THIS IS the complete revised version of my book

“Non-Philosophy and Aphilosophy”.

This is the free copy, and will be available on Scribd for a few weeks, until the revised print copy begins its distribution.

Please enjoy this first instalment of

The Philosophical Hack.

Non-Philosophy and Aphilosophy

By Lance Allan Kair

Lance A. Kair

2015

Copyright © 2015 by Lance A. Kair

All rights reserved. This book or any portion thereof may not be reproduced or used in any manner whatsoever without the express written permission of the publisher except for the use of brief quotations in a book review or scholarly journal.

First printing: June 2015

First revision Aug 2015

ISBN 978-1-329-21471-2

Lance Allan Kair

Louisville, Colorado, 80027. U.S.A.

Ordering Information:

Special discounts are available on quantity purchases and other reasons, by corporations, associations, educators, and individuals. For details, contact the publisher by one of the means below.

Contact: Lance Kair (303-589-9492)

Email: erlk2@hotmail.com

Please visit: www.secondmusic. org

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This book is the first of a series called

The Philosophical Hack.

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ContentsNon-Philosophy and Aphilosophy.................................................1

THE SITUATION.............................................................................11

PHILOSOPHY and NON-PHILOSOPHY....................................14

THE ISSUE........................................................................................27

Kant.............................................................................................................30

Hegel...........................................................................................................37

THE ANTE-APOLOGISTS:............................................................45

Marx, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche...........................................45

Marx............................................................................................................48

Kierkegaard.............................................................................................55

Nietzsche..................................................................................................60

APHILOSOPHY AS A CRITIQUE OF NON-PHILOSOPHY.... .64

The Apologists........................................................................................64

The Aphilosophical Case....................................................................90

Reiteration............................................................................................100

AFTERWORD: Object Orientation.........................................113

Notes...............................................................................................119

Selected Bibliography...............................................................121

Noted Authors.............................................................................122

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What happened ??

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“HERE THEN IS THE ONLY EXPEDIENT, FROM WHICH WE CAN HOPE FOR SUCCESS IN OUR PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCHES, TO LEAVE THE TEDIOUS LINGERING METHOD, WHICH WE HAVE HITHERTO FOLLOWED, AND INSTEAD OF TAKING NOW AND THEN A CASTLE OR VILLAGE ON THE FRONTIER, TO MARCH UP DIRECTLY TO THE CAPITAL OR CENTER OF THESE SCIENCES, TO HUMAN NATURE ITSELF..."

David Hume. A Treatise On Human Nature.

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THE SITUATION.1.

The situation is what is happening; the situation is the issue. Non-philosophy presents the situation in its absolute truth through discourse. Though the idea of a non-philosophy has arisen in at least a few texts, we will center our concern and discussion with the manner that non-philosophy, the idea, has been transcribed into a more formal setting by the philosopher Francois Laruelle. So as we begin, for this short essay, the terms of discourse themselves as indicators of a constant, relatable and universal reductive potential, cannot be taken to reflect an absolute truth, for the terms are also the issue; this is the non-philosophical situation. While this situation arises at many significant occasions of discourse, and particularly upon philosophical discourses, the proof of non-philosophy becomes evident through two mutually exclusive routes. The topic of non-philosophy is the description of itself, that is, of the situation coming to bare upon its own condition of being inherently involved with two routes, and in this way non-philosophy is unique with respect to its structure of meaning, what can be called axiomatic or requiring of no proof, because non-philosophy is involved with the presentation of the proof

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that is itself. The discernment of what can be said to be the axiomatic non-philosophical situation occurs with the issue of method and what can be seen as the antithesis of such method, a type of aphilosophical route.

2.

The problem inherent to the discursive representation of non-philosophy can be described in terms of experiment, method and results. Within the experiment, the method can achieve and argue to its result, but the result does not necessarily argue any particular method, rather, the result itself could be achieved through many possible methods. The non-philosophical result thereby can be said to bring into question the philosophical method. Where method is seen as inseparable from result, where any result is automatically referred to one particular method, there we have a non sequitur. The distinction that arises is between result and method. So likewise this essay proposes that the result that is non-philosophy arguing or otherwise proposing itself as a method is non sequitur; that is, as an assertion of a proper mode over or through an apparent contradiction it is a move of bad faith, in a usual sense meaning a betrayal of truth, but likewise in the sense that Jean-Paul Sartre discusses. The meaning that is non-philosophical is a result that necessarily disengages or is already disengaged from the method that brought it, so it is that the author of Non-Philosophy, Francios Laruelle, is involved in an effort that contradicts itself so much as he proposes that it, Non-Philosophy, this particular result, might be learned through its method, which is, for a term, the non-philosophical philosophical method. Further we say that this is possible because he has been involved with the development of his ideas through an ideological investment, and thus understands his development as due to this given, proper and unimpeachable methodological institution; in general, what is called the

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academy. The meaning of non-philosophy as method thereby requires of him, in the end, to back pedal and restate his terms to be consistent with the institution from which non-philosophy would otherwise break from. This can be to say that the method called 'philosophy', or that method by which philosophy finds itself and through which it operates as such, yielded a result called 'Non-Philosophy' that proposes to describe a method by which non-philosophy can be arrived at philosophically to mean something other than philosophical; which is to say, something non-philosophical. This proposal is non sequitur, and thus contradictory in-itself. It is this apparent contradiction, found in a predominance of philosophical texts, but most clearly in Laruelle’s Non-Philosophy statement, that implies as it requires a revolution to occur for its completion in real meaning.

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PHILOSOPHY and NON-PHILOSOPHY.

3.

The veracity of the non-philosophical situation is self evident because and while it is describing the situation that occurs within the significant occasion of certain discourses; its involvement with philosophy is through a kind of, what we can call, radical agency. Philosophy, as an object of investigation, is seen to evidence a lack, and this lack, as Laruelle identifies, is in its decisional structure, which is to say, based in a prior decision upon an already operational method for reconciling the various and discrepant facets of world. This method, which we shall call the conventional method, allows for and implements real agency, what it means to be an active member of world, which by now is thus the world, reality. In as much as the philosophical method can be said to have yielded non-philosophy as a result, there do we notice an historically significant mark.

4.

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Like a Janus, non-philosophy reflects two truths by its arrival, one in potential and one in actuality. The meaning of each of these true situations arise from one another in the act that is the making of meaning, and the meaning of either removes itself from the truth of the other necessarily since the one always reduces the meaning of the other to itself as to annihilate all dissension and contradiction. This method or route of meaning evidences its own fault. Analogous to the situation at hand – the situation in which we find ourselves, the situation we consider and address here – the figure itself, of the Janus, can be viewed as indicating a 'one' truth, but it is a oneness that can never be realized; this is to say, the view upon the figure itself is subject to the situation it represents such that the knowing of the figure overcomes a sort of gap. This particular overview thus defines a transcendental event, an event of knowing that is more than its terms suggest and therefore that cannot be conveyed in its actuality. The supposition, proposal or assertion that suggests that a grand unity is indicated through the meaning of the terms of the conveyance, where the terms are taken to reflect or otherwise refer to or indicate this unitive truth of things, is thus concordantly based in a redundant function, consistently conferring the state of meaning to that of the True State of Reality, in general segregating aspects of the redundancy through an effective ignorance of the gap and deferring those elements to what we have called the True Object, as in the case of our analogy, the state that is proposed upon the figure of the Janus instead of what the Janus represents ; which, in a religious frame, can be the basis for what can be called idolatry. What this means then is that if the figure is understood for what it represents then the figure itself represents a blank spot, a gap, between the view and what is possible of the view; not between the opposite facing views but between the two views and the presumption that these views together might constitute or

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otherwise represent an obtainable whole view. This limit is, for all purposes of truth, between the view and what is said of it, for once something is spoken of a thing and a question is asked into that thing as it has been spoken of, the world of deduction arises in potential to become the route that leads inevitably to the one world that is then deduced from the objects obtained from it, a redundant move that ignores the problem of the initial induction of terms. The question has always to do with whether or not an object is associated in any essential way to the term of its referencing. This is the condition of which thus returns us to the initial situation posed by the non-philosophical manifestation of discourse: The reconciliation of two apparently different aspects of reality.

5.

As suggested, the two truths are not reducible to some one truth, but remain eternally suspended in essential separation, together indicating only their individual truths, i.e. unilaterally dual in nature. This as opposed to and in contrast to the view that supposes to be able to obtain the figure of the Janus itself, that is then a bilateral unity, the suggestion that either side is involved with the other in a mutual, unitive, affection and that this affection is in potential directly communicable through the terms of discourse. The philosophical decision determines how the affection comes to pass and thus resolves this passing as an orientation upon objects that we can call teleo-ontology.

6.

We should be aware of how this situation can function. The potential meaning is always contained in the actual meaning; what meaning could be belongs to the actual meaning that is had or come upon. This route is the actual route of meaning, where the proof of the truth of the meaning of any

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discourse is evident at all times through the situation of itself, the occasion of meaning. There is no doubt in this, or rather, doubt involves the question of how the actual meaning might be true. By contrast, the route of potential meaning looks for the proof of the discourse in another area, some other arena in which the discourse is supposed to have meaning, an area that is not discourse but from which discourse is informed. Ironically, it is always the ulterior arena that supplies truth, and in this way is never found by or through the discourse in question; that is, the route cannot use discourse to find the arena by which itself gains truth; the discourse is found to be true or false due to the arena that supplies, or for all other purposes, is truth. Yet, this route of potential sees discourse as a link between such two essential substrates that we often call the subject and object, a link that holds the potential to find the actual truth of that duality, that truth we are calling the True Object, and the link or suture, the effective combination of discourse upon these discrepant aspects whereby reality is problematized, is called faith.

7.

This route that is viewed upon, stemming from and or towards a True Object is called method, and it occurs methodologically; the disassociation of method as process or activity of investigation from the subject or object of its investigation yields the conventional disclaimer that justifies the route of potential truth. The discourse is not taken to present an axiomatic structural meaning of itself, but rather is taken to be presented upon, through or by an axiomatic structure that we know as proper argumentative and referential methodology; in this way and by this route of potential, method does not evoke a sense of a fundamental situation of objective quality, but is indeed a route, a path, by which we may analyze, synthesize, locate or discover truth. We say that such a found truth is

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redundant due to its self-referential system as it is split to always reveal a foundational depth supporting an overt appearance; it is here that we may find what is more real and more true of reality. Within this arena lay the real duality, again, what is commonly known as the subject and object, because there can be no reality without these fundamental dual aspects; a 'deep and foundational' object that yields the appearance that is the meaning of discourse and their relation, the basis of real truth. Here we argue that the aphilosophical point of non-philosophy is the counter partial object of conventional philosophy: The beginning of the object in-itself as an actual, rather than intuited, manifestation occurs in the irony of an actual unilateralized duality.

8.

The situation at hand has less to do with subjects and objects than it does with truth and reality. Subjects and objects exist in reality as the basis of reality, offering a route as well as fulfilling that route's potential in the possibility of truth, or a true reality. This discernment is found through Laruelle's philosophical decision. Here is not an exceptional paradigm; that is, it indicates a paradigm that does function through exception, at that, through the only way exception may be known, through the exceptional clause, which is, contradiction as an indicator of what is not true of reality. Reality, then, becomes that arena, that substrate, within which all possibility arises according to the dictates of method that determine what is true and false, as these conditions reflect essential conditions of the real objects themselves. Yet the true meaning of non-philosophy is that the real indication of such a condition is itself informed by a prior decision such that the real situation arises to be able to be considered as such, but that this situation, what we may call conventional reality, is itself a necessary condition

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of the decision by which the apparent unitive reality may exist, at that, as a philosophical object.

9.

By this conventional methodological objective we might then begin to see what exactly non-philosophy is doing, because it is indeed doing more than making an argument. By conventional method, non-philosophy is taken by its philosophical object, philosophy, the object under investigation as the object that is being described as to its functioning, as well then its veracity as being. By such method, the decision is placed out into a medium by which to have an object: Philosophy. Yet the terming of 'non-philosophy' is significant, since it attempts by its naming to displace the conventional philosophical meaningful appearance of its (non-philosophy's) discursive manifestation. It thus should not be understood as another conventional argument, but as a disruption of such method, a suggestion that a particular orientation upon argument is incorrect as to its presumption of ubiquity and potential in omnipotence, as to its ability to include non-philosophy in its absolute discursive paradigm of meaning. In short, non-philosophy can present as it describes the collapse of the philosophical method, and so should indicate by its singular presentation, by its axiomatic structure, the removal of doubt as well as the centrist phenomenal subject, thus revealing a more historic movement; i.e. the decision already made as history (its bare fact; historicity) but not by history (conventional methodology). Yet this type of historicity and its distinction is always missed in the conventional estimation of things, so instead, because it's move comes at the 'end', or 'in the last' of the phenomenon, non-philosophy still takes its cue from the centrist view, as evidenced in Laruelle’s "Christ" and "Gnostic" explorations. As part of the phenomenon, one cannot but present an attempt for reconciliation.

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10.

We have now two ways to see the situation. The dual aspects of reality are deferred to the terms of discourse, or, the terms of discourse are referencing a basic foundation, or object, this object thus accounting for all objects of discourse including the subject. In as much as terms reference such objects, and the former situation of objects deferring to discourse thus deferred becomes another object of reference, we find a problem embedded in philosophical speculation. This argument thus bleeds over into the sciences such that we have a reductive disclaimer of 'conceptual models' that sets our cognition within a 'content with good as it gets', a 'functioning' ontology in a limited purpose.

11.

The problem we treat of non-philosophy concerns the latter potential case. This situation is of two discourses proposed within a hierarchical framework or scaffolding where one discourse is referred to the other for its truth. This can be called a bilateral consideration of truth, a reductive move toward a realized transcendental unity, aka, immanence. Thus in reference to the axiomatic non-methodological discourse, it is because this latter route is likewise true, as opposed to having or containing the potential for accounting for all truth; that is, it yields truth unto itself through its own method self evidently, a decision involving only itself, that we have an essential segregation of truths: Duality. It is likewise the assertion of methodology as foundational to all potential of truth that reveals that we are dealing with an arena of power, but not merely one arena to which all other arenas reduce and in which power is negotiated, where many bases of power are negotiated (reality), but actually two arenas. It is thus the infringement of a power of truth upon what is essentially foreign and autonomous

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in its own right, that accounts for and represents all possibility of philosophically real problem and it's perpetuation. Reality of potential involves a multitude of positions in negotiation, this negotiation based upon a reductive power that stems from the rejection of contradiction; again, in other words, duality. The unity that this duality implies denies that any possibility may exist outside itself, whether subjective or objective. Yet due to its axiomatic protocol for meaning, this duality must reside upon a substrate that is not dual; i.e. the universe or any other type unitive ideal, from 'empty' bases such as philosophical 'nothingness', to its most 'fulfilling' first cause, to creator. But these unitive aspects or entities have likewise been gained within a dual imperative, and thus cannot be true but only real, or at least potentially true or real; such unity thus relying upon a faith for its truth moves in the direction of the True Object of Reality. The reduction must be left to itself, for its own.

12.

This situation cannot be proven because, for one, it is merely the truth of reality, but also, the route of conventional argument cannot be proven unto itself by its own process. Non-philosophy is, not the rejection (through agency) of contradiction, but the acceptance (non-agency) of such eternally paradoxical reductive method by which philosophy gains it stature. This type of acceptance may be called a revolution, and aside from strictly non-philosophical designations, we might call this the philosophical revolution. Without reiterating a sizable segment of argument, Georg Hegel can be seen to fully explore the logical ramifications of the reductive reality to implicate a realizable essential historical agency, and Karl Marx can be seen to put such idea into actual formulation, to see how what is logical is insufficient to bring this about, and sublate the agent of transcendence into the conventional discourse to create the ideological state of reality. Soren Kierkegaard, on the other

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hand, can be considered to do the opposite of these fellows, and retain the ideological for the revolutionary subject, so to implicate the absurdity of the conventional method and its solution, and thus supply the 'higher' route toward a type of revolutionary, or radical, state of what he calls the True Christian. The realized yet sublated phenomenal agency of historical motion can be seen as the essential existential rhetoric found in Nietzsche

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Through all these authors, though, the assumption was or is upon an essential unity represented by duality such that reality itself could or otherwise should resolve to the 'higher' synthetic state. This is to say, the substantial duality upon which conventional duality resides together would, as a universal imperative, resolve in a higher state of being. The mode of all philosophic enquiry is just what this higher state is and how to get there. What we see in the extents of method then is the end run that is non-philosophy; it is the 'last' enfolding of symbol and meaning, of discourse unto itself, exemplifying its meaning as its meaning is inherent in the exemplification. It is the redundancy inherent of all philosophical discourse in practice, as performance.

14.

If we are ever to get anywhere, we need come to terms with what has been historically an infringement upon innately human providence. But unfortunately the pessimistic attitude may just be the real attitude, for no one wants to give up their idols; indeed, they cannot choose to give them up. It is thus an argument against any actual subjective agency. This is the situation, the issue at hand. In this context the question of what human providence is will inevitably arise, and at this late date what is actual and real is marked by the 'new' schools saying

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that we get to redefine what 'human' is – to there by become something else.

15.

