FRENEMIES - iwps.org.af
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Transcript of FRENEMIES - iwps.org.af
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FRENEMIES
Afghans Views On How to Integrate Taliban Fighters
and Commanders Along with Their Families into
Military and Civilian Life?
Institute of War and Peace Studies (IWPS)
In collaboration with
The American University of Afghanistan (AUAF)
December 2020
A joint work by
IWPS PREPARING FOR PEACE PROJECT RESEARCH TEAM
AND
AUAF PREPARING FOR PEACE PROJECT RESEARCH TEAM
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MAP OF AFGHANISTAN
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Table of Contents
Abbreviations ............................................................................................................. 6
List of Terminologies ................................................................................................. 8
List of Figures .......................................................................................................... 10
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................... 11
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................... 13
SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ............ 20
Chapter 1.1. Background and Introduction............................................................... 20
Chapter 2.1. Research Methodology ........................................................................ 31
Chapter 3.1. Literature Review ................................................................................ 38
SECTION TWO: MILITARY INTEGRATION ........................................................ 56
Chapter 4.2. Military Integration – How to Integrate Taliban Fighters and
Commanders within the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF)? 56
Chapter 5.2. The Afghan Experience –Military Integration in Post 9/11 Afghanistan
.................................................................................................................................. 60
Chapter 6.2. Bamyan a Tell-Tale Story of Success: How DDR and DIAG Succeeded
in Bamyan Province? ................................................................................................ 78
SECTION THREE: CIVILIAN INTEGRATION ...................................................... 98
Chapter 7.3. Civilian Integration – How to Integrate Taliban Ex- Combatants and
Their Families within the Civilian Life? ................................................................... 98
Chapter 8.3. The Afghan Experience – Civilian Integration in Post 9/11 Afghanistan
................................................................................................................................ 102
SECTION FOURE: THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE ............................... 117
Chapter 9.4. DDR and Integration in Post- Conflict Iraq, Colombia, and Nepal .... 117
a. Colombia .................................................................................................... 121
b. Iraq ............................................................................................................. 146
c. Nepal .......................................................................................................... 167
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SECTION FIVE: THE MILITARY MACHINERY OF THE AFGHAN PARTIES TO
CONFLICT ................................................................................................................ 185
Chapter 10.5. An Assessment................................................................................ 185
i. The Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) ......................... 186
ii. The Afghan Taliban Fighting Machinery........................................................ 192
iii. The Militia force ..................................................................................... 198
SECTION SIX: ROADMAP TO INTEGRATE THE TALIBAN FIGHTERS AND
COMMANDERS INTO MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LIFE.................................... 204
Chapter 11.6. Roadmap for Military Integration ................................................... 204
Chapter 12.6. Roadmap for Civilian Integration ................................................... 220
SECTION SEVEN: CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNT ............................ 227
Chapter 13.7. Challenges and Lessons Learnt for Integration in the Afghan Context
................................................................................................................................ 227
SECTION EIGHT: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................... 238
ANNEXES ................................................................................................................. 244
Annex 1. List of Interviewees ................................................................................. 244
Annex 2. Focus Group Discussion (FGD) Questionnaires ...................................... 248
Annex 3. Key Informant Interview (KII) Questionnaires ........................................ 251
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................... 266
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Abbreviations
ALP Afghan Local Police
ANA Afghan National Army
ANBP Afghan New Beginning Program
ANDSF Afghanistan National Defence and Security Forces
ANP Afghan National Police
APRP Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DIAG Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups
ETIM East Turkestan Islamic Movement
GIROA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
IWPS Institute of War and Peace Studies
LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
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NDS National Directorate of Security
PTS Program Tahkim-e Solh
RSM Resolute Support Mission
TAF The Asia Foundation
EU European Union
UN United Nations
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UN-DPKO United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
USFORA United States Forces Afghanistan
USIP United States Institute of Peace
WB World Bank
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List of Terminologies
Integration
“The long-term process of an ex-combatant gaining acceptance from his or her
community and finding a sustainable livelihood.”
Re-integration
“The process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain
sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and
economic process with an open timeframe primarily taking place in communities
at the local level.”
Disarmament
“Refers to the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms,
ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of combatants.”
Demobilization
“Refers to the dismantlement, disbanding and discharging of armed groups and
fighters ready to join a peace process and live normal lives.”
Reinsertion
“An immediate support package that is offered to demobilized combatants either
in the form of cash or otherwise to help them for short term employment and
income.”
Shura
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“The Arabic term for council.”
Quetta Shura
“Named after the Pakistani city of Quetta bordering Qandahar province of
Afghanistan where the highest level of the Taliban movement leadership resides.”
Peshawar Shura
“Named after the Pakistani city of Peshawar bordering Nangarhar province of
Afghanistan; it is the second highest level of Taliban decision making shura on
military and political matters.”
Miranshah Shura
“Named after the Pakistani town of Miranshah bordering Paktia and Khost
provinces of Afghanistan; it is one of the leadership shuras of the Taliban which
is considered to be close with the Haqqani Network.”
Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF)
“It is the name of the professional armed forces of the Afghan Government
supported by the United States and NATO.”
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List of Figures
Figure1. Process for Military Integration
Figure 2. Ministry of Defence Organization Chart
Figure 3. Ministry of Interior Organization Chart
Figure 4. ANDSF Chain of Command
Figure 5. Funding Contributions to ANDSF
Figure 6. Taliban’s Leadership Chart
Figure 7. Taliban Shuras
Figure 8. Taliban Chain of Command
Figure 9. Various Aspects of Integration
Figure 10. Integration Phases-A
Figure 11. Roadmap to Integrate Taliban Fighters and Commanders –
Integration into an Existing Force
Figure 12. Integration Phases-B
Figure 13. Roadmap to Integrate Taliban Fighters and Commanders- Integration
into a Newly Reconstituted Force
Figure 14. Process of Civilian Integration
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research was carried out in partnership with the American University
of Afghanistan (AUAF) with generous funding from the European Union’s
Afghanistan Peace Support Mechanism (EU-APSM) through the Swedish
International Development Agency (SIDA) under the project entitled “Preparing
for Peace: Peace Research and Advocacy, Peace Monitoring and Integration of
Taliban Fighters, Commanders and their Families into Military and Civilian
Life.”
The research was undertaken under the overall supervision of Dr. Victoria C.
Fontan (AUAF) and Tamim Asey (IWPS) with a team of local researchers which
included: Mohammad Erfani (Senior Researcher – IWPS), Brig. Gen. (retd.)
Saleh Jahesh (Military Researcher – IWPS), Brig. Gen. (retd.) Esmat Ahmadi
(Military Researcher – IWPS), Colonel (retd.) Hakim Salem (Military Researcher
– IWPS), Fazal Ahmad Afzali (Senior Researcher – IWPS), Mustafa Sarwary
(Researcher – IWPS), Abulfazl Rezayee (Documentary Maker – IWPS), and
Nemat Haydarinezhad (Researcher – IWPS).
We would like to thank Prof. Dr. Victoria C. Fontan and her team at AUAF for
their contribution to the entire research design and process, including reports,
stakeholder engagements, quality control and enforced research ethics and
standards.
We would also like to thank all of our provincial focal points as well as all the
participants of our provincial consultative conferences. Special thanks go to the
distinguished individuals who spared time and talked to us in the face-to-face
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interviews. The research team would also like to thank AUAF and IWPS
management for their role in facilitating and coordinating the administration,
finance and logistics for this research.
DISCLAIMER
This document was produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The
views expressed herein can in no way be taken to reflect the official opinion of the
European Union.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
With the possibility of a peace agreement between the Afghan government
and the Taliban on the horizon, the question of Taliban integration within military
and civilian life requires proper research and investigation. This research report
explores the people’s views on the processes of integration and re-integration of
former combatants and commanders into military and civilian life within the
context of Afghanistan in case of a post- peace settlement. The purpose of the
research is to chart out a roadmap for military and civilian integration of Taliban
fighters and commanders post peace settlement informed by the past Afghan and
international experiences.
Aimed at drawing an integration roadmap suited for the indigenous population,
the authors of this report critically reviewed the existing literature while
examining various stakeholders’ points of views through direct discussions and
interviews held across five provincial centres representing five zones of the
country. Assessment of four major post-2001 reintegration programs- including
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), Disbandment of Illegal
Armed Groups (DIAG), Program Tahkim-e Solh (PTS), and Afghanistan Peace
and Reintegration Programme (APRP), provides a framework for
contextualization of the research question. Qualitative methods of data analyses
were used to go through the in-depth information revealed during the course of
consultations and interviews.
Our research findings show that the concept of integration and disarmament is
infamous within the Afghan military, policy and non-government circles. All
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previous reintegration programs suffered from a lack of local ownership and a
lack of trust among the beneficiaries. They were conducted without belligerent
parties having gone through political negotiation and settlement. The absence of
political agreement was typically filled by various local and international
powerbrokers who manipulated underlying processes according to their own
needs and interest. As a result, powerbrokers and politicians i.e., the elite,
changed position and status at the cost of rank-and-file combatants and the wider
society. Moreover, a total disregard for victims’ rights and grievance resolution
undermined all the previous initiatives. They are rather recalled as ineffective
short-term projects, not as effective long-term processes.
Taliban integration within the military and civilian life is welcomed on a
conditional basis. The expected integration deal should not undermine the civilian
achievements of the past two decades; including civilian laws, constitutional
rights of the citizens and institutions built through civilian participation.
Disregard for civilian achievements damages the legitimacy of any integration
program. Respect for civilian achievements shall be considered as the first step
towards addressing the root causes of the conflict- such as the political exclusion
of the Taliban in post-2001 Afghanistan.
Immediate compensation only works if provided in the framework of long-term
recovery plans. Proper needs assessment must take place across targeted
communities. While in any community - especially in war-affected communities,
there exist exceptional needs, situations and individuals that must be taken care
of; no individual may proceed with post-conflict integration, unless his
community and the wider society prosper. In this regard, individual and
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community-based approaches to civilian integration shall be administered side by
side in a complementary manner.
Military integration of the Taliban must take place through consideration of
professional criteria based on a proper needs assessment of the post-peace era. To
that end, the country’s security sector must be protected from any politicization
attempts - including dogmatic ideological impositions. In recent history, the
country’s security sector suffered from both politicization and rigid ideological
impositions.
Reviewing the experiences with DDR in Colombia, Iraq, and Nepal, we have
sought to extract applicable insights for Afghanistan. While some lessons are
partially applicable or prove instructive for the Afghan case, each peace process
is governed by a set of both local idiosyncrasies and international interventions,
with the modalities of each ultimately shaped by how these influences interlock.
As far as international interventions and assistance go, commonalities can come
into view. The trajectories of conflicts ebbing out, the events lulls, near-
breakdowns, and accelerations trigger, and the manner in which peace takes root
may also be instructive. Finally, the specific methods by which DDR has been
sought implemented in places like Colombia, Iraq and Nepal.
Given the decentralized fighting machinery of the Taliban, a decentralized
approach towards DDR is advisable. A decentralized DDR, on the one hand,
makes the vetting and identification processes easier and on the other hand, it
provides ground for designing community-based long-term recovery plans for
civilian reintegration. However, a decentralized DDR and community-based
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reintegration need to take place through certain negotiated principles agreed upon
at the strategic level i.e. the national level.
The previous DDR program in Afghanistan, was supposed to take place within
the broader Security Sector Reform (SSR). However, the SSR components-
including a) judiciary reform, b) anti-narcotic operation, c) police reform, d)
reform of the army and e) DDR, were not considered as complementary elements.
Hence, flawed processes of reform proceeded across all the above-mentioned
areas. Based on the lessons learned, a future DDR process should be taken into
consideration as a complementary element within the wider framework of the
SSR. DDR by itself cannot succeed unless meaningful reforms take place across
the main branches of governance.
Taliban integration within the military and civilian life must not come at the cost
of justice. Although at the end of the day, combatants themselves are considered
as victims of war and injustice, civilians affected by war- including those who are
taken to war forcefully, disabled and displaced people- among others, are the
main war victims. While addressing factional and political grievances of the
belligerent parties is an important part of integration – reintegration, it is of vital
importance not to create the perception that combatants and their commanders
are being rewarded for their misconduct. A balanced approach is needed to level
the grievances of the combatants and the grievances of their victims at the same
time. In this perspective, “transitional justice” proposes certain means and
procedures for post-conflict healing that shall be taken into consideration -
including truth findings, acknowledgment of the past atrocities, prosecution,
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repatriation and reform of laws.1 Consideration of transitional justice, as a post-
conflict healing mechanism, may promote the culture of accountability in the
post-conflict era. Meanwhile, local traditions, norms, institutions and concepts-
such as the Islamic concept of Haqqullah (right of God) vs. Haqqulabd (right of
man), also introduce certain means and procedures for post-conflict healings.
Those are not necessarily in conflict with transitional justice approaches. Local
traditions, norms, institutions, concepts, and transitional justice approaches may
complement one another if the status of actors and stakeholders are recognized
through the recognition of their actions towards each other on both individual as
well as collective basis. DDR and transitional Justice need to be taken into
consideration in parallel, as both these processes provide means and procedures
for successful transitioning from state of war to state of peace. DDR and
transitional justice should provide justification regarding why and how various
actors would reconsider their situation within their society and the wider strategic
environment.
Providing proper public information and preparing people – especially the
combatants, for integration - reintegration are important to filter beneficiaries’
expectations. Unrealistic promises - especially promises dependent on external
funding and one-sided promises, may create motivations for early compliance but
they may also provoke unrealistic expectations and cause conflict in the long-
term. A proper public information strategy should be sensitive towards the
availability of local narratives, institutions, means, resources and feasibility of
1 “What Is Transitional Justice?: ICTJ,” May 24, 2018, https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-
justice.
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long-term developmental plans. Unmet promises significantly contribute to the
continuation and re-emergence of conflict. Action must follow rhetoric.
While this research focuses on the question of post-peace deal integration of
Taliban and their families into military and civilian life, the research findings
show that the journey to successful integration, especially in multicultural
countries such as Afghanistan, is all about inclusiveness of the peace process. No
single party, such as Taliban, should dominate post-conflict integration processes.
The dilemma of local ownership and confidence in integration processes cannot
be solved unless the overall ownership is guaranteed for all stakeholders
including Taliban’s families, women and children who do not play a combat role
in the battlefield.
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SECTION ONE
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH
METHODOLOGY
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SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH
METHODOLOGY
Chapter 1.1. Background and Introduction
As Afghanistan is inching towards a comprehensive political settlement,
there is a dire need for a comprehensive and credible roadmap to integrate Taliban
fighters and commanders along with their families into military and civilian life.
Recently, both President Ashraf Ghani2 as well as the NATO Senior Civilian
Representatives to Afghanistan3 have highlighted the importance and challenge of
integration of the Taliban into civilian and military life post- peace deal. The
success of such an integration program is critical to the long-term sustainability of
any peace deal between the Taliban and the Afghan Government.
This research was undertaken with three objectives: a. gather and reflect the
perspectives of local stakeholders (mostly those who went through the DDR,
DIAG, PTS, and APRP program) on the military and civilian integration process.
b. compare the indigenous perspectives with international experience i.e.
Colombia, Iraq, and Nepal. c. chart out a roadmap that is informed by the Afghans'
views on any potential future reintegration (military and civilian) of Taliban
combatants and commanders into the Afghan society.
2 Eltaf Najafizada, “Afghan Leader Wants Taliban to Help Fight against Islamic State,”
Bloomberg, October 7, 2020, https://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/afghan-leader-wants-
taliban-to-help-fight-against-islamic-state-1.647752. 3 NATO Urges Continued Int’l Support for Afghanistan, SAYHOON, accessed December 8,
2020, https://sayhoon.com/post/15032/english
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The research was undertaken over a period of around 9 months across Afghanistan
by a mixed team of civilian and retired military researchers coupled with an
extensive desk review of the international case studies.
Background and context:
The future of the Afghan Taliban fighters and commanders in a post peace deal
environment as well as the future of the Afghan National Defence and Security
Forces (ANDSF) remain one of the most critical but undervalued and less
discussed topics in the US -Taliban as well as intra-Afghan peace negotiations4.
Re-integration of Taliban fighters and commanders into military and civilian life
is vital to the future sustainability of any Afghan political settlement.5 The threat
environment as well as the trans-criminal and terrorist networks that operate in and
around Afghanistan have the potential to threaten the long-term sustainability of
any peace agreement if the fighting machinery i.e. fighters and commanders are
not integrated into a professional military force and/or civilian life. In the absence
of a well-designed and well-planned re-integration program, such networks will
invest and try to sow discord and create new groups as an offshoot to carry on the
fight. Groups such as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Lashkar-e-Taiba
(LeT) or Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), among others, could cannibalize on the
4 Tamim Asey, “Frenemies: Prospects and Challenges for the Military Integration of the Taliban
into the Afghan Security Forces,” Global Security Review, July 2, 2019,
https://globalsecurityreview.com/frenemies-prospects-challenges-military-integration-taliban-
afghan-security-forces/. 5 Deedee Derksen, “Options for Reintegrating Taliban Fighters in an Afghan Peace Process,”
United States Institute of Peace, July 17, 2019,
https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/04/options-reintegrating-taliban-fighters-afghan-peace-
process.
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disenchanted and extremist members of these groups in order to fill in their ranks.6
In the meanwhile, regional and neighbouring countries may easily recruit them as
proxy forces.
With a potential peace settlement on the horizon, a lot will depend on the prospects
and challenges of military integration of Taliban battlefield commanders and
fighters within the ranks of the Afghan military, police and security services. Once
the Taliban give up the fight and join a peace deal, the threat environment in the
country will dramatically change. In this perspective, a military integration
requires both the Taliban and the Afghan government to go through a security
sector reform.
Reorganization, reconfiguring and reformatting of the existing military and
security architecture of Afghanistan may take place through vertical or horizontal
integration of individuals, groups or unit integration of Taliban commanders and
fighters within the existing Afghan military, civilian and political institutions7.
Many senior and mid-level Taliban commanders would want to join leadership
roles in the Afghan army and police whereas their foot soldiers would like to join,
en-masse, the Afghan security forces. This will require a detailed roadmap
outlining the ways and means of military integration but more importantly, such
an integration roadmap could serve as a guarantor and accelerator for the long-
term sustainability and resilience of any peace deal.
6 Najibullah, “Concerns Grow over ISIS Recruitment of Disaffected Taliban Fighters,”
SalaamTimes, August 27, 2019, https://afghanistan.asia-
news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_st/features/2019/08/27/feature-01. 7 Ibid.
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According to the US Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction
(SIGAR), the Afghan Taliban is estimated to have 60,000 permanent fighters
under the leadership of mutually exclusive operational commanders but mutually
politically interdependent factions. The Taliban have a highly centralized chain of
command but a decentralized control and decision-making system which gives
considerable levy and authority to the local commanders to decide routine day-to-
day operations in consultation with Taliban shadow administration officials i.e.
Governors. The total number of the fighters fluctuates, peaking during the
summertime with the seasonal fighters and volunteers coming from Pakistani
madrasas, to fight in Afghanistan while it reaches its trough during the wintertime
when the number of fighters reaches its lowest levels due to harsh weather and
logistical hurdles.8
The Afghan government estimates that part of these fighters are foreign terrorists
who fight under the Taliban umbrella. They are global, regional and Pakistani
terror outfits such as Al Qaeda, ISIL, East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM),
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and LeT, among others. These fighters
are vital for Taliban finances, logistics and provide sophisticated explosive making
expertise.9 Therefore, any peace deal at the outset should require the Taliban to
break ties with these terror outfits and foreign terrorist fighters, a challenging task
which Taliban are yet to show the resolve and determination to undertake.
8 “Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan,” SIGAR,
accessed December 8, 2020, https://www.sigar.mil/interactive-reports/reintegration/index.html. 9 Abdul Wali Arian, “20 Terrorist Groups Fighting Against Afghan Government,” TOLOnews,
accessed December 8, 2020, https://tolonews.com/afghanistan/20-terrorist-groups-fighting-
against-afghan-government.
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The integration of over 60,000 fighters and commanders into military and civilian
life is going to be a daunting and fragile task, which would require delicate
management and sharp political negotiation skills with Afghan ownership and
third-party foreign oversight preferably the United Nations.
Afghanistan is no stranger to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of
former combatants into military and civilian life. Back in 2004, the Afghan New
Beginning Program (ANBP) administered through the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) assisted in disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration of thousands of former Mujahedin and combatants but with mixed
results. It was followed by the Disarmament of Illegal Armed Group (DIAG)
program which again had mixed results given a lack of Afghan ownership and
because of a strong presence of warlords within the Afghan security and military
institutions.
Any military integration of the Afghan Taliban within the ranks of the Afghan
military and security institutions would have to be defined within the limits of the
type and structure of the new state and subsequently the kind of a security structure
and organization agreed upon by all sides of the conflict. Furthermore,
international experience especially in Africa and South Asia shows that after a
peace deal certain countries have opted to downsize the number of their security
forces given the new threat environment.
Military integration of the Taliban fighters and commanders within any new or
existing military and security architecture would require a multi-year phased linear
approach under the ownership and management of Afghans supported by technical
assistance of a third party i.e. the United Nations (UN). Moreover, as the United
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States and its NATO allies draw down their troops, it is expected that they redirect
their financial and political support towards reintegration initiatives.
The Approach
Afghanistan has had its own versions of military integration after the fall
of the communist regime in the 1990s and later in early 2000 during the fall of the
Taliban regime. However, both of them were more institutional cleansing than
military integration. International experience shows that there are mainly three
approaches to military integration10. The three military integration models are11:
(a) consent-based approach – whereas a comprehensive negotiated settlement of
the conflict is reached between the warring parties and the government forces
absorb the combatants within its ranks and/or the two forces from the different
warring parties merge and constitute a brand new single national security force.
(b) complete demobilization model – whereas the government downsizes its forces
but does not integrate combatants into the national security forces; and (c) coercive
model of peace building – whereas forced disarmament and demobilization of the
armed rebels takes places with external assistance i.e. UN mandated forces.12
In all these models, the most feasible one for the Afghan case is the consent-based
model whereas the ANDSF is resized based on the new threat environment and
10 Brig. Gen. Frank K. Rusagara , “Military Integration as an Integral Part of Peacebuilding: The
Rwandan Example”, accessed December 8, 2020, https://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/bisa-
africa/files/africanagency-seminar2-rusagara.pdf. P 2 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid.
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security landscape and the Taliban commanders and fighters are accommodated
across all the levels of ANDSF accordingly.
The Prospects
In the event of a comprehensive peace deal with the Afghan Taliban,
military integration will inevitably be part and parcel of such deal. The
foundational questions, which needs to be tackled at the outset of any peace deal,
will be: what will be the size and shape of the new security and military
architecture of Afghanistan in view of the new security environment? What model
should the new security and military architecture be based on, i.e. NATO or non-
NATO military model? What would be the future relationship of the Taliban with
the United States and its allies? Moreover, what would be the future relationship
between the security and defence sector and its first-hand beneficiaries i.e. the
people of Afghanistan? These foundational questions will determine the size,
scope and sustainability of the future Afghan military and security forces.
Subsequently, the Taliban can be integrated at three levels of: (a) senior
commanders, (b) mid-level commanders, and (c) foot soldiers. This can be done
individually, in groups or unit level integration at the field level. Senior and mid-
level Taliban commanders would expect positions of influence within and outside
of the Afghan military and security services. This can be approached through a
bottom–up field level integration at the division or corps level or be undertaken
through individual negotiations with the Taliban military leaders through a
screening and filtering mechanism. Much will also depend on the size of the new
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Afghan military and their operational priorities in view of the rise of Daesh13 and
emergence of Taliban splinter groups and criminal outfits, who would split from
the Taliban chain of command and carry on the fight in pursuit of their own
political and financial agendas.
In such circumstances, in the interim the Afghan government and its allies will
have to integrate Taliban rank and file within the existing ANDSF size and
structure and then, through a roadmap, transform and downsize ANDSF into a
more affordable and sustainable force. This interim integration could be done
through centre and field level integration i.e. integrating Taliban units to various
geographical army corps across the country and integrate senior Taliban
commanders in Kabul headquarters (HQs).
In the long run, the Afghan government together with its allies will also have to
decide how many professional armed forces and how many auxiliary local forces
they need for securing the country. This could provide an opportunity for Afghans
and their NATO allies where the existing army could be kept as a professional
force, albeit significantly downsized, whereas the Taliban forces with some
exception could be added as auxiliary local forces given their vast presence in the
country side to complement the security work of the newly reorganized Afghan
army.
Furthermore, the Taliban commanders and fighters will need to go through
sensitization programs as well as short and long-term training courses and attend
joint exercises with the Afghan forces to promote unity in the force. This will help
13 Arabic acronym for ISIL
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cohesiveness and efficiency within the command and control structure of the
newly reorganized and reconfigured Afghan military.
The Mechanism
Based on international best practices, there are normally two
internationally recognized mechanisms through which the Taliban fighters and
commanders can be integrated with the rank and file of Afghan forces14: (a) a
temporary parallel co-existence mechanism until full integration happens which is
normally referred to as interim security arrangement; and (b) immediate
reintegration whereas forces are immediately disarmed and demobilized by
individuals, groups and units sometimes keeping the entire command and control
structure intact.
Both mechanisms have their pros and cons. Under the interim security
arrangement both forces co-exist within their geographies under their control but
in a cooperative manner i.e. ceasing hostilities, providing security and law
enforcement services to their respective areas, and eventually merged into one
force. This mechanism is a recent phenomenon due to size and institutional
absorption capacity issues. Many military integration and DDR processes have
failed because it has stalled due to institutional capacity issues and political
infightings. Therefore, an interim period is envisioned whereas the forces are
integrated in instalments over a period of time while both forces co-exist with each
14 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Second Generation Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations,” 2010,
https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/2gddr_eng_with_cover.pdf.
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other in a cooperative manner conducting joint patrols, joint trainings and
exercises.15 This will assist in better integration and merger of the two forces.
The immediate mobilization mechanism is doable only when the sizes of the
opposing warring parties are small and the institutional absorption capacity in the
military apparatus of the country is high with a firm political will and adequate
financial resources at hand. This is normally the classic method of military
integration whereas the armed rebels are disarmed and demobilized immediately
and reintegrated within the government security forces through an elaborate
screening, training and professionalization process.
The Challenges
With the military integration of the Afghan Taliban into the security
infrastructure of Afghanistan comes many sets of political, military, institutional,
cultural, financial and budgetary challenges. In fragile countries such as
Afghanistan, the biggest of them all will be the political challenge, wherein both
sides of the conflict remain committed and resilient regardless of the change in
personalities and leaders to the agreed terms of the peace deal and do not use
military force as a means of political leverage on each other. Most of the peace
deals and military integration plans fail because one side renege on their
commitments and start using military force as a political leverage. Second comes
the institutional absorption capacity. This is followed by the management and
15 Reto Rufer, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR): Conceptual Approaches,
Specific settings, Practical Experiences, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed
Forces (DCAF), 2005,
https://dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/RUFER_final.pdf
30
financial requirements which is the least of the worries since a third party i.e. UN
with the help of the international community will assist in providing the technical
expertise and raise funds to finance the budgetary requirements of the peace deal
and military integration plan.
In the case of Afghanistan, the two top challenges will be political resilience and
institutional capacity to transform and accommodate the newly integrated Taliban
commanders and fighters. The rest can be managed.
31
Chapter 2.1. Research Methodology
This research was conducted through a qualitative method of data collection and
analysis following the bellow four phases:
1) Conducting a desk review of the past reintegration initiatives inside
Afghanistan and international experience across Colombia, Iraq and Nepal.
2) Conducting in-depth interviews and stakeholders’ consultation
conferences in Kabul and in four regional provincial capitals on potential
ways and means to integrate Taliban and their families within ANDSF and
civilian life.
3) Systemic analysis of the data collected through the desk review,
stakeholders’ consultation conferences and in-depth interviews.
4) Developing and presenting a roadmap on the potential integration of the
Taliban fighters and commanders into military and civilian life.
2.1.1. Scope of the Research
To find gaps in the existing literature and to determine the scope of the research
and design the research methodology, the research team conducted a
comprehensive literature review. Through the review of academic articles and
official documents, four previous reintegration programs including DDR, DIAG,
PTS and APRP, were critically studied and the research questioners designed. In
accordance with the objective of the research i.e. to draw a roadmap for integration
of the Taliban into the security sector and civilian life, this inquiry follows a
qualitative methodology using both primary and secondary data sources. Initially
the research team decided to conduct Provincial Consultative Conferences (PCCs)
32
across four provinces hosting military corps (including Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e
Sharif, and Qandahar). However, during the course of the filed work, the research
team also held a PCC in Bamyan. Bamyan was added to the list for several reasons,
including its overall security and peacefulness, its cultural and geographic
significance. The research report includes a separated chapter on post- 2001
experience of DDR implementation in Bamyan.
PCCs provided the research team with opportunities to connect with provincial
actors and stakeholders. In each province a total of 30-40 people– through
purposive sampling, were selected and invited for consultation. The data collection
method in provincial consultative conferences consisted of a) Focus Group
Discussions (FGDs), and b) Key Informant Interviews (KIIs). The PCC
participants consisted of 1) former Jihadi combatants and retired military officers,
2) members of Civil Society, and 3) local governance representatives. From
among the PCC participants, three to four individuals were interviewed as Key
Informants across each province. An additional 21 high profile Key Informant
interviews were also conducted in Kabul outside PCC platform. The high profile
Key Informants in Kabul included: a) high ranking security personnel, b)
government officials involved in pervious and current integration-reconciliation
efforts, c) former Taliban and Mujahedin members, representatives of political
parties, and d) Parliamentarians and civil society activists.
2.1.2. Questionnaire Design
Based on categorization of FGD participants and key informants, separate
semi-structured questionnaires were designed consisting of two sets of questions
33
including: a) general questions to be asked from all participants and the Key
Informants, and b) particular questions to be asked from different categories of
interviewees. The questionnaires incorporated five major topics including 1) post-
2001 peace and integration programs, 2) legitimacy of the government, 3)
assessment of the national defence and security sector, 4) possibilities for military
integration of the Taliban, 5) possibilities for civilian integration of the Taliban.
Corresponding with the PCC participants’ background, four FGDs were held in
each province (due to importance of military aspects of the research, in each
province two military FGDs were conducted alongside other FGDs). Overall, 20
FGDs were held in all five provincial consultative conferences.
2.1.3. Case Studies
To provide comparative insight to the research question and to investigate
the best international practices, a number of local and international Case Studies
were included in the research design. Local Case Studies include a critical review
of post- 2011 reintegration experiences i.e. DDR, DIAG, Program Tahkim-e Solh,
and Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program. Furthermore, three
international Case Studies – namely Colombia, Iraq, and Nepal, were included in
the inquiry. Meanwhile, the implementation of the DDR and DIAG programs in
Bamyan province was studied as a separate case study.
2.1.4. Data Analysis and Verification
34
Content analysis was applied to clearly and properly interpret the data
gathered through in-depth interviews and FGDs. Content analysis covers
methods/tools of qualitative analysis, specifically for identifying trends and
themes appearing in a piece of qualitative content. In other words, content analysis
is an approach to summarize any form of content/details through the application
of categorization, classification and interpretation of qualitative data. Categorizing
the scattered and unclassified answers and expressions put forward by the
respondents helps researchers to interpret, understand and present the data in a
logical, understandable and systemic way. The research analysis is also informed
by Narrative and Discourse analysis and Within-Case and Across-Case method.
To ensure reliability and validity of the research, a number of methods were put
into practice including transcript review (Letting Key Informants confirm a
transcript of their words before analysis), peer review (colleagues cross-checking
each other's work), concurrent data collecting and analysing (Iterative and
simultaneous interaction between data and analysis), keeping methodological
coherence in check (evaluating the coherence of research components as research
work unfolds) and theoretical examination (matching the micro level data with
macro conceptual framework). Since every research endeavour is susceptible to
errors and biases, the above-mentioned methods of data verification helped the
research team to control and examine errors and biases along the way.
2.1.5. Research Structure
The research report is presented in the following structure including
section 1) Introduction and Research Methodology, section 2) Military Integration,
35
section 3) Civilian Integration, section 4) The International Experience, section 5)
The Military Machinery of the Afghan Parties to Conflict, section 6) A Roadmap
to Integrate the Taliban Fighters and Commanders, section 7) Challenges and
Lessons learned, and section 8) Conclusion and Recommendations.
2.1.6. Research Limitations
1. This research does not study community- level security arrangements made in
various parts of the country.
2. The assessment of the previous peace and integration programs i.e. DDR,
DIAG, PTS, APRP, is conducted mostly through the review of the existing
literature and the stakeholders’ provincial consolations; it does not study the
sequencing and various departments of each program in detail.
3. Provincial consultations took place only in a few relatively secure provinces. In
addition, only certain groups of people through purposive and snowball sampling
were consulted and interviewed. For example, due to availability of former Jihadi
combatants and army officers, more army officers, Jihadi affiliates, and less
number of police force were approached and consulted. Such approach increases
the chance of bias.
4. In the course of the fieldwork, many high profile figures – such as leaders of
political parties, government officials and PMs, were not available for interview
or simply refused to be interviewed.
5. Due to professional ethical protocol, which prohibits approaching incumbent
Taliban members and difficulties in contacting Taliban affiliates, especially their
36
rank and file soldiers, only two ex-high ranking officials of the Taliban were
interviewed. No Taliban ex-combatants participated in the FGDs. Therefore,
possible diversity in the views of Taliban affiliates toward post-conflict integration
is not reflected in this research. For similar reason, the file and rank soldiers of
ANSDF were not consulted in this research. Only retired military officers were
consulted and interviewed.
2.1.7. Research Ethical Protocol
In accordance with standard research ethical considerations, including risk
mitigation plan, the research team conducted its work based on a clear code of
conduct. Consent Forms were prepared and shared with all Key Informants and
FGD participants to make sure that they fully understand the terms of their
participation in the research project. The names appeared in the research report
belong to those Key Informants and FGD participants who agreed to share their
identities with the general audience. All records are kept in the office of the
AUAF’s Vice President of Academic Affairs and the IWPS research archive.
2.1.8. Risk Management
To ensure that neither informants nor researchers face harm as a result of their
participation in research activities, a number of precautionary measures were taken
into consideration: Safety precautions with regard to the timing and location of the
field work, covid-19 mitigation measures, as well as consideration of the local and
37
national socio-cultural mores. Researchers were trained on those issues before
visiting the field.
38
Chapter 3.1. Literature Review
There is no dearth of research papers, journals, handbooks and guidelines
on integration of former combatants and commanders into military and civilian
life and more so on Afghanistan. What is not there is the perspectives of Afghans,
especially those affected by such processes, in the mainstream academic discourse
and programming for future initiatives. The main aim of this literature review has
been to synthesize the Afghan experience with the international experience in
order to chart out a reasonably realistic roadmap for potential future integration of
the Taliban fighters and commanders into the Afghan military and civilian life.
Literature on the Afghan Experience
Any successful integration and re-integration program needs to be firmly
linked to a broader political framework in Afghanistan such as a political
agreement and ceasefire16. In the absence of a comprehensive agreement, any
reintegration initiative is not sustainable and will falter on the way with integrated
combatants taking up arms again. This is evident of Bonn agreement in
Afghanistan whereas the absence Hizb-e-Islami Group (Hekmatyar) and the
Taliban in the negotiations led to a renewed insurgency and the implementation of
an incomplete and faltering DD(R) program.
Furthermore, national ownership and evidence-based verification i.e. fact-finding
missions regarding the list of combatants claimed by various groups, is extremely
16 P D Thruelsen, “From Soldier to Civilian: Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration in
Afghanistan,” GSDRC, September 4, 2015, https://gsdrc.org/document-library/from-soldier-to-
civilian-disarmament-demobilisation-reintegration-in-afghanistan/. DIIS REPORT 2006:7, 4-6.
39
important. Both the national ownership and evidence-based verification is critical
but at the same time could be potentially damaging because national and local
actors can use it for their own agenda.17
Any integration program would need to rely on a two-pronged approach of
political integration of the Taliban leadership and military-civilian integration of
the Taliban rank and file18. This further complicates the question of the foreign
fighters who operate under the umbrella of the Taliban movement. In the context
of integration, such questions which encompass cross-border and cross-
sovereignty matters, complicate an already complex war. Moreover, the
assumption that standalone integration leads to de-escalation of conflict in the
absence of a broad political framework agreement is at best questionable.
Simultaneously, incentivization schemes i.e. cash, amnesties and third-country
settlement can only have short-term effects and would not necessarily lead to a
permanent de-escalation or snowball effect for breaking the insurgency and/or
weakening them permanently. All of these cases were evident from the
Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP), which was signed in June
2010 by former President Hamid Karzai.19
Evidence shows that successful integration programs are closely interlinked to a
parallel process of peace building and peace making.20 Integration programs
17 Ibid. 18 Tazreena Sajjad, “Peace at All Costs? Reintegration and Reconciliation in Afghanistan,” Peace
at All Costs? Reintegration and Reconciliation in Afghanistan (AREU, October 2010),
https://areu.org.af/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/1035E-Peace-at-all-Costs-IP-2010-web.pdf/. 19 Ibid. 20 Alpaslan Ozerdem, “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in
Afghanistan: Lessons Learned from a Cross-Cultural Perspective,” Coventry University (Taylor
& Francis, January 1, 1970), https://pureportal.coventry.ac.uk/en/publications/disarmament-
demobilisation-and-reintegration-of-former-combatants-2.
40
cannot be successful and effective as a standalone initiative in an island of itself.
It has to be linked to a broader peace making and peace building process.
Moreover, the sequencing in an integration and re-integration program matters
deeply. Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration (DDR) programs should
be a step in a process and placed in the right sequence to complement a broader
peace process.
At the operational and tactical levels, in a country awash with weaponry and
pervasive gun culture where guns are inexpensive and easily available at the
market, it is hard to design and implement a successful integration program21. This
task is further complicated by the difficult undertaking of determining the exact
number of combatants from different conflict parties who require to be integrated
into military and civilian life.
Taliban also had its own disarmament and demobilization program.22 Its brutal
enforcement led to certain elements of the Mujahedin as well as the former
communist army officers to get integrated into the Taliban military apparatus.
However, Taliban only went after military integration (albeit ad hoc and never
properly designed) and did not have a civilian integration component of their
opponents after enforced disarmament.
The DDR as a post- conflict rehabilitation mechanism was never mentioned in the
Bonn agreement,23 because of fierce opposition from the former United Front i.e.
21 Mark Sedra, “New Beginning or Return to Arms? The Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration Process in Afghanistan,” LSE Research Online, June 1, 2003,
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28377/. 2-3. 22Ibid.
23 Ibid.
41
Northern Alliance negotiators. Often times the reintegration programs in
Afghanistan faced with lack of political consensus amongst the Afghan power
brokers on the terms and arrangements of disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration, donor fatigue and the absence of linkage between the demobilization
and reintegration program with a broader security sector reform and a peace
process with a defined end state.
Meanwhile, any reintegration program in Afghanistan will also have spoilers and
groups who see their benefits in the rule of guns, including both Afghans and
foreign fighters. To manage these groups and to ensure the “inclusivity” and not
“exclusion” in the peace process as well as any potential future program on
integration of combatants, it is vital to ensure at the design and planning stage that
reintegration programs target all groups and is as much inclusive as possible. If
not considered and inclusive, reintegration programs could reinforce the cycle of
violence and deepen the conflict. 24
The success of previous integration and reintegration programs i.e. DDR, DIAG,
PTS, APRP, plus the Hizb-e-Islami Group (HIG) peace agreement, has been
dismal and marginal at best. This was primarily because of a short-term approach
to reintegration and lack of regard for a civilian integration through a long-term
process. 25 With all its limited and marginal success, it is incredibly important to
highlight the vital importance of a reintegration of former combatants as part of
24 Marissa Quie, “Peace and Exclusion: The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program -
Marissa Quie, 2018,” SAGE Journals, accessed December 21, 2020,
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0160597616667592. 5-7. 25 Dean Piedmont, “The Reintegration of Taliban Fighters into a Market-Based Economy in
Afghanistan,” accessed December 21, 2020, http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/07/Reintegrated-Fighters.pdf.5-8.
