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TABLE OF CONTENTS

AKNOWLDGEMENT iv

DEDICATION v

CHAPTER I 1

1. Historical/Contextual Introduction 1

2. Statement of the Problem 3

3. Relevance of the Study 5

4. Delimitation 6

5. Methodology 6

CHAPTER II: FREE WILL AND EVIL 8

1. FREE WILL 8

1.1. The Concept of Free Will 8

1.2. Free Action and Moral Responsibilty 12

1.3. The Plausibility of Free Will of Man 16

1.4. Some Arguments Regarding Free Will 17

1.4.1. The Consequence Argument 17

1.4.2. The Origination Argument 19

1.4.3. Rejecting the Incompatibilist Arguments 20

1.4.4. Frankfurt’s Argument against “the Ability to Do Otherwise” 20

1.4.5. Strawson’s Reactive Attitudes 22

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2. EVIL 24

2.1. The Concept of Evil 24

2.2. The Problem of Evil 25

2.3. The Logical Problem of Evil 28

2.4. The Different Arguments on the Existence of God 34

2.4.1. Theodicy: Definition and History 34

2.4.2. Pascal’s Wager 36

2.4.3. Ontological Argument 36

2.4.4. Cosmological Argument 38

2.4.5. Design or Teleological Argument 39

2.4.6. The Moral Argument 39

2.4.7. The Argument from Religious Experience 40

2.4.8. The Argument from Miracles 40

2.4.9. Monism 40

2.4.10. Process Theodicy 41

CHAPTER III: PLANTINGA’S FREE WILL DEFENSE 42

1. The Start of Free Will Defense 42

2. St. Augustine’s Free Will Defense: A Model of Plantinga 42

3. Plantinga on Free Will and Evil 45

4. Plantinga’s Reshaping of Augustine’s Free Will Theodicy 46

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5. Plantinga’s Free Will Defense 50

CHAPTER IV: PLANTINGA’S FREE WILL DEFENSE ON THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

52

1. Free Will Defense at Work 52

1.1. The Function and Nature of Free Will Defense 55

1.2. The Argument 56

2. Free Will Defense in the Face of Evil 56

CHAPTER V 62

1. Summary 62

2. Conclusion 63

3. Recommendations 64

WORKS CITED 68

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ACKNOWLDEGEMENT

I would like to express my deepest and sincerest gratitude on the following persons who

guided and supported me all throughout the time when I am still doing my thesis. They have

become an instrument into making this dream into reality. These were the following persons who

became a part of this thesis realizable:

To Mr. Fortunato Caguiran, our Librarian, for lending me my resources.

To Rev. Fr. Kenneth C. Masong, M.A., the Philosophy Department’s Dean, for also

lending me books and for guiding and helping me in making this thesis be possible.

To Rev. Fr. Joel Huerto, who edited my very first chapter of my thesis and who also

guided me in doing this thesis.

To Rev. Fr. Jesus B. Layug, Jr., our beloved Director, for being my thesis adviser and

who helped me out in reformulating and revising my thesis.

To Jayson Miranda, a good friend and brother, who really sacrifices a lot in order to help

me in making and revising my thesis from the very start up to the last moment of doing this

thesis.

To my beloved classmates who are also my brothers namely: Ryan, James, Ralph,

Roniel, Joseph, Joaquin, Mark Anthony, Gale, Abel, Aldrin Q., Dominic, Marc Del, Elwin,

Jaycar, Edmel, Kong Aldrin, and Aldrin T., who had been my inspiration and strength in order to

finish this thesis.

To my dearly loved parents, Jerry and Efegin Caseja, for their untiring support and love

that gave me the strength in finishing this thesis.

Lastly, to the One, the Creator of all beings, whom I owe my life – to God – for giving

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me this life and my capabilities into making this dream comes into reality.

I would like to dedicate this masterpiece to my dearest parents –

Jerry Caseja and Efegin Caseja,

whom I owe everything especially my life.

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CHAPTER I

1. Historical/Contextual Introduction

If God is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful) and omnibenevolent (all

good), then why does He allow terrible things to happen in this world He had created? It is

written in the Bible, “God looked at everything he had made, and he found it very good.” (The

New American Bible, Gen. 1: 31) If that is so, did God create evil? Is He the one responsible for

the suffering of innocent people from pain and other afflictions?

These questions about the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent

God against the presence of evil is an ancient and venerable tradition. It began at around 2,500

years ago in the ancient Greek Philosophy and until now it still continues to be a very

controversial issue in the field of philosophy of religion.

Objections on the belief in God posed by the occurrence of evil and suffering present a

far more serious challenge than to objections from science. The philosophical problem of evil

can be posed briefly and sharply. It appears to many people, believers and nonbelievers alike,

that an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent, if he exists, will not allow the kind of evil

and suffering which occur in the world. Therefore, the existence of this evil seems to count

heavily against the existence of God (Evans 130-133). It becomes the greatest test to one’s faith

and the greatest temptation for unbelief.

It requires a lot of knowledge to give proofs and evidence to prove the existence of God.

Presenting theistic proofs is the task of natural theology which is an attempt to reach sound

conclusions about the existence and nature of God based on human reasoning. Human cognitive

faculties such as experience, memory, introspection, deductive and inductive reasoning and

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inference to best explanation are the method used in natural theology. In contrast with natural

theology is revealed theology, which is based on statements that are said to be revealed by God

and events that evidently reveal something of God. Then, natural theology has created a

perplexing variety of arguments for the existence of God and the four main types are ontological

argument, cosmological argument, teleological argument (also called as design argument) and

moral argument.

However, none of these arguments proves the existence of God. But then again, some of

these arguments contributed to a cumulative case for the existence of God. According to a

philosopher, namely Richard Swinburne1, cosmological, teleological and moral arguments

independently increase the probability of God’s existence even if none of them makes it more

probable than not. Then evidences such that deriving from providential occurrences and religious

experiences are added to the equilibrium. Swinburne concluded that theism becomes more

probable than its negation. (Audi 610)

If natural theology cannot prove the existence of God, perhaps natural atheology, which

is an attempt to prove the central belief of theism as false, can provide something essential

regarding the problem. And the most notable argument of natural atheology is the problem of

evil. There are varieties of philosophers who believe that the existence of evil constitutes, in one

way or another, a problem for those who accept theistic belief.

The problem of evil is essentially logical problem in nature wherein it sets the theist the

task of clarifying and, if impossible, reconciling the several beliefs which he holds. It is not like

scientific problems that can be solved through discoveries or a practical problem by a hypothesis

or experiments. And this problem does not arise for those world views far different from the

1 For further reading, see The Coherence of Theism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977 and The Existence of God. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979 of Swineburne.

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views of that of traditional theism. (Mackie 150-151)

This research paper seeks to expose and give concrete and concise understanding to

support the existence of God using Alvin Plantinga’s idea of Free Will Defense. This free will

defense is an attempt to refute the problem of evil, the argument that to posit the existence of an

omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good God in an evil world constitutes a logical

contradiction. Hence, God could not eliminate the possibility of moral evil without at the same

time eliminating some greater good. As Plantinga summarized his defense,

“A world containing creatures who are significantly free (and freely perform more good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all. Now God can create free creatures, but He can't cause or determine them to do only what is right. For if He does so, then they aren't significantly free after all; they do not do what is right freely. To create creatures capable of moral good, therefore, He must create creatures capable of moral evil; and He can't give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same time prevent them from doing so. As it turned out, sadly enough, some of the free creatures God created went wrong in the exercise of their freedom; this is the source of moral evil. The fact that free creatures sometimes go wrong, however, counts neither against God's omnipotence nor against His goodness; for He could have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil only by removing the possibility of moral good.” (A. Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil 30)

The very content of this research paper is to exemplify and discuss one important aspect

of philosophy of religion and the very heart of many of the major religions in the world–the

belief that God exists, that there really is a being of the sort theists claim to worship and trust,

who is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. However, this belief has not been

universally accepted. Many atheists’ thinkers have rejected it and some claimed that it is plainly

false and that it is irrational to accept. In response to those rejections and oppositions, some

theologians and theistic philosophers have tried to give plausible arguments or proofs for the

existence of God. (A. Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil 2)

2. Statement of the Problem

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The researcher is working on A Philosophical Exposition on the Problem of Evil and

God’s Existence based on Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense. The researcher wants to expose

on how Plantinga’s Free Will Defense tries to answer the problem of evil present in the world

especially nowadays. Moreover, the researcher will try to expose why such evil can be present

when there is a God who is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent.

If God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, therefore there should be no evil

in the world He created. The problem of evil appeared long ago and until now, it is still a big

issue within theology and philosophy. (Evans 130)

There are many accounts in philosophy and religion which attempt to answer the problem

on the existence of evil. Like for example, the Epicurean dilemma which is stated as this:

suppose God exists. Is He willing to prevent evil but not able? Then He is impotent. Is He able,

but not willing? Then He is malevolent. Is He both able and willing, then “whence is evil?"

(Hume and Popkin) On the other hand, St. Augustine argued that evil is not truly reality, he

applies the Platonist conception of evil to what is for him a very existential dilemma. He also

said that evil is not a being; it is a deprivation, a lack of the excellence in being which belongs

there. (Ross 123) St. Thomas Aquinas followed Augustine by saying that “Since God is the

highest good; He would not allow any evil to exist in His works unless His omnipotence and

goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil.” (Aquinas) For Hinduism and Buddhism

the problem of suffering is always connected to the previous unwholesome or evil action and to

nescience2 - both in Buddhism and Hinduism - according to the law of "Karma" or "deed" or

action performed in this or in the previous life of a person. (Ziêba)

Even though the problem regarding the existence of evil gives confusions and

misunderstanding regarding faith (for theists), the only way to know the true existence of evil is

2 unknowing or original ignorance

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by experiencing it. Here are some of the questions that this research paper would attempt to

answer.

1. What is free will? What is evil?

2. What is Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense all about?

3. How is Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense relevant to the problem of evil

The second chapter is a discussion on free will and an exposition of the problem of evil.

On the one hand, the researcher discusses in this chapter the plausibility of the free will of man

and the different arguments, in favor or not of free will, that are related. On the other hand, an

exposition of the problem of evil is discussed in this chapter. There is also an exposition of the

argument of the existence of God in the face of moral evil.

The third chapter is a comprehensive exposition of Alvin Plnatinga’s free will defense. It

is all-inclusive of the origin and the reshaping of Augustine’s idea that led Plantinga to his own

version of free will defense.

The fourth chapter deals with the relevance of Plantinga’s free will defense on the

problem of evil. It is an exposition of his free will defense and on how does it work in the face of

moral evil.

The fifth chapter deals with the summary of ideas, the conclusion and the

recommendation of the researcher based on his study.

3. Relevance of the Study

The study on the problem of evil can offer a significant contribution in understanding the

argument on the existence of God who is claimed as omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent

then evil exist. This research will show proofs and evidences that will enlighten the reader’s

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mind and give clearer view regarding the problem on evil and suffering present in the world.

Hence, the focal point of this research is to expose the argument on God’s existence amidst the

existence of evil using Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense.

Moreover, it is also significant to the readers in order to understand that evil doesn’t

come from God who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent but it is a product of man’s

free will. God has not made evil but man on his own accord. But in the light of this, man still has

his own way to choose what to do for he has the freedom that God has gave him.

In addition, the researcher finds the research very significant because of his interest on

the topic that will lead him to have a clearer and concrete understanding regarding the problem

of evil and the existence of God using Plantinga’s free will defense. The research will also give

him knowledge about the existence of evil and the rationality of believing in an omnipotent,

omniscient and omnibenevolent God.

4. Delimitation

The main focus of the research is to philosophically analyze and expose the problem of

evil and God’s existence using Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense. The researcher will present

Plantinga’s Free Will Defense which is an attempt to answer the question on the problem of evil.

Ideas from other philosophers like St. Anselm and St. Thomas regarding God’s existence will

give clearer understanding on natural theology. And also, St. Augustine’s idea of free will will be

a great help on the problem of evil that Plantinga adopted to support his own version of free will

defense.

The study will only be touching the problem of evil in the light of moral evil where in the

free will of man is the main focus on the second chapter. Natural evil will not be included in the

study especially in the discussion of problem of evil.

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5. Methodology

The researcher will use the expository method as the tool on his research. The researcher

will try to expose and present the arguments presented by Alvin Plantinga using his Free Will

Defense as the main tool in defending the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent and

omnibenevolent God while at the same time exposing the problem of evil and suffering. The

researcher will also include some philosophical views on the problem of evil that will support

Plantinga’s argument.

The researcher will use Plantinga’s philosophical books like God, Freedom and Evil, The

Necessity of God, God and Other Minds and other philosophical books, journal articles and

scholarly websites which will offer him ideas and views regarding the problem of evil from

different sources.

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CHAPTER II

FREE WILL AND EVIL

1. FREE WILL

1.1 The Concept of Free Will

‘What is it to choose freely?’ and ‘What is it to be morally responsible for one’s

choices?’ are the central questions on free will. These two questions are very much related with

each other, for freedom of action is indispensable for moral responsibility, despite the fact that it

is not sufficient. That is why most philosophers suppose that the concept of free will is very

much related to the concept of moral responsibility. Because acting with free will is simply to

satisfy the metaphysical requirement on being responsible for one’s action.