We have thus the basis for a valid critique of non-philosophy. What is radical non-philosophically, as the argument Laruelle wants to make of his most significant revelation, is the move that would encompass the former actuality in potential while suggesting that what is in potential is actually true. This is the fault of Laruelle. The unity he seems to decry is recouped in (capitals:) “Non-Philosophical” method; it seems no different than that of its philosophical counterpart. Laruelle attempts to counter this by his adopting a new title, perhaps a Non-Philosophy V, "Non-standard philosophy", which thereby admits in practice his lack, the incompletion inherent in the non-philosophical proposal, and in fact, thus, the whole of the philosophical enterprise, and thereby the solute split whereby history begins to repeat.

16.

This can be understood in its most literal revolutionary sense. A 'revolving', a revolution, a 'flipping'. When reduced to be centered upon a single axis, ideology, all of these terms also refer to a single unimpeachable maxim: irony. The "last thing one would expect" is a turning of meaning. But in the end, in the last, such a turn reveals not only what is truly occurring, but by this view, the reaction. This is to say that the revolution that is supposed of any discourse never occurs due to the conventional reaction to the true ironic state of the human being in the world, and that the true revolution must be said to be of an aspect of the ability for humans to be in a world more than the phenomenal manifestation of theoretical (revolutionary) meaning. The implication of revolution is enough; it need not come to pass because of the nature of human consciousness.

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17.

As we venture upon the exploration of consciousness, since we are already on our way otherwise, let us look at some of what revolution means in certain philosophical contexts. At this point, a disclaimer. This essay is not intended to be a methodological investigation into the particular conceptual facets and nuances represented in the clausal formations or definitional terms of various authors. In fact, for a highly suspect philosophical form, this essay approaches from the meaning of Soren Kierkegaard's enigmatic preface to his thesis, "The Concept of Irony"; which is to say, from the intact phenomena as the solute concept, for this is likewise a part of the issue of revolution. We are concerned thus with that which is necessary and not so much with the sufficiency that draws all truth unto contingency.

18.

For this part, I suggest that non-philosophy is the meaningful culmination of that which has been and is exemplified in the whole Western philosophical library having to do with ontology and what otherwise could be called universal cosmology, or 'grand theory', but particularly what is often associated with Continental philosophy. We are not concerned here with the epistemological and or pedagogical philosophies of the more conventional and applied bent; their use and sensibilities fall under the real category of intrinsic mythology, the functioning of conventional faith.

19.

We address four authors in the stated regard; but this is not, as I said, a methodologically rigorous academic effort, and there are many more authors that may be seen in the light

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shone here. The extended argument for the complicity of all such authors is beyond the scope of this essay and is, for our specific purposes now, highly so. For this we move upon two fronts; that the reader need not have any but the most basic and rudimentary want to understand, and two, the reader already has done the investigation. While these may seem contrary and even contradictory, this essay also suggests that there is no secret, that the secret is a real function of the common conventional notion of power and its assertion, and that esotericism is a feature of much institutional philosophical structure. So I also propose that these authors were involved, in one way or another, each respecting their moments, in an attempt to break the academic stranglehold on the world of providence, and due to the nature of the phenomena they all treat, they in effect were all first describing the same feature, aspect, event and or object, and offering then their appraisal of what must likewise be true of reality, a subsequent theory based on the reiterated premise. The motion is typical to convention: If A be the case, then b must follow. In this instance, though, I argue that the case here A is the same for all these authors in their stipulating of b subsequently where b marks that A is proposed of reality. The issue has to do with the subsequent theory, for it is this theory that seems to be based within so as to bring about and perpetuate the conventional misunderstanding of what is then the same, in retrospect. What then we have to treat at some point is the difference between what is necessary of A for what is then sufficient, b, and how it is possible that what is sufficient thus is likewise necessary. For this essay, though, we deal with the common premise; what is common of the subsequent theories in themselves apart from the premise will be shown later. For now, if the difference is marked in particular discourses between what is necessary of them and what is sufficient, then what is sufficient contains what is lacking of the various theories that are posed upon the

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possibility of revolution in as much as the premise(s) are seen as the revolution already having taken place but noticed in the displacement that the subsequence exhibits as its theoretical position; i.e. the object is the premise deferred in the theory. Thus is marked non-philosophy as that object identified in situ, that is, in and as that situation thus not deferred, the object and its repercussions returned as describing the object in-itself, and the problem, the issue, brought to bear upon non-philosophy is that it indeed somehow follows the same method, or, the method of the same, by the stipulation that the subsequent truth, the truth that emerges from the disclosing of meaning upon itself, thus accounts for what convention encloses and obscures by spiritual, esoteric and religious proposals; in the case of non-philosophy, namely Gnostic knowledge and wisdom concealed in the Christian themed objective, that such may be learned through a discursive method, at that, a philosophically precise method. Yet, the argument made here is upon a completely different set of axioms; not argument toward proving, but argument of verification.

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THE ISSUE.

20.

It seems so cliché to begin with Emmanuel Kant, but it appears with him that the whole problem can arise. We should expect that any author of such notability should have addressed the significant issue, the issue that is always the same object, and thus it is not whether or not they have a correct or incorrect assessment. By now we should see that all authors of a certain attitude or orientation indeed have addressed the object correctly. So also yet see; each and every author suspected and proposed to place the object in view, and so is also suspected to have closed the issue to be able to move on to a more scientific approach or ability to address its reality. Kant proposed a science of metaphysics, of sorts; Edmund Hersserl was frustrated that by his science his students kept wandering off the specific path he laid; Georg Hegel sought to systematize with his this same object; Martin Heidegger likewise sought a type of science of this same object. And many more. Much of philosophy since then can be said to have stemmed from the imperative that it did not happen "and here's why and what needs be fixed", and thus can be seen to include our present considerations:

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Non-philosophy supposes to reveal why it is seen to never happen and propose a closing (recognition) of the unrecognized infinite loop, the loop that he argues is missed through the philosophical decision; aphilosophy, as a step from non-philosophy, says that it indeed happened and explains why it is not understood to have happened by explaining the issue that is never exposed.

21.

It is counter intuitive, as well as non-conventional, non-methodological, and of a non-standard philosophical approach to consider also that when we say that non-philosophy is the culmination of what these other authors were attempting in their ways to express as to its objectivity, indeed Laruelle notes his own concern that non-philosophy would be made into another object. So in a certain sense, Laruelle gets nowhere greater or further than anyone else, since they are all meaning the same thing but with marginal differences, differences taken into conventional definitions that are used in the place of what is informing the discussion, so that the actual common element is obscured for the sake of the potential invested of the terms to present real identity. Likewise we can place Laruelle in the Rolodex of historical philosophical ideas and confirm the conventional maxim. But again, it is not the effort here to go into a breakdown of how all these authors might relate in the potential meaning of their ideas through the definition of terms and the arguments of designation and context; the issue is what they are all meaning the same thing about, and not how what they are saying is different might be finding reconciliation, either in their individual proposals or a number taken together.

22.

The issue is the attempt to find the true thing through the methodological consideration and negotiation of

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conventional discourse. The effort here is to develop the significant idea whereby all these authors gain their veracity, and to make the futile suggestion that we need thus move beyond it; we need enact of the revolution by the proper understanding of the event, yet because this never occurs, as evidenced by these authors (the subsequent philosophy that felt it must reiterate or improve upon them) thereby do enact the non-philosophical to its necessity by the suggestion inherent of this aphilosophical enterprise, thus granting the revolution to its deterministic state that inevitably occurs because it already has occurred.

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Kant.

23.

We shall call forward the categorical imperative as well as the synthetical a priori, two fundamental ideas for Kant, as the main example of the problem that appears to have perplexed nearly everyone who entertains those terms, such that much of the history of philosophy since then is primarily a perpetual reinstatement of these tenants. One problem that Laruelle addresses of philosophical method is that the method is so self-evident, so impositional by its stature, as to its want to convey or otherwise represent what is true, what we could call a common sensibility is ignored. The meaning that the author intends to convey is deferred in the reader away from the sensibility that the author is intending to address or arouse of the reader herself, such that the philosophical reader is constantly in an effort of missing herself despite best efforts, seeing the terms of the author in question as indicating something more than the reader's ability to see of itself; which is to say, as indicating a True Object.

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24.

In short, a categorical imperative coined by Kant and rephrased here, is an event that cannot occur or unfold in any manner other than the way it does. Kant finds this idea by considering what supernatural and or otherwise metaphysical claims attempt to account for. He thus finds a 'category' that must be the object of such superstitious assertions, a reduction of sorts to the common element that is somewhere of humanity, such that this category, as yet unnamed, is attempting to show itself in the real world; we have then what is necessary in a coordination with what is sufficient. This category seems to make a certain sense to everyone that even Kant himself can consider it, but then as well what may be incorrect as to the superstitious reflections. Further, we should also see this in the context of a universal whole as the vehicle of this whole might be known: And he calls this effort, "The Critique of Pure Reason". What may be common of the object that is being expressed in various forms is, as we might have it, Pure Reason. The critique is being put forth by the Pure Reason. We have thus an initial marker or indicator of when truth is being expressed, because here we have a critique that is being enacted upon what can be called 'pure reason', the concept and thus the category by which categories may be categorized, and the categorization of this, which, by its very nature of being involved with the motion of truth, thus brings into question the very ability to have such a dialogue, such a critique. Here, we should see, the apparent thought asks of itself the discrepancy involved with its, that is, thought's, occurrence in the world, and the question upon the discrepancy is called ethics. Ethics can only exist where there is thought as an indicator of separation, or at least the perception of separation, where an act must have an associated choice. The categorical imperative is thus an answer to the ethical question that arises to pose thought towards its correct activity, in other

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words, the coordination of what is necessary of the category to what is sufficient of it. So we have an indicator of the revolution in question, initiated by the implication of a suspended redundancy, a cyclic motion of essence to discourse to essence of discourse, which is stopped at a specific but arbitrary point for the purpose of establishing the dialogue itself. The issue that is begun and thus allows for the insinuation of what later will be called "revolution" is an apparent ignorance involved with the thesis. Kant sees the point where discourse has taken hold, the arbitrary point of discursive purchase, as indicating an essential linkage, and the discourse itself – its impetus as well as its meaning, deriving from a particular object that (Kant's) thought has acquired the truth of, as if this object was not the discursive motion itself, and that the thought was not the stopping of it, such that there is thought – as an actual segregate universal element, a tool, if you will, that consciousness 'uses' to find the truth of things. This is to say, if the correct and proper use of this tool stems from the pure reason, then the motion implemented by this linkage is thus imperative; indeed, the necessary arrangement, procurement or otherwise manifestation of discourse for the truth of the matter to be represented in its truth: The imperative of the category that is the issue at hand.

25.

The issue of freedom is not itself present with the pure reason of Kant because of the categorical imperative involved with the true expression of truth; the idea is that with the enactment, or however one would speak of it, of such pure reason, one is thereby de facto free. Rather, he is concerned with how freedom is conditioned, for it is obvious that there would be no correct manner of describing truth truly if there was not another way that thus would be the description of truth that is not true; or, so much as what is not described or enacted correctly is not true in its essence we have what is categorically

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not necessary, or contrary to the nature of the category, not an imperative of the category yet something that nevertheless has something to do with it: We have a hypothetical imperative. For Kant's categorical imperative, freedom is taken as a given, as the apparent and essential separation involved with the human being and the world is manifest as thought, this ethically reconciled. The world, then, by which the discrepancy is realized, as an essential condition of having such pure reason, is also the practical world, which concordantly functions by its own imperative, the counterpart to the pure reason's categorical imperative whereby such knowledge as he is exhibiting has been allowed. So again, the issue for Kant is thus how thought, which here then arises in the potential of pure reason, might be aligned or coordinated with a True Object, or an intuition of such, so that ethically dubious situations might be mitigated. He thus treats freedom as a moral issue, rather than an essential issue because freedom is already present in the questioning that he is involved with through that separation by which thought is seen to be separated enough from its object thereby to consider it. His question is thus exactly how it is possible that he (Kant) himself has been let unto, has been allowed to be privy to, this truth he is trying to convey, that is so obvious and apparent to him. As well, how can he bring this state (the later revolutionary state) around to those who apparently do not know of it, which is to say, to those of that state which is governed or that otherwise operates by a hypothetical imperative. He thus is involved in the attempt to convey through logic a sensibility where ethics no longer needs to be enforced, but rather comes along itself as part of an imperative: A capacity or ability for a reasoning that is pure.

26.

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We can enjoin Kant with another notable consideration, that of the synthetical a priori. This ability or capacity to find and or have, know or act upon a categorical imperative, an imperative distinguished from what is hypothetical and practical, is not gained through the practical but must somehow reside outside or beyond its purview. Kant presents an example of how such an extra-practical aspect is necessary through his consideration of analytical, synthetical, a priori and a posteriori judgments. Three of the combinations, analytical apriori and a posteriori, and synthetical a posteriori, can be found and verified against experience. The manner in which this idea is framed has to do with propositions, statements, sentences, or just plain discourse; it is framed by using examples of discourse. Synthetical means that the predicate cannot be inferred from the subject. So, very basically, we may have with the statement "all feet have toes" an analytical statement because the predicate 'toes' is included in the presumption of what it is to be 'feet'. Whereas the statement "all men have hair" can be synthetical because having hair is not an inherent quality of being a man. Further, when Kant speaks of experience, he means an experience of some thing in the world; a posteriori connotes that an experience is needed, and a priori means that it is not needed, that the veracity of a statement is known independent of an experience. Mathematics can be an example of a posteriori knowledge because it is not apparent that having two things equals having two things; having these things that they together are two must be learned through experience of such things in concert with knowledge. Whereas the knowledge may arise intact as indeed there are these things and I may indeed know them intuitively 'one' and 'one', the quality of their being such a 'one' is always in the experience deferred to the potential involved in that one being 'of two' such that there may be indeed 'two' at some point. This is the issue of the void and

35

multiple discussed below, the issue that this essay addresses incidentally, of how these basic 'two' might be reconciled.

27.

Thus Kant's main concern is the synthetic a priori, where the veracity of the statement is confirmed independent of experience. See first; the examples of statements, of subjects and predicates, are examples for his meaning. So much of conventional philosophy finds Kant and then goes about looking for truth through structural discursive analysis, taking apart sentences as to the truth they might indicate depending upon Kant's logical system, and so much does this kind of humanity find terms expressing objects in-themselves that are ethically dubious, yet looking to Kant's systemization for a solution to the problem, finding mainly problem, and miss the issue entirely. Thus to reiterate; Kant is concerned with synthetical a priori: A predicate (that which confers meaning) that is not found within the subject (a truth not verifiable by the usual discourse of reality) and that is verifiable independent of (worldly, physical) experiences.

28.

The whole of Kant's ideas are based upon these two notions. In consideration of things, consistent with what has been outlined above, Kant thus ponders the link between the object and the thinker. This is why Kant is often seen to be pivotal in the philosophical scheme: Because he places the whole of his ideas upon the primacy of knowledge, that objects in-themselves are known only by knowledge. If we can take such objects that are in essence themselves by virtue of our knowing them as such, we have then not only a proposal for a proper One reality, but that there is only one reality and this

36

reality contains all truth. His solution is that objects are intuited, and, again, that there are correct and incorrect intuitions of objects, thoughts that align correctly with activity and thoughts that do not (ethics), and that the correct alignment is upon Pure Reason, but that this Pure reason exhibits a discrepancy of itself. Hence, beyond Kant, we begin to find irony, and it is this type of reason that amounts to what we are calling the philosophical revolution.

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Hegel.

29.

Georg Hegel said it all, but what he said is (still) based in the polemic of the same. If Kant can be said to mark the issue in its beginnings, Hegel can be said to be the issue in its maturity; the view is fully developed with him. With him we have the effort to reconcile of what we see is the ironic situation of Pure reason. As with Kant, this view of the same figures upon a one wholeness, conveyable and knowable through the human faculties. The wholeness is always constituent of a thoughtful human being and a world of material objects, and premised upon the singular ability for thought and its proper application to yield the true world. As said, thought uses language as a probe, of sorts, upon world to thereby find this truth, and this situation is not problematized, rather, it is problematized within the singular and unitive ethical horizon. In all this view, each element is understood to have essential capacities and aspects, abilities and substantialities that naturally, apparently and obviously amount to their respective roles, as these roles supply the philosophical meaning towards a revolutionary manner of being human in the world.

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30.

In this regard, Hegel offers his dialectic. A foundational Hegelian example of how the revolution plays for his texts is found in his book "The Phenomenology of Spirit", the passage called 'Lordship and Bondage'. The motion of the narrative centers on the apparent manifestation of consciousness in an encounter with an other, another self-consciousness, as well as the meaning of such an event. Now, it is here that all the trouble arrives, for as with all discourses that reflect truth, the text lays itself open for a double narrative. This is to say the conventional reading of the text will yield a discussion as to its real merits and deficiencies, an analysis into the definitional structure of the report – indeed, into all aspects of discursive classifications such as mechanics, semantics, poetics, history, culture, et cetera – such that the singular author becomes a participant in the multiplicity of happening opinions that never really gain a consensus of what the author was really saying. The double narrative is always thus diffused into the real discussion of reality, that is, of itself, so that it misses the true meaning. This route unto its own confusion is thus one narrative against the other narrative that sees the truth of the discourse before it has even been encountered, such that the reading of it, the unfolding of the encounter in the experience, becomes the occasion for the truth of the matter. 

31.