42
the any peace deal because former combatants can be both enablers and spoilers
in any peace process. Former combatants can become a major source of threat to
the peace deal as they could remobilize, shift alliances and join other violent
groups opposing the deal or ultimately join criminal groups, and this could
undermine the long-term sustainability of any peace deal.
One of the major shortcomings of the successive reintegration programs in
Afghanistan has been civilian integration. Civilian integration in Afghanistan has
been treated as one-off projects often times lacking sustainability and market
strategies. The training programs provided to the former combatants after
demobilization often did not correspond to real market needs and also lacked
cultural stigmatization. 26 The Afghan commanders refused to take up jobs at the
market for prestige and social status and served as spoiler due to poorly designed
reintegration packages.
Within the Afghan context, political integration of the Taliban leadership and mid-
level commanders is an important vehicle for the long-term success and
sustainability of any peace process. In other words, there should be willingness on
the part of the Taliban leadership and their senior commanders to join Afghan
politics, military and civilian life27. If this is not the case, efforts should be made
to lure and convince them. Otherwise they could take up arms and join splinter
groups and continue the fight. Political integration is important because much of
the fight on the battlefield is based on personal and religious charisma and such
26 Ibid. 27 Deedee Derksen, “Options for Reintegrating Taliban Fighters in an Afghan Peace Process,”
United States Institute of Peace, July 17, 2019,
https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/04/options-reintegrating-taliban-fighters-afghan-peace-
process. 4-9.
43
splinter personalities could pave the way for a renewed cycle of violence in the
country.
At the tactical and operational levels the Afghan experience shows that field level
unit integration with breaking the chain of command is the best method for Taliban
rank and file military integration. However, international experience shows that
military integration can be done by merging Taliban into a newly reconstituted
Afghan security forces based on a new political agreement in Doha; integrating
existing insurgent military units as complete units within ANDSF and finally
individual integration of Taliban fighters and commanders after a process of
professionalization within a newly reconstituted Afghan security forces. Mainly,
there are two approaches to integration28: a. the classic approach to integration i.e.
immediate integration and b. the new interim arrangements for integration which
sees integration more of a process rather than a project and advocates for a more
calculated and process-oriented integration of combatants in the long-run.
SIGAR in its recent comprehensive report29 “REINTEGRATION OF EX-
COMBATANTS: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan” highlights the
importance of demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants as an important
pre-requisite for a durable and sustainable peace in Afghanistan. The SIGAR
report also highlights that any integration program should be undertaken in the
broader context of peace and DDR program. No integration program can be
successful in the absence of a comprehensive political settlement or peace
28 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Second Generation Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations,” 2010,
https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/2gddr_eng_with_cover.pdf. 29Ibid.
44
agreement. Moreover, militias cannot be partners in Counter Terrorism (CT) but
at the same time targeted for demobilization and reintegration. Reintegration
programs suffered from lack of security for the reintegrated militias on the face of
threats from splinter groups or corrupt government officials; lack of monitoring
and evaluation system. Reintegration initiatives are used as military and political
tools to weaken and fracture the insurgency. Finally, the socio-economic
conditions are vital pre-requisites for a successful reintegration of ex-combatants
program.
Overall, a community-led, Afghan-led, and Afghan-owned reintegration program
contextualized for the Afghan ground realities as a process has higher chances of
success rather than a project-based, one-off approach.
Major Themes
The question whether the post-2001 security arrangements correspond with post-
conflict requirements lingers upon all reconciliation efforts aiming at future
integration of the Taliban combatants within the security sector and civilian life.
In this section, the existing literature on the research topic is categorized through
the identification of the main actors, stakeholders, and institutions against stated
goals, expectations and achievements of the post- 2001 peace and reintegration
programs. The projection of rule of law instead of rule of gun, the nexus between
the DDR program and transitional justice, the relationship between DDR-DIAG
and Security Sector Reform (SSR), reintegration, rebuilding and sustainable peace
nexus, constitute major themes of interest in that regard. These themes highlight
45
certain criterion through which one may proceed with evaluation of proposals for
future integration- reintegration programs.
3.1.1. The Rule of Law Instead of the Rule of Gun
The main goal of all post-2001 reintegration and peace processes have been
to replace the rule of gun with the rule of law. However, the stated goal of securing
the rule of law in post -2001 Afghanistan proved to be more challenging than
expected. In his article entitled “Disarmament, Demobilization and
Rearmament?”30 Christian Dennys suggests that the DDR should be evaluated
based on assessment of the outcome and the effect rather than the number of
disarmed men or the number of collected weaponry. He argues that the DDR
program facilitated the introduction of a new government and its security
institutions, but it did not address structural problems directly effecting the lives
of ex-combatants and their communities. With many ex-combatants, failing to
benefit from the reintegration packages – exemplified by inadequate, delayed
livelihood assistance and limited opportunity for reorganization within the newly
established security sector, local power concentrated in the former commanders’
hands. Midlevel commanders ended up stockpiling arms, rearming and exploiting
unresolved grievances. Informal patronage structures, through which Afghan
militias used to operate, continued to function next to formal security arrangement.
“Some people have participated in the program that should not have, while
30 Christian Dennys, Disarmament, Demobilization and Rearmament?, Japan Afghan NGO
Network (JANN), 2005
46
elements of other destabilizing units remain.”31The DDR Program was hammered
by “two critical policy failures” including:
“Firstly the insistence that support to former combatants could only be
given to individuals. This failed to assist the wider community ... Secondly;
the failure to expand the program to include the lower level commanders
(they were treated like their own file and rank soldiers) has led to an
entrenchment of their power and their links with senior political and
national figures in Afghanistan.” 32
In such circumstances, the following Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups
(DIAG) program was overshadowed by coalition’s reliance on the fighting
capacity of the same armed groups which were supposed to be disbanded. Through
private security companies, many illegal armed groups were legalized and as a
result, illegal activities including criminal activities prevailed across the country.33
Dennys concludes by recommending that a comprehensive planning and quick
implementation through long term monitoring strategy would increase the chance
of successful post-conflict disarmament and reintegration programs.
3.1.2. DDR and Transitional Justice
In order to replace the rule of gun with the rule of law, the past abuses of
power need to be taken account of and addressed. However, the transition from a
31 A UNAMA report suggested, “80% of participants in the Phase 1 and 2 of the DDR Program
in the central region did not meet the minimum requirement of 8 moths service in a military
unite.” Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid.
47
bloody past to a prosperous future is necessarily a painful transition; for both
victims and predators need to be heard and face justice. To address the grievances
of the past atrocities and to facilitate a sustainable peace, the notion of transitional
justice has been introduced alongside the DDR program. But hopes for
experiencing post-conflict transitional justice faded away as both local and
international decision makers decided to go ahead with institutional reform
without paying attention to the nexus between reform and justice.34 In the article
entitled “Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case Study of Afghanistan”, Patricia
Gossman asserts that the link between the DDR and transitional justice was never
taken seriously in Afghanistan.”35 The international community in general saw the
pursuit of transitional justice and the idea of promoting human rights as potentially
destabilizing. Both the United States and the UN acted upon the presumption that
focusing on human rights and transitional justice could cause backlash from the
side of local warlords whom the coalition relined on in their state-building
endeavours. Accordingly, in order to secure their peace plan, the international
community collaborated with illegal armed forces and warlords, without taking
into consideration of their involvement in the past war crimes and other criminal
records. As a result, the DDR program was implemented through a selective
approach not as part of a comprehensive security sector reform.
Since at the time the coalition forces were fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaida, one
cannot label the post-2001 period as post-conflict situation either. “The DDR
process had no jurisdiction over members of militias employed by US-led coalition
34 Patricia Gossman, Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case Study of Afghanistan”,
International Centre for Transitional Justice, June 2009. 35 Ibid.
48
forces.”36 On the other hand, Gossman argues that the international community’s
insufficient funding and its “light footprint” approach in Afghanistan, caused delay
and disruption in vital reforms.
“In reality, the light footprint has meant that vital reforms have lagged for
lack of capacity and clear leadership. In addition, with the
compartmentalization of key reform efforts, disarmament, police reform,
judicial reform, human rights- cooperation among donor and Afghan has
been inadequate, undermining the creation of accountable institutions.”37
The author suggests that comprehensive planning, sufficient funding and
deploying international peacekeeping forces are necessary components of a
successful transition from war to peace in Afghanistan. As Gossman put it “At its
core, transitional justice is about setting standards for the appropriate use of state
power. It is about good governance and the rule of law.”38
3.1.3. DDR and SSR Nexus
The DDR program received funding from the international community as
part of a wider Security Sector Reform (SSR) agenda, which was not part of the
Bonne Agreement. Due to disagreements among the Mujahedin factions
participating in the Bonne Conference, “the Bonne Agreement only indirectly
addressed SSR and did not contain any agreement on DDR.”39 It only required
36 Ibid. p 5 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. p 33 39 Caroline A. Hartzell, “Missed Opportunities, The Impact of DDR on SSR in Afghanistan”,
USIP, 2011.
49
that “all Mujahedin, Afghan armed forces and armed groups in the country shall
come under the command and control of the Interim Authority, and be reorganized
(and reintegrated) according to the requirements of the new Afghan security and
armed forces.”40 It was at Geneva conference 2002 that the donor community
introduced five pillars of SSR in Afghanistan with individual countries taking
responsibility to lead reforms across each SSR pillars. Accordingly, the United
States, Germany, the UK, Italy and Japan took responsibility for leading reforms
across military, national police force, counter-narcotics campaign, judicial system
and the DDR program respectively. The reform process was undermined by
compartmentalization and factional manipulations.41 In her article entitled
“Missed Opportunities, The Impact of DDR on SSR in Afghanistan” Caroline A.
Hartzell argues that lack of coordination among the donor community next to local
power struggle among militia leaders i.e. powerbrokers, overshadowed the SSR in
general and the DDR in particular. The US allied Northern Alliance took
advantage of the situation by manipulating the DDR program and facilitating their
own adjustment within the security sector.
“With the positions of minister of defence, minister of the interior, and the
director of the National Directorate of Security initially occupied by
Shura-i Nazar42 militia members, many Afghans grew to mistrust SSR, as
it became increasingly politicized along communal lines.”43
40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Shura-i Nazar– consisting of the Tajik- Panjshiri militias played the dominant role in the military
leadership of the Mujahedeen government. 43 Ibid, p 9
50
Hartzell concludes by offering two major recommendations including A) the DDR
program should be an integral part of a peace settlement; it should be considered
as a political process where the main stakeholders go through detailed negotiations
before implementation of the program. And B) The presence of outside
peacekeeping forces is necessary to oversee such process.
The police reform provides a good example of compartmentalization and lack of
coordination among the international community in terms of SSR in Afghanistan.
Firstlly, the simultaneity of the SSR programs such as DDR, with other state-
building processes- such as holding the first ever Afghan Presidential elections,
imposed its own challenges on the reform process. As the DDR program was going
on “the Ministry of Interior (MoI) registered militia forces, were kept off limits”
as preserved forces to be used in facilitating the 2004 Presidential elections.44 On
the hand, the leading reform partner i.e. Germany, never carried out its task while
replacing partners i.e. the EUPOL and the US, lacked proper planning and
coordination. In his assessment of the EUPOL role in the Afghan police reform,
Qayoom Suroush suggests that the EUPOL replaced Germany as leading
organization to offer a more comprehensive police reform, but in practice the
EUPOL mandate lacked cohesiveness.45
“The initial EUPOL mandate in June 2007 had no reference to some of
what became the mission flagship. The promotion of policewomen, fighting
44 Barbara J. Stapleton, Disarming the Militias, DDR and DIAG and Implementations for Peace,
AAN, April, 2013. P 7.
45 Qayoom Suroush, Assessing EUPOL Impact on Afghan Police Reform (2007-2016), AREU,
2018
51
corruption or countering narcotics were not mentioned a single time in the
initial EUPOL mandate.”46
The EUPOL offered only short-term trainings and advisory missions while not
involving local officials in planning and implementation of such programs.47
Furthermore, the US police program- the largest police program, which was rather
a military oriented program, overwhelmed the Afghan National Police (ANP). In
his article entitled “Afghanistan’s Police, The Weak Link in Security Sector
Reform” Robert M. Perito argues that “putting soldiers in charge of police training
has led to militarization of the ANP and its use as a counterinsurgency force.”48
A wholesome SSR requires that the police act alongside courts and prisons to
protect civilians through community relationships, but the US police program
treated the Afghan police forces as “little soldiers”.49
As Gossman suggests the post-2001 fight against the Taliban, derailed
comprehensive institutional reforms. However, less attention is paid to the fact that
with the continued military campaign in post-2001 Afghanistan, the DDR and the
SSR processes were technically impossible. A successful SSR – and for that matter
DDR, require all conflicting parties to agree upon the terms of a comprehensive
agreement on the implementation of reforms. In case of post- 2001 Afghanistan,
those armed forces who were subject to the DDR and the SSR processes were the
same forces who helped Americans in toppling the Taliban. In other words, the
US i.e. the victor, conducted the DDR upon its own allies. The continued US -led
46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Robert M. Perito, Afghanistan’s Police, The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform, USIP,
2009 49 Ibid.
52
fight against terrorism and -as a result, the military component of SSR in
Afghanistan, overwhelmed the international community’s SSR efforts in general.
3.1.4. Reintegration, Rebuilding and Sustainable Peace Nexus
The international vision for post-2001 reintegration in Afghanistan supposed to
link reintegration to a wider peace and state-building discourse. To that end at the
2002 Petersburg conference i.e. “Rebuilding Afghanistan: Peace and Stability”,
the international community – including Germany, the EU and the UN and
Afghanistan, signed a decree to build the Afghan National Armey (ANA) and set
the terms for DDR. However, while ambitious in its stated goals, the DDR
program did not include a community-based “recovery strategy” for war-torn
Afghanistan.50 In his report on the Afghan DDR program, Peter Dahl Thruelsen
suggests while community participation was appreciated in Disarmament and
Demobilization phases of the DDR program- due to regionalized structure of the
program, the program structure was not supportive of a community-based
reintegration. Acknowledging locals lack of capacity at early stages, he argues that
a community-based reintegration process could have contributed in the overall
peace-building process.
“The programme structure has not created the possibility of community
participation in the reintegration phase because of it not being a weapons-
for-development-programme, but rather designed to deal with fixed
50Peter Dahl Thruelsen, From Soldier to Civilian: Disarmament, Demobilization Reintegration
in Afghanistan, DIIS, 2006, https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-
library/publications/publication.html/20984
53
military units. […] there were several advantages in doing reintegration
with the unit structures (such as collective disarmament), but as far as the
connection to the overall peace-building process the reintegration phase
could have attained greater success if another approach had been
adopted”.51
The author also criticizes the politicized structure of the DDR program in
Afghanistan, its unrealistic “targets and timeframes for program implementation”
and its non-effective public communication.52 Thruelsen assets that in order to
engage with the wider peace-building process, post-conflict reintegration
programs should take place through civilian-military expert cooperation.53
In such context, Program Tahkim-e Solh (PTS) was initiated (2005-2011) to
reconcile with Taliban rank and file fighters. According to SIGAR several factors
contributed in undermining the program, including lack of proper monitoring, the
US treatment of the program as a counter-insurgency tool, and corruption of the
local implementer.54 By the end of 2010, the Afghan Peace and Reintegration
Program (APRP), was conducted by the government to facilitate reintegration of
rank and file Taliban fighters as well as to pave the way for political dialogue with
the high-profile Taliban leaders. However, as Derksen suggests while the Afghan
government saw the program as a peace-building mechanism and reintegration
vehicle, its international partner i.e. the International Security Assistance Force
51 Ibid. p 42. 52 Ibid. p 43. 53 Ibid. 48 54 Ibid. p 30-32
54
(ISAF), considered it as part of its counter-insurgency strategy.55 On paper through
the incorporation of the lessons learnt from previous efforts i.e. the DDR, the
DIAG and PTS, APRP was set to utilize local institutions and capabilities in
management of peaceful reintegration. However, in reality it remained susceptible
to deep mistrust between the local and the international actors on the one hand,
and the insurgency and the program initiators on the other.56
“Divisions between and within the international community and the
Afghan government over the sequencing of reintegration and
reconciliation have hung over the program, but many mid-level
commanders are not interested in reintegration unless there are visible
negotiations with their leaders.”57
Inability to provide adequate security for the ex-combatants and disregard toward
grievance resolution considerably limited the achievements of the program.58
Derksen provides three recommendations for improvement of future reintegration
programs including: a) Link reintegration with reconciliation, b) Focus on quality,
not on speed. And c) Support local processes.59
55 Deedee Derksen, Peace from the Bottom Up? The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration
Program, PRIO, 2011, https://www.prio.org/Publications/Publication/?x=7308 56 Ibid. p 24. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. p 21 59 Ibid. p 24-25
55
SECTION TWO
MILITARY INTEGRATION
56
SECTION TWO: MILITARY INTEGRATION
Chapter 4.2. Military Integration – How to Integrate Taliban Fighters and
Commanders within the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
(ANDSF)?
a. Concept
Military integration of former combatants refers to the process of re-joining,
professionalization and training of former combatants to join and serve a
reconstituted or an existing professional military organization. The concepts of
demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants is as old as the war itself.
Within the Afghan context, we have had at least three regime changes with unique
set of disarmament rules but less of integration of the combatants. First, the fall of
the last communist government in Kabul and integration of its forces within the
Mujahedin armed forces. Second, the fall of the Mujahedin government and forced
disarmament and marginal integration of those forces with the Taliban’s Islamic
Emirate forces; and finally the fall of the Taliban regime and the combined
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of Mujahedin and communist
forces within the new Afghan National Defence and Security Forces.
Each of these episodes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of rival
groups (armed forces and militias) had their own peculiar characteristics often
times undermining basic principle of DDR as outlined in the UN-DPKO
handbooks and guidelines. Many of them were simply forced disarmament
performed under torture. The DDR episode of 2004 was altogether different and
was carried with a clearly laid out program albeit with marginal success given the
constraints of the time.
57
How to Integrate Taliban Fighters and Commanders into the Afghan National
Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF)? – An Afghan Perspective
b. What Do We Mean?
The US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction defines
“reintegration” as “the long-term process of an ex-combatant gaining acceptance
from his or her community and finding a sustainable livelihood.” This definition
does not distinguish between military and civilian integrating and is not really
contextualized for Afghanistan. In case of Afghanistan, it seems that the main
challenge of reintegration of ex-combatants in their community is rather about
finding a sustainable livelihood. Because of historical, cultural and socio-
economic reasons, Afghanistan is awash with weapons. Many times the ex-
combatants are not really disarmed and integrated into military and civilian lives
but rather rearmed (not yet activated) either as an individual fighter or as a part of
a larger group.
On the other hand, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Practice
Note on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants
defined reintegration as “the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian
status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially
a social and economic process with an open timeframe primarily taking place in
communities at the local level.” This definition puts a lot of emphasis on civilian
aspects of reintegration; essentially, terming the reintegration process of ex-
combatants as socio-economic process, which requires long-term planning.
58
c. Approaches to Military Integration
Participants of key informant interviews and focus groups advocated two
approaches for any potential reintegration efforts in the case of the Taliban:
i. Unit based Field Integration (UFI)
Unit-based field integration is essentially network and group based integration of
Taliban field commanders into the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces
(ANDSF) keeping their chain of command intact but merged with the Tashkeel
(structure) of one of the geographical corps and/or zonal police commands. This
can be done by identifying Taliban group commanders (mid to senior level) in
various geographical zones of Afghanistan and integrating them through a two
phased process: a. wholesome integration of units within the geographical army
corps and/or zonal police command, and using them in the interim to provide
security in areas under their control but under the chain of command of a
professional officer. b. chart out a process of training and professionalization for
the integrated units in a specified timeline.
ii. Individual Based Professional Integration (IBPI)
In this mechanism, the Taliban leadership will provide lists of their fighters and
commanders along with their equipment and expertise to the political and military
leadership of the Afghan Government and its international allies. The Afghan
Government and armed forces will undertake a verification and vetting process of
those lists and will integrate the Taliban fighters and commanders within the
Afghan armed forces through a three-phased approach: a. vetting and military
needs assessment b. training and professionalization. c. deployment to units and
monitoring.
59
d. Process of Military Integration in the Afghan Context – Step by Step
Based on our extensive provincial consultations with both former integrated
combatants as well as officials’ in-charge of previous reintegration programs in
Afghanistan, the bellow chart highlights six consecutive steps for the process of
any potential integration of Taliban fighters and commanders into military life:
Figure1. Process for Military Integration
This six-step process for military integration ranges from the initial listing and
identification of combatants and commanders all the way to post deployment
monitoring and counselling for the integrated ex-combatants.
Step 1: Identification and Listing of Fighters and Commanders
Step 2: Assessment of Capabilities and Talents
Step 3: Referral to Military Training Centers and Schools
Step 4: Professionalization
Step 5: Deployment to Unites
Step 6: Post Deployment Monitoring and Counseling
60
Chapter 5.2. The Afghan Experience –Military Integration in Post 9/11
Afghanistan
DDR and DIAG Experiences
The international sponsored DDR program (2003-2005) was conducted in
Afghanistan alongside the continued US-campaign against terror. In such
circumstances, certain groups of combatants, under the Afghan Militia Forces,
participated in the program, while other groups such as the Taliban and Hezb-e
Islami alongside Al-Qaida were deemed irreconcilable and subject of military hunt
down. Japan, supervised the program as the leading reform partner, while the
Afghan Transitional Administration was put in charge of implementation of the
program. On the surface, the question of local ownership, at least on operational
level, was addressed. However, most participants of the DDR program consulted
and interviewed in this research, hold critical views toward the DDR, though they
disliked the program for different reasons.
A considerable group of participants, especially participants across Kabul military
FGDs with professional background in military sector, describe the DDR as
destructive; they say that through DDR, the existing security infrastructure was
dismantled without being replaced with something better. The inherited weaponry
of the Afghan security sector was collected and destroyed, instead of putting it in
use of the new government. On the other hand, the DDR lead to sidelining of many
professional and educated officers.
61
“The DIAG and DDR processes were conducted to destroy the 100-year-
old Afghan army. We had hundreds of Tanks and other types of heavy
weaponry; they destroyed it all in the name of DIAG and DDR.”60
“Instead of destroying our weapons, the UN and NATO should have
collected and restored all the functional and dysfunctional weapons that
we inherited form Najeebullah’s government.61 They promised that we
would be equipped with new American weaponry according to the NATO
system. Through such empty promises, they destroyed our military
equipment. The recruitment process for the new national army was not
merit-based either. A lot of professional officers were left outside the
system”.62
Participants across local governance and civil society FGDs, especially in Herat
and Mazar-e Sharif, also agree with the above criticisms. This is despite the fact
that the DIAG program, (2006-2011), conducted as reinforcement of the legal
authority of the Afghan government.
“Those tanks we had, we paid for them from the budget of Afghanistan; we
bought them by the blood of our martyrs. They destroyed the Afghan army.
If we were in possession of that army, neither Pakistan nor Iran would dare
to confront us. All the professional and educated officers were suspended
and our weaponry were destroyed. The weapons provided by the US do not
work”.63
60 Military FGD male participant, retired General, Kabul 61 Dr Najeebullah led the last leftist government in Afghanistan before the Mujahedeen took over. 62 Military FGD male participant, retired Brig. General, Kabul 63 Local Governance FGD male participant, local elder, Herat
62
Beside the above criticisms, participants across all military, civil society and local
governance FGDs, highlighted that the DDR in Afghanistan suffered from major
operational shortcomings and mismanagement including: a) most of the collected
weapons were old and broken weapons, b) heavy weapons were collected, but light
arms remained in circulation, c) the program lacked nationwide implementation,
d) the program lacked long-term recovery plan; it was rather focused on short-term
compensation, e) the reintegration processes within the newly established security
sector lacked transparency; bribe taking and lobbying were common practices, f)
only a small portion of disarmed individuals were integrated into the security
sector, g) the program was overshadowed by power struggle and factionalism
among local stakeholders , h) security grantees were not provided to the program
participants, and i) the persistent dependency of local leaders and powerbrokers
on their patrons made the program prone to external manipulation.
Considering all these shortcomings, one may conclude that the program, largely,
lacked local ownership. Local ownership of the program cannot be reduced to
official division of labour between international sponsors and local implementers.
Local ownership is rather a by-product of proper planning and coordinated action.
In this perspective, all actors, including leaders of the armed factions, the Afghan
Transitional Administration and the international community, contributed in
producing a sense of mistrust among the program participants – especially the rank
and file combatants. Former combatants believe that after DDR their respective
organizations left them alone.
“I participated in DDR and personally delivered some 70 tanks and some
3000 trucks of ammunition to the government in the west zone. Both our
Mujahedin and officers took part in the program. They were paid some
63
money and left alone afterwards. For example, as a squad commander I
myself, to this day, do not know whether the government has any plan for
me or not”.64
“The DDR and DIAG programs were applied as tools not as goal. Political
parties did not support their disarmed members. For example, Jamiat65
has a luxurious office in Herat, but it has not been responsive towards its
members who underwent the DDR. I know some professional officers who
currently work on the street”.66
Although the leadership of the armed factions would greatly support their inner-
circle and loyal members, rank and file participants were largely disenfranchised.
From this perspective, the experience of reintegration through DDR and DIAG
programs was rather different to different people; while the leaders of the armed
factions, through their inclusion in the leadership of government institutions, were
fully compensated, rank and file participants of the DDR and DIAG were
marginalized in the process. Key Informant, Abdulwahid Wahid, the political
representative of the Islamic Revolution Movement, suggests that the DDR
program failed to bring the ordinary people into the picture. “Except for a few
influential figures and ministers, the people were not part of the process”.67
The international community’s insistence on total renewing of the security sector,
to a varying extent, provoked doubt and suspicion among the combatants. As
partners of international war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, they considered
64 Military FGD male participant, DDR participant, former squad commander, Herat 65 Jamiat-e Islami was/is among the prominent Jihadi parties. 66 Military FGD male participant, cultural counsellor to DDR and DIAG programs, Herat 67 Interview with Abdulwahid Wahid, the political representative of the Islamic Revolution
Movement, Kabul
64
themselves entitled to be treated respectfully. The DDR program challenged their
expectations dramatically.
“One of the mistakes of the DDR was to disarm us. We were allies [with
the Americans]; we were not the opposition force. Why did you collect our
weaponry? Why not submitting the collected weapons to the former army
[former government]? After the DDR we lived a miserable life”.68
“Those local commanders who underwent DDR, during the Jihad area,
fought for the freedom of their country and for the security of their
homeland. Instead of getting integrated into the army and police forces,
they were disarmed. When the DDR started, I felt very disappointed. Many
participants of the DDR program later on were targeted and got killed”.69
The post-2001 DDR program has been a unilateral program. In contrast to a
conventional DDR scheme, where DDR as a conflict resolution measure provides
middle ground for belligerent parties to put down their arms and end hostilities,
DDR in Afghanistan lacked he opposition front i.e. the Taliban. It was a unilateral
action in the sense that the US as the victor applied the process upon its own allies.
According to the participants, the DDR program in two ways facilitated the re-
emergence of the Taliban. On the one hand, it weakened the main body of anti-
Taliban armed forces, and on the other hand, the program’s lack of long-term
recovery plan, made the disarmed ex-combatants prone to recruitment of illegal
armed groups and criminal gangs.
68 Military FGD male participant, DDR participant, retired major, Mazar-e Sharif 69 Military FGD male participant, DDR participant, retired military officer, Qandahar
65
“After the DDR, some people got integrated in the system. Others were
paid for a short period. Afterwards they faced unemployment. Since there
was no factory around and no job opportunities available, they joined the
opposition forces or turned to criminal activities. Some others migrated to
the neighbouring countries and elsewhere. If job opportunities are
available nobody turn to criminal activities”.70
The attitude of the armed factions towards DDR processes was greatly influenced
by the treatment they received from the international community. While they were
considered as allies in the war against terrorism, they gone through a unilateral
DDR process, with the US led coalition utilizing their fighting machinery and
mobilizing power on an ad hoc basis. This resulted in giving the militia leaders
extensive leverage over state-building processes while at the same time making
them controllable. In other word, the Bonn agreement and the following DDR
program delegitimized their previous organizing body – i.e. the Mujahedin
government, while reinforcing their mobilizing power across factional lines. Key
informant, Mawlawi Jalaluddin Shinwari, former Taliban Attorney General,
suggests that the Jihadi armed factions subject to DDR acted upon their political
interest while calculating the benefits of a trade-off in between.
“The Jihadi political parties, who fought the Soviets, disliked the DDR,
because they saw their survival and prosperity in holding arms. They
believed that their weapons would bring them social and political leverage
70 Military FGD male participant, DDR participant, retired Jihadi lieutenant colonel, Mazar-e
Sharif
66
including giving them the upper hand in the elections process. People
obeyed them out of fear”.71
In general, the DDR program was successful in collecting the heavy weaponry,
but it did not dismantle the militias’ war machinery and its patron-client political
economy. The US- Afghan militia alliance continued to exist for years to come in
various forms and formats, including through private security companies and
semi-official local security forces – such as local police and army and local
resistance forces.72 Such approach toward reintegration left little space for
consideration of DDR- DIAG programs in the context of a wholesome security
sector reform (SSR). The 20% quota for military integration of ex-combatants into
the new national police and army, created a tens competitive environment in which
only well-connected individuals would win.
“The people of Shibar district [of Bamyan], voluntarily gave up their arms.
They were happy to pick up pens instead of holding guns. Our people never
returned to militancy. However, they never received proper reward for
their cooperation with the government. It was not a transparent process. It
was manipulated by ethnic politics. Those who lacked relationships did not
manage to benefit from the process”.73
In addition, the implementation of DDR and DIAG programs across the country
lacked consistency and inclusiveness. In some areas such as Hazarajat, the Jihadi
militias and illegal armed groups were completely disarmed, demobilized and
71 Interview with Mawlawi Jalaluddin Shinwari, fromer Taliban Attorney General, Kabul 72 Ibid. 73 Military FGD male participant, DDR participant, chair of Shibar development council, Mazar-
e Sharif
67
dismantled while in other areas, to different extent, weapons were kept hidden or
remained untouched.
“The DDR was not a nationwide program; the program was implemented
through a biased policy. In Hazaristan [Hazarajat], according to
instruction of their leaders, people gave up their arms. The Mujahedin
were completely disarmed. But in other places, the DDR was not
implemented as such”.74
Two major reasons contributed in lack of inclusiveness and consistency in
implementation of the above programs. On the one hand, the Taliban and Hezb-e
Islami were excluded from the process (they and their sympathizers were
practically at war with the government and the international forces). On the other
hand, leaders of different armed factions held different levels of influence and
power in the Afghan government; accordingly, their political leverage and
calculation of the trade-off in such processes differed; leading to different levels
of compliance and cooperation.
Not surprisingly, civilian participants across civil society and local governance
FGDs evaluate the DDR–DIAG programs mostly through the assessment of the
security situation and contribution of such programs in the overall development in
the country. Youth participants in particular, point out that the continued terror and
violence across the country is a clear indicator that the DDR and DIAG programs
were not successful. The fact that guns are widely used in criminal activities show
that they are in circulation and easily available in the market.75 One civil society
74 Military FGD male participant, former Jihadi commander, Bamyan 75 Civil Society FGD male participant, civil society activist, Kabul
68
FGD participant in Mazar-e Sharif asserts that instead of disarming people, it
would be better to change the mind-set of the gun holder. The rule of law may
significantly change people’s mind-set.
“I think possession of a gun by itself is not problematic; the idea behind
the use of gun is rather problematic. Instead of putting so much effort and
energy to collect people’s weaponry, it would be better to deal with the
root causes of the conflict. If across each district at least one dispute was
resolved through the judicial system, no one dared to [illegally] use
weapons”.76
In short, reintegration programs – such as DDR and DIAG, may bear fruit only if
applied through an integrated approach with taking into consideration of
contextual bearings. Our findings show that immediate compensation without
long-term recovery plan will not help reintegration programs. Many DDR and
DIAG participants received immediate compensation, but due to lack of
monitoring and follow-up plans, they ended up disenfranchised. Immediate
disenfranchisement would not lead to the return of ex-combatants to militancy
either, if proper monitoring and follow-up plans are in place. This is especially
true in Afghanistan where the culture of self-governance among various
communities is strong. Policies that encourage dependency, at any level, will not
improve the situation.
76 Civil Society FGD male participant, peace activist, Mazar-e Sharif
69
b. Assessment of the Program Tahkim-e Solh and Afghanistan Peace and
Reintegration Program
Reintegration efforts targeting the Taliban only started after the government of
Afghanistan faced a growing Taliban insurgency. In 2005, with the aim of
engaging with the Taliban rank and file, Program Tahkim-e Sulh (PTS), or the
Strengthening Peace Program was initiated. Subsequently, incorporating the
structures and the lessons learned from previous initiatives, Afghanistan Peace and
Reintegration Program (APRP), was introduced. Both of the programs received
funding and support from the international community while utilizing certain local
institutions and initiatives- such as elder mediation and Afghan laws, as their tools.
Former Mujahedin presidents namely Sibghatullah Mojaddadi and Burhanuddin
Rabbani, headed the above programs respectively.
PTS protocols suggested that insurgents could re-join the society on the conditions
of renouncing violence, respecting the country’s constitution and obeying the
Afghan laws.77 By the end of program, PTS mediated reconciliation with some
8,700 combatants as well as facilitating the release of another 721 detainees from
US facilities.78 The program was mainly criticized for its lack of transparency, lack
of monitoring and limited outreach.79
APRP was designed to engage with both rank and file as well as the Taliban
leadership in a nationwide scale. Several international organizations including
UNDP and ISAF cooperated with the program. By the end of the program in 2016,
officials claimed to have reintegrated some 11,000 combatants. However, due to
77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid.
70
“the absence of a political settlement, the continuing war, and problem with
program design, implementation, and monitoring” the donors’ decided to abruptly
stop funding the program.80
Largely, participants’ assessments of the above-mentioned programs are
influenced by the recent US-Taliban peace deal and the release of Taliban
prisoners from government jails. Most participants across all constituencies view
the post-2001 peace and reintegration initiatives toward the Taliban as flawed and
ineffective. A repeated remark in this regard across all military, civil society, local
governance FGDs as well as Key Informant interviews is that neither the Afghan
government nor the Taliban possess the necessary authority to make peace. The
key to peace is in the hands of foreign powers.
“People of this country are not free. When someone lacks freedom, he
cannot make decisions. Nobody including the president and the leader of
Taliban have authority. Currently more than 50 countries are involved in
Afghanistan affairs. They use us one way or another, in the name of
women’s rights, ethnicity etc. On the other hand, the Taliban too do not
trust each other”.81
“Out of three sources of war, including finance, ideology and territory, we
only got the territory. Others manage the other two sources of war. Local
players are weak; especially they lack proper understanding of the root
causes of the conflict”.82
80 Ibid. 81 Local governance FGD male participant, community elder, Herat 82 Civil society FGD male participant, civil society activist, Mazar-e Sharif
71
The Key Informant, Fatima Kohistani, Member of Parliament from Ghor province
says since the people of Afghanistan are dependent on foreign funding, various
countries use their leverage over the people and manipulate them. She suggests
that widespread corruption across government institutions, drug trafficking and
propaganda regarding the presence of foreign troops, greatly contributed in failure
of the previous peace and reintegration programs.83
In the meantime, the Taliban’s unwillingness to engage with the government’s
peace and reintegration programs is understood by participants across various
FGDs, as the main obstacle ahead of reconciliation efforts. Some participants
including Key Informant, Asadullah Saadati, member of Islamic Unity Party and
the second deputy of Dr Abdullah Abdullah, suggestes that the main reason behind
the failure of the PTS and APRP was that program administrators sought Taliban
surrender not Taliban reintegration.
“The Taliban considered their engagement with such programs as
surrender. Unlike other Mujahedin factions who, as part of the
government, willingly participated in DDR and DIAG programs, the
Taliban did not like to turn in their weaponry through government peace
programs”.84
A key Informant suggests instead of “reintegration” which requires certain levels
of surrendering, Afghan stakeholders , including the government and the Taliban,
should prioritize “reconciliation.”85 The Afghan government has built all the
83 Interview with Fatima Kohistani, Member of Parliament from Ghor province, Kabul 84 Interview with Asadullah Saadati, member of Islamic Unity Party and the second deputy of Dr
Abdullah Abdullah, Kabul 85 Ibid.
72
necessary institutions and mechanisms for peace making, but it lacks a genuine
peace plan because it lacks flexibility.
“Today, Khalilzad works as the peace mediator. This shows that they [the
Americans] had a proper peace plan, but we did not. We even created a
peace ministry, but still we lack a peace plan. During the past four
decades, we did not come across a peace agreement, because we do not
show flexibility towards each other. We need to focus on reconciliation and
mutual compromise rather than reintegration”.
The 2019 SIGAR report on assessment of post-2001 reintegration programs
highlights that the international community, specifically the US administration,
viewed both the programs as “counter-insurgency” tools. According to SIGAR,
this approach toward PST and APRP, led to “militarization of reintegration
efforts”, undermining the Afghan government’s idea of running reconciliation and
reintegration in parallel.86
Some of the key Informants say that the international community and the Afghan
government approached the Taliban too late. They assert that in early days of the
new government, after the fall of the Taliban, major Taliban figures sought
reintegration, but they were refused. They emphasize that at the time, many
Taliban members were preparing to negotiate the terms of their surrender.
“President Karzai and some elements of the Taliban appreciated a peace
process, but the US did not. Most Taliban members at the time tried to
avoid war and return to their homes. However, the rulers at the time hunted
them down anyways. They were put at jails and prosecuted. They were
86 Ibid. p 29-39
73
insulted. As a result they turned to the enemy for help and started to resist
the government.”87
“At the time, I worked as security deputy of the interior ministry. On
several occasions, we held meetings with the same Mullah Baradar -who
is now representing the Taliban in the peace talks, and figures like
Qayyoom Zakir- a prominent Taliban commander, and Mawlawi
Motawakkil. The idea was to integrate them within the system. However,
suddenly they became disinterested. I found out that they were threatened.
As government we did not act responsibility”.
Lack of adequate security guarantees for both program participants and program
staff and administrators, posed a serious challenge to both PST and APRP. During
the life span of these programs hundreds of program participants and dozens of
program staff including the chair of the High Peace Council, Burhanuddin Rabbani
were killed without any predators being brought to justice.88This by itself caused
widespread mistrust across various constituencies.89 Moreover, the US sponsored
Local Police Force, which was considered a secure avenue for reintegration of ex-
combatants proved not be reliable; as the same institution got involved in
“corruption, criminality and human rights abuses”.90
Several participants- across different constituencies refer to lack of national unity
and social cohesion as the main reason why peace and reintegration efforts have
87 Ibid. Interview with Abdulwahid Wahid. 88 Ibid. 89 Interview with Amin Mohammad Ramin, head of regional cooperation at the ministry of
foreign affairs, former High Peace Council staff, Kabul 90 Ibid.