As for Augustine, many historians of philosophy read his account on free will and one of

them is John Rist who says:

There is still no consensus of opinion on Augustine’s view of each man’s responsibility for his moral behaviour… There are those who attribute to Augustine the full-blown Calvinist position that each man has no say in his ultimate destiny… Other interpreters reject this view in varying degrees. They will not hold that for Augustine man’s will is enslaved, or they would dispute about the sense in which it is enslaved and the sense in which it is free. (Stumpand Kretzmann 124)

Augustine’s theory of free will would present that post-Fall human beings, these are

angels that fall from heaven and become part of the world, have free will. Among other reasons

for thinking so, Augustine maintains that the exhortations of scripture would be pointless unless

human beings have free will. (Stump and Kretzmann 133-134) He says,

One must not think that free choice has been removed because [the Apostle] said, “It is God who works in you both to will and to do, of [his] good

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will.” Because if this were so, he would not have said above, “Work out your own salvation in fear and trembling.” For when it is commanded that they work, their free will is invoked. (Stump and Kretzmann 134)

Also, Augustine’s argument with the Pelagians, the point he emphasizes is that the post-

Fall human beings are unable to will not to sin unless their will is aided by grace; but he argues

that God gives grace to the intellect and will person who desires it. By his grace God gave the

law, so that people might know what they should do, and that, knowing it, they might ask God

for help in doing it.3

Furthermore, Augustine’s thinking about the will is very important because of three

distinct features: In one of his book De Libero Arbitrio, he endeavors to build up an anti-

Manichean theodicy which accounts for the presence of moral evil in the world without either

substantializing it or finding its source in divine activity. In this regard, the will is what makes an

action one's own, and placing the burden of responsibility on the one who performs the said

action. And by the time he had composed the Book III of De Libero Arbitrio, yet, Augustine had

come to picture out the human condition in terms of the ignorance and difficulty that attend it,

and these features tend to cause difficulties in the libertarian optimism of his Book I by putting

questions regarding the possibility for man to overcome ignorance and difficulty. However, the

will is still intended to serve as the fulcrum of moral responsibility.

Despite the fact that the two are closely related, it is needed to distinguish the concern

with moral responsibility. With that, Augustine is still engaged in building up an anti-Manichean

representation of the human condition. He is likewise concerned with the aspect of purely

rational or intellectual analysis which falls outside its scope. In his book Confessions this feature

of the discussion is heightened by the fact that the choice entails a necessary moral reorientation 3 See e.g. De nat. et gratia 12.13. There are even places where Augustine applies this point to pre-Fall human beings: “Even if [Pelagius] were speaking about a whole and healthy human nature… what he says would not be correct, [namely], that not sinning depends only on us, as sinning depends on us. For even then there would be the help of God… which is prepared for those who are willing [to receive it]” (De nat. et gratia 48.50)

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consecutively opposing to habits which have acquired a necessity of their own, but Augustine's

discussion of the example proposes that he perceives it as more than a peculiar or secluded

incident. Rather, it is intended to draw one’s awareness to an introspectively available variety of

phenomena that forces one to recognize a fundamentally non-rational component of human

choice.

However, there is a third factor at work here, because the problem of evil in the non-

Hellenic religious and in the scriptural traditions received a relatively different treatment in the

Greek tradition, even Augustine improved his knowledge with the former e.g. Ad Simplicianum,

circa 396 C.E. and Confessions VII.ix.14, still the dissimilarity between the two was not

completely lost. Here, one finds less emphasis upon rational analysis and logical argumentation

than upon pledged community membership, trans-generational authority, obedience to divinely-

sanctioned standards, and, in some other cases, an explicit suspicion of intellectualism alongside

with an emphasis upon the necessity of divine aid for moral transformation. With this legacy, it

helped Augustine to divert his attention away from the strictly rational features of human agency

and also, to encourage him to think about rationality in innovative ways.

Without a doubt of mistake to classify the religious and philosophical aspects of

Augustine's classical legacy, it is often useful to vision his thought as presenting a gradual

movement away from a Greek intellectualism towards a voluntarism highlighting the profound

ignorance and difficulty of the human condition, in addition to the need for the divine aid to

conquer the ignorance and difficulty. At the heart of this change of emphasis are Augustine's

developing views regarding the will. Without a surprise, this development often has to be

understood against the backdrop of the philosophical and theological difficulties that come to

occupy him over the years.

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Relation of human free will to divine foreknowledge is one of these difficulties. Despite

the fact that it is enticing to view this as a clash among the cities of Athens and Jerusalem, the

problem initially arises within the Greco-Roman tradition itself. Even though Augustine's

primary treatment of the problem at De Libero Arbitrio III.2–4 seems innocent of this fact, his

later treatment at De Civitate Dei V.9–10 shows that he was aware of Cicero's discussion of the

problem in De Divinatione and De Fato. In later medieval philosophy, it is also worth noting

that, one sees the mirror-image of this problem in terms of the relation of divine freedom and

power versus the extent of human knowledge. The problem is attributable to the concept of

necessity which underlies the Greek conception of knowledge in both cases. So in this particular

case, the problem is on how to resolve the absolute necessity that attends God's knowledge, that

is, if God genuinely knows that this is going to happen, it is impossible for this not to take place,

for more understanding see De Libero Arbitrio III.4 and De Civitate Dei V.9. Now, with the idea

that there can be no moral responsibility unless it is one’s own power to choose to do other than

the self, from De Libero Arbitrio III.3. Apparently, freedom to do otherwise appears to rule out

the possibility of foreknowledge, and on the contrary, foreknowledge seems to rule out the

possibility of freedom to do otherwise. Within the books De Libero Arbitrio and De Civitate Dei,

Augustine’s treatment regarding the problem is complex and at times extremely unclear. Also, he

is concerned with defending compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom with the

anti-Manicheans and Cicero by means of arguing that the free exercise of the will is among the

events foreknown by God and that such foreknowledge in no way detracts from our culpability

for our acts of willing that is in his book De Libero Arbitrio III.3 & 4 De Civitate Dei V.9. The

obscurity of the details notwithstanding, Augustine leaves no doubt that he wants to maintain

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both that God does have foreknowledge of man’s actions and that one is morally responsible for

them.

According to David Hume, the question of the nature of free will is “the most contentious

question of metaphysics” (Timpe, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy). If this statement is

plausible, then it is not an easy task to know what free will is. Free will is basically to say that an

agent has free will when this agent has the ability to choose his or her course of action. However,

this criterion is also suitable for animals, and naturally one thinks that only human beings have

this free will, and not animals. So, considering free will as a unique ability of human beings that

allows them to control their actions. But it is controversial whether this basic understanding of

what it means to have a free will actually requires an agent to have a specific faculty of will,

whether the term “free will” is simply shorthand for other features of human beings, and whether

there really is such a thing as free will at all.

1.2 Free Action and Moral Responsibility

Why is it important to be concerned whether agents have free will? Maybe the best

possible reason that the researcher could find is that free will is very much related to two other

very important philosophical issues which are freedom of action and moral responsibility.

Nevertheless, these concepts have their close connection with each other and it is critical not to

conflate them.

One almost thinks that an agent’s free action comes from the action that he does as a

product of exercising his free will. For example, a student named Adrian is reflecting whether or

not to go to school after waking up early in the morning. He might say, “I know that I need to go

to school because it is my responsibility as a student to attend my classes. But the problem is, it

started raining and the weather makes me lazy, so, I think that the best decision that I will make

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is to go to school.” After looking at this statement one can see one reason that is necessary for

free action which is – Adrian, as an agent, must first decide or choose to go to school before he

actually prepare and go to school. Presupposing that human actions are those actions which are

products of human’s rational faculties then one can see that the chance of free action is based on

the choice of free will. Then one can say that an agent’s action is basically triumphant in

executing a free choice. And that is free will that is being exercise by an agent.

In addition, there were different accounts offered by various philosophers regarding the

concept of freedom. One of them is David Hume who wrote in his book An Enquiry Concerning

Human Understanding, that liberty, the term he used for free will, is simply the power of acting

or not acting, according to the determination of the will: If one chooses to remain at rest, he may;

if one chooses to move, he also may. So, this hypothetical liberty is generally allowed to belong

to everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains. Thus, the statement proposes that freedom is

basically the facility to choose a course of action wherein an agent is free if not hindered by

external obstacle from carrying out that action. Another philosopher in the name of Thomas

Hobbes said, “A free agent is he that can do as he will, and forbear as he will, and that liberty is

the absence of external impediments.” (Timpe, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Hobbes

suggested that freedom consists in there being no external impediments to an agent doing what

he wants to do. Therefore, in the statement earlier about Adrian whether or not go to school,

Hume and Hobbes would tell that Adrian is free to go to school as long as there is nothing that

hinders him from executing his decision, and also he is free not to go to school as a long as there

is nothing that forces him to go if he would choose not to.

On the other hand, others might still consider this approach as a failure in order to

differentiate these two related, but conceptually different types of freedom which were – freedom

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of will and freedom of action. There might be some reasons behind this differentiation which is

motivated by the evident reality that agents can acquire free will without also having freedom of

action. One may presume, prior to the choice that Adrian made wherein he will go to school; he

is suffering from a headache. Also at that very moment while he is suffering from headache, the

weather is in bad state. The rain started to drop so hard and followed by a sharp lightning and a

thundering sound rolled down the sky. And because of the rain, it flooded the street and vehicles

cannot enter the street no more.

Now, it depends on one’s view of what free will is whether or not one can have freedom

of action without free will. Moreover, causal determinism would not require that agent’s lack of

freedom to do what they want to do. Rather, that agent could still do what he wants to do even

the fact that he is causally determined to do that action. Hence, Hume and Hobbes can be

characterized as being compatibilists4 in nature.

The distinction between freedom of will and freedom of action is not a problem because

it comes out that free will is essential for exercising free actions. So, we can say that if Adrian is

persuaded when he is still asleep to feel like going to the school, in that case still if no external

hindrance is stopping him from carrying through with this decision, it is clear that his decision in

going to school is not a free action at all. Persuasion is the main reason that’s why it is clear to

say that it is not a free action, because the decision does not arise from Adrian’s free will. That’s

why, one can say that free will might be an essential condition for free action even if the two are

distinct with each other. The phrase “acting with free will” means engaging in an action as the

result of the utilization of free will. Use of the phrase does not deny the distinction between free

will and free action.

4 According to compatibilists, freedom is compatible with determinism because freedom is essentially just a matter of not being constrained or hindered in certain ways when one acts or chooses.

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The second reason to take into consideration about free will is that it seems to be required

for moral responsibility. Though there are various accounts of what exactly moral responsibility

is, it is widely agreed that moral responsibility is different from causal responsibility. Think

about a falling rock that landed on a glass table, and then breaking it into pieces. Although the

rock is causally responsible for breaking the glass table into pieces, it is not morally responsible

for it since rocks are not moral agents. Depending on one’s account of causation, it also might be

possible to be morally responsible for a state of affairs even if one is not causally responsible for

that same state of affairs. For present reason, simply say that an agent is morally responsible for

a state of affairs only if he is the appropriate receiver of moral praise or moral blame for that

state of affairs5. Based on the principal view of the relationship between free will and moral

responsibility, an agent is not morally responsible for his actions if an agent does not have free

will. For example, if Adrian is forced into doing a morally bad act, such as stealing money, one

shouldn’t hold him morally responsible for this action since it is not an action that he did of his

own free will.

Some philosophers do not believe that free will is required for moral responsibility.

According to John Martin Fischer, human agents do not have free will, but they are still morally

responsible for their choices and actions. In a nutshell, Fischer thinks that the kind of control

needed for moral responsibility is weaker than the kind of control needed for free will. (Timpe,

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Furthermore, he thinks that the truth of causal determinism

would preclude the kind of control needed for free will, but that it wouldn’t preclude the kind of

control needed for moral responsibility. As this example shows, virtually every issue pertaining

to free will is contested by various philosophers.

5 an agent can thus be morally responsible even if no one, including herself, actually does blame or praise her for her actions

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However, many think that the significance of free will is not limited to its necessity for

free action and moral responsibility. Various philosophers suggest that free will is also a

requirement for agency, rationality, the autonomy and dignity of persons, creativity, cooperation,

and the value of friendship and love. Thus, one needs to see that free will is central to many

philosophical issues.

The majority view, however, is that one can readily conceive willings that are not free.

Indeed, much of the debate about free will centers on whether human beings have it, yet

virtually, no one doubts that he or she will to do this and that. The main apparent threats to man’s

freedom of will are various alleged determinisms which are physical/causal, psychological,

biological, and theological. For each variety of determinism, there are philosophers who deny its

reality, either because of the existence of free will or on independent grounds, accept its reality

but argue for its compatibility with free will, or accept its reality and deny its compatibility.

1.3 The Plausibility of Free Will of Man

The dilemma of the nature of free agency and its relation to the origins and conditions of

responsible behavior is called the problem of free will. There are times when “free” and

“determined” are being contrasted that produced the central question whether human beings are

free or are they only determined by external events beyond their control. Another related concern

is whether an agent’s responsibility for an action requires that the agent, the act, or the relevant

decision be free. With this, it directs awareness to action, motivation, deliberation, choice, and

intention, and to the precise sense, if some, in which one has control of his actions. The use of

free will is just a matter of traditional nomenclature wherein it is argued whether freedom is

appropriately attributed to the will or the agent, or to actions, choices and deliberations.