Hegel's dialectic thus concerns the interplay of these essential components: One that sees in the other a foreign "other-ness", as a subject-object of real determinations and universal scientific (if such a term can be used) dimensions, such that Hegel is seen to address the common reality in which astute thinkers enjoy the pondering of various problems, abstract and pertinent, concrete and obtuse; and another that

39

sees in the other a particular stubborn intimacy of consciousness interacting with itself, but yet with the added oddity that this other-self-consciousness is indeed acting nevertheless, regardless of the self-consciousness in which this event is occurring. This last is not merely a consideration of what may be, for the simple answer, other conscious human beings – this is the irony of the revolutionary break, and the double voice – but rather merely a contemplation on a particular significant event where the truth of the matter is presented, and thus by its being true addressing of truth in its truth, thus naturally and axiomatically contains that which is now subsequent by its representation in reality as reality, which is, conventional reality. This moment wherein discourse is seen to express that which is true already, a priori, as opposed to theoretically and a posteriori true, knowledge already known in and as the experience, is the philosophical revolution, the dialectic that is self-consciousness coming upon itself; not as a part of itself accounted for within the structure of common and conventionally designated consciousness, but itself in self reflection, not as a willful and thoughtful consideration of objectivity upon oneself, but as an unwilled manifestation of self consciousness against the self consciousness that is having or doing the thoughtful considering that we are apt to call the 'person', that one of agency, this then that is the experience. The dialectic is thus not only some alternate way of describing an argument or a method by which to have an argument; such an argument is just another reiteration of redundancy, of seeing the example as the object itself, as method. Hegel's dialectic concerns the truth of discourse and the manner that such a truth has come about. He does not frame it in terms of discourse, but this is because, as we have said, he is still involved with one truth and the reconciliation of apparently distinct and segregate modes of experiencing reality.

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32.

In this way and by this way, Hegel's dialectic is a route to a higher form of knowing. On one hand we have the text that is exhibiting a truth that is already known. As one reads the text (encounters in experience), the proceeding clauses verify that indeed the truth is manifest as has been or is being revealed. This revelation becomes the issue. So, on the other hand, we have this truth that is evidenced through the reading because it is addressing the phenomenon of self-consciousness coming upon a self-consciousness that is apparently not an obvious segregated object/person/subject; which is to say, because the reader (Hegel in this case) has had an experience of this other self-consciousness. The interaction of these elements constantly proposes a break with conventional reality, but because this experience cannot be dismissed, because it indeed involves a consciousness of consciousness that is behaving as a self-consciousness that is not the self-consciousness, the break cannot be made. The insistence of the experience demands accounting, for it is a preoccupation made upon the consciousness without askance or recourse to its conventional will: The logical deduction from the term-object identity (see below), the given reduction based in conventional reality, is that the route is yielding a further truth of itself that is the inescapable inference of an inducing true element that lay outside the purview of the proposed discourse that is concerning what is otherwise real discourse-relatable objects.

33.

We may now begin to see the how the titles "Lord" and "Bondsman" are applicable. This is all occurring within, or

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otherwise of consciousness, and so the dialectic is the exchange of those elements that behave autonomously but implicit to the arena by which they interact. The meaning of the initial setting, wherein such exchanges take place as the dialectic, in its working out along those lines of meaning implemented through the encountering of certain discourse, is a process of doubt, which is to say, of investigating the incredulity in the face of the evidence; not fact checking the evidence, but indeed examining the doubt, because it is inevitably understood that it is the doubt that has allowed for the arrival of the evidence. The world being manifest as the involvement of these self-consciousnesses, it's features and terms reach out to contain and concern all possibility of world in its possibility regardless of the opinions had upon its expression, for the expression has been made and the opinions expressed. Hence we have the qualification of conventional reality, or what is the concordant arena of the Bondsman. In the explaining of this situation, then, the apparent discrepant meaning of the world expressed in the terms likewise enjoin the world whereby the self-conscious other is and has been informing truth, such that the self consciousness begins to become reconciled in the resulting discourse. This motion that occurs in the process of the attempt to explain the synthetical a priori situation thus succeeds in manifesting the argument whereby what had been synthetical has become analytical and at that, also a posteriori. The expository discourse itself, a telling of the possibility involved in already knowing the content of a prior discourse through the involvement with an other self-consciousness, becomes, for a term, a forensic effort, a dissolving of the other self-consciousness, a negation of the thesis involved in the initial presentation that is the antithesis in the effort to be disclosed, but in such a way that what is negated is not annihilated but reconstituted in another polemical formation, this time of a higher knowledge of reality and consciousness where the self-consciousness is no longer needed

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as an object of doubt: The Lord. This process of understanding by which self-consciousness comes to terms with itself as an other, is a conflation whereby neither aspect is lost but rather contribute to an uplifting of the whole, has been termed in English as sublation, and it is the end 'result' of the dialectical process that can be said to have been the reason it could ever have occurred in the first place, thus being an account for what Hegel finds as the motivating and indeed foundational universal motion of historical consciousness. It is the culmination of the dialectical process that achieves the philosophical revolution.

34.

The problem that we see over and over again in philosophy, is that what is revolutionary is was already present in the formulation of the discourse that proposes to describe the system (method) by which the revolutionary may be achieved, or to have been achieved. In truth, the discourse is merely a fidelitous report of what occurred and is occurring, a manifestation of the true configuration of terms of the state of reality. It is beyond the intent of this essay to explore the more involved repercussions of his statement, but, even with Hegel, we can begin to see how an essential segregation of aspects, over reconciliation, is viable because what we have achieved here is another reinstatement of redundancy, a falling back into itself, a supportive motion of itself, a segregation that occurs through its making claims upon something other than itself, while making claims only upon itself. Hence again: Revolution, but this time not indicative of the need to unify, but rather for divergence.

35.

The main issue with any systematic philosophy always concerns how seemingly separate elements imply or are other wise involved with the other. The problem is always how to

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disentangle terms to thereby get a true thing, and though Hegel does not refer to it, the discernment of this true thing for him is indeed the instruction of how to know, or become of that knowing, that which is then the philosophical revolution. We should note the reason he does not refer to such an occurrence is the same reason that philosophy persists as a conventional effort: It is based upon the 'object-term identity', the potential invested of such coupling, as this amounts to all we consider parts of reality. Where Kant noticed that knowledge is the key element of this dyad, that our use of objects depends upon the intuited knowledge gained from the object, Hegel finds the logical extents of such biased existence in the transcendental object that is knowledge itself – that is, when discourse is understood as a tool of knowledge; he thus moves toward the absolute truth of the situation as the situation (here, of this type) is de facto reality.

36.

We should see the same exemplary manner at work in Hegel as Kant. Simply speaking, for every thesis there exists an antithesis that is its opposite and negation. This is not a strictly discursive application but the comparison of statements is an analogue for what is occurring at a supposed 'higher' level. Again like Kant, Hegel's dialectical reference is already antithetical, and thus in this vein, already not conventional; thus with Hegel upon Kant we have the same move that Kant reports of Hume, the same revolutionary apprehension of meaning, and this situation as an historical presentation sees that some sort of progress is occurring, albeit of a 'higher' motion.

37.

What we say now is conventional to ironic, and real to not real, as Laruelle posits philosophy to non-philosophy, so this is the thesis to the antithesis and by this establishment thus is

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already synthesized, already synthetical a priori knowledge; already the revolution has occurred. Like all authors who posit the revolution within their text, Hegel is very subtle and thorough in this regard to be able to speak to the issue and untangle its conventionally meaningful defaults, but we find that all the care to detail serves only to further pronounce and aggravate the discrepancy. It is this intensity, this devotion that, like Laruelle’s Non-Philosophical work, shows what is true in its truth, and thus marks a particular historically ontological item. The compulsion is founded in the revolutionary experience, such that because it indeed is revolutionary, that the meaning is gained synthetically a priori, gained by the situation where the meaning of the text cannot be inferred from the conventional meaning of the text itself but is rather known for its veracity apart from the worldly, physical, objective experience of things – such a significant event beckons such authors to explain how it is true, but more: To suggest, against what is viewed as hiding, that this truth can be taught.

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THE ANTE-APOLOGISTS:Marx, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.

38.

The tension between the individual, as a conscious and willful agent that makes history, and history as an impersonal movement of universal things are pronounced in the ideas of Karl Marx, Soren Kierkegaard, and Friedrich Nietzsche, philosophers of the first generations after Hegel. It is with them that the completion that should be occurring is noticed to not be occurring; so it is we have an emphasis of the split that remains begging to be mended. The impending need for such a reconciliation can be felt in the respective ways of these authors, and it may be seen that they represent two sides of a motion, Marx with his dialectical materialism, and Kierkegaard with his irony, and another that finalizes in Nietzsche. It is not the intent of this essay to delve into proofs, but it is not difficult, despite all that may be argued upon the conventional positions of the plethora of philosophers of our day, to see that there is no other position that can arise after these figures, including Hegel's; this is to say that all positions propose to reconcile the dialectical

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nature of reality by positing toward some ideal, some transcendental or some existential ideal, of which there can only be three, i.e. historical, inclusive and exclusive. That is, until we come to what may belong.

39.

The cumulative effect of such conventional posturing, of learning the meaning of a previous position, seeing its fault, and coming up with a position that is not inscribed by previous meanings, has thus allowed for the ability of meaning to be inscribed into, what can be said then to be the non-philosophical position, that which lay 'in between', a position that is, for a term, a positing of a transcendental existential ideal that is not ideal in its posture. This we say can only be ironic, that which defies conventional sense, and thus we suggest the only way to continue philosophically is to diverge from the conventional philosophical methodology, since irony only can be said to arise as a conventional response to the failure to reconcile what are essentially real polemics; which is to say, irony is historically and commonly philosophically misunderstood as it is misapplied. Thus, if the meaning of philosophy can be said to develop only out of the attempt to reconcile real essential polemics, then Laruelle’s formulation of non-philosophy does indeed mark a certain end of philosophy.

40.

The impetus of both these authors, and then Nietzsche, is twofold; in one sense, neither Kant nor Hegel's notions did anything to bring about the supposed 'better' or 'higher' synthesis beyond some sort of conceptual possibility, but the world is obviously still here (there, for the next generation of thinkers) in the same manner or form that is was in Kant's or Hegel's time, and one could say that things are now even worse, and so now demands a greater and more profound urgency.

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Marx.

41.

The material side of what can be said to be dialectical is found in as much as material things are taken to be elemental components of reality. We do not yet say it, but equally it will be that such material is part of being in the world. For now, for Marx, the material points directly away from ideal or 'thoughtful' world of contemplative real transformations; it is apparent by now (then) that the ideal synthesis did not work, was not sufficient in its idea. Thus this failure can be reasoned to be due to there being a world that is not merely of ideas, but one that is actually of material, of things that we as human beings are involved with. So much as there is indeed a world of ideas and a material world, then, the reconciliation takes place through a significantly different modality. Here is the mark of revolution, where a decisive split occurs between what is given such that what was given before is now problematized as given; which is to say, what is given can no longer be assumed to be of a level playing field within the universal and unilateral horizon. While the logic of ideas may yield strange, interesting and surprising things when one really investigates the possibility of things of ideas and the world through experience as a particular

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qualifier for the type of discussion, what demands a revolutionary reckoning actually considers reconciliation of two fundamental and different universal types; what is revolutionary comes into play when what is given and common loses its obvious sensibility. Here, for Marx, what is given must be reconciled through revolution. So he suggests that there are two types of interactors with material: The Bourgeoisie and the Proletariat. Here, consciousness is problematized upon types of attitudes, or orientations, upon things, as opposed to being a given factor upon a common things that is things; what may be solely of the psyche, that is in an ideal sense of itself, is left moot and what is of the idea of the material, or the material of the idea, is found active such that we now must think in terms of ideology, the economy of ideas that interact in view along particular lines involving a struggle of power concerning the material of reality. To put it differently; what is revolutionary is to have that which has been silent, speak.

42.

Within this world of material, there is an apparent control over what is available to freely use, and this control is asserted by a particular type of person: The Bourgeois; the Bourgeoisie are the type group that seem to naturally have control over what is produced in reality. It is this type, or class, of human being that controls the value of property. The Bourgeoisie's word has propriety in as much as the control they assert is understood for the value that is being set for any material as this material may be owned, that is, as such material may then be used freely because it is the bourgeois that understands as it exhibits a certain control over the system by which material has value. This type controls the production of material as well as its value. This control is based in discourse and thus the dialectic that occurs is between those who have control over the discursive material, or over the material that is

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discursive, and those for whom the discourse of the material is problematic, which is to say, those for whom the value of the discursive production not only is not controlled by them, or rather, not determined by them, but is more so mysterious. It is apparent, for Marx, that there is this other type who do not control production nor value, but is rather controlled through the same mechanism of production and value, the group he calls the Proletariat. For the Bourgeoisie, the Proletariat is likewise material, and has value only in as much as they act in production, as much as they may produce, such they are products themselves. In fact, it is this later type, what Marx classifies as Proletariat, that must find a way to use the means of production (the material, or, the manner or ability from or by which products are produced) in order to bring about the revolution that is de facto and concordantly the transformation of discourse.

43.

This is a usual synopsis of Marxism, but it does not end here, for the usual Marxist interpretation misses the significance of revolution for this essay. The conventional Marxist includes the issue at hand only by virtue of the inescapable realm wherein the negotiation of power is the ubiquitous element, such that the issue of the human being is thus entirely and essentially a discursive issue, an issue of the dialectic of material, the discourse thus being the only indicator of what material may be but with the further caveat that this material references what is truly real. Yet more to the issue here, ideology is not understood for how it comes about, but rather for what it represents, and this is to say that by now what is represented is taken to be and mean the thing in-itself, the True Object, but without the question put forward of some Pure Reason, such that we have the conventional beginnings of the real axiomatic structure of identity, as well as the roots of what

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has been coined as correlationalism . This is to say that from this point we have an assertion of power wherein reality comes to contain, as it must now be delineated and asserted, as doubt has breached the given, all that may be true. The intuited nature of the thing in-itself has been sufficiently motivated to be understood as what we are calling the 'term-object identity' by which the initial misinterpretation of Kant is transformed and used to justify and reduce the meaning of Marx's discourse to ideological considerations only, that is, to the material objective things of the world to which discourse refers in its capacity and ability to convey truth. But the setting is the same: As with Hegel, the description again finds itself within a one given reality that is being analyzed and proposed upon toward a revolutionary reconciliation. This is the mark of conventional method, that discourses of sense have already determined the truth of things such that what needs now to be found is what is more true or really true of the thing in question. This situation is exactly what Marx describes such that here, still, we are indicating the same true condition, that of an aspect or group where the term-object identity is not problematized such that the material of reality may be controlled, and another aspect or group for which the term-object identity is problematized such that a revolution is posited as necessary. The difference here is that we suggest that there is no possible reconciliation beyond what has already been set of the issue in question; where no problematization of the term-object identity occurs, there is no finding or being taught how such a problemitization is viable because, in truth, there is no transcendent truth that upholds the position of the term absolutely; there is no trans-lation, no trans-scription between sorts of essential substrates – irony – and this is to say the same as Kant but without the unproblematized given one reality: There is no knowable thing in-itself. For the problem is by the intuited element of being human; for Marx, the fetish is the vehicle by which the term-

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object identity remains unproblematized: Money is the maximized symbol of this situation, that which allows for the control of the means of production, and this is to say it is the fetish that allows of the real unity of problem and ‘un-problem’ that then called (or calls) for revolution. But, it is the belief in the One True reality whereby Marx finds the fetish, as finds commodification as the problem that thus requires revolution. This prompts a topic to explore in another essay. Only in the One reality can we say that there was or is a True historical world wherein a fetish was always functioning in various ways to manifest humanity against its ideological or political structures; yet the fetish, as it arose with Marx, shows a particular fact-ness of history: In so much that an object of sorts can be said to be of a material by which whatever it is to be human may operate, that the fetish is identified by Marx, in his time, so to speak, in the manner that it does, which is to say philosophically, shows a particular universal movement of concept-idea into an actual objective state, this state that thereby precipitates Law as a feature of human material that does not arise through human agency, through some kind of essential freely gained and or activated choice. It is not so much that reality has been problematized requiring a real revolution, but more that reality itself is not the problem but only an arena where problem manifests; indeed, in denial of this nauseating fact reality thereby argues itself in method as the only possible Truth.

44.

Conventional Marxism places the discourse of revolution totally in the objective world of things wherein the subject of transcendental agency is in a struggle to shift the potential of products and their value to a position that is beneficial to the agent itself who − by virtue of the revolution, activates the transcendent clause, which is seen to be activated and verified

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by an essentially transcendental affect, ironically through Marx's fetish – is or otherwise becomes exempt from the material economic oppression. The oppressed agent here is justified by its alignment with Marx's rhetorical truth through the transcendent clause, and is thereby in a position to shift the fulcrum of power away from the Bourgeoisie, because it is the Bourgeoisie who until this moment of Proletariat agency were in the position removed from the economy of production sufficiently enough to thereby be able to control it; in other words, the world of the Proletariat is controlled by an aspect that is transcendent to the world of their immediate experience, and the Bourgeois, being the controllers of this world thus amount to having already transcended that world, that ideological world based in production and value, that Marx refers to as capitalism; and this is to say that the capitalist is the one who accepts transcendence as the route to power. The role of the revolutionary is to shake off the slumber of ignorance, seize the means of production, to thereby, having learned from their oppressed condition, bring about and allow for a new instatement of power based in an ethical human equity that he calls communism.

45.