74
not succeeded yet. Division of people across factional, religious and ethnic lines
are considered a major obstacle ahead of peace and reconciliation.
“If Pashtuns do not appreciate Tajiks and Hazaras; if Hazaras do not
appreciate Tajiks and Uzbeks, we won’t reach peace at all. Instead of
hearing each other out, we are fighting each other in the name of Sunni
and Shia, Hazara and Uzbek. Regional countries made use of this
situation. That’s why we are confused and ask who holds the key to
peace.”91
Several local governance FGD participants in Herat assert that only mafia groups
and criminals benefited from the peace and reintegration programs. “No
ideological Taliban were participated in such programs”.92 Others – including
several civil society FGD participants in Qandahar, say that peace and
reintegration efforts failed because only ordinary people seek peace; those in
power – including elements in the Taliban and elements in the government, do not
seek peace, because according to them peace will not repay.93
The Key Informant, Amin Mohammad Ramin, head of regional cooperation at the
ministry of foreign affairs and former High Peace Council staff, emphasizes that
while APRP looked good on paper, the program administrators lacked authority.
They acted upon the erroneous assumption that without a political agreement in
place, Taliban combatants and commanders would fall for incentive packages. The
91 Ibid. 92 Local governance FGD male participant, community elder, Herat 93 Military FGD male participant, community elder, Qandahar
75
programs also suffered from lack of coordination and cooperation among partner
organizations.
“We faced a serious challenge in terms of monitoring and coordination of
developmental projects across provinces. Our provincial committees had
to spend a lot of time and energy to monitor those projects and in some
occasion to design such projects”.94
APRP, s economic incentives and developmental projects did not match the end
goal of the program i.e. helping the combatants to reintegrate within the system.
Important elements such as “grievance resolution, political amnesty, and local
security guarantees” were disregarded.95 A repeated critical argumentation across
all FGDs- including military, civil society and local governance FGDs, is that the
above-mentioned programs were rather short-term projects not long-term
processes. They were conducted in the name of people of Afghanistan, while only
benefiting the elites.
“If we care about peace, then why making parallel institutions? We created
the high peace council, then the reconciliation council and then we created
the ministry of peace. This shows that they were all after salaries. If we
have a ministry of peace in place, then it should remain a single body, why
making a parallel institution such as peace council?”96
One civil society FGD participant in Mazar-e Sharif cited inadequate public
communication as the program’s major shortcoming.
94 Ibid. 95 Ibid. 96 Local governance FGD male participant, community elder, Herat
76
“If you go to countryside, many people do not understand what peace
means. Mosques could be used as platform for raising people’s awareness
about peace. Let us ask the ministry of Ministry of Hajj and Religious
Affairs, how many mosques engage in such activities? I say that not even
a single mosque cares about such thing. In Herat city, out of 700 mosques,
only 200 of them are monitored by the government”.97
The above assessment of the two pervious peace and reintegration programs,
including PTS and APRP, indicates that the program administrators put so much
money and energy on short-term incentives while ignoring long-term strategic
considerations such as grievance resolution, strategic communication, and fighting
corruption inside government institutions. Both PTS and APRP operated in the
absence of a political agreement while suffering from lack of coordination and
cooperation among implementing partiers as well as militarization of their
strategic environment by the international forces. The fact that the Taliban as a
whole never reconsidered their worldview and given that, the Taliban agreed to
talk to the Afghan government only after they reached a peace agreement with the
US government, indicate that the above programs lacked certain qualities such as
a recognized status and authority inside the Afghan government and accountability
before the people.
“Unfortunately, the high peace council was not accountable before the
people. In the absence of accountability, one cannot hope for effectiveness
of such programs. When we, as civil society, criticized their ineffectiveness,
they would tell us that we are funded by UNDP and only report to them;
97 Civil society FGD female participant, youth and women activist, Herat
77
nobody including you and the government cannot question our
performance”.98
Several participants suggest that governmental peace and reintegration programs
could have contributed to peace and reconciliation if the government held the
upper hand and talked to Taliban from a position of strength. Participants,
especially civil society FGD participants in Bamyan, argue that governmental
peace and reintegration programs only led to strengthening of the Taliban,
exemplified by the release of thousands of Taliban prisoners through the US-
Taliban peace agreement.
98 Civil society FGD male participant, civil society activist, Bamyan
78
Chapter 6.2. Bamyan a Tell-Tale Story of Success: How DDR and DIAG
Succeeded in Bamyan Province?
a. DDR and DIAG Experiences
Bamyan province exemplifies an exceptional case among the provinces studied in
this research. Bamyani participants expressed satisfaction with their security,
albeit at varying levels, thanks to a successful implementation of the DDR and
DIAG programs in the province. Various factors contributed to the success story
of Bamyan. Located in mountainous Hazarajat, Bamyan has been a stronghold to
the Hazara Jihadi armed faction i.e. Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan or
Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan. Participants from across military FGDs, all of
them affiliated with the Islamic Unity Party unanimously said that they were
disarmed and demobilized in agreement with the instruction of the party
leadership. Given that the Bonn agreement provided political legitimacy to the
mainstream Jihadi armed factions, 99the leadership and the armed affiliates of the
party, both were convinced that the DDR program is going to facilitate and
accelerate their integration with the new system. Retired Brig. Gen, Mohammad
Ivaz Isar who at the time worked as logistic manager of the 9th corps- based in
Bamyan, recalls the DDR as a collective voluntary process:
“The 9th corps was a factional corps belonging to Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami
under the leadership of Mohammad Karim Khalili. After the Bonn
agreement once the DDR program initiated, according to the instruction
99 At the time, Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami of Afghanistan was part of the anti-Taliban alliance known
as “northern alliance” who allied with the US forces in deafening the Taliban.
79
of the party leadership the whole corps was disarmed and demobilized. We
were promised that we would get integrated within the system.”100
In other words, the militias of Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami in Bamyan along their
leadership considered themselves as stakeholders of the international state
building efforts in Afghanistan. No participants in military FGDs talked about
fragmentation in their party leadership regarding the DDR program. Furthermore,
no other Hazara or Shia parties disagreed with the DDR program. The functional
role of Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami is explained by the fact that at the time, it has been
the most powerful Hazara Jihadi party across Hazarajat and it still holds substantial
political power in the area especially in Bamyan. In fact, in 1989 Hezb-e Wahdat-
e Islami was founded in Bamyan as a uniting Hazara – Shia organization bringing
nine separate, mostly antagonistic Hazara armed factions under one roof. ‘Shia’
Islamism and Hazara ‘minority rights’ shaped the political identity of the party and
the Bonn agreement promised to guarantee both.101 DDR was considered a
facilitating process for Hazaras and Shiite of Afghanistan in transition from a state
of war and injustice to a process of peace and justice-seeking.
“Hazara people and their leaders in general- among Hazaras there are
several parties, Jihadi parties, but all Jihadi parties focused on peace; they
believed in the Bonn agreement. When the international community
decided to put an end to the suppressive regime of the Taliban, we decided
to support the system and create a central authority, a constitutional
100 In-depth interview with Retired Brig. Gen, Mohamad Ivaz Isar, 28 Sonbola, Bamyan 101 Although at the time of the Bonn agreement, the current constitution – which recognizes the
judicial authority of the Shia jurisdiction, was not in place, the agenda of the Bonn conference,
which included representatives from various political and national groups, by itself, was promising
to the Hazara people.
80
government. Most Hazaras are peaceful people. They are after national
unity. Hazaras experienced violence with their blood and skin. A man, who
understands someone’s pain, never wants to inflict harm upon others.
These are the reasons we favoured a fair central constitutional
government”.102
However, not all Bamyani ex-combatants are happy about integration and
reintegration processes. Although some of them, including Brig. Gen. Isar, were
happily integrated with the system and its security apparatus, widespread
dissatisfaction among both ex-Jihadi affiliates and professional military officers
tarnished the DDR experience in Bamyan. Two main reasons were referred to as
indicators of the weakness and partial failure of the program. On the one hand, the
promises made to the DDR participants were not fulfilled, and on the other hand,
the implementation of the DDR program was not a nation-wide inclusive process.
The Taliban, among others, was not included in the program.
“In central provinces [such as Bamyan], the DDR and DIAG were
implemented properly; but promises made to the DDR participants were
not met; for example, developmental programs were not implemented in
this region”. 103
“DDR was implemented in central provinces; but it was not a nation-wide
process. The government collected weapons only from one or two
provinces and the rest remained untouched. That led to re-emergence of
102 Ibid. 103 Military FGD male participant, retired colonel, Bamyan
81
the Taliban. Given that the government was strong at the time, they could
have collected Taliban’s weaponry as well.”104
One ex-Jihadi commander complained that people kept their promises but the
government did not.105 Military integration proved to be problematic; only few
DDR participants managed to join the security sector.106
“Ex-combatants were interested in joining the national security forces, but
unfortunately they faced systematic discrimination. A low percentage of
them managed to join the security forces”.107
However, despite the continued grievances, Bamyani ex-combatants in general
never picked up arms again. They were detached from their ex-commanders and
successfully returned to normal life. Members of local governance and civil
society organizations in Bamyan too hail the disarmament and demobilization of
the armed factions as a positive step forward. The implementation of DDR and
DIAG programs in Bamyan paved the way for ordinary people to restart their
normal life, providing grounds for cultural freedom, entrepreneurship, education
and service delivery. By 2015, Bamyan was declared as the cultural capital of
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
“One of the positive aspects of the implementation of the DDR in central
regions [such as Bamyan] is that our youth managed to go to school and
104 Military FGD male participant, retired officer, Bamyan 105 Military FGD male participant, former Jihadi commander, Bamyan 106 Military FGD male participant, retired colonel 107 Military FGD male participant, former Jihadi commander, Bamyan
82
focus on modernization and rebuilding. Thank God today in central
regions most people are literate”.108
Reintegration component of the DDR proved to be challenging for both
ex-combatants and the civilians. While ex-combatants were challenged
with lack of employment, insecurity remained a lingering fear upon the
whole population.
“The DDR and DIAG programs had positive effects on people’s lives.
Previously, even small skirmishes would lead to a gun battle between
armed men. After the DDR, only people with registered guns would be able
to carry guns. It created a positive mind-set for people. But the government
did not manage to provide employment for reintegrated people. Those who
did not managed to be employed, joined the Taliban or created their own
armed group. The government should have supervised the process
properly, but it failed to do so”.109
“The DDR program was implemented in Bamyan properly; the only
disadvantage is that now the people of Bamyan is empty handed; we are
under threat everywhere. Roads to Bamyan are not safe at all. For
example, in Maidan Shar, in Jalriz region110 all people got weapons at
home and they threaten us constantly”.111
The above narratives and statements show that the success story of Bamyan
regarding the experience of DDR and DIAG programs has its own flaws. As
108 Civil Society FGD male participant, civil society member, Bamyan 109 Local Governance FGD female participant, Bamyan 110 Jalriz region located across the road between Maidan Warda, Kabul, and Bamyan. 111 Civil Society FGD female participant, university student, Bamyan
83
suggested by the participants across military, local governance and civil society
FGDs, only the disarmament and the demobilization parts of the DDR program in
Bamyan were implemented successfully. Inadequate monitoring of the process,
factionalism and unmet promises imposed persistent security and livelihood
challenges upon both ex-combatants and civilians across this province.
In short, a) overall homogeneity of the Bamyani constituency and the functional
role of Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami and its leadership in implementation of the DDR
program, significantly contributed to the success story of post-2001 reintegration
in Bamyan (the party leader Mohammad Karim Khalili as vice-president, also
headed the Disarmament and Reintegration Committee, designed to manage the
DIAG program). b) The success story of Bamyan is only partially true, as only the
disarmament and demobilization parts of the DDR program were implemented as
expected. And c) the success story of Bamyan’s reintegration experience at best is
an isolated case detached from its wider strategic environment.
b. The US-NATO and Government Campaign Against the Taliban
Participants across all focus group discussions, including local governance, civil
society and military FGDs, expressed their suspicion towards the US-NATO and
government military campaign against the Taliban. This suspicion covers a wide
spectrum of opinions regarding the intention as well as the operation of
internationals and their relations with local actors. While some participants think
the Taliban are recipient of US support, others suggest that the US and NATO
strategy in Afghanistan correspond with their own priorities rather than the interest
of Afghanistan. According to the participants, the military campaign against the
84
Taliban suffers from a lack of political will, corruption and a lack of coordination
and cooperation among local, regional and international actors. This paves the way
for continued external intervention, proxy wars and the subsequent failure of the
military campaign against the Taliban.
“The US and the international community play double standards; they
wanted to keep both the Taliban and the government of Afghanistan [under
control]. In early days of their campaign, they were quite successful. But
after a while they apologized from the Taliban and started to support them.
It is not that they failed to defeat the Taliban; they did not want to defeat
them. They only care about their own interest”. 112
“Firstly, the international community have not managed to convince the
regional players about the situation in Afghanistan. Secondly the dominant
corruption inside government institutions- especially security institutions,
[deteriorated the situation]. Both financial and human resources were
wasted. In security sector we lack merit-based recruitment”.113
Politicization of the security sector and factionalism are mentioned as major
challenges of the defence and security sector. Retired Brig. Gen. Isar points out
that the reform of the security sector has been susceptible to political and factional
interest and as a result, professional considerations were rather undermined.
“Politicians made use of the security forces. They manipulated the vetting
and recruitment of the security personnel and they continue to intervene in
such processes. The selection and appointment of the security cadres are
112 Military FGD male participant, former Jihadi commander, Bamyan 113 Civil Society FGD male participant, activist, Bamyan
85
not merit-based. Our security sector is marred by ethnic politics; it is
politicized. For example, the current minister of defence is not a
professional person, if it’s not political, then what it is?”114
Given the widespread dissatisfaction of the participants towards the performance
of the government and its international allies in their campaign against the Taliban,
one may conclude that the leading stakeholders of the DDR and DIAG programs
failed to link the tactical, operational and strategic levels of the security apparatus
together. While observing the policy of “ethnic balance” in building the national
security and defence forces motivated compliance among the armed factions, the
same policy was manipulated by the local actors – among others, in favour of
ethnic politics and politicization of security in the country. This suggests that a)
the fight against the Taliban and for that matter the management of the security
and defence sector suffer from lack of coordination and cooperation among
national and international actors, b) politicization of security and defence sector
led to fragmentation of the command structure and disregard for professional
criterion, and c) a lack of coordination and cooperation between local and
international actors and politicization of the security and defence sector
contributed in structural corruption.
c. The Rule of Law Instead of the Rule of Gun
Despite all the criticisms, grievances and complains, the DDR-DIAG experience
in Bamyan resulted in relative security for both ex-combatants and civilians where
the rule of gun was replaced with a relative rule of law. As suggested constitutional
114 Ibid.
86
promises of the new government – such as the recognition of the Shia
jurisprudence, recognition of freedom of speech, equality before law and
recognition of political parties, encouraged both the ex-combatants and the
civilians to cooperate with the government. They actively took part in rebuilding
of their country. Civil society activist, head of Afghan Women Network, Najeeba
Ahmadi emphasizes that the relative security in Bamyan depends on the will of
the people as well as the will of local government and their cooperation with the
security forces. In Bamyan both people and security forces reinforced a common
peaceful worldview according to the rule of law.
“In Bamyan local governance plays its role, people play their role and the
civil society plays its own role; that’s why we have relative security in
Bamyan. In other insecure provinces such as Qandahar and Jalalabad,
there exist some elements of Taliban and probably there are some level of
sympathy and support for the Taliban too. If the people do not want peace
in their own society, the security sector by itself cannot do anything.”115
Participants in Bamyan hold a mixed view toward the effectiveness of semi-
structured security forces such as local police and army and resistance forces. They
suggest that local forces functioned when the state security apparatus failed to
protect the people.
115 Interview with the Civil Society FGD participant, head of Afghan Women Network, Najeeba
Ahmadi, Bamyan
87
“In Bamyan the number of local police and resistance forces are very low,
and they have functioned well. Since the government cannot protect the
people, these forces protect their own people”.116
“Local police and resistance forces are prominent in insecure areas where
mafia and drug dealers operate. Thank God, we do not have such problems
in Bamyan; therefore, the number of local security forces is very low and
they do not cause insecurity. In Bamyan people are partner with their
government; people are their own police”. 117
One participant at local governance FGD emphasizes that the role of police –
whether being national police or local police, is not to engage in warfare activities.
“The role of police is to supervise and protect the public order. The same is with
the local police; but when the national army fails to protect us, people have to
protect themselves”.118
d. Integration of the Taliban Within Military and Civilian Life
The compliance of the Bamyani constituency with the rule of law, their peaceful
lifestyle and their historical experience affect their attitude toward the issue of
integration of the Taliban and their families within the military and civilian life.
Participants from across all FGDs, including military, local governance and civil
society FGDs, emphasize that certain criterion such as endorsing the existing
military rules, constitutional values and human rights norms, should be considered
116 Ibid 117 Ibid 118 Local Governance FGD female participant, government employee
88
as preconditions for Taliban integration with the military and civilian life.119 As
Hazaras the Bamyani constituency in various historical periods faced suppressive
and arbitrary use of power by various parties including militant groups and
government forces, while not being able to react accordingly. The massacre of
Hazara people in Yakawlang district of Bamyan in January 2001 by Taliban
forces, colours the memory of every Hazara man, especially the Bamyani
constituency. The destruction of 1600-year-old magnificent statutes in the city of
Bamyan by the Taliban in 2001 remains unforgettable as time passes by.
Therefore, Bamyani participants believe peaceful coexistence is the backbone of
integration approach for the Taliban forces.
“After making peace with the Taliban, Taliban forces should be able to
return to their hometown and we must appreciate that. Together we need
to work for the public good, but at the end of the day it is up to each to us
to organize our life internally”.120
According to the military participants, the terms of Taliban integration with the
security sector should be clear and lawful. At the same time, they warn that the
government should deliver on its promises and provide shelter and job
opportunities for ex-Taliban members.
“When they make peace with the Taliban there must be a law for
integration. They must be provided with opportunities and within the
119 Ibid. 120 Local Governance FGD participant, anonymous, Bamyan
89
framework of law they must receive government support. They must be
treated like other peoples”.121
“Previously promises made to the retired officers – regarding their
integration with civilian governance or distribution of land, were not met.
If they treat the Taliban likewise, if they do not incorporate them into
civilian and military institutions, if they do not provide them support and
assistance, there will be no peace”.122
Participants across all FGDs suggest that in order for the Taliban to be able to get
integrated within the security sector and civilian life, their mind-set must be
changed; they have to be educated as normal citizens.123 Furthermore, they want
guarantees from the side of the Taliban and the international community that the
process go ahead accordingly. There is an emphasize that in order to mitigate
possible negative impacts of the Taliban integration with the current system, all
the stakeholders including local, regional and international actors must agree on
the details of an integration-reintegration roadmap. To that end, the government of
Afghanistan among other things must solve its border disputes.
“If the international forces do not guarantee the process, integration of the
Taliban will lead to destruction of the system in Afghanistan; we will be
pushed back toward a backward society and civil war. Their integration
shall be guaranteed by the international community while the regional and
121 Military FGD male participant, retired colonel, Bamyan 122 Military FGD male participant, retired colonel, Bamyan 123 Ibid.
90
the neighbouring countries support it; in this situation having border
dispute with neighbours would not help.”124
The insistence of the participants for lawfulness of an integration program is a
significant indicator that a whole new discourse regarding acceptable norms of
civilian life and its corresponding security apparatus is being promoted and
observed in Bamyan. This discourse categorically rejects any suppressive
ideology, institution and actor. Youth and women across civil society and local
governance now want to have their own elected representatives in the peace
process with the Taliban.125 They even doubt whether the mainstream political
parties are able to represent them in the process. Despite the fact that the
negotiating team of the government in the current peace talks with the Taliban
includes representatives from various socio- political parties- including that of
Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami, many participants across civil society and local
governance FGDs think that the negotiating team does not represent them
properly.
“The negotiating team of the government in Qatar is not inclusive; the
presence of women is insignificant. We do not have any representative
from the civil society; and there is no representative of the victims of war.
Youth do not have representative in the current peace talks; those selected
as representative of youth are affiliates of political parties and related to
powerful people”.126
124 Local Governance FGD male participant, activist, Bamyan 125 Civil Society FGD female participant, student, Bamyan 126 Civil Society FGD participant, member of civil society, Bamyan
91
In the meanwhile, participants from military FGDs question the authority of the
government in the peace process. Lack of authority, weak management, and lack
of political will are mentioned as major challenges of the current peace talks with
the Taliban and for that matter Taliban integration with the state.
“If the US wants peace, Taliban’s financial channels must be disrupted.
Only if the US and regional countries fulfil their interest in Afghanistan,
we would reach peace. Foreigners are manipulating the people of
Afghanistan. Neither the Taliban nor the government have authority; they
are dependent on foreigners”.127
“A handful of people – based on their personal interest, are manipulating
peace efforts in Afghanistan. Nobody sacrifices his personal interest in
favour of peace. There is no regard for people’s interest”.128
In short, the Bamyani constituency supports condition-based integration approach
toward the Taliban where the Taliban respect the rule of law and the post-Taliban
achievements are preserved. The local governance, civil society and security
forces in Bamyan appear to have similar concerns in this regard. To that end, the
government must make sure that it is able to deliver on its promises. Participants’
suspicion and doubtful views towards the current peace talks with the Taliban
indicate that the government failed to mobilize people through its various peace
initiatives.
127 Military FGD participant, retired colonel, Bamyan 128 Ibid.
92
e. The Way Forward: How to Supervise the Integration- Reintegration
Processes?
Due to a lack of confidence in the peace process, participants consider a major role
for international supervision of any integration program. Participants recommend
that a joint government-Taliban committee supervised by the international
community monitor the integration process.
“A joint government- Taliban committee must be created. Such committee
needs to supervise all the issues pertinent to the peace process. The UN
must supervise the wider agenda, while the joint government- Taliban
committee work at national and provincial levels”.129
The peace agreement and for that matter integration roadmap of the Taliban within
the military and civilian life must include explicit and well-defined elements
observable by the people.130 Moreover, the supervising body need to be
responsible before the people.131 Several participants across the civil society FGD
suggest that the past peace initiatives such as Tahkim-e Solh and Afghanistan
Peace and Reintegration Program have failed because of the fact that they were
poorly supervised and that the supervising body was not accountable to the people.
“We have not reached peace yet, because there has not been a proper
supervision [of the peace process]. It would be good to have a supervising
129 Military FGD participant, retired colonel police officer, Bamyan 130 Civil Society FGD female participant, member of civil society, Bamyan 131 Civil Society FGD male participant, member of civil society, Bamyan
93
committee that is responsible before the people; a committee that report to
the people.”132
Participants also suggest that the role of local councils, elders and Ulama should
not be undervalued.133 Local initiatives and institutions such as Muharram festival
proved to be a useful platform for strategic messaging across Bamyan.
“It [Muharram festival] provides opportunities to raise awareness among
the people. Mullahs can use the platform to reflect on the Quranic verses
pertinent to public issues such as women’s right or peace. The same
Mullahs who in the past held negative views towards women and their role
in society, now are playing a positive role supporting us; they even
participate in our advocacy programs.”134
A significant reference point across all focus group discussions, including local
governance, civil society and military FGDs, was that future peace and integration
programs must not ignore the existing institutions and the past experience.
Provincial head of social and economic affairs of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs,
Hawa Gol Rezaee suggests that institutional continuity should be considered as an
intrinsic part of an integration program.
“One important challenge of the security sector is that those coming to power
usually tend to change the system; for example, if a new defence minister takes
office, he will try to initiate something new. In my view, it would be better if
they prioritize the system and work on it. We do not have a proper system in
132 Civil Society FGD participant, journalist, Bamyan 133 Civil Society FGD participant, journalist, Bamyan 134 Ibid.
94
place yet, that’s why we do not see continuation in the affairs of the security
sector”.135
f. Transitional Justice; Dealing With the Past
Participants from across all FGDs, including military, local governance and civil
society FGDs, think that compassion and forgiveness play an important role in
transitioning from war toward peace. However, through different wording and
reasoning, they categorically assert that war crimes should not be bypassed.
Addressing the past atrocities is vital to achieve a lasting peace. In this process,
there must be a differentiation between personal and public grievances, between
criminals and law-abiding citizens.
“If we push for an immediate peace, it is plausible to forgive everybody
and go ahead with a general amnesty. But this does not result in
sustainable peace. In long-term I think we need to implement transitional
justice which is a universal mechanism. If we are not able to implement it
completely, at least we should distinguish between criminals and good
citizens. Of course, the Taliban are not the only criminals in town; there
are a lot of criminals inside the government as well who are immune from
prosecution”.136
Given that the judicial system in specific and the government in general do not
possess necessary capabilities to bring criminals and predators of the war crimes
135 Interview with the Civil Society FGD participant, provincial head of social and economic
affairs; Ministry of Women’s Affairs department, Hawwa Gol Rezaee, Bamyan 136 Ibid.
95
to justice, the people of Bamyan like other constituencies tend to think of
alternative ways of addressing war-related grievances. Several participants
consider the observance of traditional distinction between Haqqullah (Right of
Allah) and Haqqulabd (Right of People)137 as the only way forward.
“Like always, we need to forgive the Haqqullah. But nobody can forgive the
“Haqqulabd”; this is the personal right of everybody to claim”.138
Participants hope that observance of the distinction between Haqqullah (Right of
Allah) and Haqqulabd (Right of People) in judicial processes, would promote
accountability in their community and government.
g. Conclusion: Why the DDR Program Implemented in Bamyan with
Success?
Bamyani militias joined the DDR program through a collective voluntary process
in line with the instruction of the Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami leadership who at the
time controlled the ninth corps in Bamyan. Most of the disarmed combatants,
despite their grievances, never returned to militancy. Several factors contributed
to such phenomenon, including A) as a homogenous constituency both ex-
137 Haqqullah or “right of God” in contrast to Haqqulabd, “right of people/servant”. In traditional
Islamic Jurisprudence there is an interpretive theory suggesting that specific areas of authority-
right belong to God – such as public issues that people, as individuals do not have authority-right
over (Haqqullah). By the means of substitution, it is upon the [rightful] ruler or government to
decide about such issues. On the other hand, personal –private issues are categorized under
“Haqqulabd”. Since these concepts are interpretive, the relationship between them remains open
to interpretation. See Muhammad Shafiq Ahmad, Islamic Idea of Human Rights, Journal of
Sociology, 2009,
http://journal.library.du.ac.bd/index.php?journal=JS&page=article&op=viewFile&path[]=2115&
path[]=1957 138 Military FGD participant, retired colonel, Bamyan
96
combatants and civilians along with Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami trusted the DDR
program as vehicle for transition towards peace and justice. The recognition of the
Shia jurisprudence by the 2004 constitution along its democratic elements
encouraged them to work with the government and support it. They improved on
the existing opportunities and took active part in reconstruction processes. At
political level, Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami was compensated. From 2004 to 2014, the
party leader Mohammad Karim Khalili, worked as the second vice president.
Khalili also was appointed as head of Disarmament and Reintegration Committee,
to manage the DIAG program. He also served as the head of High Peace Council
of Afghanistan. B) The cultural identity of the Bamyani constituency is attached
to an ancient, non-aggressive civilization resistant toward violent ideologies. As
part of that cultural identity, Shia Islam, in which most Hazaras in Bamyan believe,
does not encourage militancy.139 As a result, a new peace-loving generation in
Bamyan, including educated youth and women, observe the peace process and
integration of the Taliban with caution.
139 According to traditional Shia jurisprudence, believers are only allowed to engage in war of self-
defence; offensive warfare is categorically prohibited; it is believed that only the rightful Imam
[rightful leader] – blessed with divine mandate, has the right to start such wars. See Robert Rabil,
Contextualizing Jihad and Takfir in the Shi’a Conceptual Framework, August 31, 2018, The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/contextualizing-jihad-and-takfir-in-the-
shia-conceptual-framework
97
SECTION THREE
CIVILIAN INTEGRATION
98
SECTION THREE: CIVILIAN INTEGRATION
Chapter 7.3. Civilian Integration – How to Integrate Taliban Ex-
Combatants and Their Families within the Civilian Life?
a. Concept
The UN defines reintegration as “the process by which ex-combatants acquire
civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income.”140 According to the
same source, “reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an
open timeframe, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part
of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often
necessitates long-term external assistance.” Considering this definition,
integration is a long-term process containing several steps and wide range of
services aimed at involving ex-combatants and their dependents in socio-economic
programs, helping them to gain sustainable employment and income.
b. What Do We Mean?
Considering the definition provided above, we intend that reintegration is a
process by which the Taliban commanders and fighters along with their families
adjust themselves to civilian life through taking new roles in their communities
with support services, capacity building and employment opportunities from the
government and donor communities.
140 United Nations. 2014. “Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration Standards.” Available at: http://www.iddrtg.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/OG-
2014.pdf
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c. Approaches to Civilian Reintegration
I. Individual Approach
Individual reintegration essentially targets individual Taliban commanders and
fighters, addressing their specific needs, expectations and concerns. The overall
objective of this approach is to involve the Taliban fighters in socio-economic
projects, increasing their employability, on the one hand, and enabling them to
gain sustainable income for themselves and their families, on the other hand. To
this end, it might be necessary to differentiate and categorize them in terms of their
capabilities and age; a) younger individuals can be enrolled in educational
institutions to get formal education which enable them to be recruited in the labour
market or public administration after completion of their studies; b) senior
individuals who possess technical capabilities can be recruited in public
institutions and private sector with some wage subsidies from the government; and
c) senior individuals who lack technical capabilities should be enrolled in
vocational training centres or be provided on-the-job trainings, building their
capacities in accordance to the needs of the labour market.
According to our interviews and consultations, education and employment
opportunities are two key elements for successful civilian reintegration of the
Taliban fighters. It requires that the government coordinate with private sector to
engage the Taliban fighters in businesses, enterprises and industries.
The private sector, in addition to recruiting the ex-combatants, can provide on-the-
job trainings that enable the ex-combatants to find job in the market over time
independently. In the meantime, the government needs to enhance the capacity of
local government institutions to design and implement large-scale projects through
which large number of ex-combatants can be recruited in different projects.
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II. Inclusive Community Based Approach
Community-based reintegration targets both the Taliban fighters and the whole
community, involving them in economic and developmental programs which are
beneficial for both ex-combatants and the conflict-affected communities. Most
participants in our in-depth interviews as well as FDGs recommended inclusive
community-based reintegration of the Taliban fighters into civilian life, suggesting
that long-term development projects benefiting the whole community should be
implemented in areas where they are to be reintegrated.
However, in this approach, the government, in the first place, should settle the
dispute between local residents and Taliban fighters, reconciling them to accept
each other and mutually cooperate in socio-economic affairs. According to our
interviewees, addressing the local drivers of conflict, including personal or
factional rivalries is essential for reintegrating Taliban fighters into communities.
This can be achieved through local mechanisms of dispute resolution, strengthened
local security, effective rule of law and enhancing public information through
media and civil society organizations.
d. Process of Civilian Integration
Civilian reintegration of the Taliban fighters can be achieved through several
consistent steps including initial comprehensive assessment and profiling
following disarmament and demobilization, planning and program design, public
information and sensitization, resource mobilization, training, providing support
services and above all, providing employment to address the economic, psycho-
social, political and security challenges faced by the ex-combatants.
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Finally, the reintegration process should be thoroughly monitored and evaluated.
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Chapter 8.3. The Afghan Experience – Civilian Integration in Post 9/11
Afghanistan
a. The Politics of Integration
One of the main claims of the post-2001 government is that it is an “inclusive”
government. During the past couple of years, the government supported by the
international community conducted several reintegration initiatives such as DDR,
DIAG, PTS and APRP. Civilian integration in post-2001 Afghanistan is a two-
sided phenomenon. On one hand, it is about reintegration of the disarmed,
demobilized and disbanded combatants into their respective communities and
normal life. On the other hand, post-2001 civilian integration corresponds with the
overall experience of social cohesion in the so called post-conflict situation.
The post-2001 political order resulting from the Bonn agreement, at the cost of
excluding certain elements such as Taliban and Hezb-e Islami, provided a broad-
based socio- political integration platform for various parties including Jihadi and
non- Jihadi groups. To pave the way for the monopoly of power in the hands of a
legitimate government, the DDR program along with process for adaptation of a
new constitution were initiated simultaneously. While the DDR program
administrators predicted sequences of a civilian reintegration through their own
demilitarization framework, the 2004 constitution introduced the polity in which
reintegration was going to take place. The constitution outlined structures of an
accountable government, enumerating fundamental rights of the citizens. It
promised equality before law and balanced development- among other things.141
Based on such premises, masses of people participated in various constitutional
141 The 2004 constitution.
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processes such as elections, and accordingly national institutions such as
parliament and the country’s security sector were built. Hence, the assessment of
Afghan experience of post-2001 integration cannot be reduced to reconciliation of
a group of combatants with the Afghan government and society as such. The
Afghan experience of post-2001 civilian integration encompasses the experience
of combatants who underwent reintegration processes as well as the experience of
post-2001 social cohesion across the society in general.
At national level, the Bonn agreement initiated a broad-based integration platform,
but remained susceptible to fragmentations along ethnic and factional lines. The
very participants of the Bonn agreement disintegrated across their old patronage
networks shortly after integrating as a united national front against the Taliban.
Helaluddin Helal, former deputy of Ministry of defence, suggests that due to
widespread ethnic politics, people of Afghanistan failed to shape a national
process for post-conflict integration.
“We lacked a national strategy. Regional intelligence agencies made use
of the situation and manipulated us. As a result, law was not implemented
and justice was not met. Confidence building and tolerance, provision of
security, and the rule of law were three major requirements for stability.
We failed in all that. ”142
The above argument is a repeated theme across all provincial FGDs. Participants
say in order to assess the achievements of reintegration programs one need to
measure the level of social cohesion among various constituencies.
142 Interview with Helaluddin Helal, retired general, former deputy of Ministry of defence, Kabul
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“If we assess the level of social cohesion from the past to present time, we
see that today we are witnessing a widening gap across ethnic, communal
as well as class divisions. In 2007, we would travel to countryside without
security concerns. The national development strategy promised us that by
2014 we would be connected through asphalted roads. On the contrary,
today roads are not safe anymore”.143
These observations reveal important challenges of post-2001 reintegration
processes, affecting ex-combatants and their communities alike. In their return to
normal life, ex-combatants would have to face layers of mistrust and
fragmentations. Given the deep level of donor-dependency in the Afghan society,
socio-political fragmentations directly affect one’s access to economic
opportunities. In this perspective, there was no serious difference between
individual (in case of DDR and PST), and community-based (in case of DIAG and
APRP) reintegration approaches as both individual combatants and their
communities had to face the same challenges.
The fact that disarmament and demobilization of many ex-combatants led to their
professional isolation, ex-combatants faced psychological pressures as well as
livelihood constrains . While reintegration programs propagated the rhetoric of the
end of conflict, the continuation of war, civilian casualties and disregard for
professional criteria in reform processes made ex-combatants and their families
suspicious of the reintegration processes. This is especially problematic with
regard to the role of internationals in management of the DDR program and the
wider Security Sector Reform (SSR).
143 Civil society FGD male participants, civil society activist, Herat
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“This is a war between superpowers; between Russia and the US. The US
does not want to retreat. I am a son of a retired officer who served his
country for 31 years. When the US process [the DDR process], came to
Afghanistan, they disarmed him and told him to go home. Why not
benefiting from such military cadres. Why put some inexperienced civilian
in control of a military institution? This is all about the conflict of interest
between the US and Russia. Whenever they are satisfied, there will be no
war anymore”.144
Civilian integration cannot take place properly if its strategic environment seem
unrealistic to the beneficiaries. Ex-combatants such as veterans of war, their
families and their immediate constituency would grow distrust toward their
situation as soon as they realize that in some respects they are being deceived. A
break from the past cannot take place in a vacuum. Understandably, combatants
participating in reintegration programs expected that their past is going to be
acknowledged, and to some degree, they are going to be treated respectfully.
However, failing to make sense of their situation, many ex-combatants remained
doubtful towards civilian integration processes. They found inconsistency
between the programs stated goals and the implementation policy.
“Why Jangalak factory145, Polytechnic in Kabul146 or other Russian-made
infrastructures were not rebuilt by them [foreign sponsors of the DDR and
DIAG programs]. These plans are being implemented according to the will
of Pakistan. They pushed all the experienced Generals toward retirement.
144 local governance FGD male participants, member of citizens charter program, Herat 145 Built in 1960, Jangalak factory was one of the few industrial sites in the country; it was
destroyed during the 90th infighting. 146 Kabul Polytechnic University
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If a 75 years old man could serve as president, then why retire a 54 years
old General? Justice was not met in this regard”.147
Meanwhile, in the narratives of the FGD participants and the Key informants
across different constituencies, political parties do not possess a prominent place.
Despite the fact that the current government peace negotiating team includes
representatives of the mainstream political parties, participants still think that they
are not being represented in the peace talks properly.
b. The Economy of Integration
Post-2001 peace and reintegration programs were run according to short-term
sequential steps, some of which lasting only a day. For example, in the DDR
program, demobilization of combatants happened during a one-day workshop. The
reintegration phase of the program, depending on the rank of the demobilized
individual and the type of assistance package provided, would last several weeks,
months and maximum two years. In such circumstances, assistance for most ex-
combatants especially for rank and file soldiers, typically packaged as emergency
help. For example, winter food packages and emergency employment offered
through the Japan funded National Emergency Employment Program (NEEP)
aimed at providing immediate compensation.148 While such sequencing of
reintegration programs technically provided ground for management of post-
conflict reintegration of ex-combatants, in the long run ex-combatants found
147 Military FGD male participant, retired Major General, Kabul 148 Caroline, A. Hartzell, “Missed Opportunities, The Impact of DDR on SSR in Afghanistan.”
United States Institute of Peace. USIP, April 2011.
https://www.usip.org/publications/2011/04/missed-opportunities. P 6-7
107
themselves hapless, surrounded by the many problems of a shattered economy.
This is especially relevant in the post-2001 situation where for the very first time
in Afghanistan’s history, the free market economy was put into practice as the
country’s economic system.149 The market economy for sure paved the way for
private enterprises and the flow of international aid, but for a people not used to
having such a system in place, it also meant new challenges and difficulties. Given
that all previous governments, especially the leftist regime, followed government-
controlled economies, the market economy brought about an abrupt change in ex-
combatants’ lives. Key informant, Aziz Kosha, researcher at the Organization for
Policy Research and Development Studies (DROPS), asserts that with the
introduction of the market economy traditional way of life lost relevancy.
“Little attention is paid to the root causes of the conflict. For example, the
untimely introduction of the market economy was devastating. In such
context, a traditional peasant in Ghazni or Logar provinces, with his
outmoded tools, had to compete with- for example, a Pakistani peasant
equipped with modern technology. Due to lack of competitiveness, our
rural economy was destroyed and as a result, people approached illegal
opium cultivation. Such an illegal economy significantly increased the
level of violence”.150
149 Article 10 of the constitution asserts, “The state shall encourage, protect as well as ensure the
safety of capital investment and private enterprises in accordance with the provisions of the law
and market economy”. 150 Aziz Kosha, researcher at the Organization for Policy Research and Development Studies
(DROPS), Kabul
108
Participants across military FGDs emphasize that while people were being
disarmed and demobilized, they had not been provided employment opportunities.
After DDR, they ex-combatants were detached from the system.151
“Wherever you underwent the DDR, they would give you some 700 dollars
for starting a small business. You take 700 dollars while being completely
detached from the system. It is impossible to find a place in the market and
start a small business. 700 dollars’ worth nothing, you open a place and
after six months, it is all gone. I am not satisfied at all”.152
“Before proceeding with the DDR program, they should have created jobs
and employment opportunities. During the past 40 years, the same
powerful politicians manipulated us. They are only after power and wealth.