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The most common interpretations of “free” are these two elements: first, freedom entails

an absence of determination or definite kinds of determination; and secondly, when one’s

endeavors are, properly speaking, the one who owns the act chooses freely. And because of this,

accounts diverge. For some, they take freedom (liberty) or indifference or the contingency of

alternative courses of action to be critical. For example, a man who is pondering on what food he

will eat, each of his choice is an open alternative since it is possible but not yet imposed.

Indifference can also be understood as motivational equilibrium, that is, a condition that some

find critical to the idea that a free choice must be rational. There are others who are focused on

freedom (liberty) of spontaneity, for example, where man is free to choose on what food he likes

to eat which he chooses or desires, it can be equated as – doing what one wants. In association

with the two, the third is like this – man acts freely if he exercises his control, involving

responsiveness to intent as well as both abilities to perform an act and to refrain. And the fourth

view recognizes freedom with autonomy, for example the man being autonomous to the extent

that his selection is self-determined, that is, by his character, deeper self, higher values or

informed reason.

A recent trend is to assume that agent causation accounts capture, and possible, one’s

prereflective idea of responsible, free action. But the failure of philosophers to work the account

out in a fully satisfactory and intelligible form reveals that the very idea of free will and so of

responsibility also, is incoherent or at least inconsistent with a world very much like our own.

1.4 Some Arguments Regarding Free Will

1.4.1 The Consequence Argument

The Consequence Argument, created by Carl Ginet and Peter van Inwagen which is the

most renowned and powerful argument for incompatibilism. This argument is based on a

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fundamental distinction between the past and the future. An informal presentation of this

argument is to be considered first. There seems to be a philosophical irregularity between the

past and the future which is based on the direction of the flow of time and the normal direction of

causation. In a way the future is open while on the other hand the past is not. For example, it

looks as though there is nothing that Adrian can now do about the fact that someone killed Ninoy

Aquino, given that Ninoy Aquino was assassinated by someone in 1985.

Even if one admits the possibility of time travel still stands at this point. If the possibility

of time travel is possible, Adrian can influence what the past turned out to be, but he cannot

literally alter the past. Consider the following argument:

(1) The proposition “Ninoy Aquino was assassinated in 1985” is true.

(2) If Adrian travels to the past, he could prevent Ninoy from being assassinated in

1985 (temporarily assumed for reductio purposes).

(3) If Adrian were to travel to the past and prevent Ninoy from being assassinated in

1985, the proposition “Ninoy was assassinated in 1985″ would be false.

(4) A proposition cannot both be true and false.

(5) So, therefore, (1) is false.

Consequently at most the possibility of time travel permits for agents to have causal

impact on the past, not for agents to change what has already become the past. Thus, the past

seems to be permanent and unchangeable. Though, it appears that the same is not true of the

future, for Adrian can have an influence on the future through his decisions and the succeeding

actions. For example, if he will be inventing a time machine, then at some point in the future he

could get in his time machine and he will be travelling to the past and try to stop Ninoy from

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being assassinated. But, given that he was assassinated, one can suppose that his efforts would all

be unsuccessful. Then again, in this way he could refrain from using his time machine.

1.4.2 The Origination Argument

Based on this argument, an agent has free will when his volitions issue from the agent

himself in a particular sort of way (like his beliefs and desires). What is important for free will,

proponents of this argument claim, is not simply that the causal chain for an agent’s volition goes

through the agent, but that it originates with the agent. In other words, an agent acts with free

will only if he originates his action, or if he is the ultimate source or first cause of his action.

One can represent a formal version of the argument, called the “Origination Argument,”

as follows:

(1) An agent acts with free will only if he is the originator (or ultimate source) of his

actions.

(2) If determinism is true, then everything any agent does is ultimately caused by events

and circumstances outside his control.

(3) If everything an agent does is ultimately caused by events and circumstances beyond

his control, then the agent is not the originator of his actions.

(4) Therefore, if determinism is true, then no agent is the originatorof his actions.

(5) Therefore, if determinism is true, no agent has free will.

One can see now that the Origination Argument is valid. So, in evaluating its soundness,

one must evaluate the truth of its three premises. Since for an agent to be an originator just is for

that agent not to be ultimately determined by anything outside of him, then premise 3 is clearly

true. The premise 2 of this argument is true by the definition of determinism. One must therefore

reject premise 1 in order to reject the conclusion of the argument.

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1.4.3 Rejecting the Incompatibilist Arguments

It is noted that the Origination Argument for incompatibilism is valid, and two of its

premises are above disputed. Thus, rejecting the first premise of the Origination Argument is the

only way for the compatibilist to reject its conclusion. In other words, with the description of

determinism, compatibilists have to reject that free will involves an agent being, the originator or

ultimate source of his or her actions. But how can this happen? Most often, compatibilists

motivate a rejection of the “ultimacy condition” of free will by appealing to either a hierarchical

or reasons-responsive view of what the will is. If all that is necessary for free will, for instance, is

that a definite interconnection between an agent’s 1st-order volitions and 2nd-order desires6, then

with that kind of account it does not require that an agent be the originator of those desires. In

addition, since the truth of determinism would not entail that agents don’t have 1st and 2nd-order

desires and volitions, a hierarchical account of the will is compatible with the truth of

determinism. Similarly, if an agent has free will if she has the requisite level of reasons-

responsiveness such that she would have willed differently had she had different reasons,

ultimacy is again not required. Thus, if one adopts certain accounts of the will, one has reason for

rejecting the central premise of the Origination Argument. (Timpe, Internet Encyclopedia of

Philosophy)

1.4.4 Frankfurt’s Argument against “the Ability to Do Otherwise”

Two other arguments for compatibilism were built on the freedom requirement for moral

responsibility. In the truth of determinism, if one can show that moral responsibility is

compatible with it and if it is also required for moral responsibility the presence of free will, then

6 According to the hierarchical model, agents can have different kinds of desires. Some desires are desires to do a particular action; for example, Adrian may desire to go eating. Call these desires “1st order desires.” But even if Adrian doesn’t desire to go eating, he may nevertheless desire to be the kind of person who desires to go eating. In other words, he may desire to have a certain 1st order desire. Call desires of this sort “2nd order desires.” If agents also have further desires to have particular 2nd order desires, one could construct a seemingly infinite hierarchy of desires.

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one will have absolutely revealed the compatibility of free will with the truth of determinism.

The first of these arguments for compatibilism rejects the understanding of having a choice as

involving the ability to do otherwise. Whereas a good number of philosophers have learned to

acknowledge that an agent can be morally responsible for doing an action only if he or she could

have done it otherwise, Harry Frankfurt has attempted to show that this requirement is in fact not

true.

Frankfurt presents an example in which an agent does an action in situation that leads one

to believe that the agent acted freely (Frankfurt 155). However, unknown that is, happening or

existing without one’s knowledge to the agent, the conditions comprise some mechanism or

instrument that would bring about the action if the agent did not perform or do it on his or her

own. As it happens, still, the agent does perform or do the action freely and the mechanism or

instrument is not concerned in bringing about the action of the agent. Consequently, it appears

that the agent is morally responsible regardless of not being able to do otherwise. Here is one

situation:

Adrian is reflecting whether to jog at the oval. Unknown to Adrian, his mother, Petra,

wants to assure him that he does come to a decision to jog at the oval. Therefore, he has

implanted in Adrian’s head a computer chip such that if he is going to make a decision not to jog

at the oval, he will be persuaded by the chip when it activates and lets him decide to jog at the

oval. Adrian is unable not to decide to jog at the oval, and he lacks the ability to do otherwise

because of the presence of the chip in his head. Although, Adrian decided on his own will to jog

at the oval.

So therefore, Frankfurt believes that the presence of Petra, his mother and the computer

chip in Adrian’s head play no causal role in his decision making, so Adrian is morally

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responsible for his decision. Since he would have been morally responsible had Petra not been

prepared to ensure that he decide to jog at the oval, so, why think that the presence of Petra

makes him not to be morally responsible in his action? So, Frankfurt concludes that regardless of

lacking the ability to do otherwise Adrian is still morally responsible. If Frankfurt is correct with

his conclusion that the possibility of such cases like Adrian seems to be possible, then even

though the truth of determinism is contrary with a kind of freedom that entails the ability to do

otherwise, it is now compatible with the kind of freedom that is required for moral responsibility.

1.4.5 Strawson’s Reactive Attitudes

Peter Strawson argues in an influential article that several of the traditional debates

between the compatibilists and the incompatibilists7 are misguided (119). He believes that the

focus should be instead on what he calls the reactive attitudes which are those attitudes that one

has toward other people based on their attitudes toward and treatment on each other. “Essentially

natural human reactions to the good or ill will or indifference of others toward us, as displayed in

their attitudes and actions,” says Strawson and that it is the hallmark of reactive attitudes.

Gratitude, resentment, forgiveness and love are examples of reactive attitudes. He also thinks

that these attitudes are essential to interpersonal relations and that they give the foundation for

holding individuals morally responsible. Then he argues for two claims. The first is that an

agent’s reactive attitudes would not be affected by a conviction that determinism was factual:

The human commitment to participation in ordinary interpersonal relationships is, I think, too thoroughgoing and deeply rooted for us to take seriously the thought that a general theoretical conviction might so change our world that, in it, there were no longer such things as inter-personal relationships as we normally understand them.… A sustained objectivity of inter-personal attitude, and the human isolation which that would entail, does not seem to be something of which human beings would be capable, even if some general truth were a theoretical ground for it. (Strawson 140)

7 such as how to understand the ability to do otherwise

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Moreover, he also argues for a normative claim: the truth of determinism must not

destabilize one’s reactive attitudes. There are two kinds of cases where it is suitable to postpone

one’s reactive attitudes as Strawson believes. The one involves agents who are not moral agents,

like young children or the mentally disabled, should not have reactive attitudes. In the second

kind of case where it is suitable to postpone one’s reactive attitudes are those wherein the agent

is a moral agent, his or her action toward others is not associated to his or her action in the

correct way. For example, while Adrian may have the reactive attitude of forgiveness to

Christmer who bumps into him and makes him spill his food, if Adrian were to discover that the

person was pushed into him, he would not be justified in forgiving Christmer. But the truth of

determinism would neither involve that no agents are moral agents nor that none of an agent’s

actions are connected to his moral agency. Therefore, Strawson believes, that the truth of

determinism should not destabilize one’s reactive attitudes. Because moral responsibility is

basically based upon the reactive attitudes, so he thinks that moral responsibility is compatible

with the truth of determinism. And if free will is a prerequisite for moral responsibility then one

can say that Strawson’s argument gives support to compatibilism.

In all of these, the researcher tried to expose some arguments regarding free will not to

confuse the readers but to make them aware that it is not only Plantinga who argues for free will

as one of the disputed arguments. The awareness of other arguments on free will, the researcher

believes, gives way to a critical thinking of readers to weigh what argument is plausible for them.

Either there is an assent or rejection of these is not the researcher’s concern but an awareness is

prior to judgment.

2. EVIL

2.1 The Concept of Evil

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In this world, there are large numbers of cruelties, violence, deceptions, humiliations,

tortures, accidents, natural disasters, murders and killings that human beings are almost

experiencing every day and often present everywhere. And these happenings bring human beings

to experience pain, sorrow, suffering and most severe, death. Some would say that these are all

examples of evil. But, how can one determine an experience as evil? What does the word evil

mean? What is the concept of evil? These questions brought human beings in perplexity on the

existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God.

In the book God, Best and Evil St. Thomas Aquinas, one of the prominent medieval

philosophers, gave his concept about evil. He said:

Evil is simply a privation of something which a subject is entitled by its origin to possess and which it ought to have, as we have said. Such is the meaning of the word ‘evil’ among all men (Langtry 42).

Also, St. Augustine defined evil that which is not a separate entity, but it is a deviation

from a good. Which a subject should possess, it is a failure to be what it should be and hence, a

pure nothingness. (Gilson 144)

So now, evil can be understood as the privation of good or privatio boni, that which

occurs when a being renounces its proper role in the order and structure of creation. Therefore,

something becomes evil when it ceases to be what it is meant to be, or stops doing what it is

ought to do.

It is also important to distinguish the two kinds of evil, the moral evil and natural evil.

Moral evil consists of morally wrong actions and morally bad states of mind together with any

resulting pain, illness, and deprivation such as murder, rape and theft. On the other hand, natural

evil consists of pain, illness, deprivation, etc. which results entirely from impersonal causes such

as earthquakes, tsunamis, landslide and floods. There are times that the two are intermingled, like

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for example when earthquakes results in loss of human life due to poor planning or substandard

construction of buildings. But the focus of this paper is on moral evil which Alvin Plantinga is

trying to point out in the free will defense.

2.2 The Problem of Evil

Now, as evil and suffering occur in the realm of humanity, the question on the existence

of God posts problems and confusions in the mind of every human being. What is the problem of

evil all about? What is its effect to human beings?