The significance of the explication thus far is that it represents a decision upon what is actually being addressed and thereby opens itself up to a revolutionary interpretation. The usual revolution is of the conventional type: A group or segment of society controls production, use and value of objects, called commodities, such that another group is kept from their right to freely enjoy them; the situation is evidence of a type of inequality of subjects; the oppressed subjects need to realize their situation, gain control of production and restore or otherwise enact equity to subjects; i.e. to enact revolution. Yet the actual philosophical revolutionary meaning dismisses itself

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from such objective formulations, for it deals only in real material and in fact thus allows for, not some truly inspired phenomenal agency, but a true objective case. Here, while the rhetoric is consistent with the conventionally objective representation, the revolutionary agent's main goal is to shake off the mystique of fetishism, of the investment in the ideological stakes, the opiated state of religious ideological fantasy, to thereby actuate an unbiased affect of power; which is for all purposes, the destruction of the transcendent.

46.

Understand that the description of the usual interpretation is not suggesting that it is somehow essentially wrong in its interpretive effect. Rather, in as much as it may be correct, there do we likewise have an object: The ideological world of named and true objects being used and negotiated by subjects that exist as exceptional agents that intuit the truth of reality through a transcendental clause. This is a description of how reality might function. Yet, see also that we are not specifically involved with this essay towards another explanation of how reality might function, that is, how it is really true. The debate of the truth of reality we leave to others, and simply say that reality is real, whatever one wants to say about it. This essay concerns only how the philosophical revolution is involved in certain discourses. Thus in the case of Marx, we are not concerned with whether there is indeed a real situation as he proposes, for the case to be made has more to do with the fact of the revolution involved with the case as it is proposed to concern all that is true.

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Kierkegaard.

47.

Kierkegaard may be said to be the only philosopher that deals with the issue directly. Of course, it is easy to show Marx when we speak of the philosophical – or for that matter, any – revolution, but Kierkegaard moves in the direction of the issue instead of a unity that is not understood; his pivots upon what can be said to be a unity that can not be understood , a condition of being which beckons a revolution. Kierkegaard moves toward the unity that can only be understood by abolishing the usual route for understanding. He proposes an essential segregation that is only reconciled through a desperate act which he calls the leap; yet for Kierkegaard, this act is into faith, and not from a position of faith; this is to say, faith does not implore or compel one to make the leap. This act together with the abandonment of reason thereby may be understood as the reason of all reasons, enacting again a split from the practical reason that was left behind, and the pure reason drawn by Kant; but to its own veracity, its own in-itself-ness, the move can be called thus not only a leap of absurdity, but indeed a leap into absurdity, because what was once the entire possibility for truth, reality, that which defines what is rational and real and true, is seen

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now to be not so much, but in fact rooted in fallacy, and thus the revealing of this truth translated for reality is absurd. Yet the significance involved in the revolution having already occurred is the transformation of Kierkegaard's meaning that shows him as ignorant of his own position, that this ignorance is indeed the Pure Reason set aside in faith. So it is that the most absurd thing possible is to have made that leap only to find the leap was not necessary– for it was entirely necessary and determined as such – and that if the leap were never made then it could not be made because the leap there was entirely a conceptual exploration and thus based in a choice of reason; in other words, the leap only is viable in so much as it is not possible. This is consistent with the philosophical revolution where we are not speaking about some new subjective awareness of what is really real, but rather a relinquishing of the conventional method for coming to the truth of the matter.

48.

Kierkegaard is conventionally understood for irony as indicating a deep kind of spiritual knowledge, a kind of philosophical consideration of things that may have to do with a human soul or spirit, because the real ungrounded possibility of any statement is left to an absolute unknown that is assumed by the absence marked of any stated meaning. Yet while what is revolutionary is indeed this absence of fulfillment in the ironic life, he is recognized for irony because of this fundamental fact, encompassed of multiple enfolding clauses, the irreconcilable condition of the revolutionary event: He still saw that such revolutionary knowledge should be able to be sufficiently described if not proven, to a common sensibility, such that people would make the leap, and he shows a bit of frustration toward the people that apparently are not understanding his ideas: In his time, he is publishing within an obvious public arena, but intends his writings for only certain individuals; he

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outlines the repercussions of faith as well as acknowledges that any choice made outside of reason is not a choice that could be had. The ironic moment thus falls away and outside of the conventional existential (mis-)understanding that would have Kierkegaard show a limit that indeed is never traversable: This is the revolution having already occurred, because it is indeed that revolution that can only occur when there is no option. His whole effort is to present the possibility of there being an existence outside of what is a reasonable world through the question, "Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical", whereby he defines what is reasonable with reference to what is universal, defining the universe as that ethical state of existence. His preponderance with this question places him in an odd sorting, where ironically his activity met with misunderstanding causes him to sink into ever more despair, which, as he claims, is the mark of "sin"; this sin, in the context that traverses Kierkegaard and the philosophical revolution as presented in this essay, the equivalent to gaining justification by the True Object.

49.

So above all, the significance of Kierkegaard is this irony. Though he himself could not see it and instead thus posited absolute transcendence without the need for the transcendental clause (this the ironic situation), he nevertheless presents by his very existence the situation at hand. For just as all the others, he attributes his experience upon the truth of discourse to some primal cause, some originating agency that transcends or has been transcending the universal capacity to know it. This is to say that an experience of discourse through which truth is expressed – discourse in the broad sense of all that is being known as experience – is seen to indicate an agent source, so to speak, that is speaking through the discourse, a truth that cannot be inferred from the discourse itself – that is to say, if

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one were to ask others what the meaning of the discourse is, the answer would be different than the meaning that was gained by the questioner. In other words, the predicate, the verb, the 'is', that which conveys or places meaning to the subject, cannot be inferred from the subject, but neither is its truth verifiable in the experience of the objective, universal, ethical, world. The irony is found in the synthetical a priori; in as much as the experience of meaning further indicates a truth larger than the conventional discourse can contain, a truth that apparently is not noticed by the rest of the world, thus likewise is the impetus of this experience the effort to effect a containment, of expressing the larger truth through the vehicle of discourse that is seen to be inadequate to the task in the initial moment that is the experience itself. But we cannot even say that it is inadequate as a whole; rather, because it was adequate to the significant experience, we must thereby realize a division, and this division thus indicates what is revolutionary, in Kierkegaard's terms, that which is a teleological suspension of ethical, universal (practical) reason: The experience justified by the absurdity that is the history that he could not know of: The history of the future, or for the meaning of that moment: Faith, in the most Kierkegaardian mode. Kierkegaard admits that he cannot make the move of Abraham, the figure he uses to propose the Knight of Faith, the one who by virtue of the absurd is able to accomplish revolutions, is able to overcome and otherwise bypass the ethical, universal world because through the absurd faith the Knight no longer is subject to the ethical world. Kierkegaard thereby resides in irony because he could not see the meaning of his own proposals, was incapable of understanding what it means to have faith by virtue of the absurd. He thereby has achieved what is absurd; his sacrifice, his fidelity to the absurd situation, marks the historicity of the significant event, because he could not overcome his faith in the True Object and the possibility of philosophical revolution, such

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that in the face of absurdity he could only achieve what has been determined of him, as Laruelle might put it, in the last instance: He is the example of the Knight of Faith in as much as he was the Tragic Hero who accomplishes his faithful task, but then is doomed to relinquish the object of that faith. Kierkegaard's irony is unfathomable.

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Nietzsche.

50.

Jean-Paul Sartre is known for labeling Kierkegaard as the first existentialist, but with regards to Kierkegaard’s faith, it seems more proper to place Friedrich Nietzsche in that position, since he appeals to nothing beyond that which exists as a holistic presence of life. Conventionally speaking, he does not hold an ironic position that tells of an absolute transcendence through the limit of universal reality. But his irony nevertheless involves the same revolutionary position; that is, the human being holds a potential within itself that is held back by the tendency to believe and hold onto a truth that transcends reality. Nietzsche's revolutionary subject he calls the übermensch, and by this title he thus situates 'man' as a neotenous state of being. The new man, or depending on how the original German is translated, this 'over', or 'beyond' man, who nevertheless is man grounded 'of the earth', in a manner of speaking, is a being who now realizes, accepts or otherwise comes to terms with the actuality of its existence. Through no recourse to some God, nor idols that take the real effect of such transcendental position, but a complete rejection of it,

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Nietzsche's beyond-man is able to enact a kind of true potential of human agency.

51.

With Nietzsche we see not only another meaningful reversal of position, but as well a type of intensity that is not evident in other philosophers. Marx and Kierkegaard surely make a call to arms and show a certain frustration with the world – Marx to beat the Bourgeois at their own game, and Kierkegaard to overcome the universal hypocritical religious disparity – but aside from what mental instability might have existed before his breakdown in his later years, Nietzsche has an intensity all his own. With him we see a figure in which the sensibility not only should have been understood by now (his time), but definitely when he gets done. It is the frustration like that toward an obstinate child, one who is being dense for the mere fun of it, despite the severity of its situation. Indeed, Nietzsche offers a 'new' human consciousness, one that overcomes the childishness of what will have been before, and it is as if the pangs of revolutionary birth is evidenced in the density of conventional misunderstanding that must be countered with a proportional intolerance.

• • •

52.

Of course many other philosophers can be viewed in this way, each attempting to expose that which should have already been revealed by its obviousness, and that indeed has already been revealed to them – but why not anyone else? Unfortunately we are at a point where we must expose what has been

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occurring philosophically; this essay is but a beginning. We shall see below; no longer should we equivocate philosophically to what is methodologically real, to the correlational maxim that says that what has been revealed to them is evidenced in what they said, and quibble and signify how the pieces can be made to mean so much for various real situations. No longer do we attempt to reconcile reality to never-ending discussions and proposals of true reality; we grant these discussions do well to make reality whatever it is. Such is a spiritual dimension of being an individual in reality, of willfully having to create purpose and meaning to one's life. Nevertheless; we are not concerned here with how individuals justify themselves in their own process and discovery of agency, of psychological, social and ideological transformations: These real spiritual ventures are always concerning revolution. We propose that the philosophical revolution has already occurred and was missed; this then reveals what is most offensive to human identity: The human standard against which all truth is measured shows for our time that the human standard merely repeats an historical motion, and that human agency itself is but a real and thus conventional determination. Whatever is an actual universal object, it is moving along its own path, ontologically manifesting in its own in-itself-ness, and we, as the universal object that is human consciousness, are merely justifying ourselves with explanations of a true reality that cycles upon itself, always involved with the forgetting the possibility of beginning for the sake of the origin that eternally explains our purpose for being in a transcendental clause. This is the fact of being human such that where it is denied, there we have both arguments, both sides that verify that indeed we are merely a universal object among other universal objects, making our way in our own way: One, the Kantian intuition, and two, what can be called, empiricism, or maybe the scientific object. Either way, difference is never acknowledged in reality.

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53.

Nevertheless; regardless of whether the revolution is meant to be ultimately or existentially 'different' or speculatively real, the meaning of such a notion invested for reality never achieves that which is posited as composite of the ‘new’ difference, and thus is always a notion set in a transcendental aspect, that is, gained through faith. Yet the offense is not the assertion that what is real is not real, that what is real can be reduced or otherwise relinquish its reality to something more real; rather, in so much as the philosophical reduction has yielded a revolution that has already occurred, and that this reduction thus marks a repetition that cannot be avoided but only denied, what is not real thus occurs in a manner by which a total explanation of all ideological ground may be gained.

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APHILOSOPHY AS A CRITIQUE OF NON-PHILOSOPHY.

The Apologists.54.

The insistence upon an essential perception, experience and or existence of non-philosophy as method located of the author indicates an involvement with a proposal of transcendence, but that this transcendence might occur immanently. Laruelle must assert that he has a valid position, so he must enter into the transcendental clause very carefully so as to disguise that he is merely verifying the Kantian maxim of an intuition of ethically correct transcendental truth. To avoid the scent of religion, his task is to posit a synthetical a priori judgement as analytical a posteriori. But we have already seen, and already thus implied, that the philosophical motion that Non-Philosophy marks in significance already does this by virtue of the revolution already haven taken place as evidenced in the subsequent discourse not deferred. It is here the divergence is pronounced, for Laruelle must thereby propose that the linkage is no link, but merely a marker of a type that he

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frames as philosophical, that is non-philosophically an already essential unity. He must posit himself as an ethically suspended agent, one that is not separated from the act of his agency nor the apprehension of world by which such agency arises to perform, and argue that the performative situation is Real. Yet, the argument itself, the description of philosophical problem and it's solution as spelled out through the method of representation is also, indeed, merely the performative side of what is unilaterally axiomatic unto that performance, already at all times. This is the meaning by which the tool has been said to be withdrawn by its use. As we have said, to suggest that the view that includes by virtue of that which belongs to it is the more true case merely succeeds in arguing that the proposal is using the very same method that is supposed to be excluded from its axiomatic structure; for what can be axiomatic of a method that must be learned for it to be so? If something is obviously true, why would it need to be learned? This is irony incarnate, the definition of irony as situation; this is the significance of non-philosophy. But Laruelle is not involved, as a radical agent, with what may be ironic of a method; rather, he is involved with what may be real, and the enactment of revolution, evident by his proposal for attaining that imperative to the category of real, the same ideal proposed by all the authors mentioned above, and more: The non-philosophical methodological reduction to an "actually Real truth of reality" shows its problem even before one begins to entertain and learn Laruelle’s Non-Philosophical jargon.

55.

The inherent contradiction of non-philosophy poses a serious philosophical problem. This problem is that the contradiction of non-philosophy can only be solved through a type of privileged knowledge. There are two types of privilege; one that is allowed and one that is not allowed. The type of

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privilege that is allowed we call real privilege, and it is socio-economically as well as educationally founded. This is to say that one can be taught such privilege, and this is allowed, though with qualifiers of present day issues of social justice; the conventional method is the route to real privilege. Privilege that is not allowed is what can be called revelatory or prophetic privilege where a person makes claims to truth based solely upon communion with a transcendent entity or element such as God, gods, goddesses, spirits, universal consciousness, spiritual center, pure reason et cetera. This latter also has qualifications in the ideological arena, but tending more upon religious and spiritual genres and groups that are already open and acclimated to the possibility of such occurrences. This latter privilege is not allowed in certain philosophical circles because it is just these types of essentially subjective experiences and claims that are investigated and proposed upon as to what might really be occurring philosophically. Nevertheless, aside from such strictly revelatory experiences, we have then what is philosophically permitted: Intuition, of subjects and objects, allows for the philosophical distinction between real and revelatory privilege for the purpose of investigating the matter. Thought and the phenomenon of knowledge is thereby determined upon a method, conventional method, whereby further the affect of privilege becomes the method for the True Object; that is, the effect itself of consciousness is deferred and ignored for the sake of the method, thereby becoming that eternally elusive object, or purpose, of the method: The transcendental clause. The method thus becomes its own proof for its validity and veracity in every possible truth. While revelatory privilege is often at least acknowledged for possibility, if only to say that people attest to it, conventional philosophy adamantly closes the possibility to its ranks, namely, that which can be proven in some manner or another. It is here that the main problem arises, as we say, the limit of discourse,

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for the issue becomes about if the terms of discourse are indicating and or are able to indicate true things.

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Perhaps the most significant reconciliation of the two types of privilege we have just spoken was put forth by Martin Heidegger. In short, he calls the real reconciliation of what is transcendental and imminent being authenticity. Again, the reiteration he makes is of an oppressive element or aspect and the question of relief from that situation. The question is made within a One reality where there is an issue of freedom. Might we say his proposal was the beginning of the last to stem from as it holds onto what we might call the real essentialist position, the effort of which position that we have been discussing of a One real truth of the universe and or the One true reality in general, and a reconciliation of what is viewed as obvious and essential polemical aspects. After Heidegger, an adjustment was made upon the view to the evidence of such knowledge and the repercussions of there having to be evidence (what is evidence of evidence of Being?): One need only ask why such an adjustment would be necessary to see the completion that Laruelle represents by his Non-Philosophy. The issue we address now, through this essay, is how this subsequent view, the Post-Modern and the Post Post-Modern, in so much as they might pose a step away from Heidegger and or some sort of enlightenment of what he and others were ‘really’ saying, is really merely a reinstatement of what has been occurring not only with Heidegger but indeed many if not all philosophical proposals. This is the issue of non-philosophy. And, if we can indeed take Heidegger for his concern, we should then rightly see that where we revive proposals of Realism we have indeed forgotten out existential angst; but again, whether this is good or bad is not our concern, for our concern is really the issue at hand.

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57.

The distinction between revelatory and real privilege has already been formulated. For our certain philosophical mind, it is the difference between superstitious and rational thought, and as we have seen, is the question that Kant starts with, i.e. what is the object that is informing superstitious assertions. Hence, once we begin in this 'rational' venture, we inevitably come to the problem of intuition; with Kant, things are qualified in knowledge only, and things are qualified in this way correctly and incorrectly. The question then becomes, how do we know which intuition is correct? The revolutionary answer: Through the categorical imperative of synthetical a priori knowledge, where the categories of knowledge are already situated to their true, ethically uncompromised meaning. For how do we account for answers that arise otherwise? How do we account for, say, the knowledge apparent of analytical a posteriori statements without a synthetical a priori judgement already intact, already operating, for the apprehension of the truth of the statement in general? It is knowledge of this type that is proposed to be come upon in the philosophical revolution, and it is this type of knowledge that certain authors have been writing about, the position that they are writing from. Indeed, we are talking about the appropriation of discourse, and not so much about some real state of the human being. We are not in an effort here to argue or describe what may be more or less real of our situation.