They should also go through DDR. The young generation must replace
them”.153
Lack of proper monitoring and follow up plans exemplified by the government's
failure in providing balanced nationwide service delivery significantly reduced the
credibility of civilian integration in both the eyes of program participants and the
wider society.
c. Police Reform and Civil Society
151 Corresponding with the market economy, the post -2001 arrangement of the security sector also
underwent some changes, including the introduction of voluntary service in defence and security
forces. 152 Military FGD male participant, retired Jihadi Colonel, Mazar-e Sharif 153 Military FGD male participant, retired Colonel, Mazar-e Sharif
109
As a law enforcement institution, the national police force has not been able to
play a positive supporting role in civilian integration processes. Many participants
identify police as an incapable corrupt institution, incapable of protecting the
civilians. This is understandable in the light of the fact that the reform of police
force in the post-2001 era was overshadowed by an ongoing war and prioritization
of other parallel stat-building processes such as presidential and parliamentary
elections.154 In addition, increasing focus on parallel semi-formal security forces
i.e. the Afghan Local Police (ALP), further pushed the national police force aside.
Various actors including politicians and criminals had easily manipulated the
national police force.
“In our city, police chiefs across police stations were linked to various
powerful people including politicians and parliamentarians. From time-
to-time, they have to be changed and replaced; but some of them are
holding their positions for a very long time. They learned how to make
money. Poor people have to pay and they collect”.155
“Among the country’s defence and security forces, the performance of the
police is very weak. Their acts are not lawful. Either they do not know
about their responsibility or they just do not care. For example, when
mediating between a victim and a criminal, they usually take side with the
criminal. Extortion across the roads is a common practice among the
police force”.156
154 Ibid. 155 Interview with Abdulhamid Ansari, peace activist and university lecturer, Mazar-e Sharif
156 Interview with Salima Ahad, women’s right activist and university lecturer, Qandahar
110
Over the years, the persistent corruption across the police and the court system
impeded the development of healthy bottom-up civilian integration.157 Meanwhile,
oversighting bodies such as parliament were not so eager to supervise various
government offices. Fatima Kohistani, Member of Parliament from Ghor
province, suggests that people’s representatives mostly respond to their
constituencies’ expectations regarding the implementation of developmental
projects in their area. To that end, they try to stay close to government officials
and not bother them with criticisms. As a result, parliamentarians fail to focus on
two of their most important responsibilities including law making and supervision
of government offices. In fact, their supervision mandate became limited to
supervision of developmental needs of their own constituencies. Beyond that,
there is little space for monitoring high-ranking officials of the government or
national strategies.
“On the one hand, the President and the government in general, try to
impose legislation on parliament. On the other hand, people want us to
work for them in terms of balanced development. We cannot criticize the
government that much, because if we do so, they would not approve
developmental projects for our constituency. At the moment some
provinces enjoy the abundance of developmental projects, while in other
provinces such as Ghor we even do not have 5 kilometres of asphalted
road”.158
In such circumstances, civil society organizations also proved to be ineffective in
shaping civilian integration policies, because, as grassroots overseeing
157 Ibid. 158 Ibid.
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institutions, they themselves are not properly integrated within the wider society.
Ehsan Qane, a researcher at Afghanistan Analysis Network (AAN), points out that
in early years of post-2001 government, most civil society organizations were busy
with service delivery operations and that significantly limited their advocacy role.
“At the time of DDR program, civil society was rather busy with service
delivery in areas of food and water distribution, road construction and
similar operations. At that time, human rights issues, elections, DDR or
transitional justice were completely new subjects which civil society
organizations were getting familiar with”.159
While through freedom of speech, the outreach of civil society is larger than ever
before, according to the Key Informant, Mohammad Karim Dadfar, civil society
activist in Herat, outside city centres, people do not know anything about civil
society.
“The scope of operation of civil society organizations is limited to cities.
In rural areas, nobody knows about civil society. Civil society is playing a
positive role through public awareness advocacy programs. However,
given that some stakeholders do not accept it as a legitimate part of society,
the outreach of civil society is limited. Civil society is considered as
western imposition”.160
“Civil society is just a term indicating that certain groups of people live in
cities. Currently civil society organizations are just loudspeakers. Both the
159 Interview with Ehsan Qane, researcher at Afghanistan Analysis Network (AAN), Kabul 160 Interview with Mohammad Karim Dadfar, civil society activist, Herat
112
government and civil society are project-based entities. 40 years of
revolution, destroyed our thoughts and norms”.161
A Qandahari peace activist points out that as long as there is war in the country,
one cannot think of community-based integration initiatives. Once peace is
prevailed in the country, community-based initiatives start to come to the surface.
d. Transitional Justice
A vital part of post-conflict civil integration in any context is to deal with the
grievances of past atrocities. The international mechanism of post-conflict healing
known as transitional justice has not been so popular among powerbrokers in
Afghanistan. Even the international sponsors of post-2001 peace and reintegration
programs have not taken it seriously.162In 2007, the approval of “National Stability
and Reconciliation Law” in the warlords-dominated parliament, severely blocked
the implementation of transitional justice in the country. Article 3 of the law, also
known as “the amnesty law”, states that all parties involved in pre-2001 hostilities
shall enjoy legal protection from prosecution. Based on traditional distinction
between Haqqullah (right of God) and Haqqulabd (right of people), the law only
allows for individual-based claims of accountability.163 While this is justified in
the name of public good, national unity and reconciliation, one cannot ignore the
fact that most war crimes during conflicts, especially during civil wars, happen
through collective actions. In comparison, the scope of personal or individual acts
161 Civil society male FGD participant, peace activist, Qandahar 162 Ibid. 163 National Reconciliation, General Amnesty, and National Stability Law
113
of atrocity during wars remains insignificant and unseen. Accordingly, the scope
of individual capacity for bringing the predators of such crimes to justice is limited.
With the amnesty law, the predators of pre-2001 war crimes gave precedence to
the prevailing culture of immunity in Afghanistan. Peace activist in Kabul Fatima
Alawi emphasizes that overlooking the past is not going to help healing the
traumas of the war. The way forward is to investigate the past and seek justice.
“At the moment, many parties – especially the Americans, are dictating
that we must forget the past. However, the past atrocities are not
forgettable. By overlooking the past, we may reach a short-term peace, but
soon after, we will be witnessing another war. Even if we could not bring
the predators into justice, we should document the past atrocities and
transfer that knowledge to the next generation, so they do not repeat the
same mistakes. This paves the way for a victim-based justice.”164
“Regarding traditional justice, currently they have compromised the
release of 5000 Taliban prisoners and that is over. However, the Taliban
must be forced to at least apologize from the people. When Gulbuddin
[Hekmatyar] was coming to town, we held a conference on victims’ rights;
they condemned us. Such approach won’t help us to reach a peaceful
integration”.165
A major argument put forward by participants across all FGDs in different
constituencies is that in addressing the grievances of the past atrocities, there
should be no discrimination towards the war victims. Such argument backs the
164 Interview with Fatima Alawi, peace activist, Kabul 165 Interview with Sima Samar, woman's and human rights advocate, former Chairperson of the
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), Kabul
114
hypothesis that assessment of post-2001 civilian integration cannot be reduced to
reconciliation of an apposition armed group with the government. Civilian
integration requires a broad-based narrative that transcend political identities of
specific parties to the conflict. One may also conclude that the experience of post-
2001 integration across the country achieved certain levels of mutual
understanding and sympathy among its beneficiaries. No participant across
various FGDs, including military, civil society and local governance FGDs
advocated for discrimination against victims of one party at the cost of other
party’s victims. At the same time, participants emphasize that all criminals should
be brought to justice without discrimination.
“The notion of addressing the injustices of the past should not be limited to
advocacy for prosecution of the Taliban. Justice means that no criminals be
able to escape justice and no innocent people is prosecuted. This is the
fundamental principle. In addition, we must have a timeframe for such process.
All peoples including the government, the Taliban and the Americans should
be part of such process. Justice does not belong to a single party”.166
e. Different Constituencies - Different Integration
Participants of various FGDs across different constituencies suggest that local
culture and institutions – including traditional norms and elders, provide for local
style transitional justice. However, in post-2001 integration experience, different
constituencies made use to their local norms and institutions differently. For
example, Shia religious leaders in Bamyan province, as part of local civil society,
166 Civil society male FGD participant, journalist, Qandahar
115
progressively used mosques to disseminate peace messages as well as to inform
people about their God given fundamental rights. Nevertheless, in other
constituencies such as in Mazar-e Sharif, manipulation of mosques and religious
educational institutions i.e. Madrassas by Sunni extremists poses a big challenge
a head of civilian integration. While in some constituencies, the involvement of
women in reintegration processes are welcomed and appreciated, in other
constituencies, women’s presence in public places is still considered a taboo. The
ideological aspect of civilian integration, though usually played down,
significantly contribute to keeping ex-combatants under control as well as
preventing people from joining violent armed groups.
Given the diversity of peoples, and cultures and differences across socio-political
status, it is no surprise that different constituencies and individuals experience
civilian integration differently. Accordingly, their attitudes toward change and
reform are different. However, strategic planning of reintegration programs
alongside implementation policies can indiscriminately affect the way various
constituencies adapt or confront the situation. Corruption and malfunctioning
reduce the capacity and potentials of reintegration programs, as well as
undermining the capability of participants for successful integration.
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SECTION FOUR
THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE
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SECTION FOUR: THE INTERNATIONAL
EXPERIENCE
Chapter 9.4. DDR and Integration in Post- Conflict Iraq, Colombia, and
Nepal
It is firstly essential to understand what DDR is, what it implies, how it
should take place and the actors involved. Its final objective is to establish durable
peace by providing security and stability. It is advised that the process take place
directly after a conflict to avoid the appearance of spoilers and exclude the
possibility of militias persisting in a post-conflict country. However, if DDR can
be seen as a means of establishing peace, it reciprocally requires a minimum of
political stability to have a realistic opportunity to be implemented. There is indeed
no chance for example that militias accept to disband without security guarantees.
Positive peace is based on trust between a population and the ruling government.
This trust band leads to the acceptance of former combatants to follow a DDR
process and the government to proceed in SSR (the Security Sector Reform).
The DDR process secondly requires the involvement of international actors. The
so-called duty to intervene was promoted in the 1960’s by international
associations and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as the French
“Première Urgence Internationale”. The latest intervened in “illegally” in
Afghanistan as soon as 1980 to support the population and the health system. This
theory induces that one is not in the obligation of respecting the sovereignty of the
state if it goes against human rights. Furthermore in 2000 and 2005, at the UN
World Summit was added the notion of “Responsibility to Protect”, known as the
R2P, to re-enforce human security throughout the world. Crimes against humanity
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are therefore considered as a threat to global stability. The defence of basic rights
is viewed as an essential peace-related issue at the same level as the respect of
International Law. The concept in short is to protect populations and therefor
preserve peace. The 688 resolution of the UN Security Council of April 5th, 1991
was a founding movement. The UN actually demanded the Iraqi government to
allow the access of NGOs to its territories as well as the halt of violence against
the Kurd and Shia population. It was the first time a government was summed to
authorize non-government entities to fulfil its duty of protecting its population.
It is important to bear in mind that the end of a conflict does not automatically
mean peace. Actually, more than 50% of post-conflict nations tend to dive back
into war. (Millemium Project, 2004). In 2004 we observe that a considerable
number of post conflict countries presented more danger/a less secure environment
for civilians than during the conflict itself. This tendency can be explained by
various factors. Firstly, during an internal conflict, developing countries increase
considerably their security budget absorbing an average of 5% of the gross
domestic product whereas only 2,8% is dedicated to this sector in peace time. If
defence expenses rise rapidly during a conflict, it takes a long period of time for
them to recover its pre-conflict level. Secondly, more health-related problems may
occur as many infrastructures have been destroyed during the conflict. Plus, the
question of disarmament appears. Certain armed factions may be stronger than the
national security forces, leading to high criminal violence as ex-combatants and
civilians often stay heavily armed after a conflict in order to defend themselves as
the government finds itself unsettled and weakened, therefore incapable of
providing proper security to its populations. This is an important issue; if the state
fails to bring security to its population, which is by the way one of its basic duties,
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the country is likely to slide back into war. The disarmament part of DDR thus
usually takes place to a certain extent during the cease-fire, the period of
negotiations, to prove both parties good will to move towards peace as well as just
after the peace agreement is signed. This is therefore an enforced political
procedure, the voluntary disarmament should come late once peace is truly
established and foreseen as durable. Once again if the general population does not
feel secure and confident in the country’s lasting stability it cannot wish to disarm.
DDR has therefore become a central issue for international actors. In 1990 the head
of the UN Council for Security underlined in many occasions the high importance
of implementing DDR to reach “positive peace” which includes a development of
the country’s economy, society and infrastructures. DDR also holds a central
position in the World Bank’s help for development strategy and the Organization
of Cooperation and Economic Development (OCDE)’s operations of military-civil
transition. To be more accurate we should probably mention that the issue of
disarmament is not part of the World Bank’s mandate but the UN’s and its
partners. It was created explicitly to rebuild post conflict countries and help others
with development issues. In other words, it establishes guidelines for developing
countries to follow. The world Bank offers a timeline for peace procedures to
follow. It recommends for instance the presence of international forces straight
after a conflict to help stabilize and secure the country. It then advises that a
financial support should be given for the next five years. And finally, after ten
years suggests implementing democratic institutions, structures. If we now turn to
the OCDE, one may notice it actually added a new dimension to disarmament.
Former combatants were encouraged to give in their weapons against financial
reward. However, one may wonder if it’s the proper way to go about it. It seems
120
as if it puts forward the number of arms collected to evaluate the success of the
process whereas this does not automatically show or lead to a will of the civilian-
military population to disarm as only motivated by the financial aspect. They may
therefore rearm as quickly as they disarmed. Moreover, as it was the case in many
countries where this method was implemented, many people gave in old deficient
arms while keeping their proper weapons. Arms against cash seems therefore to
be a very superficial way to deal with a deep-seated issue, leading to superficial
success. To change the way weapons are perceived in gun culture countries is a
very challenging long-term issue, The WED (Weapons against Development) tries
to change the way weapons are viewed, creating awareness among the populations
through awareness-raising campaigns. It dedicates its efforts to making people
realize that weapons among the civilian population is a threat to peace even though
it may procure a sensation of protection, and therefore arming is but a superficial
solution, even a counter-solution.
DDR being a main concern for influential international organizations, it is yet
surprising that there are few means to evaluate DDR’s success, there seems to be
no way to judge these operations’ level of success on the ground. Weather it helped
maintain peace or not remains uncertain. This may be in part due to the fact that
DDR’s targets are difficult to identify as there is not a clear distinction between
military and civilians in post conflict nations.
Even though international actors ‘involvement seems crucial in the rebuilding of
a country, their role remains to support and not replace a government. The state’s
role is not to be neglected, it is the government’s place to lead the process, being
the nation’s ruling power.
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a. Colombia
"The award should also be seen as a tribute to the Colombian people who, despite
great hardships and abuses, have not given up hope of a just peace, and to all the
parties who have contributed to the peace process," stated Kaci Kullman Five, the
chairman of the Norway Nobel Committee, as Santos received 2016 Nobel Peace
Prize.
Once a Peace Agreement was found between the government of Santos167 and the
FARC-EP168, the armed group accepted to disarm and disband as they ended their
armed opposition to the government. It would yet be naïve to assume that years of
violence and discord would suddenly come to a halt. A peace deal is always but
the first step towards cessation of violence and national reconciliation. The
establishment of “positive peace” depends greatly on what happens after the deal,
in other words on how well the promises and expectations deriving from the treaty
are fulfilled. It is at this point that Disarmament; Demobilization; Reintegration
(DDR) comes into play. DDR is a three-step process thought out by the United
Nations in order to provide a guideline to post conflict nations for establishing
positive-peace. It should be implemented directly after the signature of the
Agreement, according to the UN, in order to prevent the appearance of spoilers.
Indeed, DDR provides a clear path for former rebels to follow so that they have
some idea of how to manage a normal life and do not fall back into criminality.
Nonetheless, we should bear in mind that DDR should be implemented alongside
167 Juan Manuel Santos was first elected president in 2010, his mandate was renewed in 2014. He
received the Peace Nobel Prize in 2016 in reward of his efforts directed towards peace. 168 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia- Ejército del Pueblo; the most influent armed
group in Colombia from 1964 till its disband in 2016, it opposed the government violently and
claimed itself of Marxist ideology.
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true political, economic, security reforms as it alone cannot solve the problems
which initially led to the conflict. As for positive peace, it is another word for
lasting peace. The peace agreement ends immediate fighting whereas achieving
positive peace is making sure the conflict is truly buried and is not likely to re-
emerge. Therefore, the route towards implementing peace is longer and more
complex than the signature of an agreement and demands both parties’ good will
and real government interest and investment. Today even though Colombia has
made notable progress in this direction, violence remains a central issue as armed
groups still exercise their power throughout the country. Our study shall thus focus
on how Colombia went about implementing DDR in order to see what lessons can
be learnt from its experience. To start, we shall first of all resume Colombia’s
conflict briefly. We shall then see which actors were involved and try to trace a
timeline of the negotiations and peace procedures. Finally, we shall focus on the
content of the deal before turning to the implementation of DDR, its successes and
failures.
Preambular: Brief reminder of the violent conflict which opposed the Colombian
government and the FARCs.
Colombia has suffered for over half a century from the violent conflict which
opposed the FARC-EP to the national government. In the past five decades, more
than 200,000 people have died, mainly civilians (80%), and almost 7 million
people have been forced out of their homes. Colombia also became the second
country the most affected by mines after Afghanistan counting that 70% of its
territory found itself affected. Eventually, after three years of rough negotiations
in Havana, the Colombian government and the FARC came to an interim Peace
Agreement on the 26th September 2016. However, to everyone’s surprise and
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against all prediction, the referendum which was supposed to ratify the peace
agreement got rejected as 51% of voters opposed it. This could be explained by
the fact that the far-right, with its head the future president Alvaro Uribe, had
previously opposed it strongly throughout various demonstrations. The agreement
was accused of being too favourable to the FARC, presented as unfair as rewarding
criminals instead of rendering justice to victims, and proof of the Colombian
state’s weakness towards armed groups. On the other side, it may also be explained
by the massive abstention of the population (62%). It is also speaking to note that
those who had suffered the most because of the guerrilla group, which had been
the immediate victims of the war as located in the worst war zones, voted
massively yes to peace. The treaty was therefore revised and signed this time
without a referendum on the 24th November 2016. The FARC officially gave up
their armed rebellion to start a political fight in the name of their Marxist ideology
within democratic rules and regulations. They were allowed to form a political
party; for the 2018 presidential elections the former leading commander Timoleon
Jimentez presented himself as FARC candidate. A transitional justice system was
also established to judge crimes committed during the war. In summary, the
combatants were asked to come forwards and acknowledge responsibility for their
crimes, apologize and in exchange they would receive partial amnesty. This meant
avoiding prison in most cases and providing reparations instead which could
include civil services. Furthermore, a DDR process was also implemented by the
government under the supervision of international organizations. The 7000 former
combatants agreed to give in their arms to the UN in order to officially demobilize
and start the reintegration phase of DDR in view of returning to civil life and
reintegrating society. The process’s aim was to give a second chance to former
combatants to begin an honest life. DDR is however first a strategic process meant
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to break the spiral of violence. Helping former FARC members gain a living and
reintegrate society is a means to put a halt to the temptation of joining another
armed group in view of obtaining easy financial gains. Therefore, former
combatants and civil society should both benefit from the process directly for the
first and indirectly for the second.
The Main Stakeholders Involved in the Implementation of the Peace Process
A peace agreement is but the first step towards positive peace. The implementation
of all phases of a peace process remains complex given that the end of the armed
struggle does not solve all the problems it embodied or caused. It engenders the
challenge of social reconciliation, the reintegration of former combatants, the non-
reiteration of combat. It first calls for goodwill on both parts and involves various
actors. We will classify the latter into two categories; national actors on the one
hand and international ones on the other.
a) National Actors
The National Government, holding full sovereignty, naturally takes the lead of the
process. Its role as the principal actor is to set up and implement the peace process
including the reforms agreed upon such as the Progressive Plan for social
protection and safeguarding the human rights of rural workers. To support the
government in its efforts to apply the peace process, the tasks are divided among
various entities. An important number of councils and committees are formed,
specially missioned to help the government uphold its commitments.
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All actors cannot be cited, so we will only name those which seem the most
relevant for our study. Among them can be found the National Commission on
Security Guarantees for the dismantling of criminal organizations. Its role is to
draw up strategies and carry out special investigations into particularly violent war
crimes and abuses. It is formed by the Minister for the Interior, The Minister of
Defence, the Minister of Justice, the Attorney General, and the Ombudsman. The
Technical Committee on Security and Protection is more specifically in charge of
preparing regulations and procedures for guaranteeing the security of former
FARC combatants, their families and their newly formed political party. The
National Council for Reconciliation and Coexistence for its part fights
discrimination and stigmatization and therefore helps with reintegration and
reconciliation. The National Reincorporation Council (NRC) within the
framework of the CMPVI meanwhile deals with the established Transitional Local
Zones for Normalization (TLZN), it pays particular attention to the protection of
minors and aims to reintegrate them if possible, within their native communities.
As for the Commission for Monitoring Promoting and Verifying the
Implementation of the Final Agreement (CMPVI), it is made up of three delegates
from the National Government and three delegates from the FARC-EP in process
of reincorporation into civilian life, it also includes the accompaniment of one
delegate from each of the guarantor nations (Cuba and Norway) and one delegate
of the observer countries (Chili and Venezuela). Appointed by the U.N., the
Executive Secretary of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP) holds centre stage
as he is in charge of transitional justice. As to the Monitoring and Verification
Mechanism (MVM), it is in charge of the Agreement on the Bilateral and
Definitive Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities (BDCCH). It is actually a
tripartite technical mechanism composed of representatives from the National
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Government (Colombian State Armed Forces and the National Police), the FARC-
EP, and the IC-MVM. Concerning the implementation of the Reintegration part of
DDR, the leading entity is the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization.
This is the governmental agency which succeeded the Colombian Reintegration
Agency (ACR) and the Program for the reincorporation to civil life (PRCL)
created in 2003. The DDR initiatives of the ARN aim to fulfil the following
objectives; 1st Create conditions for demobilized ex-combatants to become
independent citizens; 2nd Strengthen socio-economic conditions in receptor
communities, and 3rd Promote reconciliation. Last but not least, the Colombian
Family Welfare Institute (ICBF) through its Specialized Assistance program takes
into its charge former child-soldiers. It sets out policies and programs to ensure
their protection, health, education and reinsertion within their communities. We
could also mention Bandes Criminales (BACRIM)169 as a counter-actor for peace
as it presents a risk for DDR’s success; it has indeed recruited an important number
of former FARCs members.
b) International Actors
Turning to International actors, they find themselves involved in Colombia’s peace
process as guarantors, observers of the state of human rights and financial
supporters. Firstly, the UN and its various departments play a major role.
International donors and countries which took part in the negotiations as witnesses
or advisers are also particularly involved in the proceedings. As the international
actors are numerous we will mention only the most key actors.
169 BACRIM are criminal bands which emerged after the demobilization of the AUF (United
Self-Defence Forces of Colombia) in 2006.
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First, Cuba and Norway should not be omitted as they are the guarantors of the
Peace Agreement. As to Chile and Venezuela they hold the responsibility to
accompany the Colombian Government in its peace efforts. The UN is also fully
involved as the Office of the United Nation High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR) was attributed the important task of collecting all the former
combatants’ weapons; the Laying-down of arms (LA). Moreover, the United
Nations Political Mission for Verification was mandated to verify the
reincorporation of the FARCs and the implementation of personal and collective
security and protection measures. It was given a period of exercise of three years
with the possibility of extension. The Advisory Committee convened by the Office
of the Ombudsman, also a UN mediation service, meanwhile advises and makes
recommendations to the government and more globally to state institutions and to
human right organizations, with regard to human rights and peace. As for the IC-
MVM, the international component of the Monitoring and Verification
Mechanism (MVM) and a U.N. Office similarly, is trusted to “preside over and
coordinate the mechanism at all levels, settle controversies, make
recommendations and submit reports” (Joint Communiqué No.65 of 19 January
2016), in sum oversee the implementation of the agreement paying special
attention to the respect of the cease-fire and the laying-down of arms (LA). It is
composed of three units, one at national level, eight regional verification structures
as well as local monitoring structures established in specific areas. It is principally
composed of observers from the Community of Latin American and Caribbean
States (CELAC.) Finally, some foreign nations offer bilateral assistance. For
instance, the United States committed $33 million to demining and France has
been engaged in setting up rural development as well as demining operations.
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Basically, the international actors’ role is, on the one hand, to oversee the work of
national actors in order to ensure the proper enforcement of agreements by virtue
of their status of guarantors of the deal. On the other hand, their role is to support
and advise the government in its efforts to implement the peace agreement. It is
important to underline once more that the National Government takes the lead on
the peace process and divides the tasks among various national entities in order to
smoothly implement the agreement. To take our thinking a little further, if
international powers are able to play a positive role in Colombia’s peace efforts,
they are also capable of becoming spoilers, deliberately or not, they may
undermine the peace process. For instance, Venezuela has been a sanctuary for
Colombian rebel groups.
Timeline:
a) The difficult Setting Up of Dialogue Between the Government and
the FARCs; War Rages as peace Initiatives Turn Short.
✓ 1948 -1958: Known as the time of the « Violencia », the civil war resulted
in an average of 3000 killed.
✓ Expansion of drug trafficking, the paramilitary is created in response to the
growth of violence and the State’s acknowledged incapacity of dealing
with the problem alone.
✓ May 1964: Rebel leader Manuel Marulanda founds the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia, commonly known as the FARC.
✓ August. 7, 1982: Government of President Belisario Betancur starts peace
negotiations with the FARC and allows the founding of left-wing political
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parties. This initiative results in a failure as around 4000 members of the
Patriotic Union are assassinated by paramilitary groups during the
following years.
✓ June 1987: An already tenuous cease-fire is fragilized as a rebel attack kills
25 soldiers in southern Colombia.
✓ April 1991: FARC, alongside other rebel groups; National Liberation
Army and Popular Liberation Army, sit down for talks with government
delegates in Venezuela. Talks are later moved to Mexico. No agreement
results as negotiations end in October 1992.
✓ 1997: Violence intensifies as the paramilitary regroup under the banner of
the AUF (United self-defence Forces of Colombia)
✓ August 1998: President Andrés Pastrana announces new peace efforts with
the FARC. A Switzerland-size demilitarized zone in southern Colombia is
created in which talks can be held.
✓ 1998-2002: What is known as the « Cagùn » negotiations between the
FARCs and the government not only fails but results in a growth of power
on the part of FARC as they gain territory.
✓ 2000: Plan Colombia is set up by the United States in order to fight drug
trafficking and criminal groups. This however results in a failure
considering that violence spreads and intensifies.
✓ Feb. 20, 2002: Negotiations once again end as rebels hijack a plane and
take captive a senator member of the peace commission.
✓ 2002 Alvaro Uribe is elected and stays in power until 2010. He carries out
a strict security policy in order to end the long-lasting conflict. As a result,
the number of FARCs is halved, the armed movement loses key
commanders, its armed power no longer equals the national army’s. In sum
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the government gains the upper hand giving them a position of force during
negotiations.
✓ 2005: Law on Justice and Peace is voted in aiming to demobilize thousands
of paramilitaries, the law however fails as paramilitary groups continue to
expand.
✓ Aug. 16, 2007: Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez offers to mediate
between FARC and Colombian President Alvaro Uribe. The effort
collapses a few months later.
✓ 2010: Juan Manuel Santos is elected president; he is given the opportunity
to serve a second term in 2014.
✓ 2011: High Presidential adviser for Reincorporation becomes Colombian
Agency for Reintegration (ACR), first founded in 2003 under the name of
Program for the Reincorporation to Civil Life (PRCL).
✓ Feb. 26, 2012: The FARC renounce kidnapping for extortion and frees all
military officers in captivity.
b) Time for Peace Negotiations Has come:
✓ August 12, 2012: President Juan Manuel Santos announces new peace talks
with FARC which start on the 19th November in Havana.
✓ September 26, 2016: Santos and FARC leader formally sign peace accord
after three years of negotiation.
✓ October 2, 2016: Colombian voters narrowly reject the deal producing
uneasiness and general astonishment.
✓ October 7 2016: the president Juan Manuel Santos receives the Nobel
Peace Prize in recognition of his efforts towards ending bloodshed and
bringing peace to his country.
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✓ November 24, 2016: President Santos and FARC sign revised peace deal
which is ratified by the Congress. The peace agreement is to enter into
force within six months. A U.N. mission is appointed to oversee
disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants. This time, the public’s
opinion is not required as the government could not afford to put at risk the
peace process and suffer a renewed refusal.
c) Implementing the Peace Process - A New Challenge:
✓ 2017: ACR becomes Reintegration and Normalization Agency (ARN) and
is in charge of leading and coordinating the reintegration process.
✓ June, 2017: disarmament is completed as the UN collects 7000 arms.
✓ September 1, 2017: FARC is officially turned into a legal political party,
with its leader “Timochenko” running for the 2018 presidential elections.
✓ August 2, 2018: The National Center for Historical Memory reports an
average of 262,000 killed in six decades of violence in Colombia, a large
majority actually being civilians. (80%)170
✓ July 3, 2019: U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres calls on the
government to respect commitments stating that the U.N. mission in
Colombia has verified 123 killings of former combatants since the peace
deal was signed.171
170 “Watchdog adjusts Colombian conflict death toll to 260 000”, in New Straight Times, August
3,2018, available at : https://www.nst.com.my/world/2018/08/397413/watchdog-adjusts-
colombian-conflict-death-toll-260000 171 United Nation Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, “United Nations Verification Mission in
Colombia report”, Jun 27, 2019, available at :
https://colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1918521.pdf
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✓ August 29: Ivan Márquez releases a video showing himself with
Hernández and other ex-rebels declaring they are taking up arms once
again. He justifies this decision by referencing the government’s failure to
meet commitments. Many former FARC members were assassinated,
while the government, at best, showed itself incapable of ensuring their
safety and was, at worst, an accomplice. The government, however,
showed no interest in the matter and willingly turned a blind eye.
Moreover, progress on the agricultural reforms promised remains scarce.
One may recall that the president in charge of implementing the
peaceagreement had previously firmly opposed it.
The Peace Agreement in Itself
a) The Content of the Deal
The Peace Accord172 is composed of six parts, each negotiated separately,
addressing the following six main issues; i) Comprehensive Rural Reform173; ii)
Political Participation: A democratic opportunity to build peace174 ; iii) End of the
armed conflict175; iv) Solutions to the Illicit Drugs Problem176; v) The Victims of
the Conflict: "Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparations and Non-
172 Colombian Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace,
November 24, 2016, available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/1845 173 Ibid, p. 10-33. 174 Ibid, p. 34-56. 175 Ibid, p. 57-103. 176 Ibid, p. 104-131.
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Recurrence", including the Special Jurisdiction for Peace; and Commitment to
Human Rights177 ; vi) Implementation, verification and public endorsement178.
The problems addressed go beyond the mere cessation of the fighting and aim to
establish lasting peace by tackling the roots of the conflict. The peace agreement
therefore outlines economic and political societal reforms. As it would be
impractical to explicate all the points covered by the deal (the agreement text paper
is 322 pages),we will concentrate on the points that are most relevant to the
research at hand. We will therefore pay specific attention to the transitional justice
system, the security aspect, the place given to victims and former combatants and
the rural reforms.
Concerning the matter of transitional justice, there exists three types of sanction.
The first form of sanctions are applicable to those who acknowledge truth and
responsibility for the first time in adversarial proceedings before the First Instance
Chamber of the Tribunal for Peace prior to delivery of judgement. The second kind
of sanctions are imposed for very serious acts upon those who acknowledge truth
and responsibility before the prosecuting chamber prior to delivery of judgment
and consist of five to eight years of imprisonment. They will have to contribute to
their reincorporation into society by means of work, training or study during their
years of imprisonment, and shall, where appropriate, engage in activities ensuring
non-recurrence. The third kind of sanction, applicable to those who do not
acknowledge truth and responsibility but are later found guilty, sees perpetrators
be subject to the ordinary Colombian Criminal Code.179
177 Ibid, p. 132-203. 178 Ibid, p. 203-231. 179 Ibid, p. 203-231.
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The second aspect is security; more specifically that no armed group may accept
to disband without security guarantees. Therefore, the agreement provides security
guarantees for the exercise of politics as stipulated;
“the Government will strengthen, concentrate and implement all its
institutional capacity to prevent, dismantle and neutralize, adopting a
multi-dimensional approach, any possible source of violence against those
exercising politics and will take every necessary measure to ensure that
there is no resurgence of paramilitary groups”180
In practical terms, a Comprehensive Security System for the Exercise was to be
established.181 This includes “a specialized protection program for members of the
new political movement arising from the transition of the FARC-EP to legal
political activity, to be agreed between the FARC-EP and the National
Government.182Even though the conflict has ended, the populations, specifically
those living in territories affected by crops used for illicit purposes, remain
exposed to mine hazards.
“The protection of communities, the safeguarding of the right to life and
the well-being of the rural population also require ensuring the
performance of demining, for which purpose the National Government,
after the signing of the Final Agreement and within the context of the
implementation thereof, will establish a program for demining and
180 Ibid, p. 38. 181 Ibid, p. 39. 182 Ibid, p. 39.
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clearing the areas of the national territory that have been affected by the
laying of anti-personnel mines and unexploded ordnance.”183
Therefore, it was reached that:
“[t]he signature of measures and protocols to implement programs for the
decontamination and removal from the country’s territories of anti-
personnel mines (APMs), improvised explosive devices (IEDs),
unexploded ordnance (UXO) or explosive remnants of war (ERWs);
immediate humanitarian measures for the search, location, identification
and dignified delivery of the remains of persons deemed as missing in the
context of and due to the conflict.”184
This leads us to the place attributed to the rebels on the one hand and the victims
on the other, in sum, to the question of reconciliation. The victims hold a central
place in the Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice and Non-Recurrence:
“The FARC-EP are committed to reincorporation into civilian life and to
taking action as part of that process to help to redress the harm or injury
caused. Such action may include, inter alia, participating in infrastructure
rebuilding work in the areas most affected by the conflict and in programs
to clear such areas of anti-personnel mines (APM), improvised explosive
devices (IED), unexploded ordnance (UXO) or explosive remnants of war
(ERW), participating in programs to substitute crops used for illicit
purposes, contributing to the search for, location, identification and
dignified return of remains of deceased persons or persons deemed missing
183 Ibid, p.112. 184 Ibid, p134.
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in the context of and due to the armed conflict, and participating in
programs to repair environmental damage, ( reforestation.)”185
In addition to these aspects, further reforms concerning taxation, environment,
access to basic goods (i.e. water, health, education, and housing), corruption, the
promotion of democracy, the fight against organized crime and criminal
organizations, are addressed as part of the Peace Agreement.
b) Concessions and Benefits for the Former FARCs in a Nutshell
The FARCs agree to end their armed guerrilla. They shall therefore first of all lay
down arms according to the Agreement on the Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire
and Cessation of Hostilities (BDCCH) and Laying Down of Arms (LA)186 to then
disband as a combatant group and become a political party; their fight shall no
longer lie in the use of firearms but political weapons. Former combatants will
have to take responsibility for their crimes and show repentance. The recognition
of the victims’ sufferings is a first step towards reconciliation. They will have to
conform to the precepts of transitional justice and give compensation: this may
pass by public services. They must end drug trafficking as it is a straight route to
violence. Former combatants shall have to participate in the DDR process,
showing good will to return to an honest life. The path to reintegration is clearly
explained in a simple schema designed by the ACN187 and comprises the following
steps: 1) Obtention of a CODA certificate which attests that the holder is a
demobilized individual; 2) Stabilization phase; 3) healthcare; 4) psychological
185 Ibid, p.189. 186 Ibid, p. 232-236. 187 Agencia para la Reintegration y Normalization, “Reintegration Route”, available at:
http://www.reincorporacion.gov.co/en/reintegration/Pages/route.aspx (accessed November 15,
2020).
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care; 5) education; 6) training for the trades; 7) economic insertion, 8) social
service, in order to help reconcile with the community in which they evolve, 9)
legal assistance, 10) post accompaniment.
In exchange the State guarantees the protection of former combatants, a special
transitional justice system is built up to deliver “comprehensive justice” which in
practice results in partial amnesty, and a DDR process is implemented to help
former FARCs combatants reorganize their lives, return to civil life, and rebuild a
normal life. Special zones are actually created, such as the one located in the
“Tierra Grata”. These so called Transitional Local Zones for Normalizations are
there to help them in their transition towards reintegrating into society. The TLZN
are transitional, temporary and territorial-based. They are defined and delimited
by an agreement between the government and the FARC-EP. The MVM is in
charge of their monitoring and verification.188 Plus, the FARCs are allowed to
found a political party, they are offered a chance to integrate into the democratic
system. A Comprehensive Rural Reform shall be implemented. An equal
relationship between rural and urban areas shall be promoted. The reform aims to
develop a small-scale farmer and family run economy. This is a central point as it
was the source of the conflict, inequity between those who owned all the land and
those who owned nothing gave birth to the FARCs. Furthermore, anti-
discrimination measures shall be taken to prevent stigmatization and favor
reintegration. Finally, the state guarantees a substantial social and economic
reintegration through psychological support and formal education. Last but not
188 Colombian Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace,
opt.cit., p. 62. https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/1845
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least a special aid will be provided to disabled people and minors will similarly
receive special attention.
The Challenging Implementation of the Peace Deal, Including DDR Process
a) Successes and Failures
The implementation of the Peace Agreement, including the manner in which DDR
was carried out was to some extent a success. Indeed, Colombia is often given as
a positive example to countries willing to pursue a DDR process with a view to
provide stability and lasting peace to their nation.
The first success was of course the outcome of negotiations. The FARCs accepted
the deal and put an end to their armed rebellion. They proved willing to reintegrate
into society and submit to DDR proceedings. The state, NGOs, foreign nations and
organizations helped to some extent implement and finance projects to support
former combatants in their conversion to civilian life. We were able to identify at
least 1 531 financial projects which benefited 4 600 former-combatants. Plus, by
2019, 25 049 out of the 51419 who entered the reintegration process completed it,
according to ARN189. When it comes to the victims, they had a word to say in the
Peace negotiations; they were heard through several forums and representatives;
3000 victims participated in 4 forums190. Concerning drug issues, after the failure
of the U.S. financed “plan Colombia”, the government focalized a more
189 “ARN in numbers”, Agencia para la Reintégration y la Normalization, September 30, 2020,
available at :
http://www.reincorporacion.gov.co/en/agency/ARN%20Process%20Figures/ARN_in_Numbers_
September_2020.pdf 190 Ibid.
139
comprehensive struggle against drug trafficking, taking into account that
populations in the state of poverty made a living out of the growth of illicit
cultures. Therefore, the state tried to offer alternatives to these communities while
pursuing the drug dealers and inciting countries to deal with their internal drug
issues with a view to cut down consumer demand. However, implementing DDR
is always a challenge and never a complete success.