First, it is needed to know that there are two features of the problem of evil and suffering

which are vital in the problem of God’s existence; these are the philosophical or apologetic

aspect and the religious or emotional aspect. The philosophical aspect is the problem of evil

approached from the standpoint of the skeptic who challenges the possibility or probability that a

God exists who allows such suffering. The use of one’s reason and evidences is much needed in

dealing with this apologetic aspect as what the Bible says, “Giving a reason for the hope within

us.” (The New American Bible, 1 Pet. 3:15) On the other hand, the standpoint of the believer is

called the religious whose faith in God is severely tested by trial. One must appeal to the truth

revealed by God in the Sacred Scripture upon meeting the challenge of religious/emotional

aspect. (Rood)

Man’s faith to God becomes a question upon experiencing evil and suffering. The

existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God posts a big question when

dreadful events arise in the life of an individual. Also, the tendency of unbelief comes in because

one’s faith is tested caused by these dreadful events. So now, the starting point of unbelief in

God is the experience of evil and suffering. But a number of theists would disagree with that

statement because they would restate it this way – “He will wipe every tear from their eyes, and

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there shall be no more death or mourning, wailing or pain, [for] the old order has passed away.”

(Revelation 21: 4) Evil and suffering can awaken a greater hunger for heaven, and for that time

when God's purposes for these experiences will have been finally fulfilled, when pain and sorrow

shall be wiped away.

Furthermore, in the Bible, suffering for Christianity plays a major role. There are some

accounts that would give a positive viewpoint regarding suffering. What are these? In John 9:1-3

it is written, “As he passed by he saw a man blind from birth. His disciples asked him, ‘Rabbi,

who sinned, this man or his parents, that he was born blind?’ Jesus answered, ‘Neither he nor his

parents sinned; it is so that the works of God might be made visible through him.” Suffering can

present an opening for God to show his glory, to manifest His mercy, power, faithfulness and

love in the midst of painful and agonizing conditions. Also, suffering can allow one to provide

confirmation of the genuineness of one’s faith, and even serve to purify it (1 Pet. 1:7). In the

book of Job, “But Satan answered the Lord and said, “Is it for nothing that Job is God-fearing?

Have you not surrounded him with your protection? You have blessed the work of his hands, and

his livestock are spread over the land. But now put forth your hand and touch away anything that

has, and surely he will blaspheme to your face.” (Job 1:9-10) One’s faithfulness in trial shows

that serving the Lord is not merely for the benefits He presents but for the love of God Himself.

As for severe trials, it gives a chance for believers to express their love for one another as a part

of the body of Christ who "bear one another's burdens" (1 Cor. 12:26 and Gal. 6:2). As God’s

loving comfort took place in times of affliction, in return one can better express his/her comfort

for others (2 Cor. 1:4). In developing one’s godly virtues and deterring one from sinning,

suffering also plays an essential role. In 2 Cor. 12:7, Paul acknowledged that his “thorn in the

flesh” keeps him from showing, and promoting true humility and reliance on God, his loving

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father. While in Psalm 119:71, “It was good for me to be afflicted, in order to learn your laws.” It

was recognized in this psalm that affliction increases one’s determination in following God's

will. As well as Jesus Christ, he acknowledges the vital role of suffering that “Son though he

was, he learned obedience from what he suffered” (The New American Bible, Heb. 5:8). Jesus

Christ as a true man He learned by experience the significance of surrendering Himself to the

will of His Father, even if it was the most difficult thing in the world to do.

So, the Bible shows how the presence of suffering is important to Christian faith. But on

the other hand, suffering now is a big factor on questioning the existence of a loving and

merciful God of the Bible. The paradigm shift is so obvious because of the effect that it can bring

about to human beings. Evil and suffering now becomes a basis of unbelief to Christian faith.

In terms of other religion one argument is the predestination argument that comes

primarily from those attempting to assert the all-knowing and all-powerful aspects of God. Thus,

conservative Muslims and protestant Christians of the radical reformers, that is, Calvinists, are

the main proponents of this argument.

This argument states that God, being all-powerful, is the ultimate cause of all events good

and evil. But being all-knowing, God is able to see that actions which appear evil to us are

actually somehow good in the eternal perspective of God. As simple, imperfect creatures who are

totally incapable of grasping the difficult ways of God, one must simply trust the goodness of his

higher, all-knowing purposes even when one cannot visualize how any good could come from a

situation. God doesn’t cause the evil, but allows evil to be done by others says a

Softpredestinarian, a predestination believer. But this evil is still not really evil because in the

end one can see that it was actually all for good.

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Another theodicy from other religion is the process theodicy which was a product of

Modern Jewish theologians which they developed after the holocaust. It simply denies the initial

idea of the problem of evil. Also, it asserts that God is neither wholly good, all knowing, nor all-

powerful. It is also lowers one’s expectations of the past and the present while attempting to

provide some hope for a better future.

2.3 The Logical Problem of Evil

The presence of evil and suffering in the world appears to cause a serious challenge in the

belief on the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God. So, if God is all-

knowing, He should know about all of the horrible things that would happen in the world. Also,

if God is all-powerful, He should be capable of doing something about all of the evil and

suffering that human beings are experiencing. Moreover, if God is wholly good, then surely He

would want to do something about it for He loves His people so much. However, the world is

still full of innumerable instances of experiencing evil and suffering. Therefore, these evidences

about evil and suffering appear to have a conflict with the claim of an orthodox theist that there

exists an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God.

The challenged posed by this apparent conflict has come to be known as the problem of

evil. In the second half of the twentieth century, atheologians usually claimed that the problem

of evil was a problem of logical inconsistency in the beliefs one typically accepts. So in the book

of Plantinga, J. L. Mackie stated:

I think however, that a more telling criticism can be made by way of the traditional problem of evil. Here it can be shown, not that religious beliefs lack rational support, but rather that it is positively irrational, in that some of its central theological doctrine are inconsistent with one another (God and Other Minds 116).

And for H.J. McCloskey:

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Evil is a problem for the theist in that a contradiction is involved in the fact of evil, on the one hand, and the belief in the omnipotence and perfection of God on the other (A. C. Plantinga, God and Other Minds 115-116).

The logical problem of evil emerges from these four core propositions: (1) An all-

powerful God could permit evil from existing in the world; (2) An all-knowing God would know

that there was evil in the world; (3) A wholly good God would wish to prevent evil from existing

in the world; and (4) There is evil in the world.

As what J.L. Mackie highlighted in his statement that there would appear to be a

contradiction between these four propositions such that they cannot all be true. Given that the

fourth proposition would appear to be undeniable, it can be inferred from above that one of the

other three propositions must be false and thus there cannot be an all-powerful, all-knowing and

a wholly good God. Otherwise, putting it in another way, if God does exist, He must be either

“impotent, ignorant or wicked”.

Two or three among the propositions might be true at the same time but there is a

possibility that all of the propositions might be true. In simple terms, propositions one (1) up to

the fourth (4) form a logically inconsistent set that the atheologians are trying to point out. So,

what is that logically inconsistent thing that the atheologians are trying to state?

Logically inconsistent statements are set of statements if and only if: that set includes a

direct contradiction of the form “p & not-p”; or a direct contradiction can be deduced from that

set.

So now, what the atheologians are precisely claiming to do is this: none of the statements

in one (1) through four (4) directly contradicts any other, thus if the set is logically inconsistent,

it must be because it can deduce a contradiction from it. Through this, once atheologian think

through the propositions of the divine attributes cited in one (1) through three (3) one can claim

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that a contradiction can easily be deduced from the first proposition up to the fourth proposition.

The atheologians reason as follows: (6) if God is omnipotent, he would be able to prevent all of

the evil and suffering in the world; (7) if God is omniscient, he would know about all of the evil

and suffering in the world and would know how to eliminate or prevent them; (8) if God is

perfectly good, he would want to prevent all of the evil and suffering in the world.

The three statements six (6) up to eight (8) reciprocally entail that there would not be any

evil or suffering if the perfect God of theism really existed. Nevertheless, the truth that our world

is filled with an astounding amount of evil and suffering is a never ending story. The

atheologians say that reflecting upon propositions six (6) through eight (8) in light of truth of evil

and suffering in the world, one should be led to the following conclusions: (9) If God knows

about all of the evil and suffering, and also knows how to eliminate or prevent it, then He wants

to prevent it, and yet He does not do so, therefore He must not be all- powerful. (10) If God is

powerful enough to prevent all of the evil and suffering, then He wants to do so, and yet He does

not, therefore He must not know about all of the suffering or He does not know how to eliminate

or prevent them—that is, he must not be all-knowing. And lastly, (11) if God knows about all of

the evil and suffering in the world, and He also knows how to eliminate or prevent them, and He

is powerful enough to prevent them, and yet He does not prevent it, therefore He must not be

perfectly good.

So, from propositions nine (9) through eleven (11) one can conclude that: (12) If evil and

suffering exist, then God is either not omnipotent, not omniscient, or not perfectly good.

Given that evil and suffering evidently do exist, one can get that: (13) God is not

omnipotent, not omniscient, and not perfectly good at the same time.

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As a result, putting the point more directly, this line of argument implies that—in light of

the evil and suffering that human beings experience in the world—if God exists, if He really

does, He is either impotent, ignorant or wicked. So, it must be evident that proposition thirteen

(13) contradicts with propositions one (1) through three (3) above. Making the contradiction

clear, propositions one (1), two (2) and three (3) must be put into the following single statement.

(14) God is omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good.

It is impossible that thirteen (13) and fourteen (14) might both be true at the same time.

These statements are logically inconsistent or contradictory as what the atheologians are trying to

say.

Therefore, proposition fourteen (14) is merely the combination of propositions one (1)

through three (3) and states the innermost principle or belief of classical theism. Nevertheless,

proposition (13) can also be derived from propositions one (1) through three (3) claimed by the

atheologians. Propositions thirteen (13) and fourteen (14), still, are logically contradictory with

each other. All theists believe in propositions one (1) through four (4), and then atheologians

claim that theists have logically inconsistent beliefs because a contradiction or inconsistency can

be deduced from propositions one (1) through four (4). It is never rational to believe something

contradictory as philosophers have always believed in. So, the belief that a perfect God exist is

irrational because of the existence of evil and suffering in the world.

Is there an escape for the believer of God from this problem? In Rabbi Harold Kushner’s

best-selling book When Bad Things Happen to Good People (1981), he somehow offers the

following escape route for the theist regarding the problem of evil. First, he said that one should

deny the truth of proposition one (1) that God is all-knowing. Now, based on this proposal, that

God in the first place is not ignoring one’s suffering when He doesn’t do anything to avoid it for

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the reason that—God an all-knowing—all the sufferings that a human being experiences, knows

all about them. Being a wholly good God, He also feels the pain of His people. The problem now

is this—God cannot do something about it because He’s not omnipotent. With Kushner’s

representation of God, he said that God is somewhat of a kind-hearted wimp. God doesn’t have

the power to do something about evil and suffering even though He would like to help. So what a

theist can do is to deny the truth of the first four propositions in order to escape from the logical

problem of evil, but many theists would disagree with this answer.

In the eighteenth century, David Hume questioned the natures of God. He stated the

logical problem of evil as this, "Is He willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then He is impotent.

Is He able, but not willing? Then He is malevolent. Is He both able and willing? Whence then is

evil?" (Craig, 80). What the skeptic is suggesting is that it is irrational or logically impossible to

believe in the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good God wherein the reality

of evil and suffering is present in the world because such a God would not possibly allow evil to

exist if He has these natures.

But then again, the key to the resolution of this evident inconsistency is to be aware of

this: saying that God is all powerful, it is not implied that He is capable of doing anything

imaginable. As what the Holy Scripture states “For human beings this is impossible, but for God

all things are possible” (Mt. 19:26). However the Holy Scripture also states that God also has

something that which He cannot do. For example, God cannot lie (Tit. 1:2). And also God is not

subject to temptation to sin, nor can tempt others to sin (James 1:13). In simple terms, God

cannot do something that is “out of character” for a virtuous God. He can neither do anything

that is out of character for a rational being in this rational world that He created. Definitely, even

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God cannot “undo the past,” or to make a circle square, or interchange what is false from what is

true, God cannot do something that is illogical or ridiculous.

Furthermore, it is on this foundation that one can conclude that God could not eliminate

or take away evil and at the same time without rendering it impossible to carry out other goals

which are significant to Him. Surely, as beings who are created in God’s own image, and are

capable of sustaining a deep personal relationship with Him, they have to be beings who are

capable of freely loving Him and following His will without cruelty. Obedience or love on any

other origin would not be obedience or love at all; it is just but mere obedience. However,

creatures who have the freedom to love God should also have the freedom to hate or ignore Him.

Those creatures who have the freedom to follow God’s will should also have the freedom to

reject it. Furthermore, when human beings do something in ways outside God’s will, the ultimate

result is great evil and suffering. This line of thinking is known as the "free will defense"

concerning the problem of evil.

Even though this research paper will not be talking about natural evil, still, it is also

important to have an idea on these natural evil in the world. So, what about natural evil that is

resulting from natural processes like earthquakes, floods and diseases? At this point it is essential

first to be aware that man live in a fallen world, a world that is full of evil and suffering and that

they are subjected to these natural processes that would not have happened which man did not

choose to revolt against God. Still, it is hard to visualize how one could act as free creatures in a

world much different than their own—a world where natural processes permit one to foresee

with some conviction which are man’s consequences of their choices and actions. Like for

example, take the law of gravity, wherein this is a natural process that without this it is not

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possible for human beings to function, nevertheless in various states of affairs it is also capable

of resulting in enormous harm.

Definitely, God has the capacity to annihilate evil—although the violation of human

freedom, or a world in which free creatures can function with this kind of reasoning one can

successfully answer to the challenge of the logical problem of evil.