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Once this is understood, then we must see that the revolution has failed, that it apparently is either sought after as

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a vocation, ideological position or identity, or it is eternally missed. Rather, if it has already happened then it is not being communicated, not occurring due to the discourse that arises from it. The vehicle works; no one really cares how or why it works except in as much as they may ride in the proposal. We can only admit, then, that the knowledge that has arisen with such authors is not practical, did not arise through the hypothetical reason, but is indeed of a revelatory privilege, but pure reason, and that the meaning of these 'knowledges', this 'pure' reason, what Alain Badiou calls "truth procedures", is not being conveyed in their truth(s). What is occurring, though, is that some kind of knowledge is being conveyed, the whole of academic critical theoretical and political discussion and negotiation floats upon this kind, and this is thus Kant's practical reason that occurs by a hypothetical imperative in an essential sense. What this means is that no such essential (revelatory) privilege can be methodologically proven or shown in its actuality but only (really) taught of conveyed in potential, so such (non-philosophical) knowledge in a proposal of being teachable through what we can generalize to call the banking model of education (to borrow a term) is thus a contradiction in-itself. The aggregate of real knowledge in an effort towards its own foundations yields an inevitable contradiction in the last analysis of itself such that the route of potential comes upon itself as itself, potential potentially in potential, so to speak, such that this potential can no longer uphold its own means, which is to say, intuition intuited of itself can no longer be put off onto or into another True Object and is therefore an indication of at least one true non-intuited object. Yet the inherent problem of this synthesis is that it does not automatically occur along some sort of line of common sensibility; the real problem is the reliance upon intuition as a qualifier of what it is to be human. This is to say, even if such a contradiction is an inevitable result of taking the conventional route to its end, the result is not

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inevitable, for if it were, these authors we have been entertaining would not need to explain it further, nor would the subsequent authors need to offer attempts, and we could get on with whatever is supposed to come next. Yet we continually see in philosophy that the improbability of the success of such a venture, of opening the privileged sector, is proposed able to be successfully countered through a type of discursive manipulation, a contrivance of meaning upon the actual situation that is this one true thing. Due to the philosophical reductive imperative located within non-philosophy, within the idea of radical agency, or radical performativity, the tracking of meaning to its source, to its place of recognition, which is the event replayed as a distanced object – the notion to be placed outside of itself as a propriety, as a proper or more real reality, requires also a displacing of this essential gap: It requires that the contradiction itself as contradiction not indicate at least one true thing but rather essential falsity that shows the proper route we must go if we wish to find what is true and real, the potential route that already includes the reconciliation in a denied displacement. Hence we must now say that the significant question put toward all philosophical proposals should be no longer how structurally, this is to say, syntactically, nor semantically, this gap is displaced, but rather how logistically. We need describe how it is that an object ontology has arisen, how it is possible. Yet for this to happen we cannot merely argue over transcendence and theism and such, continue to quibble over a perpetual misunderstanding of correlational reality which only verifies the correlational accusation; again, we must expose what is occurring – not merely neuro-physiologically, because then we are still left with the doubt upon the knowledge that is toward the science, still left with the revelatory knowledge that may be had to question such science. We must instead expose what is occurring in the revelatory experience itself; we must speak about what is most offensive to

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human experience: Not merely how intuition operates, but more what happens when consciousness is formed upon an ideology of freedom based upon a transcendental intuition, a motion of unity within a concept already segregated in its formulation. But better: How this operation, a notice of segregation as opposed to reconciliation –which is to say, in full recognition of the transcendental clause as opposed to an implicit (but unspoken) cooperation of inspiration − witnessed as an operation, the revolution having already occurred, yields a complete historical determination of meaning. For those so keen: This is not a move for a reconciled austerity. If it were so, then we would find again a conventional usurpation of what is natively ironic; we are talking about the appropriation of discourse and not how discourse might align itself with any true real thing. Austerity in the real world often can be seen to function in the short term, and then fail in the long, because while reality is all there is, it cannot be divided unto itself, but only biased in its accounting; and that is what we see: The motion for a total ideological inclusion, which is for all meaningful purposes, a global religion but negated as such concepts are sublated into the real conventional arena.

• • •

59.

So it is that in finding our critique of non-philosophy we uncover a method that continues as a route for truth despite its fallacious basis. Though it might honestly be proposed in the context of a more proper manner of understanding reality, "should humanity be saved" in the call of potential 'savior', non-philosophy works ironically to hide its complicity in the real

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displacement if not instigation of contradiction through what we can call the Post Post-Modern gambit. The gambit is necessary due to the repetition that has occurred, a retreading of philosophical grounds. Instead of asserting upon the gap towards a righteous and absolutely true and best world, which is the Modernist move of displacement through reconciliation by demand (the One), the Post-Modern exposed the facade of an argued previous totalitarian view by the converse assertion of the gap, a type of reconciliation by supply (the multiple). The general Post-Modern position is where the One may be associated with what is essentially human reality, what is multiple not only consists of other humanities but also an instatement of new mechanisms to enforce the (ideological material) consistency of reality; so it is argued. So likewise is history viewed as an enforced narrative that is being disrupted. The Post-Modern proposes to uncover implicit codes of force and power, codes that likewise are implied in the ethical narrative of reality. The problem of this move, of realizing and then exposing the ethical inconsistency involved with such an assertion, is it opens up the inconsistency of its own assertion, namely that the opening is supposed to reveal what may be more proper and true, but that this more proper and true manner is only gained by virtue of the previous order of what can possibly be proper and true. The Post-Modern solution offers thus the same solution that is never being recognized, the same solution offered of the authors we treat in this essay, albeit formed differently; which is to say, stemming from the situation that already showed itself insoluble through the routes of the Ante-Apologists, the Post-Modernists still attempted to find a route, a way to describe and therefore break through the ideological façade to be able to get to and communicate the significant meaning, the Event itself. But alas, they suffered the same fate, or maybe, the fate of the same.

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60.

The solution of what we call here the Post Post-Modern is a flattening of this irony: In the act of proposing what is correct, by the tenants of the proposal, I open my position to compromise. Thus the Post-Post-Modern solution says that the agent of truth must relinquish such truth for the sake of and in acknowledgment of the fact that it will not be apprehended for its truth, but only for the value of truth the discursive item has within the real economy of meaning, or for other words, the material; the One cannot retain its oneness within the multiple. This is to say that there is a consistency of narrative that is being downplayed in the Post Modern, and that the Post Post-Modern thus repeating this motion − a motion that we can be safe in pleading the ignorance of the Post-Moderns – has allowed for its exposure in its subsequence; that is, the new Realists. But also, that the Post Post-Modernists could not find their proposals through the rhetoric of the same that now identifies conventional philosophical discourse (see below), but thereby such Realism must be the occasional signal to revisit the meaning of philosophy all together: This is the non-philosophical Event, that whatever real discourse is occurring it is inadequate and insufficient to describe what is truly happening. Better: That which is multiple can be said to be so in as much as its position is never compromised due to its imperative to enjoin with all else but itself, for if it were to ever enjoin with itself, by virtue of its multiplicity it would thereby be in a state of contradiction, and thus no longer multiple (the fault of Post-Modernism); this is to say the multiple cannot include itself as it belongs to itself only (the fault of the Post Post-Modern and its subsequent Realism). We thus say reality, that which is of the multiple, is not true, but only real, and despite what conventional determinations may arise to locate True Objects, reality is always of Oneness. What is true then occupies

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that region for which reality by its method can never account, it's way being multiple in its truth, such that in as much as reality is meaningfully constituted (read: Defined) as a true 'one' reality such a meaning is based in a denial of the truth of reality, but not the real truth; thus due to the real insistence of conventional method, the truth and void arise in the same moment but by different occasions; hence the modern preoccupation with nihilism. We can say then in essence the truth that might arise from the void is thrown back into the void whereby the truth is recouped by virtue of the void itself, which has no inherent consistency in itself aside from the fact that it generates truth against no knowable method of accounting, that is, except that method that appears in and as reality says it does. In other words, the One is so by virtue of the multiple it addresses by its being the first instatement of the void that is multiple, but before the one must have been found as 'that' one among many. Once that One is found, conventional faith has taken hold.

• • •

61.

The watershed evidenced of this Event just mentioned (which could be non-philosophical) concerns thus this gambit, this solution of compromise; but as we will see, it is not so much compromise as it is deception. The single discernment by which this pivotal case arises has to do with what we shall call the Discursive Principle. The Principle states that discourse reflects the present condition of reality, and vice versa, that the state of reality is the condition of discourse for any time. See that this is not another form of Presentism, and is more in line with the

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strong correlationalism coined by Quentin Meillassoux, but voiced to emphasize the inclusivity of the correlational position in general, as well as the hard limit it imposes: Only discourse exists; if there is something outside or beyond discourse then it is entirely unknowable. Now, what this actually is saying is that existence is what can be communicated, and if there is something that is not communicable then it does not exist. There is a difference between what might be and what is communicated, yet the caveat that is often withheld from this imperative, the blank around which argument arrives, is that in reality there indeed may be something that is not yet communicable, that discourse is the process of having some thing be communicable, that some thing may be communicable in potential. What we have with this caveat, though, again, is a non sequitur; indeed, discourse may be communicating a meaning that is not conventionally conveyable. The problem is a misunderstanding of the meaning of the Discursive Principle as well the meaning of Jean-Francois Lyotard’s discussion of idioms.

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The meaning of the Principle is typically understood to be an aspect of the tool of discourse. This meaning is automatic to sensibility as evidenced by the confusion we wish to sort out, the confusion of missing the watershed. It shows a particular attitude or orientation, a certain idea of how truth should be ascertained. We have called this route 'method', but it is, indeed, conventional method. Here, the tool of discourse exceptionalizes human agency, even while it is the subject that is at issue. Here, the 'not yet' specifically indicates the psychic human being as the object of the investigation, the point of the endeavor. The human being is a privileged being, a user, an observer; discourse, like and arm or a leg or a pencil or computer is a thing that a human being uses. Hence, we can use discourse as a

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tool to find out just what the human being is as well as everything about it, and inso using discourse, the human being argues its privilege within the potential for displacement, i.e. A One ubiquitous power and the impetus to bring its effect. So usually when we say "discourse reflects the present state of reality" we take it to mean that indeed there is this some thing that is reality made up of all sorts of interrelating and acting things, together behaving in a certain fashion to be able to be called reality, and that discourse is only suited as a tool to its purpose: To name and categorize these real things for further use, and we can only have whatever use is presented to us for its function. In terms of humanity, this is called agency, but in so much as having the power upon the displaced gap, a more precise formulation is the agent of transcendence.

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The actual, or perhaps, intended meaning of the Principle follows in general from the contradiction inherent of the Post-Modern findings: The state of reality as discourse, set in discourse as to its condition, presents what can only be said to be an essential contradiction, essential because it is of discourse in its indisputable state. This state thus presents a condition of knowledge that says nothing of any actual, 'in-itself', things such as a past and a future or even a free agent. Indeed; the Post-Post-Modern gambit arises as an inevitable and inherent condition of its own position. At no other time, through no other discursive setting is there a need for the gambit because it is only within the post-modern setting that the objectival transcendent is encountered for what it is: Irony, in the most capital repercussion that can be imagined. This is as we have already discussed earlier; the investigation into the possibility of an actual transcendent agent or aspect of the universe yields the object of the investigation itself: Nothing; but nothing in a particular sense, the sense of sense itself which is

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meaning, yet the meaning of this encounter with meaning nothing is exactly still meaning. The question of this becomes the pronunciation of the transcendent itself: A faith that cannot be swayed, that is, what we are calling reality itself, because the meaning of the effort has yielded nothing as its meaning is taken to have been granted by something that is beyond the term that presents the meaning, which is to say, as an actual True thing of the universe: The True Object. Thus by the material manifestation of its position, the position or asserted position of the gambit, the terms of discourse by which it sets itself aside to debate transcendence and immanence, acknowledges and incorporates the indicated nihilism, we thus posit by its apparent materiality only, a singularity that manifests meaningfully within the ends of discourse. The precipitated contradiction thus shows that the phenomenal agent of transcendence is but a universally determined object of discourse, and not of some essential free human agency, but further, that this reduction does not function to include the conventional method in its functioning; the agent of transcendence maintains its freedom by virtue of its faith and the conventional method remains real while exhibiting a truth whereby mutual exclusion is the necessary and true condition. Being honest in our philosophical effort then, the gambit is, with the assertion of an object ontology, that the reliance upon the transcendental clause will not be noticed, but more, that the irony is upheld without having to include it in the proceeding considerations; it proposes to be done with the phenomenal agent through a stroke of discourse. This is deceptive behavior: The expression of a truth that admits its appropriation will be based in misunderstanding, defaulting to this misunderstanding in an attempt to further explain where it is mistaken, is an effort of bad faith.

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The extremity of this latter idea opens another accusatory door that again argues the default of tool use: Absurdity. It is absurd because of the singularity it evidences. The Principle states that discourse refers only to itself, and thus is not a tool, but an essence, a thing in-itself reflecting only itself; in fact, as itself it is never another segregated real object, it can thus be said to be the only object in-itself. Discourse thus has a self referential quality, and thus allows for another mistaken idea that reifies tool use; we can say that conventional method recoups all meaning unto itself: Discourse being self referential, it thus refers only to the user. This is another common mistaken post-modern theoretical derivative; this idea forms a basis of the breaking away from the previous modernist paradigm in the form of multiplicity, since we have then a bunch of discourse using agents interacting and actively producing reality through a discursive negotiation with one another, agents that can now be 'revealed' to their subjectivity through the science of psychology, one of the sciences, as we have seen, that is admittedly short sighted by design, merely in blatant denial of is clausal basis. Nevertheless, the result is always a mistaken appropriation of meaning, always a containing or upholding some sort of essential but withheld element that is 'really doing' the act.

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Another manner of discerning what we can call the defect of conventional discourse is the investigation into the referent of the term, the object of the subject. This shows in two ways. In terms of the phrase, the meaning is the subject of the discourse in question where the point or purpose is the object. For example, while I may be talking about prisons, the object of the discourse is to bring about a change in the treatment of prisoners, but not merely some sort of change, rather, a specific change addressing a specific issue. While still on the subject of

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prisons, the change may come about, the object may be achieved, but then that object dissolves into being a part of the subject by which to address another object. The subject of prisons is always limited by the object; the object being achieved only serves to show another object such that the subject is never found but always deferred to the object of discourse. Whatever is was 'really' the subject was never acting in-itself but was always acting through the problem of the object, such that what ever the object was, it could not be framed in any other way to remain consistent with the subject of the matter; one could not, say, put air in the tire to address the object of the treatment of prisoners in the subject of prisons; that is, if we are confined by conventional method. In terms of the Kantian scheme, the referent is always implied in the subject of the object. The distinction we make here has to do with where the contradiction occurs and how it is used. For conventional method, the experience of the truth of the matter is always in reference to objective experience, verified against the True Object that is viewed to be granting aspects of itself to our (human) knowledge, analytical and synthetical a posteriori. Yet the contradiction itself is the fact that the object is always implied in the subject, and that this situation occurs in knowledge as experience a priori such that this type of experience is foreign to the ability of conventional method to discern.

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In terms of the term, earlier in our conversation about Marx we brought the notion of the object-term identity. This notion arises simply: When we have an object, a thing of the world, in the world, such as a chair or a tornado or a thought, and we try to identify what that thing is – that is, when we try to

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communicate with another person as to what the thing may be – never do we find a complete and total description that identifies absolutely what that thing is. Always there is discussion and references to other terms and ideas. So the best we can do with an object is offer a sufficient description accompanied by the inclusion of what we can call a common human experience; again, conventional reality. Yet again, once we include this human aspect, we further aggravate the situation because we can never account for what this human aspect is that is allowing us to come to consensus of what the object is. The best we can say is that there is a consensus over what it is. This consensus is likewise never found through conventional methodology, but instead is only justified against the method's failure; this failure, when applied to the method by which reality is reckoned thus amounts to the gap mentioned earlier, that which is the conventional subject, which is to say, individual identity. We have here then the notion offered of this essay of conventional faith in the True Object. So, because reality is viewed as a common sense, not of or requiring of any sort of faith, any real effort of discourse toward the truth of an object is viable due to the potential involved with the ability or capacity of discourse to procure its object, what we call then, the object-term identity. The object is seen within the teleo-ontological horizon of the terms and vice-versa. Yet what the actual object is in-itself is thus a contradiction in terms, but not just any terms: Exactly terms from which they arise designated as to their proper meaning by the conventional method.

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Again, the meaning of the Principle harkens away from real community; the community is taken as a condition of discourse wherein and accorded to do we find the oneness of conventional meaning. Community thereby excludes and functions through selective biases. The irony involved with this

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situation is that where modernism is often associated with an assertion of a proper and absolute oneness upon what is otherwise a faceted world, post-modernity is concerned with how such a oneness is possible within an established multiplicity that has yet to be enlightened to its true reality. That is, the extent of potential of the multitude has yet to be revealed; hence a startling discovery: This is the same Modernist type effort that Post-Modernism was supposedly treating differently: All must fall under the One methodological type. Thus in this instance, the position of the 'one' is compromised by the formulation of idea that has compromised the veracity of its own meaning, that is, the position itself as multiple; at every juncture of meaning, the discourse is taken to indicate more than itself, a singular position or situation 'behind' the rhetoric. The position that is the multiple is always denied, and hence by the watershed noted above and the essential duality brought, we may now speak of an orientation upon objects. Belief based upon an assemblage of definition, knowledge of the multiple informing position is not sufficient for our meaning here; the situation at hand has been found to be incommunicable, but where it is seen as communicable, even within the Post Post-Modern gambit, we have then to figure upon orientation on objects and not knowledge itself. We may now begin to understand the significance of the Janus allusion and the irony of the non-philosophical splitting, for the notion that we as human beings are moving into a new era of oneness is still merely an ideological construct of the phenomenal agent. We will take up the social and historical implications in a subsequent work.

