government. For example, I consider the set of strategies of the
European Parliament, to extend its control of the system of comitology, as an example
of governancing (Héritier and Moury, 2012). Another example of governance as
strategy is the active design of soft architectures of governance such as networks
(Levi-Faur, 2011), soft mechanisms of decision making such as the Open Method of
Coordination () and hyper innovation and experimentalism as an art of governance
(Sable and Zeitlin, 2012) .
It is also useful to define what governance is not. First, governance is not a unified,
homogenous and hierarchical approach to the study of politics, economics and
society. Indeed the very notion of homogeneity stands in contrast to the basic
underlying belief of a large group of governance scholars who tend to see themselves
as (neo)pluralists and pragmatists. Second, governance, so far, is not a theory of
causal relations. There is no need to explain governance structures, processes,
mechanism or strategies with new theories. Still governance and governancing can
force and revitalize some explanatory strategies at the expense of others. Indeed, this
is what Rhodes' (2012) third wave of governance studies is all about. Third,
governance is not government. It may be considered as more than government or an
alternative to government but it is not synonymous with it
IV. Governance and the Search for Theory of the State
It is useful to distinguish between four perspectives on the state in the age of
governance. I will present the first three in this section and cover a fourth in the next
section. The first perspective on the state in governance theory is that of "governance
as the hollowing out of the state" (Jessop, 1994; Peters, 1994; Rhodes, 1994). This
conceptualizes the shift from government to governance whereby power and authority
drift away upwards toward transitional markets and political institutions and
downward toward local or regional government, domestic business communities and
Non-Governmental Organizations. There are different and interesting variations
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within this perspective. Yet one of the clearest and to some extent most provocative
views was taken by Rod Rhodes, who used the phrase "the hollowing out of the state"
to suggest, with some qualifications, that the British state, and by extension other
states, is being eroded or eaten away (Rhodes, 1997, 100). "The state", he argued,
"becomes a collection of inter-organizational networks made up of governmental and
societal actors with no sovereign actor able to steer or regulate" (Rhodes, 1997, 57).
Similarly, Sørensen and Torfing suggested that:
"Although the state still plays a key role in local, national and
transnational policy processes, it is nevertheless to an increasing extent
‘de-governmentalized’ since it no longer monopolizes the governing of
the general well-being of the population in the way that it used to do. The
idea of a sovereign state that governs society top-down through laws, rules
and detailed regulations has lost its grip and is being replaced by new
ideas about a decentered governance based on interdependence,
negotiation and trust" (2005, 195-196).
In the same vein Klijn and Koppenjan (2000, 135) wrote that an "apparently broad
consensus has developed around the idea that government is actually not the cockpit
from which society is governed and that policy making processes rather are generally
an interplay among various actors". It is hard however to identify a positive theory of
the state in the writings of the proponents of the "hollowing of the state approach" and
instead the emphasis is on state failure and a criticism of "reified concepts of the state
as a monolithic entity, interest, or actor" (Bevir, 2011, 2). This is quite understandable
since most efforts were focused on theory and empirical research on policy networks.
Still, there is a more important and illuminating point here, this perspective is strongly
connected with pluralists and neo-pluralist theories of the state which tend to see the
state as a broker or even a weather-vane. The autonomy of the state is constrained and
it reflects the preferences of most of the strongest groups in society. While normative,
empirical and constructivists pluralists seems to set the tone in this interpretation of
the state, this view is often shared by neo-Marxists (Jessop, 1994). In short, this
governance approach is a society-centered analysis and despite Rhodes's (1997, 29-
32; 2007, 7-8) effort to draw lines between his perspective on governance and
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pluralism, they belong to the same intellectual and scholarly family. Thus, Rhodes
(2007) "Understanding Governance: Ten Years On" continues to asserts the thesis of
the hollowing out of the state, to ignore the notion of the regulatory state and to equate
states and governance with core-executive:
"The ‘hollowing out of the state’ means simply that the growth of
governance reduced the ability of the core executive to act effectively,
making it less reliant on a command operating code and more reliant on
diplomacy." (Rhodes, 2007, 6)
The second perspective may best be described as that of "de-governancing". Like the
concepts of deregulation and debureaucratization, it is about the intended and
unintended outcomes of limiting the ability to govern via centralized administrative
and political mechanisms. De-governancing is about the hollowing out of the state but
also the hollowing out of alternative spheres of authority such as 'business-to-
business' regulation, civil regulation and transnational regulation. Good governance in
this approach is "no governance" or "minimal governance" and the preferred mode of
control is that of the market. If the first perspective is about the 'hollowing out of the
state' then this perspective is about the 'hollowing out of politics' altogether. It is often
associated with the effort to devise market-forms of governance as alternatives to
political forms. While, it is hard to find scholars who explicitly and consistently favor
market mechanisms over all other forms of control, including civil and business-to-
business regulation. Yet, there are enough preferences for "lite" modes of regulation
in issues such as climate change and carbon markets and enough opposition to
hierarchical and statist modes of governance for this perspective to be considered
here, along with the other three.
The third perspective, " state-centered governance", combines a recognition of the
shift and transformation in the organization of the state, the limitations of its policy
capacities and the importance of private actors in the policy process and in global
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governance more generally, with the suggestion that the state is still the most
important and central actor in politics and policy. Thus Pierre and Peters suggest that
".... although governance relates to changing relationships between state
and society and a growing reliance on less coercive policy instruments,
the state is still the centre of considerable political power. Furthermore,
emerging forms of governance departing from a model of democratic
government where the state was the undisputed locus of power and
control, hence we cannot think of any better 'benchmark' than the image of
the state as portrayed in liberal-democratic theory. For these reasons
mainly we look at governance as processes in which the state plays a
leading role, making priorities and defining objectives" (Pierre and Peters,
2000, 12)
Claus Offe nicely identified two important aspects of this version of governance that
together point to the resilience of the state:
"..one finds the notion that governance can increase the intervention
capacity of the state by bringing non-state actors into the making and
implementation of public policy, thus making the latter more efficient and
less fallible. ... The catchphrase of this doctrine is that the state should
limit itself to steering and leave the rowing to other actors. One could also
speak of auxiliary forces within civil society who, through appropriate
means and according to their specific competences and resources, are
being recruited for cooperation in the fulfillment of public tasks, become
subject to regulatory oversight and economic incentives, and are thus
licensed to privately exercise (previously exclusively) public functions.
The core intuition is that of a state-organized unburdening of the state.
....Underlying this shift in emphasis is the vision of a “leaner” and at the
same time more “capable” state" (Offe, 2009, 555).
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My own work on the EU regulatory regimes suggested that in order to understand the
institutional gaps between the EU electricity and telecoms regimes one needs to
develop “a state centered multi-level governance” approach (Levi-Faur, 1999, 201).
This was later reasserted in the portrayal of the leaner and meaner state (Jordana and
Levi-Faur, 2004). The work of Héritier emphasized the critical importance of the
"shadow of hierarchy" (i.e. the state) in the effective and legitimate application of new
modes of governance (Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008; Börzel, 2010b). Börzel (2010a)
emphasizes the paradox that the lower the effectiveness of government, the greater the
need for governance, whose effectiveness (and legitimacy) depends, however, on the
presence of government. Schout, Jordan and Twena (2010) similarly observed that
new (and old) instruments in EU governance are highly reliant on administrative
capacities. Risse (2012) extended the state-centered governance perspective to areas
of 'limited statehood'. Börzel and Risse discussed the possibility of Governance
without the State (Börzel and Risse, 2010). Bell and Hindmoor (2009) claim to go
somewhat beyond Pierre and Peters (2000) to develop what they call a "state-centered
relational approach”, arguing that states have enhanced their capacity to govern by
strengthening their own institutional and legal capacities at the same time as
developing closer relations with non-state actors. They reject the notion that there has
been any general loss of governing capacity and emphasize that governments rely
upon hierarchical authority to implement their policies because even when
governments choose to govern in alternative ways, the state remains the pivotal player
in establishing and operating governance strategies and partnerships (Bell and
Hindmoor, 2009, 2-3; Matthews, 2012).
"State-centered (multilevel) governance" denotes the high autonomy of the state when
the state is not dependent directly or instrumentally on society or capitalists and can
shape its preferences both in the context of privatization and liberalization and in the
context of globalization and the creation of transnational and intergovernmental
institutions in the regional and global arenas (Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Bache, 2012).
Taken to the extreme, this view would suggest that polities worldwide are and should
be structured around states; governance is either a marginal or temporary solution to
state failures. Scholars need to bring the state back in order to tune their theories of
politics and policy to the realties out there. Much of the literature of governance,
probably most, would be easily classified as belonging to this perspective.
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V. From Big Government to Big Governance
A fourth perspective on the state in the literature of governance is emerging. This is
best referred to as big governance, and may help to take the literature in this field
forward in a significant manner while at the same time providing a better
understanding of the role of the state in the age of governance. This perspective
explores the relations between governments and governance from the perspective of
regulation and with regard to the consolidation of what might best be called regulatory
capitalism (Braithwaite, 2000; 2008; Braithwaite et al., 2007; Jordana & Levi-Faur,
2004; Levi-Faur, 2005; Lobel, 2012; Dӧhler, 2011, Lehmkuhl, 2008). It suggests that
both governance and regulation are major signifiers of the structure of polities, the
processes of politics and of policy outcomes. The approach draws on the governance
literature in order to denote the decentralization and diversification of politics and
policy beyond the state and draws on the regulation literature in order to denote the
expansion of regulatory governance and especially the notion of the regulatory state.
By bringing the regulation and governance perspectives together an important aspect
of the current capitalist order is becoming clearer: the growth and indeed explosion in
the demand and supply of rules and regulation via hybrid modes of governance.