2.4 Different Arguments on the Existence of God

Why does mankind experience suffering? Why do these happen to good people? Why

does one experience horrible things in life? Why are there bad things happening in this world?

Why does God let these things to happen? These questions arise from the lips of different people

every day. Answering these questions is very difficult which are the major perplexity among

believers in different theistic religions and also a major cause of non-belief among the others.

This problem of evil now will pose this scholarly question regarding the existence of God which

is: If there is a God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good, why is there evil in this

world?

Not all of these arguments have their origins in Christian philosophy; Jewish and Muslim

philosophers have made significant contributions to the philosophy of religion, and both Plato

and Aristotle have influenced its development

The Arguments for the Existence of God section sets out to explain each of the common

philosophical arguments for theism, and so to explore the case for the existence of God.

2.4.1 Theodicy: Definition and History

Now, what is a theodicy? ‘Theodicy’ is a term coined by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz from

the Greek words “theos” which means God and “diké” that means righteous or justice. This

theodicy is an attempt to justify or defend the existence of God in the face of evil by answering

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the following problem: First, God is all good and all powerful; secondly, the universe/creation

was made by God and/or exists in a contingent relationship to God; and thirdly, evil exists in the

world then why? (Theodicy: An Overview)

Theodicy is a centuries aged set of inquiry. It is often seen by historical scholarship as a

historical ideas and/or social ideologies. The social, political and religious contexts that gave

impetus to reflection on the problem of evil changes from time to time. They are important in the

history of the problem. The reflections of different thinkers may be said to be semi-

commensurable or, at least, analogous, one cannot set aside a historical sense of where various

insights come from.

The question is whether there is enough commensurability that exists across periods and

thinkers to say that a tradition exists or that later theodicts are justified in borrowing earlier ideas.

Some suggest that theodicy is a modern problem, and that the earlier formulations that is

concerned with evil cannot justify the existence of God, rather to argue for a specific God of

Marion and while Boethius’ idea of theodicy is to explain the role of wisdom, or the purposes of

conversion within a history of salvation an idea of Augustine.

Here are the historical lists of theodicies in Christian tradition: Iraneaus, Lactantius,

Pseudo-Dionysius, Augustine, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, The Mystics, Luis de Molina, Luther,

Calvin, Malebranche, Pierre Bayle, Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Schleiermacher, Karl Barth, Simone

Weil, Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, Dorothee Soelle, Teihard de Chardin,

Jacques Maritain, and Austin Farrer. (Theodicy: An Overview)

Also, theodicy is a good example of an argument used to justify the goodness and justice

of God, in a world where there is evil and suffering. Furthermore, it deals with the problem of

evil. It is usually an attempt to show that it is possible to affirm the omnipotence of God, the love

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of God, and the reality of evil without contradiction. The skeptic's argument generally is that

given the reality of evil, one must sacrifice either the power or the love of God wherein a

dilemma arises. If God’s omnipotence will be given up, it seems that God cannot prevent or

overcome this evil. At the same time, if God’s goodness will be unavoidable, it appears that God

will not also prevent or overcome evil. Most theodicies attempt to show that this problem is just

obvious and that it is possible to affirm both that God is all-powerful and perfectly loving,

despite the presence of real evil in the world.

2.4.2 Pascal’s Wager

Blaise Pascal (1623-62) was a French Catholic mathematician, philosopher and

theologian. In his book Pensées, he offered an argument in favor of religious belief which is in

favor of Christian faith that has come to be called Pascal Wager. (Davis 156)

Pascal’s Wager is an argument for the belief in God based not on an appeal to evidence

that God exists but rather based on an appeal to self-interest. This claim is supported by a

concern of the probable consequences of belief and unbelief. If one believes in God, then, he will

receive an infinite reward in heaven while if he does not then he has lost little or nothing. And if

we do not believe in God, the argument continues, in that case if he exists then we will receive

an infinite punishment in hell while he does not then he will gain little or nothing. (Holt)

Either receiving an infinite reward in heaven or losing little or nothing is clearly

preferable to either receiving an infinite punishment in hell or gaining little or nothing. It is

therefore in one’s interests, and so rational, to believe in God.

2.4.3 Ontological Argument

Before discussing about the ontological argument, it is needed to know what natural

theology is. It requires a lot of knowledge to give proofs and evidence to prove the existence of

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God. Presenting theistic proofs is the task of natural theology, is an attempt to reach sound

conclusions about the existence and nature of God based on human reasoning. Human cognitive

faculties such as experience, memory, introspection, deductive and inductive reasoning and

inference to best explanation are the method used in natural theology. Then, natural theology has

created a perplexing variety of arguments for the existence of God. The four main types are

ontological arguments, cosmological arguments, teleological arguments also called as design

arguments, and moral arguments.

Ontological argument was first formulated by an eminent medieval philosopher and a

Catholic bishop by the name of Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109). This argument is a priori

which is an argument crucially based on a certain definition or concept. Also, it does not involve

looking around at various properties of the world with senses, rather, it asks the reader to think

hard about certain concept, a definition of God, together with certain other metaphysical or

necessary truths. It is also one of the most incredibly fascinating arguments in the history of

philosophy. (Davis 15)

He started with a proposition “That than which nothing greater can be conceived.” Here

is how Anselm’s ontological argument works: (1) God exists in the understanding but not in

reality–assumption to reduction; (2) Existence in reality is greater than existence in the

understanding alone–premise; (3) A being having all God’s properties plus existence in reality

can be conceived–premise; (4) A being having all of God’s properties plus existence in reality is

greater than God–from (1) and (2); (5) A being greater than God can be conceived–from (3) and

(4); (6) It is false that a being greater than God can be conceived–by definition of ‘God’; (7)

Hence, it is false that God exists in the understanding but not in reality–(1) up to (6), reduction

ad absurdum. (A. C. Plantinga 29)

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If God's perfection is a part of the concept of God, and if God's perfection implies God's

existence, then God's existence is implied by the concept of God.

He often refers to God as the “greatest conceivable being”, but this is not like saying God

is the most powerful or the most knowledgeable Being imaginable.

2.4.4 Cosmological Argument (Davis 60-66)

The cosmological argument is first in Plato’s dialogue laws. It is a posteriori, which is an

attempt to argue for the existence of God based on the things that man know from his experience

and from the things that man learned through the senses.

The cosmological argument focuses on the Three Versions that can be found in Thomas

Aquinas’ book Summa Theologica. Through this, he suggested ‘5 Ways’ of arguing for the

existence of God. Here are the first three versions of the cosmological argument of Aquinas: The

first way is summarized as this – (1) everything that is in motion is moved by something else; (2)

infinite regress is impossible; (3) therefore, there must be a first mover. The first way focuses on

motion and at the same time the first or the prime mover that moves all things.

Next is Aquinas’ second way that is summarized as – (4) every effect has a cause; (5)

infinite regress is impossible; (6) therefore, there must be a first cause. The second way is talking

about the first cause of all things in this world.

The third way is summarized as this – (7) some contingent beings exist; (8) if any

contingent being exist, a necessary being exists; (9) therefore, a necessary being exists. In

Aquinas’ third way he focuses on the contingent and necessary existence.

Furthermore, the cosmological argument is the argument from the existence of the world

or universe to the existence of a being that brought into and keeps it in existence.

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It uses a general pattern of argumentation (logos) that makes an inference from certain

alleged facts about the world (cosmos) to the existence of a unique being, generally identified

with or referred to as God. Among these initial facts is that the world came into being, that the

world is contingent, in that, it could have been other than it is or that certain beings or events in

the world are causally dependent or contingent. From these facts, philosophers infer either

deductively or inductively that a first cause, a necessary being, an unmoved mover, or a personal

being (God) exists. The cosmological argument is a part of classical natural theology, whose goal

is to provide some evidences for the claim that God exists.

2.4.5 Design or Teleological Argument (Davis 97)

This argument is also a posteriori which is based upon facts that can be learned by

experience and through the senses. The word teleological comes from the word telos meaning

end or aim.

The design argument or teleological argument is an inductive argument that tends to

render support for its conclusion. Also, this argument is often stated as an analogical argument

which asks the reader to notice a certain similarity between the distinct things.

That this is so remarkable; there are numerous ways in which the universe might have

been different, and the vast majority of possible universes would not have supported life.

It is far more plausible and far more probable that the universe is this way because it was

created by God.

2.4.6 The Moral Argument (Holt)

Moral principles would often tell what man ought to do. That is, there is an inner

command independent by the agent and such command must have a source. The moral argument

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is the argument from the existence or nature of morality to the existence of God. And also, it has

two forms which are the formal and perfectionist.

The formal moral argument takes the form of morality to imply that it has a divine origin.

Morality consists of an ultimately authoritative set of commands. Where can these commands

come from but a commander that has ultimate authority?

The perfectionist moral argument sets up a problem. How can it be that morality requires

perfection of man? That morality cannot require of man more than he can give, but that we

cannot be perfect? The argument suggests that the only way to resolve this paradox is to posit the

existence of God.

2.4.7 The Argument from Religious Experience (Davis 121)

While religious experiences themselves can only constitute subjective evidence of God's

existence for those fortunate enough to have them, the fact that there are many people who

testify to having had such experiences constitutes indirect evidence of the existence of God even

to those who have not had such experiences.

2.4.8 The Argument from Miracles (Holt)

The argument from miracles is the argument that the occurrence of miracles demonstrates

both the existence of God and the truth of Christianity.

2.4.9 Monism (Holt)

This argument is not a theodicy but a challenge to the existence of evil. Monists argue

that the universe is perfect and good and the concept of evil is just an illusion that suggests the

feeling of suffering in a human being.

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2.4.10 Process Theodicy

Process theologians argue that God is not omnipotent and he did not create the universe;

instead, the universe is uncreated and he is a part of it. This is contrary to the all-powerful and

transcendent God of Abrahamic religions. According to process theodicy, God is responsible for

starting the evolutionary process which eventually led to the development of humans, and is thus

partly responsible for the existence of evil and suffering.

The argument also presents that God does not have control over humans thus they are

free to ignore him. But God does everything in his power to ensure the universe produces enough

goodness to outweigh evil in the world, although he is restricted by the laws of nature. Likewise,

God also suffers with humans when evil occurs in them. Whitehead said, “God is a fellow-

sufferer, a companion who understands.”

In all of these, one can conclude that the existence of evil and suffering cannot be

separated from the question of the existence of God. The claim that God exists is somehow hard

to reconcile given the existence of evil. The existence of evil is an issue since time immemorial.

Many philosophers and theologians have tried to articulate and rationalize it, but in the end, no

one received its full affirmation of the acceptability of any given argument. There is still

oppositions and refutations. But this does not render the investigation absurb. There is still need

for constant research and philosophizing. After all it may have answer, if there is any and no one

knows how, when and why?

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CHAPTER III

PLANTINGA’S FREE WILL DEFENSE

1. The Start of Free Will Defense

Why do mankind experience suffering? Why do evil things happen to good people? Why

do we experience horrible things in our life? Why are there bad things happening in this world?

Why does God let these things happen? These questions arise from the very lips of different

people every day. Answering these questions is very difficult and it is also the major perplexity

among believers in different theistic religions in the world. And at the same time, it is a major

cause of non-belief among others. This problem of evil now will pose this scholarly question

regarding the existence of God which is: If there is a God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and

wholly good, why is there evil in this world?

2. St. Augustine’s Free Will Defense: A Model of Plantinga

Free will is often the key issue in the medieval period by Christian philosophers. One

famous philosopher by the name Augustine of Hippo contributed a lot in the medieval period

when it comes to the matter regarding free will and evil. And this free will defense was patterned

by Alvin Plantinga and making it as his model for his argument.

The question of free will is often a key issue in the field of ethics. Many moral

philosophers like Newman, Kant, and Sidgwick argued that people need to be truly free in their

decision-making, if their actions are capable of being judged, and considered morally significant.

In other words, if people have no choice but to act in a certain way, are they accountable for

what happens as a result of them doing something? Now, the need to look into Augustine’s Free

Will Defense argument is important when it comes to the problem of evil. To begin

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understanding Augustine’s theodicy, one needs first to examine his ideas in the light of two

major influences in his life.

The first is Manichaeism which was established by Mani at around 216-76 CE to which

Augustine was associated for some time. Manichaeism was a gnostic faith that emphasized the

duality or separation of darkness and light. This duality was expressed in two eternal principles,

i.e. matter and God which are opposed to each other. Escape from the bonds of the physical

world or matter, was said to be the aim or purpose of humanity. Augustine eventually became

disheartened with Manichaeism because he came to see it as a bad philosophy which is a set of

sophistical fantasies without rational coherence or explanatory force and as a result he began to

reject the notion that evil is an independent and corrupt substance. The other key factor

influencing him was the teaching of Plotinus (204 BCE up to 70 CE). Plotinus taught the

goodness of creation and the chaotic nature of evil. He often speaks of matter as “evil”, and of

the Soul as suffering a “fall”, but in fact he sees the whole cosmic process as an inevitable result

of the superabundant productivity of the One8, and thus “the best of all possible worlds.”

Augustine's belief that “sickness and wounds are nothing but the privation of health”,

seems logical when it comes to illness, and may work on a number of levels elsewhere.

However, if this is the case, where did evil9, first begin? As far as Augustine is concerned, evil

entered the world because of the wrong choices of free beings10. In other words, corruption

occurred as a result of free will.