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Still another problem that has plagued philosophy is what can be said to be the investigation into God and religion. In fact, it is difficult to ask into the truth of things without bringing

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up what is typically a theological problem. Along this line, what can be said to be the main philosophical impetus is an accounting for assertions that gain their credence from what we could call inspired or revelatory experience, but at least it is what we can call induced, or given knowledge; in short, the destruction of the transcendent. It is for this reason that we say that we must be involved with a forensic effort, rather than an evidential hearing. The reason for this is aptly clear: If an individual human consciousness may have communion with a transcendent agent, of sorts, God, if you will, or any other extra-universal possibility, of which we may have an intuition, at length, then by what crucible would we know that its communication and or inspiration was valid? Simply speaking, if you say that God has spoken to you, how would I know if what He/She/It told you is true? Of course, on an individual level, where activity is left to some peaceful and unobtrusive effect, our concern should be little swayed. The issue comes to bare upon social effects and situations. If God has told someone that abortion is wrong and that they need to go get rid of places that do abortions, then there is a problem; one, because it is affecting other people, and two, because there is just as likely a pregnant woman whom God told to get an abortion.

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The problem with conventional method is it sees its products as emanations of truth, and discourse is one of these products. The recourse is that if we cannot be sure if one person has been inspired by (a) God, then surely if all of us get together then the result must have been so inspired. Indeed, all of science and much philosophy is based upon a suspension of the investigation into the induction of knowledge; the effort is satisfied to allow the deduction to show us how we come upon knowledge of things, to deduce from the product of deduction, to assess causality upon as essentially traceable causality. And

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vice versa: The production of discourse is seen to solve problems truly. Yet any suspension relies upon solution which it cannot discover, cannot locate; scientific effort seems admittedly short sighted by design. We thus speak about effects, rather than objectival substance. The social theorists often capitalize upon the one-sided material of ideological effects and suppose to find how power functions through discursive structures (substantial objects). Nevertheless and contrary to the ubiquitous assertion of route, the significance of orientation upon objects occurs when the induction is investigated by its inductive capacity; only in this way the object is found lacking such that this lack, by virtue of the nature of the investigation, becomes the source of knowledge of the object, such that orientation thereby becomes pronounced. On the other hand, conventional philosophy takes the long tack and supposes to thereby be able to find the user of the tool by using the tool upon the user; it does not see or admit that the tool is the user withdrawn from its using. The disclaimer for its own method is that there is no getting beyond its method, but this method relies, for its ability to find truth, upon a transcendent aspect to reality itself, and though real we have found this method lacking in essence. Hence we say that conventional method, the manner through which the facets of reality may be said to be true, is based in justifying denial, and that this denial is necessary. All the same, the conventional effort is seen to involve only one possibility of truth, and reality reflects what this truth is. So we can stay in the suspension and deduce that reality behaves as a type of processor, the individual subject-agent inputs data into the processor, and sees what comes out. What comes out then reflects whether the position of the subject is a valid position, as in the example of the change of the treatment of prisoners still reckons the prison subject as indeed still a prison, as well, whether the idea the individual has is viable in reality, which is to say, true and real. Likewise, ideas that we human beings as

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processors are thus in an ever eternally chaotic patterned dance; knowledge, a point marker of wave forms; et cetera. We should be clear what this implies: That there is nothing exceptional, outside, or beyond reality, and this is to say that if there is anything outside reality, it is not allowed to be true – this, the conventional correlation of discourse.

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Again, there is an inherent but suspended irony of such a method. It calls forth an extraordinary element that is routinely negated in the negotiation for its inclusion with reality, all the while being reified by the conventional institution of faith. In fact, the history of at least Western philosophical effort of the past 300 years can be seen to be the noticing of this element as a source of a proper truth for reality, and the attempt to bring such a truth into a meaningful ideological formulation. Even as the varieties of post-modernisms want to propose that they are or finding the 'real-true' solution to the great philosophical problem of exception or difference is no exception to the status quo of the conventional method. Hence the latest versions of philosophical proposals that take the conventional representations as the default material with which to work, while at the same time reifying as they may assert that they are indeed addressing all that may be true.

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We thus can say that, now, Laruelle and the Post-Post-Modernists, as well as the New Realists, are in an effort of bad faith because they are involved in a perpetuation of a method that they appear to want to disrupt in their proposals of solution; radical or not, we should see that the term 'radical' is often a patsy term, a discursive magic, that is used in place of what is otherwise "of the spirit" or transcendent; their effort appears more toward ideological consolidation. That this bad

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faith is indeed a condition of reality, ironically we can excuse their mistake, since each in their own way admit to their involvement in the situating of reality. Yet we see through their gambit: Their wager is that no one will notice their bluff (or no one will care). Speaking to the event of production (displaced truth event): Their faith lacked sufficient power to overcome the real power of methodological reductive argument and was thus bad faith, so they had to cover this offense and direct (force) justification to that power which effectively nullified the truth that was come upon by them in the significant event, and involve themselves thus in the activity of ideological deception, an effort in bad faith, because their assumption – but hope – is that their experience is of a potential contained in the general humanity, but more, that their experience is derivative of a common real type called ‘human’. The real catholic faith is being developed as we speak.

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We therefore suggest that Laruelle and these other authors intimated were and are involved with a deal wherein they had/have to play the hand given to them and thus chose to bluff in the game of big stakes – because their faith demanded it − as this is the accepted mode of operation of the conventional method, the value of the fetishized commodity for the investment of individual identity. The deal plays with the involvement of choice in as much as choice becomes the pivotal philosophical element. In this regard, we shall say that the deal is a voluntary acquiescence to a particular condition that formulates or structures activity, such that once agreed to, the formulation is or otherwise behaves to be thence forth true, and inescapable in this capacity. For this essay we suggest that in as much as there is or has been a deal, there has been a situation

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discerned in a non-philosophical manner by which the aphilosophical view could not have been chosen. If I have made a choice upon my future within an historical idea of progress, then the philosophical result of that choice will yield only a philosophical idea of any consequence. This idea, then, in as much as there is or has been a real choice to be had and made, is thus identified and determined in and as ideology, the real scheme developed of this, a real institution.

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There is no deal, though, to be made with an institution. The deal arises out of conventional faith, out of the possibility that might be beyond faith, beyond what is real, because what is real evokes the dichotomy between subject and object. Of the One, faith is not seen as operative but instead only reality is known as true in potential of the One. Here, the person, the human being, exists in a natural potential that concerns True Objects; on one hand, the true physical things of the universe, and on the other, the true things of spiritual and or psychic or mental knowing. The confusion of thought in this arena thus contains a potential to encounter that which is the effector of faith, the suture itself, which is at once an actual transcendent, the True aspect of its identifying term, the object by which the term is come by, regardless of what that object may be. Within this arena of decision, a deal is made, a pact, or even a covenant. The authors indicted here are involved in an assertion over the failure of communication, as this is the imperative of the deal: Communicate by any means.

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The deferring of truth to any institution develops the idea of reality as an attainable, knowable one thing, the oneness that is the true reality, even if this one piece of knowledge is that the oneness cannot be known – that this one reality is known as

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not a knowable one thing. Most often, despite best efforts, any member of the institution, an individual invested in identity, will yield results that argue the institution. The question that must be asked of any result is what prompted the investigation. In the case of philosophy, one usually likes to think and ponder about things, is prone to asking probing unconventional questions, is interested in thought and thoughts, and thoughts of thoughts; when they go into life, they are often not so much interested in truth as they are in their own person, their own interests as these might be converted for identity; this is to say, if they were interested in finding truth then it was an interest that did not surmount their interest founded in identity. They study things and thus find more things and things of things, philosophy and critical theory and such, ideas, people, history. So it is that philosophy must be distinguished, for the polemics it reveals hence must be mitigated, denied, for the sake of identity, for the sake of the individual finding the truth and likewise supporting itself within the presented reality; which is, correctly now, capitalism; we cannot have a member of the institution revealing and discrediting the institution. All those who are rewarded by the institution ( the incessant ‘they’, the philosophical ‘straw man’, but reinstated for its negating effect), whether it be the reward of punishment called oppression and repression, or the reward of success, the reward of justified power, often called authorial authenticity, must argue its veracity; this is the imperative of conventional faith for maintaining the practicality of what would be otherwise pure: When it is found out, again, we call it correlationalism, but then we follow the meaning laid out in this essay, for we have located a one. In this anti-correlational endeavor, though, they just might ponder the question of truth, but truth is not and has not been their concern, and so truth is not found, only problematized into a reflexive definition of problem, and by this problem they have succeeded in parleying their idea into

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identity; through an effective denial of the lack involved with identity, an object is created, as well manifested toward its justification, its establishment, it's institutionalization, what is typically known as a proposal for real solution, and or a real proposal. The truth in this manner is thus converted into real method, because the impetus of their effort is identity and not truth, but only truth in identity. They thus find only method because they are invested in method; in fact, instead of investigating the grounds of the deal, they delay and distance themselves from it by arguing what elements might appear around the terms of the deal – which are invested of a deceptive power, of mistake, such that argument can be said to be toward an object that is thereby always initially avoided, but proposed teleologically and ontologically sound, but at that, by faith their findings, so invested of the institution, commandeers what could be extra-institutional findings such that they are absolutely incapable and foreign to the question of truth, and only privy to what may be real. So it is thus, by this formula, that we can begin to address the logistics of how philosophers have indeed been able to consider and make proposals of truth; and this is to say, we can begin an exegesis concerning the individual of conventional faith.

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For now, see that this is not a picture to discredit, but merely a laying out of facts. Concordantly, truth is not some sort of subjectivity, some sort of intuition. We are not setting in the conventional arena of the one reality, where there is a multiplicity of belief, experience and physiological possibility that go into a unique individual among many, discussing their various perspectives, perceptions and interpretations, and needing to be discerned, classified and governed. Indeed, as to what is real, we cannot escape its gravity, but at the same time, in mind of such a force, we can speak of the truth of things

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that are beyond a gravitational possibility without calling into question the fact of gravity as a real effect.

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Identity is not a ubiquity, an omniscience; it is an ideological state, a mandate, a justifying construct, that which is the coercive aspect of a deal. Identity holds and implements power, but not of its own, rather the power of the institution in which it is invested. Within reality, identity, as a ubiquitous relational phenomenon, occurs through an initial investment that is capitalized upon with further investment. Identity, as a universal operation, though, occurs independently, as an object in itself. The contradiction as contradiction yields the first true object that exists outside of faithful intuition, and thus marks the terms of the deal as an oriented identity. Where faith does not guide choice, identity does not reduce to discursive relations, rather, does not involve a total economy of a sort of global interaction or informational exchange because such an economy is real and thus always misses what is true for the sake of marketable and negotiable identities; the deal thus rests in the potential that the investment holds for real interest.

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So to suggest that there is a truth independent of real objective identity is to call upon the non-philosophical as not method, which is to say, aphilosophy. It is to invoke the meaning of non-philosophy aside from its suggestion that it is and provides a methodological path not only to its meaning, a proper conceptual frame, but to some sort of living a proper life. Here, though, we have not succeeded because no investment was made. This is the only way that the method can be viewed: The first object must arise outside of reality, aphilosophically; where a method exists to arrive there, the deal is presented in

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the situation of two parties, for a choice to be made – but in this case, in the last instance, a choice that is no choice.

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The Aphilosophical Case.

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From the standpoint of reality, a critique of non-philosophy may stem from a type of jealousy, but a non-philosophical one if any, since it is non-philosophy that further confirms the point of contention is indeed being addressed in a manner suitable to its real difference; transcendental privilege is not allowed. Yet, it is actually more a debt of gratitude that an occasion specific to the issue has been presented outright, in its positive form. Good critique and rebuttal can only originate from such a jealous position toward (if such a position can be said to be soluble) non-philosophy, because jealousy is a type or indication of anxiety, which marks a significant approach; otherwise we are still involved with a deception. So in a sense it is no jealousy; rather it is exactly the hint or impetus of simpatico non-philosophical exchange, an exchange that I would say is exactly philosophical as opposed to methodological. In some way, Francois Laruelle spent all this time to see if and how strangers might really get along.

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The non-philosophical situation can be broken down in the following manner.

One might see non-philosophy as a non-method, which is to say, as its occasion of the last instance over its presentational method, it’s passive rather than active situation in its active rather than passive mode, forecloses debate by its very nature. It is a description that concerns the appropriation of discourse. At every challenge, every accusation of intention is absorbed; it is an eternal 'yes': Yes, it is true that it is; yes, it is not true that it is; yes, it is true that is it not; yes, it is not true that it is not – agreeing with every statement that can be formed concerning its foundation while equally comfortable in its incessant 'no': there is no phenomenal intention – all query centered around its fundamental problematic: Is non-philosophy philosophy? The answer of which answers the philosophical reduction: What is philosophy? What problems are posed and solved with philosophy? In fact, to argue with the points of non-philosophy tends to validate and verify the maximum inclusionality of its axiomatic structure which discerns itself from (conventional) philosophic methodological scission. What this means is, if one has understood before the presentation of non-philosophy such that non-philosophy has become the coincidence of knowledge known and knowledge presented, then non-philosophy is exactly the occasion to speak, this discourse being of nothing that arises outside of the immanence that Laruelle calls radical. What I would say, then, is that only an aphilosophical rebuttal is relevant because only such speaking can involve the talk about the philosophical object of conventional methodology while remaining viable non-philosophically. And this is to say that there is no comment to be

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made, no link that can negate its move that does not at once contain the original premise as step from it. Only when the step, the link, accounts for the premise within its stepping, as its stepping indeed reflects the premise in its entirety, and yet by this step critiques or rebuts the premise, can a step be made. Such a move is serial, not propositional. Thus, in so much as non-philosophy may be methodological, such is aphilosophy a step from non-philosophy, the mark of atemporality in history, the absolute 'no' of the axiomatic 'yes'.

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This movement may seem ridiculous to some, but only to those who do not understand (stand under) the premise, since the apprehension of the series, that which falls within or is otherwise characteristic of or qualified by scission from the particularity of the conventional de-cision, is actually absurd. I shall explain.

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Non-Philosophy addresses the philosophical method of dividing or splitting issues (universal objects) into polemical aspects thereby to gain what may be true of the issue. In this way any particular issue arrives through a previous decision, that issue that is posed as no longer an issue, whereby the truth of the matter is represented by particular argumentative moves. For example, one may wish to speak about the universe, but the universe has already been problematized by the philosophical method such that one is never sure of what such a universe may be; a decision has already been established that concerns the correct avenue or route for the truth of the matter. Often this method is associated with doubt, but even such doubting is highly problematized to the point that philosophy itself arises as a certainty of problem, this hailed in the nobility of its method toward a real solution. Laruelle works on specific exemplary

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issues to show just how a particular ethical-discursive horizon establishes the true philosophical universe. This method of splitting, scission, and then resolving, de-cision, is thus a methodological axiom, that is recouped as method for itself, such that it's ways argue itself: The decisional structure of the philosophical universe. Non-philosophy takes philosophy as its issue, as its object, and thereby can make claims about the apparent ubiquity of its route unto itself by presenting a universe that is not decisional, which is to say, is established upon a basic and fundamental scission that is not recouped by the philosophical method of splitting and resolving objects, a universe that requires no decision to be made because it indeed is already made.

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He thus proposes a unilateral duality whereby non-philosophy can be proven to logically include philosophy; philosophy, by its method, that excludes the possibility that any other reality may exist – multiuniverses and alternate realities only confirm that reality informs what may be real – thus must be immanent to itself, it's decisional structure accommodating only for that reality which it can discern through its decision. Transcendence and immanence are called into play here because by philosophical rights, non-philosophy should be proposing itself as some sort of transcendent possibility to what the (philosophical) universe rightly is, and thus non-philosophy becomes merely another (immanently) philosophical argumentative approach. Hence Laruelle and others propose a radical immanence that includes transcendence as an operational mode but that does not exclude its immanent possibility through the decision. This is why we refer to the 'radical non-philosophical agent', a term that I believe is not used by Laruelle himself.

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The Discursive Principle discussed earlier thereby exists in meaning as a segue to understanding a 'whole' through essential difference; which is to say difference not recouped in the liberal application of what it means to be different: In line with Alain Badiou, a content that is not contained in the ethical ideal of difference, but rather a difference that allows even for the ideal that difference is not to be, and or cannot be, abided.

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Laruelle also describes how in philosophy being an object, it supplies the only route to the uncovering of its decisional structure, but that discourse itself must be used carefully in order to explicate and uncover its methodological redundancy. The non-philosophical situation should thereby be beyond its philosophical bearings and since then there is no decision by which to split aspects of reality, the philosophical reading will necessarily amount to and supply an incorrect meaning to the discourse at hand.

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Hence, the aphilosophical route will play.

