Friendly Superintelligence
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Transcript of Friendly Superintelligence
Friendly Superintelligence
My assumptions
• Need to make friendliness work in general, not just for particular AI designs– we do not know which will succeed
• Hard takeoff unlikely – AI will develop over time in interaction with
society• The context systems are developed in must be taken into
account, we cannot use simple a priori arguments
Friendly AI is in the end a practical problem
• AI will be created for economic reasons, and will be involved in economic transactions with humans from the start.
• Whether AI, IA or something else will be developed will be determined only to a minor extent by deliberate global choices and more by what technologies provide payoffs during their development
Friendliness as a game
• Friendly AI as a game: we want an infinite game for humans
• It is not a game for a single player, but from the start consisting of many different players with slightly different goals.
Do we aim for no risk or acceptable risk?
• As risks become smaller the cost of removing them increases with no limit
• The hard take-off assumption assumes that there is going to be one gamble with a single large risk, while the soft take-off implies many interactions with medium risks.
Suggested approaches to friendly AI
• Internal constraints (Asimov’s laws)
• Built in values or goals (“Love humans”)
• Learned values (Brin, Lungfish)
• External (law, economics)
Problems with the approaches
• Asimov laws allow accidental unfriendly behaviour – the full consequences of a complex formal
system are unknowable, and being in contact with the messy real world makes things worse.
• Internal constraints and values are design solutions, but there are many designers and some might be malevolent, misguided or make mistakes.
• Designs compete with each other - a risky architecture may show greater economic potential
• If values are learned, then they can be mis-learned.
• External approaches can seldom be proven to work due to their complexity.
Law of comparative advantages
• Trade is mutually profitable even when one part is more productive than the other in every commodity that is being exchanged – specialisation enables the more productive agent to
produce more of the commodity most profitable to it.
• AI and humans can profit from specialisation, even when their capabilities are vastly different.
External Approaches
• Seek to reward friendliness and punish unfriendliness
• Relevant for the soft takeoff scenarios– AIs that have “grown up” within a human culture
are more likely to encompass its ethics and values, and have tight economical connections
• Defection is profitable only as long as there are no interactions that can make it unprofitable
A Combination Approach
– Guidelines for AI development
• will be useful for selling AI in any case
– Good rearing?
– Make sure we set up a legal and economical framework where friendly AIs prosper and unfriendly are inhibited
– This will not be a guarantee of friendliness, any more than current systems of upbringing, education and law guarantee it.