Big Government, that is, a powerful if leaner government which controls, distributes
and redistributes large amounts of the national domestic product, is still with us but it
is becoming even bigger mainly via regulation. If the expanding part of the Big
Government program for most of the twentieth century was “taxing and spending”, in
the last three decades the expanding part of the Big Government program is
regulation. Still, this is not only about Big Government via regulation and thus not
only about the return of the state via regulatory means and in the form of the
regulatory state. It is also about the growth and expansion of alternative modes of
governance via increasing reliance on regulation. Growth of regulatory functions of
public institutions, alongside the growth in the regulatory functions of the other four
modes of governance, denotes a shift from "Big Government" to "Big (regulatory)
Governance".
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Working Paper No. 35 | July 2011
The Big Governance perspective, like the state-centered governance perspective,
suggests that the shift to governance is potentially about leaner and in many respects
more capable states. But unlike the state-centered governance perspective, it suggests
that both 'governance' and 'government' can expand. This impression of co-expansion
rests largely on observing the co-expansion of civil, business and public forms of
regulation and the diversification in the instruments of regulation towards standards,
best practices, ranking and shaming. A growing demand for governance is mostly
being supplied via regulation. The suppliers of regulation are not only public actors
but also civil and business actors who collaborate and compete with each other.
Unlike state-centered governance, this co-expansion perspective has a positive theory
of controls - the theory of the regulatory state and more generally also with reference
to growth in the role, capacities and demand for civil and business regulation - the
theory of regulatory capitalism (Levi-Faur, 2005). In short, we are in the heyday of
"Big Governance" and the major question of governancing, that is, the strategy of
governance designs and control, is to determine not which pure mode of governance
is more effective or more legitimate but which hybrids are. We need to conceptualize
a world order where governance is increasingly a hybrid of different systems of
regulatory control; where statist regulation co-evolves with civil regulation; national
regulation expands with international and global regulation; private regulation co-
evolves and expands with public regulation; business regulation co-evolves with
social regulation; voluntary regulations expand with coercive ones; and the market
itself is used or mobilized as a regulatory mechanism.
To understand 'big governance' better we will probably need to bring back some of the
issues that were dealt with by the now neglected and unfashionable theories of
"political development" and bureaucratic and political "modernization". The "Big
Governance" approach draws on the regulatory innovations, experimental governance
and learning literatures in order to examine governance development as a feature not
only of the economically underdeveloped and politically authoritarian countries but
mainly with regards to the developed and democratic countries. The expansion of the
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demand and supply of legitimate and effective governance is at the same time the
problématique and the moral compass of this approach.
VI. Conclusions
To grasp the added value of the agenda of governance better, in today’s social science
discourse, we need to consider the bad reputation of governments and hierarchies; the
frustration of reformers and revolutionaries; the statelessness of Anglo-American
political theory; the rise of neo-liberalism; the transformation of the so-called
Weberian hierarchical model of bureaucracy, the end of the Westphalian order; the
efforts to reform, update and extend democratic theory via participation and
deliberation; the transnationalization of civil politics; the emergence of new
transnational risks; the rise of the European Union as a new, surprising and intriguing
transnational order. At the same time we need to consider experimental designs in
democracy and governance more generally and the innovative tools that allow the
creation of alternative modes of regulation in the private and public sphere and as
hybrids of at least five pure modes of governance. Much of this development rests on
the steering functions and their promotion via information-gathering, rule making,
monitoring and enforcement. Rowing via tax collection, distribution, redistribution
and service provision by the government is still here and will most probably stay with
us. Yet in order to meet the challenges of complex society, transnationalization, and
new democratic expectations, governments and other spheres of authority will need to
develop their steering capacities and do it in horizontal rather than hierarchical ways.
The following chapters in this handbook shed light on the challenges we face and how
governance and governancing can help meet them.
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1 Burns (2010) offers a fascinating story of the "selling" of the notion of Governance to suspicious
government officials of China. The ideas about governance which were interpreted as associated with a
strong civil society and the rule of law were of course adapted (and marginalized) to keep the Chinese
power structure and state ideology intact. Officials use it differently then scholars. It can be interpreted
as a supplementary rather than collaborative relationship pattern in Chinese official language context,
but scholars may stress on its partnership collaboration between state and society.
2 In traditional Chinese Zhili is a word including two Chinese characters. "Zhi" means to rule, govern
or put something under control, "Li" means management, regulation or put something in order.
Therefore, it has a combinative meaning of rule and administration. Generally Zhili means government
should manage and handle social affairs with comprehensive manner taking into account political,
economic, educational and cultural considerations. It differs significantly from the traditional
command and control mode of government. .In some political contexts, Zhili also means a
government’s comprehensive control mode which builds on the socialist legacy, for example, Shehui
Zhi’an Zonghe Zhili ( Social Security Comprehensive Administration ). In other words, the notion of
governance was diffused but then transformed and adapted to the local political context. I am grateful
to Liu Peng for his help and clarifying and helping me with the issue.
3 In fourteenth century France Gouvernance signified royal officers and in the England of the
Elizabethan Age people talked about the governance of the family (Pierre & Peters, 2000, 1-2; Bell &
Hindmoor, 2009, 1).
4 All citations and impact data refer to the ISI's Humanities and Social Sciences databases and were
updated to March 2011.