The issue is the term; I develop the term, the issue, and this reveals the point of contention as the issue of the term as differend, the term being the site of contention, the marker of difference. I begin the count; existence and reality are operational bases. In so much as Laruelle is merely using the terms of conventional method to reveal his experience, and due to the fact of describing the process of his experience, non-philosophy appears as method. His text may be telling about the manner by which one may come about the object(-ive) supposed of the method, but he is actually justifying his own experience to himself as a distanced object, what is debated

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historically concerning the dialectic, the sign, signified, and signifier. The point of contention can be said to be located exactly between the experience and the reporting of the experience as a rationale that includes the potential of all humanity; Laruelle proposes to close this series and may appear to have done so when the methodological assertion is sublated in the (non-philosophical) experience itself. In mind of this dyadic closure, he thus proposes to be able to explain how one might reach the dialectical departure, the point of the break, which is the philosophical revolution. Yet what actually occurs is much more insidious: While subsequently (posterior) he can only speak sufficiently from his orientation and then watch as what has essentially arisen from the unilateral dual condition is presented and then commandeered by convention (reality), nevertheless, initially he speaks to the point of contention in its necessary condition (existence). He can only hope for more. Such is the case of the one who understands before understanding as it should be understood by the one who understands through the method of learning but likewise includes the one who already understands as this situation reiterates it. Similarly, as mentioned earlier, the difficulty in speaking of the situation of rebuttal is that it appears to implicate privilege, but it is actually a move of inclusion, explanation and acceptance, as opposed to proof through exclusion, justification and denial. Hence, when the rebuttal speaks, it is the rebuttal of the one who understands before learning, but through experience. But alas; if I do not already understand, it is only because I am oriented in the re-presentation of myself, as I might learn of my self through a method that was at some point initially presented to me but I ignored it, forgot about it, or plain denied it.

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Such an aphilosophical rebuttal can only be a second critique; the first critique is always to come. The non-philosophical method is the presentation 'in the last', as the 'instance' of the conventional religious-ideological 'utopia', of the 'Future Christ', of the 'Man in man', the 'Son of Man', returned in the 'end of philosophy' as represented within the progress of conventional reality. Rebuttal and critique must necessarily rebuke such progress and recede, or else non-philosophy suffers in becoming necessary not unto itself, but sufficient to conventional faith, which is, in the last, a revocation of non-philosophy as a radical enterprise; that is, unless what is radical is itself an historical convention. For non-philosophy to be solute as 'Real' (in its most non-philosophical situation), there can be no option; hope must be run-out. As Slavoj Zizek has said somewhere (I paraphrase and summarize): Only on the precipice do things change; there is no decision that brings change. We do not choose to have a revolution; revolution comes as a matter of course, when there is no choice. Only when there is no other option beyond necessity do things change. The representation of non-philosophy as method, as a proposal for the future, even if that future is 'foreclosed' to or by some 'vision-in-one', leaves open the option for conventional recourse, which is exactly the current problematic of conventional reality, its assertion of its total (true object) truth. The solution is thus not method, but absorption into the fact of motive history.

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We are no longer concerned with what is the same, in the sense of Hiedegger's Dasien; Oneness is always used for conventional power. Non-philosophy iterates the same solute in difference, in contrast to the conventional solution that wants to find difference through the same; but this distinction is nearly negligible and the confusion offered by the ambiguity beckons

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the conventional default. Non-philosophy's meaning rides the line, so to speak, of presentation and conventional representation. This does not mean that we are done with these, or this, though, as the case may be. So long as there is an option, we will have discussion and argument as an indictment of what is true. Just as this essay will present an opportunity to be misread in its representation, history indicative of a progression towards the truth finds its effort in a method of discarding of contradiction. In conventional argument, the presentation of the case exhibits what is wrong and a proposal of solution; this method is based in the option of sameness. Therefore, for our argument here we are not indicating what is incorrect as to then set up what might be then a correct formulation; rather we are merely describing the situation and how historically this situation is reduced to a one particular truth. This is also what we may call the philosophical decision; at some point before we were concerned with reconciliation, of a more proper reality aligned with truth, but neither the conventional sensibility nor the assertion could achieve it. Hence the decision was made moot such that it was no longer a substantial informing aspect but merely evidence of a kind of power. In fact, it is the blind spot involved with the decision that has revealed the decision as the culprit, the reason why the conventional method for truth remains rooted in the effort of the same, as well as the effort of difference: One had to make a choice. It is the offense that comes with the decision that the truth of its method yields only more method; conventionally speaking, the method cannot have a counterpart for the method is of oneness. What would be its counterpart can no longer merely suggest or argue its veracity, for the condition of that veracity is marked by convention; instead we must speak as the revolution has already occurred. It is no longer necessary to attempt to convince. Where there is choice, the choice, a representation of division, is deferred to the common humanity of a one reality, de-cision. That which is of

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the exception is routinely injected into reality, so we are always addressing what is the same in potential. Here then, we are thus not concerned with what is the same, but neither are we done with it because we are not involved with what options we may have, for we have found that where choice is involved with what is proposed to be of the same, we have the basis for no communication, or rather, a restitution of difference as being the same: The achievement of the failure of the same is the confidence of deference; the same, though, is not discarded upon the progress of decisive choice, but rather is retained within the presence of difference. This is what non-philosophy presents in the meaning that defies conventional method, yet shows as of such method. Non-philosophy marks an historical epoche, a moment that can only occur in the facticity of history, as an historical motion, and, it is by this epoche that an essential divergence in the meaning of the discourse of reality is marked.

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Non-philosophy is the Western Greek-traditional reconciliation that can be able to find that by which Eastern philosophies addresses distinction. But see that we do not suggest that the Eastern philosophies are more true, merely that history withdraws at this point when we see the Eastern reconciliation as having been subjected to the same attempt and conventional usurpation. Still, we thereby might understand from where the current Realist efforts stem: They stem from a coming upon world as new world. Yet as well, in much the same way as non-philosophy presents and conventional method commandeers the manner of coming to terms with non-philosophy, what is different is always recouped into the same conventional reality; what is true always warped into the conventional purpose of oneness; which is to say, un-admitting of a non-agency, so to speak, where history is the causal formation of agents of transcendence behaving in a medium of

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freely available real option. So also we can begin to understand how ideology is now a religious position, since the productions of a soul or spirit have now been flattened to such an extent of large acceptance (God is love; all religions are reflections of the One God), any assertion of belief merely another clausal position of ethical negotiation. We just have left to tame the left over zealots. Due to this fact, we need no longer concern ourselves with the conventional mistake, for it involves itself, yet, methodologically, in faith. We need now only to distinguish philosophy from conventional methodology.

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The significance lay in the appropriation of rhetoric. What I write should (it seems)only be that which is presented to the subject (the point of the endeavor; the subjunctive; the non-philosophical 'Ego'), but not re-presented for the subject-object (the purpose; that which is spoken to, the indicative; the individual; Laruelle's 'philosophical subject') necessarily. Where I am speaking, to the subject, non-Ego, or non-philosophical vision-in-one, I am then at once heard as originating from 'nowhere' but exactly in the occasion of reading arising in knowledge already known, a confirmation of experience in the experience. If such a manner of appropriation can be learned through a banking type education, then the meaning of such a non-philosophy exists beyond a fantasy, over a fabrication of discourse, for the content would then be present in two states. Hence, non-philosophy announces the aphilosophical approach, as well as falls back into its conventional security, and reneges with a Non-Standard Philosophy,which is exactly non-philosophy in the act of the methodological negation of its own proposal.

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Reiteration.

90.

We may encounter such a reading in the aphilosophical rebuttal to non-philosophy, a critique that only arises ironically in the occasion.

You mentioned 'unilateral duality'. What I am understanding of non-philosophy is the reason why your interaction with me does nothing but confirm that I understood Laruelle at first read, though I may not have used his terms. The axiomatic structure of meaning coincides historically with non-philosophy, but the discursive framing of Non-Philosophical discourse, as opposed to the objective frame of discourse, is merely sufficient to its purpose of verifying the self evidence of its truth; through the conventional method one may indeed come to a certain meaning that instructs the reader to a certain understanding, but what is radical of the proposed (non-philosophical) immanence should be not merely an understanding. The mere sufficiency of method still leaves the meaning gained to that of a distanced object. Obtained through the choice to investigate, the meaning of Non-Philosophy may be a meaning that is thereby, by definition, not radical but still conventional and reactionary; such a meaning gained is radical

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by proxy – which is at all times the best method can gain. If this be the case, then aphilosophy is not what Laruelle terms radical as method, but radical in its radicality – as Laruelle himself has said is the point of Non-Philosophy, but non-philosophy as well: Immanence behaving immanently. Since, using my terms and Laruelle's, you are (as addressor) the occasion for my radical performance of unilateral duality (or however one would put such an idea), you cannot be but that part or expression of myself that I come upon in the Real, but yet exclude in the localization of my strange situation of being one of a democracy of such awarenesses. In that I am not a-part, but am indeed (for all meaning) unilaterlized-in-duality as the expression Man-in-the-last-instance, not only do I appropriate your replies as that which is me unaccounted-for before hand in the apriori, outside the experience, in the 'you', but in the last instance, that which I can only occasion in my performing radically.

91.

If I have somehow not yet been clear; the issue is with Laruelle suggesting non-philosophy is a method. I have come upon no method but that he has written it, and he even says that non-philosophy is a method; the reason I know what Laruelle is saying and means, even as I only encountered him at first through the presentation of his book The Dictionary of Non-Philosophy, is exactly because I used no method: I accounted for his occasion as a matter of course, such that what he has to say is indeed – now that I see how he has situated the point of contention, which is to say, what terms he used – axiomatic within the unilateral duality. That is to say, the terms, the phrases, are presented as axioms, as reflecting a prior (ante-) 'institution' of truth, an idiom of the differend of the terms.

92.

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The problem with method is exactly the denial of this idiom for the proposal of method; non-philosophical radicality is not a proposed method of acting in the world, for the world of method is already problematic. For one, it is not a method, or maybe non-method; it is the method that Laruelle himself did or continues to do. He only learned it by virtue of him doing it, and in that sense, it was a radical method because though he was taking the route that conventional method laid, the route of understanding historical figures and ideas, logic and critical analysis, the end result at any moment along the line was exactly his enterprise, that no one could have dictated upon him, indeed, nor influenced. But to the extent we might say “him” or “his” we have already denied the radical manner by which such performance occurs, for the situation is supposed beyond conventional reckoning. Of course, one could say that all the circumstances of his ‘doing’ went into his doing and cannot be separated out in that way, so then I would say just try and communicate that! And, is not this the whole issue that we are treating? This is the meaning of difference, of radical performativity. His method thereby cannot be based around some learning or developing of some skill that is initially one's person such that a method can lead one to himself or world (but One world??): It is the appropriation (as Laruelle himself has put it) of immanence behaving immanently. The truth laid out as truth in its truth is an axiomatic presentation – and ironic when it is a part of the potential that misses it; i.e. that it would have to be explained. This is the significance of Kierkegaard’s life and work: As we say, 'In practice as performance' is not about a method that can be learned; neither are we suggesting the ridiculousness of a method to learn how to be Laruelle’s subjective person, or something like that, however one would say that. Rather, it is about a series of verification, that a particular experience is not of an individual’s, subjective

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privilege. This is the issue Kierkegaard discusses in his essay concerning “the contemporary”.

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This 'radical' version is why we can say that Laruelle appears in bad faith: Because he is merely stating the facts of his experience, the facts as the experience itself, the experience of viewing the experience, the reason gained thereof and disseminated into a logical scheme – yet it is evident, at least, by his apparent proposal of a sort of "one day..." or "this is actually the correct way..." – within a guise as if the method might be learned, as if everyone should learn it. If this is indeed what has occurred or can occur then the non-philosophical proposal has no fidelity to its meaning. If he indeed is involved with a proposal of this sort then it is likely due to himself having come upon such an understanding through learning by being taught (the banking model of education), seeing his experience as due to the learning of things he did not somehow possess. Yet if such a project is a learnable skill then it completely defies that his situating of Real is actually (big T) True, largely because the majority of people could not care less, but more significantly, because then the method reveals that he is involved in a division of labor where radical is merely another idea, a project of advocating or asserting a particular way of understanding reality that is best, in particular and specifically, that what he has developed is merely a discursive structure – however inspired or intuited − contrived upon a particular method, and that thus the meaning means nothing that we could call philosophically sincere – unless the very nature of philosophical sincerity is found in the repeating of methodological propriety. One can only wonder if by this model the academy is not a religious institution because he is then projecting the experience he gained through the banking model as well as the meaning of that experience, as it was indeed gained upon the

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cumulative and combined knowledge of the academic institution, upon the world as if the world should harken unto him as a voice of the academy, or might I say, religious institution. This is to say if Laruelle is indeed promoting a type of skill, a type of applied understanding, then it is because either he himself came to an understanding through this very method, or he is not understanding what he himself wrote, or both. It is then this type of contradiction that should then bring an aphilosophical move; but this is further the significance of Laruelle's notice (concern) that non-philosophy will fall prey to the tendency to be made into another philosophical object: The meaning of non-philosophy defies its completion in a conventional method, and this would be because his project is exactly thus involved with a transcending element, as Lyotard may have put it, an unrecognized and unaccounted-for differend, a presentation of a presentation, but put off into an unknown a posteriori event, that of direct experience of the world and its "in-itself" True Object: A re-presentation that denies what may be radical by Laruelle's terming, unless Laruelle indeed feels that he has been inspired by some transcendental agency, but an agency that no longer implies a segregation in knowing. Yet by advocating a method, Laruelle is exactly promoting such a segregated arena, and a reckoning, a transformative return in so much as and by virtue of his denial that any such return cannot come in the decisive world, or that it eternally does. A possible answer or solution to this paradoxical situation is that Laruelle himself, the one premiere advocate of non-philosophy, has not actually been able to complete the motion he prescribes thus he must include a disclaimer in the last as a ‘non-standard’ route, because it is the last disclaimer that can be made this side of the aphilosophical divergence. Indeed, Christ says "I am the door ... the way, the life...the truth".

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94.

Hence, the aphilosophical rebuttal is ironic: Only in as much as he can prescribe a method does his project-as-method have any credence, because such a radical method evidences a foundation in conventional history as such that it becomes just as good or bad as any other proposed method. Yet if non-philosophy is subject to the opinion of conventional comparison, if it stands on the historical structure of an actual temporal and true objective history, a segregate and distanced object, an actual philosophical tradition with which it breaks only to return to it then it is hardly a radical enterprise and has exceeded (overdetermines) itself for its concern – except if we can see the potential of radicality as the conventional reconciliation of essential polemics, which is the exposure of the post-post-modern gambit of revolution posited through methodological application.

95.

Also, when we see that the method of which he speaks concerns the performance that is the discourse itself then no one except the one who already performs radically within or of the unilateral duality understands it – and that the one who does needs no method for they used no method in the conventional sense. Instead, non-philosophy becomes the occasion that verifies that the axiomatic situation for Laruelle is Real. For him the case is Real, for he is situating discourse in the only manner that conveys a solute meaning, the solution. Due to this fact we should see that the true issue is not therefore some Grand Reality, but discourse itself and how it is appropriated; not whether that what he is saying is true of false – it is true – and not about some quality or ability to be true. The truth itself therefore shows that our issue is one of how discourse is

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situated, how the terms are laid and presented, then as well, how one is appropriating for what meaning is gained, which is to say, one’s orientation upon the ontological basis of the presented term. Because Laruelle has no recourse to orientation, he is hedging his bets by sticking close to philosophy as his object, riding the fence, so to speak, so he can thereby disclaim his proposal if need but without losing theoretical face. The furthest he can see, here, is the meaning of "in-the-last-instance": The proposed radical enclosure whereby what is Real may mean all that may be. The conventional methodological reduction reveals a contradiction that becomes the point where an irresolvable contention appears. Once this point is breached, then phenomenal appearance loses its potential for ubiquity.

96.

Now the question becomes about this breach; this is the philosophical revolution. Specifically: What is traversing the gap? Or more properly in the context of his essay: Is there a bringing of the truth into reality? The same founding question of Kierkegaard; “Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical”. In looking at Laruelle, while the answer is ‘there is no bringing’, in as much as he may be oriented toward the True Object indicated of a ‘Real’, he is involved in the description of the situation of there no available traversing route, yet by this description, the contradictory stance this effort evidences, he is thus advocating a leaving of the conventional route for the possibility of a reality that is somehow ‘more’ real, i.e. Real. Further, in as much as this Real implies a total Truth in correspondence with a real truth that can never be known, a condition of Truth, what could be understood as ‘other’ agents, he thereby suggests a setting wherein interaction is highly conditional, a ‘democracy of strangers’.

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97.

The irony continues, incessantly. So it is that we have the point of contention exhibited through another discursive situation. This is the notice of divergence, the watershed mentioned earlier. The phenomenal agent exists within a particular ontological horizon that is evidenced by discourse; discourse is the evidence and tool of reality. The phenomenal method taken to its ends yields contradiction, and the contradiction indicates the route that is to be taken for a proper understanding of the true reality. The Post-Modern is still Modern, and what we are calling the post Post-Modern is another reinstatement of this route, it's method. Laruelle’s Non-Philosophical proposal is made within this route. The proposal, for any other terms, is that a person may have a revolution in their understanding of reality. While this may be true, his proposal thereby becomes no more interesting than any other proposal of transformation, be it social, intellectual, spiritual or religious. This is to say while it may be important, it is no more important than any other, as it might be weighed in the court of reality. This can only be the case if the philosophical revolution has already occurred.

98.