The government favoured individual projects which only benefited 16,6% of
former combatants. 71,3 % of ex-combatants still await for the state to give them
a financed project, according to the Congress’s Peace Commission191. The second
worrying point is that two years after the Peace Accords the agrarian reforms still
haven’t been implemented. The agrarian model remains production-driven and
agrarian-based on land concentration. Multinationals are welcome, free-trade
agreements have been signed with the EU, Rural and Economic Development
Interest areas (ZIDRE) were created by allocating to large agro-food vast extensive
areas of so-called unoccupied territories. Human Rights defenders have even been
threatened or assassinated by paramilitary groups opposed to the rural reforms.
The existence of these groups was only recognized by the government in 2016.
They were previously merely considered as criminal bands. Security guarantees
for former FARCs members also struggle to take a favourable turn. 200 former
FARCs members have been killed since the signature of the peace deal according
to data from the United Nations Verification Mission192. Fear has driven more than
191 Calle Aguira, Mària Clara, “Quatre ans après les accords de paix, la Colombie toujours en
proie à la violence”, France 24, September 26, 2020, available at :
https://www.france24.com/fr/20200926-quatre-ans-apr%C3%A8s-les-accords-de-paix-la-
colombie-toujours-en-proie-%C3%A0-la-violence 192 “Report of the Security-General of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia”,
United Nation Security Council, December 27, 2017, available at:
140
9 500 former combatants out of the TLZN, territories where the peace agreement
placed them under the government’s protection. Yet most of the killings took place
outside these zones. In response, the United Nations Mission recommended
strongly that the government strengthen the security of ex-guerrillas. The FARC
political party called for measures of protection before the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights.
Victims felt left aside: Since 1985, 6,5 million people have been displaced within
the country and more than half of them (60%) have found refuge in shantytowns,
living in extreme poverty193. However, these collateral victims of the 50 years
conflict have not been included in the deal, but considered a humanitarian matter
left to the UNHCR. Many victims therefore feel left out, forgotten whereas their
persecutors receive all the attention. The DDR process indeed offers an
opportunity for former FARCs members to reintegrate into society, to return
within their communities, a chance they had not always been given in the past.
The question of the governments’ goodwill to fully keep to the agreement once the
militia is no longer a threat and has lost its military power, is put to the test.
International pressure and its own commitment may not have been enough to
engage the government once the rebel group was no longer a central issue.
Furthermore, the question of whom the peace agreement engages can be brought
forwards; whether it commits the next president or not. The situation remains
delicate as the president responsible for implementing the peace process had
previously strongly opposed the deal, openly campaigning against it. Alvaro Uribe
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2017_1117.pdf 193 Gottwald Martin, “Thinking ahead; displacement, transition, solutions”, in Forced Migration
Review, RM 52, May 2016, available at: https://www.fmreview.org/solutions
141
actually first claimed he did not feel any obligation towards it. One may
nonetheless recall that the agreement is engraved within the Colombian
Constitution, so the government is obliged to comply with it.
Since the signature of the agreement, many former FARCs have been murdered.
The government has considered these crimes as isolated, creating indignation
among the former combatants, who feared for their lives, but for whom the state
appeared indifferent, unwilling to act firmly to ensure their protection, and turning
a blind eye. This indifference pushes many to fear for their future as they accuse
the state of not keeping to the peace agreement. Indeed, as well as not showing
any interest in ensuring the former combatants’ safety, the government has also
failed to invest properly in their reinsertion within society. In addition, rural
reforms are still awaited. As an example, the ZVTN within Tierra Grata was meant
to be a two-year transition zone but is still yet to be given an official status, creating
incertitude among the former FARCs regarding their future.
The present attitude of the government may bring many back to the events of the
1980s. The armed group had disarmed following a peace agreement passed with
the government. They had formed legal political parties among which was the
Patriotic Union. Nonetheless, regardless of the deal, 5000 former combatants were
killed among which two presidential candidates. The government only recognized
its responsibility in 2016.194 History risks once more to repeat itself.
Therefore, in response to the government’s lack of concern, the ex-number two of
the FARCs, Ivan Marquez, announced on the 29th of August 2019, that the militia
194 “les accords de paix en Colombie-et après ?” , in Réseau France Colombie Solidarité, August
25,2016, available at : https://reseaucolombie.ecoledelapaix.org/nos-services/penser-et-
agir/accords-de-paix-mars-2016/
142
was remobilizing.195 The former combatants all feel betrayed by the government,
but most still hold on to the peace agreement desperately and are not for the
moment being willing to take back arms, tired of years of fighting. Rodrigo
Londono, the present political leader of the FARCs, called for the respect of the
Peace Agreement, and apologized to the Colombian people and the International
Committee for those leaving it. Rodrigo Londono furthermore warned against
falling into the extreme right’s trap by rearming, as he accuses them of looking for
an excuse to go back on the agreement. Yet, around 2500 former FARCs have
rearmed and are seeking alliances with other armed groups with a view to regain
power196. It is hence the fear that the DDR process may fall into the negative
pattern of disarmament; demobilization; failed reintegration; re-armament;
remobilization; renewal of the conflict.
Furthermore, the government showing itself unwilling to advance with the
implementation of the main points of the peace process means that the
fundamental problem remains; the question of land. 1% of the population still
owns 50% of the land and the government has proven itself unwilling and most
likely incapable of attempting any serious land reform. The origin of the conflict
therefore remains present. Concerning the FARCs’ side of the deal, particular
attention must be paid to ensure that they complete their reintegration process and
do not fall back into the easy path of crime.
b) Deductions and Recommendations
195 Ibid 196 Blin Denis, “En Colombie les ex-leaders des FARC reprennent les armes”, in Le Temps,
August 29, 2019, available at : https://www.letemps.ch/monde/colombie-exleaders-farc-
reprennent-armes
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From Colombia’s successes and failures, lessons can and must be learnt. First,
rendering justice to victims is essential to prevent the occurrence of reprisals.
Secondly, the importance of informing; the ins and outs of DDR must be laid out
clearly. Thirdly, ownership of the process must be clarified. Fourthly, the problem
must be tackled at its roots. Fifthly, without political will, DDR is realistically
impossible.
With a view to building positive peace, special attention must be paid to the
victims. They should not feel left out of the peace process and receive fewer
benefits than former combatants, in particular through the Reintegration phase of
DDR. This would consequently lead to resentment and a deep feeling of injustice.
It would furthermore convey the message that persecutors are rewarded for their
crimes, nourishing the idea that violence is the means to achievement. The
challenge of a peace agreement is hence to strike the right balance between
providing justice to victims, reparation, and rendering the deal acceptable, baiting,
for ex-combatants so that they agree to lay down arms and disband. The agreement
tackles a political aspect on the one hand as it aims to end the conflict; whether it
seems proper or not from a moral stand, the FARCs must see some benefit in the
deal to accept it. On the other hand, it addresses societal issues, the victims and
the population in general must not feel that the FARCs are treated too softly and
have not paid their debt towards society, as this would be humanly unbearable.
Indeed, it would also put national reconciliation in great difficulty and be a
disservice to the former combatants themselves in their path towards reconciliation
and assimilation, hardening stigmatization.
The question of rendering justice to civil society is delicate; insurgency conflicts
engender particular violence from both sides, in violation of human rights. A
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possible solution is transitional justice. Those called to appear are tried under a
jurisdiction specifically designed to judge crimes committed in the particular
context of war. This jurisdiction is comprehensive and offers a partial amnesty in
order to promote reconciliation and encourage incriminated persons to
acknowledge their responsibility and collaborate in the search of missing people.
The question remains of who should benefit from this court. Official national army
members who committed war crimes would ask to be judged according to the rules
of transitional justice and not under the stricter military court. On the other hand,
they may hope, if not expect, to escape justice as they acted in protection of the
state’s interest and benefit from their winning status. General amnesty may thus
be a solution as it would avoid overburdening the defeated party. It seems naïve to
assume that a totally fair solution can be found, but one may only hope for the best
possible given circumstances, bearing in mind that power should not be a criterion
for justice, but equity should prevail.
It seems relevant to stress the role of communication, the importance of informing
on DDR. Political leaders should be careful to explain properly what it induces,
specifically the ins and outs of the reintegration part of DDR involving civil
society. It must be explained clearly to the populations, especially the direct
victims and the former combatants, so that they know exactly what to expect.
Informing on the process is essential for the victims to not feel that the former
fighters are rewarded for their crimes, and on the other side for the former
combatants not to expect too much and hence feel cheated by the government. The
reintegration procedure should thus be set out clearly to inspire trust and avoid
misunderstandings. If not, transitional justice can easily seem like a vague concept
open to all kinds of interpretations, people may feel like they are not involved,
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have not been consulted, but that it has been imposed on them by the elite in
agreement with international powers.
This leads us to the importance of local ownership of the process. The process, it
is important to underline at this point, must not be seen as a foreign policy,
imposed by people outside the conflict, unaware of the country, its society, its
realities, and its situation.
Finally, we should keep in mind that DDR cannot function as a peace solution
alone but works in conjunction with economic, political and security reforms. If
this is not the case, DDR remains, at best, an immediate answer to dealing with
end of conflict issues. Yet it cannot solve the origins of the conflict which are
deeper than the conflict in itself, the conflict being a mirror of internal problems.
To prevent the reoccurrence of a conflict the state should tackle the problem at its
roots, meaning the source of the conflict. If true changes do not occur, there is then
a huge risk that violent confrontation may shake the country once more. Indeed, it
is stated that 40% of post conflict countries are dragged back into war197 as
fundamental problems have not been dealt with. A country which dives into an
armed conflict is basically a country with a population which is desperate and has
nothing to lose. Internal issues, economic and political, should be dealt with before
this red line is crossed. Once again, DDR is basically meant to deal with the
question of former combatants, what new positive roles they may be given in
society. But if reforms are not undertaken, the implementation of DDR risks being
very challenging and may purely result in a loss of time and money for the state
197 Hoeffler Anke, “Growth, aid and policies in countries recovering from war”, in OECD,
October 2012, available at : https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-
resilience/docs/WP1%20Growth%20Aid%20and%20Policies.pdf
146
and international donors. Indeed, unless the government is able to ensure the safety
of the entire population, the latter will inevitably look for other means of
protection, turning therefore to armed groups. In Colombia’s case, the state not
only seems incapable of fulfilling its duty to provide security, but its security
apparatus cannot be trusted. Indeed, as mentioned in the previous paragraph the
official army has committed and commits crimes similar to those perpetrated by
militias. Many politicians and political parties are commonly known to affiliate
with paramilitary groups in order to gain or remain in power.
b. Iraq
“Just as in our occupation of Germany we had passed what were called "de-
Nazification decrees" and prosecuted senior Nazi officials, the model for the de-
Baathification was to look back at that de-Nazification” acknowledges Paul
Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).198 De-Baathification
has therefore often been described as Iraq’s De-Nazification process.
This section outlines the peace procedures implemented in Iraq after the fall of
Saddam Hussein in 2003 and after the military defeat of Daesh in 2017. The aim
is to determine applicable lessons from Iraq’s past experiences, including what
worked and what did not and to identify the local and international actors involved.
This means closer scrutiny of the concepts of the DDR, positive peace,
reconciliation and national unity, and more specifically the question of how DDR
is to be implemented in a post-conflict country with a view to reach positive peace.
198 Paul Bremer, edited transcript drawn from two interviews conducted on June 26 and Aug. 18,
2006, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/analysis/fuel.html
147
Towards this end, we have based our research on interviews, historical and
political reviews and books, as well as previous studies published online. To begin,
we shall present briefly the various conflicts which unsettled Iraq, their sources,
and the parties involved. Then we shall turn to the strategies put in place to restore
peace, before finally examining the outcomes, successes and failures, permitting
us to suggest paths towards alternative solutions.
We shall at present focus on the means put in place to create positive peace in Iraq
after the fall of Saddam Hussein and later the defeat of ISIS.
To understand the complexity of Iraq’s society and the difficulties of
implementing DDR and more generally durable peace and national cohesion, it
may be useful to look back at the construction of Iraq as a nation. This brings us
back to 1916 and the Sykes-Picot accords, ratified in 1918, placing the Middle
East under British and French influence (mandated by the League of Nations,
antecedent of the United Nations). The arbitrary way in which the Middle East
was carved up meant that various ethnic groups found themselves united under
one flag, having to form one country, one nation, laying the ground for instability.
If we look at Iraq’s society, we note that 60% of the Arab population is Shia, 40
percent Sunni, 18 percent is Kurd which is 94 percent Sunni, living alongside small
Assyrian Christian and Yezidi populations. The arbitrary delimitation of Iraq may
explain why the country has been affected by so many conflicts. Indeed, Iraq
fought three major intrastate and regional wars between 1980 and 2011: the Iraq-
Iran War (1980–1988), the First Gulf War (1990–1991) and the Second Gulf War
(2003–2011), and over two decades of international sanctions, all of which
contributed to social, political and economic stagnation. The US-led intervention
in Iraq in 2003 instigated the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime and
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culminated in a long-term presence of the US military. In the intervening years,
thousands of people were killed, and millions displaced. The US military
operations ended in 2011, but interethnic, tribal, and religious tensions erupted
into a civil war in 2014, and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) gained
popularity in northern and western Iraq.
The Geneva Convention stipulates that the responsibility of rebuilding a post-
conflict country rests on the occupying force. In the case of Iraq, the United States,
which headed the International Coalition which overthrew Saddam Hussein, found
themselves subsequently responsible for managing Iraq. To achieve this purpose,
the de-Baathification policy was decided. The US nominated Paul Bremer as head
of the Coalition Provisional Authority making him the highest authority in Iraq.
As the United States’ Defence Department ambassador, his mission was to
implement the occupation strategies of the Department of Defence and the Office
of Special Plans. The ultimate goal was to reconstruct Iraq, leading it to
democracy, providing security and economic stability. The de-Baathification
policy was thus decided to be the way forward. Its purpose was to purge the
country of Saddam’s influence and heal the population’s psychological wounds by
recognizing the human abuses they had suffered under the dictatorial regime. It
was composed of 100 decrees which were decided in order to provide a “secure,
stable environment that will sustain freedom and democracy for Iraqi people”
(CPA memorandum number 7). 199 The first order of de-Baathification of May 16,
2003, was that all members or persons affiliated to the Bath party was to be
199 Coalition Provisional Authority Memorandum Number 7 Delegation Of Authority Under De-
Baathification Order No. 1 (Cpa/Ord/16 May 2003/01), https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-
iraq/regulations/20031104_CPAMEM0_7_Delegation_of_Authority.pdf
149
"removed from their positions and banned from future employment in the public
sector."
America’s Department of Defence decided the overall policy to adopt- De-
Baathification- and nominated Paul Bremer as head of the Coalition Provisional
Authority making him the highest authority in Iraq. As the Defence Department
Ambassador, his mission was to implement the Department of Defence and the
Office of Special Plans occupation strategies. The CAP delivered a total of 100
decrees between May 2003 and June 2004. Concerning the Office of Special Plans
created by Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith, its mission was as its title indicates,
to plan the operations.
When one refers to America’s occupation of Iraq, it is impossible not to mention
the army’s involvement. Military experts at CENTCOM (the U.S. central
command in Iraq) held meetings successively in Doha and Tampa to deal with the
Iraq problem and its numerous security issues. The NSC, directly dependent on
the U.S. President, also held various meetings for the same purpose. Other than
the military high-grade officers, soldiers and their ground commanders were given
high responsibilities running the country. They were effectively asked to play a
role they had never been trained to undertake. Being soldiers and not politicians,
it is difficult to understand how they could have been expected to run a country
with everything it involves.
The role and dedication of international organizations, NGOs, and think tanks, is
not to be minimized either. The RAND corporation, 200 for instance, directed by
200 Research And Development Corporation was founded in 1948 by Douglas.
150
James Dobbins, advised Paul Bremer. 201 Throughout the occupation period, it
defended the idea that America needed to send more troops urgently. It delivered
to this end a report explaining that based on its research and past experiences, an
occupying power needs 20 men for every 1000 inhabitants to maintain order. This
meant that in the case of Iraq, approximately 400 000 would have been necessary
whereas only 100 000 were sent. “You do not go in and wait to be challenged but
go in with such an overwhelming force that nobody thinks to challenge you and
then you can cut it down, and not the opposite,” explains James Dobbins in an
interview. 202
A well-known study called the Future of Iraq Project was also undertaken. It
rendered a 2 000- 3 000 report based on the views of Iraqis in exile.203 It indicated
that even though they could not agree on one path, the Iraqis agreed that de-
Baathification had to happen. It is still worth asking if the report presented a biased
point of view as the respondents were opponents of the Baath regime.
Nonetheless, as Paul Bremer himself mentioned in an interview given on June 26,
2006, an Iraqification of the process seemed necessary. The United States
acknowledged their lack of understanding of the country and their difficulty in
differentiating true Baath believers and those who joined the party by
opportunism. “Did a person join the party because he was a real believer, or did
he join it because he wanted to be a teacher, and to be a teacher you had to join
201 James Dobbins, edited transcript drawn from two interviews conducted on June 26 and Aug.
18, 2006, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/analysis/fuel.html 202 Ibid. 203 Ibid.
151
the party? I said: We are not going to be able to make these distinctions. I need to
turn it over to Iraqis”.204
Therefore, an Iraqi de-Baathification Council was created by Order N°5 (25 May
2003). The Council transferred the process to Ahmed Chalabi, head and founder
of the Iraqi National Congress in exile. The interim government took the lead of
the de-Baathification process after the transfer of authority. It used the policy and
in fact hardened and extended it, further enforcing the process via various
institutions.
An Iraqi Supreme National De-Baathification Commission formed by the CPA
continued to exercise under the Interim Government, sustained by Chalabi.
A Supreme National Commission and Justice was established to bring justice to
the Iraqi people. According to Article 4, its aim was to identify individuals covered
by the de-Baathification process and thus render justice.
We can also point out the United Iraqi Alliance’s role in the maintenance of the
de-Baathification policy. This influential Shia political party rejected the
reintegration of former Baathist members in the new government or their
participation in any public sector as such. Mouwafak Al-Rubaie, a UIA delegate
insisted on the fact that the government should make a priority of rendering justice
to the victims of Saddam Hussein’s regime. “The issue is not about appeasing the
old Baathists or old criminals who have committed crimes against our own
people.” (CNN Late Edition interview of Mouwafak al-Rubaie).
204 Ibid.
152
During the period of occupation, the procedure followed a clear hierarchic order
which at its summit the CAP followed by the coalition force and eventually the
Iraqi De-Baathification Council. Furthermore, tribal style Accreditation Review
committees were created to work with military investigators in order to implement
the de-Baathification process.
Timeline of the De-Baathification Process:
✓ Saddam Hussein came into power in 1968 and established a strict
dictatorship over Iraq which lasted until it was overthrown by the United
States and the International Coalition in 2003. Following the Saddam area
there was a period of American occupation which lasted 14 months and
saw Iraq plunge deeper into chaos.
✓ January, 2003: The de-Baathification process, delegated to the US
Department of Defense as part of the overall strategy of occupation, was
initiated.
✓ 10 March, 2003: A National Security Council meeting was held to
determine the extent of de-Baathification as there were disagreements
between the Department of Defense, the United States Department of State
and the CIA. A compromise was finally reached; the top leaders of the
Baath party would be removed and a South African style “Truth and
Reconciliation” council established to assess the culpability of lower
members of the Baath Party. Nonetheless, in spite of the compromise
agreement, the Office of Special Plans drafted the Department of Defence
version. The de-Baathification was therefore harder than expected as it hit
all former Baath supporters regardless of their level of implication. It bears
153
mentioning that the planning and the implementation of the policy was
highly influenced by Ahmed Chalabi.
✓ 16 May, 2003: Order 1 Dissolves of Saddam Hussein’s government
✓ 23 May, 2003: The Baath party is officially dissolved, and former members
excluded from the government and public sector. This includes the health
and education sectors as well as public services such as the industrial
sector. In parallel, the army is dismantled (300 000 Shia are sent back
home, relieved to leave an army in which they were mistreated by their
Sunni officers) The disbanding of the army was considered by authorities
as inevitable as it had been used to commit abuses against the Kurd and
Shia populations. Nonetheless, we should point out that the army’s
involvement and loyalty to Saddam Hussein and more broadly to the Bath
Party is to be nuanced. In fact, except for the Special Republican guards,
the army was not allowed inside Baghdad as the dictator was wary of them,
and did not himself believe in their loyalty. On the other hand, the police
had to be called back to secure the state and stop crime spreading
throughout Baghdad.
✓ 25 May, 2003: CAP creates the Iraqi de-Baathification Council hardening
furthermore the purge (many former bath members are arbitrarily arrested
and some tortured).
✓ 2003: Cordon-and-sweep operations take place with many suspected of
belonging to the ex-Baath party arrested. The arrests reach such numbers
that it becomes difficult to identify the real enemy and turns many
extremes.
154
✓ 30 June, 2004: The end of the CAP as the 100th decree transfers power
from the CAP to the Iraqi Interim Government. This also signifies that the
de-Baathification policy is officially rescinded.
✓ 15 October, 2005: A Constitution is put together by the newly established
Interim Government banning the Baath party from Iraq.
✓ 2006-2007: a new strategy is reached by the United States to deal with
insurgencies. It is written by General Petraeus and turns out to be relatively
successful.
✓ 2007: Some former Baathists are reintegrated (mainly ex- combatants of
the Sunni Sahwa militia, which turned against extremist movements such
as Al Qaeda and accepted to ally with their ex-enemies, the Americans,
who therefore supported and financed them).
✓ 18 January, 2008: The Justice and Accountability Law replaces the de-
Baathification decree. It extends on the purge to the legal sector and seeks
to rehabilitate low-ranking former members or supporters of the Baath
party.
✓ 2009: Sunni parties join Al Iraqiyya; the former Prime Minister Iyad
Allawi’s inter-confessional party, in order to fully return to the political
scene.
✓ 2010: This leads the Shia Iraqi president to ban many of the party’s
candidates during the elections of 2010 to remain in power. Throughout
2010 many Sunni representatives are fired from their jobs in the public
sector, accused of being former supporters of Saddam Hussein’s regime,
leading Sunnis to feel discriminated against.
✓ 2010 -2013: Demonstrations against Nouri Al-Malaki’s government
multiply as he is accused of discrimination towards the Sunni community
155
(among the demonstrators can be found many former Baathists who were
victims of the purge of 2003)
✓ 2011: 600 people are arrested and accused of terrorism in order to
undermine the credibility of the Sunni movements of opposition.
✓ 23 March, 2013: An anti-government demonstration is violently repressed
in Kirkuk province, Hawija, marking the renewal of intercommunity
violence as Sunni movements such as the already violent Naqshbandi
Army (its head a former high commander of Saddam Hussein, Izzat Al
Douri) turn extreme forming an alliance with Al Qaeda (which ends in July
2014).
✓ 2014: Haidar Al-Abani succeeds Al-Malaki.
✓ 2015: There was talk about an amnesty law and a revision of the justice
and accountability law, but this is yet to be enforced.
The Successes and Failures of De-Baathification
According to an interview given by Paul Bremer, 205 the implementation of the
occupation policy was to some point a political success for Iraq as it set up a
political structure, a constitution, and offered a path towards elections. He adds
that the occupation was to a certain extent an economical success even though the
reconstruction was not as successful as planned, with nearly one million actually
spent on small projects run by military commanders.
205 Paul Bremer, edited transcript drawn from two interviews conducted on June 26 and Aug. 18,
2006, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/analysis/fuel.html
156
We should also note that the overthrow of the dictatorship meant that former exiles
were able to return to their homeland. The de-Baathification also put into light the
suffering that the population had endured for decades, especially the Kurds and
the Shia. The policy rendered justice to those who had been persecuted and gave
many the opportunity to climb the social ladder as it had actually been reversed.
But, the CPA failed to restore peace within the country. Defeating the insurgencies
and bringing security to Iraq remains a challenge, a priority issue critical to deal
with if Iraq wishes to advance. In 2003, Iraq was actually one of the most
dangerous countries in the world. 206 Iraq fell into chaos following the fall of
Saddam Hussein’s regime, demonstrations spread across the country as former
army employees protested for their paychecks. Sectarian militias multiplied
throughout the country to replace the deficient security system, each community,
village having to defend themselves, having no longer security guarantees, and the
newly established state failing to fulfil its basic duties.
Furthermore, the purge created a lack of qualified employees to run the country,
including, importantly, the public sector (electricity, health ministry and industrial
sectors etc.) De-Baathification delivered an economic blow to Iraq as it lost its
leadership and unemployment reached between 27 and 50%. The health sector
suffered a purge rendering thousands of competent people jobless. The justice
sector was also broadly affected. Sunnis found themselves left out of the new
political system altogether. Sunnis were basically told they had no future in their
206 Robert Muggah, “La gestion des armes dans les zones ‘post-conflict’”, Small Arms Survey,
2005,
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2005/fr/Small-Arms-Survey-2005-
Chapter-10-FR.pdf
157
own country, they were removed and excluded from power, not allowed, given an
acceptable future, leading to humiliation and resentment within the community.
In addition, the process was applied too extensively, driving 40 000 to 50 000 so-
called Baathists out of a job overnight (De-Baathification decree) and was
instrumentalized by the Shia and Kurds to take over power at the Sunni’s expense,
nourished by a wish of revenge rather than in a spirit of justice and reconciliation.
Indeed, Shias and Kurds took revenge of their years of alienation, as they saw in
de-Baathification a chance to reverse the power pyramid, social hierarchy, and
become the new Iraqi leaders.
It is also to be noted that while Saddam’s army was dissolved, it was not disarmed
as it happened far too suddenly. Former army members thus found themselves still
armed and out of a job which inevitably made them dangerous as desperate and
hence easy targets for militias recruiting members. Indeed, around 500 000 former
members of the army found themselves without a job or without a pension. 207
Plus, the US by arresting and using draconian methods to interrogate civilians by
thousands, turned those neutrally disposed into foes. Overwhelmed by the
situation, the US army could not draw a clear line between “friends” and enemies,
turning the first into the second, and thereby precipitating the rise of insurgent
movements and organizations such as Al Qaeda and later ISIS.
How Did De-Baathification Fail to Lay the Ground for Positive Peace?
207 Jessica T. Mathews, “The Surge has failed in its objective”,
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/po38_iraq_surge_final.pdf
158
As mentioned above, de-Baathification was supported by the Kurds and the Shias,
which saw in it a means to obtain political power. The Sunni community felt left
out and was associated with the defeated, fallen regime, leading to resentment and
humiliation and thus laying the ground for the rise of ISIS, welcomed as a
movement which was to restore their pride, dignity and a future in Iraq. 208
It also seems that there was not a sufficient number of American troops to secure
the country (25 million people and 100 000 American troops). Experts agree that
more US troops would have been necessary to maintain peace especially in Sunni
dominated areas such as al Anbar.
To provide security is necessary to gain the population’s loyalty, if you are not
able to give clear security guarantees you cannot expect the population to
collaborate.
Transitional justice should probably not dig too deep, and opt to favour
reconciliation rather than punishment. The media may find here an interesting role
to play in promoting it. Justice must be given, but cannot be confused with revenge
or become arbitrary. It should be careful not to affect those not responsible for war
abuses. It should be wary of the risk of being instrumentalized by one part of the
population to gain power and serve their own parochial interests instead of those
of the nation.
As the occupying force may not be well aware of the country’s way of functioning,
its particularities, its culture, it should do its best to understand the country it is in
208 Saghier Hazem,“The life and death of De-Baathification”, July 200,
https://journals.openedition.org/remmm/3451
159
charge of and exercise caution to not to unbalance it, listening to every group and
not to be manipulated by a specific one.
We can recall a founding moment of the Islamic State; on the 10 th of June 2014,
photos were published on Twitter with Islamic networks mentioning “the fall of
the Sykes-Picot border”. It showed members of Daesh symbolically smashing a
sand wall with a bulldozer, hence bringing together Iraq and Syria in one state.
The Sunni protest movements against the Shia government were violently
repressed by the government, using heavy weapons to target hospitals, schools and
civilians in particular in Mosul and Tikrit, in turn making the Sunni population
more radical, and allowing ISIS to grow popular, as it presented itself as a capable
defence of the Sunni community. Furthermore, the government refused to allow
more than 20 percent of former militia fighters to integrate into the national army
even though these militias turned against Al Qaeda in 2006 and 2007, supported
by the Americans. Indeed, 80 percent of former Sunni combatants were not
provided a job, thus effectively left out of the DDR process, allowing a feeling of
deep injustice to submerge the Sunni community. As a result, the Islamic State in
June 2014 took over most Sunni areas without much resistance, with even Mosul
being practically deserted by the national army. This can be explained by the fact
that the Iraqis lacked not only the will to fight, but also manpower. Indeed, if on
the paper Mosul was said to be guarded by 25000 soldiers, this was hardly the
case. Their numbers barely reached 10 000. Moreover, the Islamic State profited
from the ethnic division then prevailing in Iraq. It is interesting to note that the
Kurdish Peshmerga could once have been described as allies of ISIS before
changing sides. ISIS passed an agreement with Kurdish leaders such as Masoud
160
Barzani head of the Kurdish region.209 This agreement stated that both parties
would share the Iraqi territory, with ISIS pushing back the national army while the
Kurdish Peshmerga agreed not to interfere. For example, the Islamic State left
Kirkuk on 12 June 2014 as soon as the Peshmerga was announced, allowing the
Kurds to take over areas that were disputed with the Iraqi government. Nonetheless
this agreement did not last long as the Kurds formed an alliance the same month
with the government to defend Baghdad province against ISIS.210
Therefore the Iraqi political landscape seems more complex than one could have
expected. It is actually impossible to neatly separate the “good” and the “bad” as
a Manichean point of view would have it. Iraq being a sectarian nation, there does
not seem to be any true national cohesion as each community puts its own interest
first.
To conclude, if DDR is to take place successfully and ISIS to be defeated not only
militarily, but also and above all ideologically, it must not repeat the same
mistakes. If former Sunni combatants are once more left marginalized, the
possibility of a re-emergence of ISIS or other extremist Sunni groups cannot be
excluded. Moreover, as most of the Sunni population did not show formal
opposition to ISIS, it is hard to define who was Daesh and who was not. To make
things clearer, we can draw a parallel with France’s position after the Second
World War. The majority of its population remained passive to the German
occupation, with only a very small proportion actually joining the Resistance.
What is more, some opposed the Nazis only when they saw that the tide was
turning, thus making it difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint who was
209 Luizard Pierre-Jean, “Le piège Daech”, édition La Découverte”, Paris 2015 210 Ibid.
161
“collaborators” and who was not. To a certain extent, the attempt to actually
answer this question would have been counterproductive as it would lay the
ground for division and suspicion. Instead of a “collaborator hunt down”,
establishing national reconciliation and peace was prioritized. France succeeded
in uniting the country, concentrating only on bringing to justice only known high-
ranking collaborators. Iraq should perhaps follow a similar approach and highlight
the Sunni movements which opposed Daesh and DDR should not exclude the
Sunni population.
When implementing DDR all parties must be included (this does not obviously
mean including violent war criminals in the process and not bring justice to
victims). Too severe punishments of a specific community, a defeated party must
be avoided, and national forgiveness and reconciliation promoted. The
reintegration part of DDR must not be overlooked, as poverty and despair may if
not lead to a new conflict. Without a minimal degree of stability, DDR can
realistically not take place
After the fall of Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, on the 10th of June 2014, Grand
Ayatollah Sistani, the most senior clerical representative of Iraq, delivered a so-
called “Wajib al-Kifai fatwa” proclaiming jihad against Daesh. All eligible men
were called to volunteer for the ISF (Iraqi Security Forces). Thousands of men
answered the call but the ISF was not able to absorb such numbers. Therefore,
these volunteers joined sub-state armed groups as the official army, on the verge
of collapse, was not capable of receiving them. More than fifty militias were
created, among which prominent organizations were Badr Organization, Asaib
Ahl al-Haqq and Saraya al Salam. The diverse paramilitary groups united to form
the PMF (Popular Mobilization Forces) also known as Hashd al-Shaabi, an Iran-
162
affiliated entity, creating consequently a parallel force to the official army.
According to an article from the Middle East Policy Council,211 the PMF
regrouped approximately 125 000 fighters. Moreover, the militias are closely
linked to political parties and formed according to ethno-sectarian criteria,
deepening therefore divisions within the Iraqi society. The fight against Daesh also
permitted foreign interference, with Iran being the first country to assist Iraq in its
struggle. On the 11th of June, Iran’s highest military officer, Major General Qasem
Soleimaini of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force entered Iraq to
help reorganize militias assuming a defensive posture against Daesh. This was
actually two months before the International Coalition’s intervention. Hashd al-
Shaabi along with the Kurdish Peshmerga and the International Coalition’s air
support undoubtedly played an essential role in Iraq’s fight against Daesh at a time
when the ISF was unable to secure the country’s security.212 Nonetheless, while
the presence of sub-state armed groups was necessary to ensure national security
back at that time, their presence has since become a threat to Iraq’s security sector
and national unity. Furthermore, instead of demobilizing the militias once Daesh
defeated, the PMF was in fact legitimized by the “Hasd Law” of 26th of November
2016 thereby establishing a parallel, predominantly Shia army in Iraq.213
Carrying out a DDR process in such circumstances is quite challenging. The Iraqi
Security Forces proved its incapacity of coping alone with a terrorist threat, thus
tarnishing its image and losing popular trust. This is a serious issue as no armed
group can accept to disarm until security is established throughout the country.
211 Middle East Policy Council, 2017; https://mepc.org/journal 212 Luizard Pierre-Jean, “Le piège Daech”, édition La Découverte”, Paris 2015, 186 p. 213 Mathieu Guidère, “L’Irak ou la terre promise des jihadistes”, 2007,
https://www.cairn.info/revue-critique-internationale-2007-1-page-45.htm
163
According to the UN, a climate of security is a minimum pre-requirement for
successful DDR. Indeed, DDR works alongside SSR (Security Sector Reform).
An effective and transparent security sector which guarantees security to all parts
of society regardless of ethnicity and belief is essential to build trust and so allow
the militias to disarm without fearing for the safety of their community. On the
other hand, if DDR fails to reintegrate, SSR is put at risk as jobless ex-combatants
may rearm. The reintegration part of DDR is therefore essential as well as
challenging. According to the International Crisis Group, the vast majority of the
PMF combatants were daily laborers before joining the various armed groups and
had not finished primary or middle school.214 Their skills are therefore limited, and
in accepting to demobilize many may fear a return to poverty. On the other hand,
integrating exclusively into the Iraqi army, and not civilian life cannot be a solution
for all either. The ISF is not capable of absorbing the entire PMF force, the security
sector in Iraq does not need so many members and this would furthermore not be
economically viable. Moreover, integrating a large number of PMF combatants
would undermine the ISF. The latter would lose its ethnic balance as most PMF
fighters are Shia and this would moreover for Iran’s influence in Iraq to increase
as many militias such as Kataib Hezbullah are ethno-sectarian in orientation.
It consequently seems as if DDR has to face many challenges linked to the
specificities of Iraqi society. DDR is indeed a political and theoretical process
which needs to adapt to ground realities. Moreover, before implementing DDR, a
favorable climate is necessary, which includes security and trust in the state. It is
therefore essential that state structures such as the official Iraqi army regains
214 Robert Malley, “Iraq and the Surge”, International Crisis Group, 9 April 2008,
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/iraq-and-
surge
164
popular trust. To make this happen the ISF should work on its image by becoming
a more inclusive and diverse army, representing all ethnic groups. Demobilization
and reintegration without disarmament has also been considered as an option as
gun culture is deeply embedded in the country’s society. A too aggressive DDR
process would be a disservice to the purpose by generating distrust towards the
state. Disarmament should remain a long-term goal. With regards to reintegrating
the ex-combatants back into civilian life, the reintegration package should
correspond to economic realities. Indeed, as all sectors are not in need of the same
number of workers, some ex-combatants may have to go back to high school or
pursue professional training in sectors where need exists. Reintegration would
probably be easier if ex-combatants returned to their original community and could
even happen naturally without necessarily involving the state. When it comes to
the question of rehabilitation, the process is still more delicate as the state would
have to maneuver between rendering justice to victims and reconciliation
procedures. Indeed, it is essential not to create a feeling of injustice among the
population which would result in resentment and non-acceptance of ex-fighters.
Establishing Truth Committees at a national and community scale may be a
solution as it is important for the nation and each individual to understand what
went wrong to prevent such deadly conflicts in the future. The question of foreign
patronage is also an issue; the World Bank and the United Nations Development
Programme have global expertise in implementing DDR but international
involvement may on the other hand be perceived as interference and a threat to the
state’s independence. Finally, it is important to note that DDR should be part of a
more systemic and state-led effort to reform, involving anti-corruption measures,
development initiatives and the creation of a capable security sector. DDR’s
success also depends strongly on national unity without which each community
165
may pursue parochial interests instead of national interest. Last, but not least, for
DDR to have any chance of success, those who undertake it must ensure that the
population trust its efficacy and its ability to develop capacity for long-term peace.
Conclusion
In summary, what strategies did Iraq follow with a view to achieve positive peace?
How was DDR implemented in Iraq? Who were the actors involved? What have
these past experiences taught us?
The fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 marked the beginning of the De-
Baathification process. The CPA hoped that this would bring justice to the Iraqi
people. However, this strategy unfortunately upset Iraq’s power balance while
creating resentment among the Sunni community thus laying a favourable ground
for the emergence of extremist organizations such as Al Qaeda and ISIS. Adding
to this, the Sunni population felt persecuted by militias linked to the newly
established Shia government, plus thousands were left jobless, becoming easy
targets for recruiting militias. Instead of finding peace, Iraq once again plunged
into chaos.
DDR found Iraq a difficult and challenging ground in which to take root. The
country lacks national cohesion, political stability and the government is incapable
of providing security guarantees. Plus, it has come out fragilized by the conflicts
as it has shown itself incapable of coping alone with extremists. Until the Iraqi
government can ensure security to all its various communities equally, these will
be compelled to turn to their own militias to ensure survival.
166
The experience of DDR in Iraq proves the necessity of balancing international
interference with local ownership of the process. The Iraqi government should take
the lead of the process if it wishes to gain popular trust. If not, it runs the risk of
being accused of serving foreign interests. But this means, on the other hand, that
the government must be prepared to invest in the reintegration of combatants,
which demands a financial effort, political will and ability (the government must
show it is capable of conforming to professional standards). The importance of
adapting to realities on the ground should also be highlighted in order for DDR to
gain popular trust and not be viewed as an Occidental concept. Furthermore, DDR
must work hand in hand with SSR as without security no militia can concede to
dismantlement. Disarmament does not have to become an utmost priority as
weapons are strongly embedded in Iraq’s culture. National reconciliation should
on the other side be highly promoted without omitting justice all together.
The demonstrations which took place recently in Baghdad to denounce corruption
within the government, unemployment and external Iranian and American
interference, reminds us that DDR is not meant to replace political and economic
reform but should be tackled alongside with it.
It is now Afghanistan’s turn to open a new page in history as the Afghan
government pursues negotiations with the Taliban. How can Afghanistan benefit
from past experiences with a view to integrate the Taliban in its political scene and
thus march towards positive peace?
167
c. Nepal
In 1994, the Communist Party of Nepal was founded by Pushpa Kamal Dah and
in February 1996, it opposed Nepal’s constitutional monarchy and started a
“people’s war” which would last ten years in order to establish a single-party
communist republic. Violence escalated and intensified on both sides, leaving the
civilians caught between two fires, having to pay “revolutionary taxes” in rural
areas and lodge freely Maoist combatants on the one side. On the other side, having
to suffer brutal interrogations from the national police, suspected of being Maoist
supporters. The police were first left to deal with the rebellion as king Birendra
was reluctant to involve the army since it would give rise to the perception of civil
war. At the start, the monarchy was actually not displeased with the emergence of
a rebellion as it was bound to destabilize the democratic parties. Yet the king was
urged by many to engage the army, but still refused and did probably not take the
rebellion seriously enough. In 2001 however, following the Royal Massacre, the
king’s brother Gyanendra succeeded him. He did not follow late king Birendra’s
method, but introduced a new line of conduct to deal with the Maoists. Indeed, he
dissolved Parliament and called in the army to support the police who were by that
time completely overwhelmed by the situation and controlled little but the ground
they stood on. The well-trained army was probably involved too late in the conflict
as the Maoist’s influence had already spread among the people, the villages, in
mainly rural areas. After two attempts to negotiate with the rebels had failed, the
king dissolved the parliament and took full powers in 2005 in order to crush the
rebellion. However, this had an opposite effect as the main political parties formed
a Seven Party Alliance in May 2005 and signed a Twelve Point Agreement with
the Maoists to oppose royal rule in November of the same year. In June 2006, the
same parties signed an Eight Point Agreement and finally came to a
168
Comprehensive Peace Agreement on the 21st of November. Soon after this, the
parliament was called back and elections held in 2008 in order to form a
constituent assembly. The United Nations (UN) was invited to monitor the
elections and in May 2008 the assembly gave fifteen days to the king to abandon
the royal palace, marking the end of 240 years of monarchy rule.
The CPA215 was viewed as a political victory by the Maoist as they obtained
stalemate on the battlefield against the far more numerous national army. The ten-
year insurgency initiated by the Maoist marked the end of royal rule. In addition,
the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) obtained a strong political position and
Maoist combatants held much effective control over the countryside even after the
end of the conflict.
Timeline:216
✓ 1994: Pushpa Kamal Dahal establishes the Communist Party of Nepal
(Maoist).
✓ February 1996: Maoists oppose the country’s constitutional monarchy
and start a “people’s war” in order to establish a single-party communist
republic.
✓ June 2001: Gyanendra succeeds to his brother and becomes king after
what is known as the “Royal Massacre”.
215 Comprehensive Peace Agreement ending the decade long conflict between the Maoist rebels
and the official army on the 21st November 2006. 216 Chronology of the ten years conflict which opposed the Nepali government to the Maoist
rebels and the peace process.
169
✓ 27 July, 2001: First cease-fire and negotiations between the government
and the rebels.
✓ 13-14 September, 2001: Maoists submit 31 demands including
constituent assembly.
✓ 23 November, 2001: Negotiations come to a halt as Maoists end the
ceasefire and launch an attack against the army.
✓ 26 November 2001: The army is for the first time mobilized in the
conflict as the Government announces a nationwide state of emergency.
The CPN-M217 is declared a “terrorist organization”.
✓ October 2002: King Gyanendra dismisses Prime Minister Deuba after
several strong disagreements, appoints RPP leader Lokendra Bahadur
Chand as prime minister, and assumes alone executive power.
✓ 29 January, 2003: A second bilateral ceasefire is agreed upon.
✓ 5 July, 2003: The main political parties (NC, UML, NSP, Janamorcha
Nepal and NWPP) sign an eighteen-point agreement in the first alliance
against royal rule in order to restore parliament.
✓ July-August, 2003: After a disagreement over the constituent assembly,
Maoists pull out of talks and end the ceasefire.
✓ February 2005: King Gyanendra takes absolute power in order to put a
definite end to the Maoists rebellion.
✓ April 2005: Secret NC-Maoist talks start in New Delhi.
✓ 10 April 2005: Government signs agreement with OHCHR to open a
Nepal office.
217 Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist
170
✓ 8 May 2005: Several influential political parties (NC218, NC(D)219,
UML220, Janamorcha Nepal, NWPP221, ULF222 and NSP223) form Seven-
Party Alliance (SPA).
✓ 10-15 July, 2005: UN Special Advisor Lakhdar Brahimi visits Nepal and
later holds talks with New Delhi in September.
✓ 3 September, 2005: Semi-secret talks with SPA results in a Maoist
announcement of a three-month unilateral ceasefire, yet the royal
government refuses to reciprocate.
✓ 22 November, 2005: SPA and Maoists sign a twelve-point agreement in
New Delhi to oppose Royal rule.
✓ 2 December, 2005: Maoists extend unilateral ceasefire by one month; this
gesture is still not followed by the government.
✓ January 2006: Maoists end four-month ceasefire with numerous attacks
throughout the country.
✓ 8 February 2006: Government holds municipal elections; SPA and most
other parties boycott.
✓ April 2006: SPA and Maoist start a “the second people’s movement”
against the crown who is obliged to surrender power and reinstate
parliament.
✓ 30 April, 2006: Girija Prasad Koirala becomes prime minister and starts
open talks with the Maoists.
218 Nepali Congress 219 Nepali Democratic Congress 220 United Marx Lenine Party 221 Nepal Workers and Peasant Party 222 United Left Party 223 Nepal Goodwell Party
171
✓ 3 May, 2006: The government and rebels agree on an indefinite ceasefire.
✓ 26 May: Government and Maoists sign 25-point ceasefire code of
conduct (the king loses all power).
✓ 16 June: Maoists and SPA leaders sign an eight-point agreement
(Parliament is dissolved, an interim government formed, and UN invited
to monitor arms and verify elections, an interim constitution is planned to
be drafted)
✓ 21 Nov 2006: Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed between
government and Maoist.
✓ December 2006: Agreement on the Monitoring of the Management of
Arms and Armies (AMMAA)
✓ January 2007: a new interim constitution is adopted. Maoists control 84
seats in the 329-member interim. The UN officially establishes a mission
in Nepal (UNMIN).
28 September, 2007: Parliament passes an Army Act increasing
democratic control. 31 October, 2007: Indian
Ambassador Shiv Shankar Mukherjee holds first meeting with Maoist
leaders.
December 2007: The establishment of an interim government fails to
conclude. SPA and the Maoists agree to abolish the monarchy after the
elections
June-December 2007: Verification of Maoist combatants by the UN
✓ 2008 February: The Madhesi demand a higher degree of proportional
representation and hold strikes across the country.
April 2008: Elections to the Constituent Assembly are held. The CPN-M
emerges as the largest party
172
May 2008: The Constituent Assembly abolishes the monarchy.
July 200: Ram Baran Yadav, a Madhesi politician from the NC, is elected
first president of Nepal
28 October 2008: A Special Committee for Supervision Integration and
Rehabilitation of Maoist Army Combatants is built up
✓ May 2009: Prachanda resigns following the President’s refusal to back
his dismissal of the army chief. Madhav Kumar Nepal of the UML
becomes prime minister.
16 December, 2009: Agreement to discharge disqualified combatants
✓ January 2011: UNMIN’s mission ends as it has to deal with increasing
hostility from the Nepali Army and main political parties. The UCPN-M
hands over monitoring of cantonments to the Special Committee for
Supervision, Integration and Rehabilitation of the Maoist Army
Combatants.
✓ November 2012: The State Restructuring Commission is formed, and a
seven-point agreement signed.
✓ January-November 2012: Maoist former combatants receive voluntary
retirement packages
✓ July-November 2012: A symbolic 1400 former combatants are integrated
into the Nepali Army
✓ February 2015: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the
Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons are finally
formed nineteen years after the beginning of the conflict, but members still
struggle to put aside political interests.
The Peace Deal in Itself
173
A peace deal was reached on the 21st November 2006 putting an end to a decade
of violent confrontations between the Maoists and the Nepali government. The
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) contains and thus confirms the twelve-
point agreement, the eight-point consensus, the twenty-five-point code of conduct
as well as “all agreement, consensus, code of conduct reached between
Government of Nepal and CPN (Maoist), and letters of similar viewpoints sent to
United Nations”224.
The peace deal is the result of stalemate on the battlefield and mass popular
movements for democratization of the state encouraged by India. It pays particular
attention to the achievement of democracy, the restructuring of the state, respect
of human rights, cessation of violence on both sides and compensation towards
victims of the conflict in pursuit of impartial justice. The CPA also gives centre
stage to the United Nations who are to monitor the lock up of arms, manage the
cantonments and verify the legitimacy of the 2008 elections. Both parties agreed
on the necessity of establishing cantonments in order to help the communist
combatants transit to civilian life. These special spaces were meant to last six
months. The government committed to ensure that the former rebels have adequate
accommodations and lack no basic needs. The Maoist leaders remain responsible
for managing the cantonments. Their arms were locked up and under supervision
of the UN, but the Maoist chief of each cantonment guarded the key. In parallel,
the official army was to be confined to barracks; their activities were reduced to
the absolute minimum, border control for instance. In addition, they were
symbolically demanded to lock up the same amount as the Maoist had given in.
224 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, preambul, November 21, 2006,
https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/comprehensive-peace-agreement
174
UN agents, as agreed in the 28 November 2006 Agreement on Monitoring of
Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA), were permitted to enter the
cantonments as well as the military barracks in order to verify the agreement was
kept and the arms properly locked up. In addition, the CPA decided in 2006 to
revoke the Army Act of 1959, ending the relationship between the king and the
army, leading the former to lose his status of chief supreme of the royal army.
Concerning the reintegration of former combatants into society, the CPA fixed a
quota of 6500 to be integrated into the national army. The rest were to choose
between voluntary retirement (receive a certain amount of money according to
their grade) or a rehabilitation package (receive adapted training or peruse studies
in view of obtaining a job making them useful to society).
The CPA also contained a part devoted to comprehensive justice. A transitional
justice system was supposed to be implemented to help Nepal respond to the
necessity of dealing with the human right abuses which occurred from both sides
during the conflict. This meant procuring reparation to victims and prosecuting
persecutors while bearing in mind the special circumstances of civil war. In 2007,
the landmark Supreme Court gave directives to the Nepalese government to
investigate cases of disappearance during the war, leading the Commission of
Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons to be founded. The National
Human Rights Commission and other human rights activists had indeed urged the
government to act on the question of justice as they exposed the war’s violence.
External Aid to Fulfil the Peace Process and Implement DDR
175
Nepal’s geographical situation may give us an idea of some of the important
international actors which intervened in the peace process. Firstly, China may
come to one's mind, however this international giant had an indirect role in the
peace process. Surprisingly, the Nepalese are not more aware of China than of the
far Western countries, Europe and the United States. This can partly be explained
by China’s “non-involvement” policy and by its acknowledgement of India’s
supremacy over Nepal.
As can therefore be expected, India holds a central but ambiguous place within the
peace deal. New Delhi made possible the negotiations between the Maoist and the
parliamentary parties and therefore can pride itself over the success in 2005 of the
12 Point Understanding, the deal which preceded the final Comprehensive Peace
Accord signed in 2006. New Delhi was thus perceived as a peace guarantor by
both parties. The parliamentary parties as well as the Maoists saw India’s
involvement positively as it provided legitimacy to the latter while containing
them within the parliamentary order. However, relationships between India and
Nepal were not always downstream. Indeed, during the conflict, the Nepalese
government resented India for not showing support in putting an end to the Maoist
rebellion. On the contrary, India’s passivity and tolerance towards the Nepalese
rebels was displayed as Maoist leaders were able to openly hold meetings with
other far left-wing groups on Indian soil. On the other hand, after the peace
agreement was signed and during its implementation, New Delhi insisted that no
more than a few thousand former Maoist fighters should be allowed to integrate
the Nepalese Army in order to prevent the Maoist from taking over the army. In
addition, India intervened to include the Madhesis requests within the new
constitution. This can be explained by the fact that the latter are favourable and
176
closely linked to India. Plus, as the Madhesis are Nepali inhabitants of Tarai plains
located at the Indian border, calm in Tarai would mean calm in India’s border
states, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. In sum, India intervened in Nepal to put forward
its own national interests.
As to the United States, the first world power, it did not welcome the revolt of the
Maoists with a good eye. As it occurred little after the end of the Cold War it was
perceived as a communist remnant. More importantly after the 2001 first terrorist
attack on American ground, the Nepalese government’s struggle to end the Maoist
rebellion was viewed through the spectre of global war against terror. Indeed, the
Maoists could be found on America’s Terrorist Exclusion List until 2012225.
Therefore, the United States, even after the Peace agreement was signed, strongly
advised the Nepalese government to prevent the Maoists from entering fully the
political scene before they had truly laid down arms and renounced the use of
violence. As a result, the US played a small part in the peace process, yet they
supported its implementation as it provided strong financial aid to rebuild Nepal’s
society through USAID.
The United Kingdom – Nepal’s old colonizer – played but a limited role,
supporting the implementation of the peace process through its Department for
International Development. According to a study undertaken by Conciliation
Resources in March 2017, it began development programming to address
underlying grievances. It states that in 2004 the United Kingdom “started the
Janajati Empowerment Project (JEP), which was aimed at ensuring greater social,
225 “Two steps forward, one step backward, the Nepal Peace Process” , Accord review, issue 26,
https://www.politicalsettlements.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/2017_CRAccord_Nepal.pdf
177
political and economic inclusion”226. Yet the UK’s continual attempts to put
forward the issue of democratic freedom and inclusion had the negative effect of
irritating the Nepalese government.
Last but not least, the United Nations played a paradoxically central third-party
role throughout the peace process. It was already present during the conflict and
held centre stage during the implementation phase of DDR and the only actor in
charge of its implementation. The UN’s position was however instrumentalized
by the various political groups and the organization found itself in the middle of
political struggles, accused by all parts of serving the opposite party’s interests. In
May 2005, the UN officially established an OHCHR office in Nepal and in 2007
it played a key role in determining how former Maoist combatants should be
integrated within the official Nepalese Army. A UN military advisor facilitated
negotiations that led to the Agreement on Monitoring the Management of Arms
and Armies (AMMAA) signed in late 2006. The UN acted through its several
specialized offices (UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA and ILO). It launched the UNIRP
program in February 2010 and distributed “packages” which offered options of
vocational skill training, micro enterprises, health training and education to young
combatants as the government of Nepal gave instructions to the UN to concentrate
on economic integration. The funding was provided by the UN Peace Fund for
Nepal (UNPFN), a multi-donor trust fund supported by Canada, Denmark,
Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Yet the UN faced difficulty
building political buy-in from the Government of Nepal, as well as direct
opposition from elements within the UCPN. It conceded less and less leverage and
in 2008 once its mandate on monitoring and verifying the implementation of the
226 Ibid
178
constituent assembly election was achieved, its sole role remained the monitoring
of both armies. This lack of responsibilities created frustration within the UN
which felt pushed aside from the peace process, as it was not given the means to
verify its proper implementation. It was not involved with the discussions on how
the DDR process should go through but were left to deal with the outcomes and
possible negative effects. In addition, the UN had to remind repeatedly and without
much success the parliamentary parties that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
was not only about DDR and reintegrating the Maoist combatants but also about
democratization and restructuring of the National Army which should aim to be
more inclusive, meaning representative of all parts of society. Hence the UN was
accused by the parliamentary parties of being biased in favour of the Maoists or at
the least instrumentalized by the latter, while on the other side the Maoist opposed
DDR as they were uneasy about the process of demobilizing their combatants.
Their armed forces were perceived and used as a leverage during negotiations with
the government, disbanding their combatants would thus weaken their position.
Another reason for the UN’s loss of popularity was its repeated calls to include
marginalized groups such as minorities and women. This did not convene the main
political parties which grew wary of the UN. Therefore, the UNMIN’s mission
was not renewed in 2011 and they were bid farewell by the Nepalese government
on the 15th January.
The Challenges of Implementing the Peace Agreement
The Maoists and main political parties pursue opposite goals as each party fights
for its own interests instead of national interests. For instance, concerning the issue
of former combatants the UNCP wishes the Maoists to integrate into the national
179
army as a group and in mass. They also demand that the actual ranks of the soldiers
be respected. On the other side, the other parties strive to limit the numbers of
Maoists integrating the army and are wary of them. They wish to break the chain
of command existing between former Maoist fighters and favour an individual
integration which would enforce loyalty towards army commanders and the
government and soften the communist ideological beliefs. Another crucial point
of disagreement is whether disarmament of the former rebels should happen
straight after the comprehensive peace is signed or wait until the Maoists are
properly integrated into the national army.
In addition, there exists severe discrepancies between the UN’s idea of DDR and
those of the Nepali government and former Maoist rebels. The UN is highly in
favour of a rehabilitation procedure of former combatants which is a common
DDR approach. Combatants would be encouraged to reintegrate into civil society.
In order to do so they would be provided education as well as social and
psychological support. They would receive training or be aided to continue their
studies in order to play a positive role within their communities which would help
them integrate. As for the UNCP, the party supports the voluntary retirement
option also known as the “golden handshake”. The former rebels would receive a
certain amount of money, which could be quite considerable depending on one’s
rank, in exchange for their laying down of arms. The UN finally found itself side-
tracked, and DDR was implemented for the least in an original way. Political
parties chose to follow an “integration, rehabilitation, and retirement” (IRR) after
a “breakthrough deal” in 2011. The UN found itself obliged to cope with this new
form of DDR. The integration of a “golden handshake” procedure within the DDR
180
process appears to be particularly expensive as 90%227 former combatants chose
this option. Former combatants received a one-time cash payment of between 5000
and 8000 US dollars228 in order to demobilize and start afresh. As most
international donors are reluctant to finance the cash package project, its funding
would cost the Nepali national treasury approximately 6 billion NRS.
Regarding the reform of armed forces and demobilization of former combatants
after the CPA agreement, it took the extremely long period of five years for former
Maoists to demobilize. A short time after the peace agreement was signed between
February and March 2007, the Maoists were placed in 28 cantonments in order to
pursue their transition towards civilian life smoothly and providing time for both
parties to decide on the future of these ex-rebels, on the form DDR should take.
The containments were meant to last for only six months at the most, a period
which was uncommonly extended. While the discussions were ongoing, the
former combatants were used as a strong political leverage by the Maoist party. It
was therefore not in its interest to let their combatants demobilize rapidly. The
containments resembled war communities more than a space favorable to
demobilization as the military hierarchy and training was kept. The period of
containment re-enforced the former combatants’ belief in the communist ideology
and thus their loyalty towards the Maoist party, making their reintegration into
society more difficult. The former combatants could hence hardly be qualified as
disbanded. Moreover, the end of the conflict did not entail the end of recruitment.
On the contrary, many so-called former combatants were recruited after the
conflict to strengthen the number of former combatants and hence provide more
227 Ibid 228 Ibid
181
political power to the Maoist party. In a controversial video, Prachanda is shown
explaining to other Maoists during a secret meeting held in January 2008, how he
deceived the UN on counting 35 000 former Maoist combatants instead of the true
8000. This gave a poor image to the UN who were portrayed as naïve and unaware
of realities on the ground and moreover made the other parties wary of the UN
who was accused of being biased. It was indeed challenging for the UN to make a
distinction between new recruits and former fighters. Still 4000 Maoist within the
containment were disqualified by the UN as they were late recruits or under-age.
They therefore had to quit the containments, this creating frustration among the
disqualified as they were discharged and returned to their communities with a very
small amount of money, sometimes after spending years in the containment, but
with nothing to show for. In addition, they were badly received by their community
as “disqualified”, which in Nepalese culture has a very negative meaning. This
lack of tact from the UN disserved their popularity and harmed the reintegration
process. Due to this a considerable number of Verified Minors and Late Recruits
(VMLR) joined the YCR, a Maoist youth party.
As for the national army, in December 2009, the government formed a ‘Committee
for the Recommendation for the Formulation of the Plan for the Democratization
of the Army and Improvement of the Security Apparatus’. The committee
submitted a ‘Detailed Plan for the Democratization of the Nepali Army’ in August
2010. However, the government proved reluctant to release the report, hence it did
not result in any clear action taken. Therefore, the Nepali Army remained the most
powerful, well-organized and autonomous institution of the Nepali state. Yet the
Nepali army did make some significant positive changes as the Interim
Constitution required the army to be ‘national and inclusive”, open to all parts of
182
society. Therefore, separate regiments were established for people of Tarai origin
and for eastern Nepal Janajatis of Kirat background. Plus, the army aimed to
include women with the aim that they comprise five percent of total recruits, which
it had practically achieved by 2016. Regarding the integration of former Maoist
combatants, regardless of the Maoist demand, a symbolic number of only 1400
were integrated within the national army which corresponds to 8,3% of verified
former combatants229.
Finally, the transitional legal system saw little success. In June 2007, the Supreme
Court gave directions to the government to investigate cases of disappearance, but
it failed to go beyond political interests. At the repeated demands of victims and
human rights activists, in 2008 a Commission for Truth and Reconciliation was
established. However, it took the controversial decision to offer amnesty for
crimes committed during the war by Maoists and the national government,
neglecting the people’s requests for justice. After further protests and struggle,
seven years after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed, a Commission
on Investigation of Enforced Disappearances, Truth and Reconciliation Act was
passed. However, it favoured impunity, creating frustration among victims who
felt powerless and deeply betrayed by the government. Hence, in 2016 the UN
wrote officially to the government to express its disapproval and dissociate itself
from the Napoli Transitional Justice System.
Conclusion
229 Ibid
183
The battlefield turned into a multi-party political struggle in which the UN found
itself entangled and each party was putting forwards its own interest in order to
gain power. International and national peace actors should do their very best to
work closely, hand in hand, and thus find a common approach so that they agree
on one same path towards positive peace. National interest should prevail over
personal or party interests, and international actors must have a clear
understanding of the social and cultural realities particular to every nation to avoid
offending a certain group. Failure to do this could have a negative impact on the
ongoing peace process and render the population discontent and wary towards
foreign peace actors or even create an escalation of tensions. Former antagonists
must show good will in implementing DDR and not maneuver to delay. Victims
should not be forgotten and left out of the peace process; comprehensive justice
must not be overlooked but truly undertaken. Equity should prevail over power
and status. Economic integration is essential, but this should be undertaken jointly
with psychological aid and social reintegration. Specific attention should be paid
to child soldiers, and reintegration efforts should distinguish women and men as
having different needs and as confronted with different issues and social stigmas.
It should be acknowledged that former women soldiers face different integration
difficulties than their male fellow combatants. They often face stigmatization from
their original communities, and are perceived as immoral as they lived side by side
with men combatants. DDR should therefore adapt to answer women’s special
needs. DDR should be undertaken straight after a peace agreement is found to
avoid the appearance of spoilers. Moreover, it should be seen as a priority along
with political, economic and military restructuring and should not be postponed.
184
SECTION FIVE
THE MILITARY MACHINERY OF THE
AFGHAN PARTIES TO CONFLICT
185
SECTION FIVE: THE MILITARY MACHINERY OF THE
AFGHAN PARTIES TO CONFLICT
Chapter 10.5. An Assessment
A. Background
There has been a historical clash and enmity between organized Afghan
armies based in urban centres and disorganized tribal-cantered irregular militias
based in rural areas over territory and power. This and for many other reasons
Afghans have seen the successive rise and fall of many different armies over the
course of history (armies largely dependent on foreign aid and technical military
assistance). Afghan Emirs and rulers were obsessed with building armies mainly
to safeguard their power and throne but also to suppress rebellions across the
country. During these cycles of rise and fall of various armed forces of
Afghanistan, we have had many instances where armies and militias integrated
and re-integrated into each other under a new ruler or a new organization.
In the last four decades, Afghanistan has seen the rise and fall of at least three
Afghan armed forces with various degrees of disintegration: the royal armed
forces; the communist armed forces; and the Mujahedin forces. In this entire cycle
of lapse and relapse of the Afghan armed forces, the process of integration and
reintegration into military and civilian life took place for personnel in the armed
forces of Afghanistan and some with peculiar characteristics limited to the Afghan
context. For example, when the communists took power, they immediately started
a purge of officers loyal to the former Afghan King, which included imprisonment
and torture, exiling but also renouncing the King and taking membership of the
one of the communist factions i.e. Khalq (The People) or Parcham (The Flag) and
186
returning to service. Moreover, after the collapse of the communist regime in
Afghanistan, the Khalqis (The People) joined Gulbuddin Hekmatyar group
whereas the Parchamis (The Flag) joined Ahmad Shah Massoud group.
In this context, it is extremely important for any successful and sustainable
integration and reintegration of Taliban fighters and commanders both into
military and civilian life to understand the institutional platform through which
integration take place. Understanding military roles, military culture, type of
military organization, command structure, force size as well as force composition
helps on to be able to identify units for integration with the already constituted or
newly reconstituted military under a new political agreement.
B. An Overview
i. The Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF)
a. Organization and Structure.
The Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) was constituted in
2003 during the Geneva Security Sector Reform donors conference as a part of the
international effort to create a viable alternative to the expansion of international
security forces based in Afghanistan as well as to eventually transition security
responsibilities to a viable, professional and national force. ANDSF was expected
to be able to safeguard Afghanistan from internal and external threats but also to
serve as a counter-terrorism partner to the international community to ensure
terrorist safe havens do not emerge again in the country. The current ANDSF
strength stands at 382,000, which consists of: Afghan National Army (ANA),
Afghan National Policy (ANP) and National Directorate for Security (NDS). The
187
actual strength of each of these services vary from year to year due to many
different factors. The current strength of the Afghan National Army is estimated
to be around 227,000 personnel and the strength of the Afghan National Police
(ANP) is estimated to be around 125,000 personnel. Moreover, the government of
Afghanistan and its international partners i.e. the US and NATO, trained and
recruited thousands of local armed men as local police and regional army (see
Militia Force below).
The Afghan forces are organized into office HQs in Kabul with various zonal and
geographical command centres i.e. army corps commands and police zones.
188
Figure 2. Ministry of Defence Organization Chart
Source: IG, D. (2020). Enhancing Security and Stability In Afghanistan. Retrieved
December 06, 2020, from https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jul/01/2002348001/-1/-
1/1/ENHANCING_SECURITY_AND_STABILITY_IN_AFGHANISTAN.PDF
189
Figure 3. Ministry of Interior Organization Chart
Source: IG, D. Enhancing Security and Stability In Afghanistan. Retrieved December
06, 2020, from https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jul/01/2002348001/-1/-
1/1/ENHANCING_SECURITY_AND_STABILITY_IN_AFGHANISTAN.PDF
b. Force Management
The Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) is built on the NATO
model and initially was a co-optation of various Mujahedin factions who were later
on professionalized through training and working with NATO officers in the
battlefield. The NATO and US advisory missions played a critical role in the
190
raising, training, equipping and deployment of the Afghan forces. In the beginning,
these forces were initially an infantry force used to augment NATO combat and
counter terrorism capabilities in counter terrorism operations across the country.
Later on, two more services were added to these forces i.e. the air force and special
operations forces. The current strength of the Afghan National Defence and
Security Forces (ANDSF) stands at 382,000 but the actual strength is well below
this number.
c. Approach to War and Chain of Command
The Afghan army is trained in regular warfare. It is organized, trained and
equipped on the principles of regular warfare. Recently, with the introduction of
the special forces i.e. Afghan commandos and the Afghan Air Force (AAF)
Special Mission Wing (SMW) new critical capabilities were introduced to ANDSF
to be able to conduct special operations and counter irregular warfare.
Moreover, the Afghan forces have a clear and straightforward chain of command.
At the helm of it stands the Afghan President as commander in chief (CiC) along
with Minister of Defence as political civilian commander of the force whereas the
Chief of General Staff (CGS) stands as a four-star general considered to be the
highest professional military officer in-charge of all forces from all the three
services (ANA, ANP and NDS).
Figure 4. ANDSF Chain of Command
Commander in Chief (CiC)
MOD/MOI/NDS Chief
Chief of General Staff
(CGS)
Corp Commands and Police
Zones
Battalions and Brigades
191
d. Sources of Financial and Technical- Military Support
Based on the Chicago NATO summit declaration, NATO and its partner countries
will commit to provide funding to the Afghan forces through 2024. Meanwhile the
primary responsibility of providing funds for the ANDSF rests with the Afghan
Government with the Afghan Government increasingly taking responsibility for
the financial burden of the forces through an annual contribution of at least $500
million to the Afghan forces.
Figure 5. Funding Contributions to ANDSF
Source: GENERAL, U. OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL. Retrieved December
06, 2020, from https://www.stateoig.gov/system/files/lig_oco_ofs_mar2017_508_1.pdf
The Afghan forces are primarily funded through two mechanisms: The Afghan
National Army Trust Fund (ANATF) and the budget of the Afghan Government.
192
ii. The Afghan Taliban Fighting Machinery
a. Organization and Structure
The Taliban military machinery is a polycentric and shura-based system.
It is a decentralized fighting machinery which gives considerable amount of
autonomy to its senior and mid-level commanders in the field. At the top of this
shura-based decentralized system is the Amir al Muminin (Leader of the Faithful)
whose religious authority is absolute and is selected for life. As Antonio Giustozzi
the long-term observer and expert on Taliban movement puts it:
“In Taliban’s system, shuras are representative organs and commissions,
departments and offices are executive ones. Theoretically at the top of the
Taliban’s structure is the Amir al Muminin (supposedly Mullah Omar until
2015), who however never played a real leadership role until 2015;With
the controversial succession of Akhtar Mohammad Mansur to Mullah
Omar in the summer of 2015, the Amir al Muminin was finally a real leader
and not a ghostly presence, but at the same time large portions of the
Taliban refused to acknowledge Mansur as Amir al Muminin on grounds
of his rigging of the party congress that selected him. The same has applied
to Haibatullah Akhund when he succeeded to Mansur in May 2016,
selected by a small clique of leaders. For all intents and purposes,
therefore, the Amir al Muminin from 2015 has become a source of division
and controversy, rather than a unifying figure. The Taliban no longer have
a figure around whom they all unite.”
According to Antonio and other sources – the Taliban were organized under four
shuras:
193
i. Quetta Shura: This is the highest political and military decision making body of
the Afghan Taliban named after the Pakistani city of Quetta. Under this Shura
operates Miran Shah, North Waziristan and Peshawar Shuras. The notorious
Haqqani Network also comes under the authority of Quetta Shura but enjoys
certain level of autonomy because of its close linkage to the Pakistani
establishment.
ii. North Shura: It is a breakaway group from the Peshawar shura and operated
initially out of Baghlan and then moved to Badakshan province. The entire
operations in the north falls under the responsibilities of this shura and consists of
Jundullah, Baryal and Habibullah Mahazes.
iii. Mashhad Shura: It is both considered as a regional command for western
provinces of Afghanistan as well as a political office. The name is derived from
the Iranian city that it is based. The Mashhad shura is under the heavy influence
of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) and operates both as an autonomous
as well as dependent shura under the Taliban leadership.
iv. Mullah Rasoul Shura: This shura is named after its leader Mullah Rasoul who
used to be a member of the Quetta Shura. He is now in open opposition to Quetta
shura and runs his own military command. It is rumoured that he is linked to both
the Afghan Government as well as the Iranian.
194
Figure 6. Taliban’s Leadership Chart
Source: Council on Foreign Relations (CfR)
195
Figure 7. Taliban Shuras
Charisma and personalities play an important role in the Taliban movement. The
mahaz-based system which consists of groups ranging between twenty (20) to a
couple of hundred is the basis of the Taliban military machinery.
b. Force Management and Chain of Command
There are different estimates of the Taliban’s total strength. Unofficial
statistics from the Afghan Government sources estimates the total strength of the
Taliban at 45k people whereas SIGAR estimates around 60k permanent fighters
with fluctuating number of seasonal fighters. Academics such as Gustiozzi
estimate the total manpower of the Taliban to be around 200k of which 60k of
them are permanent fighters and the rest are seasonal fighters and mobile units.
196
The mobile units tend to be based out of Afghanistan i.e. Pakistan and Iran and
arrive in the battlefields around Afghanistan on a need or operation basis.
There is no single command and control centre for the Taliban operations. The
command system varies from shura to shura and often from commander to
commander. However, the Taliban Amir al Muminin is the commander in chief of
the Taliban and has the ultimate say on all military, religious and political matters.
Theoretically, the Amir al Muminin approves and has the final say on all military
matters within the military domain and then different Taliban shuras and
commissions carry out Taliban military operations through their shadow governors
as well as field commanders.
Figure 8. Taliban Chain of Command
Mainly, there are two types of forces within the Taliban military chain of
command: a. central forces under the direct control of the military commission i.e.
mobile units and b. autonomous fronts i.e. Loya Mahazes which are not directly
owned by the military commissions and have their own leaders and chain of
command. While the latter coordinates its activities and plans with the military
commission, it operates autonomously. Most of the time, these chain of commands
and force management is also affected by the sources of funding, donors and
personality differences within various Taliban factions.
Taliban Amir al Muminin
Taliban Shuras Taliban Military
Commissions
Shadows Governors (Provincial /District)
Taliban Field Commanders and Fighters
(Mahaz)
197
c. Approach to War
Taliban conduct guerrilla warfare. It is a historical military approach and
runs deep into Afghan military culture and way of war. The Taliban military
strategists believe in the age-old “death by a thousand cuts”. In other words,
ambushes hit and run tactics, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks among
others while waiting out your enemy. This strategy was implemented against the
Red Army’s 40th Division in Afghanistan and proved to be successful because of
the geography and landscape of the country which is quite hospitable and an ideal
for conducting guerrilla warfare. The same strategy today is put into
implementation by the Taliban against US, NATO and the Afghan Government
forces. Taliban fight in groups of 20 or more and often times with basic weapons.
d. Source of Financial and Technical- Military Support
The Afghan Taliban financial sources are a mixed pot of state
sponsorships, extortion money, illegal mining, drug-dealing money and financial
assistances from the wealthy Sheikhs as well as friendly businesses in the Gulf
countries. Different sponsors of various Taliban factions pursue different
objectives and agendas. Therefore, Taliban have been trying to centralize revenues
and funds through the finance commission. To this date, the financial system of
the Taliban is not fully centralized and the financial autonomy of certain groups
who operate under the Taliban umbrella give them the freedom to operate away
from the rigid Taliban chain of command.
198
iii. The Militia force
a. Background
Militia force played an important role in history of Afghanistan. For example,
foreign funded Afghan militia force used to secure the Durand borderline.230
Governments would give them certain privileges such as dispensation from formal
military service.231 Militia forces i.e. local organized armed forces have engaged
in both aggressive and defensive wars at the service of both local communities and
foreigners.
During the reign of People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, amid the “war and
Jihad”, militias became widely popular. Najeebullah’s government used militia
force across the north, northeast, and the west regions.232 However, such forces
rather used the situation for furthering their personal interests. During the
Mujahedin’s reign in power, various Jihadi militia groups fought each other over
government resources. Their infighting led to destruction of the country and paved
the way for further promotion of the militia force.233
230 Durand-line is the borderline between Afghanistan and Pakistan, named after Sir Henry
Mortimer Durand, the British agent who administered the borderline agreement between British
India and Abdurrahman Khan. 231 Mark Sedra, “The Army in Afghanistan, from Abdur Rahman to Karzai,” Middle East
Institute, November 17, 2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/army-afghanistan-abdur-
rahman-karzai. 232 David H. Young, “The Coming Rise of Afghan Militias,” The Atlantic (Atlantic Media
Company, January 24, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/01/the-
coming-rise-of-afghan-militias/272470/. 233 Ibid.
199
In the course of the 2004 presidential elections, the militia i.e. illegal armed groups
re-emerged as a powerful stakeholder.234 The evidences show that by supporting
their favourite individual candidates and threatening the people, the militias and
the warlords, significantly distorted the elections.235
The newly established government and the international community recognized
them as a serious challenge ahead of peace, stability, and democratic reforms.
However, due to a lack of proper strategy, the government failed to confront the
power of the militia. The international community found themselves collaborating
with the Afghan militia force. The militia force significantly challenged the 2005
parliamentary elections and continued to thrive afterwards. As a result, the DDR
and the DIAG programs ended while not having contributed to the improvement
of the security.
According to the report of Afghanistan’s Independent Human Right Commission,
during the 2005 parliamentary elections, warlords and militia-affiliated candidates
had violated the electoral laws and rules, intervening and fabricating documents.
As a result, 80% of the warlords and the militias become parliament members,
rising alarms for the newly established Afghan government. Despite the presence
of NATO forces under U.S. leadership, they managed to consolidate their
power.236
234 “Afghanistan: From Presidential to Parliamentary Elections,” Crisis Group (International
Crises Group, September 27, 2016), https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-
asia/afghanistan/afghanistan-presidential-parliamentary-elections. 235 Andrew Wilder, “A House Divided - Refworld,” AREU, December 2005, accessed December
8, 2020, https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47c3f3c01b.pdf. 236 Rights body warns of warlords’ success in elections, October 18, 2005, The New
Humanitarian, 18 October 2005
200
b. Approach to War
The militia’s approach to war differs from place to place, and from time to time
based on their mission and recruitment. In post-2001 era, the militia forces have
been collaborating with different actors through different framework including:
Cooperation of Militia with the coalition forces: After the 2005, with the re-
emergence of the Taliban and deterioration of the security situation, the ISAF
forces recruited some of the militia force to provide security for their Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). That way, the militia started to benefit from the
ISAF security contracts. They grew wealthier and more powerful.237
Private Security Companies: Some of the militia force, in cooperation with certain
high-ranking officials in Ministry of Interior, and parliamentarians, initiated
private security companies. Through private security companies, the militia force
became a big challenge ahead of the rule of law; some of them even managed
private prisons. Ali Ahmad Jalali, the then minister of interior, launched a night
operation against two of these private security companies in Kabul. At the end of
his presidency, President Karzai through a presidential decree put an end to
operation of private security companies and instead created the government-
controlled Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF). 238
237 Robert M. Prito, “The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan:
Lessons Identified,” United States Institute of Peace, May 19, 2015,
https://www.usip.org/publications/2005/10/us-experience-provincial-reconstruction-teams-
afghanistan-lessons-identified. 238 “The Survival of the Private Security Companies,” Afghanistan Analysts Network - English,
March 9, 2020, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-peace/the-survival-of-
the-private-security-companies/.
201
Semiformal security force: In recent years, militia forces increasingly used as
semi-official security forces across localities facing security threats from the
Taliban. Some of the semiformal militia forces include:
- Local Police and Army: The local police force (around 30,000 armed men)
and local army were created as a parallel force next to the formal security
forces. Mechanisms were created for to guide the operations of theses local
militia forces but it proved to be impractical. While they proved to be
effective in some areas and circumstances, reports suggest that militia
forces are involved in criminal activities such as kidnapping, violation of
human rights, violence against women, among other things.239
- The People’s Uprising Forces: The strategy of establishing a local police
force and local army failed to ensure the security of insecure districts.
Then, the National Security of Directorate (NDS) in collaboration with
commandership of Resolute Support (RS) took another initiative, i.e. the
creation of people’s uprising forces in insecure regions under the
leadership and control of the NDS and provincial governance. Once again,
this initiative served as a milky cow for the warlords and the militia. This
initiative was held hostage by the militia force. While labelled as
community defence force, they were, to a varying extent, outside the
control of local people.240
239 “The Future of the Afghan Local Police,” Crisis Group, August 23, 2016,
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/future-afghan-local-police. 240 Kate Clark and Fazl Rahman Muzhary, “Enemy Number One: How the Taleban Deal with the
ALP and Uprising Groups,” Afghanistan Analysts Network - English, March 9, 2020,
https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-peace/enemy-number-one-how-the-
taleban-deal-with-the-alp-and-uprising-groups/.
202
c. Source of Financial and Technical- Military Support
The sources of income and technical- military support of the militia force largely
depend on their mission and recruitment, which determine their organization and
structure. As suggested above, during the past couple of years a portion of militia
force operated on the payroll of the government. As semiformal security forces
they received financial and technical support from the government. However, the
militia force has also been engaged in illegal and criminal but profitable activities.
Some of such forces provided security service to certain warlords.
Conclusion
The above assessment of the military machinery of the various Afghan parties to
conflict shows that all parties, to different extents rely on militia force and militia
making to further their group interest. In some areas, local militias managed to
defend their community against external threats. However, widespread operation
of the militia force created its own political economy stretched across insurgent
groups- such as Taliban, criminal networks and government institutions. Lack of
accountability, lack of financial transparency and corruption, are major
characteristics of the militia’s political economy. Militia force grew strong at the
cost of formal security sector.
203
SECTION SIX
A ROADMAP TO INTEGRATE THE
TALIBAN FIGHTERS AND COMMANDERS
INTO MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LIFE
204
SECTION SIX: ROADMAP TO INTEGRATE THE
TALIBAN FIGHTERS AND COMMANDERS INTO
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LIFE
Chapter 11.6. Roadmap for Military Integration
The integration of ex-combatants i.e. fighters and commanders always takes place
in a complex military and political environment. Usually, it is a post-conflict
environment wherein complex set of political, military, historical, and socio-
economic factors interact with each other. Therefore, the integration or
reintegration component of any DDR process is always interdependent on the first
two Ds i.e. Disarmament and Demobilization as well as the larger political and
military environment.
Figure 9. Various Aspects of Integration
POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT
FRAMEWORK
Political Integration of Senior Taliban Leaders
Military Integration of Senior-Mid Level
Commanders
Unit Based Operational and Tactical Commanders
Individual Integration of Foot Soldiers
PO
LIT
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NV
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MIL
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205
The success of the two Ds (Disarmament and Demobilization) would in turn
depend on the political framework agreed by the parties of the conflict. The Bonn
agreement in 2001 did not include any provisions with regards to the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration of the fighters and commanders of the parties to
conflict. This left a void which had a significant effect on the long-term security
and sustainability of the post-Bonn order in Afghanistan, ultimately paving the
way for the resurgence of the Afghan Taliban and a new war in Afghanistan.
For the entire DDR process to succeed, an umbrella political settlement framework
clearly laying down the future of the armed forces is a must. Furthermore, within
this political framework, a process of disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration of fighters and commanders into both military and civilian life,
should be envisioned. This will ensure that all parties to conflict abide by
disarming and demobilizing of their fighters, and the monopoly of force is left to
the newly constituted government of reconciliation or unity.
Once a comprehensive political umbrella is in place, the process of integration of
fighters will take up two forms: i. political integration of Taliban military leaders.
ii. Individual or Unit integration of Taliban tactical and field commanders and
foot soldiers. This process could take place top-down or bottom up including
political integration of the leaders followed by tactical integration of field
commanders and fighters or vice-versa. In both approaches, the military and socio-
economic environment plays an important role in enabling a successful and
sustainable long-term integration of ex-combatants into military and civilian life.
Depending on the provisions of the new political settlement agreement between
the parties, one can envision two types of integration in the Afghan context in light
of the Doha peace talks: a) integration of Taliban fighters and commanders into
206
the existing structure, or b) integration of both the Taliban fighting machinery and
existing force into a newly reconstituted force.
Integration into an Existing Force – The Afghan National Defense and Security
Forces (ANDSF)
Integration of ex-combatants after necessary professionalization and training
processes is a standard process for sustainable peace processes. In this case, the
Taliban fighting machinery, an estimated 65 thousand permanent fighters and
commanders who operate under the chain of command of various shuras will have
to be dismantled and integrated via a clearly laid out roadmap within the Afghan
National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF).
This can be done under a set of assumptions and in certain phases:
Assumptions:
1. The current strength of ANDSF remains unchanged at 364 thousand.
2. NATO continues to support either an existing ANDSF or a newly
constituted force based on NATO standards.
3. Taliban agree within a political agreement to dismantle their fighting
machinery and become part of the ANDSF. Specifics are clearly laid out
in a chapter within the political agreement signed by all sides.
4. Taliban leaders are integrated through a political integration process based
on a quota system i.e. certain leadership positions within ANDSF are
allotted to Taliban leaders.
207
5. Taliban tactical level commanders and foot soldiers are either integrated
by units or as individual fighters and commanders within ANDSF.
Under these assumptions both unit integration and individual integration of the
Taliban fighting machinery can take place in three phases: i. Pre-Integration
Phase: In this phase, strategic and tactical activities such as the conclusion of a
political agreement, provision on the future of the forces and DDR plus lists and
vetting processes are prepared. ii. Actual Integration Phase: This is the phase
where the actual integration process of fighters and commanders will take place.
It would include steps such as assessment and vetting of lists provided by the
Taliban of their fighters and commanders, verification followed by biometric and
retraining of those individuals. iii. Post Integration Phase: In this phase, the
integrated fighters and commanders are monitored to ensure they have cut ties with
their previous groups and provided the right counselling and advice in case of
need. The detailed step-by-step roadmap for the integration of Taliban fighters and
commanders can be envisioned as below (Figures 10 and 11):
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Figure 10. Integration Phases-A
Pre Integration
1. Identify Groups and Combatants.
2. List fighters and groups.
3. Compile an inventory of weapons.
During Integration
1. Biometric.
2. Identify intellectual potentials.
3. Undergo 6-months Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) course.
Post Integration
1. Appointment in a field or HQ position.
2. Monitoring and oversight of appointees.
3. Provide counselling and advice.
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Figure 11. Roadmap to Integrate Taliban Fighters and Commanders – Integration into an Existing
Force
Level 1
• Political Agreement.
• Agreement on the future size and
structure of armed forces.
Level 2
• Joint Commission
• List of fighters and commanders
• List of Weaponry.
Level 3
• Joint Operations Centre.
• Identification and vetting.
• Establish weapons collection centres.
Level 4
• Assessment of fighters and commanders for their abilities.
• Establishing standards and procedure for integration into armed forces.
Level 5
• Referral to various services for recruitment.
• Introduce to various military centres for training.
• Referral to different services division i.e. infantry etc.
Level 6
• Formation of an appointment board.
• Appointment in various services of the Afghan armed forces.
Level 7
• Establish monitoring mechanisms to ensure fighters and commanders
have cut their ties with their previous group.
• Establish counseling and advising centers for ex-combatants.
Level 8
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The above roadmap envisions a three phased eight (8) levels and seventeen (17)
steps military integration process for the Taliban fighters and commanders into the
Afghan National Defence and Security forces. Each step outlines a set of specific
activities that need to be undertaken as explained below:
i. Pre – Integration Phase – Steps Explained
This phase includes two (2) levels and five (5) steps with the following activities:
Step 1. Successful conclusion and signing of a political settlement agreement with
specific provisions on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of
Taliban fighters and commanders. This shall provide an umbrella political
framework with specific commitment to demonstrate political will by the Taliban
political and military leadership to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate their
fighters into military and civilian life.
Step 2. Development and agreed joint vision on the future shape, size and structure
of the Afghan forces by the Taliban and the Afghan Government along with their
international allies.
Step 3. Establishment of a joint DDR commission which consists of members from
the Afghan Government, the Taliban and the international community. This
commission will have the overall responsibility to formulate and implement
policies, programs and projects related to the DDR and reintegration process.
Step 4. The Taliban political and military leaders provide lists of their fighters for
individual or unit integration into the Afghan National Defence and Security
Forces (ANDSF).
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Step 5. The Taliban political leaders and military commanders compile and furnish
lists of their weaponry for stockpiling and collection.
ii. Integration Phase – Steps Explained
This phase includes four (4) levels and ten (10) steps with the following activities:
Step 6. After the establishment of the joint commissions which would set and
oversee the overall policy and program direction for the DDR and integration
program, there is a need to establish a joint operations centre at the military
operations and tactical level to manage day to day activities of reintegration.
Step 7. Identify and vet all the lists of fighters and commanders provided by the
Taliban and other groups for integration with ANDSF.
Step 8. Set up weapons collection centres for the disarmed and demobilized
fighters and commanders.
Step 9. Undertake a thorough and comprehensive assessment of each fighter and
commander to evaluate their abilities, skills and talents for integration with
ANDSF.
Step 10. A joint committee of the ANDSF, the Taliban and international military
experts establish a set of criteria and procedures to identify and integrate eligible
candidates into the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF).
Step 11. Establishment of a referral mechanism for the fighters and commanders
for counselling and advice on recruitments and appointments within ANDSF.
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Step 12. Once the candidates are identified, vetted and assessed then based on their
abilities and skills they shall be introduced for integration into various branches of
ANDSF i.e. Army, Police and Security Services.
Step 13. Once introduced to the various branches of the armed forces, the relevant
ministries and agencies shall refer these candidates for retraining and
professionalization at their relevant military and security training agencies.
Step 14. A high-level appointment board shall be formed to assess candidates at
the tactical, operational and strategic level for appointment in various positions
across ANDSF.
Step 15. The board appoints the candidates into various branches of ANDSF.
iii. Post Integration Phase – Steps Explained
This phase includes two (2) levels and two (2) steps with the following activities:
Step 16. Establish a monitoring and oversight mechanism to ensure that Taliban
fighters and commanders along with other groups who are integrated within
ANDSF do not hold their ties with their previous groups and remains apolitical
and professional.
Step 17. Establishment of counselling and advising centres for the integrated
combatants and their commanders in case they need help and advice post
integration to ensure they do not resort to violence against.
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Integration into a Newly Reconstituted Force
Under this scenario, both the Afghan Government as well as the Taliban
movement agree to design, train and equip a new force. Both parties dismantle and
demobilize their forces and integrate their fighting machinery into a new force
under a new chain of command, rank and file system with a new leadership. The
provisions for such a scenario need to be clearly laid out in the new political
settlement agreement between the two parties to conflict.
This can be done under the following set of assumptions and in three phases:
Assumptions:
1. Both parties i.e. GIROA and the Taliban movement agree to dismantle
their forces.
2. The potential political settlement agreement has clear provisions on
ceiling, composition and structure of the new force.
3. The Afghan international partners including the United States and NATO
agree to this new political and military set up.
4. A new rank and file system is set up for the new military and security
forces.
5. Both parties provide the list of their tactical, operational and strategic
commanders for integration into the new force.
In this case, under the above assumptions, a new force can be raised, trained and
equipped albeit keeping the existing resources of the previous forces i.e. ANDSF
in three phases: i. Pre-Integration Phase: In this phase, both parties dismantle their
forces and under the provisions of the new political agreement mobilize their
forces to a join a newly formed force. ii. Actual Integration Phase: The
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demobilized military machinery of both sides i.e. the Taliban and ANDSF are
retrained and redeployed under a new structure and chain of command. iii. Post
Integration Phase: Finally, an oversight and monitoring mechanism is established
that both forces can work together after retraining and deployment and provide
counselling to the officers, NCOs and soldiers of the newly reconstituted force
(Figures 12 and 13).
Figure 12. Integration Phases-B
Pre Integration
1. Dismantling the fighting machinery of both sides and demobilize.
2. Decide on the size, structure and composition of the new force.
During Integration
1. Retraining and professionalization of the new force.
2. Redeploy under the chain of command of the new forces.
Post Integration
1. Appointment in new positions under the new chain of command.
2. Oversight and monitoring for effective operation.
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Figure 13. Roadmap to Integrate Taliban Fighters and Commanders- Integration into a Newly
Reconstitued Force
• Political Agreement.
• Agreement on the future size and structure of armed forces.
• Establish quota ceilings for integration of forces from each side.
Level 1
• Joint Commission
• Establish standards and conditions for recruitment in all three services branches (ANA, ANP &NDS)
• List of Weaponry.
Level 2
• Joint Operations Center.
• Identification and vetting.
• Establish weapons collection centres.
Level 3
• Assessment of fighters and commanders.
• Establishing standards and procedure for integration into armed forces.
• Re-designing rank system and re-assigning ranks according to new standards
and ethnic composition.
Level 4
• Referral to various services for recruitment.
• Introduce to various military centres for training.
• Referral to different services division i.e. infantry etc.
Level 5
• Formation of an appointment board.
• Appointment in various services of the Afghan armed forces at tactical,
operational and strategic levels. Political agreement will decide senior ranks i.e.
Minister. DM and CGS.
Level 6
• Establish monitoring mechanisms to ensure fighters and commanders have cut
their ties with their previous group.
• Identify families of martyred and disabled.
Level 7
• Establish counseling and advising centers for ex-combatants.
• Establishment of an incentive pay scheme for the families of martyrs and disabled.
Level 8
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The above roadmap pretty much envisions the same number of phases,
levels as the previous model and twenty steps; the steps in certain levels differ.
These steps and levels are explained below:
i. Pre – Integration Phase – Steps Explained
This phase includes two (2) levels and five (5) steps with the following activities:
Step 1. Successful conclusion and signing of a political settlement agreement with
specific provisions on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) by
all sides. This shall provide an umbrella political framework with specific
commitment by the warring parties to demonstrate political will to disarm,
demobilize and reintegrate their fighters into military and civilian life.
Step 2. Development and agreed joint vision on the future shape, size and structure
of the Afghan forces by the Taliban and the Afghan Government along with their
international allies.
Step 3. Agreement on a ceiling and quota system for each side on integration of
their tactical, operational and strategic level forces within the newly reconstituted
force.
Step 4. Establishment of a joint commission to formulate the newly reconstituted
force which consists of members from the Afghan Government, the Taliban and
the international community. This commission will have the overall responsibility
to decide on the future size, shape, structure and standards of the new armed forces.
Step 5. The two existing forces i.e. ANDSF and Taliban compile and furnish lists
of their weaponry for stockpiling and collection.
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ii. Integration Phase – Steps Explained
This phase includes four (4) levels and ten (11) steps with the following activities:
Step 6. After the establishment of the joint commission which would set and
oversee the overall policy and program direction of the reconstitution of the new
armed forces and DDR, there is a need to establish a joint operations centre at all
three branches of the armed forces i.e. Army, Policy and Security Services to
implement the decisions of the commission on a day to day basis.
Step 7. Identify and vet all the lists of fighters and commanders provided by all
parties to the conflict for integration into the newly reconstituted force.
Step 8. Set up weapons collection centres for the disarmed and demobilized
fighters and commanders.
Step 9. Undertake a thorough and comprehensive assessment of each fighter and
commander to evaluate their abilities, skills and talents for integration with the
newly reconstituted force.
Step 10. A joint committee of the ANDSF, the Taliban and international military
experts establish a set of criteria and procedures to identify and integrate eligible
candidates into the newly reconstituted force.
Step 11. Review of the existing rank system and re-assign ranks based on the
standards and criteria established for the newly reconstituted force. The rank re-
assignment should also take into consideration national composition.
Step 12. Establishment of a referral mechanism for the fighters and commanders
for counselling and advice on recruitments and appointments within ANDSF.
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Step 13. Once the candidates are identified, vetted and assessed then based on their
abilities and skills they shall be introduced for integration into various branches of
ANDSF i.e. Army, Police and Security Services.
Step 14. Once introduced to the various branches of the armed forces, the relevant
ministries and agencies shall refer these candidates for retraining and
professionalization at their relevant military and security training agencies.
Step 15. A high-level appointment board shall be formed to assess candidates at
the tactical, operational and strategic level for appointment in various positions
across ANDSF.
Step 16. The board appoints the candidates into various branches of ANDSF.
iii. Post Integration Phase – Steps Explained
This phase includes two (2) levels and four (4) steps with the following activities:
Step 17. Establish a monitoring and oversight mechanism to ensure that Taliban
fighters and commanders along with other groups who are integrated within
ANDSF do not hold their ties with their previous groups and remain apolitical and
professional.
Step 18. Each side provides list of the martyrs and families to compile a
comprehensive list of the dead from both sides for incentive schemes.
Step 19. Establishment of counselling and advising centres for the integrated
combatants and their commanders in case they need help and advice post
integration to ensure they do not resort to violence against.
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Step 20. Design and implementation of a martyrs and their families incentives and
payment scheme.
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Chapter 12.6. Roadmap for Civilian Integration
Successful reintegration of the Taliban commanders and fighters along with their
dependents into their communities appears to be one of the challenging and
complicated components of the Afghan peace process, consequently requiring
comprehensive and detailed scrutiny. While fighting as part of one group, Taliban
fighters not only differ in terms of needs, concerns, problems and expectations,
but also their reasons and motivations for fighting are different. Participants of this
research from Mazar-e-Sharif province noted that most of the Northern Taliban
fighters are fighting for economic returns or salary. In the meantime, some people
have joined the Taliban movement because of local rivalries between political
factions or ethnic groups. While many Taliban fighters possess property,
agricultural land and farms, some other have lost their homes, family members and
their properties or become disabled during the war. Reintegration of such diverse
fighters into civilian life requires a comprehensive approach. Although
reintegration of Taliban fighters into communities greatly depends on peace
agreement and restructuring scheme, effective management of the available
resources contributes to success of such programs.
Our key informant interviews and FGDs revealed that the Taliban has forced local
people to pay taxes [Usher], recruited their sons by force to join them in the battle,
and used their houses as strongholds or military base, which overall displaced
many villagers from their home, as well as inflicting casualties and other economic
losses. As one of our interviewees from Mazar-e-Sharif noted if the government
settle the local enmity and enable both Taliban and displaced people to return to
their homes without threating each other, there is no need for additional or special
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assistance for the Taliban because most of them possess agricultural farms and
lands that are sufficient for their integration.
Most participants in our provincial consultations, FGDs and interviews, insisted
on inclusiveness of the civilian reintegration, involving not only the combatants,
but Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) and above all, the war victims. All training
programs, in addition to Taliban fighters, should include war victims, displaced
people and the members of the communities. They argued that any assistance
programs for the Taliban fighters -while excluding war victims and displaced
people, would be perceived as a “reward” and privilege, warning that it can
exacerbate hatred towards integrated individuals and even trigger another conflict
and hostilities. As one of interviewees from Mazar-e-Sharif province stated:
“Unilateral assistance would not be provocative by itself. For instance, if
we support The Taliban’s families and ignore those families who are
displaced due to war or have lost the head of their household, it is unjust,
which will stimulate or trigger another conflict in communities. If the
assistance be project-based, in that case, hundreds of families will
introduce themselves as Taliban to receive assistance.”241
In the meantime, participants also strongly recommended that providing
educational opportunities for the Taliban children and short-term courses for their
families as well as health services are key elements for effective and successful
reintegration of the Taliban fighters along with their families into communities.
241 Interview with one key informant from Mazar-e- Sharif.
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e. Process of Civilian Integration in the Afghan Context – Step by Step
1. Disarmament and Demobilization: According to the UN definition,
disarmament refers to the “collection, documentation, control and disposal
of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of
combatants.”242 Accordingly, civil reintegration process begins with the
disarmament and demobilization of the Taliban fighters, formally
discharging them of their command and control structure. In this step,
civilian population also should be disarmed if they possess arms.
2. Assessment, profiling, and verification: During arm registration and
documentation, the profile of all Taliban fighters should be developed and
verified, including their background, age, health condition, level of
education, family or dependent, specific needs and their local residency.
This database provides a baseline information for developing reintegration
strategy, designing programs as well as monitoring and evaluation of the
process. Moreover, a detailed assessment and analysis of their areas of
return or any other areas of their choice in terms of local resources,
potentials for reintegration, availability of services, and above all security
challenges should be made.
3. Reinsertion: As a ‘stabilization program’, a support package called
“reinsertion” might be offered for disarmed Taliban fighters, but not
necessarily for all, helping them cover their basic and immediate needs.
242 United Nations. 2014. “Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization
and Reintegration Standards.” Available at: http://www.iddrtg.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/OG-2014.pdf
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Alternatively, instead of paying cash, the government can provide
immediate short-term employment for ex-combatants.
4. Program design and resource mobilization: Based on macro and micro
economic analyses of the country and areas of return, depending on
specific needs and expectations of disarmed fighters as well as depending
on which approach being selected, specific programs need to be designed
for long-term reintegration of disarmed Taliban fighters and wider
economic and social recovery of the whole community. To this end,
allocation of sufficient resources is essential for implementation of the
programs.
5. Public information and sensitization: According to the UN Integrated
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standard (IDDRS),
sensitization and public information is intended to “reduce the real or
perceived threats by the return and reintegration of ex-combatants into
communities, which contributes to creating an enabling environment for
reconciliation to take place.”243 Accordingly, in this step, implementing
agencies along with the civil society organizations, and the media in
cooperation with the local councils and religious scholars provide general
information on the reintegration process, its strategy and objectives,
resources and support service available for disarmed Taliban fighters and
the communities, rebuilding trust between community members and
disarmed Taliban fighters.
6. Education and training: Capacity building is an essential component of the
civil reintegration aimed at providing vocational training, apprenticeships,
243 Ibid.
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on-the-job training, and life skills development for disarmed Taliban
fighters, enabling them to reintegrate into economic life of communities.
7. Monitoring and Evaluation: Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) is
necessary for establishing key indicators for “monitoring progress and
measuring the achievements of outputs and outcomes”244 of the
reintegration process. It helps all parties involved in the reintegration
“agree on clear objectives and expected results of the DDR program.”245
The findings of assessment are to be used for effective management and
implementation of the reintegration programs or making necessary
adjustment in the process.
Figure 14. Process of Civilian Integration
244 “Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
Standards.” United Nations. 2014. Available at: http://www.iddrtg.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/OG-2014.pdf 245 Ibid.
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Disarming & Demobilizing
•"Collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of combatants." (UN 2014).
•Formally discharging of Taliban fighters from their command and control structure.
Assessment & Profiling
•Developing and verifying a profile for disarmed Taliban fighters encompassing ex-combatants’ background, specific needs, expectations and areas of return during demobilization.
•Providing information and analysis of the local resources and opportunities, security and socio-economic potentials, and social services and security challenges.
Reinsertion
•Providing financial assistance called reinserion, which help disarmed fighters cover their immediate and basic needs.
•Aternatively, providing immediate short-term employment.
Program & Resource
Mobilization
•Designing specific programmes for long-term reintegration of ex-combatants and wider socio-economic recovery of the whole community.
•Allocating sufficient resources for implementation of the programmes.
Information &
Sensitization
•Provding general information on the prospect of reintegration process including reintegration strategy, objectives, programmes, and support service available.
•Rebuilding trust between ex-combatants and communities and reducting the real or percieved threats by return of ex-combatants through "sensitization".
Education & Training
•Reintegrating disarmed Taliban fighters into the economic life of the communities by providing neccessary training and life skills development.
•Recruting ex-combatants in public works, municipalities, roads, schools and other public projects.
•subsidizing industries and businesses that recruit ex-combatants.
M&E
•Developing indicators for measuring the progress, uncovering the strengths and weakness of the prgrammes.
•Helping all involved parties to agree on clear objectives and expected results fo the programmes.
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SECTION SEVEN
CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNT
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SECTION SEVEN: CHALLENGES AND LESSONS
LEARNT
Chapter 13.7. Challenges and Lessons Learnt for Integration in the
Afghan Context
Since early 1990s, governments in Afghanistan have attempted to make
peace with their enemies and integrate them into the system. During the reign of
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Najeebullah’s government attempted
to incorporate the Mujahedin through a national reconciliation program. President
Najeebullah’s integration policies promoted pro-government militias across
various localities, but failed to save his regime from breakdown. The Mujahedin,
on the other hand, managed to incorporate their adversary in an ad hoc manner.
But the Mujahedin also didn’t survive their integration initiatives. The Taliban
pushed the fragmented Jihadi groups into isolation and exile. However, their
incorporation of the surrendered combatants and commanders never ascended to
a genuine integration.
Post 2001, the Afghan government was established through an internationally
sponsored integration roadmap for incorporation of different parties within a
legitimate democratic system. Based on the Bonn agreement, various groups and
parties, except for the Taliban and Hezb-e Islami, entered an agreement with the
international community to reform and integrate with the peaceful liberal world.
Major post-2001 reintegration programs included the DDR, the DIAG, Program
Tahkim-e Solh (PTS) and Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP),
targeting Afghan Militia Forces, illegal armed groups and Taliban combatants,
respectively.
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The US-NATO led intervention in Afghanistan not only toppled the Taliban
regime, but also terminated the Mujahedin government and reformed the remains
of the Soviet style bureaucracy. With the possibility of Taliban integration with
military and civilian life on the horizon, the review of post-2001 peace and
reintegration programs underlines various challenges of integration in the Afghan
context that probably await future integration attempts as well. Based on findings
of this research, this section highlights some of those challenges and lessons
learned along the way.
Challenges of Integration in the Afghan Context
1) In terms of culture, languages, and religion, Afghanistan is not a
homogenous country. Several national groups live in this country with
different spoken dialects and languages. Although, the majority of people
believe in Islam, no single school of religious jurisprudence prevail across
Afghanistan. People of various national groups live in different parts of the
country. Hence, post-conflict reintegration programs across both military
and civilian dimensions face considerable spectrum of diversity. Over the
years, various patron-client networks around armed factions emerged
within various national groups. These patron-client networks proved to be
capable of shaping the dynamic of integration initiatives.
2) The post-2001 integration experience in Afghanistan is shaped by the
‘victor peace’ doctrine. Accordingly, the US led intervention mainly relied
on military superiority and top-down integration policies. Given the
continued war and presence of the US-coalition forces in Afghanistan, all
the peace and reintegration programs inherited eventualities of the ‘victor
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peace’. While propagated as ‘emancipatory’, post-2001 integration
programs mainly relied on the use of force, hegemony and monetary
incentives.246 Such approach towards peace and integration leaves little
space for bottom-up initiatives and diversity. The rhetoric of international
war against terrorism greatly impacted the peace and integration programs
in the Afghan context. Some parties in the ruling elite used the situation
for revenge or suppressing their rivals. In the meantime, the cooperation of
internationals with notorious militia forces undermined human rights
concerns and post-conflict transitional justice.
3) The conflict in Afghanistan has not been solely an Afghan conflict.
Neighbouring, regional and international actors with different levels of
leverage over local actors, sponsored the conflict. Therefore, various
regional and international players are involved in management of peace
and integration initiatives in the country. However, post-2001 peace and
integration programs took place without the consensus of the
neighbouring, regional and international actors. Through the manipulation
of local patron-client networks, external actors largely remained watchful
of their own national strategic interests.
4) The post-2001 peace and integration programs also lacked the consensus
and political will of the local stakeholders. Due to the years of infighting
and rivalries, they mistrusted each other. Their cooperation within the US-
international sponsored programs mainly took place through individual
trade-offs.
246 Oliver P. Richmond, The Problem of Peace: Understanding the Liberal Peace, Conflict,
Security& Development volume 6: issue 3, October 2006, P 291-314
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5) Widespread involvement of politicians i.e. powerbrokers in the
construction of the post-2001 security sector led to the politicization of the
security apparatus. Politicians have been able to insert influence in vetting,
recruitment and appointment processes across the defence and security
institutions. During the DDR program, many eligible ex-combatants who
desired to join the country’s security sector, and did not have links to
powerful politicians, failed to get integrated into the security sector. The
policy of observing “ethnic balance” in construction of the newly
constituted national security apparatus led to manipulation of the security
sector by ethnic politics.
6) In contrast to a conventional DDR program where belligerent parties
negotiate the terms of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of
their fighters, the DDR program in Afghanistan lacked a real opposition
front. The Afghan militia forces who underwent DDR program were the
same forces who helped the Americans win the war against the Taliban.
This paved the way for manipulation of the program by various local and
international parties. Lack of a political agreement at the strategic level
among the leaders of the opposing groups significantly nulled all the post-
2001 peace and reintegration programs. Since post-conflict integration
requires certain levels of compromise among the belligerent parties, the
absence of political agreement between belligerent parties leaved the space
open for spoilers to intervene.
7) Lack of proper monitoring, led to flawed processes. For example, the
vetting and identification processes of armed men and their weapons were
not monitored. As a result, modern and functional arms remained hidden
and stockpiled, and old dysfunctional weapons were collected instead.
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8) Post-2001 integration initiatives took place in the absence of a functioning
police force. The international sponsors of programs rather focused on
building the military machinery of the Afghan security sector. In addition,
the focus of sponsors on supporting semi-official security forces further
pushed the national police aside. Lack of adequate security for program
participants discredited post-2001 integration programs.
9) The drug trade and other illicit businesses provided the armed groups the
necessary economic avenues to survive and thrive.
10) The post-2001 Afghan defence and security sector was challenged by two
simultaneous problems; firstly, it had to fight a war, and it had to fight
through the US-NATO reforms. While the US- NATO led reform
programs lacked consistency and proper support, the performance of the
Afghan defence and security further disrupted by widespread corruption
inside the government.
11) Widespread corruption across government institutions significantly
derailed post-2001 integration programs. The government’s lack of
credibility made the peace and integration programs less attractive. It also
provided the armed opposition and the criminals fertile ground for
recruitment. Lack of proper coordination and cooperation between local
and international partners marred all the previous peace and integration
programs. It led to a waste of resources and widespread dissatisfaction
among the participants of the integration programs.
12) Less attention has been paid to ideological and educational aspects of the
conflict in Afghanistan. The post-2001 peace and integration programs
were largely run through monetary incentives to provide immediate
compensation to ex-combatants. Government offices, civil society
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organizations and local institutions such as mosques were not so concerned
about the ideological and educational aspects of the conflict. This led to an
information gap which was eventually filled by extremist rhetoric.
13) The post-2001 integration experience was challenged by the abrupt
introduction of the market economy as the country’s economic system.
Given that all previous governments followed different models of
government-controlled economy, many ex-combatants found life more
competitive, while they themselves lacked competitiveness.
14) Compartmentalization of the SSR mandate in Afghanistan significantly
damaged the success of different components of the SSR.
15) Civil society organizations were largely absent in early post-2001
integration initiatives. After nearly two decades, civil society organizations
in Afghanistan are still city-based entities with very limited outreach in
rural areas.
16) Redistribution of arms through various semiformal security programs such
as Local Police force, Local Armey and Local Resistance force, alongside
the private security companies, paved the way for re-emergence of
warlords across the country.
17) The approval of the 2007 “amnesty law” severely blocked the possibility
of bringing the predators of the past atrocities into justice. The amnesty
law by itself promoted a culture of immunity among the warring parties
involved in the Afghan conflict.
18) Short-time project-based programs and a lack of institutional continuity
undermined various peace and integration programs. Without proper needs
assessment, assistant packages failed to provide real help to many ex-
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combatants. Unmet promises and lack of job opportunities – especially for
rank and file soldiers, marked the post-2001 integration programs.
Lessons Learnt on Integration in Afghanistan
1) Successful integration requires reaching a political agreement between two
identifiable opposite groups at the leadership level. Under a clear political
agreement between belligerent parties, both individual-based and
community-based integration programs may have a chance of success.
Because, at the end of the day, policies are made through compromises. A
political agreement must produce a roadmap for integration including clear
definitions and well-defined procedures that are observable by various
stakeholders and participants.
2) In order to prevent the security sector from being manipulated by
politicians, the political agreement between belligerent parties must
include specific clauses regarding the future of armed forces and the details
of military integration as well a roadmap for civilian integration. To that
end, it is advisable to hold simultaneous, parallel talks among the political
and military commissions of the belligerent parties. Otherwise, if the peace
talks, and for that matter integration negotiations, are concluded solely
through political compromises, the risk of politicization of the security
apparatus remains high. Only a professional apolitical security sector may
be able to serve as a vehicle for successful transition to peace and
integration.
3) In order to proceed with long-term sustainable integration,
professionalization of the defence and security forces is necessary. That
234
requires merit-based recruitment policies and avoiding organizational
overload, among other things.
4) Reaching a regional – international consensus on integration roadmap is
important to implement integration policies properly. Without such
consensus, the existing patron-client networks will manipulate integration
processes. Regional and international organizations may significantly
contribute to creation of a broad-based transnational consensus. The
existing regional platforms and agreements may be considered as points of
departure for further synthesis.
5) Third party neutral mediation and monitoring is needed both for facilitating
the integration process and for guarantying the implementation of
agreements. In this regard, involvement of regional and international
organizations such as security and cooperation organizations may
positively contribute to long-term monitoring of the integration process.
6) Without proper assessment of economic feasibilities for long-term
integration, post-conflict reintegration remains stock in short-term
ineffective project-based initiatives. Such short-term initiatives will not
only fail to support the livelihood of ex-combatants, but also create further
conflicts due to the waste of allocated resources. Preparations for future
integration processes must start early. The government may start job
creation initiatives based on good governance criteria. Given the deep-
donor dependency, fighting corruption across government institutions is
vital. Reduction of corruption across government institutions is a
precondition for success of any reintegration scheme.
7) There is a need for promoting a local discourse on post-conflict integration
processes. All the previous peace and integration programs were conducted
235
through foreign narratives rather than local narratives. Creating a local
discourse requires consensus among the various local actors including
political parties, civil society organizations, and local governance
institutions. In that respect, a local discourse needs to be inclusive too.
Exclusionary discourses will not contribute to promoting a local discourse
at all.
8) Future integration processes need to be responsive towards the victims of
the past atrocities and prosecution of the predators. Overlooking the past
atrocities may result in re-emergence of the conflict in one form or another.
Moreover, persecution of the predators and addressing the victims’
grievances must be a comprehensive process. Traditional terminologies
such as Haqqullah (right of God) and Haqqulabd (right of people) are
widely misused to overlook the past atrocities and minimize the victims’
rights. Given that these are interpretive terminologies, the distinction
between personal loses and public loses needs to be balanced through open
and inclusive dialogue among the stakeholders.
9) Institutional continuity helps the participants of integration programs to
adapt the new changes in their life in an orderly manner. As vulnerable
groups, participants of integration programs cannot simultaneously deal
with large-scale abrupt institutional change and changes in their own socio-
economic status. Institutional continuity reduces the costs of integration as
well as protecting locals from external manipulation of resources.
10) Ideological aspects of the Afghan conflict is significant; therefore, post-
conflict integration programs and processes have to deal with ideological
concerns of its participants. Promoting free and open dialogue among the
stakeholders may benefit the process of integration.
236
11) Previous integration programs showed that without the existence of a
responsible security apparatus at the national level, promotion of
semiformal security forces won’t help solve the many security problems
across the country. While the nature of security challenges varies from
locality to locality, without a comprehensive national strategy towards
security challenges, semi-official militia groups will not be able to address
security needs across their locality. Reconsideration of administrative
structure in a way that gives various localities security management
discretion could be considered a long-term option.
12) The drug trade and other illicit economic activities should be dealt with
decisively. Otherwise, no integration incentives overtake such
multimillion-dollar businesses.
237
SECTION EIGHT
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
238
SECTION EIGHT: CONCLUSION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
While Afghans support the notion of the monopoly of violence in the hands
of a strong central government, the harsh realities of militias and strongmen on the
ground coupled with dark clouds of unsuccessful disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration programs make it hard for them to believe that any DDR process will
succeed in the Afghan context. This is due to the limited or no success of the
yesteryear DDR programs in the country. Throughout our five (5) provincial
consultation conferences and in our Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with former
Mujahedin members, retired Afghan military officers and ex-combatants, members
of the civil society and local governance affiliates, almost all of them expressed
dissatisfaction, regret and disappointment over the previous years’ reintegration
programs.
Moreover, they also acknowledge the need for a disarmament and demobilization
program in case of a political settlement agreement and peace as a result of the
Doha talks. Therefore, it is important for them that both the Afghan Government,
the Taliban as well as the international community do not repeat the previous years’
mistakes.
Hence, based on our extensive consultations as well as the findings of this research
we have four sets of recommendations to the Afghan Government, the Taliban, the
Civil Society Organizations and the international community.
239
Recommendations
Recommendation to the Afghan Government
o Only promise what you can deliver; delivering on the promises is vital for
successful implementation of integration programs.
o Have a clear roadmap for the implementation of DDR; DDR should take
place within the wider context of Security Sector Reform (SSR).
o Use the lessons learned from the previous peace and integration programs
as well as international best practices.
o Give priority to reforming the national police and intelligence, then focus
on reforming the national army. Police and intelligence help lawful
integration.
o Do not focus on creating semiformal security forces; instead improve the
formal defence and security apparatus.
o Create a joint commission with the Taliban and international observes for
implementing the DDR processes (such as identification and vetting,
assessment of fighters and commanders, and establishing standards and
procedures for military integration).
o Avoid politicization of the DDR and the SSR programs and processes.
o Include all the opposition and illegal armed groups in your DDR program.
o Include all the major local stakeholders and institutions – such as
community councils, political parties, civil society organizations,
parliament, in major decision-making processes.
o Invest in long-term development projects, such as extractive industries, for
creating large-scale employment opportunities.
240
o Initiate long-term support programs of 10 to 15 years for integration of ex-
combatants into civilian life.
o Embrace all the war victims including the displaced people in your
reintegration programs.
o Take care of security concerns of war veterans and integrated fighters.
o Fight against corruption and increase your monetary accountability across
all integration processes.
o Appreciate third party mediation.
o Declare a general amnesty and consider mutual recognition of combatants
perceived and actual achievements.
o Keep all the DDR collected weaponry as part of your military machinery.
o Support and facilitate transitional justice through community-based means
and methods.
o Recruit civil society organizations for implementation of various integration
programs.
o Support reintegration processes in comprehensive integrated manner i.e.
through coordinated capacity building programs, economic recovery
initiatives and diplomatic affairs.
Recommendation to the Taliban Movement
o Enter a long-term ceasefire with the government before reaching a
permanent agreement.
o Cut your links with international terrorism and foreign extremist groups.
o Use your leverage to facilitate integration processes, especially through
public information and sensitization among your own constituency.
241
o Engage in voluntary works and charity affairs to facilitate civilian
integration.
o Encourage and assist literacy programs for both girls and boys, men and
women.
o Enter into open intellectual dialogue with different schools of thoughts.
o Appreciate third party mediation.
o Support and facilitate transitional justice through community-based means
and methods.
o Actively contribute to conflict management while proceeding with
reintegration programs.
o Consider party politics as long-term strategy for successful integration with
a civilian government.
Recommendation to the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)
o Actively take part in facilitating and monitoring of reintegration processes
i.e. work with various stakeholders in terms of public information,
community mobilization, and conflict management.
o Actively take part in holding literacy and educational programs for both ex-
combatants and members of their family.
o Take the scope of your operation beyond city centers to cover both rural and
urban areas.
o Take community-based initiatives as the backbone of your operations.
o Investigate and research the needs, expectations and problems of various
war effected groups and communities and provide appropriate solutions.
o Initiate and monitor anti-corruption programs and processes.
242
o Facilitate open intellectual dialogue among various stakeholders i.e. take
active part in such dialogue beyond the rhetorical practices.
Recommendation to the International Community
o Take UN as the principle guarantor of reintegration programs.
o Deploy the UN peacekeeping forces for monitoring ceasefire between
belligerent parties and implementation of DDR.
o Support reintegration processes in comprehensive integrated manner i.e.
through coordinated capacity building programs, economic recovery
initiatives and diplomatic affairs.
o Engage with local integration processes as neutral mediator; monitor the
implementation of both military and civilian integration processes.
o Invite regional actors such as neighboring countries and regional
organizations to support your aid mechanisms.
o Use the existing regional developmental projects and processes to support
reintegration program in Afghanistan.
o Avoid supremacist approach when supporting and advising integration
processes in Afghanistan.
o Enforce guarantees for prosecution of war criminals and violators of
reintegration agreement between belligerent parties.
Conclusion and Way Forward
The long-term sustainability of any peace deal would depend on a
successfully designed and implemented reintegration and integration program of
243
former Taliban combatants and commanders along their families within military
and civilian life. For a complex environment such as Afghanistan, it is imperative
to have a robust military integration roadmap for integrating Taliban fighters and
commanders within the existing or a new Afghan military and security apparatus.
This means Afghans together with their international partners will need to reassess
their force size, posture, composition and operational readiness in view of the new
challenges and opportunities that would emerge in the event of a post peace deal
with the Taliban.
The Taliban leadership will also have to evaluate and make certain key decisions
such as what kind of army and police they envision for Afghanistan. How do they
intend to break their ties with terrorist organizations and fight foreign terror outfits
such as Al Qaeda, ISIS, LeT and the likes. They also need to define their long-term
relations with the United States and its allies. This is vital for promotion of post-
conflict economic prosperity and successful military and civilian integration.
Finally, the United States and its allies need to review their policies toward
Afghanistan defining conditions upon which they will continue assisting a post-
peace deal reconstituted and reorganized Afghan security forces with Taliban
commanders at its ranks.
All of the above decisions will have a significant bearing on the success and/or
failure of any potential future military integration plan for the Taliban commanders
and fighters within the ranks of the Afghan security forces.
244
ANNEXES
Annex 1. List of Interviewees
Abdulghani, (Retired Colonel) interviewed by Esmatullah Ahmadi, 25 July, 2020,
Herat
Agha, Seyed Akbar (former Taliban official) interviewed by Fazal Ahmad Afzali,
4 October, 2020, Kabul.
Ahad, Salima (peace and women’s rights activist) interviewed by Fazal Ahmad
Afzali, 25 August, 2020, Qandahar
Ahmadi, Farid (Lieutenant General, Commander of Afghan Special Operations
Forces) interviewed by Saleh Jahesh, 29 September, 2020, Kabul.
Ahmadi, Mohammad Amin (member of Afghanistan’s negotiating team in Doha
peace talks) interviewed by Mohammad Erfani, 6 September, 2020, Kabul.
Ahmadi, Najiba (Afghan Women’s Network) interviewed by Mohammad Erfani,
17 September, 2020, Bamyan
Akbari, Hamida (Member of Parliament, Wardak province) interviewed by
Mohammad Erfani, 5 October, 2020, Kabul.
Alavi, Fatima (human rights activist) interviewed by Mohammad Erfani, 5 October,
2020, Kabul.
Aman, Afzal (Retired General) interviewed by Mohammad Erfani, 21 September,
2020, Kabul.
Amin, Ramin, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) interviewed by the research team, 10
July, 2020, Kabul.
245
Aminzada, Sangar (peace activist) interviewed by Fazal Ahmad Afzali, 3 October,
2020, Kabul.
Ansari, Abdulhamid (peace activists and university lecturer) interviewed by
Mohammad Erfani, 12 July, 2020, Mazar-e Sharif
Armani, Ahmad (peace activist) interviewed by Mohammad Erfani and
Mohammad Afzal Zarghoni, 12 August, 2020, Qandahar
Behmanish, Nasrin (women’s rights activist) interviewed by Mohammad Erfani,
23 August, 2020, Mazar-e Sharif
Dawlatzai, Mohammad Khan (former combatant and local elder) interviewed by
Mohammad Erfani and Fazal Ahmad Afzali , 12 July, 2020, Mazar-e Sharif
Enayaturahman, (local elder) interviewed by Fazal Ahmad Afzali, 24 August, 2020,
Kabul
Eshraq, Seyed Asghar (Editor in Chief, Rahi-Madaniat newspaper) interviewed by
Mustafa Sarwari, 4 August, 2020, Kabul.
Helaluddin, Helal (Retired Lieutenant General, former deputy of Ministry of
Defense) interviewed by the research team, 5 July, 2020, Kabul.
Isar, Mohammad Ivaz, (Retired General) interviewed by Mohammad Erfani, 18
September, 2020, Bamyan
Kohistani, Fatima (Member of Parliament, Ghor province) interviewed by
Mohammad Erfani, 6 October, 2020, Kabul.
Kosha, Aziz (organization for Policy Research and Development Studies)
interviewed by Mustafa Sarwari, 6 August, 2020, Kabul.
246
Dadafar Karimi, Mohammad (civil society and university lecturer) interviewed by
Mohammad Erfani, 25 July, 2020, Herat
Nazok, Hamdullah (Retired General) interviewed by Saleh Jahesh, 1 September,
2020, Kabul.
Qane, Ehsan (Afghanistan Analysts Network) interviewed by Mohammad Erfani,
22 October, 2020, Kabul.
Rashed, Rajab Ali (Retired General) interviewed by Mohammad Erfani, 22
September, 2020, Kabul
Rezai, Hawaagol (provincial head of social and economic affairs; Ministry of
Women’s Affairs) interviewed by Fazal Ahmad Afzali, 17 September, 2020,
Bamyan
Amin, Rohullah (Journalist and civil society activist) interviewed by Mustafa
Sarwari, 16 September, 2020, Kabul
Saadati, Asadullah (second deputy of Dr. Abdullah Abdullah) interviewed by
Mustafa Sarwari, 2 September, 2020, Kabul
Samar, Sima (Former chairperson of Afghanistan Independent Human Rights
Commission) interviewed by Mohammad Erfani, 21 October, 2020, Kabul.
Shir Ahamd, (Retired Colonel) interviewed by Mohammad Erfani, 26 July, 2020,
Herat.
Sharif, Sahira (Member of Parliament, Khost province) interviewed by Fazal
Ahmad Afzali, 8 October, 2020, Kabul.
247
Shinwari, Mawlawi Jalaluddin (former Taliban official) interviewed by Mustafa
Sarwari, 4 October, 2020, Kabul.
Wahedi, Monawar Ahmad (civil society) interviewed by Fazal Ahmad Afzali, 20
August, 2020, Qandahar.
Wahid, Abdulwahid (political representative of the Islamic Revolution Movement)
interviewed by Mustafa Sarwari, 4 October, 2020, Kabul.
Yush, Nadir (Brigadier General, Army headquarters) interviewed by Saleh Jahesh,
29 September, 2020, Kabul.
Zuri, Gol Mohammad, (local elder) interviewed by Fazal Ahmad Afzali, 25 July,
2020, Herat.
248
Annex 2. Focus Group Discussion (FGD) Questionnaires
بحث گروهی افسران و مجاهدین دی دی ار شده
لطفا خود را معرفی کنید.
بخش اول: برنامه های مصالحه گذشته
سالهای اخیر تعقیب شده است )مانند تحکیم صلح، برنامه آشتی و به نظر شما برنامه های مصالحه با طالبان که در
ادغام مجدد(، چه اندازه طالبان و مردم افغانستان را برای صلح امیدوار و آماده کرده است؟ چرا و چگونه؟ لطفا
توضیح دهید.
بخش دوم: دی دی ار و دایاگ
ی شما از آن برنامه ها چیست؟ لطفا توضیح دهید. آیا در برنامه های دی دی ار یا دایاگ اشتراک داشتید؟ ارزیاب
تطبیق برنامه های مذکور در منطقه شما چطور بوده و چه نتایجی داشته است؟
رابطه افراد خلع سلاح شده با گروه یا سازمان مسلح که سابقا در آن عضویت داشتند/ داشته اند، حالا چگونه است؟
و دفاعی کشور جلب وجذب شدید؟ اگر اری، آیا پروسه شفاف بود؟ لطفا آیا پس از دی دی ار، به نیروهای امنیتی
شرح دهید چگونه؟
دفاعی و بخش سوم: ادغام طالبان در بخش امنیتی
چرا مبارزه نظامی قوای امریکایی، ناتو و حکومت افغانستان علیه طالبان، تا هنوز بی نتیجه مانده است؟
نظر شما درباره نیروهای پولیس محلی و خیزش مردمی و موثریت آنها برای تامین امنیت چیست؟
دفاعی موافقت دارید ؟ اگر اری، و اگر با طالبان صلح شود، آیا برای ادغام جنگجویان ایشان در نهادهای امنیتی
توضیح دهید. لطفا بگویید چرا؟ چه فرصت ها و چه مشکلات در این زمینه وجود دارد؟ لطفا
بخش چهارم: ادغام طالبان در زندگی ملکی
برای بازگشت آبرومندانه جنگجویان طالبان و خانواده هایشان به زندگی عادی چه کارها باید صورت گیرد؟ چه
نهادها و اشخاص دراین باره مسئولیت دارند؟
249
بخش پنجم: عدالت انتقالی
و اشخاص که جنایت جنگی مرتکب شده اند چگونه باید برخورد صورت به نظر شما، در مصالحه با طالبان، با افراد
گیرد؟ رسیدگی به رنج و مصیبت چه کسی اولویت دارد؟ طالبان یا مردم ملکی؟ لطفا توضیح دهید.
بخش ششم: نظارت از برنامه ادغام طالبان
ما برای نظارت از همچون ادغام طالبان در بخش ملکی و نظامی چگونه باید نظارت شود؟ پیشنهادات مشخص ش
برنامه چیست؟
اگر موضوع یا مسئله دیگر در رابطه با بحث ما در ذهن دارید، لطفا بیان کنید.
و حکومتداری محلی بحث گروهی جامعه مدنی
لطفا خود را معرفی کنید.
برنامه های مصالحه گذشته
اخیر تعقیب شده است )مانند تحکیم صلح و برنامه آشتی و به نظر شما برنامه های مصالحه با طالبان که در سالهای
ادغام مجدد(، چه اندازه طالبان و مردم افغانستان را برای صلح امیدوار و آماده کرده است؟ چرا و چگونه؟ لطفا
توضیح دهید.
دی دی ار و دایاگ
امه ها اشتراک کرده باشد؟ ارزیابی ن برنآید؟ آیا کسی را می شناسید که در از برنامه دی دی ار و دایاگ چه میدان
شما از موفقیت یا ناکامی برنامه های خلع سلاح و ادغام که در گذشته تطبیق شده است چیست؟ )تطبیق برنامه های
مذکور در منطقه شما چطور بوده و چه نتایج در پی داشته است؟(
دفاعی و ادغام طالبان در بخش امنیتی
امریکایی، ناتو و حکومت افغانستان علیه طالبان، تا هنوز بی نتیجه مانده است؟ چرا مبارزه نظامی قوای
نظر شما درباره نیروهای پولیس محلی و خیزش مردمی و موثریت آنها برای تامین امنیت چیست؟
250
دفاعی موافقت دارید ؟ اگر اری، لطفا و اگر با طالبان صلح شود، آیا برای ادغام جنگجویان ایشان در بخش امنیتی
بگویید چرا؟ چه فرصت ها و چه مشکلات در این زمینه وجود دارد؟ لطفا توضیح دهید.
ادغام طالبان در زندگی ملکی
هایشان به زندگی عادی چه کارها باید صورت گیرد؟ چه برای بازگشت آبرومندانه جنگجویان طالبان و خانواده
گروه ها و فعالین جامعه مدنی نهادهای حکومتداری محلی/ نهادها و اشخاص دراین باره مسئولیت دارند؟ ) نقش
در این زمینه چه می تواند باشد؟( مانند خودتان،
عدالت انتقالی
با افراد و اشخاص که جنایت جنگی مرتکب شده اند چگونه باید به نظر شما، در مصالحه با طالبان و ادغام ایشان،
برخورد صورت گیرد؟ رسیدگی به رنج و مصیبت چه کسی اولویت دارد؟ طالبان یا مردم ملکی؟
نظارت از برنامه ادغام طالبان
همچون ادغام طالبان در بخش ملکی و نظامی چگونه باید نظارت شود؟ پیشنهادات مشخص شما برای نظارت از
برنامه چیست؟
اگر حرف یا مسئله دیگر در رابطه با موضوع بحث ما در ذهن دارید، لطفا بیان کنید.
251
Annex 3. Key Informant Interview (KII) Questionnaires
(1) اعضای سابق طالبان نماینده گان احزاب و مصاحبه با
دی ار، دایاگ و دیگر برنامه های مصالحه بخش اول: مرور تجربه گذشته از برنامه های دی
سوالات شماره
آیا در مورد برنامه های دی دی ار، دایاگ، کدام معلومات دارید؟ .1
آیا در همچون برنامه ها خودتان کدام نقش داشته اید؟ اگر اری، نقش شما چه بوده است؟ .2
چه کسانی شامل برنامه های دی دی آر و دایاگ بودند؟ .3
؟آیا امکان داشت طالبان را هم در آن برنامه ها شامل می کردند؟ چرا طالبان شامل آن برنامه ها نشدند
دی دی ار و دایاگ چه بود؟ نقاط ضعف آن برنامه ها چه بود؟ نقاط قوت برنامه های .4
تا چه اندازه سازمانهای دولتی ومحلی و رهبران سیاسی با نفوذ در تطبیق و نظارت برنامه های مذکور .5
نقش داشتند؟
تا چه اندازه آن برنامه ها را حامیان خارجی افغانستان رهبری می کردند؟
قبلی مصالحه بخش دوم: تلاش های
سوالات شماره
مانند برنامه تحکیم صلح و برنامه صلح و ادغام مجدد افغانستان، -تلاش های قبلی مصالحه با طالبان .6
را چگونه ارزیابی می کنید؟
اده تا چه اندازه تلاش ها و برنامه های قبلی صلح با طالبان، مردم را برای صلح و آشتی با طالبان آم
کرده است؟ لطفا توضیح دهید.
252
گروه های ذینفع مانند احزاب سیاسی، بزرگان محلی، سازمان های دولتی و رهبری طالبان، در نقش .7
تطبیق یا نظارت آن برنامه ها چگونه بوده است؟
تا چه اندازه آن برنامه ها را حامیان خارجی افغانستان رهبری می کردند؟
ا نظارت کرده است؟آیا کدام نظارت تعقیبی صورت می گرفت؟ چه کسی آن برنامه ها ر .8
دفاعی افغانستان و : بخش امنیتی سومبخش
سوالات شماره
دفاعی افغانستان در برابر مردم، نگرانی ها و نیازهایشان پاسخگو می باشد؟ آیا باور و آیا بخش امنیتی .9
دفاعی می شنوند؟ و دارید که صدای شما را نهادها و مقامات امنیتی
دفاعی چیستند؟و به نظر شما، مهمترین چالش ها و مشکلات بخش امنیتی .10
دفاعی چیست؟ برای بهبود قوانین و پالیسی و پیشنهادات شما برای رفع چالش ها و مشکلات بخش امنیتی
دفاعی پیشنهاد خاص دارید؟ و امنیتی های
دفاعی کشور مطابق قانون عمل می کند؟ چگونه و چرا؟ اگر ممکن است لطفا با مثال و آیا بخش امنیتی .11
توضیح دهید.
و ، آیا قانون اساسی و سایر قوانین و پالیسی های امنیتی افغانستان با نیازهای امنیتیبه عبارت دیگر .12
دفاعی کشور مطابقت دارد؟
دفاعی کشور و )روند( مصالحه با طالبان، برای بهبود و تقویت بخش امنیتی آیا می توان در جریان .13
وجود دارد. اقداماتی انجام داد؟ اگر اری، لطفا توضیح دهید چه فرصت ها
دفاعی در جریان )روند( مصالحه و پیشنهادات مشخص و مفکوره شما برای بهبود و تقویت بخش امنیتی
با طالبان چیست؟
253
دفاعی را )در عملکرد ، تمامیت سازمانی و آیا روند صلح و ادغام مجدد جنگجویان طالبان، بخش امنیتی .14
ر اری، لطفا توضیح دهید. و اعتبار آن( با تهدید مواجه نمی سازد؟ اگ
ما چگونه می توانیم از همچون تهدیدات جلوگیری نماییم؟
دفاعی افغانستان نفوذ نکرده اند که به طور مخفی و غیر و آیا جنگجویان فعال طالبان در بخش امنیتی .15
رسمی فعالیت کنند؟ اگر اری، تا چه اندازه؟
دفاعی کشور چگونه ارزیابی و ضعف و قوت طالبان را در برابر دولت فعلی افغانستان و نیروهای امنیتی .16
می کنید؟
البان در دوام دادن جنگ خود به کدام منابع منابع حمایتی طالبان در دوام مبارزه نظامی شان چیستند؟ )ط
ی تکیه دارند؟( لطفا توضیح دهید. حمایت
دفاعی افغانستان و به نظر شما چه فرصت های مشخص و معین برای ادغام طالبان در بخش امنیتی .17
وجود دارد؟ لطفا توضیح دهید.
ملکی : ادغام مجدد جنگجویان سابق طالبان در زندگی چهارمبخش
سوالات شماره
چگونه جنگجویان سابق طالبان و خانواده هایشان می توانند به نحو خوب و درست اش در جامعه محلی .18
شما دوباره ادغام شوند؟ چالش ها و نگرانی های اصلی در برابر همچون تلاش ها برای ادغام مجدد
طالبان چیستند؟
آیا خانواده های جنگجویان طالبان از در حالی که طالبان علیه دولت افغانستان می جنگد، به نظر شما .19
باقی جامعه جدا افتاده و منزوی زندگی می کنند یا خیر؟ آیا به لحاظ اجتماعی خانواده های جنگجویان
طالبان با مشکلات خاص مواجه هستند؟ لطفا توضیح دهید.
کمک و همکاری ویژه آیا برای ادغام مجدد طالبان و خانواده هایشان در زندگی ملکی باید با ایشان کدام
صورت گیرد؟ اگر اری، لطفا توضیح دهید.
254
ادغام مجدد .20 در ایشان افغانی چه کسانی هستند؟ نقش در جامعه مهمترین حامیان و طرفداران طالبان
طالبان درجامعه چه می تواند باشد؟
طالبان چگونه می تواند زمینه ادغام جنگجویان و خانواده های خود را در جامعه فراهم کند؟ طالبان چه .21
در جامعه دارد؟ ظرفیت و قابلیت برای ادغام صلح آمیز
به نظر شما، در مصالحه با طالبان، چگونه باید رنج ها و عقده های ناشی از جنایات گذشته را جواب .22
کدام طرف ارجحیت دارد؟ طرف مردم ملکی یا طالبان؟ لطفا توضیح تداد؟ رسیدگی به رنج ومصیب
مصالحه چه فکر می کنید؟ دهید چرا و چگونه؟ در مورد اعطای امتیازات به طالبان در روند
آیا به روند جاری صلح با طالبان اعتماد دارید؟ لطفا توضیح دهید چرا. .23
: جایگاه طالبان در میان احزاب سیاسی پنجمبخش
شماره سوالات
جایگاه طالبان در میان احزاب سیاسی افغانستان چیست؟ به نظر شما آیا ممکن است طالبان به حیث یک .24
حزب سیاسی به رسمیت شناخته شود؟
25. به عنوان یک عضو سابق طالبان، رابطه میان خودتان و طالبان را چطور ارزیابی می کنید؟
نظام سیاسی فعلی چه ظرفیت ها و قابلیت ها برای جای دادن طالبان در جامعه و ادغام ایشان در بخش .26
امنیتی دفاعی دارد؟
برای ادغام مجدد طالبان در جامعه و ادغام ایشان در بخش امنیتی و دفاعی، چه تغییرات و اصلاحات در .27
نهادها باید ایجاد شود؟ لطفا توضیح دهید.
: نقشه راه برای ادغام مجدد طالبان در جامعه افغانی ششمبخش
255
سوالات شماره
طالبان در زندگی ملکی و یکجای شدن ایشان با نیروهای عناصر اساسی یک استراتژی برای ادغام مجدد .28
امنیتی دفاعی چه باید باشد؟
به نظر شما مهمترین بازیگران و افراد ذینفع در همچون برنامه چه کسانی اند؟ به لحاظ تقسیم کار، چه .29
کسی چه کاری باید انجام دهد تا استراتژی مورد نظر با موفقیت تطبیق شود؟
کسانی به چه ترتیب باید از همچون برنامه نظارت کنند؟چه
با توجه به اینکه افغانستان شدیدا به حمایت کشورهای خارجی وابسته است، چگونه می توان از همکاری .30
و حمایت همکاران خارجی برای همچون برنامه اطمینان حاصل کرد؟
در جریان روند صلح بیان کرده اند چه فکر می کنید؟ تا در مورد تقاضاها و موضع گیریهای طالبان که .31
چه اندازه همچون تقاضاها و موضع گیری ها را مشروع می شمارید؟
در مورد اعطای امتیازات به طالبان در روند مصالحه چه فکر می کنید؟ .32
جنایات گذشته را جواب به نظر شما، در مصالحه با طالبان، چگونه باید رنج ها و عقده های ناشی از .33
کدام طرف ارجحیت دارد؟ طرف مردم ملکی یا طالبان؟ لطفا توضیح تداد؟ رسیدگی به رنج ومصیب
دهید چرا و چگونه؟
به نظر شما وضعیت جنگی فعلی میان طالبان و دولت افغانستان در میانه روند صلح، با وضعیت های .34
کدام مثال به ذهن شما میاید، لطفا توضیح دهید. مشابه در کدام کشور قابل مقایسه است؟ آیا
: سوال پایانی هفتمبخش
سوالات شماره
آیا کدام حرف دیگر به گفتن دارید؟ کدام سوال باقی نمانده که باید پرسیده می شد و من نپرسیده ام؟ .35
256
( 2) بلند رتبه مصاحبه با مقامات
بخش اول: مرور تجربه گذشته از برنامه های دی دی ار، دایاگ و دیگر برنامه های مصالحه
سوالات شماره
قش داشته دی ار، دایاگ، کدام معلومات دارید؟ آیا در همچون برنامه ها کدام نآیا در مورد برنامه های دی . 1
اید؟ لطفا توضیح دهید.
چه کسانی شامل برنامه های دی دی آر و دایاگ بودند؟ . 2
آیا امکان داشت طالبان در آن برنامه ها شامل می شدند و اشتراک می کردند؟ لطفا توضیح دهید. چرا . 3
طالبان شامل آن برنامه ها نشدند؟
نقاط قوت برنامه های دی دی ار و دایاگ چه بود؟ نقاط ضعف آن برنامه ها چه بود؟ . 4
مهمترین انتقاد شما بر برنامه های مذکور چیست؟ لطفا توضیح دهید.
لطفا توضیح آیا میان تطبیق کنندگان برنامه های مذکور و حامیان خارجی هماهنگی لازم بود؟ اگر نی،
دهید که خلاها چه بود و چرا همچون خلاها وجود داشت؟
به نظر شما اهداف اعلام شده برنامه های مذکور و روش های تطبیق آن برنامه ها با یکدیگر هماهنگی
داشت؟ اگرنی، لطفا توضیح دهید.
ر اری، لطفا بیشتر توضیح آیا گفته می توانیم که برنامه های مذکور از عدم تعهد سیاسی متاثر بود؟ اگ
دهید.
تا چه اندازه سازمان ها و ادارات دولتی محلی، فعالین جامعه مدنی و دیگر چهره های با نفوذ سیاسی در . 5
رهبری، تطبیق و نظارت برنامه های مذکور نقش داشتند؟ تا چه اندازه آن برنامه ها را حامیان خارجی
افغانستان مدیریت می کردند؟
بخصوص نهادهای امنیتی دفاعی کشور، -اندازه تطبیق آن برنامه ها به بازسازی نهادهای دولتیتا چه
کمک کرد؟
257
آیا از برنامه های دی دی ار و دایاگ کدام نظارت تعقیبی صورت گرفت؟ چه کسی از تطبیق آن برنامه . 6
ها تعقیب و نظارت کرده است؟
بخش دوم: تلاش های قبلی مصالحه
سوالات شماره
مانند برنامه تحکیم صلح و برنامه صلح و ادغام مجدد افغانستان، را -تلاش های قبلی مصالحه با طالبان . 7
چگونه ارزیابی می کنید؟
تا چه اندازه تلاش ها و برنامه های قبلی صلح با طالبان، مردم را برای صلح و آشتی با طالبان آماده
ه است؟کرد
ادارات دولتی محلی، فعالین جامعه مدنی و دیگر چهره های با نفوذ سیاسی در تا چه اندازه سازمان ها و . 8
رهبری و تطبیق برنامه های مذکور نقش داشتند؟
تا چه اندازه آن برنامه ها را حامیان خارجی افغانستان مدیریت می کردند؟
امه ها را نظارت کرده آیا از آن برنامه ها کدام نظارت تعقیبی صورت گرفته است؟ چه کسی آن برن . 9
است؟
مهمترین انتقاد شما بر برنامه های مذکور چیست؟ لطفا توضیح دهید. . 10
آیا میان تطبیق کنندگان برنامه های مذکور و حامیان خارجی هماهنگی لازم بود؟ اگر نی، لطفا توضیح
دهید چرا و چگونه.
های تطبیق آن برنامه ها با یکدیگر هماهنگی به نظر شما اهداف اعلام شده برنامه های مذکور و روش
داشت؟ اگرنی، لطفا توضیح دهید چرا و چگونه.
آیا گفته می توانیم که برنامه های مذکور از عدم تعهد سیاسی متاثر بود؟ اگر اری، لطفا بیشتر توضیح
دهید که چرا و چگونه.
258
دفاعی افغانستان و بخش سوم: نظام امنیتی
سوالات شماره
کن است لطفا با مثال دفاعی کشور مطابق قانون عمل می کند؟ چگونه و چرا؟ اگر ممو آیا بخش امنیتی .11
توضیح دهید.
دفاعی این و زهای امنیتیآیا قانون اساسی و سایر قوانین و پالیسی های امنیتی افغانستان مطابق نیا . 12
کشور است؟
دفاعی چیستند؟و به نظر شما، مهمترین چالش ها و مشکلات بخش امنیتی . 13
امنیتی دفاعی چیست؟ برای بهبود قوانین و و پیشنهادات شما برای رفع چالش ها و مشکلات بخش
پالیسی های امنیتی دفاعی پیشنهاد خاص دارید؟
و ن ملکی چیست؟ رهبران امنیتی ارزیابی شما از رابطه موجود میان بخش امنیتی و دفاعی و رهبرا . 14
دفاعی چه رابطه ای با رهبران سیاسی و ملکی دارند؟
تا چه اندازه مقامات نظامی بر سیاستمداران و رهبران ملکی دولت نفوذ و کنترل دارند؟ تا چه اندازه
دفاعی کشور نفوذ و کنترل دارند؟ و سیاستمدارن و رهبران ملکی دولت بر بخش امنیتی
دفاعی کشور اقداماتی و ا می توان در روند مصالحه با طالبان، برای بهبود و تقویت بخش امنیتی آی . 15
دفاعی و انجام داد؟ اگر اری، لطفا توضیح دهید. پیشنهادات مشخص شما برای تقویت بخش امنیتی
در روند مصالحه با طالبان چیست؟
دفاعی را )در عملکرد ، تمامیت سازمانی و بخش امنیتی آیا روند صلح و ادغام مجدد جنگجویان طالبان، . 16
و اعتبار آن( با تهدید مواجه نمی سازد؟ اگر اری، لطفا توضیح دهید.
ما چگونه می توانیم از همچون تهدیدات جلوگیری نماییم؟
دفاعی افغانستان نفوذ نکرده اند که به طور مخفی و غیر و آیا جنگجویان فعال طالبان در بخش امنیتی . 17
رسمی فعالیت کنند؟ اگر اری، تا چه اندازه؟
آیا طالبان بر سیاستمداران افغانستان نفوذ دارند؟ اگر اری، تا چه اندازه؟ . 18
259
دفاعی کشور چگونه ارزیابی و ضعف و قوت طالبان را در برابر حکومت افغانستان و نیروهای امنیتی . 19
می کنید؟
منابع حمایتی طالبان در دوام مبارزه نظامی شان چیستند؟ )طالبان در دوام دادن جنگ خود به کدام
ی تکیه دارند؟( لطفا توضیح دهید. منابع حمایت
دفاعی افغانستان و های مشخص و معین برای ادغام طالبان در بخش امنیتی به نظر شما چه فرصت . 20
وجود دارد؟ لطفا توضیح دهید.
بخش چهارم: ادغام مجدد جنگجویان سابق طالبان در زندگی ملکی
سوالات شماره
پس از صلح با طالبان، چگونه جنگجویان سابق طالبان و خانواده هایشان می توانند به نحو خوب و درست . 21
اش در جامعه )جوامع محلی( دوباره ادغام شوند؟ چالش ها و نگرانی های اصلی در برابر همچون تلاش
ها برای ادغام مجدد طالبان چیستند؟
افغانستان می جنگند، به نظر شما خانواده های جنگجویان طالبان در جوامع در حالی طالبان علیه دولت . 22
محل زندگی شان، در انزوا زندگی می کنند یاخیر؟ لطفا توضیح دهید.
آیا برای ادغام مجدد طالبان و خانواده هایشان در زندگی ملکی باید با ایشان کدام کمک و همکاری ویژه
دهید. صورت گیرد؟ اگر اری، لطفا توضیح
مهمترین حامیان و طرفداران طالبان در جامعه افغانی چه کسانی هستند؟ نقش ایشان در ادغام مجدد طالبان . 23
در جامعه افغانی چه می تواند باشد؟
ده های خود در جامعه پس از توافق صلح، طالبان چگونه می تواند در ادغام مجدد جنگجویان و خانوا . 24
کمک کنند؟
پنجم: نقشه راه برای ادغام مجدد طالبان در جامعه افغانی بخش
260
سوالات شماره
عناصر اساسی یک استراتژی برای ادغام مجدد طالبان در زندگی ملکی و یکجای شدن ایشان با نیروهای . 25
دفاعی چه باید باشد؟ و امنیتی
به نظر شما مهمترین بازیگران و افراد ذینفع در همچون برنامه چه کسانی اند؟ به لحاظ تقسیم کار، چه .36
کسی چه کاری باید انجام دهد تا استراتژی مورد نظر با موفقیت تطبیق شود؟
37. چه کسانی به چه ترتیب باید از همچون برنامه نظارت کنند؟
تقاضاها و موضع گیریهای طالبان که در جریان روند صلح بیان کرده اند چیست؟ تا نظر شما در مورد .38
ع گیری ها را مشروع می شمارید؟ چه اندازه همچون تقاضاها و موض
به نظر شما، در مصالحه و ادغام طالبان، چگونه باید رنج ها و عقده های ناشی از جنایات گذشته را . 39
کدام طرف ارجحیت دارد؟ طرف مردم ملکی یا طالبان و خانواده ت ومصیب رسیدگی به رنج جواب داد؟
هایشان؟ چرا و چگونه؟
در مورد اعطای امتیازات به طالبان در روند مصالحه چه فکر می کنید؟
با توجه به اینکه افغانستان شدیدا به حمایت کشورهای خارجی وابسته است، چگونه می توان از همکاری .30
همکاران خارجی برای همچون برنامه اطمینان حاصل کرد؟ و حمایت
به نظر شما وضعیت جنگی فعلی میان طالبان و دولت افغانستان در میانه روند صلح، با وضعیت گروه .31
های متخاصم در کدام کشور قابل مقایسه است؟ آیا کدام مثال به ذهن شما میاید، لطفا توضیح دهید.
پایانیبخش ششم: سوال
سوالات شماره
آیا کدام حرف دیگر به گفتن دارید؟ کدام سوال باقی نمانده که باید پرسیده می شد و من نپرسیده ام؟ .32
261
( 3)مصاحبه با اعضای جامعه مدنی
بخش اول: مرور تجربه دی دی ار، دایاگ و دیگر برنامه های مصالحه
سوالات شماره
منحل در مورد تجربه افغانستان از برنامه های خلع سلاح، منحل سازی و ادغام مجدد) یا دی دی ار(، و . 1
مسئول )یا دایاگ(، چه می دانید؟ گروه های مسلح غیر سازی
ارزیابی شما از موفقیت و کامیابی آن برنامه ها چیست؟ از نظر شما نقاط ضعف و قوت آن برنامه ها . 2
چیستند؟
مانند خود شما. در آن برنامه ها دخیل بوده اند؟ اگر نقش جامعه -تا چه اندازه نهادها و فعالین جامعه مدنی
مدنی ناکافی بوده است، به نظر شما چه چیز نقش جامعه مدنی را محدود کرده است؟
آیا کدام روش برای نظارت برنامه های مذکور وجود داشته است؟ چه کسی از آن برنامه ها را نظارت . 3
کرده است؟
بخش دوم: تلاش های قبلی مصالحه
سوالات شماره
مانند برنامه تحکیم صلح و برنامه صلح و ادغام مجدد افغانستان، را -تلاش های قبلی مصالحه با طالبان . 4
چگونه ارزیابی می کنید؟
اده کرده تا چه اندازه تلاش ها و برنامه های قبلی صلح با طالبان، مردم را برای صلح و آشتی با طالبان آم
است؟ لطفا توضیح دهید.
در آن برنامه ها دخیل بوده اند؟ اگر نقش جامعه ، مانند خود شما -الین جامعه مدنیازه نهادها و فع تا چه اند . 5
ش جامعه مدنی را محدود کرده است؟مدنی ناکافی بوده است، به نظر شما چه چیز نق
آیا کدام نظارت تعقیبی صورت می گرفت؟ چه کسی آن برنامه ها را نظارت می کرد؟ . 6
262
دفاعی افغانستان و بخش دوم: بخش امنیتی
سوالات شماره
دفاعی افغانستان در برابر مردم، نگرانی ها و نیازهایشان پاسخگو می باشد؟ و بخش امنیتی تا چه اندازه . 7
دفاعی می شنوند؟ و آیا باور دارید که صدای شما را نهادها و مقامات امنیتی
ن است لطفا با مثال دفاعی کشور مطابق قانون عمل می کند؟ چگونه و چرا؟ اگر ممکو آیا بخش امنیتی . 8
توضیح دهید.
دفاعی کشور مطابقت و آیا قانون اساسی و سایر قوانین و پالیسی های امنیتی افغانستان با نیازهای امنیتی
دارد؟ لطفا توضیح دهید.
دفاعی کشور چگونه ارزیابی و ضعف و قوت طالبان را در برابر حکومت افغانستان و نیروهای امنیتی . 9
می کنید؟
منابع حمایتی طالبان در دوام مبارزه نظامی شان چیستند؟ )طالبان در دوام دادن جنگ خود به کدام منابع
ی تکیه دارند؟( لطفا توضیح دهید. حمایت
دفاعی کشور اقداماتی و ن)روند( مصالحه با طالبان، برای بهبود و تقویت بخش امنیتی آیا می توان در جریا . 10
انجام داد؟ اگر اری، لطفا توضیح دهید چه فرصت ها وجود دارد.
دفاعی را )در عملکرد ، تمامیت سازمانی و آیا روند صلح و ادغام مجدد جنگجویان طالبان، بخش امنیتی
.نمی سازد؟ اگر اری، لطفا توضیح دهید و اعتبار آن( با تهدید مواجه
ادغام طالبان در دولت افغانستان چقدر امکان دارد؟ چگونه؟ چه فرصت ها و چالش ها در پیش رو قرار . 11
چگونه می توان چالش های پیش روی ادغام طالبان در دولت را به نحو خوب حل و فصل کرد؟ دارد؟
دفاعی کشور چه فکر می کنید؟ مهمترین چالش و در مورد ادغام جنگجویان سابق طالبان در بخش امنیتی . 12
ها و ترس ها در این باره چیستند؟ به نظر شما برای ادغام طالبان در بخش امنیتی و دفاعی کشور کدام
دفاعی چی خواهد بود؟( و فرصت ها وجود دارد؟ )فایده های احتمالی ادغام طالبان در بخش امنیتی
263
اگر جنگجویان یا یک قوماندان سابق طالبان در منطقه شما مسئولیت امنیتی بگیرند احساس شما چه خواهد
خود با طالبان همکاری کرده اید؟( بود؟ )آیا تا به حال برای تامین امنیت منطقه زندگی
بخش سوم: ادغام مجدد جنگجویان سابق طالبان در زندگی ملکی
سوالات رهشما
در صورت صلح با طالبان، چگونه جنگجویان سابق طالبان و خانواده هایشان می توانند به نحو خوب و . 13
درست اش در جامعه )جامعه محلی شما( دوباره ادغام شوند؟ چالش ها و نگرانی های اصلی در برابر
همچون تلاش ها برای ادغام مجدد طالبان چیستند؟
دولت افغانستان می جنگد، به نظر شما آیا خانواده های جنگجویان طالبان از باقی در حالی که طالبان علیه . 14
جامعه جدا افتاده و منزوی زندگی می کنند یا خیر؟ آیا به لحاظ اجتماعی خانواده های جنگجویان طالبان با
ص مواجه هستند؟ لطفا توضیح دهید. مشکلات خا
ن در زندگی ملکی باید با ایشان کدام کمک و همکاری ویژه آیا برای ادغام مجدد طالبان و خانواده هایشا
صورت گیرد؟ اگر اری، لطفا توضیح دهید.
آیا برای سیهم سازی زنان در همچون برنامه ها به تدابیر و اقدامات ویژه ضرورت است؟ چرا و چگونه؟ . 15
چه نوع ابتکارات محلی/ مردمی می تواند به ادغام مجدد جنگجویان طالبان در جوامع محلی کمک کرده و . 17
آنرا تسهیل کند؟ چه افراد و اشخاص برای تسهیل و هماهنگ سازی ادغام مجدد طالبان در جامعه نقش
مهمتر دارند؟
قده های ناشی از جنایات گذشته را جواب داد؟ به نظر شما، در مصالحه با طالبان، چگونه باید رنج ها و ع . 18
کدام طرف ارجحیت دارد؟ طرف مردم ملکی یا طالبان؟ چرا و چگونه؟ ترسیدگی به رنج ومصیب
در مورد اعطای امتیازات به طالبان در روند مصالحه چه فکر می کنید؟
د؟ نقش ایشان در ادغام مجدد طالبان در حامیان و طرفداران اصلی طالبان در جامعه افغانستان چه کسانی ان . 19
جامعه افغانی چه می تواند باشد؟
264
غام مجدد طالبان در جامعه دارد؟ نظام سیاسی فعلی چه ظرفیت ها و قابلیت ها برای اد . 20
ید برای ادغام طالبان در جامعه، دولت و بخش امنیتی و دفاعی کشور چه تغییرات و اصلاحات در نهادها با . 21
ایجاد شود؟ لطفا توضیح دهید.
طالبان چگونه می تواند به ادغام مجدد جنگجویان و خانواده های خود در جامعه کمک کنند؟ طالبان چه . 22
ظرفیت و قابلیت برای ادغام صلح آمیز در جامعه محلی شما دارد؟
بخش چهارم: نقشه راه برای ادغام مجدد طالبان در جامعه افغانی
سوالات شماره
عناصر اساسی یک استراتژی برای ادغام مجدد طالبان در زندگی ملکی و یکجای شدن ایشان با نیروهای . 23
دفاعی چه باید باشد؟ و امنیتی
به نظر شما مهمترین بازیگران و افراد ذینفع در همچون برنامه چه کسانی اند؟ به لحاظ تقسیم کار، چه . 24
کسی چه کاری باید انجام دهد تا استراتژی مورد نظر با موفقیت تطبیق شود؟
چه کسانی به چه ترتیب باید از همچون برنامه نظارت کنند؟
افغانستان شدیدا به حمایت کشورهای خارجی وابسته است، چگونه می توان از همکاری با توجه به اینکه . 25
و حمایت همکاران خارجی برای همچون برنامه اطمینان حاصل کرد؟
در مورد تقاضاها و موضع گیریهای طالبان که در جریان روند صلح بیان کرده اند چه فکر می کنید؟ تا . 26
و موضع گیری ها را مشروع می شمارید؟ چه اندازه همچون تقاضاها
به نظر شما وضعیت جنگی فعلی میان طالبان و دولت افغانستان در میانه روند صلح، با وضعیت های . 27
مشابه در کدام کشور قابل مقایسه است؟ آیا کدام مثال به ذهن شما میاید، لطفا توضیح دهید.
بخش پنجم: سوال پایانی
265
سوالات شماره
آیا کدام حرف دیگر به گفتن دارید؟ کدام سوال باقی نمانده که باید پرسیده می شد و من نپرسیده ام؟ . 28
266
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