The freewill defense finds support from the first book of the Bible. It can be found in

Genesis chapter 3 when Adam took and ate the fruit from the tree of the knowledge of good and

8 postulated by Plotinus as a principle superior to intellect and being, totally unitary and simple9 the ability for things to become corrupted10 free in the sense that there was no external force necessitating them to do wrong

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evil. However, this was not because Satan tempted him, but because he was encourage by the

woman, Eve.

Within Augustine's Divine order of things, the angels in heaven partake of the highest

degrees of goodness. Though, some of these were said to have revolted against God, before the

creation of humanity. Thus there exist two rival camps in the heavens and on earth. The first one

is seeking to follow the ways of God (the City of God), and one seeking to follow their own

desires (the City of the World).

Augustine's theodicy has been largely adopted by the Western Church and has become

the yardstick of orthodoxy with regard to addressing the problem of evil and suffering. The key

idea is that God is in control of everything, but not the choices of free-agents such as humans and

angels. However, despite of this, Augustine's free will defense is not without its problems. For

example, in John Hick’s critique on Augustine he argues whether angels are truly capable of

sinning?11 If a perfect being sins then surely, as Hick argues, they were not perfect in the first

place, and God is to be held accountable as their Maker? Of course, Augustine held that God

created the angels and humanity in the full knowledge that some would fall or sin, even though it

was never God's desire for them to do so. So, as far as Augustine is concerned, although God is

the Creator and he knew that some of God's created beings would sin, God is absolved from

blame, because God did not force anyone to make these choices.

Both the Augustinian and Irenaen theodicies12 assume free will, that is, the notion that

moral evil stems from moral agents, and free agency is a necessary condition for human

development. According to the free will defense, the goodness of free agency outweighs the evil

11 If the angels are finitely perfect, then even though they are in some sense free to sin they never will in fact do so.12 Irenaen theodicy focuses on Christian Theodicy, which is a defense on the goodness of God in the face of evil.

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derived from free moral agents. Supporters of the free-will defense argue that divine intervention

would compromise human freedom, thus preventing human development.

3. Plantinga on Evil and Free Will

An emeritus Professor at the University of Notre Dame who is noted to be a Christian

analytic philosopher in the name of Alvin Plantinga, had formulated his own argument regarding

the problem of evil after so many years of his constant effort in trying to solve the logical

problem of evil. He called this argument "The Free Will Defense" which is trying to solve the

logical problem of evil.

Alvin Plantinga, a Christian philosopher, thought that the problem of horrendous evil was

the primary theoretical difficulty for believing in God for those people outside of the Christian

faith. As a response, he wrote the book entitled God, Freedom, and Evil, and many believe that

he successfully answered the charge that the belief in the existence of God was said to be

logically impossible because of the reality of evil and suffering. He made naturalistic

“verificationism” momentarily move away into a modest obscurity because of his restatement of

the free will argument. On the other hand, the argumentation regarding free will moved Plantinga

and his critics. So, Plantinga defended his argument and answered those who said that, though he

had presented a powerful answer to the continuing problem of evil and suffering, other Christian

beliefs continued implausible. For that reason, Plantinga published another book entitled

Warranted Christian Belief which is his magnum opus. This book argues for a particularly

Christian type of religious epistemology.

Plantinga notices his work as a different approach from the earlier theodicies, mainly his

understanding of St. Augustine’s work. He claims that he is not attempting to “prove” that evil is

a part of God’s magnificent plan, as what is in the thought of St. Augustine. Rather, his goal is

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far more modest because he desires to show that evil does not require a logical inconsistency for

the orthodox Christian.13 He claims that evil might be greatly troublesome to the Christian mind,

but it does not inevitably nullify the believer’s faith.

Plantinga’s goal is simply to avoid contradicting what he sees as the heart of his free will

defense, that is, the statement that “God is omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly good.” And he

said that this is not a free will theodicy but rather a free will defense. Also, he is not claiming to

know why God permits evil.

4. Plantinga’s Reshaping of Augustine’s Free Will Theodicy

For the past several decades, Alvin Plantinga is one of the prominent Christian

philosophers of religion. In the article written by Brown, John Stackhouse said that Plantinga is

not just simply the best Christian philosopher of the last century, but also, he is the “most

important philosopher of any stripe.” (Brown 323) Furthermore, with some of his thirty named

lectureships and having been honored with various honorary degrees, “several scholars from a

variety of disciplines, philosophical schools, and religious orientations have pointed to Plantinga

as one of the most influential philosophers of religion writing today.” (Beilby 29)

In recent decades, only Plantinga more than any other thinkers has revived and reclaimed

the God question for modern philosophers. Because of the long-standing academic bias against

integrating personal faith into one’s academic work it leads Plantinga to state on the suitability of

using Christian themes in formulating a philosopher’s worldview:

Followers of Bertrand Russell and Madelyn Murray O’Hare may disagree, but how is that relevant? Must my criteria, or those of the Christian community, conform to their examples? Surely not. The Christian community is responsible to its set of examples, not theirs.” Plantinga holds that one’s religious beliefs have an

13 By orthodox, the definition given by Plantinga, where he states that the brand of Christian faith he writes of is that which “is common to the great creeds of the main branches of the Christian church, what unites Calvin and Aquinas, Luther and Augustine, Menno Simons and Karl Barth, Mother Teresa and St. Maximus the Confessor, Billy Graham and St. Gregory Palamas—classical Christian belief, as we might call it.” It is taken from the Preface of his Warranted Christian Belief.

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influence on every aspect of one’s life, including one’s academic endeavors. There may be such a thing as “neutral” chemistry or physics, but not in theology! “Plantinga believes that the theist and the non-theist have fundamental differences in their approach to epistemology. . . . And one’s answer to these questions [questions of faith] will affect your appraisal of what counts as a ‘suitable explanation’ of a given range of facts. (Beilby 37)

Plantinga does not only avoid the “god of the philosophers” for a complete Christian

theism, he also freely admits that he sees himself as a successor to Christian orthodox tradition.

Plantunga believes he writes of what “is common to the great creeds of the main branches of the

Christian church, what unites Calvin and Aquinas, Luther and Augustine, Menno Simons and

Karl Barth, Mother Teresa and St. Maximus the Confessor, Billy Graham and St. Gregory

Palamas—classical Christian belief, as one might call it.” (A. C. Plantinga, Warranted Christian

Belief Preface) A great deal of Plantinga’s work has been apologetic in nature, which is very

sophisticated in type. Still, that he is a world-class philosopher and at the same time a defender

of Christian orthodoxy. On this point, Plantinga says:

One of my chief interests over the years has been in philosophical theology and apologetics: the attempt to defend Christianity (or, more broadly, theism) against various sorts of attacks brought against it. . . perhaps the main function of apologetics is to show that, from a philosophical point of view, Christians and other theists have nothing whatever for which to apologize. I can scarcely remember a time when I wasn’t aware of an interested in objections to Christianity and arguments against it.” (A. C. Plantinga, Warranted ChristianBelief Preface)

Plantinga’s primary purpose is not like those of the Christian apologetics that often aimed

at the conversion of non-Christians. For him, the main role of apologetics in his work “is to assist

those in the Christian community who, for whatever reasons, have questions about their faith.”

Secondly, Plantinga can see the apologetic endeavor as “useful for those on the fringes of the

Christian community, and perhaps even for those adamantly opposed to Christian theism.”

(Beilby 23)

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From Plantinga’s work regarding the problem of evil, much of his reputation stems up.

His influence in this area is that though there are still several people who continue to believe that

Plantinga’s argument didn’t unscathe the logical problem of evil, vast majority accepted and sees

his argument as a success. Perhaps the best evidence for the success of Plantinga’s Free Will

Defense is that since the publication of his argument, the vast majority of atheists who employ

the problem of evil do so inductively, not deductively; evil is claimed to be evidence against

God’s existence, not a decisive refutation of God’s existence. (Beilby 11)

There were many questions that arose in the post-Holocaust and post atomic age, whether

or not anything similar to an Augustinian-style theodicy should even be attempted. Thus,

Terrence W. Tilley says that Plantinga simply does not take the “awful reality of evil seriously

enough.” (229) He also added that theodicies “are not addressed to people who sin and suffer.

They are addressed to abstract individual intellects who have purely theoretical problems of

understanding evil.” (229) Also, Kenneth Surin agreed with Tilley’s position that admonishing

theodicists because of their lack of realism and practicality. There are two things that must be

said in reply to this: First, Plantinga is not doing pastoral theology, in fact, he willingly declares

that no theodicy would “give any hint as to what God’s reason for some specific evil—the death

or suffering of someone close to you, for example—might be.” (A. Plantinga, The Free Will

Defense 25) Also, as being an analytic Christian philosopher, Plantinga restricts himself to the

theoretical or theological realm. But it is not a problem for his theodicy because “metaphysical

theories typically are not required to provide relief or consolation. . . . The dividend of a

metaphysical theory is theoretical, not experiential or practical.” (Cress 114) He also knows well

about the distinction between the formulation of technical philosophy and theology, and the

practical world of pastoral care. He noted that academic writing on the problem of evil, will

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probably not allow the “believer to find peace with himself and with God in the face of the evil

the world contains,” (God, Freedom, and Evil 29) but that is not its purpose. Another reason that

criticism of Plantinga in this area is misplaced is because he, like St. Augustine, he is also

extremely anxious about evil. Plantinga also realizes that suffering is like a stain in the world that

God created and it is also like something to which those antagonistic toward the faith could

easily use in their attack upon Christianity. Evil has always been “deeply troubling” to him, as

He admitted. (A. C. Plantinga, "Self-Profile", in Alvin Plantinga 34) Because Augustine took the

problem of evil too seriously, he turned away from Platonism and Manichaeism. It is the primary

stumbling block to intellectually satisfying Christian faith, as evil is frequently perceived. But in

some case it can be made that it was precisely the seriousness with which Augustine took evil

and made him to embrace the Christian faith. The embrace of Christianity can be seen by

Augustine “as directly connected with the philosophical need to provide an account of the nature

of things and the human condition [as marred by sin] which is both rationally satisfying and true

to our lived experience.” (Maker 149-160)

After all, through the thinking of both Augustine and Plantinga regarding the puzzlement

of evil there is a trace of realism, not naiveté. Even if they are often accused of retreating into

airy speculations far separated from the true problems of human suffering, a case can be made

that, comprehensively by writing on the subject, both men succeed in making the dilemma of

evil even more terribly “real.” How did they do this? It is by rejecting explanations that try to

place the blame on anything or anyone other than humans, which the Christian tradition, and

most other religions, clearly say the onus rests. Hinduism teaches that suffering is the wages of

sin one has accrued in his past life, and the Manichees of Augustine’s pre-Christian period taught

that humans were tempted by a malignant cosmic power to sin, but such theories do not resonate.

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It is the same effort to absolve the problem of evil, and to place the burden of sin upon

humankind, that one also find in Plantinga. The entire thrust of his work on the free will defense

is to silence critics who think that evil is an indictment of God’s goodness.

5. Plantinga’s Free Will Defense

There were also many philosophers who presented different arguments regarding the

problem of evil like Hume, Mill, Cleanthes, Gruner, J.R. Lucas, C.A. Campbell and Kant. In the

contemporary time, Alvin Plantinga presented his version of the Free Will Defense that he had

adopted from St. Augustine. His argument regarding the existence of evil is somehow related to

Augustine’s free will defense that he had modified. But still, many philosophers had refuted his

version. Plantinga’s concept of the free will puts forth a defense offering a new proposition that

is intended to demonstrate that it is logically possible for an omnibenevolent, omnipotent and

omniscient God to create a world that contains moral evil. He does not need to assert that his

new proposition is true; merely that it is logically valid. Plantinga's approach differs from that of

a traditional theodicy, which would strive to show not just that the new propositions are sound

but that they are also either true, prima facie plausible, or that there are good grounds for making

them.

Alvin Plantinga's version of the Free Will Defense is an attempt to rebut the logical

problem of evil, which posits the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God in an

evil world constitutes a logical contradiction. Plantinga's argument is this; "It is possible that

God, even being omnipotent, could not create a world with free creatures who never choose evil.

Furthermore, it is possible that God, even being omnibenevolent, would desire to create a world

which contains evil if moral goodness requires free moral creatures.” (God, Freedom and Evil

30)

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The Free Will Defense can be looked upon as an effort to show that there may be a very different kind of good that God can’t bring about without permitting evil. These are good states of affairs that don’t include evil; they do not entail the existence of any evil whatever; nonetheless God Himself can’t bring them about without permitting evil. (Plantinga, “God, Freedom and Evil” 29)

Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense is usually stated something like this way:

A world containing creatures who are significantly free (and freely perform more good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all. Now God can create free creatures, but He can't cause or determine them to do only what is right. For if He does so, then they aren't significantly free after all; they do not do what is right freely. To create creatures capable of moral good, therefore, He must create creatures capable of moral evil; and He can't give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same time prevent them from doing so. As it turned out, sadly enough, some of the free creatures God created went wrong in the exercise of their freedom; this is the source of moral evil. The fact that free creatures sometimes go wrong, however, counts neither against God's omnipotence nor against His goodness; for He could have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil only by removing the possibility of moral good. (30)

The majority of the philosophers agreed with Plantinga’s free will defense and thus sees

the logical problem of evil as having been sufficiently rebutted. Robert Adams says that "It is fair

to say that Plantinga has solved this problem. That is, he has argued convincingly for the

consistency of God and evil." (225) Then William Alston said that "Plantinga has established the

possibility that God could not actualize a world containing free creatures that always do the right

thing." (29) And also, William L. Rowe has written "granted incompatibilism, there is a fairly

compelling argument for the view that the existence of evil is logically consistent with the

existence of the theistic God", referring to Plantinga's argument. (115) In Arguing about God’s

existence Graham Oppy offers an opposition, acknowledging that many philosophers seems to

suppose Plantinga's free will defense because it utterly demolishes the kinds of 'logical'

arguments from evil developed by J.L. Mackie, an atheologian.

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CHAPTER IV

PLANTINGA’S FREE WILL DEFENSE ON THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

1. Free Will Defense at Work

One of the atheologians who have tried to prove the absence of God by using the problem

of evil is J. L. Mackie. Mackie’s argument against God from evil is briefly stated as follows:

(1) God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good.(2) Any omnipotent God can create any logically possible world.(3) There is at least one logically possible world which contains significantly free

creatures who perform only moral actions.(4) A perfectly good God would want to create such a world (3).(5) The actual world contains moral evil(6) God, so described, does not exist. (LaFollette 115)

J. L. Mackie’s argument can be synthesized in one sentence: “God does not exist because

there is moral evil in the world.” (LaFollette)

Plantinga eagerly accepts (1), (3), (4) and (5), but rejects (2). That is to say, he argues that

God would have, if he could have, created a world with only significantly free creatures who

always act morally. Yet, he argues that God cannot create such a world. "What is really

characteristic and critical to the Free Will Defense is this claim that God, though omnipotent,

could not have actualized just 'any possible world he pleased." (LaFollette 124)

Plantinga started his defense by trying to illustrate that there are some possible worlds

that cannot be actualized by God. For instance, he argues that: If God were a contingent being

that is, did not exist in all possible worlds, subsequently there are obviously possible worlds He

could not actualize, explicitly those world in which He did not exist. Certainly, the response to

this claim is just simple: Plantinga provides it himself in the development of ontological proof

later in God, Freedom, and Evil. The very critical premise of this evidence is the claim that God

is a necessarily existent being, that is to say, that God exists in all possible worlds. Moreover,

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because he strongly supports this evidence, he is unable to consistently hold the absence of God

in some possible world(s) adequate enough to show that God could not have actualized those

worlds. In contrast, he will have to throw out his ontological proof if he would like to continue

this assertion in his Free Will Defense. However, even if he does maintain this argument by

abandoning his ontological proof, the atheist can, as even Plantinga admits, successfully revise

(2) to say:

(7) An omnipotent God can actualize any possible world in which he exists. (LaFollette

125)

However, since it is evident that Plantinga wanted to hold that God is a necessarily

existent being, the atheist does not need (7); he can continue to assert the stronger proposition

(2). With these responses, Plantinga is so much aware that is why he takes another track. Now, in

LaFollette’s work, he said that:

Plantinga begins his argument by setting forth an example which he contends will establish his claim. Here is a trivial example. You and Paul have just returned from an Australian hunting expedition: your quarry was the elusive double-watted cassowary. Paul captured an aardvark, mistaking it for a cassowary. The creature’s disarming ways have won it a place in Paul’s heart; he is deeply attached to it. Upon your return to the States you offer Paul $500 for his aardvark, only to be rudely turned down. Later you ask yourself, “What would he have done if I’d offered him $700?” Now what is it, exactly, that you are asking? What you’re really asking in a way is whether, under a specific set of conditions, Paul would have sold it. These conditions include your having offered him $700 rather than $500 for the aardvark, everything else being as much as possible like the conditions that did in fact obtain. Let ‘s’ be this set of conditions or state of affairs. ‘S’ includes the state of affairs consisting in your offering Paul $700 (instead of the $500 you did offer him); of course it does not include his accepting your offer, and it does not include his rejecting it; for the rest, the conditions it includes are just like the ones that did obtain in the actual world. So, for example, ‘s’ includes Paul’s being free to accept the offer and free to refrain; and if in fact the going rate for an aardvark was $650, then ‘s’ includes the state of affairs consisting in the going rate’s being $650.

Now, let us deal with future events. For an instance, think about, some human being, Maurice, who will, at some time ‘t’ in the near future, be free with respect to some insignificant action-like having oatmeal for breakfast. That is, at

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time ‘t’, he will be free to take oatmeal, but also free to take something else, let us say, shredded wheat, perhaps. Next suppose we consider ‘s’, a state of affairs that is included in the actual world and includes Maurice's being free at time t to take oatmeal and free to reject it. This ‘s’, Plantinga tells us; includes neither Maurice’s taking nor rejecting the oatmeal. For the rest, ‘s’ should be considered as much as possible like the actual world. But even though‘s’ does not include Maurice’s taking or not taking the oatmeal, God knows that one of the following conditionals is true:

(8) If ‘s’ were to obtain, Maurice will freely take the oatmeal.or

(9) If ’s’ were to obtain, Maurice will freely reject the oatmeal.Now, Plantinga says, let us suppose that (8) is true. Then there is a

possible world which God, though omnipotent, cannot create....For consider a possible world ‘w’ that shares ‘s’ with the actual world

(which for ease of reference, I'll call Kronos), and in which Maurice does not take the oatmeal. (We know there is such a world because ‘s’ does not include Maurice's taking the oatmeal.) ‘s’ obtains in ‘w’ just as it is in Kronos. Indeed everything in ‘w’ is just as it is in Kronos up to time t. But whereas in Kronos Maurice takes oatmeal at time ‘t’, in ‘w’ he does not.Now ‘w’ is a perfectly possible world; but it is not within God's power to create it or bring it about. For to do so he-must actualize ‘s’ But (8) is in fact true. So if God actualizes ‘s’ (as he must to create ‘w’) and leaves Maurice free with respect to the action in question, then he will take the oatmeal; and then, of course, ‘w’ will not be actual. If, on the other hand, God causes Maurice to refrain from taking the oatmeal, then he is not free to take it. That means, once again, that ‘w’ is not actual; for in ’w’ Maurice is free to take the oatmeal (even if he doesn't do so). So if (8) is true, then this world ‘w’ is one that God can't actualize; it is not within his power to actualize it even though He is omnipotent and it is possible world. (LaFollette 125-126)

Similarly, Plantinga argues that if (9) is true, then there is a similar result, i.e., there are

worlds which even an omnipotent God cannot actualize. So since either (8) or (9) are true, and

then there are possible worlds that God can't create. “If we consider a world in which ‘s’ obtains

and in which Maurice freely choose oatmeal at time ‘t’, we see that whether or not it is in God's

power to actualize it depends upon what Maurice would do if he were free in a certain situation.

Accordingly, there are any numbers of possible worlds such that it is partly up to Maurice

whether or not God can actualize them". Thus, concludes Lafollette, there are many possible

worlds which God cannot create. (LaFollette 126)

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Now, going back to the discussion regarding the Free Will Defense and the problem of

evil of Plantinga, the free will defender, one can reacall, insists on the possibility that it is not

within God’s power to create a world containing moral good without also creating one that

contains moral evil. His atheological opponent – Mackie, for instance – agrees with Leibniz in

insisting that if (as the theist holds) God is omnipotent, and then it follows that He could have

created any possible world that He is well pleased. Then, the atheologian is right in holding that

there are many possible worlds containing moral good but without moral evil; his mistake now

lies in endorsing Leibniz’ Lapse. So then, one of his premises – that God, if omnipotent, could

have actualized just any world that He pleased – is false.

1.1 The Function and Nature of Free Will Defense

The Free Will Defense is designed as a response to the atheologian’s claim that Christian

belief is illogical and thus absurd, to prove that in fact there is no contradiction between God and

evil is its function.

Similar to what Plantinga said, the function of Free Will Defense is to show that there is

no contradiction between the existence of a perfect God and moral evil in the world.14 Plantinga

uses several propositions as a form in order to explain his argument as follows:

The Free Will Defense is an effort to show that(1) God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good(Which I shall take to entail that God exists) is not inconsistent with(2) There is evil in the world.That is, the Free Will Defender aims to show that there is a possible world in which (1) and (2) are both true. (A. C. Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity 165)

The primary aim or goal of Plantinga's Free Will Defense is an attempt to show that God

and moral evil are logically consistent. Primarily, the Free Will Defense is only dealing with the

logical validity between God and moral evil.

14 The Free Will Defense focuses more on moral evil, less on natural evil.

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1.2 The Argument

Based on Plantinga, the Free Will Defender affirms that the following statement is likely

possible: God is omnipotent (all-powerful), and it was not within His power to create a world

containing moral good but no moral evil. (God, Freedom, and Evil 45) The reason why this is

possible is that God creates free persons who sometimes perform morally evil actions. (God and

Other Minds 136) If a person is free with respect to a given action, then he is free to perform that

action and free to refrain from performing it. (A. C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil 29) What

Plantinga is trying to show is this – that even if God is omnipotent, He does not want to cause or

determine people to do only what is right because by doing that, then people are not significantly

free after all. To create creatures capable of moral good, therefore, he must create creatures

capable of moral evil. Sometimes God prevents them from doing wrongly because he cannot

leave these creatures free to perform evil, but some of them went wrong in the exercise of their

freedom. And according to Plantinga, this wrong way of exercising their freedom is the source of

moral evil. The very heart of the Free Will Defense is the claim that it is possible that God could

not have created a universe containing moral good without creating one containing moral evil.

(The Nature of Necessity 166-167)

2. Free Will Defense in the Face of Evil

The main point of this topic is not to expose a tradional theodicy that gives the defense on

the agency of God or the source of moral evil. Why? Because traditional theodicy does not

answer why there is evil in the world. Its aim is to defend God and not answer the problem of

evil. Now, where can one point this issue? The discussion about God in the face of evil appears

to be an appeal to higher harmony that reason can’t possibly understand. If one cannot point to

theodicy because of this reason, maybe one can study the circumstances pointing on man on the

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agency of evil that happens. It is a starting point where one can name it not theodicy but

anthropodicy.

Moral evil now does not owe its existence to God but on man. In this, one may study the

following circumstances that can give clear manifestation or a trace of truth regarding this

anthropodicy. If moral evil does not owe its existence to a God, does it owe its existence from

the deeds of men? Maybe one may examine the following:

One of the best presentations of the problem of evil comes from Fyodor Dostoevsky’s

novel, The Brothers Karamozov. At one point the brother Ivan goes through a litany of

observations regarding the depth of evil in humanity in one particular culture. He states:

’They burn villages, murder, rape women and children, they nail their prisoners to the fences by the ears, leave them so till morning, and in the morning they hang them—all sorts of things you can’t imagine. People talked sometimes of bestial cruelty, but that’s a great injustice and insult to the beast; a beast can never be so cruel as a man, so artistically cruel. The tiger only tears and gnaws, that’s all he can do. He would never think of nailing people by the ears, even if he were able to do it. These (men) took pleasure in torturing children, too; cutting the unborn child from the mother’s womb, and tossing babies up in the air and catching them on the points of their bayonets before their mothers’ eyes. Doing it before the mother’s eyes was what gave zest to the amusement. Here is another scene that I thought very interesting. Imagine a trembling mother with her baby in her arm, a circle of invading (men) around her. They planned a diversion; they pet the baby, laugh to make it laugh. They succeed, the baby laughs. At that moment a (man) points a pistol four inches from the baby’s face. The baby laughs with glee, hold out its little hands to the pistol, and he pulls the trigger in the baby’s face and blows out its brains. Artistic wasn’t it?

By the way, (these men) are particularly found of sweets, they say.’"Brother, what are you driving at?" asked Alyosha."I think if the devil doesn’t exist, but man has created him, he has created

him in his own image and likeness."Later Ivan puts the problem of evil more bluntly to his brother."Tell me yourself, I challenge you answer. Imagine that you are creating a

fabric of human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature that little child beating its breast with its fist, for instance—and to found that edifice on its unavenged tears, would you consent to be the architect on those conditions? Tell me, and tell the truth."

"No, I wouldn’t consent," said Alyosha softly

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From the human perspective, the presence of evil does not make sense and no

explanation has ever developed that sufficiently answers or explains it. But still, the evil actions

that took place in the novel were basically done by human beings and not by God. So, does God

create evil?

Another illustration of evil that is almost present everywhere in each corners of the world

would be killing or massacre. One may still remember the bloody massacre happened in

Maguindanao province in the Philippines way back November 23, 2009. Almost 57 innocent

people were heartlessly killed which were mistakenly recognized by the killers. Here is somehow

a clear summary of what had happened in the said massacre: (Mcindoe)

The Maguindanao massacre, also known as the Ampatuan massacre, occurred in the

morning of November 23, 2009, in Ampatuan, Maguindanao province on the island of

Mindanao, Philippines. This heartless massacre killed 57 innocent people, most of whom were

journalists who were just mistakenly recognized as part of the convoy. Here is a brief story on

what happened on the subject heartless killing. According to reports, when the victims, in a

convoy, were on their way to file a certificate of candidacy of Esmael Mangudadatu who was

then running for vice mayor of Buluan town, they were kidnapped and eventually brutally killed

without hesitation by the Ampatuan men. It was believed that the filing of Mangudadatu’s

certificate of candidacy as a challenge to the post of then Mayor Andal Ampatuan, Jr., the son of

the current Maguindanao governor Andal Ampatuan, Sr., was the root cause of the brutal

incident. There were 57 people who were killed including the wife of Mangudadatu, his two

sisters, journalists, lawyers, aides, and motorists. (news.bbc.co.uk.)

Two days prior to the incident, the grave yard was allegedly prepared by using a backhoe

with the name Gov. Andal Ampatuan Sr. emblazoned indicating that it was actually owned by

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the Ampatuan family.

The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), a well-known media organization, named the

Maguindanao massacre as the single deadliest event for journalists recorded in history of the

Philippines. There were at least 34 journalists who were killed in the massacre. According to the

group, even before the Maguindanao massacre, the Phillipines was already labeled as the second

most dangerous country for journalists, next to Iraq.

The exact location of the said massacre was about 10 km from the town of Shariff Aguak,

where the Commission on Elections provincial office was located. Before reaching their

destination, the convoy was impeded by 100 armed men who abducted and afterward killed all of

its affiliates. There were also unverified evidences that five of the female victims, were raped

before being killed and almost all of the other women had been shot in their genitals and were

allegedly beheaded.

On November 24, 2009, a day after the incident, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in

an immediate act of preventing more violence, declared a state of emergency in Maguindanao,

Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City. Prospero Nograles, the Speaker of the House called the police

to quickly identify the perpetrators of the massacre and disarm private armies. The Philippines’

Department of Justice made a panel of special prosecutors to handle the cases regarding the said

massacre.

The families and relatives of the victims were all shocked with what had happened. The

incident made them angry at the people who committed the merciless murder. By this time, the

families and relatives of the victims started to doubt about the presence of God and his goodness

because of the incident that occurred.

This merciless killing that was allegedly made by the Ampatuans can be seen as a

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product of evil and not by God. God has nothing to do with these evil acts because man willed

them.

Another example of merciless killing was committed by Edwin John Espinueva from

Vigan City, Philippines, who killed his wife, daughter and two other relatives before he shot

himself in the head last August 3, 2012. Another daughter was wounded who had been shot in

the head and chest. Edwin had written a suicidal note written on a small page of notebook

stating: “Mama Weng, Sam and Karla… Mahal na mahal ko kayo kaya ko nagawa ‘to… Ayaw

kong magkahiwa-hiwalay tayo… Love, Papa Bong.” And on the other page, he wrote: “Happy

15th year to my loving wife, Frances Louella M. Espinueva. I love you. From Papa Bong.”

(Balbin A 18) The moral evil act comes from Edwin who killed his wife and children and other

relatives. The free will defender would say that God is not the source of evil but rather the wrong

doings of men. Edwin willed it. He did it, not God.

Padrica Caine Hill, a former bank teller in Washington D.C., killed her three children.

One morning, she dresses her children and made them breakfast. Then she smoked some cracks

cocaine and lets her children watch cartoons. After then, with a clothesline she strangles her

eight-year-old Kristine and four-year-old Eric, Jr. Then she tries to strangle her two-year-old

Jennifer, but leaves her still breathing softly on the floor. When the policemen came, she said to

them that she loves her children so much. After that they asked her why did she kill them? She

answered in apparently bewilderment, “I don’t know.” She also added, “I hadn’t planned on it.”

(Morrow, Evil 39) With this, Padrica is the source of evil but not God. (Morrow, Evil)

Moreover, how can one justify the existence of God in the midst of torture and

persecution? Why is he not helping those victims of tortures and persecutions? For example, in

the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Bonita Baran, a housemaid who suffered from years of

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maltreatment by Reynold and Analiza Marzan whom she worked for. She also cited two

incidents when Analiza allegedly tried to kill her. In the first incident, Analiza stabbed her in the

arm with a pair of scissors while she was doing the laundry inside the bathroom. And in the

second incident, Analiza tried to strangle her while telling her that why is she taking too long to

die. She also said that she had been wounded with a knife, struck her in the head with hard

objects until she bled, punched her in the eyes, singed her with a flat iron, and force-fed her with

dead cockroaches. (Andrade A 25) So, with that, one can say that the source of evil is not God

but rather the couple who tortured and persecuted Bonita. The evil that happened to Bonita was

done by the couple as reported. It clearly drives away the agency of God as the origin of evil.

In the cycle of poverty, a poor person can say that it is the fault of God why he is living in

poverty. But looking at one’s capabilities (the poor man) he or she has the ability to work that

will help him or her to go out from the circle of poverty. So, the source of evil or poverty is not

God but rather, he or she who does not make a move to go out from that circle.

And with all of these events that picture out the faces of moral evil in the lives of human

beings, one can probably question the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent and

omnibenevolent God. How can a free will defender claim that there is a God in the midst of

moral evil?

Anthropodicy, if a free will defender would say, makes sense regarding the problem of

moral evil. He defends the existence of a God who, by his defense, has nothing to do with the

moral evil that happens in the realm of humanity. It is man who creates moral evil and he is

responsible to face them. This is the conviction of a free will defender. A conviction that

challenges man to take responsibly as to what will happen because of his deeds.

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CHAPTER V

1. Summary

In this research paper, the researcher presented and exposed the very heart of Alvin

Plantinga’s free will defense on the problem of evil. The researcher discussed in the second

chapter of this research paper the concept of free will that is, as a unique ability of human beings

that allows them to control their actions. Also, the researcher discussed the plausibility of the

free will of man and the different arguments, in support and opposed to free will, which are the

Consequence Argument, the Origination Argument, Rejecting the Incompatibilist Arguments,

Frankfurt’s Argument against “the Ability to Do Otherwise”, and Strawson’s Reactive Attitudes.

In addition, it is also discussed on this chapter an exposition of the problem of evil that is, an

argument on the existence of a God who is omniscient, omnipotent and wholly-good and there is

evil in the world. An exposition of the different argument of the existence of God in the face of

moral evil like Theodicy, Pascal’s Wager, Ontological Argument, Cosmological Argument,

Design or Teleological Argument, Moral Argument, Argument from Religious Experience,

Argument from Miracles, Monism, and Process Theodicy are also presented by the researcher.

So then, the existence of evil and suffering cannot be separated from the question of the

existence of God. Given the existence of God the claim that evil exists is somehow hard to

reconcile.

In the third chapter of this research paper, the researcher presented a comprehensive

exposition of Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense. His concept of the free will puts forth a defense

offering a new proposition that is intended to demonstrate that it is logically possible for an

omnibenevolent, omnipotent and omniscient God to create a world that contains moral evil.

Plantinga's approach is different from that of a traditional theodicy, which would attempt to

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explain not just that the new propositions are sound but that they are also either true, prima facie

plausible, or that there are good grounds for making them. It is all-inclusive of the origin and the

reshaping of Augustine’s idea of free will theodicy that led Plantinga to create his own version of

the free will defense.

And in the fourth chapter the researcher presented the relevance of Plantinga’s free will

defense on the problem of evil. It is an exposition of his free will defense and on how it works in

the face of moral evil. The researcher presented different evil happenings and events that shows

that the agency of moral evil is man and he is responsible to face them. That is now the role of

anthropodicy, as a free will defender would say which makes sense concerning the problem of

moral evil. The free will defender defends the existence of a God who has nothing to do with the

moral evil that happens in the realm of humanity.

2. Conclusion

Who does not want to experience pleasure? By nature, man seeks pleasure. He always

wants to experience the good things in life. He seeks what is good unless he is a masochist,

unless he wants sufferings. But what if man experiences the other way around? What if

suffering, a reality, happened in his own life? What would be its effects?

The problem of evil and suffering is an ancient problem which philosophers always try to

solve or give plausible arguments. In the existence of evil and suffering, man tends to question

the existence of a divine being who they believe powerful, good and potent. Evil and suffering is

the greatest test for one’s faith and may give way to unbelief.

Many philosophers already tried to present plausible theodicies that can somehow solve

the origin of evil and its coherence to the existence of a personal and loving God. It seems that

many believe in the incoherence of this that led to the diversion of its focus to the reality of the

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freewill of man. In studying freewill, one may not divert his focus on his deeds. His deeds result

to good or bad outcomes. Now, these bad outcomes may come to its extreme of labelling them as

evil and suffering. One’s deeds result to the very suffering of man. This is known as freewill, the

capacity of man to choose. Choosing seems to entail the virtue of responsibility. If one chooses

evil, then its consequence will be manifested in the humanity of man. One may be enlightened

that this freewill may be the cause of evil and suffering that happen in the world. Evil itself is a

choice and its origin traces the very being of man, this is anthropodicy. The agency of man paves

the way for immoral actions and effects that can become a suffering for him and even for his

fellow human beings. Anthropodicy now becomes a shield of God. Evil now is not contested as a

creation of God but man. God has nothing to do about it. God, for many, is a personal deity who

loves his creation. But what does he do amidst the suffering of his creation?

Still, this question has not yet gained plausible answer. It is still a journey for many to

find out. After all, evil and suffering- whether it comes from God or not- can be a challenge to a

human being. It is a challenge of taking responsibility over his deeds. It is a challenge to test the

belief of a person but most of all it is a challenge on how does man reach out to help his fellow

sufferer in the world.

It may come from God, if there is. It may come from man. These two propositions are

still contestable. It is a long way to go. What is important is one’s attitude towards it. It is a

common experience. In all of these, maybe it is not so important to engage in answering the

origin of evil and suffering. It is a reality to be faced. Maybe, it is also a reality that can be solved

in charity.

3. Recommendations

For all the readers of Alvin Plantinga the researcher would like to recommend his books

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and journal articles that will help them to deeply understand his ideas especially on his free will

defense against the problem of evil. Here are the books and journal articles of Plantinga:

God, Freedom, and Evil (1974), this book of Plantinga discusses and explains the

philosophy of religion, or philosophical reflection on central themes of religion and one

important aspect of philosophy of religion concerns this latter belief- the belief that God exists.

This book also offers arguments that Alvin Plantinga used to explain the very reason of the

existence of evil while God who is omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent exists.

God and Other Minds: A Study in the Rational Justification of Belief in God (1986),

Plantinga uses this book to investigate the rational justification of belief in the existence of God.

He had examined arguments like ontological, cosmological, teleological, and natural theology,

which is a very important approach in this problem. He believes that these arguments are worthy

of serious and detailed study. Plantinga also presented his free will defense to explain and

examine it.

The Nature of Necessity (1974), this book discusses the rational justification on the belief

of God’s existence in the midst of the presence of evil.

“The Free Will Defense,” in The Analytic Theist (1998), in this article Plantinga discuss

his idea of free will defense regarding the problem f evil to rationally justify God’s existence.

“Self-Profile,” in Alvin Plantinga (1985), this book was a tribute to Plantinga for being

one of the prominent Christian philosopher of his time. Different ideas of Plantinga was

presented

“Ad Hick.” Faith and Philosophy 14 (1997), Plantinga presented his rational

justification on God’s existence in the midst of the presence of evil.

“A Christian Life Partly Lived,” in Philosophers Who Believe: The Spiritual Journeys of

P a g e | lxxi

11 Leading Thinkers (1993), through this article Plantinga puts up his argument on the existence

of God by rationally justifying it with his free will defense.

“Internalism, Externalism, Defeaters and Arguments for Christian Belief.” Philosophia

Christi 3 (2001), in this philosophical journal, Plantinga contributed a big helped to support the

arguments on Christian beliefs especially on the existence of God.

“The Foundations of Theism: A Reply.” Faith and Philosophy 3 (July 1986), this

philosophical journal presents the basis of theism and as a Christian philosopher; Alvin Plantinga

contributed a good support with his ideas.

“On Reformed Epistemology.” The Reformed Journal 32 (January 1982), in this journal,

Plantinga’s reformed epistemology is a flawed epistemological edifice and could be improved

upon if he would incorporate into it some of the same ideas that make his free will defense so

successful.

“Reformed Epistemology Again.” Reformed Journal 32 (1982), in this journal,

Plantinga’s epistemology was presented again to give more justification on the existence of God.

“Reason and Belief in God,” in The Analytic Theist (1998), Plantinga’s justification on

the existence of God was discussed here profoundly.

It is recommended for those who always seek pleasure, that when the opposite thing

happens one should be responsible for his deeds. What one should need to do is to find another

way to attain or achieve the pleasure they want to have. Seeking for pleasure is not bad but it

should be balanced.

Also, the researcher would like to recommend this paper for those people who see life as

a mere suffering. The responsibility of man over his deeds is a primary attitude that must be

inculcated. Suffering is a reality and must be treated as a challenge to the self. It is not being a

P a g e | lxxii

masochist, but a reality that must be faced to the best of the capacity. It is after all a consolation

when one sees suffering as a way to hope and salvation.

For the theists and the atheists, what is essential is not about the problem of what to

believe in, what is important is that one can be spiritual in his own way without destroying each

individual’s belief. Rationality is needed when putting up arguments and at the same time respect

with each other’s belief. Evil and suffering is a reality that both believer and a non-believer face.

It is a challenge and the greatest test for one’s belief and unbelief.

For future researchers of Plantinga’s free will defense, this can also be a reference for

future researches. It can somehow add clarifications for some ideas that may come out from the

freewill defense of Plantinga.

In all of these, what man chooses makes him. His choices become part of his becoming.

If he chooses evil, it is up to him and it should not be blamed to others. His responsibility over

what happens is maybe the best choice to take.

P a g e | lxxiii

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