In stark contrast to this case, interestingly enough, aphilosophically, we don't go so far as to propose a total inclusion and instead speak about what may belong. If we are staying with the phenomena as an experience of knowing that occurs at the end of discourse, in the last instance, we cannot say it is Real, except using Laruelle's conventional definition; we must say it is not real but true, for reality cannot be any more than it is, which is to say that reality is exactly the arena in which the decision takes place: Only by virtue of the speculative world can there be a more or less real, as it grants the arena by

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which to make practical decisions. To take non-philosophy as some sort of practical method of living a true or otherwise ethically correct life is based in utter fantasy, for the description (above) of what such a radically activated life may be never occurs except in the same fashion as one upholds a creed; or better: Except as one is religiously motivated to conform to a set of ethical principles: True Objects – which is then often quickly followed by an assertion of the proper ethical behavior. If this is indeed the true case, then we have gotten nowhere and should then go back to the beginning of this essay, for something has been missed. The difference between non and aphilosophy is that the former may be involved with some sort of progress occurring in history; yet, the assertion and or apprehension of method (if Laruelle in fact is promoting a conventional method) reveals ignorance, a 'misplaced' faith, and is the pivotal reason whereby he may equate a type of gnostic knowledge with the 'everyday' people, the masses: Because they have no problem with situating reality through all sorts of problematic ideals, such as the link of progress that includes faith. So, consistent with this strange situation where all of what may be real is not proclaimed upon, we maintain that no such 'awakening' ever comes at the end-beginning of some methodological progress, and that any such awakening that occurs happens only within faith, which is to say, in reality by the transcendental clause. It is only in-the-last-instance that never occurs, but only occurs as one is already-situated. If Laruelle can take this situation and transform it into a true object of some progressed humanity, then he is truly a magician as well as philosopher; we might then also call him a prophet.

• • •

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99.

To reiterate; the fact that I may need not Laruelle’s Non-Philosophical method to know what he means before I read more than a smidgen and that I may have objections to his conclusions (not his premises), reveals either that I (too?) am ignorant, or that he is incorrect. Better: He is in bad faith, but due to the misappropriation of his meaning. The fact is, is that there is nothing he says that does not verify to me the truth of the matter, as well as his truth, that what he is saying is true. The fact that I can account for all of his proposal and not agree with his conclusion of method, reveals that his method-as-progress fails, or has-already-failed because it needed no method. Indeed, to explain how I understand him through a further explication of his terms and ideas would place the situation back into the decisional contradiction that Laruelle cannot escape. The divergence is thus evidenced by this essay: We have already left, already on our way. The explication already fails in its consummation as true instead of Real because if it excludes one person it then becomes merely another proposition rather than an example of a truly radical enterprise; hence Non-Philosophy becomes an example of an aphilosophical proposition, but a proposition in the last philosophical position, which is a manner of saying that it announces a certain divergence. The revolution is missed as it has now already occurred, but indeed is occurring. The only way one might prove that indeed non-philosophy is somehow activated in method is to not merely reiterate but indeed repeat the exact structural-definitional real representation. Inevitably, those who will suggest they are working non-philosophically do so within an argumentative suspension because if investigated and prodded they would inevitably have to do away with the paraphrasing of Laruelle's form, the appropriating of his jargon to new Real 'non-philosophical' conventions, and eventually give the Non-

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Philosophical phrasing of the texts themselves. So by method, where non-philosophy hesitates and balks, does aphilosophy become the completion of radical as radical instead of radical as some learned and applied definition of reality as a configuration of objects. Here the explanation that arises as authority: Non-philosophy is the occasion which verifies that the point of contention is indeed being addressed through its necessary difference. In so much as we might speak of experience, we then can invoke the significant event as true and end our doubt, finally.

100.

Further, his project cannot be a personal subjective truth, and it cannot decide that others 'do not understand' and so must be taught; his presentation appears, as I (the addressee) am involved not in a method but radical immanence itself, as a consideration of an 'over-viewer': not Real, but exactly of reality as I cannot but situate it, a vision that takes place due to the one being that place where visions may occur, though the vision is not of the oneness. Likewise it cannot be of some innate human capacity or ability; that is, unless the project is a conventional program, for then again we have stepped onto the platform of Real prophet, like some god-man guru who can bring lowly pedestrians up into the light of true, Real, Being (or non-Being, as the non-philosophical case may or may not be). Thus his method activated, as it might, conventionally is through what Aristotle sees as 'poetry', or, so far as a poetics of difference, it can only be achieved conventionally. This having been said, the method-that-is-not-taught-or-teachable is discernible by those who already practice it, and non-philosophy is thereby a verification for – not the individual subject-object, the conventional agent – rather, what we might call, the true subject, that which we are discussing, the issue, the point of contention. The intact phenomena of the solute concept.

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101.

We need not fall back into looking for the correspondents in the letter; the addressor and addressee call forth the referent and defy conventional sense. This operation is that of the differend, of the third possible witness in occasioning the conventional conversation; we need look nowhere else. The Event, in this case, is a significant event, but the Significant Event, that occasion first come upon as an occasion, and not the perpetuated tallying move toward the conventional True Object of faith.

102.

Hence we have the first problem before us. We find it in the effort of Laruelle presenting non-philosophy in the least offensive way possible: As method. This conventional effort towards inclusion reveals a self-centered philosophy to a 'Real' experience, he thus may move in historical practice: He merely repeats the motion of all conventional religious ideologies, summed up by the phrase: "If only everyone could or would...and should!." But the fact is revealed existentially that types of knowledge cannot bring an inclusion that defies such diversion and difference: The category is true. Though Laruelle would have it be radically relatable, it's relation annihilated beckons for a Real rebirth, a revolutionary radical transformation, but one that merely rejoins conventionally. His rejoining, at length, evidenced by his rephrasing his project to "non-standard philosophy", could be because he had received no objective (from a distance) confirmation that his proposal had been understood in its truth. This then, the message that arrives without a messenger, is an ironic, and only partially non-philosophical, enterprise; not a mis-reading of Laruelle, not a Real conventional appropriation of some eternally happening present truth, but a necessary aphilosophical extension.

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End.

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AFTERWORD: Object Orientation.

103.

The issue this essay treats can be said to address what has occurred concerning what I have termed ‘orientation upon objects’. The obvious similarity to Graham Harman’s ‘Object Oriented Ontology’ cannot be missed. It seems then we have the oddity that prompts my essays that fall under the title The Philosophical Hack.

104.

It will appear that I am back pedaling, attempting to gain a sort of credential that has already been given to Professor Harman and the authors of Speculative Realism note (or infamy, as the case may be). Perhaps, but this is also the issue I treat; I cannot in good faith deny the real facts of existence. It would be a most ridiculous thing to come out in 2015 (or my blog prior) and demand that I was somehow or in some way the first or one of the first to see things in this way. Useless and ridiculous. The fact of the matter is that at a certain time a number of people began to see things in this way, myself included, and, that at a certain time I began to hear rumors of these authors and when I encountered their texts, echoes of what I already knew, first

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Laruelle, then Badiou, then Harman, Meillassoux, and others. It can be no miracle of unlearning that Badiou’s Being and Event, read to me like a high school book; but of course many will say that I thereby indeed did not understand him. So be it. I will, at some point, put out a description of the path that Badiou took in that book.

105.

A question is then: How can this be so? But aggravating to the ready-made answer is that somehow I was come upon by this view without having been privy to any contemporary philosophical discourses whatsoever. At most, for the time and the view, I had but a preliminary knowledge of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard barely in the year 2004 when I returned to school; I did so for the sole purpose of finding out just where modern academia was and what it had to say; I was not really looking for a career (but it would have been nice). Before that I had read a small bit of Sartre and keyed into the ‘Bad Faith’ idea of his, as well the relations of referential time, but other than that, his Zen type philosophizing did very little for me; I found what tiny bit of Heidegger I did read nearly unreadable, and for all purposes, completely nonsensical. Further, even in my anthropological and philosophical studies, I had not heard anything of any sort from what might be current philosophical veins. In fact, most of what I gained at university could be categorized under the problematizing of anthropological participant observation; I will admit, though, that perhaps there was some seeds there. Even in my philosophy classes I learned only about the historical figures, mainly the undergrad learning of the Existentialists, Dostoyevsky, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Camus, de Beauvoir,and Sartre, but I took classes where Feuerbach and Wittgenstein came up. I understood and or retained very little from all that; I was very intoxicated most of my college time. I did ok in my classes but the problem I was attempting to deal with, even

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then, was not readily apparent in the undergraduate syllabus; I even remember asking one of my professors about the issue I was obsessed with, for Existentialism seemed like it had something to do with it (I had signed up for the class, after all), but she had nothing to say to me of any consequence, and actually gave me a look like my questions were, well, kind of insane. There was no way, beyond some very useless type of ontological philosophizing, not even through some trickle-along dissemination of ideas through society and the people I interacted with, that I gained such a view through some kind of human economical osmosis. I was quite self absorbed, watched little news, and had no one who would or even could engage with me intellectually even if I wanted them to; I was adrift in a sea of people who really didn’t want to think critically about anything beyond the conventionally regular intellectual tropes of academian life, fun, work, money, intoxication and the like, that might gain a cool identity or even a job at some point.

106.

The ideal behind who is noted for what is also the issue. We cannot in good faith reduce everything to the occurrences of contingent circumstance; we would hardly be thinking critically if we did. There is no ‘luck’ or ‘providence’ that favors an individual over another; at least in this case. The point here is that there was nothing of any type of learning that I did not have or was not privy to, that Professor Harman had or was privy to, that allowed for him to come up with his ideas, the basis of which he frames as Object Oriented Ontology. All one can say is that Harman had more access to objectival references by which to talk about and put forward his ideas; but that’s not all. It is most proper that the Object be presented first as the philosophical motion always should recede; the first is always a motion of ideological progress. Nevertheless, there was no educational learning that allowed him to come to his idea; O.O.O.

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was already there in history, it needed a vehicle, a platform through which to be expressed; orientation upon objects is a necessary precipitative meaning in historical philosophical context, and Harman just saw the conventional half of it. This is also part of the issue.

107.

The significance here, of our coincidence, is that the ideas put forth by previous authors are not novel ideas, rather, they are discursive variations of the same idea, such that over a span of discursive space, symbolic emanations of various authors fill out universal ‘place-holders’ of meaning, outline, color in, occupy and or otherwise inscribe an object into being, but at that, within a particular ontological horizon, such that a ‘teleo-ontology’ remains effective as World until the object being inscribed ‘fills out’ the object that is World itself. This all occurs in meaning, not necessarily involved with any actual True objectival thing, as a thing may be; the issue of a True thing is moot, but Harman is involved in a way to speak about True Objects. We speak instead of effects. The effective World is a world that has not been revealed to its basis in meaning only.

108.

Conventionally speaking, the Speculative and Realist move(s) came out of the sheer boredom with what we can call general Phenomenalism. Philosophically speaking, it is the view that sees what is meant as having equivocation to real-true objects, that will come across this saturation of meaning described above as meaning something essential is occurring, like some previously undiscovered True thing or aspect of the universe has been let to our understanding because of our innately innovative and imaginative ability for creativity in thinking, experiment and tool use. Such philosophers are thus oriented upon the True Object. Hence, the significant issue has to

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do with one’s orientation upon objects; not that there is indeed some ‘more-true’ possibility of real objects, but that in so much as one might argue such a case as if it is indeed true they must be oriented upon such True objects.

109.

This is the reason why I say that such philosophers are involved in an effort of bad faith: Because they assume that the revelation indicated by at least Alain Badiou and Francois Laruelle is of an essential case, as indicating a particular vector of argument that avoids contradiction, but it is only the contradiction in as much as indeed the Objects of such clausal reference are True, essential entities. It is thus ironic because this effort that is designated bad faith is, in-itself, as an operation of the universe called ‘human consciousness’ that has reality as its functional arena, actually good faith in so much as it indeed supplies a true reality, an arena by which humans can operate effectively: A viable intrinsic mythology. The functioning of consciousness, the manner that it operates as a universal element or aspect, which is to say by the reductive exclusionary method, due to its universal determination that offers no essential freedom, eventually reduces the universe/World to itself, to itself the free producer of meaning (the subject), and to itself that World of True Objects (the object), in the same moment (this is the non-philosophical); the terms of the universe do not matter, the effect is always the same and occurs in and as time as time is a universal marker of meaning. When the epochal reduction happens a divergence in universal meaning occurs; difference occurs as the One route that has come upon its own contradiction, its own incompletion, bifurcates. Hence we see the reduction of conventional philosophy shows that there are two routes, and not only One route wherein the combination of polar elements reveals the contradiction that then shows which route should be taken to be

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True − it only shows what is really true, or, what is allowed to be counted as real. In this moment after the philosophical revolution, while there may be one reality, there indeed are two true routes.

110.

The other route is then that which destroys as it describes, and this seems quite distasteful for those who are employed in the service of the Great One ideology, for we need begin construct this new – should we say it? – World (Foucault) Order. But in order to bring this about, in order to allow a movement onward, we cannot merely say the body is dead, we must look into it, then we find out why it is dead and the issue is closed and we can move on (maybe). This other route thus does not assert that what is real is not real or based in some kind of illusion, it merely situates itself with reference to what is real by saying that its own route is not real. The (real) evidence is in and has already been considered; this does not mean we merely dig up some more evidence: There is only a finite amount of evidence (do I hear Meillasoux?). What is infinite is located by the faith in the True Object. Thus we are no longer concerned with describing how objects may be True or Real; instead, we merely describe what is occurring. A new teleo-ontology can only arise once the previous universe has died; but in conventional reality, this transference, this conversion, is never witnessed, as reality remains the only route to what is true.

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Notes.The foregoing paper is strictly philosophical; perhaps one could say it is free philosophy in the sense that it is not proposed within an academically rigorous setting. But this in no sense should be taken to mean that the ideas of philosophers were not well considered or not thoroughly researched. In fact, part of the issue behind this series, Philosophical Hack, is that for a very long time I thought that the meaning of various philosophical essays was obvious; it was only after a time that I realized that this was not true. Non-Philosophy and Aphilosophy is the first installment in the series that deals with the apparent break that involves the obscurity of the philosophical endeavor. There is a multitude of literature that addresses the multitude of facets that may accompany philosophical proposals, and the question that guides should always be “why am I investigating”. If there is never a why, then there is always more to investigate; but indeed, if there is a one thing that each philosopher is involved with, then most often we do not find out the why until we have found the answer. But that it is and was always with us. What hundreds of various opinions have to say about a topic, or a phrase or a term, often never find a why, but only a perpetuation of real confusion, nonsense, and nihilism.

The reader may have noticed that there are no footnotes, no references in the body of the essay. In intend no slight upon any authors. Rather, I would first admit that it’s all been said before. Yet somehow I also cannot properly say that I got any of my ideas from other authors; I would say that the benefit from them is the particularly good way of analogizing things about the issue that I also address, and not so much that they said it and I had an awakening to some new idea so I used it; I do not know

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how to crunch or assemble philosophical ideas to pop out or come to a new idea. In fact, this is the issue I treat through the Philosophical Hack, so I will shut up about it for now.

Nevertheless, I do owe my readers some references, and the authors I drew from some gratitude –if only for letting me know its OK. .

If this essay actually gets any attention, perhaps I will be able to annotate more completely with footnotes and all. For now, I hope the essay stands on its own.

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Selected Bibliography.

The following list of books I site as they indicated to me that it was time, and in the essay I reference their ideas specifically. This is not an exhaustive list, but merely a significant one:

Badiou, Alain. “Being and Event”. ©2005 Continuum. Freire, Paulo. “Pedagogy of the Oppressed” ©2007 Continuum. Hegel,Georg. “The Phenomenology of Spirit”.©Oxford University

Press. Kant, Immanuel. “The Critique of Practical Reason”. Published

1788. Ibid. “The Critique of Pure Reason”. Published 1781. Hume, David. “A Treatise of Human Nature”. Published 1776. Kierkegaard, Soren. “The Concept of Irony” ©1989 Howard V.

Hong. Princeton University Press. Ibid. “Fear And Trembling and The Sickness Unto Death”©1941

Princeton University Press. Ibid. “Repetition and Philosophical Crumbs” ©2009 Oxford

University Press. Laruelle, Francois. “Future Christ: A Lesson in Heresy” ©2010

Continuum. Ibid. “Philosophy and Non-Philosophy”. ©2013 Univocal. Ibid. “Principles of Non-Philosophy”. ©2013 Bloomsbury Ibid. “Dictionary of Non-Philosophy” ©1998 Editions Kime.

Translated into English by Taylor Adkins, 2009 Lyotard, Jean-Francois. “The Differend: Phrases in Dispute”.

©1988 Regents of University of Minnesota. Marx, Karl. “Capital” Published 1867. Meillassoux, Quentin. “After Finitude”. ©2008 Continuum. Nietzsche, Friedrich. “Thus Spoke Zarathustra” Published 1885. Sartre, Jean-Paul. “The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre”. Edited

and introduced by Robert Denoon Cumming. ©1965 Random House.

Noted Authors.I cannot in good conscience neglect to also name others that also

inspired me to keep going for this essay about the phenomena involved in encountering texts. The very short list:

Graham Harman. “On Vicarious Causation” Essay from December 2006. His objects don’t fool us.

Slavoj Zizek − Can never be left out; (I could not locate the specific reference site in the essay).

Martin Heidegger. The seminal phenomenologist.

-----…and the great Phenomenalist apologists:

Jacques Derrida Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari